The Never Ending Dance: Islamism, Kemalism and
the Power of Self-institution in Turkey
Chris Houston
Anthropology, Macquarie University
Kemalism in Turkey is often presented as an exemplary case of paternalistic and
authoritarian modernisation from above, and lauded or condemned for that very
reason. Represented in these terms, certain analytic and political binaries are also
activated: state versus society; world-view versus life-world; universality versus
particularity; inauthenticity versus indigeneity; homogeneity versus heterogeneity/
resistance. By contrast, in this paper I seek to sidestep these organising categories
to focus on Kemalism and Islamism as rival forms of the same social imaginary
signification, and not as shorthand for these polarities. Using a number of
representative texts, I argue that the extravagance of Islamist resistance in Turkey
post-1980 brings to light the fantastical power of Kemalism itself, exposed as a
project of the triumph of the will. This being the case, what has been written in
anthropology about acts of 'self-institution'? The work of Nigel Rapport and
Cornelius Castoriadis emphasises, in different ways, the arbitrariness and gratuity
of social creation out of nothing or self-institution. Pierre Bourdieu's work, on the
other hand, is radically contrary to Rapport's in its structuralist elaboration of
agency as guided action. My analysis of processes of change within both the
Islamist and Republican social movements in Turkey from the early 1990s to the
present seeks a temporary rapprochement, at least in this case, between Rapport's
methodological individualism and Bourdieu's methodological holism.
In this paper, I seek to illuminate key processes of change within the Islamist social
movement in Turkey over the last two decades. I will argue that the extravagance of
Islamist politics in Turkey post-1980, characterised by ongoing innovation, gratuitous
invention, florid polemics, rejection or rehabilitation of 'tradition', and radical breaks with
political positions strenuously defended only a few years before, diagnoses or brings to
light the fantastical power of Kemalism, exposed as a politics inspired by a doctrine of the
triumph of the will. In other words, and following Abu-Lughod's (1990) suggestion that we
read resistance as diagnostic of power, Islamist opposition reveals the power of Kemalism
as originating in its creation of 'self-instituting' individual or collective subjects. Further,
when we reverse this perspective to examine the resistance of Kemalists as diagnostic of
transformed modes of Islamist power in Turkey, the efficacy of Islamism is also seen to
reside in its own processes of self-institution 'out of nothing'.
Interpreting the political history of the Turkish Republic in this way leads us to consider
what variety of anthropological theory might be useful in illuminating its defining
characteristic. Castoriadis' and Rapport's sketching out of what has been described as an
'ontology of creation' (Amason 1999) is particularly suggestive. Kemalism in Turkey is
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often presented as an exemplary case of paternalistic and authoritarian modernisation from
above, and lauded or condemned for that very reason. Represented in these terms, certain
analytic and political binaries are also activated: state versus society; world-view versus
life-world; universality versus particularity; inauthenticity versus indigeneity; homogeneity
versus heterogeneity/resistance. My odd pairing of Rapport and Castoriadis helps me
partially sidestep these organising categories to focus on Kemalism and Islamism as rival
forms of the same social imaginary signification (to use Castoriadian terminology), and not
as shorthand for these polarities. Bourdieu's work is useful in a different way. Not only is
his social theory radically contrary to Rapport's in its structuralist elaboration of agency as
guided action, but it is also worked out in a context (Kabylia) where there is no pronounced
intention on the part of a state to transform social practice.' Yet despite these differences,
Bourdieu's theorising partially supplements what I feel is Rapport's lack of attention to
agents' power to dominate—that is, to the power of people and the things they create (from
institutions to social movements to built environments) to condition the 'transcendent'
individual's unique devising of personal constructs, not to mention their conduct.
In the first theoretical section, and before engaging with the claims of the Islamist
movement (on the part of the governing AKPARTi), I want to show how the ideas of
Rapport and Castoriadis on creation, autonomy and the individual differ from more
'internalist' analyses of domination, as seen in the work of Bourdieu. The second and third
sections build upon this discussion to analyse the conflict in Turkey between Islamists and
Kemalists, as well as to use that interpretation in turn to revisit these earlier theoretical
remarks. My brief notation of differences between Rapport and Castoriadis below mirrors
the particular rhetorical bravado that invests contemporary political life in Turkey.
Three polemical claims
1.
2.
3.
Rapport argues individuals to be self-instituting, whereas for Castoriadis the selfinstituting power is society itself, the 'collective anonymous'. Both theorists deny the
possibility of 'intersubjectivity' in constituting selves or meanings; Rapport on an
individual level (individuals are primarily self-fashioning, rather than crosssubjectively, collaboratively produced); Castoriadis on both an individual and social
level (intersubjective relations, although fabricating individuals, are not the origin of
social-historical creation, whilst societies are self-preserving entities, opposed to the
self-institution of other societies).
What Rapport (2002) calls the randomness of the individual mind, Castoriadis might
call the arbitrariness of the social institution. Neither understands the creations of the
random mind or of the instituting society to be determined by or inversions/transpositions/
transformations etc. of prior structures, nor as explainable by reference to the bricolage of
existing elements.
Rapport denies Castoriadis' implicit understanding of the anthropological project as
built upon and partially illuminating the different and distinct imaginary significations
('webs of significance') of separate societies. For Rapport, a Geertzian stress on
singular cultural systems of meanings, signs or symbols obscures private meaning and
individual creation. By focusing on individual aspects of world making. Rapport also
evades the theoretical problems produced by such visions of cultural apartheid vis-dvis relations with other similarly conceived sealed cultures or civilisations.
These three brief statements on creation, society and the individual open up a particularly
interesting set of issues in relation to the experience and analysis of domination and
resistance. First, what are actors dominated by or resisting if we reject in the name of the
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transcendent individual (Rapport) any encompassing theory of corporate or collective
frameworks of meaning, politicised or otherwise? Bourdieu presents us with the epitome of
such a model: in Masculine Domination, for example, he writes that 'when the thoughts and
perceptions of the dominated are structured in accordance with the very structures of the
relations of domination that is imposed upon them, their acts of cognition are inevitably
acts of recognition, submission' (2001: 13, my emphasis).^ For Bourdieu, this is invariably,
unexceptionally the case. A less systematic concern to ground freedom, resistance and
submission in cultural and relational networks is seen in Abu-Lughod's 'fundamental
premise [that] humans are social beings, always raised in certain social and historical
contexts and belonging to particular communities that shape their desires and
understandings of the world (2002: 786, my emphasis). Forms of resistance here are
culturally provided (i.e. Bedouin oral lyric poetry), and subordinated selves acquire
'oppositional authenticity and agency by drawing on aspects of the dominant culture to
criticise their own world as well as the situation of domination' (Ortner 1995: 190). Less
optimistically, Abu-Lughod (1990) also argues that such resistance primarily reveals
power, being oriented to existing cultural elaborations of the world and more limitedly to
the particular social experiences and modes of domination. Useful mainly as a diagnostic
tool (for the anthropologist), resistance points to political aspects of social relationships.
Second, and in radical contrast, how might we understand resistance and domination if
we reject in the name of the social institution (Castoriadis) even this minimal ability of
subordinated selves to acquire 'oppositional agency' through their drawing on ethical ideals
of the culture to de-legitimise the situation of domination? In his more polemical moments,
Castoriadis would not allow individuals in heteronomous societies even this degree of
social-analytic lucidity. Unlike Rapport, Castoriadis never prises apart individual and
society: as an incarnated fragment of a particular instituted society, individuals have no
scope for imagining themselves as self-constituting other than through their intemalisation
of the imaginary significations created by society. The social institution and the individual
presuppose each other, and the significations of any particular society function through
'organizational, informational [and] cognitive closure' (Castoriadis 1997a: 16). It is only
autonomous societies that fabricate the new anthropological type of autonomous
individuals. Only in autonomous societies does politics translate as a struggle for explicit
self-institution. In these societies, mere interpretation of existing social laws or controversy
over their right application is not at issue. By contrast, it is their altering or replacing of
existing laws through the positing of new laws that constitutes 'resistance', although
resistance is hardly the correct word here. In his less polemical moments however,
Castoriadis does admit a more nuanced possibility for the alterability (or at least, historical
alteration) of heteronomous societies, even by the individual. His discussion of the limits of
the power ofthe instituted society—^what we might call threats to heteronomy—allow for a
potentially less severe dichotomy between traditional/tribal or religious societies and
modernity. The most serious of these threats include time or the future; the capacity of the
psyche to thwart the schooling visited upon it; the crisis of instituted meaning or the
potential a-meaning of the world; the threat of other societies; and most importantly, the
continuing flow ofthe instituting imaginary itself (cf Castoriadis 1991).
Despite an identical claim then that social existence is ontologically characterised by
creation 'out of nothing' (i.e. by self-constitution), Castoriadis' argument that individuals in
societies other than the 'Greco-Western' are incapable of lucidly questioning the
significations that create their world—that is, a claim for their creativity without agency—is
intrinsically opposed to Rapport's delineation of the transcendent individual. This chasm
between them can only be bridged by a universalisation ofthe autonomous subject. In other
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words, their positions can be reconciled only by extending to everyman and to everywoman
what Castoriadis reserves for the particular men and women of autonomous societies.
Obviously, this is what Rapport does, although not in explicit reference to Castoriadis. And
obviously, also, Castoriadis would not agree with this attempt to allow the individual in
general to usurp the instituting power of the social imaginary. For Rapport, the words and
actions of individuals are related to but undetermined by social context, even when subjects
appear to reproduce broader cultural forms or idioms. Far from individuals' lives being
conditioned by their 'socio-cultural environment', subjects' ^acts of cognition' (Bourdieu)
and 'desires and understandings of the world' (Abu-Lughod) are self-selected and
idiosyncratic. Action in essence is de-contextual, anti-relational and non-necessary (nonfunctional). At best, individuals' actions and practices might be elucidated by the
examination of context, historical social relationships and collective cultural orientations,
but these do not explain them. The key aspect of an individual's social action is creation exnihilo. Creation 'out of nothing' then, acts as a counter to the idea of creation out of
something, say creation as 'structured improvisation' bound to a subconscious 'strategygenerating principle' (Bourdieu 1977), or creation as connected to and partially conditioned
by existing cultural elaborations of a world (Abu-Lughod).^
Finally, if we allow this convergence between Rapport's and Castoriadis' discourse on
self-institution (or autonomy), one immediate objection that needs to be addressed—there
are others—is the danger of social and individual solipsism. That is, how is the arbitrary
self-creation of society to be related to political and economic context, to time and place, to
interaction? And on what grounds or through which mechanisms do transcendent or
autonomous individuals, who create themselves in an originary fashion, relate to each
other? Castoriadis' (1997a: 15) notion that society 'leans' upon the 'presocial world' or its
physical environment—but in an 'utterly trivial' way—can be used as an analogy to
conceptualise how gratuitous new institutions of society might be related to the
significations of other societies from which they seem to emerge. The Roman imaginary
institution is re-signified by Christianity by being invested or endowed with a new
meaning, which is not determined by the significations of its previous form. 'The old enters
the new with the signification given it by the new and could not enter it otherwise'
(Castoriadis 1997a: 14). New social-historical forms are creative of a world as well as
irreducible to historical antecedents. For Castoriadis, the theorist/anthropologist can
elucidate the vital relationships, connections and historical transmissions between the social
imaginary significations of different societies, but not account for, explain or predict
change and development. Similarly, individual autonomy can be understood in an
analogous way: minimally, pre-constituted collective symbols and practices (conventions)
are dependent on individuals' choice and vitalisation for their continuing social presence.
More polemically, however. Rapport draws attention to what we might gloss as the semisolipsism of social life: precisely because autonomous and transcendent individuals are the
'origin of what will be and know themselves as such' (Castoriadis 1993: 3),
miscommunication, indirection and lack of mutuality or acceptance are ever-present
outcomes of interaction.
The never ending dance
In the second and third parts of this paper I want to use this abbreviated discussion to
explicate processes of change within the Islamist social movement in Turkey from the early
1990s to the present, the years in which I have, unavoidably intermittently, been following
its development. To do so, I will take up Abu-Lughod's (1990) suggestion to track power
via resistance. In keeping with her Foucauldian inspiration, Abu-Lughod proceeds to
THE NEVER ENDING DANCE
165
analyse new forms of Islamism, at least amongst younger Bedouin in Egypt, as resistant to
and hence diagnostic of both the demands of a Westernised and capitalistic Egyptian state
and of the kin-based authority of elders. Although some analysts of Islamism might claim
Muslim resistance in Turkey is partially revelatory of similar structures of power (Yavuz
2000), I will argue that its key features diagnose much more specifically the power of the
political-cultural project of Kemalism (Republican-Turkism)." Islamist resistanee here
reveals Kemalism's power to be the power of explicit self-institution or unceasing creation
'out of nothing'. Indeed, this form of powerflil Islamist resistance can be systemically
related to, even interpreted as intimately conditioned by, Kemalist society. Furthermore,
contra Rapport's stress on the individual's original experience and construction of the
world, Islamist and Kemalist acts of constant creation indicate that the key imaginary
signification constituting both secularism and Islamism in Turkey is conscious selfinstitution. Self-institution 'out of nothing' then, interpreted in this case as a practice
generated by the social and political world in which subjects are involved, allows us to find
a middle path between Bourdieu's systemic and 'internal' analysis of agency, and the
indomitable understanding of the transcendental individual in Rapport.
I will proceed by analysing a number of eclectic yet not unrepresentative texts—^an
advertisement placed in Time magazine by the Turkish state; a recently published and
lengthy document of the governing 'Islamist' AKPARTi; and a speech in Parliament by the
Chairman of the opposition People's Republican Party (CHP). The most detailed of these is
Muhafazakar Demokrasi {Conservative Democracy), commissioned by the Justice and
Development Party (AKPARTi) with a foreword by Tayyip Erdogan, party chairman and
current Prime Minister of Turkey (Ak Partisi 2004). Following Abu-Lughod, I will read it
relationally, that is primarily as diagnostic of forms of Kemalist power.^ Written by
Erdogan's political advisor Yal9in Akdogan, the work (also published as a book) is
intended as a 'modest contribution' to the endeavour of producing new coneepts and ideas
useful for 'our political life' (p.2). Although its scholarly nature disqualifies it from being
read as a 'politieal declaration' (p.2) or manifesto, in his foreword Tayyip Erdogan states
that the work should be seen both as a vital contribution to the political identity of
AKPARTi and as bringing a new perspective to politics in Turkey {Muhafazakar
Demokrasi...yeni bir soluk ve agilim getirir, p.3). To locate or diagnose the power of
Islamism in turn, I will briefiy examine a much shorter speech expressing Kemalist
opposition and resistance to the electoral success of the Islamist movement.
To begin, let me present an arbitrary but not atypical interlocutor for Muhafazakar
Demokrasi. In 1998 Tekel, the state-owned General Directorate of Tobacco Products, Salt
and Alcohol Enterprises, placed an advertisement in Time magazine to celebrate the 75th
anniversary of the Republic. The advertisement featured a photograph of Ataturk, ballroom
dancing in suit, bowtie and tails, bare-headed men and women watching in the background.
Wearing a transparent veil, his partner eyes the crowd while Ataturk faces the camera.
Inscribed in the centre of the page in large font were the words 'The never ending dance'.
Beside this a smaller text in column read:
Seventy-five years ago, a new leader created a new nation on a historic strip of land
where Europe meets Asia...Turkey emerged as a modem and ambitious republic
from a turbulent past and became a model for the developing countries of the
world. Now, celebrating the 75* anniversary of the year it became a democratic
republic under the leadership and inspiration of Kemal Ataturk, Turkey remembers
those who built the nation and made it strong for succeeding generations. This is
the dance that began in 1923 and, with strong and confident footsteps has taken
Turkey to its rightful place in the modem world.'
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The striking metaphor of nation-building as Ataturk's continuous dance (in Republican
style) suggests that the founding of the Turkish Republic is made actively and ceaselessly
in the present. The Republic is not something that is ever accomplished, even if it has a
definitive beginning. The steps must be danced perpetually, the revolution constantly lived.
Ataturk's never ending dance and those of succeeding generations effects the unfinishable
instituting of the Republic.
Can we confirm in the primary themes expressed in Muhafazakar Demokrasi the
exereise of this continual and activist creation? That Kemalism's power is experienced by
Islamists as rooted in a social and political project committed to never-ending creation or
continuous self-instituting (communal or individual) is seen in at least three of the key and
repetitive points made in the document. Particularly pertinent is its appropriation of
conservatism's critique of the Enlightenment project of total revolution and rational (as
opposed to reasonable) social transformation. (It also makes use of conservative and liberal
anti-communist and anti-utopianism arguments from the 1960s and 1970s.) Some of the
words used to condemn this form of radical change are buyurgan (despotic); baskici
(oppressive); dayatmaci (forced); tektipgi (homogenising); tepeden inmeci (proclamation
from above). ^ Similarly, the document rejects social engineering {toplumsal muhendisligi)
and Utopian programs of ehange while advocating evolutionary, gradual or ordered
development of traditions, history and cultural values. At the same time however, the
document defines AKPARTi's politics as 'New Conservative', neither against change in
principle nor defenders of the status quo. Thus, it is not preservation of culture or tradition
as such that is lauded but muhafazakartik as a form of 'negative philosophy' {olumsuzlama
felsefesi), directed against both the radicalness (thoroughness) and elitism (despotism) of
political projects of social engineering. Limiting the power of the political sphere
safeguards against 'arbitrary and oppressive regimes'. {Iktidarin simrlandirilmasi keyfi ve
baskici yonetimlere karsi gelistirilen bir coziimdur, p.26).
Second, the document claims that muhafazakar concern to limit state and governmental
power is connected to a related acknowledgment of naturally occurring social diversity
{tomplumsal ce^itliligi), cultural difference and local values, as well as to its desire to have
these refiected in the political sphere. Here 'variety is richness' {AKPARTi'ye gore de
farkliliklar tabii bir durum ve zenginliktir, p. 10). This rending of conservative
multiculturalism is complemented by an insouciant acceptance of the inevitability of
political and economic reforms demanded by globalisation and informed by new 'universal
dominant values', in particular those of democracy, human rights, primacy of law, the
intemalisation of pluralism, protection and representation of minorities and tbe free market.
Along with a rejuvenated importance given to locality and region, these are all interpreted
as manifestations of a reaction to the homogenising and interventionist politics of
authoritarian nation-states {ulus devletler, p.73). Accordingly, Muhafazakar Demokrasi
calls for a less aggravating mode of politics than one whose ceaseless instituting is
produced via an antagonistic representation and negating of 'social realities' like religion.
This call is also functionally justified: religion—but not Islam specifically—brings social
stability and if properly harnessed can contribute to Turkey's development and leadership
in the Middle East and Caucasus. It also provides an antidote to fundamentalism and
terrorism. These themes are brought together under a single masterword, demoeracy:
AKPARTi conceives politics as an 'arena of compromise' {siyaset bir uzla§mi alamdir,
p. 113), and democracy as a 'system [or procedure] that enables different or even opposed
styles of life, as shaped by different goals and values scales, to live in the same place
together in peace' {Demokrasi...farkh amag ve deger skalalarina gore §ekillendirilmi§,
degi^ik hatta zit hayat tarzlarinin bari^ iginde birarada ya§amasina zemin hazirlaya bir
yontemdir, p.76).
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Third, Muhafazakar Demokrasi redefines secularism (laiklik) to mean state impartiality
towards religions and between denominations (mezhep) as well as freedom for individuals
to live their lives in accordance with their religious or irreligious beliefs. In the process it
seeks to shift the focus from the oft-asserted a priori of secularism as necessary precondition for democracy to the question of how laiklik should be developed in order for
democracy to operate in its broadest freedom. In other words, how might laiklik itself be
made to conform to forms of democratic practice (p.94)? One strategy would be for the
state to cease using laiklik as a tool to wage war against or interfere with religion or
believers. Another would be to separate religion from state or government control (p.95).
By the state and government remaining neutral amidst the different life styles of citizens,
laiklik becomes the guarantor of religious freedom. Here AKPARTi seeks to 'out-laicise'
the laicists, to use the ideals of secularism to critique its impoverished implementation in
Turkey. In brief, and despite the discourse on the virtues of social continuity, Muhafazakar
Demokrasi maintains that AKPARTi's political practices and understandings constitute a
new synthesis, a synthesis mediating tradition and modernity; historical values and new
values; idealism (utopianism) and realism; the local and the universal; and the individual
and society.
Read as resistance, what modes of domination might be indexed by this cluster of
themes? First, Muhafazakar Demokrasi's opposition to the instituting of new order via
erasure of existing institutional structures (radikalizm) diagnoses the power of Kemalism to
inhere in its self-alignment with a necessary universal future.'^ The document's privileging
of historical continuity in response testifies to Kemalism's attempt to rationally reform
society and state procedures 'in accordance with the foundations of and forms of science
and technology in modem times' (from the 1931 statutes ofthe ruling Republican People's
Party, as cited in Mardin 1993: 365). Second, and equally revealing, the text's critique is
made in the abstract: rather than analysing and condemning any actual governing practices
and understandings in Turkey, it merely disapproves or opposes certain possible
understandings and practices. Thus we have general comments such as 'laiklik perceived as
a life style or as a Jacobin, totalitarian or monolithic ideology is a cause of conflict not of
social peace' (Tekelci, totaliter, Jakoben bir ideoloji veya ya^am bigimi olarak algilanan bir
laiklik, tomplumsal bari^ degil, gati§ma sebebi olabilir, p.94). Not that any regime applies
laiklik in this way of course! Likewise, in principle the document is strongly in favour of
minority {azinlik) rights—'Democracy's success can be assessed not by majority rule but
according to whether minorities are self-determining or not' {Demokrasiler cogunlugun
iktidarindan gok, azinligin iradesini gergekle§tirip gergekle^tirememelerine gore ba§arili
sayilmaktadir, p.77). But it is not specifically in favour of the rights of Kurds. Read as a
discourse of subversion (Abu-Lughod 1990), Muhafazakar Demokrasi indicates that the
dynamics of Kemalist domination derives also from its totalitarian ability to close down
political parties and charge individuals in the constitutional court on the basis of their acts
and published or spoken words. The insistence on democracy in resistance to this form of
power is an act of self-preservation. But third and most significant, AKPARTi's selfproclaimed creation of an alternative synthesis, even one construed as less antagonistic
towards the past, diagnoses the power of Kemalism to reside in its own unfinishable and
ever new self-institution. These three dimensions of Islamist resistance reveal Kemalist
power in its narrative, coercive and 'ontological' forms.
How might we interpret Muhafazakar Demokrasi's claims that AKPARTi political
practices involve a new synthesis, or that it opens up space for new political practices and
understandings in Turkey? In the context of previous Islamist policies, practices and
discourses from the 1980s and 1990s (say the obsession with veiling or the polemical
rhetoric over the genius and specificity of Islam for example), the political program it
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sketches out is an unprecedented and rival self-institution, open for sure to elucidation in
relation to the cut and thrust of everyday politics and improvising upon wider resurgent
Westem political philosophies, but not accountable to them. Thus, the document makes
finely drawn distinctions between different varieties of conservatism ('traditional', 'liberal',
'classic', and 'new'), notes how they articulate with the different historical experiences of
separate societies and uses them to construct its own synthesis between conservatism and
democracy. But what is most noticeable is that whereas the Islamist parties and their texts
in the 1980s and 1990s produced an Islam antagonistic to its binary other (the West,
Kemalism, the modem), in the 2000s Muhafazakar Demokrasi talks overwhelmingly about
democracy. Indeed its first mention of Islam comes on page 91, with a brief and selective
presentation of verses from the Koran claimed to foreshadow the modem framework of
human rights. The second and only other discussion of Islam is on the question of its
compatibility with democracy, relating various arguments for their association and
concluding that in theory there is no necessary antagonism between them. The headscarf
issue itself is not mentioned.
Even more significantly, the document refuses to spell out beyond generalities and key
words—gelenek (tradition); halkin deger (people's values); toplumsal duzen (community order);
toplumsal kurumlari (community institutions); tarihsel ko^ullari (historic conditions);
tarihsel birikimleri (historic sedimentations); tomplumsal ya^amtn (social life); mevcut
birikimleri (existing accumulations); yerel degerleri (local values)—^what in Turkey
community or traditional institutions might be, what sources of wisdom have been tried and
tested through the sieve of history or everyday life and what existing values that organise
the private sphere should be quarantined from reform or abolition. This neglect is read by
anti-Islamists as deceitfully opening the back door to a restoration of Islam, to Islamic
practices that are both backward and oppressive. (In like vein the document's championing
of democracy as a regime characterised by dialogue and forbearance (tahammiil) is seen as
an excuse for debating the unacceptable and tolerating the unendurable.) Yet by contrast
this refusal can instead be interpreted as opening the door to the arbitrary definition,
creation and institution of the local and traditional by the Islamist movement itself.
Interestingly, the potential confiict in the document between muhafazakarlik being
interpreted as opposition to revolutionary change in the name of gradualism and traditional
values and muhafazakarlik being interpreted as resistance to despotism in the name of
social diversity and dispersing concentrations of power, is reflected in the two different
responses above. Muhafazakar Demokrasi claims that despite the existence of very
different strands of conservatism, one unifying feature is their stress on limiting not only the
power and authority of the govemment and the state but also 'any other centres of power'
(Muhafazakarltgin 'stnirli iktidar' vurgusu sadece siyasal iktidar anlaminda hukemetin
degil, devletin ve her turlii iktidar odagtmn stmrlandtnlmasi anlamtndadir, p.26.) Yet
general critique of monopolistic power (military, economic, religious or extemal) and
advocacy of its dispersal leads to a project of self-institution and autonomy. The slippage
can be traced in the quote below:
Power in all its dimensions should not be based on a monopolist or monolithic
structure. Both in the political arena and in other areas of life power should not be
concentrated, and as much as possible power in all its forms should be diffused to
the lowest level...The reason for limiting political power is to protect the
distinction between the private and public spheres, as well as for political power to
have only a limited impact or influence on what is accepted in the public sphere.
{Iktidar tiim boyutlanyla tekelci ve monolitic bir yapiya oturmamaldir. Siyasal
iktidar kadar hayatin diger alanlarmda da giic yogunlasmasi yasanmamali,
iktidarin tiim turleri miimhiin olabildigi kadar tabana yayilmahdir...Smirli tarzda
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169
polltikamn anlami, ozel alan He kamusal alan arasindaki ayrimin korunmasi,
siyasal etkinligin bu ikinci alana ili^kin smirli bir etkinlik veya sonug olarak ele
alinmastdir, p.26.)
The document attempts to negotiate this potential confiict by appealing to a kind of
common sense realism of the prior existence and value of civil society institutions, the
family and the wisdom of the ages.' Presented as somehow naturally occurring, these are
also posited as pre-political social forms. Yet the choice of community, tradition or family
as the preferred site of value-production, autonomy and self-institution (as opposed to their
being imposed upon by the state for instance) is never properly discussed or analysed.
Granted, Muhafazakar Demokrasi's critique of radical social engineering's imposition of its
own alien preferences on society from above applies in theory to revolutionary Islamism as
well. But the careful absence of a discussion about the actual content of'traditional values'
as well as their hinted political neutrality (as seen in the battery of euphemisms used to
describe them) prepares for the possibility of a rival project of self-institution and social
engineering 'from below', through an arbitrary and alternative politicisation of the private
sphere or tradition.^^
Indeed, some interesting parallels can be seen in James Scott's critique of high modernist
ideology in his book Seeing Like a State (1998), to which Muhafazakar Demokrasi might
be profitably compared. Both texts cite Michael Oakshott's critique of rationalism, although
Scott dislikes Oakshott's support of whichever ruling institutions have historically
dominated. Scott (1998: 6) conceives of his book as 'making a case against an imperial or
hegemonic planning mentality that excludes the necessary role of local knowledge and
know how'. Similarly his critique of social engineering designs is made in the name of
'real, functioning social order[s]' (Scott 1998: 6). Revealingly, where Muhafakar
Demokrasi and Scott part company is in Scott's concern to theorise from where and how
this functioning order is produced. His discussion of the Greek word metis as paradigmatic
of the virtues of the practical and local gives reasons for privileging it over state
simplifications and Utopian schemes. Thus, 'Broadly understood, metis represents a wide
array of practical skills and acquired intelligence in responding to a constantly changing
natural and human environment' (Scott 1998: 313)." By contrast, Muhafazakar Demokrasi's
emphasis on heritage (rather than practical knowledge or nous) manipulates a modernist
distinction in which formal scientific knowledge and technique is instrumentally
appropriated while tradition is posited as pertaining mainly to moral values. As with high
modernism then, Muhafazakar Demokrasi appears also to devalue local knowledge,
practices, informal improvisation and practical skills.
Crucially there are other differences—unlike Muhafazakar Demokrasi, Scott admits local
politics were sites of bitter class struggle. Equally important, Scott traces what he sees as
the project to map (make legible) and rationalise society to its origin in early modem
European statecraft, even if its flill fruition is only encountered in the twentieth century.
Although he doesn't examine the policy regime of the Ottoman state, other authors have
made convincing arguments about the modernity of Ottoman imperial projects and their
efficacy in reorganising culture and daily life to constitute a 'state society' in the core
Ottoman provinces in the eighteenth and nineteenth century (Meeker 2002; Deringil 2003).
This being the case, to what local or traditional values and to which history would
AKPARTi orient itself except to an arbitrary institution? For these various reasons
then—^the explicit claim to innovation, the radical disinterest in previous Islamist concerns
and themes, the refusal to sketch out what traditional values or practices might
be—Muhafazakar Demokrasi is in its turn an act of self-recreation.
Let me conclude this section by briefly turning our gaze from the diagnostics of
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Republican power via Islamist resistance to what Kemalist opposition might indicate in turn
about the power of Islamism. To do so, I will examine an article published in Radikal
newspaper (4 January 2004) titled 'Islam in Turkish Identity' {Turk Kimliginde Islam),
which cites a speech made in parliament by AH Topuz, Parliamentary Group Chairman of
the Republican People's Party (CHP).'^ Given that the success of 'Islamist' parties over the
last decade has made them the dominant electoral force in Turkey, it makes sense to
analyse as resistance a rival political 'manifesto', albeit one presented in very abbreviated
form.'^ In his parliamentary address, Topuz states:
Islamic culture is not our true culture. The cultural foundations of the Turkish
Republic rest on Turkishness. This is the culture of Anatolia. Influenced in its
development by other cultures, Anatolian culture has acquired many diverse
dimensions.
{Islam kultiiru bizim 6z kulttirumiiz degildir. Tiirkiye Cumhuriyetinin kultiirel
temelleri Tiirkluk temelini dayanir. Bu da Anadolu kultiirudiir. Anadolu kiiltiirii de
ba^ka kultiirlerle etkilenerek geli^mi§ ve gokfarkli bir boyut kazanmi^tir.)
The newspaper article goes on to note that the contents of the extended speech were
'identical' to the arguments of anthropologist Bozkurt Guven9 in his 1994 book Turkish
Identity: Cultural Historical Sources (Tiirk Kimligi: Kiiltiir Tarihnin Kaynaklan), although
parliamentarian Topuz doesn't reference this work. Whereas Muhafazakar Demokrasi
(published around the same time as the address) avoids any speculative history about
origins and essential identities—^and as we have seen studiously refrains from identifying
what 'tradition' might encompass—^Topuz/Gaven9 are not so retiring. According to the
article, Guven9's more elaborated thesis divines Turkish national culture (ulusal
kulturiimuz) as beginning four or five thousand years ago in Anatolia and two or three
thousand years ago in Central Asia. Over time, two other traditions merged with these
sources—Christianity and Islam. These infiuences converged in Anatolia around 1000 AD
to create a still evolving synthesis, one of whose works was the birth of the Republic of
Turkey.''' For Guven9, in comparison to the lasting infiuence of these Anatolian and
Turkish traditions, Islam is only of minor importance in the shaping of contemporary
Turkish identity. Accordingly, Islam should not be understood as independent but as a
dependent variable directed by the more infiuential streams of Turkish ethno-history.
{Boylece Guveng Islami, daha genif ve kapsayici bir medeniyet denkleminde bagimsiz bir
degisken olarak gormeyip, Tiirk etno-tarih denkleminde bagimli bir degi^ken olarak ele
aliyor). Two powerful currents in these streams are nationalism (ulusalcilik) and laiklik.
Fascinatingly then, laiklik is represented as a component of ethnic identity—true Turkish
identity is essentially secular—rather than as a political system or procedure.
What do these assertions, succinctly declared by Topuz in opposition to AKPARTi but
worked out in more detail by Guven9 and a host of other academicians, reveal about the
power of Islamism in Turkey today? Topuz's claims about the creation and makeup of an
Anatolian synthesis indicate an intense interest in and anxiety over the fabrication and
articulation ofthe particular and the universal in Republican politics. Navaro-Yashin (2002)
shows that this enterprise has a long history: the constructing of a correspondence between
'Turkish Anatolia' and the West was of particular concern in the first two decades of the
Republic. In the same period, the nationalist historiography of Turkish art, architecture, folk
studies and archaeology (still the dominant paradigm taught in state university studies even
now) produced an affinity between Turks and Western civilisation that was denied to
Kurds, Arabs and other minorities inhabiting the new territorial space. Topuz and Guven9's
nationalistic attempt to marginalise Islam through denying it any major infiuence on
'Turkish culture' diagnoses Islamism's power to be its creation of rival practices and
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171
narratives that articulate authenticity and universality in an alternate way.'^
Yet as we have seen, Muhafazar Demokrasi itself is disinclined to engage in this wellrehearsed polemic, i.e. in the provisioning of a pedigree for Turkish culture. In this case,
Islamist power is deployed through a shifting (never-ending) self-institution that undercuts
or evades secularists' self-affirming reading of and fearful response to Islamist practices
and intentions. Indeed, in Muhafazakar Demokrasi the ability to self-institute appears to
occur without specification of a 'constitutive other'. That is to say, unlike the conflicted
representations and discourse produced by Islamist and secularist forces up to the late
1990s, Muhafazakar Demokrasi has not enlisted in the 'war of symbols' between them nor
does it enact a politics of mobilisation. As a result, and somewhat ironically, Kemalists like
Topuz/Guven9 now talk much more about Islam, the Turkish Republic and Ataturk than do
Muhafazakar Demokrasi or AKPARTi. Resistance to AKPARTi's current diffidence on the
question of cultural origins and its championing of plural democracy is exercised by
vehemently proclaiming that such a position is purely instrumental.
In sum, what does all this sound and fury signify? These acts of creation (see the explicit
claim to new synthesis by both Islamism and Kemalism) show self-institution in Turkey to
be simultaneously a mode of resistance and domination. In his novel The Black Book,
Orhan Pamuk (1994: 373) writes that Istanbul (post-1923) was changing 'in imitation of an
imaginary city in a non-existent foreign country'. The phrase alludes to the Occidentalism
inspiring Republicans in the single party period, but can be extended to the more recent reordering of the built environment and spatial production of Islamists as well (see Bilici
1999; Bozdogan 2001). Far from an exercise in self-eclipse or cultural imperialism,
mimesis (or imagining oneself in and through selected significations of other societies,
whether Hittite, Western, Asri-Saadet or any other) is an act of self-institution. Creation
here is irreducible to historical antecedence or legacy, even if it is explicable in relation to
previous political innovations of either fellow travellers or opponents—i.e. to the work of
other Islamists or secularists. Thus on the problem of Turkish chauvinism Muhafazakar
Demokrasi no longer opposes it by citing Koranic verses detailing Allah's creation of
different tongues and nations, as Islamist discourse did a few short years ago. Nor does it
anymore seek to Islamise democracy or democratise Islam, through expanding the notion of
ijtihad, or reconstructing shari 'a through the attempted proceduralisation of fiqh (Islamic
jurisprudence), or through the call for a Medina-type constitution. This being the case,
some might interpret Muhafazakar Demokrasi and AKPARTi as heralding the dissolution
of Islamism in Turkey. More than a decade ago, Olivier Roy (1994) called somewhat
comparative developments elsewhere the 'failure' of political Islam, even if AKPARTi's
electoral success signals even more so a disillusionment with popular republicanism. But
dissolution—^what Nietzsche, naming it self-extinguishment, saw as the highest expression
of autonomy (see Ambrose 2003)—is not necessarily the end of Islamic politics, especially
when Muslims do it to themselves.
The domination of creation and the power of self-institution
In the second part of this paper I have followed Abu-Lughod's suggestion to track power
via resistance and applied it to central political antagonisms in Turkey. In this process,
Islamist and Kemalist practices of resistance and domination have revealed the key
imaginary signification constituting the field of politics in the Turkish Republic: creation
out of nothing or lucid self-institution. Stepping back slightly from this analysis, I now
argue that this interpretation of politics in Turkey allows us to mediate between Bourdieu's
more systemic and social analysis of subjection and domination, and the indomitable
understanding of the individual in Rapport. (Rapport ascribes an ontological sovereignty to
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the individual to 'make himself or herself ex nihilo in an originary fashion' (1997: 1) and
thus to institute their own life as a work of art beyond structured meanings, cultural
conventions and inculcated sensibilities.) As we have seen, for Abu-Lughod (2002: 786)
anthropology's 'fundamental premise' conceives that forms and understandings of
resistance and freedom are culturally shaped, pursued through and against collective
cultural meanings.'^ Nevertheless, this resistance (what Bourdieu (1977) calls 'heretical
discourse', in that it expresses an alternative objectification of unformulated or repressed
experience) should not be seen romantically as signs of 'human freedom' {a la Rapport) or
of the 'ineffectiveness of systems of power' (Abu-Lughod 1990: 42). On the contrary,
resistance, ineffectual or otherwise, can be used strategically to show 'forms of power and
how people are caught up in them' (Abu-Lughod 1990: 42). More usefully then, and to
continue to collapse for the moment important theoretical differences between Abu-Lughod
and Bourdieu, resistance tells us (anthropologists) of the social relations and structures of
domination, the domination that structures the 'thoughts and perception of the dominated'
(Bourdieu 2001: 13).
More particularly, for Bourdieu agents have practical but not conscious or theoretical
knowledge of their acts, and are thus unaware of the generative principles which organise
action and from which their improvised practices emerge. This symbolic violence of the
social system means dominated agents give a coerced consent to the masculine bias of
physical and social order. Similar to Castoriadis, Bourdieu disparages intersubjectivity or
inter-sociality as capable of providing any scope for subjects or their experiences to be
constituted independently from social structure. Subjects are instituted prior to encounter,
or they would be unable to relate. Thus Bourdieu (1977: 79, 81) argues that
phenomenological approaches disregard the objective structures that allot subjects their
relative positions in interaction and produce the dispositions of interacting agents. Hence,
'communication of consciousness presupposes community of "unconsciouses", i.e. of
linguistic and cultural competences' (Bourdieu 1977: 80). As the social order produces
individual's dispositions, their choices are pre-adapted and made compatible with objective
conditions, making alternative actions and feelings un-nameable (Bourdieu 2001);
ordinarily, then, 'resistance' is collectively authorised and hence ultimately reproductive of
existing social relations.
In a different but related way Asad also analyses the 'un-nameability' or unthinkability
of dissident actions and conceptions. He notes the difficulty an emphasis on 'meaning' in
itself, as the basic social object of anthropological thought, has in trying to explain social
change. For if we accept the 'social origins of concepts (the social determination of
cognition)' (Asad 1979: 611), from where might alternative conceptions, schemes of
appreciation and perception, and experiences derive that will facilitate effective criticism of
existing social relations? For Asad (as for Bourdieu), the problem inheres in the assumption
that society and social change is 'essentially a matter of structures of meaning', so that
'social criticism is not merely sometimes a necessity but always a sufficient pre-condition
for social change' (Asad 1979: 612, emphasis in original). By contrast, Asad (1979: 618)
argues that social change needs to be tied to the 'systematic historical aspects of social
forces and relations by which the material bases of collective life are produced', including
most influentially world historical capitalism. Although he does not call it resistance, he
does draw attention to the plurality of different concepts held by people within the same
society and their conflicts over the desirability and forms of social transformation. These
varying discourses, and the possibility of their undermining or sustainability, are explained
by their material production and maintenance as authoritative systems (Asad 1979: 619).
Whereas Bourdieu, then, seeks to ground reproduction in material interests identifiable by
the analyst yet obscure for agents, Asad focuses on the material conditions of change.
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173
Despite this, their emphasis on the necessary connection between non-change/change and
objective conditions means both would agree: 'the relation of complicity that the victims of
symbolic domination grant to the dominant can only be broken through a radical
transformation of the social conditions of production of the dispositions that lead the
dominated to take the point of view of the dominant... on themselves' (Bourdieu 2001: 412). Without such transformation, dominated subjects 'apprehend all reality and in particular
the power relations in which they are held, through schemes of thought that are the product
of embodiment of those power relations' (Bourdieu 2001: 33).
By contrast, politics in Turkey indicates that unlike Bourdieu's grounding of
subordination in dispositions incessantly and unconsciously inculcated over time (which in
the process 'eternalise' history, reproduce action and self-adjust in response to external
change), the structures of domination in Kemalist and Islamist projects work much more by
exculcation. That is to say, they function most significantly not by 'treading in' but by
'beating out' dispositions and sensibility, in a process of never-ending self-institution
{transvaluation). Performing the ceaseless dance (in whichever style) requires the continual
evacuating of the individual and communal self a turn to permanent self-refiexivity and
cultural critique. Consciously and constantly policing the institution or inflammation of
Islam or Kemalism in selves and society, partisans of each synchronise their steps in terms
of opposition to the other. As such, Kemalism and Islamism are projects of anomaly as
much as autonomy: the exculcation of the other in themselves is driven by a desire to
become anomalous—not according to law {nomos)—^in relation to each others' practices
and discourses. Each act of self re-creation of identity and political practice (i.e.
Muhafazakar Demokrasi) takes place against the backdrop of the other's self-recreative acts.
Yet unlike Rapport's celebration of the ontic semi-solipsism of the meaning-creating
individual (in this case both Kemalists and Islamists), we see how their inventiveness—but
not their inventions—is conditioned, even partially generated, by a common imaginary
signification whose curreney of power is creation ex-nihilio. Here self-institution, while the
act of an individual or 'communal particular' subject (Ambrose 1998) who create
themselves through it, is also an act demanded by the social and political world in which
subjects are involved. It occurs not despite the constraint of the 'socio-cultural
environment' but because of it. Self-creation is a social norm. The power of lucid autonomy
is the essential political practice of secular society through which forms of dominance are
exercised. Gratuitous creation subordinates those unable or unwilling to institute
themselves similarly gratuitously.'^ In such a situation, alternative self-institution becomes
a key mode (the only effective mode?) of resistance. Authoring the past—imagining,
appropriating, revitalising or rejeeting it—enables action in the present, on both a personal
and collective level. This interpretive reflection and the action conjoined with it are also
how otherwise inert forms and institutions of the past are generated and sustained—^actively
sustained so that they might be profited from or revolutionised.
Never-ending self-institution is the reason, then, why Ataturk is prohibited from stopping
dancing or from being dead by those who commemorate him in the present. His lack of
movement, his deadness cannot be remembered: each national ceremony forces him to
dance again, not merely in the forms of intersubjectivity experienced with him by
participants in carefully structured state rituals but equally in the never-ending Republic,
the work that is presented as his creation, the bequeathed thing he dies for and which
generates his continual life. For while the act of dying—^i.e. the death of Socrates—can
sometimes be an expression of autonomy (cf Ambrose 1998), the state of death itself is
always the final negation of the subject's autonomy. The moment of Socrates' triumph is
followed by his permanent state of heteronomy. Ataturk's continual dance is choreographed
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by the living, in the same way as they re-enact and use as political resources the
foundational practices of nation-building and state formation in the present. Why else the
periodic revival in the 'Ataturk cult'?
Conclusion
In her article on the romance of resistance, Abu-Lughod (1990) asks why it was that in the
late 1980s and early 1990s scholars from different disciplines and theoretical paradigms
converged on this theme. What work was performed, what academic voices enabled by
focusing on the weapons of the weak? We can ask these same questions of the current
vogue for ethnographic analysis that seeks to identify and explicate cultural creativity. Or to
personalise the question, why my stress on self-institution as both act of resistance and
domination?
Certainly I would defend my interpretation by noting that the critique of tradition and the
claims to new synthesis by Islamism and Kemalism indicates that self-institution out of
nothing is an indigenous practice and not just a discourse of the anthropological observer.
But beyond this, I would also claim that the political struggle enjoined between Islamists
and secularists in Turkey after the 1980 military coup is a contestation over which creative
self-institution will prevail. If my interpretation is plausible, analyses that present (and
camouflage) the Islamist movement in Turkey as a binary opposite to secularism could not
be further from the truth. Rather than intrinsically different, Islamism and Kemalism are
varieties ofthe same cultural and political project, disarmingly similar. Whether this feature
of Islamism in Turkey holds true for radical Islamism in other places is a complicated
question and beyond my concern here. Nevertheless, even as we note that some Islamists
(and much present academic and media discourse) assume that we are living a clash of
civilisations, we should acknowledge that civilisations too self-institute themselves in the
present. In that case, the vital questions are not the intrinsic incompatibility or otherwise of
'modernity' (or the West) and Islam but an examination of how the constitution of
civilisational incompatibility produces broader political struggles. How do these projects of
civility produce identity in the present and what forms of political power do they
generate?'* Even more vitally, given my argument for the resemblance between Islamist
and secularist projects of self-institution (but not necessarily their form), the processes and
forces that suppress recognition of their essential commonality or their mutual mimicry
need to be investigated.
Why is this so vital? In April 2005 the Dutch parliament published a report,
recommending that 'the country's Muslims should henceforth effectively "become Dutch"'
(BBC News, 28 April 2005). Similarly, Olivier Roy (2005: 7) notes that if Muslims wish to
stay in the Netherlands they must now follow 'enculturation courses'. In that same article,
however, he argues that the murderers of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in November
2004, one ofthe acts that inspired the report's conclusions, were not 'traditional Muslims,
barely able to speak Dutch' but Dutch citizens fluent in that language. Rather than
expressing a clash of cultures or civilisational divide then, Roy claims that such Islamists
typically have very antagonistic relations with 'traditional Islam'. Indeed and I quote, theirs
'is an endeavour to reconstruct a "pure" religion outside traditional or Western cultures,
outside the very concept of culture itself. Further, their 'quest for authenticity is no longer
a quest to maintain a pristine identity, but to go back to and beyond this pristine identity
through a non-historical, abstract, and imagined model of Islam' (2005: 6-7). In other
words and in the terms of this paper, Roy's Islamist actors are engaged in a project of
arbitrary self-institution 'out of nothing'. Yet his sociological analysis of the factors
associated with such 'uprooted' Islamism is not convincingly extended to the contemporary
THE NEVER ENDING DANCE
175
(or historical) creation of Dutchness, Frenchness or Europeanness pursued by secular nation
states, as witnessed in their very programs of forced assimilation referenced above. Perhaps
it is no great insight to remember that the originary impulse of secularism is gratuitous selfinstitution—^what Castoriadis calls autonomy. What is surprising is how Islamism's
resemblance to laicism is so often passed over, resulting in the current dominant politics
enforcing Western or Islamic exceptionalism.
Acknowledgements
I gratefully acknowledge the support of the Wenner Gren Foundation for Anthropological
Research, whose generosity fmanced the fieldwork carried out in Istanbul for this article.
Joel Kahn, Kenan Cayir, Alex Edmonds and the three anonymous referees of The
Australian Journal of Anthropology suggested many useful changes, all of which I am very
gratefiil for, but not all of which I was able to incorporate into the text. Accordingly, the
remaining shortcomings are mine.
Notes
1.
2.
3.
4.
This claim needs to be qualified. Bourdieu (1962, 2000) describes his critical period of fieldwork
(during the war of liberation in the late 1950s) as making him witness to a social
experiment—Algeria's forced transformation under French colonialism. His ethnographic
authority is produced by situating himself in such a pivotal position, both spatially and
temporally—thus his ability to reconstruct a stateless Kabylian society that presumably still
existed problematically in certain lives and practices in the present (producing incoherence for
some agents), while simultaneously using that model to analyse modernity, also represented in
certain apostate Kabylian lives.
Are subjects partially able to interrogate the dispositions with which they have been inculcated?
Even if they could (Bourdieu thinks not), consciousness raising in itself is not socially
transformative: social change requires more than social criticism or a change of social cum
ideological concepts (Bourdieu 2001). Bourdieu articulates the habitus with 'objective
conditions' or structures: change requires transformation of the objective conditions of
existence that produce determinate types of dispositions. In this way, and despite the idealistic
tenor of the quote above, Bourdieu concurs with Asad in a materialist critique of the idea that
the 'object of anthropological discourse [should be] primarily constituted in terms of human
meanings' (Asad 1979: 611).
For Castoriadis, an individual or society's self-creation 'out of nothing' does not literally mean
creation of all the constituting elements of its world. As he puts it: 'We are speaking of the selfconstitution of the living being qua living being—not of its matter. We are not saying that the
living being gives rise to molecules out of nothing.. .The living being creates something other
and much more important: the level of being we call life, as well as the infinity of modes of being
and of laws that bear on life...It creates, each time, a proper world...There is obviously an
infinity of things "outside" the living being, but they are for the living being only inasmuch as the
latter has sampled, formed and transformed them' (1997b: 337-338, original emphasis).
Technically, Kemalism describes the official program of both Mustafa Kemal's Republican
People's Party and the new Turkish state in its key formative period between the World Wars. As
formulated in 1931, its six guiding principles were republicanism, secularism, nationalism,
populism, statism and revolutionism. Since then, Kemalism has acquired a range of contradictory
meanings, and it is a matter of continuing debate in Turkey as to what the political program of a
Kemalist party should encompass. Nevertheless, neither the dispersal of the ideal nor the
irresoluteness of those defining its meaning should not be exaggerated—the most powerful
institution in Turkey, the military, continues to police the political and cultural fields in the name
of Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk), and Kemalist as a signifier of political identity is a live option.
176
5.
6.
I.
8.
9.
10.
I1.
12.
13.
14.
15.
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Other possible ways of proceeding might have been to draw attention to Kemalist power via
different forms of Islamist resistance as revealed in a range of innovative spatial, textual and
consumerist practices: for example, in Islamist tea-gardens or cafes in Istanbul (Komercuoglu
2000; Houston 2001); in Islamist novels (Cayir 2004); in Islamist fashion shows and department
stores (Navaro-Yashin 2002).
Ozyurek (2004: 382) analyses both the original photograph and the more extended propaganda
campaign organised by the Turkish Republic for its 75th anniversary on the theme of Ataturk's
dancing, broadcast on CNN in the USA.
This is a somewhat ironic critique, given the Islamist movement's stress in an earlier
manifestation on the revealed source and authority ofthe Koran.
Significantly the document pursues the same strategy of power when it assumes the inevitability
and desirability of—and its own conformity to—'globalisation' and a new more advanced system
of international law over and above the now parochial nation state.
Muhafazakar Demokrasi's occasional use of neo-conservative arguments attacking the welfare
state for encouraging irresponsibility in families is an unconvincing digression in the Turkish
context, given the absence of such a political structure as well as the centrality of the civilising
role of the family and the mother in particular in Kemalism's social policies (see p. 37 for
example). The document also makes an irrelevant foray against state funding of abortion and sex
changes.
AKPARTi's failed legislation to have zina (adultery) punishable by law in late 2004 might be
interpreted as attempted social engineering of social relations in the 'private sphere'.
Nevertheless, Scott does have a slight bias for discerning metis in the field of ecological
adaptation and practical knowledge of the natural world, as well as an accompanying
anthropological systems bias that minimises imperial penetration and regional standardisation,
and overplays the assumed isolation and self-sufficiency of pre-modem communities. For me, his
chapter on Le Corbusier and Brasilia is the least convincing and disregards Holston's (1989)
sympathetic discussion ofthe metis of Brasilia's own inhabitants.
The CHP were established by Ataturk in 1924 and have always been the political party closest in
tenor to the secularist state and Turkish military.
In her 1990 article, Abu-Lughod does not reverse her procedure by re-reading men's acts as
'resistance' that diagnoses, in turn, the power of Bedouin women. To do so, she might retort,
would be to obscure distinctions between their greater or lesser capacity to control or coerce the
behaviour ofthe other. Even if we interpret men's actions as pre-emptive strikes to counter any
possible future redistribution of power, this should not be named resistance. Nevertheless, by
focusing on resistance diagnostically (that is as a symptom of power), with no assessment of its
efficacy or otherwise in countering domination, is it implied that it can have no liberatory
outcomes?
Obviously the place and nature of the Ottoman Empire and its inspiration by Turkish or Islamic
sources becomes of key controversy here, as the concern of the rest of the article in Radikal
indicates. See Kafadar (1995) for an analysis of Turkish nationalist accounts ofthe origins and
construction ofthe Ottoman State that stress its Turkish genius.
In an article titled 'Turkish social anthropology since the 1970s' (Erdentug and Magnarella
2001), the authors make a loose distinction between popular anthropology and academic
anthropology in Turkey. Presumably Guven9's work, as befitting his status as professor of
anthropology at Hacettepe University in Ankara, would be catalogued under the academic. Their
example of popular anthropology is a work by Ibrahim Yilmaz (1995) detailing an alternative
cultural fiision to Guvenf, one in which Islam plays a greater part in the historic development of
a unique 'Turco-Islamic' culture. The cover of Yilmaz's book {Ecdat Kiiltiiru or 'The Culture of
the Ancestors') reads: 'We set out from Ergenekon with Turkish blood in our veins/ We joined
with the divine light of Islam in our hearts/ With countless martyrs, we reached the oceans and
ruled the world'. Why the author's use this as an example of popular anthropology (and not
Guvenp's work) is unclear.
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16.
17.
18.
177
Other writers concur—^Veena Das (1997) and Iris Jean-Klein (2000), for example, analyse how
cultural meanings as constructed through hierarchical intersubjective relationships can
simultaneously produce selves that are constrained by this socially instituted and culturally
informed relationality, as well as enable individuals and groups to negotiate their own divergent
projects and meanings. Over and beyond these and other treatments of the production of selfhood cross-culturally however, anthropological analysis typically expresses a disciplinary
horror over isolating the agent from social relationships and/or social structure within which
subjectivity or selves arc seen as constituted. This horror is sometimes supplemented by a
critique that argues that to do so is ethnocentric at best, importing historic Western notions of
the individual self into alien contexts, and at worst, expressive ofthe ideology of Enlightenment
thinking and/or capitalism, with its imaginary signification of self-made bourgeois men as
authoritative authors of the self Jonathan Friedman's (2002) assessment in his concluding
remarks of his review of Rapport's (2002) article 'Random Mind' is only slightly
different—rather than trace an archaeology of the idea of the autonomous self in the
constitution ofthe West, he historicises Rapport's work to the particular global moment of deregulation and the neo-liberalisation ofthe subject.
Although not the focus of this paper, this injunction to gratuitous self-creation applies also to
Kurdish movements in Turkey, in relation both to Republican laicism and Turkish nationalism.
In Formations ofthe Secular, Talal Asad (2003: 13, emphasis in original) asks these questions
somewhat differently: 'The important question, therefore, is not to determine why the idea of
"modernity" (or the "West") is a misdescription, but why it has become hegemonic as a
political goal, what practical consequences follow from that hegemony, and what social
conditions maintain it'.
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