The Lords of War: violence, governance and nation-building in north-western Greece

This is a pre-print version of an article that has been published in EUROPEAN REVIEW OF HISTORY: REVUE EUROPÉENNE D'HISTOIRE 27.5 (2020) The final version of the article can be accessed at: https://doi.org/10.1080/13507486.2020.1803218 The Lords of War: violence, governance and nation-building in north-western Greece Abstract The article explores the intersection between paramilitary mobilization and nation-building in the area of Thesprotia in north-western Greece. It does so by examining the activities of the right-wing paramilitaries of EDES (Ethnikos Dimokratikos Ellinikos Sindesmos – National Republican Greek League) between the Axis occupation and the early Cold War period. Studies of nation-building in twentieth-century Europe have adopted a state-centric approach. More recent scholarship has questioned this approach and presented a more nuanced picture of the nation-making process. A significant strand of this scholarship discusses the role of non-state armed actors – bandits, paramilitaries and criminal gangs – in this process. The present article contributes to this literature by focusing on an aspect of paramilitarism that has largely been overlooked in the existing scholarship: governance. The article discusses patterns of paramilitary governance and explores the impact of wartime rule in local institutions and civilian security, as well as the political legacies of paramilitarism. Key Words: Paramilitaries, Greece, EDES, Civil War, Governance. Introduction: The article explores the intersection between paramilitary mobilization and nation- building by providing a case-study of the activities of the right-wing paramilitaries of EDES (Ethnikos Dimokratikos Ellinikos Sindesmos-National Republican Greek League) in the border area of Thesprotia between the Second World War and the early Cold War period. EDES was the predominant armed group in Thesprotia during the Axis occupation (1941-1944) and played a pivotal part in the ethnic infighting that took place between Greeks and the local Albanian minority. EDES paramilitaries were remobilized during the Greek civil war (1946-1949) and continued to have a central role in local politics during the post-civil war era. The presence of EDES and the fierce ethnic strife that took place in Thesprotia has captured the attention of several scholars who provided important discussions of EDES’s military activities, the political and social origins of ethnic infighting and the role of local elites and the Axis military in the envelopment of ethnic violence. Kretsi, ‘The secret past of the Albanian-Greek borderlands’;. Baltsiotis, ‘The Muslim Chams of Northwestern Greece’; Margaritis, Anepithimitoi Sibatriotes, Manta, Oi Mouslmanoi Tsamides; Tzoukas, Oi Oplarhigoi tou EDES. However, EDES’s purview was not limited to the battlefield. Ethnic violence, poverty and the need for legitimacy among the local population led EDES to form a large and sophisticated governance apparatus. EDES paramilitaries taxed and conscripted civilians, provided conflict resolution, education and health care and created new forms of governance in their effort to administer local communities. Yet, these activities have received scant attention. We know very little about the nature and articulations of paramilitary governance, its impact on local political economies and the role of the paramilitaries in the post-war restructuring of the state. The article addresses this gap by asking three main questions: How and under what conditions do paramilitaries govern? What is the impact of wartime governance in local institutions and political practices? What is the legacy of these institutions? The dearth of studies in governance is not limited to the scholarship on EDES. In recent years several scholars have sought to provide a more nuanced understanding of the contribution of paramilitaries in the processes of state making and state breaking in 20th century Europe. The majority of these studies explored paramilitarism in the framework of the ‘European Civil War’ (1914-1949). Traverso, Fire and Blood. Robert Gerwarth’s study on ‘The Vanquished’ discussed how imperial collapse and the creation of a ‘culture of defeat’ in the aftermath of the Great War led to a surge of paramilitarism in central and south-eastern Europe. Gerwarth’s study provided a penetrating discussion of the politics and culture of paramilitary groups analyzing how ultra-masculinist ‘subcultures’ of army veterans and politicized youths came to embrace extreme violence as the foremost means of restructuring the successor states along ethnically ‘pure’ lines. Other scholars researched patterns and repertories of violence shedding new light to the role of militias in the waves of ethnic cleansing and genocide that followed the Great War and explored the impact and legacies of this violence on the rise of totalitarian regimes (Fascism, Nazism) and the methods they used to create racially ‘pure’ communities in the European borderlands during the Second World War. Yosmaoglu, Blood Ties, Umit Ungor, The Making of Modern Turkey; Newman, Yugoslavia in the Shadow of War; Gingeras, Sorrowful Shores; Yeomans, The Utopia of Terror; Gerwarth and Jon Horne (eds.), War in Peace; Gerwarth, The Vanquished. Yet, by focusing on the destructive capabilities of the paramilitaries this scholarship has often overlooked the fact that warfare entailed not only the dismantling of the old order but also the creation of multiple novel social orders; workers councils, national committees etc., that were operated by a host of irregular groups who acted as power-brokers, administrators and providers of security. As Tomas Balkelis noted ‘the transformative character of paramilitarism….and the relationship between paramilitarism and nation-making…[.are] the most overlooked and least understood aspects of their [paramilitaries] history’. Balkelis, ‘Turning Citizens into Soldiers’, 127. The dearth of scholarship on this aspect of paramilitarism leaves us with a partial and somewhat distorted view of the experiences, outcome and long term effects of these struggles. As David Galula noted irregular warfare is both a military and a political struggle. Success therefore also hinges on the ability of irregular actors to generated legitimacy by establishing viable and effective alternative forms of rule. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 4. Understanding how paramilitary groups try or fail to administer the civilian realm can therefore provide new insights on the short and long term outcomes of the struggles that enveloped Europe during this period. The analysis of governance activities is no less pertinent for the post-war period. Wartime governance has the potential to realign political attitudes and challenge existing social structures. These changes can sometimes have far reaching effects for post-war nation building particularly in fields such as the economy, policing and local administration. The article explores these issues by using a wealth of archival sources and deploying an inter-disciplinary methodology that draws from the nascent scholarship on wartime social orders developed by social scientists such as Ana Arjona, Mario Fumerton and Zachariah Mampilly. Arjona, Rebelocracy; Fumerton “Beyond Counterinsurgency Mampilly, Rebel Rulers. These studies sought to understand how armed actors generate legitimacy during civil wars and insurgencies. As Arjona noted, ruling through intimidation is of course not impossible however it is both costly as paramilitaries are forced to divert more resources from the battlefield to the ‘home front’, and likely to backfire in the long run. Armed actors thus have to ‘create institutions, endorse ideologies….provide public goods…and, in doing so, transform the societies in which they operate.’ Arjona, Rebelocracy, 2 Wartime governance thus serves ‘both instrumental and normative purposes by entrenching and legitimizing…political authority’ and providing ‘institutional raw material for state-building.’ Podder, “Mainstreaming the non-state”, 214. This scholarship examined these processes paying particular attention to the role of group ideology in the formation of wartime social orders, the symbols and narratives deployed to entrench and legitimize rule and the responses of the civilian population to these efforts. While the article explores these issues it also advances the scope of the scholarship in two ways. The bulk of these studies has analyzed how irregulars rule during times of war. Accordingly, relatively little attention has been paid to the afterlife of wartime governance and the significance of these structures for post-war nation-building. Yet, as Arjona noted ‘wartime social orders… [are]… likely to transcend the war, creating challenges and opportunities for reconstruction and redevelopment.’ Arjona, Rebelocracy, 303-309. The article addresses this gap in scholarship by exploring the impact of wartime governance in the post-war restructuring of politics and the state in Thesprotia. Moreover, many of these studies has adopted a national and/or transnational perspective. While this approach can generate invaluable insights it can also gloss over the considerable local variations and the contribution of civilians. The article addresses this discrepancy by adopting a view from the ‘ground up’ that pays particular attention to the agency of rank and file actors and the micro-politics of rival groups and communities. While micro approaches are not without pitfalls as ‘local political dynamics are more fluid and thus harder to neatly categorize than macro-level factors’, they are ‘also more relevant for understanding the dynamics’ of insurgent warfare’ since they can provide a more nuanced picture of motivations and processes on the ground level. Mampilly Rebel Rulers, 18. The article draws from a wide array of published and unpublished sources including reports, memoirs, diaries, newspapers and oral testimonies. The discussion makes extensive use of archival material generated by EDES officers and functionaries such as Major Kostantinos Mavroskoti who was the commander in chief of the local EDES 10th regiment, army and gendarmerie reports and the personal archive of EDES’s leader Napoleon Zervas. These archives provide important details on the formation of EDES’s governance structures, the relationship between the organization and local civilians, and the role of EDES veterans during and after the civil war. Yet, these materials also present several challenges including ethnic and political bias and a tendency to gloss over the violence of the militias and their involvement in illegal activities. The article addresses these issues by making use of oral testimonies, diaries and memoirs generated by local civilians as well as sources generated by the Greek Communist Party, Red Cross officials and as the local press. These sources help to shed new light into the activities of the paramilitaries, their relationship to local civilians and the impact of paramilitary mobilization to local social and political structures. The article is divided into three sections. The first section provides an outline of the area’s history and political conditions until the appearance of EDES. The second section traces the appearance and activities of EDES from the occupation to the liberation. It analyzes the origins and development of paramilitary governance in local societies and discusses the extent to which it led to a renewal of political practices and personnel. The third and final section discusses the legacies of paramilitary governance in the Civil War period and the subsequent decade. This section discusses how and in what extent the changes wrought by the occupation persisted and influenced the local political economy paying particular attention to the role of EDES veterans. A society at war Thesprotia was incorporated to the Greek state after the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913. The area was home to a substantial Albanian Muslim minority that numbered between 23 and 24.000 members in the eve of the Second World War. Manta, ‘The Cams of Greece’, 2 The pre-war period was marked by considerable tensions between the state, local Greeks and the minority. These tensions revolved around the land issue. Much of the best and most fertile land was in the hands of Muslim notables while the bulk of local Greeks eked out a precarious living as herders, journeymen and hired hands in local estates. This situation changed after the government undertook a massive land redistribution program in the wake of the disastrous Greco-Turkish war of 1919-1922. However, the redistribution was conducted in an abrasive and careless manner thus reducing large swathes of the Muslim minority to penury and destitution. According to Eleftheria Manta these tensions were alleviated by the liberal government of Eleftherios Venizelos in 1928-1932. Yet, the improvement in relationships did not lasted long. The advent of General Ioannis Metaxas dictatorship in 1936 led to a considerable deterioration of Greco-Albanian relations. The regime prohibited the use of the Albanian language in public and replaced Albanian mayors with Greeks. These measures led to a steady rise of irredentism among some local Muslims who looked towards Albania and Fascist Italy as allies and protectors. Ibid, 2-5 The outbreak of the Greco-Italian war was marked by an outbreak of violence against civilians and property. Some local Muslims assisted the invading Italian army by acting as guides while a small number took up arms ambushing and killing isolated Greek soldiers. Several homes were torched in the provincial capital of Igoumenitsa where two Greek civilians were executed by local Muslims. The Greek state retaliated by exiling the bulk of the Muslim male population and executing several local Albanians who assisted the Italians. Nevertheless, the return of the Italian army in the spring of 1941 and the first few months of the occupation were rather peaceful. Ibid, 6-8 The Italian authorities used local Albanians in administrative tasks and cultivated friendly relationships with irredentists. However, they did not encourage armed secessionism, since they were afraid that the ‘fomenting of separatist unrest and the organization of ethnic bands would merely have the effect of disrupting public order.’ Rodogno , ‘Fascism’s, 324. The Italian command in fact tried to earn the allegiance of the Greek population by providing them with tools, seed and agricultural implements to help them salvage the olive and maize harvest after a particularly fierce winter. Yet, the honeymoon between the Italian authorities and the local population was not meant to last for long. The first shadows appeared after the Italian command replaced Greek mayors with Albanians. The behavior of occupation troops in the occasional searches for weapons, and their unwillingness to persecute Muslim lawbreakers slowly widened the rift between the two communities. Pavlidis, Oi Alvanotsamides, 38. Italian commanders sought to gain the allegiance of the Albanian population by providing them with guns, money and preferential access to aid and resources. Many of them took advantage of this to avenge past wrongs and settle scores with their neighbors. The Greek authorities protested to no avail. These policies encouraged Albanian irredentists who began to openly attack gendarmes and other representatives of the Greek state; schoolteachers, civil servants etc. This violence forced the gendarmerie to abandon all rural stations. Many civil servants and local notables; businessmen, landowners and intellectuals followed suit. Ibid, 91. The flight of the gendarmerie and the local elites gradually led to a breakdown of authority and a rapid increase in violent incidents. Muslim peasants formed bands that engaged in extortion, kidnaping and murder for hire. Some gangs controlled entire villages and accrued large amounts of money which they dispensed among their followers. These gangs were often tolerated by the Italian authorities who were willing to turn a blind eye in exchange for information and their cooperation against Greek gangs and nationalists. Gang leaders used their ties to the Italian authorities, growing affluence and capacity for violence to displace the traditional notable class and emerge as a distinct pole of authority. Foreign Ministry Archive, 63/4/19/05/1946. The rise of the gang-leaders many of whom came from impoverished and marginal backgrounds undermined traditional forms of conflict resolution. Diefthinisi Istorias Stratou henceforth DIS/Sarantis Archive/Folder B/A/5/Kedro Allodapon Ipeirou/Second Intelligence Bureau/Report on Thesprotia-Chamouria-Chamides/03/1946/Ioannina In the pre-war period feuds were resolved through reconciliation ceremonies and the exchange of hostages. This process was supervised by joint committees of Greek and Albanian elite men. The changes in the local power structure undermined the status of these men and consequently undercut any efforts to broker peace and put an end to feuds between local communities. Ioannou, Mavros Septemvris, 11. This led to an acceleration of violence which attained a distinctively ethnic tinge as victims were chosen on an ethnic basis with no regard for age, gender or familial affiliation. Such killings ‘shocked’ many members of the local Muslim community nonetheless, reactions were ‘subdued and low key’ as civilians were too afraid of the band-leaders and their followers. Greek peasants responded in kind by forming gangs that retaliated by indiscriminately murdering Muslim peasants. Tit for tat violence broke all barriers of solidarity as everyone became fair game for the various local bands and ‘no one dared to intervene to help you.’ General State Archive (henceforth GAK) Middle East Archive/Folder 10/45/Gendarmerie report on the current situation in Thesprotia (Anafora Horofilakis peri tis epikratousis katasaseos en Thesprotia), 23/6/1943/Igoumenitsa The number of killings increased fivefold by the summer of 1942. In some cases clashes took the form of an inter-communal civil war that resulted in the wholesale destruction of villages and several large massacres. Pavlidis, 45. Violence had broader social and political implications. Greek peasants traditionally relied on seasonal immigration to the lowland Muslim villages to supplement their income and buy basic food items like olives, maize and olive oil. However, violence and insecurity made journeys exceedingly dangerous. Travelers had to pay for an armed escort and bribe the local band-leader for safe passage. Those who could not afford these hefty sums were left stranded in their villages where they lived in a state of constant fear. Families of 8-10 persons survived on dandelions and 1 kilo of maize per week. A Red Cross report estimated that over 85% of the upland population was malnourished. Many elderly persons and young children perished from hunger and exhaustion. The situation was no better in the lowlands. A Red Cross official who visited the area noted in a report that Muslim militias ‘armed to the teeth’ blockaded the main road arteries robbing local peasants, peddlers and Red Cross trucks. The same reported noted that in the towns and many lowland villages ‘citizens barricaded themselves once night fell, armed militiamen roamed the streets and no-one was safe.’ Benaki Museum, Deas Archive henceforth BMDA/Folder 262/1, Rapport dans le situation en epire d’une parte et de celle de la region d’agrinion, patras et kalavryta et Peloponese de l’autre, /23/11/1943. Violence and polarization had a detrimental impact on local economy and communal relations. In some cases entire villages were abandoned by their inhabitants, approximately 3000 civilians from the areas of Igoumenitsa and Margariti fled to the areas of Fanari and Parga. DIS/Sarantis Archive/Folder B/A/5/Kedro Allodapon Ipeirou/Second Intelligence Bureau Forging a mountain realm Violence and social dislocation created a large population of rootless men who formed gangs that survived through extortion, rustling and banditry. Yet, organized resistance groups did not appear until mid-1942. The foundations of organized resistance were laid in the autumn of 1941 when EAM (Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo-National Liberation Front), a coalition of Communists, Social Democrats and left-wing Liberals was formed. ELAS (Ellinikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos-Greek People’s Liberation Army), the armed branch of EAM made its first appearances in central Greece and Thessaly in the spring of 1942. EDES was also created in 1941. EDES original agenda was republican and anti-monarchist. The nominal head of the organization was General Nikolaos Plastiras, a distinguished veteran of several campaigns who was admired by republicans. However, the real leader was retired colonel Napoleon Zervas, a veteran of the Balkan Wars with a long experience in paramilitary organization. The two groups followed very different trajectories in the area. EAM failed to attract significant support while EDES was able to recruit over 1000 armed guerillas in Thesprotia where it also operated a sophisticated administrative apparatus. The following paragraphs explore EDES’s trajectory in the area paying particular attention to the establishment, development and impact of paramilitary governance in local structures. The first armed groups that appeared in the region had no direct ties with the resistance organizations and were driven by local and personal agendas. For instance Donatos Sofias took to the mountains in the autumn of 1941 along with several of his relatives after murdering another Greek villager over a personal dispute. Sofias, I Grika Thesprotias, 16-17. Vasilis Baloumis, a shepherd from the village of Spatharati formed a small guerilla group in the same period to avenge the murder of a relative by local Muslims. In some cases it was very difficult to distinguish patriotic activism from outright criminality. Giourgas, Martiries kai viomata, 132-3 Guerilla leaders like Zois Padazis and Spiros Ioannou aka Tsouknidas had begun their career by murdering and robbing local peddlers and shepherds. Ibid. 132 Local peasants often used terms as ‘haidut’ –honor bandits or outlaws to describe these bands. Bikas, Sta Aposkia, 201, Ziagos, Agglikos Imperialismos, 178. Most of the bands had a strictly local remit and focused their activities against the Albanian gangs while they avoided engaging the Italians. These groups were structured around the extended families of their leaders and were formed along ethno-linguistic lines. Ziagos, Agglikos Imperialismos, 223. The band-members were joined on occasion by a number of part-timers; landless peasants, itinerant workers and displaced persons who looked to protect their property, exact revenge or simply to supplement their income through raiding. Giorgos Dimitriou, Oral Testimony, Ledeza 2009. The presence of these groups attracted the attention of the resistance organizations of EDES and EAM who tried to enlist the various independent group leaders to their cause. However, these efforts met with mixed results. EAM had made some inroads in the local towns but, failed to attract a significant political following among the rural population. The lack of support was due to low quality of EAM organizers most of whom had no ties to the area. An EAM report noted ‘many of our cadres were not up to the task....they created financial problems and made political blunders which the mass of the local people was unwilling to overlook’. Arheia Ethnikis Antistasis Vol.2/ Report of Lieutenant Gerasimos Priftis (Kastrinos) member of the Souli command and the 24th regiment on the formation and activities of the commands of Souli and Zaloggo and the 24th infantry regiment/20/01/1944, 389-391. The arrival of EDES further complicated the situation. EDES had a twofold advantage over its rival. EDES’s leader, Napoleon Zervas, hailed from the region and had close ties to local notable families and army officers. Moreover, EDES had access to a large cache of money and weapons that were provided by the British Special Operations Executive. EDES managed to attract several notables and band-leaders with the help of Apostolos Konstantinidis, a retired infantry officer with strong personal ties to the region. Konstantinidis had a poor military record but was an adept politician who used a combination of flattery and bribery to form several small bands. Most of these groups were headed by his kinsmen and officers who had served under him in the past. NA/HS 5/695/ Major P. Bathgate/ The Andarte Movement in Epirus/Jun 43-February 44/B6/108, 03/01/945 However, most independent band-leaders refused to choose sides. Some remained neutral while others played one organization against the other, extracting large sums of money and weaponry in the process. The two sides engaged in a frantic struggle to attract more men to their ranks, often making wildly inflated promises, a report noted ‘the EDES command black-mailed, and bribed…offering money, boots and guns to peasants’ who would join them. Arheia Ethnikis Antistasis, Report of Lieutenant Gerasimos Priftis, 391 EDES’s promises of money and provisions helped to entice a significant number of local peasants but, were not the sole factor behind its success. EAM cadres often neglected local customs and traditional forms of justice and conflict resolution and tried to curtail the independence of band-leaders by introducing regular army style discipline. ELAS bands also used extreme violence against local lawbreakers. Eventually, this approached backfired, as ‘many of those who previously supported us defected to EDES.’ Ntousias EAM Zaloggou, 130. EDES adopted a much more subtle approach. The organization steered clear from communal affairs which were tried in-house and according to customary law by the village authorities and co-operated with local authority figures; priests, elders and monastics, who acted as mediators between the local population and EDES. Alliances between EDES and local communities were made in an ad hoc basis. Some communities for instance agreed to raise a band under the condition that they would not be asked to fight outside their turf or bands from other regions would not be allowed to operate in their area. The bands were accordingly allowed to operate independently and without interference in issues of recruitment and justice. Dimitriadis, Perpatontas, 67. These tactics helped EDES to absorb the bulk of independent bands and form groups in many communities that had remained neutral. However, it also weakened the cohesion of the organization. The relationship between EDES and the local bands were inherently unstable and subject to constant change, threats and trade-offs as band-leaders extorted the organization for money and provisions threatening to defect unless their demands were satisfied. Romanos, Mia Athinaiki, 144. During the same period EDES tried to broker a deal with Albanian gang-leaders who were disappointed by the repeated setbacks suffered by the Italian army. The deal fell apart after the Wehrmacht arrived in the area. DIS/Sarantis Archive/Folder B/A File/Confidential and urgent report by special courier/Ioannina/01/01/1944 The Germans arrested several Albanian notables and convinced the wavering group-leaders to throw their lot with them. Over 1500 heavily armed Albanians cooperated with the Wehrmacht in a series of counter-insurgency operations that resulted in the destruction of 34 villages and the murder of 250 civilians. EDES was unable to stop this onslaught, thousands of civilians took flight along with their families in the uplands. The situation deteriorated further after the political tension that had been brewing between ELAS and EDES since the summer of 1943 escalated to full-blown warfare between the two organizations in October 1943. The congregation of this population in the uplands had a detrimental effect on local economy and society. German reprisals had stopped all agricultural activity and cut off the flow of goods and humanitarian aid from the rural areas to the nearby towns. This left the local population with no means of survival. Thousands of people lived in the open countryside, where they survived by begging and foraging while gangs of destitute and brutalized youths and Albanian militiamen roamed the countryside robbing, stealing, and murdering everyone who stood in their way. This situation threatened to undermine the resistance struggle since ‘many peasants accused the guerillas for the catastrophe that befell them.’ BMDA/Folder 4/263/Activite de la Commission de Gestion pour l’approvisionnement de L’Epire. EDES responded to these challenges by bolstering its military presence. The local armed groups were officially rebranded as the X Division and restructured into platoons and regiments. This restructuring was not determined solely by military aims. Approximately 75% of adult males in the area where unemployed. Many had already turned to brigandage and robbery. Opening up the organization to new recruits provided a much needed boost to the local economy and alleviated the growing social pressure. Over 2000 local men enlisted between January and May 1944. The overwhelming majority of these new recruits were displaced persons who ‘were driven to enlist because of their desperate financial situation.’ DIS/Georgios Agoros Archive/Folder 4/1/109/8th Division/Report on events between 20 March and 3 April 1944 (Deltio Pliroforion apo 20 Martiou mexri 3 Apriliou), 01/05/1944EDES model of governance also underwent significant changes. The organization tried to impose a monopoly of violence and establish a greater degree of political control by replacing the local administrative structures such as village councils and elder committees with EDES appointed ‘committees of national struggle’. These committees that were formed by trusted EDES members had a twofold task. The first was to re-impose law and order. Displacement and poverty had led many to turn to crime in order to survive. Theft, extortion and kidnaping were common. Some civilians even stole military equipment and sold it to the Albanian militias. The committees were ordered to take ‘extreme measures’ to combat graft, collaboration and anti-social behavior; public drinking, lewdness and gambling that had become ‘major issues that undermined civilian morale.’ DIS/Mavroskotis Archive/Folder 1/101/ Order Concerning the guerilla groups (Diatagi Peri Antartikon Omadon)/29/06/43. The second task of the committees was to provide and administer social services; education, health care etc. EDES set up soup kitchens that catered to displaced persons and provided local families with a monthly allowance of two golden sovereigns. Approximately 3000 peasants received this stipend. EDES also created a forestry service, a volunteer fire brigade, and two hospitals and provided funds to local schools. Α total of 147 schoolteachers, doctors and nurses were employed to run these institutions in addition to local peasants who were hired as muleteers, couriers, foresters, and truant officers. TNA/ HS 5/ 697/ Report by Capt. D.T.H. Nicholson on Past activities etc. in Greece, p. 9/01/04/1945 Youths were also organized in the EDEE [Ethniki Dimokratiki Enosi Ellinopaidon-National Republican Youth Association]. EDEE youths acted as an unofficial police force, and helped in the transport of provisions, munitions and food to the frontline. DIS/Nikolopoulos Archive/Folder B/4/Report on military activities (Polemiki Ekthesi)/01/05 1944. These social services were funded with the help of the British Military Mission. Additional income was derived by the taxation of local merchants and the occasional raids against Muslim and left-wing communities in the area. Pavlidis, 130. These policies had a profound impact in local society. Peasant communities were highly suspicious of outsiders and had a dogged preference for their own forms of justice and conflict resolution. The destruction of the local infrastructure turned local small farmers and peasants to salaried employees and mercenaries for EDES’s state-like apparatus and monetized the local economy. EDES’s educational and aid policies also served to bridge the differences between populations that shared the same faith but had little else in common. This was achieved through the aggressive propagation of a fiercely anti-communist ideology. EDES originally beheld a republican, anti-monarchist ideology that stressed issues of social justice and equality. However, as the occupation enveloped the organization started to deviate from this focus and espouse an increasingly conservative position. In March 1943 Zervas wrote two letters to King George II. In these letters Zervas expressed his unequivocal support to the monarchy and pledged to support the King’s return to Greece ‘even against the people’s wishes’. Petimezas, Ethniki Antistasi, 150-151.This shift in position was also evident in EDES publications and propaganda material that toned down anti-Axis themes and began to underline the ‘dangers of Bolshevism’ to ‘the family, the country, and religion.’ EDES espoused an equally aggressive tone vis-à-vis the Greece’s northern neighbors and supported the position that Greece should be compensated for its war time role with territory in southern Albania and Bulgaria. Megali Ellada, 12-15. Ultra-nationalist themes were combined with peasantist and corporatist themes. The rural population and the guerillas in specific were eulogized as an ‘aristocracy of blood’ and ‘future leaders in a fairer post-war Greece’ who fought for the nation while the ‘rich and the haves’ had ‘shut themselves inside their homes waiting to be redeemed by the heavens.’ Ibid, 16-18. These narratives were disseminated systematically by EDES’s ‘office for popular enlightenment’ that was created in the winter of 1943-4. The office included 20 ‘educational officers’ many of them young schoolteachers and undergraduates from the area. DIS/Mavroskotis Archive/ File 1/201, Epirus Command, directive on enlightenment (Arhigeio Ipeirou, diatagi peri diafotiseos) /22/02/1944. These officers carried out this task with an efficiency that led a British officer to note that ‘it seems that the pen has replaced the sword as the guerrillas’ weapon of choice.’ NA/HS 5/695/ Major P. Bathgate/ The Andarte Movement in Epirus/Jun 43-February 44/B6/108.These changes also opened up a world of opportunities to local intellectuals and ambitious peasants who had been sidelined and excluded from local power networks in the pre-war period. The onset of violence had led many notable families to flee the area. The political and military branch of EDES thus had to rely on local men of relatively low social status to form the committees for national struggle, disseminate propaganda and lead the local bands. These men who according to one local peasant ‘were really nobodies before the war’ seized the opportunity to ‘become real men of influence.’ Giannes Haliatsos, Oral Testimony, Nista, 2011. Most local EDES band-leaders came from humble backgrounds. Hristos Tsitsos, Vasilis Baloumis and Nasis Bakas were illiterate herders. Nikos Athanasiou, made a precarious living as a free-lance reporter before he joined EDES while Vasilis Pavlidis worked as a teacher in a mountain hamlet until he decided to enlist in the organization. Despite their humble origins these men were not radicals. Their aim was not to abolish the tradition and practices of patronage politics but rather to take advantage of their participation in EDES to insert themselves into the local power structures and form their own political ‘clientele’. Yet, these men differed in several crucial ways from the old elites. They were poorer, came from farming families and were raised in rural communities that tended to be much more conservative and anti-Muslim than the local market towns and the local cities. These experiences endowed them with a more nationalist and anti-Muslim mindest and attitude. Mouselimis, To Popovo, 10. These men managed to build their own patronage network through a combination of politicking and violence. Group leaders would often arrest local peasants on trumped up charges of spying, trespassing or smuggling and released them only after they received a hefty bribe to smooth things over with the court-martial. They also forced itinerant peddlers, journeymen and nomadic shepherds who did business or travelled through their areas to pay a ‘protection’ tax. Raiding was no less common or profitable. While EDES predominated in Thesprotia nearby areas like Pogoni in Ioannina and Zaloggo in Preveza were at the hands of ELAS. Many EDES groups casually raided these areas in search of loot and money. EDES groups that raided the areas of Zaloggo in the spring of 1944 terrorized leftists, robbed peasants, rustled cattle and stole cash and valuables which the sold to the local black-markets. The proceedings from such activities were used to buy political influence and seize control of the committees for the national struggle through bribery and threats. DIS/Mavroskotis Archive/Folder 1/702/844/Dictate of the General Headquarters on the relationship between our army and the Committees of National Struggle (Diatagi Genikou Arhigeiou peri sheseon Epitropon Ethnikou Agona kai Stratou mas)/01/08/1944 Controlling the committees allowed the band-leaders to regulate the flow of goods, aid and provisions in the countryside. This endowed them with an undue degree of political and social influence. A British Liaison officer noted that local units were ‘only loosely controlled by Zervas’ NA/War Office/ 204/9348/ Greek-Albanian relations: Albanian minorities in Greece, 5/No Date Provided some band-leaders defied orders to ‘allow their men to break into new territory to gain booty’, while others made ad-hoc alliances with local ELAS bands. NA/ HS5/695/Report on Zervas Andarte Movement, p.6. The EDES central command often avoided intervening as they were afraid that band-leaders would raise their own banner and create an independent resistance organization. Such fears were not unfounded. In one case a 100 strong band under Zois Padazis, a rustler turned ‘freedom-fighter’ defected from EDES. Padazis private army robbed, murdered and extorted Muslim and Christian civilians for several weeks. Padazis was forced to return to the fold only after EDES placed a 10.000.000 bounty on his head. DIS/Mavroskotis Archive/Folder 1/702/844/On desertion from the ranks of the army (Peri Egatalipsis ton taxeon stratou)/01/08/1944 Such attitudes demonstrate the continuous salience of local loyalties and culture in governance. Local politics were according to an EDES officer shaped by ‘sentiments of extreme localism and conservativeness, it is if as these people live in another planet, as if they have not heard anything about the civil war that is raging in the rest of the country, to them Athens is no more familiar than Stalingrad.’ DIS/Katsadimas Archive/Folder 1/Report on the situation in the area of Parga (Ekthesi epi tis katastaseos periohis Pargas)/02/05/1944 Such attitudes were not only a by-product of localism. Warfare and the destruction of infrastructure had isolated the area from nearby urban centers. This situation had stalled communication and the flow of information with the rest of the country. As a result many peasants were not fully aware of broader developments in the country. However, while traditional loyalties retained a considerable hold the administrative changes ushered by EDES were gradually transforming the bands and local societies alike. A local activist recalled ‘until then, we were a motley crew’ the reforms ‘changed things…we started to believe that we could actually make our own state, our own corner of Free Greece within our occupied homeland….the belief that the guerilla was no different to a bandit gradually became a thing of the past’. Pavlidis, 78. This shift in attitude was noticeable among the civilian population as well. EDES’s state-building efforts, propaganda and the provisioning of social services that were chronically absent from the area helped to legitimize its presence and ideology among the local peasantry. An EDEE member recalled ‘before EDES we were dead, poverty, fear, then the organization came, it offered aid, money, food and our villages managed to breathe again’. Zervas himself was impressed by the gradual change, noting ‘the people are becoming more disciplined, there is order and enthusiasm.’ Zervas, Imerologio, 391. The combination of propaganda, social benefits and military might allowed EDES to monopolize local resistance. These local units performed strongly in a series of clashes against the German army and Muslim militiamen. These groups were also responsible for a number of atrocities against the minority. The liberation of the area in June 1944 resulted in the massacre of over 700 local Albanians and the expulsion of thousands. Killing was accompanied by large scale destruction of property, entire villages, mosques and graveyards were burned to the ground to deter the minority from returning. Ibid, 399. Fighting resumed in the area in the winter of 1944-5 when ELAS unleashed an all-out attack against EDES. The bands were unable to withstand this onslaught. Local guerillas crossed the sea to Corfu while others took refuge in the mountains where they continued a campaign of low-level warfare against ELAS. The attitude of the local population towards the left was equally hostile. An ELAS officer noted in his diary ‘the locals view us with extreme hostility, they think that we are here to confiscate their property and shut down their Churches.’ Kremmos, Imerologio, 328. Violence, military mobilization and dislocation had a profound impact on the social and cultural structures of local societies. They undermined social ties, reshaped the foundations of local economy and created an entirely new class of political/military leaders who came from previously marginalized and impoverished communities. The ‘exile’ of the guerillas lasted briefly. Fighting in Epirus was part of a larger series of clashes between ELAS, pro-state forces and British troops that had Athens as their epicenter. These clashes which are known as ‘Dekemvriana’ came to an end in February 1945 when the representatives of EAM and the government signed a peace accord which became hitherto known as the Varkiza treaty. The first civilians began to return in mid-March 1945 and the relocation of this population was completed a month later. Many of them expected that their return would allow them to settle down and rebuild the area. However, these expectations were soon dashed as their return signaled a new round of conflict which lasted for four long years. From Bandits to Cold War Warriors The accord was not the end of the line for the paramilitaries. A few weeks after the accord was signed, pro-state groups, independent militias, former collaborationists and members of the security services began to attack members of EAM, demobilized guerillas and pro-left civilians. This wave of ‘white terror’ that claimed the lives of over 1000 individuals and the arrest and incarceration of several thousand civilians culminated in the outbreak of a civil war that raged between 1946 and 1949. Local paramilitaries played a particularly important role in these clashes. The position of the area next to the Albanian border turned the area into a battlefield. Several major battles took place in the upland areas or Mourgana and Souli. The end of the war did not diminish the strategic importance of the region. The Greek authorities saw the area as a military rampart in the case of a clash between East and West and took drastic measures to bolster the state’s capacity and to complete the process of violent nationalization set in motion during the occupation. This section explores the role of the militias in these clashes and follows their careers in the post-war period discussing the impact of civil war violence and mobilization in the restructuring of local political and social structures. Political infighting, poverty and lawlessness, precluded the demobilization of the paramilitary networks and facilitated the persistence of wartime patterns of governance and economy. The state was ‘completely absent from the area’ and peasants still relied on the informal ‘black’ economy for employment and access to resources. Agrotiki Ellas 10 June 1946. Food and provisions were carried from the countryside to the cities with the help of smuggling and black market networks that were set up during the occupation. A gendarmerie report noted that ‘prices are particularly high….as a result smuggling, usury and speculation are rampant….these phenomena have a particularly detrimental effect on the economy of local societies’. DIS/Civil War Archive/A/1/2, Submission of reports on the situation on area 2 (Ipovoli Ektheseon peri katastaseos eis periohin 2), Ioannina, 12/05/1945. This situation was exacerbated by the destruction of property and homes which had led hundreds of peasants from the area and adjoining districts to squat in abandoned Muslim houses. Agrotiki Ellas 05 August 1946. Over 2500 peasants from the areas of Souli and Mourgana had relocated to abandoned Muslim villages by mid-1945. Papamokos, I Selliani xthes kai simera, 160, Mouselimis, Istorikoi Peripatoi, 115. Rivalries and violence between squatters were common. In one case local farmers tried to burn alive a family of shepherds who squatted in an abandoned home. Campbell, Honor, Family, Patronage, 330. Since most squatters had no access to courts and were afraid to ask the help of the gendarmerie they relied on band-leaders who played the role of an unofficial police force. A local peasant recalled, ‘it was chaos, the leftists victimized the rightists and vice versa, and if you were neutral and had no one to back you up, you were targeted by all’. Protection often came at a price. Paramilitaries taxed merchants, peddlers and migratory shepherds who travelled through their areas and were also involved in smuggling and gun running. Skopouli, Sta Aposkia, 254. The continuing resonance of the bands and their participation in extra-legal activities led the local and national press to dismiss them as brigands who ruled the area through violence and intimidation. Agrotiki Ellas 05 August 1946. A local newspaper affiliated to the liberal party argued that ‘the band-leaders, the kepatanaioi, have become a state within the state’, Kyrix, 23 March 1946. the editor in chief of the conservative Ipeirotiko Mellon concurred noting that ‘the band-leaders of various hues and affiliation are ruling the countryside with complete disregard for the law’. Ipeirotiko Mellon, 18 May, 1945. However, such activities did not diminished their popularity. While many local peasants identified with the anti-communist cause they also ‘distrusted the authorities and the state’ and preferred to settle their differences ‘in house’ and according to customary law with the help of band-leaders. Furthermore, while the band-leaders engaged in extra-legal activities they did not see themselves as outlaws. In fact the bands often worked in tandem with the security service who overlooked such activities in exchange for their cooperation against the left. DIS/Civil War Archive/1372/Α/1/2/Report on the domestic situation/September 1945. Such alliances were brokered with the help of friendly elements in the gendarmerie and the army intelligence service bureau that was known as A2. The local offices of A2 were headed by two EDES veterans, lieutenant Evangelos Zotos and Colonel Theodoros Sarantis. The two men offered them protection from prosecution in exchange for their cooperation. Band leaders were tasked with harassing left-wing activists and Communist party members and undertaking raids in neighboring socialist Albania. NA/FO/371/48094/Report by Lt. Col. C.A.S. Palmer, p. 3. The paramilitaries found an equally important ally in the newly founded ultra-rightist EKE (Ethniko Komma Ellados-Greek National Party) of General Napoleon Zervas. The general had completely disowned his pre-war republicanism and adopted a stringent pro-monarchist stance. Yet, his party lacked contacts and influence in traditional right-wing circles. Zervas had to rely on his wartime networks for support and funding. He tried to achieve this by creating two organizations. The first was the ‘national association of resistance veterans’, a veteran association for EDES members and the ETHNEE (Ethniki Neolaia Ellados-Greek Nationalist Youth] a youth organization for women and men between the ages of 18 and 25. The two organizations acted as ‘muscle’ for Zervas’s party. ETHNEE youths and veterans assaulted representatives of rival nationalist organizations who dared ventured in their areas and blackmailed local officials. They also provided some social services and acted as mediators between Zervas’s constituents and the central government. The veterans associations lobbied the local and national authorities to provide homes, materiel and jobs for veterans and local ‘nationalists’. ETHNEE youths tilled the fields of disabled veterans and helped to repair local infrastructure and provided local youths with books and school supplies. DIS/Civil War Archive/1372/Α/1/2/Report on the domestic situation/June 1945. The role of these organizations was further bolstered after the 1946 elections. The combination of low level terrorism and selective benefits allowed Zervas to dominate local politics. The General was appointed minister for public order in the Dimitrios Maximos government. As Thanasis Sfikas noted, Zervas seized this opportunity to wreak revenge against the left and carve out a niche for himself and his followers in the local and national political scene. During his tenure Zervas formed a ministry within the ministry that was directed by a small circle of EDES veterans. The repeated setbacks suffered by the army convinced Zervas and his allies in the cabinet and the army that ‘a shadow army could only be combated by another shadow army’ that would use guerilla tactics to combat the left-wing insurgents. Thanasis D. Sfikas, 'Napoleon Zervas: The revenge of the vanquished, 1945-1947', Dodoni, vol. 34 (2005), pp. 191-208. The ministries of defense and security formed the MAY [Rural Defence Units] and MAD [Defence and Pursuit Units] for this purpose. The first organization was envisioned as a type of home-guard militia whose main task was to guard key infrastructure and police rural communities. The second organization was structured as an elite paramilitary force that was tasked with raiding insurgent outposts, collecting intelligence etc. MAD members were paid a monthly salary while their families had privileged access to health care, state aid and provisions. General State Archives/Royal Palace Archive/ File 439/106, Report of Georgios Zalokostas (Ekthesis Georgiou Zalokosta), 7/6/1946. In Thesprotia these organizations were formed after Zervas personally called his old-band-leaders and asked them to enlist and help raise these groups. Antoniou, Istoria, 2221. The rank and file and the leaders of the MAD were recruited among the members of the ETHNEE. The MAY which functioned as a reserve force were formed and led by the heads of the local veterans associations. The formations of these groups allowed the paramilitaries to operate as a parallel state and usurp the authority of the local government. A report noted ‘the state is powerless here, the locals feel that the real government is Zervas’s party and men. The EKE local leaders control any activity that takes place, the police, the district attorney, the military commander are all under their sway. The governor general and the prefect are powerless, the locals do not take them seriously’. The activities of the MAY, the MAD and Zervas’s party was coordinated by a clandestine organization that was set up by A2 officers and party activists. The committee that was known as ‘National Alert’ was located in Ioannina and was also responsible for ‘handling’ the finances of the organization. The organizations extorted businesses and professionals who were forced to contribute a monthly fee for the armed bands. Arheia Sinhornis Koinonikis Istorias, henceforth ASKI/ Communist Party Archive/Folder 417/ Report on the situation in Epirus (Ekthesi gia tin Katastasi stin Ipeiro), 28/1/1947. Militia leaders and their political masters used the organizations to solidify their dominance of the local informal economy and strengthen their patronage networks. The high rate of unemployment, past experiences of guerilla warfare and the widespread insecurity and political volatility made mercenary service a particularly appealing option for the impoverished peasants many of whom had served in EDES during the occupation. Band-leaders used their role as recruiters to ‘carry favor with their jobless constituents’ by providing them with a position in the local paramilitary bands. DIS/Civil War Archive/Folder 14/Report of colonel Papathanasiadis, 01/08/1947 Local villages were visited by the ‘Alert’s’ officials who ‘promised to the impoverished peasants, most of whom were EDES veterans two sovereigns per month to enlist.’ ASKI/Communist Party Archive/ Folder 417/Report on the situation in Epirus, 28/1/1947. Peasants were not innocuous victims though. Many took advantage of the paramilitary’s patronage to lay claim to resources and advance socially. Wartime service in EDES had turned ordinary peasants to political savvy operators who were able to use and manipulate political narratives for their own ends. Some communities formed grass roots organizations that were locally known as ‘national unions’ to advance their agendas. For instance the founding proclamation of ‘national union of Agia’, that was formed by a military veteran pledged the locals ‘undying dedication to the national cause’ and their hatred of the rebellion. The same document also called the local authorities to show ‘special consideration’ for the community by allowing it to appropriate a thousand hectare olive grove that used to belong to local Albanians. This was far from an isolated case. In the same period peasants from the village of Vrisella used similar narratives and tactics to outfight the neighboring community of Keramitsa. The two communities had been feuding over the ownership of pasturage. In a letter send to the governor general the inhabitants of Vrisella admitted that they lacked deeds and contracts for the land but claimed that they should be nonetheless allowed to herd their flocks in it since they were ‘pure nationalists’ while the inhabitants of Keremitsa ‘supported the left’. Therefore it would be in the ‘best interests’ of the nation to grant them the disputed area. This request was promptly accepted by the local authorities who granted the land to the inhabitants of Vrisella. Agrotiki Ellas, 5 August 1946. Such cases demonstrate that anti-communism was not just an elite project enforced from the top-down. Nationalist narratives were appropriated by local peasants who used them albeit in a highly idiosyncratic manner in a myriad local battles. This helped to integrate anti-communism into the regional political framework and transform local cleavages and identities along national lines. Thesprotika Nea, 01 April 1947. The violence of the paramilitaries and the venality of local nationalist activists raised the ire of the army GHQ that dispatched several senior officers for a fact-finding mission. The report on the militias’ activities was damning. The MAD were ‘a motley crew of adventurers of no military value. These men blackmail the army for higher wages and benefits perpetually asking for more money. Discipline is completely unknown to them’. In July 1947, 150 men deserted along taking their arms, equipment and vehicles back to their villages. The local EKE leaders stepped in to stop any repercussions. The report had few good things to say about the peasantry and its representatives who were dismissed as self-serving predators. DIS/Civil War Archive/Folder 14/Report of Colonel Papathanasiadis, 01/08/1947 Zervas’s efforts to build his own parallel military apparatus eventually cost him his position and led to the disbandment of the MAD. The local units were dispersed and replaced by the newly minted dimosiosidirito tagma (municipally funded battalion) formed by Dimitris Galanis, an EDES veteran from Crete. Ploumis, I Elliniki Tragodia, 123. The appointment of Galanis was seen as an affront by local band-leaders who refused to join him or allow locals to enlist in his bands. As a result he was forced to recruit among the ‘most disreputable element’, petty thieves, rustlers, jailbirds and rapists. Galanis’s bands suffered a series of devastating defeats at the hands of the leftist insurgents. These seatbacks led over 70% of Galanis’s desperadoes to desert. The remnants of the unit was segmented into small bands who robbed, looted, extorted and raped indiscriminately. These activities resulted in clashes between the local-band leaders who were enraged by their efforts to encroach their turf and seize control of the informal economy. MAY leaders used violence to keep them off and threatened to execute anyone who dared trespass into their areas. The army was eventually forced to relocate them in the border and disband them altogether in the spring of 1948. Thesprotika Nea, 01/05/1948. The dissolution of Galanis’s signaled the end of the militias as a viable military force but, it did not diminish their political importance. Thesprotia and other border regions were placed under a special regime known as the ‘surveilled zone statute’. Civilians were not allowed to travel from one part of the district to the other unless they possessed a ‘special’ identity card that was issued by the A2 with the recommendation of the local TEA (Tagmata Ethnofilakis Aminis-National Guard Defense Battalions) leader. Ziagos, Agglikos Imperialismos, 351. The TEA were the post-civil war incarnation of the MAY. They had the same structure of command and composition. Persons who were politically ‘suspect’ could be barred from ever travelling to their homes. This situation gave paramilitaries a huge degree of power over local civilians and authorities. A year after the parting shots of the civil war were fired the gendarmerie described the militia-dominated villages as ‘no-go’ zones that were ruled with complete impunity by the local band-leaders who ‘engaged in all types of illegal activity and even have the nerve to protect known leftist supporters and criminals whom they allowed to join the bands.’ GAK/Archive of Preveza Prefecture/Folder 90/20/05/1950/Report to the commanding officer of the Preveza gendarmerie (Anafora ston Dioiketi Horofilakis Prevezis), 20/05/1950. Such attitudes might have incensed the gendarmerie but there was very little they could do to control the bands. The geographical position next to the Albanian frontier and the continuous support of powerful figures in the army’s intelligence bureau made the bands an integral part of the local security system. The position of the bands was further bolstered after the government passed law 2185/1952 for the ‘forcible appropriation of landed estates’. This legislation was used to accelerate the pace of Hellenization in northern Greece through the settlement of ‘nationalist-minded’ populations. In Thesprotia this effort was coordinated by the foreign ministry, the governor general and the A2. Representatives of the three services agreed that ‘the colonization of the border regions of northern Greece is absolutely imperative….we must settle these areas that had been permanently abandoned by the anti-Hellenic element with belligerent and capable individuals in order to bolster the national sentiment of the local population’. This process ran into trouble from the very beginning. The organizations disagreed on whether veterans, civil servants, local national-minded persons, or displaced Greeks from southern Albanian were to be given precedent. The situation was further complicated by the presence of thousands of squatters and displaced persons from the area and adjoining districts and the internal feuds of local politicians who strove to acquire land for their political clientele and themselves. Gennadios Library/Fillipos Dragoumis Archive/Folder 94.4/21/10/1952/Foreign Ministry/Minutes of the subcommittee for the colonization. The struggle over land enhanced the position and salience of the militia-leaders as the arbiters of ‘national- mindedness’ and ‘protectors’ of the local population. The presence of multiple and overlapping patronage networks and the involvement of a host of local and national actors in the colonization process led to considerable friction and violence. Denunciations became common as different actors accused their opponents of having collaborated with the left in the past or simply of lacking the necessary ‘moral fiber’ that was required to be eligible for this urgent national mission. This widespread insecurity, combined with the chronic weakness of the state ‘made the presence of networks and protectors imperative and stronger’, and strengthened the role of anti-communist ideas in local politics. Gounaris ‘Social Aspects of Anticommunism’, 187. A local peasant recalled that ‘at the time you did not know who to trust, who worked for the police who would denounce you’, as a result you ‘had to join someone more powerful’ who was usually the local TEA leader. Giorgos Dimitriadis, Oral Testimony, Gardiki 2011. This situation played into the hands of local paramilitaries whose ties to the intelligence service, wartime past and their know-how of local politics and attitudes allowed them to insert themselves as middlemen in this process. A positive reference from a band-leader could go a long way into helping secure a piece of land, a house and access to state aid. A peasant from the village of Katouni recalled ‘the community was run by L.K who was a band-leader in EDES and later in the TEA. If you wanted to do anything in the village, open a shop, get a certificate etc he had to give you the ok, because he had the era of local politicians and the gendarmerie….when the Muslim estates where finally divided it was L.K who decided who takes what and for how much.’ Kostas Papatsatsis, Oral Testimony, Katouni 2011. Such men were hardly disinterested, the land issue was used to blackmail political opponents and convince civilians to vote for the ‘correct’ candidate during the local and national elections. Many TEA leaders received hefty bribes by local villagers who looked to acquire a piece of land. Some even used violence to oust squatters and bully local competitors. However, the paramilitaries did not acted as a single block. Rivalries between different paramilitary groups over land was common and led to injuries and in some cases fatalities. Archive of Preveza Prefecture/Folder 90/20/05/1950. Nonetheless politicians and the intelligence service were willing to overlook such actions, the head of the local gendarmerie recalled in his memoir ‘the TEA leaders were the real kings of the countryside, we were hopeless, in fact we were afraid of them and made sure to step out of their way as they had the ear of the local political class and the army’s intelligence bureau’. Dokanaris, I metapolemiki Ellada, 135. Such attitudes were no doubt influenced by the instability of post-war politics and the persistent fear of communism. The post-civil war period was marked by the fracturing of politics and intense intra-party struggles both in the right and the center parties. EKE won 74.28% of the local vote in 1946. It lost 50% of its strength in the 1950 elections as its share of the vote was splintered between the Liberal Party and the EPEK (Ethniki Proodeftiki Enosi Kedrou-National Progressive Centre Union) a centrist party that was led by General Nikolaos Plastiras, a legendary figure among Greek republicans. In elections that took place during September 1951, the newly minted Ellinikos Sinagermos (National Alert), the right-wing party of Marshall Alexandros Papagos received 23% of the vote, the Liberal Party 25% and EPEK 12.97%. A year later the Alert that recruited three former EKE MP’s won 61% of the local vote. In the 1956 elections ERE won 63% of the vote while the remaining was divided between three smaller republican/liberal parties. Data from Petros Hristou, To Kaleidoskopio tis Thesprotias The paramilitary’s ability to wield violence and their ability to mobilize the rural vote with the help of the veterans associations and the ETHNEE rendered them invaluable to aspiring politicians and eventually allowed them to displace the local traditional elites that was made off merchants, schoolteachers and professionals. Their position was further bolstered by the lingering rivalry between Greece and Albania. Thesprotia served as a springboard for undercover operations in Albanian soil. Albanians were equally active in the region. In 1958 a large Albanian spy ring was uncovered in the local capital setting off a wave of hysteria. The government reacted by stepping up its efforts to destabilize Albania through the creation of underground military network that was composed of and led by paramilitary veterans. These network undertook intelligence operations in Albania, spied on local leftists and coordinated black propaganda activities. Dagios, Ellada kai Alvania, 205. This situation further bolstered the position of paramilitaries in the local and national political setting. Local paramilitaries played a key role in the formation of the local chapter of the conservative party of ERE (Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis-National Radical Union) during the 1950’s. The ERE was a conservative party founded in 1956 by Konstantinos Karamanlis. ERE ruled the country between 1956 and 1963.The party rewarded their loyalty with land, civil service positions and business contracts. These ties allowed them to control the local civil service and administration, and become the ‘true authority’ and a ‘state within a state’ that acted in conjunction with the security service and local nationalist politicians. ASKI/EDA Archive/614.2/27/05/1958/Thesprotia/Memorandum. The police, the local unions and the civil service ‘agronomists, rural guards, school teachers, telegraphists were directly…controlled’ by the TEA leader at the behest of the local conservative MPs’ both of whom were former EDES band-leaders. Ziagos, Agglikos Imperialismos, 351. The personal archive of General Zervas provides an invaluable bird’s eye view of local governance in this period. Zervas was retired from politics in mid-1950s however, the administrative apparatuses of EDES were still in place albeit in a changed form. In the post-war period the veterans associations were headed by the more senior band-leader or ‘kapetanios’. For instance the veterans association in the area of Souli was led by Gakis Bolosis aka Pilio Gakis. Bolosis was the first local man to form an EDES band in the region during the occupation. His pioneering role in the formation of local EDES gave him seniority over other group-leaders who joined at a later date. The head of the local veterans association was more often than not also the leader of the local TEA unit. Thus Bolosis was the leader of the TEA units in Souli. The other members were veteran militiamen and members of the wartime committees for national struggle. The associations formed the main link between the past and current political practices. They functioned as lobbies and pressure groups for issues of national politics, they were particularly active during the Cypriot struggle, and in local affairs. The head of the local committee or ‘kapetanios’ was the liaison between the local community, the police and the various aid agencies that were active in the countryside. The ‘kapetanios’ was also responsible for communicating demands to the local MP and the authorities in Athens about issues that ranged from business licenses to access in higher education, help for civil service jobs etc. Greek Archive of History and Literature/Zervas Archive/Folder 5/1/Margariti/19/05/1952. The committees along with and TEA leaders and local intellectuals played a pivotal part in establishing rituals and events that commemorated significant anniversaries of resistance. The most pertinent was the commemoration of the battles of Menina and Agioi Theodoroi both of which took place in the summer of 1944. Commemorative events borrowed heavily from local cultural practices and combined both religious and secular themes. The two events began with a religious service and were followed by a final roll call and anti-communist speeches by the head of the veterans associations and local intellectuals. Such high representational tropes co-existed with regional articulations of the resistance narrative in the form of songs of praise or ‘kleftika’ that were performed by local singers during the feast that followed the speeches. These ballads presented the resistance and the subsequent fighting as a struggle between ‘The Turks’, ‘the communist gangsters’ and the ‘brave-band leaders’ and praised the gallantry and manliness of individual band-leaders. TEA leaders and ordinary members would sometimes discharge their weapons in the air during these performances and the dancing that followed. These events had a dual function. Pavlidis ‘Koinonikes Sheseis’, 206. They helped to ‘nationalize the war experience’ and create a local ‘official memory’ of the resistance by merging high and low representational tropes and ‘incorporating popular ideas and beliefs’ in the official narratives. Karakasidou ‘Protocol and Pageantry’, 221. At the same time they helped to legitimize the local power relations. The speeches by TEA leaders, the ballads that praised the achievements of EDES veterans and the discharging of weapons by members of the local militias who were the only persons among local civilians allowed to bear arms legally, was an affirmation and a reminder of their contribution and dominant position vis-à-vis the local peasantry. Conclusion: The occupation and subsequent civil war ushered profound changes in the ethnic, social and political make-up of Thesprotia. EDES paramilitaries played a pivotal role in these processes. The formation of the resistance militarized local societies in unexpected ways thereby generating new constellations of political power and governance. Warfare, reprisals and ethnic violence undermined established social and political practices while the formal economy was replaced by informal networks that depended on illicit activities such as smuggling, raiding and mercenary service. These changes undercut the power of the local elites and forms of governance. The collapse of the state led EDES to form new administrative apparatuses; committees of national struggle, the ‘enlightenment’ service and the EDEE, that replicated the pre-war state’s functions. These apparatuses were formed and operated by a new breed of leaders whose authority was based on their ability to control and regulate the informal economy. The control of these networks allowed them to replace local authorities as the foremost arbiters of communal justice and affairs. The rule of these new elites was often arbitrary and violent. However, the band-leaders and EDES did not impose their will solely through force. They provided work opportunities, relief, monetary aid and conflict resolution to a society that has been often neglected and marginalized by the central authorities. This helped EDES to legitimize their role and formulate a communal consensus for their fiercely anti-communist ideology among the local population. These changes re-aligned the resistance struggle along new ideological lines (communism/anti-communism) that shaped local politics in subsequent decades. Such practices did not lost their salience after the war. Insecurity and high unemployment enabled these groups to refashion their role as mediators and brokers between the central state and the peasant population and retain their hold over the informal economy. Despite their involvement in illicit activities the new elites were by no means opposed to the state. In fact band leaders and their followers cooperated with the state to complete the process of violent nation-building that started in the pre-war period. This relationship was often fraught with difficulties. The reconstruction of post-war Greece was sometimes described in terms of a powerful state imposing its will from the top down. However, in Thesprotia realities on the ground were very different. Local state building took the form of painstaking negotiations between the state and a series of local and national actors; political parties, military and security operatives and armed groups with highly divergent interests and agendas. These processes allowed band-leaders a particularly high-degree of latitude and facilitated the persistence of a series of parallel institutions; veterans associations, paramilitary groups and political committees that co-governed with the local authorities. This process did not weakened ‘the power of the state’, in fact ‘the intertwinement’ between non-state actors and the national authorities allowed the gradual absorption of these highly localistic groupings into the state structure. Militias continued to play a pivotal role in the decades that followed the civil war and reached their apogee in the junta years (1967-1974) when many kapetanios were appointed mayors while a veteran paramilitary was appointed governor general. The power of the kapetanios persisted well into the 1980’s when the TEA were finally disbanded. Yet, their presence had left an undeniable imprint in local political practices. Paramilitary mobilization facilitated the emergence of an entirely new strata of local political leaders, the displacement of traditional elites and the emergence of new instruments of governance which introduced new political practices and new ways of understanding, thinking and relating to the nation state in the guise of a grass roots anti-communism. Such narratives helped legitimize the role of paramilitaries and provided the basis for a new political identity that merged local, national and supranational elements and served as a glue that united this fructuous, polyglot region and populations. Such processes were not unique to the region. What happened in Thesprotia was part of a much larger wave of ethnic violence, displacement and nation building in eastern and central European areas like Istria, Bukovina and Galicia. Snyder, Bloodlands; Ballinger, History in Exile; Lowe, Savage Continent. Studies of these processes have underscored the role of violence and explored the role of national and transnational political elites in the remaking of the European ‘bloodlands’. The case-study presented in this article demonstrates instead that this process was much more piecemeal and fragmented than previously suggested. Moreover, it underlined how violent non-state armed actors contributed to this process not only through violence but also through the establishment of new governance modalities. Paramilitary mobilization facilitated the reconfiguration of center periphery relations through the formation of novel political networks thereby allowing the gradual integration of previously marginal local communities into the national body-politic. Yet, Thesprotia presented particular dynamics that could very well differ from those of other areas in northern and north-western Greece. Future studies are therefore needed to examine how non-state actors such as paramilitaries but, also aid agencies, veteran associations and youth organizations that operated in these regions engaged with governance and produced new local social orders that paved the way for the nationalization of these contested frontier zones. 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