PEER-REVIEWED ARTICLE
Tax Treaty Override: A Jurisdictional Approach
Luís Eduardo Schoueri*
Despite the recent developments grounded on constitutional arguments, the current country-by-country approaches to treaty override still fail to
qualify the overriding as an unacceptable attempt to extend taxation beyond the limits agreed with treaty partners. Accordingly, treaty override has
been seen as a problem the solution of which would depend on each country’s view on the role of international law. This article suggests that such
failure is due to limitations inherent to this misleading reasoning with respect to the relation between domestic legislation and international law.
After describing the main approaches to treaty override, the author proposes that treaty override must be addressed as an issue of jurisdiction, instead
of a matter of hierarchy. The proposed approach is consistent with the actual purpose of double tax conventions and with the need to preserve the
jurisdictional limitations agreed under tax treaties.
1
law (‘Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit’), provided for by the Basic
Law, Vogel further considered that, given the position of
Germany in the international community, the treaty
override should be deemed unconstitutional.4
Vogel’s conclusion opposed to the traditional position,
as per the treaty override is considered a regrettable
violation of public international law, though without any
legal consequences at the German domestic level.5
In the last decade, there has been a trend among
international scholars to overcome this traditional
reasoning, considering treaty override an issue regarding
jurisdiction and observation to the principles of public
international law, rather than a matter that could be
addressed solely by hierarchy or lex specialis considerations,
as the traditional reasoning implies. The concern that the
violation of the principles of international law, namely the
pacta sunt servanda principle, is not compatible with the
principles of a constitutional democracy has increased, and
the need to balance the principle of the rule of law with
the principle of democracy has been privileged.6
INTRODUCTION
Bidding farewell to treaty override in Europe, Klaus Vogel
once pronounced himself ‘firmly in favour of giving
precedence to international treaties’ over domestic
legislation, predicting that, in the future, such conviction
would ‘become generally accepted’1 under German
legislation. He also added that the same would occur in
other countries, except for those which follow the United
Kingdom’s system and the United States.2
Analysing the German constitutional law, Vogel argued
that neither Article 25 nor Article 59(2) of the German
Basic Law clearly answered whether the domestic law or
the international treaty should prevail in case of a conflict.
As a consequence, a creative formation of the law
(‘Rechtsfortbildung’) should take place. The general sense of
justice, in such cases, would lead to the conclusion that
the international treaty should prevail.3
Based on the rule of law (‘Rechtstaatsgrundsatz’) and on
the observation to the principles of public international
Notes
*
Professor of Tax Law at the University of São Paulo. Vice President of the Brazilian Tax Law Institute.
1
Klaus Vogel, ‘New Europe Bids Farewell to Treaty Override’, in Bulletin – Tax Treaty Monitor, vol. 58, Amsterdam, IBFD, 2004, p. 8.
2
See Klaus Vogel, supra n. 1, at 8.
3
See Klaus Vogel, supra n. 1, at 8. Vogel makes reference to a decision of the Swiss Bundesgericht, in which it noted that ‘a state which binds itself by treaty has to respect its
rules whatever that state’s own domestic rules are’.
4
See Klaus Vogel, ‘Völkerrechtliche Verträge und innerstaatliche Gesetzgebung – Eine neue Entscheidung des BVerfG hat Bedeutung auch für die Beurteilung des treaty
override’, in Internationales Steuerrecht 1/2005.
5
The traditional position will be described below. For a contextualization of the ongoing debate in Germany, see Moris Lehner, ‘Treaty Override im Anwendungsbereich des §
50d EstG’, in Internationales Steuerrecht, 11/2012, pp. 389–404; Andreas Perdelwitz, ‘Treaty Override – Revival of the Debate over the Constitutionality of Domestic Treaty
Override Provisions in Germany’, in European Taxation – Special Issue, September 2013, pp. 446–447.
6
See Alexander Rust and Ekkehart Reimer, ‘Treaty Override im deutschen Internationalen Steuerrecht’, in Internationales Steuerrecht, 24/2005, pp. 843–849.
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Tax Treaty Override: A Jurisdictional Approach
Following this understanding, the Bundesfinanzhof
(‘BFH’) considered that section 50d(8)7 of the German
Income Tax Law violated the pacta sunt servanda principle,
because was contrary to the Germany-Turkey Income and
Capital Tax Treaty.8 Resorting to a proportionality test,
the Court concluded that the provision was
unconstitutional. Accordingly, the intent to avoid the
double non-taxation would not justify the treaty override
carried out by the 50d(8) of the German Income Tax Law.
Similar reasoning can be found in a recent decision issued
by BFH concerning to 50 d(10)9 of the same law, in
contrast with the Germany-Italy tax treaty.10 The Court
itself, upon informing that both decisions would be
submitted to the Constitutional Court, declared that since
there are other texts contrary to tax treaties, new decisions
should be expected to confirm the same trend.11
Nonetheless, there is no unanimity with respect to this
new formulation. Lehner considers that the reasoning
developed by Vogel and later applied by the BFH implies
a stronger protection to international conventions than to
ordinary legislation.12 As a consequence, Vogel’s
understanding would lead to a loss of authority of the
legislator and jeopardize the attribution of jurisdiction set
forth by the Basic Law.13
It is important to notice that, despite the fact that the
question is still highly controversial, the discussion has
levelled, in a sense that the hierarchy and prevalence
considerations have now solely a secondary role. Even
though, some States, despite acknowledging that the
treaty override is a clear violation to international law,
consider it acceptable under domestic legislation and
override treaties based on arguments such as the lex
specialis derogat legi generali and the lex posterior derogat legi
priori principles.
This article intends to demonstrate that such reasoning
is misleading and disregards the actual relation between
domestic legislation and international law. As it will be
addressed, the discussion must be centred in the role of
double tax conventions, which limit the jurisdiction of the
States at the international level.
2
PRELIMINARY ISSUE: HOW TO IDENTIFY A
TREATY OVERRIDING
Tax treaty override has been defined by the OECD14 as the
‘enactment of legislation which is intended to nullify
unilaterally the application of international treaty
obligations’, or the enactment of ‘legislation which is
intended to have effects in clear contradiction to
international treaty obligations’.
In a broad sense, treaty override could cover a number
of different situations. The International Tax Glossary
edited by the IBFD includes therein also legislation
reverting a judicial decision in conflict with the
legislature’s interpretation of a treaty; changing the
definition of a term employed in a treaty which, due to
Article 3(2) and the dynamic interpretation, implies
changing the treaty itself, as well as changes in domestic
legislation which unintentionally conflicts with a treaty
provision.15
Such an extensive definition of treaty override, however,
may imply some challenges, derived from the obvious fact
that arguments applicable to one case are certainly not
extensive to the others, what may lead to undesired
generalization of problems and solutions. Accordingly,
there is a difference between the situation in which the
Legislative enacts a statute clearly overriding tax treaties,
on one hand, and, on the other hand, a tax administration’s
interpretation contrary to the prevailing view about the
extension of a tax treaty provision. The latter is a mere case
of misinterpretation by the Executive which can generally
be controlled by the Judiciary without need of declaring a
statute unconstitutional. An example of such
misinterpretation could be found when Brazilian
authorities claimed that enterprise services not included in
Article 12 would be taxed according to Article 21 (other
income), not Article 7 (business profits). Although this
understanding caused trouble for taxpayers, they could
bring the case before Courts, which have systematically
Notes
7
The provision sets forth that the tax exemption for income from employment, agreed under tax conventions, shall only be granted if the taxpayer proves that the other
contracting country has waived its right of taxation or that the taxes in reference have been paid in the other country. The need of evidence is not addressed by the tax
conventions.
8
Bundesfinanzhof, I R 66/09, decided on 1 Oct. 2012.
9
This article defines interest paid to a partner of a German business partnership as business income for purposes of application of a tax treaty, in order to overcome prior case
Law of the BFH. The court has held that interest paid to a treaty resident partner cannot be taxed in Germany, due to the interest article of the tax conventions.
10
Bundesfinanzhof, I R 4/13, decided on 11 Dec. 2013.
11
Bundesfinanzhof, Pressemitteilung Nr 15, of 12 Feb. 2014, available at http://juris.bundesfinanzhof.de (accessed 25 Mar. 2014).
12
Moris Lehner, ‘Treaty Override im Anwendungsbereich des § 50d EstG’, supra n. 5, at 401.
13
Moris Lehner, supra n. 5, at 401.
14
OECD, Recommendation of the Council Concerning Tax Treaty Override. 2 Oct. 1989. C(89) 146/Final.
15
See ‘Treaty Override’ in Barry Lanking (Ed.), International Tax Glossary, 4th revised edition, Amsterdam, IBFD, 2001.
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Intertax
confirmed that Article 21 is not applicable,16 what has
recently been recognized even by the State attorney.17 This
example is enough for a first limitation in the definition of
tax treaty override: the concept shall include only
legislation, not mere administrative acts (notwithstanding
the latter may have normative effects). Generally, treaty
overriding derives from an act approved by the Legislative
Branch. Gebhart suggests the expression ‘legislative treaty
override’, as opposed to a ‘judicial treaty override’, the
latter referring to a case where a Judiciary would decide
against what is generally seen as the intention of the treaty
partners.18
This limitation, however, is not enough. In several
cases, legislation is enacted under a treaty, but somehow
may imply a limitation to its terms. A good example may
be found in transfer pricing. In spite of the general
international effort to find a common understanding on
the arm’s length standard, it is very difficult to find two
identical transfer pricing legislations. Each country tends
to apply the very same Article 9 on a different way, which
implies different results for similar problems. In several
cases, this may be solved by means of APAs or MAPs, but
even in such cases, the evidence is enough to show that the
wording of a treaty may lead to results which are not
contemplated by internal legislation: unless one country
would claim the monopoly on the interpretation of Article
9 (formula: ‘I am right and you are wrong’), APAs and
MAPs shall initiate after the recognition that both
countries are applying the same rule differently, but not
mistakenly. Thus, one should not consider treaty override
when a legislation simply follows one acceptable
interpretation of a tax treaty.
Another situation which should not be considered a tax
treaty override will be found when the legislation is not
clear enough on the decision to disrespect the tax treaty.
This would be the case in which the legislation would
offer several interpretations, some of them contrary to a tax
treaty and other in conformity therewith: this would be an
occasion for a treaty-conform interpretation which would
immediately deny the treaty override.19
One can therefore recognize a tax treaty override when
the legislation explicitly determines the non-application of
a (previous in time) tax treaty provision to a case.
Gebhardt refers to treaty override in a narrow sense (im
engeren Sinne),20 which is characterized by a formal will of
derogating. This is a formal procedure, since the
overriding rule makes express reference to the tax treaty
and determines that the latter will not be applicable.
A treaty override will occur in all cases in which a
domestic legislator determines the non-application of a
treaty rule, irrespective of the fact whether there is or not a
justification for such act.
Accordingly, if one adopts a concept which goes beyond
such formal approach, the existence, or not, of a treaty
overriding can always be challenged. One will claim that
the fact that tax legislation determines that a specific
provision is not applicable to a case does not necessarily
imply that the legislator is not respecting a treaty. In
several cases, one can argue that the legislator is simply
applying the treaty and avoiding that through a literal
application of one treaty provision, benefits may be
granted that were not foreseen in the treaty itself. This
was, for instance, the reasoning adopted by Mike McIntyre
in his defence of the US practice. He claimed that
overriding could be a mere extensive interpretation (and
therefore no actual overriding), or a test or a mere
potential (but not effective) override.21
The idea of an ‘interpretative override’ is quite
tempting. The argument can generally be used in case of
rules against abuse: if one admits that treaties are not
applicable in abusive situations, than one cannot claim
that States are disrespecting their international
compromises when they deny a benefit which would
otherwise not be comprised within the scope of the treaty.
This seems also to be the idea behind Avi-Yonah’s
contention that the treaty override is not a serious
problem, as it is usually argued. He observes that the US,
main target of the OECD Report, seldom carry out treaty
overrides.22 Furthermore, the treaty override would only
occur in reasonable cases, based on the purpose of the
treaty. In other words, treaty override situations should be
allowed, according to the author, when compatible with
the main purpose of the treaty, which, according to him,
would be to prevent double taxation and double nontaxation. In this sense, the treaty override would be an
important tool to prevent the abuse of treaties, provided
that it is rarely used.23 As he summarizes, there would be
an underlying assumption of treaties that they would only
Notes
16
Superior Court of Justice, Appeal No. 1.161.467/RS, decided on 17 May 2012. For a detailed analysis of the arguments developed by the Court, see Luís Eduardo Schoueri
and Mateus Calicchio Barbosa, ‘Brazil: Technical Services and the Application of Article 7 under Brazilian Treaty Practice – A Case Study’, in Michael Lang, Jeffrey Owens,
Pasquale Pistone et al. (Ed.), Tax Treaty Case Law Around the Globe 2013, Vienna, Linde/IBFD, 2013, pp. 103–116.
17
Ministry of Finance, Attorney General of the National Treasury, Opinion No. 2363, 6 Dec. 2013.
18
See R. Gebhardt, Deutsches Tax Treaty Overriding. Hallesche Schriften zur Betriebswirschaft, DOI 10.1007/978-3-658-00059-2-, Wiesbaden, Springer. 2013, p. 6.
19
See Alexander Rust and Ekkehart Reimer, supra n. 6, at 846–848.
20
See R. Gebhardt, supra n. 18, at 11.
21
See Mike McIntyre, ‘A Defense of Treaty Overrides’, in Tax Notes International, vol. 1, 1989, p. 611.
22
See Reuven Avi-Yonah, ‘Tax treaty overrides: a qualified defense of U.S. practice’, in Guglielmo Maisto (Ed.), Tax Treaties and Domestic Law, vol. 2, Amsterdam, IBFD, 2006,
pp. 66–68.
23
See Reuven Avi-Yonah, ‘Tax treaty overrides: a qualified defense of U.S. practice’, supra n. 22, at 77–78.
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Tax Treaty Override: A Jurisdictional Approach
In spite of Vogel’s enthusiastic support for the existence
of a general anti-abuse clause in all treaties,28 which would
be the necessary background to support the idea that there
would be no overriding in such cases, one has to recognize
that there is no general acceptance of the existence of such
clause. Evidence thereof can be found, for instance, on the
fact that several treaties contain clauses for limitation of
benefits or other specific anti-abuse provisions. It is
difficult therefore to admit that situations beyond the
limits foreseen in the treaties should also be excluded from
its benefits. Therefore, in case of treaties providing for
specific anti-abuse rules, the unilateral legislation which
includes among the abusive situations a case not foreseen
in the treaty must be considered a treaty override.
Moreover, one needs to agree with Hey29 to say that the
so-called general anti-abuse clause would be too abstract
(there is no clear concept of abuse in international law),
what would imply that each treaty partner would apply its
own internal anti-abuse rules, which will most probably
be different from one State to another. In such sense, it is
hard to argue that an internal rule would be ‘inserted’ in
the treaty when only one of both States applies it.
As one can see from the examples above, the internal
legislator overrides a tax treaty when a treaty benefit is
conditioned upon a fulfilment of a requirement which was
not foreseen in the treaty itself.
Also unconvincing is the denial of treaty overriding in
cases domestic legislation would be enacted in order to
avoid the so-called double non-taxation. There is no
consensus on the existence of an ‘international tax regime’,
which would include the ‘single tax principle’ (‘income
from cross-border transactions should be subject to tax
once [i.e., neither more nor less than once]’);30 on the
contrary, it is quite well spread among scholars the idea
that treaties not only avoid effective double taxation, but
also virtual one. Thus, the mere fact that an item of
income is not effectively taxed in one country is not an
argument strong enough to allow the other treaty partner
to tax a subject beyond its own limits.
In any case, the circumstance that a treaty overriding
can be justified is not enough to deny its existence. One
can argue that treaty overriding is, or is not, against
be intended to benefit bona fide residents, otherwise any
treaty would become a ‘treaty with the world’, what would
justify the override.24
It is challenging to determine whether an abusive
practice is, or not, within the scope of tax treaties. If one
considers the very history of treaty overriding, one will
immediately note that legislators do not clearly believe
they are restraining the application of tax treaties, but
rather that they are avoiding abuse. Accordingly, the first
case in which treaty overriding had an international
repercussion dates of 1980, when the United States
enacted the Foreign Investment in Real Property Act
(FIRPTA). This law constituted an exception to the rule
(present in US tax treaties) according to which capital
gains earned by non residents from sale of participation in
pure holding companies would be exempted. According to
FIRPTA, this gain would be taxable when referring to real
estate holdings.25 Although one could already claim that
this would not be against tax treaties, this does not seem
to have been the general understanding by that time, what
can be revealed by the fact that FIRPTA was not
immediately applicable and a five-year period was granted
for the continued application of the tax treaties
notwithstanding FIRPTA provisions.
Also the 1986 Tax Reform Act (TRA), which modified
the section 884 of the Internal Revenue Code in order to
prevent branches of foreign entities to be granted a tax
treatment more favourable than the applicable to local
companies.26 Since this new rule could override tax
treaties’ rules, section 884(c) declared that tax treaty
privileges would be applicable provided the beneficiary
would be a ‘qualified resident’, which was defined per
section 884-c-4-A. Said definition was not included in the
US tax treaties and preconditioning treaty benefits to the
evidence that the beneficiary was a qualified resident was a
clear treaty overriding. Once again, one could claim that
the internal rule would simply avoid abuses, but this was
not the general perception. Accordingly, upon edition of
TRA, the Group of Six (Germany, Belgium France, UK,
Luxembourg and The Netherlands) signed a joint
memorandum to express their concerns to the fact that
TRA could be against US tax treaties.27
Notes
24
See Reuven Avi-Yonah, ‘Chapter 11 – The Role of Treaties’, in Reuven Avi Yonah, Diane M. Ring and Yariv Brauner, U.S International Taxation, 2nd ed., New York,
Foundation Press, Thomson, 2005, p. 509.
25
See Herbert H. Alpert and Fred Feinglod, ‘USA: Foreign Investment in Real Property Act of 1980’, in Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation, vol. 35, Amsterdam,
IBFD, 1981, p. 195.
26
See The Tax Reform Act of 1986, vol. I, Legislative History, Tax Management Portfolios, Washington DC, Tax Management Inc, p. 454; Carl Esters, ‘Recent Developments in
U.S. Taxation of Foreign Direct Investment’, in Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation, vol. 45, Amsterdam, IBFD, 1991, p. 17.
27
See Tax Notes, vol. 36, 1987, p. 437.
28
See Klaus Vogel’s introduction in Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland auf dem Gebiet der Steuern von Einkommen und Vermögen, Klaus Vogel and Michael
Lehner (orgs.). 4. ed., Munich, CH Beck, 2003, p. 185.
29
See Johanna Hey, ‘Nationale Missbrauchsvroschriften im Spannungsfeld von DBA-und EU-Recht’, in Jürgen Lüdicke (org.), Wo steht das deutsche Internationale Steuerrecht?,
Köln, Dr Otto Schmidt, 2009, p. 137.
30
See Reuven Avi-Yonah, International Tax as International Law: An analysis of the International Tax Regime, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 8–9.
685
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immediately valid in the national legal orders, without
any need of formal reception acts.36
Despite the early theoretical divergences, monists and
dualists evolved to more ‘moderate’37 understandings. It is
possible to affirm that their divergences nowadays are
solely related to philosophical and legal principles and do
not involve practical effects.38
Accordingly, when one comes to the countries’ practice,
it is clear that different legal systems diverge in the
issue.39 An evidence can be found in a research conducted
by Karl J. Partsch back in 1964,40 when one could find
the most different solutions: while the USSR would not
recognize treaties a legal status, one would find, on the
other hand, legal systems, like France, where treaties
would prevail over laws enacted later in time (provided
reciprocal treatment would be granted by the treaty
partner), or, under some circumstances, even over
constitutional rules, like in The Netherlands. In the UK,
treaties validly concluded do not demand parliamentary
sanction in order to be binding on the state, but they will
only have effect on the laws of the UK after ‘appropriate
legislative action has been taken’.41 Accordingly, ‘[a]
treaty to which Her Majesty’s Government is a party does
not alter the laws of the United Kingdom’, in a sense that:
international law. The definition – enactment of legislative
act which derogates the application of previous treaty rules
– remains untouched.
3
TRADITIONAL APPROACH: A HIERARCHICAL
COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY SOLUTION
Traditionally, treaty overriding has been seen as a problem
the solution of which would depend on a country’s view on
the role of international law which origin dates back to the
debate between the defenders of ‘dualism’ and ‘monism’.
According to the ‘dualists’, led by Triepel,31 in Germany,
Anzilotti,32 in Italy, and Irineu Strenger,33 in Brazil, the
national and international orders would be independent,
with respect to their origins and to the relations they
concern. Hence, there would be no conflict between rules
of such legal orders: if there would be no contact, there
would be no conflict. The national and international legal
orders would only communicate if there were a reception
of international rules by the national legal orders, which
would occur by law or an express act of the Government.34
Such understanding was challenged by the monists,
according to whom there would only be one legal order.
Among the monists, there were those who defended that
the domestic legislation should prevail and those who
understood that international treaties were more
important. The monists were headed by the members of
the Viennese School (Kelsen and Verdross, whose
understanding has been supported in Brazil35 by Marotta
Rangel, Haroldo Valladão, Oscar Tenório and Celso de
Albuquerque Mello). According to the monists, there
would be only one legal order, in which the national legal
orders were integrated, as partial legal systems. In this
sense, the international treaties and conventions would be
[e]xcept to the extent that a treaty becomes
incorporated into the laws of the United Kingdom by
statute, the courts of the United Kingdom have no
power to enforce treaty rights and obligations at the
behest of a sovereign government or on behalf of a
private individual.42
Such a variety of solutions may lead one to believe that a
common solution would not be possible, what would
mean that depending on the treaty – and on the treaty
partners involved – legal certainty would diverge.
Notes
31
See Karl Heinrich Triepel, As relações entre o direito interno e o direito internacional (The relations between domestic law and international law), in Revista da Faculdade de
Direito da Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte, October 1966, pp. 7–64.
32
See Charles Rousseau, Droit International Public, 9th ed., Paris, Dalloz, 1979, p. 4.
33
See Irineu Strenger, Direito Internacional Privado: parte geral (Private International Law: general part), vol. 1, São Paulo, Revista dos Tribunais, 1986, p. 78.
34
See Guido Soares, Curso de Direito Internacional Público (Public International Law Course), vol. 1. São Paulo, Atlas, 2002, p. 203.
35
See Celso D. de Albuquerque Mello, Curso de Direito Internacional Público (Public International Law Course), vol. 1, 14th ed., Rio de Janeiro, Renovar, 2002, p. 111–112;
Haroldo Valladão, Direito Internacional Privado (Private International Law), Rio de Janeiro, Freitas Bastos, 1968, pp. 36–53; Oscar Tenório, Direito Internacional Privado
(Private International Law), v. I, Rio de Janeiro, Freitas Bastos, 1965, p. 65–67; Vicente Marotta Rangel, Os conflitos entre o direito interno e os tratados internacionais (The
conflicts between domestic law and international treaties), in Boletim da Sociedade Brasileira de Direito Internacional, year 23, n. 45/46, p. 2–54, 1967.
36
See Guido Soares, supra n. 34, at 204.
37
According to Vogel, the prevalent theory is the ‘moderate dualism’, which considers that domestic and international legislation are part of two spheres that exist separately.
An international treaty, in order to be effective in domestic law, must be introduced in domestic legislation. See Klaus Vogel, The domestic law perspective, in Guglielmo
Maisto (Ed.), Tax Treaties and Domestic Law, vol 2., Amsterdam, IBFD, 2006, p. 3.
38
See Rudolf Geiger, Grundgesetz und Völkerrecht, München, Beck, 1985, p. 16.
39
Professor Guido Soares presented Antonio Cassese’s classification regarding how constitutions deal with the relation between international treaties and domestic legislation.
Accordingly, there are (i) constitutions which ignore the question concerning the internalization of international treaties; (ii) constitutions which put the international treaty
in the same hierarchy as domestic ordinary legislation; (iii) constitutions which consider international treaties as ‘quasi’ constitutional rules; and (iv) constitutions that
absorb tax treaties as constitutional rules. See Guido Soares, supra n. 34, at 216–225.
40
See Karl J. Partsch, ‘Die Anwendung des Völkerrechts im innerstaatlichen Recht – Überprüfung der Transformationslehre’, in Berichte der Deutsche Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht,
Heft 6, 1964, p. 248–250.
41
See Jonathan Schwarz, Schwarz on Tax Treaties, Wolter Kluwer, UK, 2009, p. 4.
42
McLaine Watson v. Department of trade [1989] 3 All ER 523, HL, at 526.
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Tax Treaty Override: A Jurisdictional Approach
to whom ‘the Brazilian Constitution grants precedence to
international treaties and provides for the applicability of
its provisions upon the signature of the treaty by Brazil’.47
He also argues that ‘Article 98 of the Brazilian Tax Code
sets forth the supremacy of the conventional tax rule in
relation to domestic legislation, forbidding its
modification by the ordinary legislature’.48
Brazilian Courts used to admit the prevalence of
international law over domestic legislation.49 In 1913, the
Brazilian Supreme Court decided that a treaty was in
force, in spite of the enactment of a subsequent law
contrary to the provisions of such international
agreement.50 This statement would be repeated in a later
decision of the Court.51 There is also a precedent in which
the Supreme Court concluded that a treaty had revoked
laws formerly enacted.52
Such trend was interrupted in 1977, when the Supreme
Court decided that, in a conflict between treaty and lex
posterior, the latter would prevail, since it would express
the actual will of the legislature. In this occasion, the
Court concluded that the prevalence of domestic
legislation should be granted, notwithstanding the
international consequences of a clear violation of the
provisions of a treaty.53
Whilst the outcome of this decision, the judges
dissented in their reasoning with respect to the relation
between treaty and domestic law and made an important
distinction, which became fundamental to the
comprehension of the Brazilian case law regarding the
application of international treaties. The leading opinion
adopted the understanding whereby Brazilian domestic
legislation should prevail over international treaties.
However, it resorted to a distinction between the
Convention dealt with in the case (the Geneva Convention
Providing a Uniform Law For Bills of Exchange and
Promissory Notes) and tax treaties, considering a
classification made by some international law scholars
between ‘contractual treaties’ and ‘normative treaties’.
Normative treaties would be those treaties which have a
Although this may be confirmed by the present experience
of national decisions, this paper claims that Vogel’s appeal
towards a farewell to treaty override should not depend on
a per-country legislative decision, but rather on a general
understanding of the role of tax treaties.
3.1 An Example of a Hierarchical Approach:
The Brazilian Solution and Debates
When one adopts an hierarchical approach, the overriding
solution depends on understanding the position a treaty is
granted within an internal legal system, i.e., whether
treaties are internalized as an ordinary law, or whether a
special status (superior or inferior) is recognized to it.
The Brazilian Tax Code, enacted in 1966, expressly
assigned international treaties as a source of tax law.43 The
relation between domestic legislation and tax treaties is
dealt with by Article 98 of the Brazilian Tax Code,
according to which:
Art. 98. The international treaties and conventions
revoke or modify the internal tax legislation, and shall
be observed by the legislation which follows them.
The wording of such provision is highly criticized by
scholars.44 Accordingly, tax treaties do not ‘revoke’ nor
‘modify’ domestic legislation, which remain in force after
the signature of a tax treaty. If the tax treaty is applicable,
the effectiveness of domestic legislation is restricted, and
such provisions become inapplicable with respect to
certain individuals and situations.
Brazilian scholars generally hold the position that the
correct interpretation of Article 98 must be in the sense
that ‘international treaties prevail over domestic
legislation formerly or subsequently enacted’.45 According
to Rothmann, if there is a double tax convention in force,
the parties may not adopt unilateral measures ‘intending
to modify the content of the double tax convention’.46 The
prevalence is also confirmed by Navarro Coêlho, according
Notes
43
According to Art. 96 of the Brazilian Tax Code, ‘[t]he expression “tax legislation” comprises the statutes, the international treaties and conventions, the decrees and the complementary rules
which provide, in whole or in part, for taxes and the juridical relations regarding them.’
44
See Alberto Xavier, Direito Tributário Internacional do Brasil (Brazilian International Tax Law), 6th ed., Rio de Janeiro, Forense, 2004, pp. 119–149; Hugo de Brito Machado,
Curso de Direito Tributário (Tax Law Course), 5th ed., Rio de Janeiro, Forense, 1992, p. 43; Ruy Barbosa Nogueira, Tratados internacionais em matéria de tributação
(International Tax Treaties), in Direito Tributário Atual, vol. 3, São Paulo, IBDT, 1983, p. 341–379; Sacha Calmon Navarro Coêlho, As contribuições para a seguridade e os
tratados internacionais (Social Security Contributions and International Treaties), in Revista Dialética de Direito Tributário, n. 26, São Paulo, Dialética, Nov. 1997 p. 67–85.
45
See Hugo de Brito Machado, supra n. 44, at 43.
46
See Gerd W. Rothmann, Interpretação e aplicação dos acordos internacionais contra a bitributação (Interpretation and application of double tax conventions), Doctoral Thesis –
Faculty of Law, University of São Paulo, São Paulo, p. 81.
47
See Sacha Calmon Navarro Coêlho, supra n. 44, at 80.
48
Ibid.
49
See José Inácio Franceschini, Conflito entre os tratados internacionais e as normas de direito interno que lhe forem posteriores (Conflicts between international treaties and
subsequent domestic provisions), Revista dos Tribunais, year 71, vol. 556, São Paulo, RT, February 1982, pp. 28–36.
50
See Celso D. de Albuquerque Mello, supra n. 35, at 432.
51
Supreme Court, Appeal No. 7.872, decided on 10 Nov. 1943.
52
Supreme Court, Appeal No. 9.587, decided on 21 Aug. 1951.
53
Supreme Court, Extraordinary Appeal No. 80.004, decided on 6 Jan. 1977.
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incorporated to the rights and guaranties referred by
Caption II of the Constitution.61
Furthermore, Constitutional Amendment No. 45, of 8
December 2004, added paragraph 3 to Article 5,
according to which the treaties and conventions
concerning human rights that are approved in both houses
of National Congress, in two distinct voting rounds, by
three fifths of their respective members, shall be deemed
as equivalent to Constitutional Amendments. It is not
clear whether tax treaties would contain human rights, but
one should at least consider respected scholars’ opinions,
like Ricardo Lobo Torres who, despite not referring to tax
treaties, includes the principle of equality in tax matters
among human rights.62 If one understands that double
taxation, for harming the principle of ability to pay, is
contrary to the principle of equality, then it is immediate
that the protection against double taxation is a human
right, since it positively ensures equality.
Thus, the traditional position among Brazilian scholars
is that tax treaty rules prevail over internal domestic tax
laws. Although it will be argued that the ‘prevalence’ is
not an adequate approach towards the relation between
domestic and treaty law, the wording of the Tax Code and
the Constitution itself seem enough to indicate that, be
that as it may, internal legislation must be compatible
with tax treaties under Brazilian legal system.
general character, accepting the adhesion of other States,
while the contractual treaties would be similar to an
agreement between individuals.54
Despite not being generally accepted,55 this
classification must be considered in Brazilian system, since
it has been consistently adopted by the Supreme Court
since the judgment mentioned above. The referred
understanding influenced the subsequent judgments of
the Supreme Court on the matter,56 and also other
Brazilian courts, such as the Superior Court of Justice.57
Such a conclusion can furthermore be sustained when
one considers the 1988 Constitution,58 whose Article 5,
paragraph 2, establishes a general clause reading as
follows:
§ 2º The rights and guaranties provided by this
Constitution do not exclude any other arising from the
regime and principles adopted therein, or from the
international treaties of which the Brazilian Federal
Republic is part.
It is noteworthy that this provision is much deeper than
its similar set forth by the German Constitution (the
‘Basic Law’), whose Article 25 establishes that ‘the general
clauses of public international law are part of the
Federation Law. They prevail over the laws and impose
rights and obligations directly to the residents of the
federal territory’.59 Unlike the Brazilian Constitution, the
German Basic Law does not make reference to rights and
guaranties arising from the treaties. This explains the
traditional German approach whereby only ‘general
clauses’ would be self-applicable, not any provision of an
international treaty.60 As already mentioned, the
Bundesfinanzhof seems to be challenging this
understanding.
Under Brazilian Law, however, this discussion does not
seem applicable. As Xavier explains, according to Article
5, paragraph 2, referred above, whenever one infers a right
or guaranty from an international treaty, it will be
3.2 No Hierarchy and the Later-in-Time Rule:
The US Approach
When it comes to treaty overriding, Doernberg offers an
interesting explanation of the US perspective when he
compares the legislative process in the enactment of
statutes, on one hand, and the ratification of treaties on
the other hand: it is enough to say that the House of
Representatives has no official role in the latter, and even
in Senate, there is a substantial difference since treaties are
Notes
54
See Louis Le Four, Précis de Droit International public, Paris, Dalloz, 1937, p. 204.
55
See e.g., José Francisco Rezek, Direito Internacional Público: curso elementar (Public International Law: elementary course), 7th ed., São Paulo, Saraiva, 1998, p. 30.
56
See Supreme Court, Extraordinary Appeal No. 99.376, decided on 6 Jan. 1984; Supreme Court, Extradition No. 662-2, decided on 28 Nov. 1996.
57
Superior Court of Justice, Appeal No. 37.065-5, decided on 15 Dec. 1993. In this decision, Justice Demócrito Reinaldo expressly refers to the decision of the Supreme
Court described above, concluding: ‘Article 98 of the Tax Code, when establishing that treaty or convention are not revoked by the internal tax law, refers to agreements signed by Brazil
concerning specific matters and it is only applicable to treaties of a contractual nature’.
58
With respect to the evolution of the constitutional provisions regarding the matter, Klaus Vogel states: ‘Before World War II the problem of treaty overruling by domestic legislation
was not referred to by constitutions. The first constitution to confer to international treaties priority over domestic law was that of Japan in 1947. In Europe, the Netherlands went ahead by
1953, inserting Art. 60e into its Constitution of 1815, which is now that Constitution’s Art. 94. In France, Art. 28 of its Constitution of 1946 already provided: ‘Les traités diplomatiques
régulièrement ratifiés ayant une autorité superieure à celle de lois internes …’. Yet this provision was not applied to subsequent statutes. The same was controversial at first with respect to Art.
55 of the French Constitution of 1958, which reads: ‘Les traités ou accords régulièrement ratifiés ou approuvés ont, dès leur publication, une autorité superieure à celle des lois, sous réserve, pour
chaque accord ou traité, de son application par l’autre partie’. Meanwhile, however, the Cour de cassation and the Conseil d’Etat, as well as leading scholars, have recognized that the article
gives treaties priority over subsequent as well as earlier statutes’. See Klaus Vogel, supra n. 37, at 6.
59
In the original: ‘Die allgemeinen Regeln des Völkerrechtes sind Bestandteil des Bundesrechts. Sie gehen den Gesetzen vor und erzeugen Rechte und Pflichten unmittelbar für die Bewohner des
Bundesgebietes’.
60
For further details, see Luís Eduardo Schoueri, Planejamento fiscal através de acordos de bitributação – ‘Treaty Shopping’, São Paulo, Revista dos Tribunais, 1995, p. 95.
61
The Supreme Court has already decided that ‘rights and guaranties’ include tax principles provided by the Constitution. See Supreme Court, Direct Action of
Unconstitutionality No. 939-7, decided on 15 Sep. 1993.
62
See Ricardo Lobo Torres, Curso de Direito Financeiro e Tributário (Tax and Public Finance Law Course), 10th ed., Rio de Janeiro, Renovar, 2003, p. 67.
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Tax Treaty Override: A Jurisdictional Approach
confirmed by the Constitutional Court. Notwithstanding
this circumstance, one may consider the debates in
Germany as an example of the ‘lex specialis’ approach,
which is usual in several European countries.
The German Abgabenordnung includes a provision that is
similar to Article 98 of the Brazilian Tax Code:
responsibility of the Foreign Relations Committee, while
statutes are in hands of Finance Committee. It is
foreseeable that a conflict may arise and that Congress may
not be in agreement with treaties’ provisions.63
Notwithstanding this, in the United States, treaties are
part of the laws of the country, just like internal law. There
is no hierarchy and it is possible for a domestic law to
prevail over an international treaty, if national legislature
expressly states that it is the case.64 According to Article
VI.2 of the US Constitution (supremacy clause) ‘laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land’.
Considering that both international treaties and domestic
legislation are supreme law, as per this general rule, any law
subsequent to an international treaty that conflicts with it
shall prevail (later-in-time rule), giving rise to a treaty
override situation.
In 1902, the Supreme Court judged a case in which it
was affirmed that one may not assume that the domestic
legislator intended to violate an international treaty.65 The
presumption is that the legislator intended to preserve the
obligations contracted by the State. Accordingly, the
treaty override may not be assumed, unless the law
expressly states that it intends to prevail over the
international treaty. Hence, it is necessary that the law
expressly provide for the treaty override.
The need for an express provision was also addressed in
Cook v. United States,66 in 1933, in which the Supreme
Court decided that ‘a treaty will not be deemed to have been
abrogated or modified by a later statute unless such purpose on the
part of Congress has been clearly expressed’.
§2. Treaties with other States, in the sense provided by
Article 59, No. 2, period 1, of the Basic Law, which
provide for taxation, prevail over domestic tax
legislation, provided that they have become directly
applicable national law.
However, unlike the Brazilian Constitution, the German
Basic Law does not contain a provision concerning the
guaranties arising from international treaties, but only the
principles of public international law. Neither is there a
law with a complementary nature, such as the Brazilian
Tax Code, which complements the Federal Constitution,
with the authority ‘to establish general provisions in tax
matters’.
Nevertheless, said provision has not been deemed
unconstitutional. On the contrary, German scholars
reached an interpretation according to the Basic Law,
despite, as evidenced by a historical research on the
enactment of the provision, the original intent in 1977
was to establish that no domestic legislation could revoke
a provision of an international treaty.67
According to that understanding, said provision, as a
federal law, could not give precedence to tax conventions
over domestic legislation. Hence, the only reasonable
interpretation would be that the Abgabenordnung would
demand that the international treaty would be considered
lex specialis in relation to the domestic legislation. In this
sense, it would be possible that a posterior federal law
would modify or revoke a provision of a double tax treaty.
Nevertheless, the law would necessarily expressly do so,
since, on the contrary, the convention should be considered
as lex specialis and, as such, prevail over said federal law.68
In the same sense were the opinions of Klein and
3.3 The ‘Lex Specialis’ Approach
The traditional treatment of treaty overriding in Germany
was based on the ‘lex specialis’ approach. As already
mentioned in the introduction, this approach may be
reviewed, if the decisions of the Bundesfinanzhof are
Notes
63
See Richard L. Doernberg, ‘“Overriding Tax Treaties: The U.S. Perspective,”’ 9 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 71 (Spring 1995).
64
See Luís Eduardo Schoueri, Validade de normas internas contrárias a dispositivos de acordos de bitributação no Direito e na prática norte-americana (Validity of domestic
legislation contrary to double tax treaties provisions in the US Law and practice), in Revista Direito Tributário Atual, vol. 13, São Paulo, IBDT, April 1994, p. 119–132,
passim, with further details with respect to the debate.
65
During the judgment of this case, it was affirmed that ‘[t]he purpose of a law to override all or part of a treaty will not be lightly assumed. It should appear clearly and distinctly from
the words used in the law’. See Lee Zen Tai v. United States, 185 U.S. 213, 221 (1902).
66
See Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933).
67
See Stephan Eilers, ‘Override of tax treaties under the domestic legislation of the U.S. and Germany’, in Tax Management International Journal, vol. 19, Washington D.C.,
1990, p. 296–297.
68
See Klaus Vogel, Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland auf dem Gebiet der Steuern vom Einkommen und Vermögen, Kommentar auf der Grundlage der
Musterabkommen, 3. ed., Munich, Beck, 1996, p. 164–169.
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Orlopp,69 Debatin,70 Hübschmann and Spitaler,71
Weigell,72 Tipke and Kruse73 and Mössner.74
The reasoning based on lex specialis, despite its
acceptance by reputed scholars, may be questioned if one
points out that, actually, treaties do not concern the same
matter as domestic legislation. Only the domestic
legislation, and not the treaty, creates taxes; the treaty only
limits the jurisdiction, as described above. In order to
speak of lex specialis, it would be necessary that the treaty
provided for the levy of taxes, establishing a tax rate, for
instance, diverse from the domestic law. The treaty does
not establish a rate, it only limits it. The treaty does not
contain a lex specialis providing for the matter, whose
competence is attributed solely to the domestic
legislature.
not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification
for its failure to perform a treaty.
In fact, since the treaty override constitutes a violation
to the international obligations contracted by the States, it
is possible to consider that, if there were no sanction to the
violating State, there would be a strong limitation to the
international law.
Also the OECD75 has expressed the understanding that
the States should refrain from enacting legislation contrary
to their international obligations.76 The OECD
positioning derives from the previously discussed series of
treaty overrides carried out by the US during the 1980s.77
4
REVIEWING THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH:
JURISDICTION AS A KEY TO THE PROBLEM
3.4 The Limitation of the Hierarchical
Approach
The issue of treaty overriding has been centred on a
hierarchical debate, i.e., whether tax treaties are granted a
higher, equal or lower ranking, when opposed to internal
legislation.
However, the hierarchical debate is not adequate for the
overriding issue. Accordingly, hierarchy (lex superior)
arguments, as well as the lex specialis are formulae
applicable to solve a typical problem of antinomy.
However, in the author’s view, when one considers the
relationship between double tax conventions and domestic
legislation, discussions regarding the jurisdiction of the
States must precede the concerns related to the prevalence
issue.
International treaties and domestic legislation belong to
different legal frames (international and national,
respectively). Through international treaties, States enter
into commitments, in the international level, regarding
the limits of their jurisdiction. Hence, tax treaties aim at
delineating the contours in which the tax legislator is
allowed to operate.
While the hierarchical approach may be satisfactory if the
internal legal system deals with the issue, from an
international perspective it is clearly problematic, since
the validity of tax treaties would depend on the parties’
internal legal systems.
The immediate consequence is that a very same treaty
will be subject to different treatments according to the
treaty partners. Therefore, the primary scope of the tax
treaty – distribution of taxing rights – may be
jeopardized.
3.5 International Perspective
The Vienna Convention clearly condemns the treaty
override, especially due to the pacta sunt servanda principle,
set forth in its Article 26. Article 27 of the Convention
reinforces such understanding, providing that a party may
Notes
69
See Franz Klein and Gerd Orlopp, Abgabenordnung – einschließlich Steuerstrafrecht, 4. ed., Munich, Beck, 1989, p. 15–16.
70
See Helmut Debatin, ‘Die Abkommen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zur Vermeidung der internationalen Doppelbesteuerung (Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen)’, in
Rudolf Korn and Helmut Debatin (Ed.), Doppelbesteuerung – Sammlung der zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und dem Ausland bestehenden Abkommen über der Vermeidung der
Doppelbesteuerung, 8. ed., Systematik – III, Munich, Beck, 1989, p. 89.
71
See Hübschman and Spitaler, Kommentar zur Abgabenordnung und Finanzgerichtsordnung. 9. ed., Köln, Otto Schmidt, § 2, Anm. 15.
72
See Jörg Weigel, Das Verhältnis der Vorschrift des § 2a EStG zu den Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, in Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft, 1987, pp. 122–140 (124–125).
73
See Klaus Tipke and Heirich Wilhelm Kruse, Abgabenordnung, Finanzgerichtsordnung: Kommentar zur AO 1977 und FGO (ohne Steuerstrafrecht). 14 ed., Köln, Otto Schmidt,
1991, §2, Tz 1.
74
See Jörg M. Mössner, Zur Auslegung von Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, In Karl Bockstiegel (Ed.), Völkerrecht, Recht der Internationalen Organisationen, Weltwirtschaft –
Festschrift für Ignaz Seid –Hohenveldern, Köln, Carl Heymanns, pp. 403–426 (413).
75
In a 1989 Report, it was stated that ‘the certainty that tax treaties bring to international tax matters has, in the past few years, been called into question, and to some extent undermined, by
the tendency in certain States for domestic legislation to be passed or proposed which may override provisions of tax treaties’. See OECD, supra n. 14, at 26.
76
In this document, the OECD Council suggests Member States: ‘1. To undertake promptly bilateral or multilateral consultations to address problems connected with tax treaty provisions,
whether arising in their own country or raised by countries with which they have tax treaties; 2. To avoid enacting legislation which is intended to have effects in clear contradiction to
international treaty obligations’.
77
As seen above, in the US, the ‘treaty override decade’ began with the enactment of the ‘Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act’ (FIRPTA), in 1980. Other treaty
override situations were the enactment of the ‘Tax Reform Act’ (TRA), from 1986, the ‘Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act’, from 1989 and the ‘Technical and
Miscellaneous Revenue Act’ (TAMRA), from 1988. See Luís Eduardo Schoueri, Validade de normas internas contrárias a dispositivos de acordos de bitributação no Direito e
na prática norte-americana (Validity of domestic legislation contrary to double tax treaties provisions in the U.S Law and practice), supra n. 64, at 119–121.
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Tax Treaty Override: A Jurisdictional Approach
The exercise of jurisdiction in the national territory is a
fundamental right of the States.78 The jurisdiction,
exercised by the State within its frontiers, may be
characterized as general and exclusive: general, because the
State exercises the legislative, administrative and judicial
jurisdiction within its borders; exclusive, due to the fact
that the State faces no competition with other
jurisdictions, since it possesses the monopoly of the
legitimate use of physical force (jurisdiction to enforce).79
Jurisdiction includes an expression of the state power,
conceived as the capacity to decide and impose decisions.
From the concept of power, one may affirm that the
jurisdiction is the enforcement of the law by the State,
which enacts the rules, apply them to real cases and may
legitimately use physical force in the enforcement of its
order.80 It is therefore associated to sovereignty. The
primary normative power of the State is the basis of
sovereignty, and, at the same time, the contours of the use
of this power will define the jurisdiction of that State.
It is true that jurisdiction goes beyond enforcement and
includes also the power to prescribe rules; in this case,
however, a monopoly is not recognized, what, for purposes
of taxation, can easily explain double or multiple taxation
due to overlapping of jurisdictions, all of them with
‘genuine link’ to the situation
One of the main functions of public international law
(jus gentium) is to set the spheres of validity of the various
national orders. The relationship among States depends on
the reciprocal recognition of limits of jurisdiction, whose
extension is ruled by the international law. By the
attribution of jurisdiction, it is determined how, when and
to whom the national laws of the sovereign States may be
enforced. Therefore, sovereignty is ‘a precondition of
jurisdiction’ in a sense that the existence of the latter
depends on the former.81 Only after setting the
jurisdiction, the States are able to enforce their own laws.
Jurisdiction is a requisite of the enforcement of the law.
An example of the importance of jurisdiction on
defining the enforceability of law may be found in the
effects brought by the German reunification, in 1990, to
the jurisdiction of the former Federal Republic of
Germany (West Germany). The Basic Law of the Federal
Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik
Deutschland) was enacted in 23 May 1949, by the
parliamentary council (formed by representatives of the
states – Länder) of the West Germany. This legislation was
intended to be the German Federal Constitution and
provided for, in its Article 146, that it would lose its
validity as soon as, upon reunification, a Constitution
would enter into force in the whole German territory.
Likewise, the designation of this legislation as ‘Basic Law’
(Grundgesetz) instead of ‘Constitution’ (Verfassung) reveals
that both the legislation and the Federal State it
established (‘Federal Republic of Germany’) were intended
to be provisional solutions, which should (only) last until
the reunification, given that in 1949, the reunification
process was seen by the members of the Parliament of
West Germany as a political event that would be
completed in short term. The Cold War was responsible
for an unexpected forty-year delay.
When the reunification finally started, the former East
States adhered to the West German State under the (old)
accession Article 23 of the 1949 Basic Law. Instead of
enacting another constitution, as envisaged under the
Article 146 of the Basic Law, it was decided that this Basic
Law would be kept in force (with a few amendments,
including the abolition of Article 23 and a modification of
Article 146) and that it was, from now on, the
constitution of the reunited Germany.
Such option implied an actual extension of the
jurisdiction of the Federal Republic of Germany to the
whole German territory, fulfilling the necessary
requirement to the enforcement of the laws of the former
to the reunited Germany. In other words, the laws that,
due to a jurisdiction limitation, were only applicable
within the West German territory, became enforceable also
in the East states from the moment the jurisdiction was
extended.
The same reasoning is also valid to tax law: once the
jurisdiction is extended to the five new states, German tax
legislation becomes also applicable therein. If, for instance,
a state would cease to be a member of the Federation, the
German jurisdiction would be limited, and German tax
law would not be applicable to that state anymore. In
summary, if the jurisdiction is extended, so does the range
of the legislation; if the jurisdiction is restricted, the same
occurs to the applicability of the legislation.
With respect to international tax law, the reasoning
presented leads to the conclusion that tax legislation of a
given State is only applicable within the limits of its jurisdiction,
so that the tax powers of this State cannot exceed the referred
jurisdictional limitations.
In tax law, territoriality in its broader sense is a general
principle that limits the tax sovereignty of the States, so
Notes
78
See Celso D. de Albuquerque Mello, supra n. 35, at 432.
79
See José Francisco Rezek, supra n. 55, at 160–161.
80
Marília Machado Gattei, ‘A importância da jurisdicionalização dos procedimentos de solução de controvérsias na OMC’ (The importance of the jurisdiction of the WTO over
settlement proceedings), in Alberto Amaral Júnior (Ed.), Direito do Comércio Internacional, São Paulo, Juarez de Oliveira, 2002, pp. 108–109.
81
Alberto Xavier, Direito Internacional do Brasil, 6th ed., Rio de Janeiro, Forense, 2004, p. 13.
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former is only valid in the limits set by the latter. There is
no antinomy between such legislation.
Analogically, as a frontier treaty, an instrument
recognized by international law, sets the jurisdiction of
States, also tax treaties operate on the delimitation of
jurisdiction. As such, they are not in conflict with
domestic legislation, since they solely set limits for the
latter.
Distinct roles do not imply a hierarchical relation.
Neither the international treaty prevails over domestic
legislation, nor does domestic legislation prevail over the
international treaty. If the international treaty effectively
had a superior hierarchical position in relation to domestic
legislation, then it could regulate issues reserved to
domestic legislation. It would be the case to admit that
international tax treaties could create taxes. But this does
not occur: in countries where the principle of legality
prevails, only domestic legislation is able to create a tax,
not the treaty.
The contrary is not possible as well: a lex posterior cannot
provide for the State’s jurisdiction, enlarging the limits
established by an international treaty. By signing an
international treaty – and not enacting a statute –, the
State binds itself in the international sphere,
compromising its sovereignty.
Jurisdiction is thus the key to the polemical relation
between internal and treaty law: the treaty provides for the
limits to jurisdiction; if domestic legislation regulates this
matter, it is outraging its competence. In the same sense,
domestic law create taxes; if the tax treaty intends to play
this role, it will be unconstitutional, for violating the
principle of legality.
Tax treaties and domestic legislation deal with different
matters, whose competence also differs.
As mentioned, one may not refer to state jurisdiction
where there is no sovereignty. In this situation, the
domestic legislation would not be applied, since a
fundamental requirement would be missing.
In other words, it is not possible to enforce a law that is
contrary to the tax treaty, which is an international law
rule that sets limits – accepted by the State itself – to the
national jurisdiction. Such enforcement would trespass the
retaining wall responsible for preventing the domestic
legislature from regulating issues provided for the treaty,
which would be a violation to the jurisdiction of the State.
Alternatively, in case one (mistakenly) sustains that
international treaties are also domestic rules, the
conclusion would be the same: international treaties would
that they can only tax events with which they have a
nexus.82
A hypothetical situation seems to be interesting to
clarify this basic issue. Imagine one State would wish to
tax another State’s property. Assume, for instance, that
Brazilian Congress would enact a law according to which a
tax would be levied on the property of other governments,
for instance, a Brazilian tax on the property of the White
House. Even though there is no express limitation in
Brazilian Federal Constitution to such taxation, it is clear
that the pretension to tax the White House would violate
the limits of the Brazilian State jurisdiction. As a
consequence, in this case, Brazilian domestic legislation on
property tax would not be applicable. This example is
enough to show that the domestic legislation of a given
State cannot exceed the limits of the jurisdiction of that
State, since the jurisdiction is a requirement for the
application of such legislation.
If it is uncontroversial that taxation may not exceed a
State’s jurisdiction, it is also correct to say that domestic
tax law may not provide for a matter which is not within
the State’s jurisdiction due to a limit of jurisdiction
dictated by a tax treaty.
The sovereignty of the States must be compatible with
international law. Ihering’s doctrine, later endorsed by
Jellinek, based the volunteer submission to the Law by the
State and its subsequent limitations on the ‘autolimitation
rule’.83 The external aspect of sovereignty, defined as the
independence and equality among States, implies the
acceptance of mandatory rules of international law.84
5
THE ROLE OF TAX TREATIES
International treaties set limits to the jurisdiction of the
contracting states, establishing a ‘retaining wall’ to the
power of domestic legislature to regulate issues referred to
in those treaties.
This may be illustrated by the following analogy. The
Brazilian Civil Code is valid in the national territory.
Argentina also has a Civil Code. There is no contradiction
between such codes, because each one is valid within its
State jurisdiction. The instrument that determines such
jurisdiction is neither the Brazilian Civil Code, nor the
Argentinean one. An international treaty sets the frontiers
between the two States, and, consequently, their
jurisdiction. One may not speak of a conflict between the
Brazilian Civil Code and the frontier treaty between Brazil
and Argentina. The matters are distinct, despite the
Notes
82
See Luís Eduardo Schoueri, ‘Princípios no Direito Tributário International: territorialidade, fonte e universalidade’ (Principles of International Tax Law: territoriality, source
and universality), in Roberto Ferraz (coord.), in Roberto Ferraz (Ed.), Princípios e Limites da Tributação, São Paulo, Quartier Latin, 2005, pp. 326–342.
83
See José Alfredo de Oliveira Baracho, Teorial Geral da Soberania (General Theory of Sovereignty), in Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos, No. 63/64, 1986, p. 27.
84
José Alfredo de Oliveira Baracho, supra n. 83, at 57.
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Tax Treaty Override: A Jurisdictional Approach
tax convention is not lex specialis, in its strictest sense. In
order to be considered lex specialis in relation to another, a
legislation must address a complete tax event, adding
especial requisites to it. Double tax conventions rules are
incomplete, since they demand a complement, which is
extracted from domestic legislation. Even though, he
concludes, agreeing with Vogel, the question regarding
from where the discovery should start is irrelevant.89
Therefore, the analysis may start from domestic
legislation or from the tax treaty, according to the
specificities of each case. Only if: (i) there is internal tax
legislation, providing for the taxation in the case under
analysis; and (ii) there is not a double tax convention rule
excluding such taxation, one may conclude for the taxation
in the particular case.
be those rules that provide for the scope of the legal order
in which they are inserted. Whether these are a part of the
international order or not, tax treaties are the instrument
to set the extent of national jurisdiction; once defined the
jurisdiction, it is not possible that domestic legislation
provides for the issue, due to the lack of competence for
doing so.
The impossibility of changing the provisions of the
treaty by means of domestic legislation is not based on
hierarchical relations, but rather on a limitation to the
jurisdiction of the contracting States. One should thus
admit that addressing the treaty override based on the
hierarchy between tax treaties and domestic legislation is a
false solution to the problem.
6
VOGEL’S MASK: THE RELATION BETWEEN
7
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION
A
TREATY IS NOT LEX SPECIALIS
It is clear, therefore, that Mössner’s reasoning regarding
the impropriety of speaking of lex specialis when addressing
double tax treaties must be upheld. After all, if it were the
case of a lex specialis, the double tax convention would be
applicable instead of the domestic law. As the double tax
convention does not create taxes, it is not possible to apply
it in the absence of domestic tax legislation.
It must be highlighted that the reasoning based on lex
specialis does not proceed. A double tax treaties does not
set forth lex specialis, which is the one that contains all the
elements provided by the lex generalis and some others
elements that characterize it as lex specialis. In other words,
in order to consider a rule as lex specialis, one must analyse
if it concerns the same matter as the lex generalis,
attributing a distinct treatment to a determined situation.
Double tax treaties do not concern the same matter as
domestic tax legislation. Only the latter creates taxes. A
double tax treaty does not create taxes, since only the law
may do so, as demanded by the principle of legality. If a
double tax treaty contained lex specialis, it would be
enough to create a tax in a given situation, which is not
the case. If there is no domestic legislation providing for
the tax, the State may not invoke the double tax treaty to
levy it.
José Souto Maior Borges, analysing the Brazilian tax
system, contends that the international treaty is part of the
national legal order and, as such, must be observed by the
ordinary tax legislation, since the latter belong to partial
According to Vogel’s enlightening explanation, double tax
conventions may be understood as a mask, which is put
over the domestic law, blocking parts of it. The domestic
law provisions that remain visible, for meeting the holes of
the mask, are applicable; the others are not. It is not
important if the discovery starts from the mask or from
the text, since the result is the same; logically, there is no
precedence, and the discovery shall follow, in each case, the
most convenient path.85
Helmut Debatin, claiming that the internal law serves
as basis for the tax obligations, while a double tax
convention, as lex specialis, suits to limit them, created a
debate with Vogel. Debatin contended that the logical
conclusion would be that first the lex specialis (the treaty)
should be examined. Only after concluding that the State
has the jurisdiction to tax the domestic law should be
examined, in order to determine if the taxation shall
occur.86
Responding to the critics, Vogel argued that such
distinction would have no practical effect, showing, even
though, that there would be no logical rule imposing that
the discovery should start from the treaty, and not from
domestic legislation.87 Debatin published a response,88
which was not replied by Vogel, for solely bringing the
same arguments.
Later, the matter would be discussed again by Mössner.
Resorting to accurate definitions from legal methodology,
he argues that, in relation to domestic legislation, a double
Notes
85
See Klaus Vogel, supra n. 68, at 121.
86
See Helmut Debatin, ‘System und Auslegung der Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen’, in Der Betrieb, Nr 39, 1985, p. 2.
87
See Klaus Vogel, ‘Zu einigen Fragen des Internationalen Steuerrechts’, in Der Betrieb, No. 10, 1986, p. 507.
88
See Klaus Vogel, supra n. 87, at 510–513.
89
See Jörg Manfred Mössner, Neue Auslegungsfragen bei Anwendung von oppelbesteuerungsabkommen, Hefte zur Internationalen Besteuerung, No. 38, Hamburg, Institut für
Ausländisches und Internationales Finanz- und Steuerwesen – Univesität Hamburg, 1987, p. 7.
693
Intertax
legal orders, which renders to the national legal order.90
Such reasoning overcomes the antinomy matter, which is
an assumption of the lex specialis reasoning. Affirming that
a law must observe the limits imposed by another law does
not imply that both regard the same matter. Neither does
it mean that the problem requires a hierarchical
solution.91
In the same sense, it is unreasonable to discuss hierarchy
when facing a double tax treaty. The treaty is not ‘above’
or ‘below’ the domestic legislation. Double tax treaties are
instruments whereby the States set their own tax
jurisdiction. Domestic legislation, on the other hand,
operate within each jurisdiction. The clear evidence of the
inexistence of hierarchy between international treaty and
domestic legislation is that double tax treaties may not
create taxes: as set forth by the principle of legality, only
the internal law may create taxes. Also, the ordinary
statute is not the adequate instrument for the State to
establish the limits to its jurisdiction in the international
community.
The consequence is immediate: if a double tax treaty
restricts the possibility of a State taxing given situation,
then the law that intends to tax such situation is operating
outside the jurisdiction of the State, being, therefore,
invalid. The mere fact that the double tax treaty attributes
to a State the jurisdiction to tax certain event does not
imply that this event will be taxed, since only the internal
legislation may impose the taxation.
The jurisdictional approach is not solely an
international law solution. Actually, the jurisdictional
approach relies on an assumption made by the major
Constitutions: the States are capable of restricting their
own jurisdiction through international conventions.
Such restrictions demand intense negotiations, turning
each signed treaty into a unique piece of legislation, which
deals with very specific, concrete and opposed stakes. As
described by Vogel, the negotiations on the limits of each
State’s jurisdiction involve a persistent and artful struggle,
which may not be disregarded.92
If a contracting state unilaterally overrides a given
provision of the treaty, keeping the others in force, the
whole process of negotiation becomes useless. The initial
balance of the convention, as it was negotiated, is
completely jeopardized by such conducts. If a contracting
state waived its jurisdiction with respect to a given
circumstance, it is clear that it intended to maintain its
jurisdiction over the other taxable events, as provided by
the treaty. It is not possible to fix an unsuccessful
negotiation by simply enacting further domestic
legislation. If the conditions of the treaty are not
satisfactory, then renegotiating or terminating are the only
legal solutions.
8
CONCLUSION: A COMMON APPROACH TO
TAX TREATY OVERRIDE
Once accepted that treaties are an internationally
recognized instrument to limit jurisdiction, one will
immediately agree that no taxes may be created through
tax treaties; on the other hand, taxes may only be enacted
within a tax jurisdiction.
Tax treaty override represents, therefore, an attempt to
extend taxation beyond the jurisdiction limits a State
agreed with its treaty partners. In other words, by means
of a tax treaty override, a State legislates beyond its own
jurisdiction.
Irrespective of whether one adopts a monist or dualist
approach to the relation between international law and
domestic law, it is clear that domestic law may not reach
facts or circumstances beyond a State’s jurisdiction.
Whether these limits derive from international law, or
from internal constitutional law, limits are in any case
defined by means of international treaties. While these are
in force, jurisdiction is limited by them. Of course a State
may revoke a treaty, but this would not be a treaty
override. If, however, a treaty is valid and in force, tax
jurisdiction is limited by it.
This approach seems also correct independent of the
legal system involved. Different from the traditional
hierarchical solution, whereby the ‘position’ of a treaty
would depend on the internal domestic law concerned, the
jurisdictional approach may claim to be valid for any tax
system, thus avoiding different solutions for the same case.
From an international perspective, the uniformity of
solutions and the clear repugnance to the tax treaty
overriding seem to indicate that this approach should
prevail.
Notes
90
See José Souto Maior Borges, ‘Isenções em Tratados Internacionais de Impostos dos Estados-Membros e Municípios’ (Exemptions in tax treaties regarding taxes of States and
Municipalities), in Celso Antônio Bandeira de Mello (Ed.), Estudos em homenagem a Geraldo Ataliba, São Paulo, Malheiros, 1997, p. 166–178.
91
See José Souto Maior Borges, Lei Complementar Tributária (Tax Complementary Law), São Paulo, Revista dos Tribunais, 1975, p. 25.
92
Klaus Vogel, Abkommensvergleich als Methode bei der Auslegung von Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, in Steuerberater-Jahrbuch 1983–1984, Koln, Otto Schmidt, pp.
377–378. The author narrates negotiations in which the commissions of the States resort to time pressure, or even to physical resistance in order to achieve their aims in a
negotiation.
694