Kosovo, EU Member States and the Recognition-Engagement Nexus

On 17 February 2008, following a two-year status process overseen by the United Nations, Kosovo declared independence. The decision was greeted by very different reactions around the world. While the newly created Republic of Kosovo was quickly recognised by the United States and other key Western states, such as Canada and Japan, Kosovo’s claim to sovereign statehood was strongly rejected by Russia and China, as well as many emerging regional powers, such as Brazil, India, South Africa, and Indonesia. Significantly, these differences over Kosovo’s status were also mirrored within the European Union. While the overwhelming majority of the EU’s 27 members recognised Kosovo as an independent state in the months following the declaration of independence, five countries chose not to do so: Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain. More than a decade later, they have still not recognised Kosovo. Given the highly contentious way in which it emerged, there is perhaps a tendency to think about the way in which the international community interacts with Kosovo in distinctly binary terms: the recognisers and the non-recognisers. This division naturally leads to assumptions about the quality of the relationship Kosovo enjoys with the wider world. Amongst the recognisers, or so the thinking goes, relations are good, and the ties are strong and fruitful. Meanwhile, as the non-recognisers refuse to accept Kosovo’s statehood, they must necessarily keep their distance. To be sure, there are some states that sit firmly within these categories. For instance, amongst the recognisers, there are those states that have built up strong relations with Kosovo across a range of areas. In some cases, these states have been at the forefront of efforts to help Kosovo cement its status on the international stage. Likewise, at the other end of the scale are the non-recognising countries that resolutely oppose Kosovo’s claim to statehood and steadfastly refuse to have anything to do with it. Some of these countries have been instrumental in trying to prevent Kosovo from being recognised by other states or from joining international bodies. However, this simple division tells an incomplete, if not wholly wrong, story. In truth the two broad camps – recognisers and non-recognisers – are far more heterogeneous than is often realised. Over the course of the past ten years, a wide variation of positions has emerged. While recognition is important, there is a tendency to forget that it is merely one element, albeit an important one, of the wider process of interaction between states. It is, in many ways, a starting point (although not the only starting point). The subsequent establishment of working political, economic and cultural relations are the basis for deeper and more sustained engagement between countries. It is in this regard that the binary divisions between recognisers and non-recognisers begins to break down. One thing that has become very obvious is that recognition does not necessarily mean engagement. The past decade has shown that there are many countries that have recognised Kosovo but have little, if any, actual interaction with it, whether in terms of formal diplomatic relations or in terms of wider economic and cultural engagement. Equally, the past decade has also shown that non-recognition does not automatically preclude any form of interaction. Around the world, there are a number of countries that have not recognised Kosovo, but nevertheless have developed a range of relations with it, including regular contacts between officials.