Social Inclusion (ISSN: 2183–2803)
2016, Volume 4, Issue 4, Pages 160–167
DOI: 10.17645/si.v4i4.699
Article
Differences in Itself: Redefining Disability through Dance
Carolien Hermans
Art and Economics, Utrecht School of the Arts, 3500 BM Utrecht, The Netherlands; E-Mail:
[email protected]
Submitted: 21 June 2016 | Accepted: 30 August 2016 | Published: 10 November 2016
Abstract
This paper brings together two different terms: dance and disability. This encounter between dance and disability might be
seen as an unusual, even conflicting, one since dance is traditionally dominated by aesthetic virtuosity and perfect, idealized bodies which are under optimized bodily control. However, recently there has been a growing desire within dance communities and professional dance companies to challenge binary thinking (beautiful-ugly, perfect-imperfect, valid-invalid,
success-failure) by incorporating an aesthetic of difference. The traditional focus of dance on appearance (shape, technique, virtuosity) is replaced by a focus on how movement is connected to a sense of self. This notion of the subjective
body not only applies to the dancer’s body but also to disabled bodies. Instead of thinking of a body as a thing, an object
(Körper) that is defined by its physical appearance, dance is more and more seduced by the body as we sense it, feel it
and live it (Leib). This conceptual shift in dance is illustrated by a theoretical analysis of The Cost of Living, a dance film
produced by DV8.
Keywords
dance; difference in itself; disability; Körper; Leib; lived body; lived experience
Issue
This article is part of the issue “Humanity as a Contested Concept: Relations between Disability and ‘Being Human’”, edited
by Paul van Trigt (Leiden University, The Netherlands), Alice Schippers (Disability Studies in Nederland, The Netherlands)
and Jacqueline Kool (Disability Studies in Nederland, The Netherlands).
© 2016 by the author; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY).
1. Introduction
It is a surprising fact that philosophers and cognitive scientists took quite a long time to acknowledge the importance of the body. The devaluation of the body governed
most metaphysical thought and perhaps even most philosophical thought until at least the time of Nietzsche.
More recently one can see an explicit and nearly universal rejection of Cartesian dualism (Gallagher, 2000). The
body has been reinserted into philosophical thinking and
it’s now widely acknowledged that the body is crucial for
our intersubjective being in the world.
If the ‘normal’ body is now appreciated in philosophical thinking, the disabled body is, however, still negated
and ignored within a society of normalization (Foucault,
1980). “Disability is a deeply contested term used to
describe individuals (or a people?) that are in a position of difference from a centre” (Kuppers, 2003, p. 5).
The term disability is associated with disease, illness,
Social Inclusion, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 4, Pages 160–167
tragedy, and loss. The term is not value-free: alongside
the benefits, stereotyping, harassment, and hatred are
still commonplace.
Even more importantly, the body of the disabled person is largely absent in Western theatrical dance. The
disabled body is marginalized within the predominantly
able-bodied dance community. Western theatrical dance
has traditionally been structured by a very narrow vision of a dancer’s body (white, long-limbed, flexible, thin,
able-bodied) and by strict aesthetic structures and representational codes that suppress and devalue bodies that
don’t fit into normal categories.
This paper addresses the need to incorporate the disabled body in Western theatrical dance discourse, specifically with regard to screendance. For too long the focus
has been on idealized bodies that strive for perfect bodily control and that move within the vocabulary of standardized aesthetic movements. It is time to rethink these
normative aesthetic standards and to include a diversity
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of bodies with idiosyncratic movement styles, in order to
embrace differences. By deconstructing traditional representational codes of Western theatrical dance and by
showing other bodily realities, we can redefine and enrich our notion of the ‘normal’ body.
Despite its bodily regimes, dance can also provide opportunities to question cultural and normative standards
of what a body should look and feel like. In daily life our
bodily experiences are hidden below the surface most of
the time. In dance however, we share the bodily, that is,
we share somatic experiences in a playful, imaginative,
and expressive manner.
Dance is a social encounter: it’s a place where we
share meanings with each other on a bodily level. It’s a
place where the private and the public meet (Kuppers,
2003). Dance mediates and has the power to construct
and deconstruct social meanings; it has the potential to
create spaces in which fixed identities and normative
standards suddenly become unstable and uncertain. This
is due to the fact that dance produces embodied, living
knowledge that is always in flux:
“The intersection of dance and disability is an extraordinarily rich site at which to explore the overlapping
constructions of the body’s physical ability, subjectivity, and cultural visibility that are implicated within
many of our dominant cultural paradigms of health
and self-determination.” (Albright, 2001, p. 1)
The dance film The Cost of Living (2004) by DV8 is an example of this potentially rich encounter between dance
and disability. The film is an adaptation of a stage production that takes David Toole, a double-amputee dancer, as
its main character. In line with Overboe (1999), I will argue that the lived experience itself offers a radical way
to explore disability in terms of differences, subjectivity,
and cultural visibility. Watching a disabled dancer like
David Toole forces us to see with “a double vision, and
helps us to recognize that while a dance performance
is grounded in the physical capacities of a dancer, it is
not limited by them” (Albright, 2001, p. 1). I will use
the terms Leib and Körper (Overboe, 1999) to analyze
the way in which, in the dance film, we slowly move
away from objectified standard bodies—bodies as efficient machines—to lived bodies that are made of flesh,
are real and that are different in themselves.
The following research question is central to this paper: How can we rethink disability within the field of
screendance by using the phenomenological notions of
Leib and Körper? I will first discuss the theoretical difference between Leib and Körper, two concepts that are
embedded in the phenomenological tradition. Then I will
discuss how the intersection of screendance and disability can be an extraordinary site to explore these two concepts (Leib and Körper). Subsequently I will discuss three
scenes from The Cost of Living: in all these scenes we—as
spectators—experience a shift between Körper and Leib.
In the conclusion, I will return to my research question
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and discuss how the notion of Leib can draw attention
to an aesthetic of difference in dance. An aesthetic that
incorporates a diversity of bodies: bodies that tell their
own lived narrative.
2. Leib and Körper
Looking intuitively at these two concepts, saying them
aloud and listening to them carefully, the concept of Leib
has a more personal connotation, while Körper coincides
with the objective, anatomical shape of the body:
• A Leib can be imperfect: with scars, birthmarks, fat,
wrinkles, a missing leg, a crooked back;
• A Leib is a unit, self-awareness without distance,
the familiar without alienation;
• A Leib is the inner-felt, lived body;
• A Leib is the experience of sensing oneself as being
sensed (Slatman, 2007, 2009);
• A Leib is a way of being, an existence in the world,
while Körper, under the influence of normative
standards, becomes a suit in which a human being
exists on earth (Wijk, 2014).
The concepts of Leib and Körper both find their origins
in the phenomenological tradition (Overboe, 1999). According to Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, Körper refers to
inanimate life—the Cartesian res extensa—while Leib
indicates the contrary, namely, animated life (Slatman,
2007). Körper is the image of the body. Körper is the body
that is seen by others, an object, a thing with physical
qualities, while the Leib is the body that I experience, a
physical experience of being me. Slatman (2009, p. 120)
describes the distinction as follows: “The Körper is the
body that is seen, and the Leib is the body that is seeing.
My body is not only a thing that can be seen but it is also
seeing. It is a Leib because this ‘seeing’, while entangled
with movement and space, is not a (Cartesian) mental
way of seeing, but rather an embodied seeing”. In other
words, a Leib refers to my own living body as I experience
it from within, while the Körper refers to the body that is
being seen from the outside.
Disabled bodies in our society are often perceived in
terms of Körper. By opposing the disabled to the abled
(the abnormal versus the normal), the disabled body is
reduced to a thing to be looked at, even stared at. Under the gaze of the social other, the disabled body is constructed and filled with pre-existent expectations and by
stereotypical thinking. This results in a process of exclusion: the disabled body is reduced to a predetermined
subjectivity that leaves no room for the ground-zero experience of the body as a Leib (the body that lives, experiences, and resonates with others). According to Overboe
(1999), the concept of Körper reduces the handicapped
body to a classification that has a normative effect. The
outer appearance of the handicapped body determines
its value: from imperfection, a lack of control of the body,
and vulnerability, to pain and death, or the heroism of
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people who have conquered their handicap. In this way,
handicapped people are depicted as less human or too
human, but rarely as ordinary people who do ordinary
things and have ordinary desires (Oliver, as cited in Overboe, 1999).
However, there is more at stake here. Firstly, the normalizing external gaze forces people with a disability to
‘have’ a body, that is, to relate to their own body as being a Körper. Secondly, everyday routines no longer serve
as a way to relate subconsciously to their own body (the
body as a Leib) or as a way to sense the body in a prereflective state. Daily bodily habits and routines usually
force the body into pre-subjective agency—in affects and
sensations. In encountering the daily environment, the
body responds in ways that are unnoticeable or undetectable by the conscious mind (Berger, 2013). However
people with a disability are often forced to relate consciously to daily routines because of pain or the effort it
requires to accomplish certain actions (such as taking a
shower, going to the toilet, getting dressed etc). Access
to the pre-reflective experience of the body is not easy
for people with a disability. Although new routines and
embodied ways of being may be developed over time,
this requires a negotiation between the body and the environment and often forces the embodied experience to
become reflective and subjective. Dance can help gain
access to purely physical sensations, affects, and embodied intensities (in experiencing the body as a Leib). This
is not to say that dance can solve the complex relationship between being disabled and the suppressing forces
of the social environment but it can be helpful in tuning in to the inner-felt dynamics of the body as it is lived
and experienced.
3. Dance, Screendance, and Disability
Dance is the art form par excellence in which communication takes place on a non-verbal level. In dance we engage with ourselves and with others through the kinesthetic (Daly, 1992; Smyth, 1984). This experience is a firstperson experience, that is, we live the movement and as
we live it we understand it and give meaning to it. Experiencing self and others—in and through movement—also
includes the intentions and affects that flow back and
forth between the agents that are involved. Kinesthetic
experiences are thus always connected with a sense of
self and a sense of otherness.
Foster (2011), Reason and Reynolds (2010), and Wildschut (2003) speak of kinesthetic empathy when referring to the embodied empathic process that takes place
within the spectator. They refer to the inner-felt physical
sensations that are evoked in the spectator while watching/experiencing the dance performance.
This paper takes The Cost of Living as its departure in order to investigate the kinesthetic experiences
that are evoked by screendance. Although cinema works
differently to live performance events, kinesthetic empathic processes are still at work here. D’Aloia (2012)
Social Inclusion, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 4, Pages 160–167
states that in film the spectator interacts with a series of quasi-bodies. “The film images are celluloid bodies that, nonetheless, express vitality thanks to their
movements and their resemblance to human bodies and
movements” (p. 95). Kinesthetic empathy is awakened
in the spectator “by the film’s mediation (in the double
sense of keeping separate and putting in contact) between the two lived-bodies, although that of the character is only a quasi-body” (D’Aloia, 2012, p. 980).
In dance films the experience of both our own body
and the on-screen body is thus not only visual-perceptual
but also empathic and kinesthetic. Kinesthetic empathy
is triggered by the expressive properties of film: through
the visual, the auditory and through physical and technical camera movements. Furthermore, as Wood (2016)
says:
“The connection between the spectators and performers is affected by embodied imagination and the
haptic visuality of the image. The viewers connect to
the images on screen through their corporeal knowledge and kinesthetic sensibility to surfaces and gravity.” (p. 250)
Three different elements can be distinguished in dance
films that evoke empathic, kinesthetic reactions in the
spectator: (1) narratives, (2) filmic techniques, and (3)
synchronicity in movements (D’Aloia, 2012; Wood, 2016).
Firstly, narrative structures are used in screendance to
engage the spectator in an embodied way. Through narratives, the spectator relates personal bodily experiences
to the bodily movements that are being seen on screen.
Secondly, filmic techniques create a visual atmosphere
that brings the spectator to a heightened kinesthetic
state. Lastly, kinesthetic experiences are evoked by the
synchronicity of the dancer’s movements. “The spectators participate in the uplifting feeling of the movements
and respond in an immediate emotional manner” (Wood,
2016, p. 251). These three elements will be used later in
order to analyze several scenes in The Cost of Living.
The way in which the spectator relates to disabled
dancers on screen is still a point of discussion. One might
say that people with disabilities are already being staged
in daily life (because of the normalizing, external gaze of
the social other). I will argue in this paper that screendance offers possibilities for the opening up of new registers of meaning-making that force the spectator to look
and engage differently with disabled people. The disabled body in dance films manifests itself through perceptual experience—not as an object among objects but
as a bodily subject (Thompson, 2005), not as a Körper experience but as a Leib experience.
3.1. An Example: The Cost of Living by DV8
I will illustrate the difference between a Körper experience and a Leib experience within dance by analyzing
three scenes from the dance film The Cost of Living. This
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dance film was made in 2004 by DV8 Films Ltd. Although
it was produced some time ago, the film still has not lost
its relevance. The film was directed by Lloyd Newson, the
founder of DV8 Physical Theatre, and combines dance,
physical theatre, and dialogue. The movie is located in
Cromer, a seaside resort town, at the end of the summer
season. The Cost of Living is a dance film in which David
Toole, a double-amputee dancer, plays the lead.
“David Toole, a disabled British dance artist, performs
in The Cost of Living (2004), conceived and directed by
Lloyd Newson, based on his earlier stage production.
The film runs for thirty-five minutes and tells a story
of two men who are street performers in an end-ofseason English seaside resort. The locations are various and shift between urban, rural, domestic, and
public sites. The narrative develops around the men’s
relationship, their encounters with others, their attempts to attract women, their vulnerabilities and insecurities, as well as their tactics for survival.” (Whatley, 2010, p. 45)
The director Lloyd Newson states that the dance film is
about those people who don’t fulfill our societal criteria
of success. He asks himself what happens to those people who don’t fit in to the categories of success and perfection. Although Toole is the only dancer with an overt
physical disability in this film, he is primarily a dancer
among dancers. All the characters in the film have their
own individuality, their own way of being, and their own
autonomy, which make them all slightly different to what
is perceived to be the ‘normal’ or ‘the average’. According to Whatley (2010), the film is so powerful because “it
is located in bodies and bodily sensation that might be
characterized as excessive” (p. 45). The film also blurs the
boundary between fiction and reality (another example
of binary thinking). Eddie and David are the real names
of the main actors. Throughout the film it remains unclear whether the dancers play a character or are ‘just’
being themselves. The film lasts 35 minutes and is so
rich in detail and narrative that just giving an overview
would not be sufficient. I would therefore like to focus
specifically on three different scenes, which I will henceforth refer to as the ballet scene, the film scene and the
choreographic scene.
3.2. The Ballet Scene
The scene occurs halfway through the film. We have seen
David and his friend Eddy at the seaside, in their apartment, in a bar, on the street, and together on an autoped, as well as having fun by racing with the wheelchair
through the streets and accidently bumping into people.
The ballet scene starts with a close-up of the feet
of ballet dancers who are doing exercises at the barre.
We hear piano music in the background and the ballet teacher counting ‘two-three-four and-one’. The feet
move in complete unison. They start with a battement
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tendu, pushed sideways on the ground, with the right leg,
followed by a battement glissé with a petit battement,
then move to the left leg using a grand plié. Finally, the
feet turn to the other side to continue the exercise. The
dancers all wear classical outfits: pink tights, ballet shoes,
and a black leotard.
In the next shot we see David Toole outside, on a summer’s day, with casual black trousers (cut below the upper part of his legs) and a black shirt, looking in at the
windows. They are a little too high so David has to lean
with his arms and lift himself up from the wheelchair in
order to see what’s happening inside. Eddie joins him at
the window. David then decides he wants to go in to join
the dancers in the studio.
He moves out of his wheelchair and walks on his
hands into the studio. The dance class is still going on:
some dancers are doing exercises at the barre, others are
stretching their bodies and chatting to each other. David
moves inside and we see him moving through a mass
of pointing legs. The music changes: the violin indicates
a change in atmosphere. A different body has entered
the space.
Suddenly the dance studio is empty except for David
and a female ballet dancer. A dance duet unfolds between David and the classical dancer. It is a modern
dance duet in which David and the female dancer move
under and over each other in a playful, fluent and soft
manner. In the corner we see another female dancer, a
silent witness, who is now doing modern exercises. She
is looking outside and so completely ignoring the dancing couple. David and the classical dancer move through
the studio using the ground, they move in and over each
other, stretching, lending and giving weight, and supporting the other. The camera moves to the right and we see
another (fourth) dancer stretching his legs.
The female dancer suddenly interrupts the dance
duet and walks over to her stretching colleague, leaning
informally against the wall while they start chatting with
each other. We then see Eddie, who is still an observer
from the outside, pointing to David and inviting him to
come outside. David leaves the studio. We hear a door
opening: a sound that marks the end of this scene.
The scene is very rich in symbols and they will not all
be identified here. An important element is the notion
of moving inside at the beginning of the scene (entering
the studio space) and moving outside at the end of the
scene (entering the real world again). This can be interpreted as a movement that indicates a shift between the
body as it is perceived from the outside (Körper) to the
sensed, internal body (Leib).
When David and Eddie look in at the window (they
are literally observers from the outside) at the ballet
dancers inside, we see only Körper: idealized bodies that
move in unison, with a culturally defined aesthetic. Perfect bodies, perfect shapes that move in a perfect way.
Bodies are treated as objects here.
However, when David enters the dance studio (when
he literally moves inside) and the violin emphasizes the
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moment, we suddenly move to an embodied first-person
perspective. The change from a classical dance vocabulary to a modern dance vocabulary can be seen as a disruptive symbolic element, as can the abandonment of
unison movements; both mark the end of the Körper experience. Bodies are no longer treated as objects but as
dynamic entities, always in a process of becoming, open
to difference, moving into fields of affectivities. At this
moment, as spectators, we are no longer involved in a
Körper experience, but we are engaged in an embodied,
sensed sense (a Leib experience). The fact that the other
dancers in the studio—the silent witnesses—ignore the
dance may contribute to this shift. Since the stretching
dancers in the studio are not looking, we as spectators
are invited to look. However, the way we look at this
scene is changed by the (ignoring) attitude of the silent
witnesses: apparently the scene is not that important,
perhaps it is too ordinary (Whatley, 2010). As a result,
the spectator’s dominant gaze is interrupted and instead
the spectator is invited to use different ways of looking
(namely seeing, feeling and sensing). The ignoring attitude gives room to the spectator to come closer, to enter
the private, to become intimate.
Filmic techniques such as changing the camera’s
viewpoint (first filming from the outside to the inside,
then only inside and finally filming from the inside to the
outside) mark the shift from Körper to Leib and back to
Körper again. In addition, filming close to the floor provokes a feeling of gravity and weight in the spectator: this
feeling of groundedness stimulates kinesthetic sensitivities in the spectator. Furthermore, the looking away (the
ignoring attitude) of the silent witnesses in the dance studio serves as a gateway for the personal and the intimate.
Finally, the shift from ballet to modern dance vocabulary
can be seen as a movement away from normative, standardized aesthetics towards an aesthetic of differences.
3.3. The Film Scene
In another scene we see David in front of a building on a
green field, sitting on the grass, without a wheelchair. He
is alone. He has his sunglasses on. We hear the sounds
of seagulls flying over. The pleasant, joyful music ‘Do
you believe in life after love’ by Cher is replaced by sinister sounds. The last phrase of the song—‘cos I know
that I am strong’—resonates in our heads. The cameraman walks into the scene and approaches David in an
aggressive and direct way. The deep, sharp shadows of
the cameraman fall over David. The cameraman moves
in circles around David. The cameraman is too close. He
invades David’s space, subordinates him. His gaze turns
him into an object, a thing to be whipped at. The cameraman stands while David sits on the grass: the scene is
shot from above, so that the cameraman looks big while
David himself looks small.
The cameraman now enters David’s personal space.
He touches him but it is not a nice, gentle touch. The cameraman begins to ask David intrusive questions. David
Social Inclusion, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 4, Pages 160–167
in return reacts through movements that are simultaneously vulnerable, avoidant, and compliant.
“Can I ask you a question? What happened to your
legs? Were you born like that? Or did you have them
chopped off? Do you have an ass-hole? Or do you shit
through your back? How do you go to the toilet? Can
you masturbate? Seriously, I want to know. What’s
this lump on your back? Do you blame God for being
born? What are these (touching his stumps)? Are they
stumps? Do you have any friends? Have you ever been
in a fight? Have you? If you hit me first, it’s okay if I hit
you back, isn’t it? ‘Cos you’re a man. Do you trust me?
‘Cos I don’t trust you.”
Then the cameraman walks out of the scene. David lies
down on the grass.
The gaze of the cameraman places David under observation and causes him to experience himself as an
object that is seen by others. In Lacanian terms (Lacan,
1964), David knows that he is being looked at and the
gaze here alienates David from himself. The cameraman
symbolizes the all-seeing eye that captures him and turns
him into an object. The gaze denies his full subjectivity:
David is reduced to an object and in this act he becomes
alienated from himself. Little details all contribute to
this process of alienation: David’s sunglasses; the circular
movement (the cameraman approaching David, David
turning away); the harsh lighting with deep shadows; the
whole scene shot from above (making David look small);
and David’s silence (not answering back). Here we, as
spectators, experience the way in which David is reduced
to a Körper.
Filmic techniques and narratives (the interrogation)
are used in this scene to produce defamiliarization and
alienation in the spectator. As spectators we feel uncomfortable and ashamed and not only because the cameraman invades David’s space in a harsh and intrusive
way, thereby completely denying his lived subjectivity.
There is more involved here. Through the harsh interrogation, a narrative is constructed in which we, as spectators, have to position ourselves politically and move away
from the normalizing, imposing gaze and towards a gaze
that leaves room for the personal and the subjective. As
spectators we not only feel shame, embarrassment and
discomfort but also feelings of responsibility and guilt are
produced. The cameraman serves as a symbol for our society: he is a symbol of the external, normalizing gaze
that turns the disabled person into an object and denies
him full subjectivity (that is, humanness). In this scene
we, as spectators, are forced into feeling responsible for
the societal, normalizing gaze that is (this must not be
forgotten) created and mediated by all of us.
3.4. The Choreographic Scene
David is alone again. He sits on the grass and takes off
his sunglasses. Music starts, an accordion makes a rec-
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ognizable and human sound. David lifts himself up and
does his now ‘typical walk’: moving on his hands, while
his back and stumps swing from side to side. This scene
is shot on a small hill. Casually dressed dancers suddenly
and unexpectedly appear from under the hill, joining him
in this dance, in his typical movements. The female and
male dancers all move from one arm to the other, dragging their seemingly lifeless legs behind them. This is a
powerful scene since ‘difference in itself’ has been taken
here as a way to connect bodies. Here we encounter ‘otherness’ as a powerful force, as an aesthetic of difference,
as Leibs that move together, as Leibs that celebrate the
lived experience. We encounter here a collective of difference, all moving in unison, a sameness that nevertheless has its origin in difference.
The dancers collectively make variations on David’s
movements: they roll on the ground, spreading their legs,
hopping from one side to the other, then turning again,
standing on their feet, swinging their left leg, moving to
the ground again, lifting the other leg over the body, sitting with their legs in front of them while walking with
their arms, getting up again etc. It is as if they are finishing David’s movements and in our imagination we can
see the endless possibilities, the potentialities, of David’s
typical walk.
Finally, the dancers move backwards. David by now
has disappeared from the scene. The dancers have returned to David’s typical walk: walking on their hands,
dragging their seemingly lifeless legs behind them. One
by one they disappear under the hill, where they are no
longer visible to us, the spectators. David returns and he
is the last one to leave the scene.
We see the cameraman walking away with the camera in his hand. He is no longer filming. He looks back
and we hear the accordion music at the same time. This
scene clearly symbolizes the defeat of the all-seeing eye:
subjectivity is restored and the lived experience has been
foregrounded. A disabled embodiment and sensibility is
validated (Overboe, 1999). We, as spectators, are invited
to rethink disability by leaving representation and categorical thinking aside, and by recognizing the lived experience of disabled persons.
In this scene the synchronicity of movements invites
the spectators to tune in to David’s private experience of
being his body. The synchronicity evokes a feeling of pleasure that subsequently allows the spectator to be “bodily
carried away by an escapist flow of movements, while for
another it is to feel viscerally involved in an awareness of effort, muscle and sinew” (Reason & Reynolds, 2010, p. 72).
The feeling of pleasure raises awareness in the spectator
that different self/other relations between spectator and
disabled persons are possible and desirable. Furthermore,
by multiplying David’s personal movements, an aesthetic
of distance as well as an aesthetic of intimacy is created.
This double movement of distance and intimacy gives access to pre-reflective experiences, such as physical sensations, affects, and embodied intensities. The synchronicity
of movements introduces an aesthetic of differences.
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4. Conclusion
At the beginning of this paper, I asked myself the following question: How can we rethink disability within the
field of screendance by using the phenomenological notions of Leib and Körper? The Cost of Living is an example
of how an aesthetic of differences can be communicated
in dance: the film deliberately questions the dominant
aesthetic of dance by shifting attention away from perfect, fictitious, idealized bodies to bodies that are real,
‘excessive’ and different in themselves.
However, some criticisms should be noted. Firstly,
the film (subconsciously) seems to assume an abled spectator. The fact that David is the only disabled dancer
among abled dancers makes his position ‘special’ and
possibly evokes feelings of pity in the spectator, as well
as an acknowledgement of heroism. In both cases, the
reality of Toole’s disability is denied: the body is again reduced to a thing.
Secondly, the danger of analyzing The Cost of Living in
terms of Körper and Leib could easily produce another binary way of thinking. This is not desirable. Slatman (2009)
states that Körper and Leib are two interrelated concepts.
The body as it is lived and sensed is not closed up in itself but is embedded in the outside world. Images of how
the disabled body is looked at (from a societal perspective) thus merge with inner body images. Together they
constitute bodily subjectivity. Although for the sake of argument I made a sharp distinction between Körper and
Leib, these two concepts are closely interrelated. Its relationship, its difference in itself, constitutes bodily experience. The place where Körper and Leib meet is where an
aesthetic of difference can arise.
Thirdly, The Cost of Living blurs the boundaries between fiction and reality. However, the film depicts
David Toole as more real (hyperreal) than the other
dancers. Toole performs his “own narrative, his own authentic biography” (Whatley, 2010, p. 45) while the others play more fictional characters. Although the authentic touch allows the spectator to come close and enter
the private and the intimate, it also puts Toole in an unequal position.
Despite its limitations, The Cost of Living sheds some
preliminary light on how we can shift our attention from
a disabled body that is captured in a Körper experience
to the opening up of new, radical spaces that invite us
to look at each other in terms of subjectivity, the innerfelt, and the reality of our lived bodies. The Cost of Living questions the normative aesthetic standard of perfect bodies in dance and invites the spectator to rethink
what is perfect and what is not. The film offers us an alternative by introducing an aesthetic of differences.
What I hope to have shown in this paper is that dance
can help gain access to the Leib experiences of persons
with a disability. A film such as The Cost of Living can
encourage the acceptance of an aesthetic of differences
that gives room to the personal, the sensed, and the lived
experiences of disabled people:
165
“Rather than an ‘equality of rights’ based on identity
politics, I call for an ‘equality of condition’ that validates both a disabled embodiment and sensibility.
Our physical, mental and emotional manifestations
of disability as well as the social, political, moral and
physical environment will continue to have an impact
upon us. But shifting the notion of an identity which is
devalued to a lived experience that is validated causes
a change in approach.” (Overboe, 1999, p. 23)
Dance can be helpful here. Firstly, because dance is
the place where we share and express meanings with
each other on a bodily level. Secondly, and more importantly, because dance provides opportunities to establish an ‘aesthetic of difference’, an aesthetic that communicates embodied selves that live and breathe. Bruce
Curtis (1988, p. 18) states that we are all “dancing bodies”: we are all bodies that try to let out movements that
are joyful, bodies that are vulnerable in themselves, bodies that want to communicate and be intimate with each
other on the most basic level, namely by moving with
each other. In my opinion, that is what lived experience
is all about: the capacity to be moved by movement and
be moved to move (Fuchs & Koch, 2014). Dance is within
us and between us.
Conflict of Interests
The author declares that the research was conducted in
the absence of any commercial or financial relationships
that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
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About the Author
Carolien Hermans holds a master degree in dance and choreography. Next to this, she graduated (cum
laude) at the Radboud University in Nijmegen, department Orthopedagogy. Currently she is a senior
lecturer at the Conservatory of Amsterdam (Music in Education department). She is also a senior lecturer at the school of Arts and Economics and researcher at the Professorship in Creative Economy,
HKU University of the Arts Utrecht. She is affiliated to the Institute for Cultural Inquiry, University of
Utrecht, where she is doing a PhD on the effects of dance on the participatory sense-making of children
with a disability.
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