Macedonia 1946-1987: Why Greece overslept.

In 1946-1987, Tito's Macedonian irredentism was viewed by the Greeks as an expedient genie that kept Tito apart from Stalin and counterbalanced Bulgarian irredentism, while Tito himself kept the genie safely inside the bottle (the Yugoslav federation). Or so the Greeks thought, and colluding with Tito they fell asleep. https://www.academia.edu/36862897/Macedonia_1946-1987_Why_Greece_overslept Macedonia 1946-1987: Why Greece overslept. John D. Pappas Fig. 1 Map published on the web (2018): fYROM is referred to as Republic of Macedonia, the constitutional name of the country. The depicted Modern geographical Macedonia (purple line) includes fYROM, along with the so-called Aegean Macedonia (Greece), Pirin Macedonia (Bulgaria), Mala Prespa and Golo Brdo (Albania), and Gora and Prohor Pchinski (Serbia/Kosovo). The historical northern border of the kingdom of Ancient Macedonia (red line) is conjectural. p. 2 / 16 Macedonia 1946-1987: Why Greece overslept. John D. Pappas Macedonia 1946-1987: Why Greece overslept. John D. Pappas Updated second edition of first publication entitled «Macedonia 1946-1987: Why Greece Overslept», Issues of Greek History (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.istorikathemata.com/2018/06/macedonia-1946-1987-why-greece-overslept.html According to historiographical narratives after the First World War and especially after the Second World War, the region of the so-called «Geographical Macedonia» (Fig. 1) was «dismembered» by the Peace Treaty of Bucharest (10 August 1913) between mainly Greece (51%), Serbia (less than 39%) and Bulgaria (10%) (1) after the defeat of Bulgaria by the Tripartite Allied Coalition of Greece, Serbia and Romania in the Second Balkan War (June 29 - August 10, 1913). 1. The myth of «Geographical Macedonia» As a matter of fact though, the term «Geographical Macedonia»—inconclusively and quite confusingly outlined on maps of the Ottoman era, i.e. with geographical boundaries that vary from map to map (Fig. 2-4)—did not exist until the Peace Treaty of Bucharest (1913), or even later until the end of the First World War. Therefore it may be barely reasonably contended that the three Balkan countries «dismembered» (or «divided») something that did not exist at the time, not even as a concept, at least at the level of international law, i.e. something that was not mentioned explicitly in any peace treaty whatsoever up to that time (1913). In specific, the word «Macedonia» or its derivatives is not mentioned anywhere, not even once, in all other relevant international treaties that preceded the Treaty of Bucharest (1913), such as those of London (12 March 1871), San Stefano (3 March 1878), Berlin (13 July 1878) and London (15 May 1913).(2) Indicatively, in the Peace Treaty of Bucharest (August 10, 1913) there is no mention whatsoever of either the term «Geographical Macedonia» or even the word «Macedonia» or any of its derivatives. In that Treaty, the p. 3 / 16 Macedonia 1946-1987: Why Greece overslept. John D. Pappas Fig. 2: Guillelmo del' Isle (1731), Alexandri Magni Imperium et Expeditio. p. 4 / 16 Macedonia 1946-1987: Why Greece overslept. John D. Pappas Fig. 3: Guillelmo del' Isle (1715), Orbis Romani descriptio. p. 5 / 16 Macedonia 1946-1987: Why Greece overslept. Fig. 4: Jean Janvier (1780), Turquie D' Europe. p. 6 / 16 John D. Pappas Macedonia 1946-1987: Why Greece overslept. John D. Pappas new Serbo-Bulgarian and Greek-Bulgarian borders are defined only on the basis of geographical toponyms (mountains, valleys, etc.), as follows: ARTICLE III. Between the Kingdom of Bulgaria and the Kingdom of Serbia, the frontier will follow conformably with the procès-verbal drawn up by the respective military delegates and annexed to the Protocol No. 9 of the 25th of July (August 7th), 1913, of the Conference of Bucharest, the following line : The frontier line will start from the old frontier from the summit of Patarica, will follow the old Turco-Bulgarian frontier and the line of the watershed between the Vardar and the Strouma, with the exception of the upper valley of the Stroumitza, which will remain on Serbian territory ; it will terminate at the Belasica Mountain, where it will bend back to the Graeco-Bulgarian frontier. A detailed description of this frontier and its indication on the map 1/200.000 of the Austrian General Staff are annexed to the present article. [...] ARTICLE V. Between the Kingdom of Greece and the Kingdom of Bulgaria the frontier will follow conformably with the procès-verbal drawn up by the respective military Delegates and annexed to the Protocol No. 9 of the 25th of July (August 7th), 1913, of the Conference of Bucharest, the following line : The frontier line shall start from the new Serbo-Bulgarian frontier on the summit of Belagica planina, to terminate at the mouth of the Mesta on the Aegean Sea. Between these two extreme points, the frontier line will follow the tracing indicated on the map 1/200.000 of the Austrian General Staff and according to the description annexed to the present article. That is, through the Peace Treaty of Bucharest, the former three major Balkan allies of the «Balkan League» in the First Balkan War (29 October 1912 - 30 May 1913), i.e. Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia, divided among themselves the specific and explicitly defined territories liberated from the Ottoman yoke (not some inconclusively geographical territories of nonexistent «Geographical Macedonia»). Still ex post, from 1918 onwards, some writers began to consider and characterize those territories as constituting the so-called «Geographical Macedonia»—a term that entered international bibliography since 1918, i.e. five years after the Treaty of Bucharest. Consequently, in the present monograph, the terms dismembered and Geographical Macedonia are always inserted in quotation marks, indicating that the widespread use of these terms on the digital or print media today is legally unfounded and arbitrary, at least from an international-law perspective. p. 7 / 16 Macedonia 1946-1987: Why Greece overslept. John D. Pappas 2. Nomenclaturistic equilibrium After World War I (WWI), Serbia became part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, which was officially renamed in 1929 as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and was divided into provinces called «banovinas». So-called «Southern Serbia»—that included all the territory of what was later (as of 1993) referred to as fYROM, which was a UN appelation or provisional reference, not a country name—became known as «Vardar Banovina». Similarly, both Bulgaria and Greece avoided systematically to use the words «Macedonia» or «Macedonian» in official administrative documents pertaining to their respective regions: The («Geographical Macedonian») region of southwestern Bulgaria was named «Blagoevgrad province», while Greek Macedonia was referred to as part of the so-called New Territories («Nζες Χώρες») or Northern Greece («Bόρεια Ελλάδα»). That inter-Balkan «name equilibrium» as to Macedonia, was in line with the letter and spirit of the treaty of Bucharest and the principle of good neighborly relations: In general, right after the division of the Macedonian region by that treaty, in conjunction with the Greek-Serbian Protocol of Athens (5 May 1913) and the Greek-Serbian Peace Treaty (1 July 1913), none of the Controlling Powers (Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria) permitted the use of that name in the portions of Macedonia each had incorporated in its sovereignty. (3) 3. Macedonian irredentism 1918-1944 In the interbellum though, the concept of a United Macedonia or Greater Macedonia was the rallying cause of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO), whose leaders—Todor Alexandrov, Aleksandar Protogerov and Ivan Mihailov—aimed at independence of the entire Macedonian territory. In 1918 the Bulgarian government of Alexander Malinov offered to contribute the region of Blagoevgrad (Pirin Macedonia) to that end. Furthermore the Comintern (Third International) issued a resolution in 1934, whereby for the first time political directions were provided for recognizing the existence of a separate Macedonian nation and a distinct Macedonian language. Still, a decade later, in May 1943, Stalin dissolved Comintern in order to bring the Soviet Union in full wartime alignment with the Western Allies against their common enemy, Nazi Germany, in the Second World War (WWII): The realities of the Great Patriotic War had rendered Comintern an anachronistic geopolitical backlog that was hardly conducive to Stalin's endeavors to induce his Western Allies at the time (1943) to open a second critical (western) front in continental Europe against Germany. As consequence, along with Comintern, the «Macedonian issue» «withered away» in WWII, at least at a geopolitical level, although, at a tactical level, part of Greek Macedonia, as well as the p. 8 / 16 Macedonia 1946-1987: Why Greece overslept. John D. Pappas Country/area name: from Paeonia to fYROM and beyond PERIOD before th 4 century BC as of th 4 century BC as of nd 2 century BC as of th 5 century AC as of 15 century AC th (also in th 17-18 cent.) 1903 1903-1913 NAME .(actual, proposed). COMMENTS Paeonia Geographical area of scattered tribal kingdoms. Macedon (northwestern part of_) or Land of Macedons (northwestern part of_) Integral part (especially the southern area of the country) of Macedon, a sovereign Hellenistic kingdom (Fig. 2). Macedonia Salutaris Province of the Roman Empire. Macedonia Thema (northwestern part of_) Provincial area of the Byzantine Empire (Fig. 3). Monastir Ottoman vilayet (most of the country). [Moreover, the Selanik and Kosova vilayets included, correspondingly, a southern and a northern area of the country.] Rumelia (northwestern part of_) or Macedonia (northwestern part of_) In several maps in the Ottoman era, the geographical area of the country is specified as part of “Rumelia” “Macedonia”, “Macedonne” or “Macedonie” (Fig. 4). Krushevo Republic Short lived, August 3-13, 1903. Geographical area—not sovereign or autonomous entity (under Ottoman rule until 1912)—that, in the aftermath of the two Balkan Wars (1912-1913), was partitioned primarily between Serbia (less than 36%), Greece (52%) and Bulgaria (10%) in 1913. Macedonia (northwestern part of_) 1913 Southern Serbia (“Južna Srbija”) Province of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, by the treaties of London (May 1913) and Bucharest (Aug 1913) and the Greek-Serbian Peace Treaty (July 1913). 1929 Vardar Banovina Province of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. 1946 People's Republic of Macedonia 1963 Socialist Republic of Macedonia Federal region of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 1991 Republic of Macedonia Constitutional name of independent state. 1993 former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (fYROM) UN provisional reference (or appellation) by UN Security Council Resolution 817/1993 and UN General Assembly Resolution 225/1993. 2005 Republika Makedonija-Skopje Proposed by UN envoy Matthew Nimetz. Feb 2008 Mar 2008 Constitutional Republic of Macedonia Democratic Republic of Macedonia Independent Republic of Macedonia New Republic of Macedonia Republic of Upper Macedonia Republic of Upper Macedonia New Republic of Macedonia Republic of New Macedonia Nova Makedonija (untranslated native form) Republic of Macedonia-Skopje Alternative names proposed by UN envoy Matthew Nimetz (all rejected by fYROM, while the Greek Government appeared to favor only the “Republic of New Macedonia” at the time.) Republic of Macedonia (Skopje) Proposed by UN envoy Matthew Nimetz. Oct 2008 Republic of North Macedonia Proposed by UN envoy Matthew Nimetz (opposed by Bulgaria). Apr 2009 Apr 2010 Republic of Northern Macedonia Favored by the Greek Government. Jun 2010 Republic of Macedonia of Vardar Republic of Vardar Macedonia Vardar Republic of Macedonia Republic of Macedonia (Vardar) Alternative names implicitly favored by the Greek Government. Apr 2013 The Upper Republic of Macedonia Proposed by UN envoy Matthew Nimetz. Oct 2013 Slavic-Albanian Macedonia Suggested by the Greek Government. Mar 2014 Republic of Upper Macedonia Favored by the Greek Government. Feb 2019 Republic of North Macedonia By the Prespa Accord (June 2018), signed by the foreign ministers of Greece and fYROM. Fig. 5 p. 9 / 16 Macedonia 1946-1987: Why Greece overslept. John D. Pappas southern region of Yugoslavia, were both under joint German-Bulgarian occupation in 1941-1944. 4. Macedonist separatism After WWII though, the aforementioned post-WWI official inter-Balkan «name equilibrium» as to «Geographical Macedonia», was disturbed rather irreversibly, due to initiatives taken by the leader of Yugoslavia, Marshal Josip Broz Tito: On 11 October 1945, in the buildup of the Greek Civil War, Tito referred to the Greek Macedonian region by his term «Aegean Macedonia». Next year, 1946, Tito granted federal status to Yugoslavia's southern region (Vardar Banovina), renaming it to «People's Republic of Macedonia», within the People's Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. As of that time, Tito had already started pushing his agenda of Macedonist separatism with a maximalistic view towards the creation of a large South Slav Federation, although the Winning Powers, including the Soviet Union, opposed that unrealistically grand idea. Much later, in the new Yugoslavian constitution of 1963, he renamed that region again as «Socialist Republic of Macedonia» (Fig. 5), in order to bring the name in line with the other Yugoslav republics and with the new name of the Yugoslav federation (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). Fig. 6 The «Greater Bulgaria» by the peace treaty of San Stefano (March 3, 1878). (Rusinow, ibid. p. 5). p. 10 / 16 Macedonia 1946-1987: Why Greece overslept. John D. Pappas Tito’s policies of Macedonist separatism aimed incidentally, if not primarily, to counterbalance and eventually neutralize Bulgarian irridentism, which emanated from the Bulgarians’ collective «San Stefano Trauma» after their diplomatic failure to bring to bear the San Stefano treaty (1878), whereby Russia imposed then on Turkey the so-called Greater Bulgaria (Fig. 6) that included the entire «Geographical Macedonia» (Rusinow 1968, CIA declassified document):(4) “ An autonomous republic might also prove tactically useful, incidentally, in weakening the position and appeal of those Macedonians, including most IMRO and not a few leading Communists, who still preferred either incorporation in Bulgaria or an independent Macedonian state. [...] During the first years of the war [WWII], the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Communist parties had competed, like good bourgeois nationalists, for control of the Communist movement in the Vardar Region, and for a time the Bulgars had the best argument. [...] There is also evidence that as late as 1946 some Macedonian separatists, Communist or otherwise, were still active in the region. At least for a time, it was now Tito, and not the Bulgarians (or even the Greek) Communists, whose solution enjoyed the support of Stalin and even of Georgi Dimitrov, the aging Bulgarian former head of the Comintern, who returned after the war to become Prime Minister of his homeland; and on this basis Tito projected a larger design: It was only natural that an autonomous Macedonia should include all members of the Macedonian nation, and therefore natural that Vardar, Pirin, and eventually Aegean Macedonia should be reunited, but this time within a federal Yugoslavia. It would be equally natural that the Bulgars, linked to the Yugoslavs by blood and now also by ideology, should also join the federation, realizing at last the Land of (all) the South Slavs that nineteenth century advocates of the Yugo-Slav idea had originally had in mind. Then perhaps one could think in terms of the wider confederation, including all the Communist republics of the Balkans. [...] The history of this grand design, and of its failure, is the central theme of the well-known history Tito-Stalin quarrel. For present purposes it is only important to note that for four years, from 1944 to 1948, the Bulgarian Communist regime was forced to accept the Yugoslav argument that the Macedonians constitute a separate nation. They also actively, if reluctantly, prepared Pirin Macedonia for unification with Vardar Macedonia inside Yugoslavia, although they sought to postpone the evil day by insisting that unification could come only after federation between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. This was the substance of a Tito-Dimitrov agreement signed at Bled, in Slovenia, in August 1947, and reaffirmed in a Yugoslav-Bulgarian p. 11 / 16 Macedonia 1946-1987: Why Greece overslept. John D. Pappas Treaty of Friendship signed at Sofia when Tito returned the visit the following November. Whenever the Bulgars have subsequently raised the ghost of San Stefano, the Yugoslavs reply by exhuming the Bled Agreement.” In effect, Macedonist irredentism, as concocted by Tito, aimed to undercut the ground of two rival irredentisms, one internal (Serbian) and the other external (Bulgarian), which posed a combined long-term threat to the integrity of Yugoslavia as a federation: According to Tito’s version of Macedonist irredentism, the Macedonians are neither Serbs nor Bulgarans but members of a distinct historical nation, that allegedly has not been liberated yet, at least to its entirety. In response to Tito’s aspirations, Bulgaria’s position as to the ethnicity of Macedonians was rather inconsequential, fluctuating remarkably every few years in reflection to diplomatic oscillations in the Soviet-Yugoslav relations (Kofos, 1964):(5) “ In less than twenty years since liberation, the Bulgarian communists five times adopted totally contradictory views on the Macedonian issue. Thus, in 1944-1948 not only did they relinquish in favor of the Yugoslavs their territorial claims over Macedonia, but even accepted the Yugoslav theory that the Slav inhabitants of Macedonia as a whole were «Macedonian», i.e. a new ethnic group. Following the Tito-Cominform split—from 1948 to 1954— the Bulgarians passed to the offensive by advocating the establishment of a Bulgarian-sponsored Macedonian state within a Balkan communist federation. By the official act, the «Macedonians» became Bulgarians again. Only when the new Soviet leadership thought it expedient to try to bring Tito back to the communist fold in 1955, did Bulgaria drop her pretensions over Macedonia and acquiesced to recognition of the existence of ethnic «Macedonians» even inside Bulgaria. But this was only a short-lived retreat which lasted only for the duration of the new Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement. In 1958, amidst sharp criticism of the Yugoslav «revisionists» by the entire Soviet bloc, the Bulgarians lost no time to declare their independence on the Macedonian issue, welcome back the «Macedonians» as «Bulgarians» and do away with the theory of the «Macedonian nationality». But Moscow's new international orientations brought about a new reconciliation with Belgrade. As a result, Sofia found itself abandoning the polemics of the Macedonian issue. There were indications that following the Tito-Zhivkov meeting in Belgrade in January 1962, the Bulgarians might harden their position to Yugoslav demand. However, Soviet-Yugoslav relations have not apparently reached perfection to compel the Bulgarians to decide definitely whether «Macedonians» do exist outside the People's Republic of Macedonia.” p. 12 / 16 Macedonia 1946-1987: Why Greece overslept. John D. Pappas Still, in the post-WWII era, Bulgaria has not followed suit as to institutional use of the name «Macedonia» in the portion of «Geographical Macedonia» within Bulgarian sovereignty: Blagoevrand province has retained its name as such erga omnes for a century now. Greece though did use that name («Macedonia») institutionally after many years, in 1988, by renaming then the «Ministry of Northern Greece» to «Ministry of Macedonia-Thrace», as a belated response (42 years after 1946) of the Greek government to the constitutional name of Yugoslavia’s southern region («Socialist Republic of Macedonia»). 5. Inter-Balkan Collusion 1946-1987 An important aspect of the name issue of fYROM (since 1990s) is that for 45 consecutive years (1946-1991) Bulgaria and Greece had not formally raised an issue (in the UN etc.) as to the inclusion of «Macedonia» in the constitutional name of Yugoslavia's southern region, each country for its own different reasons, i.e.: Bulgaria. The collusion of Bulgaria with Tito's policies as to the inclusion of «Macedonia» in the constitutional name of Yugoslavia's southern region after WWII might be attributed partly to communist solidarity and partly (if not mainly) to the alliance of Bulgaria with the Axis in WWII: The devastating defeat of Yugoslavia by Germany in 1941, was primarily due to the fact that Wehrmacht was enabled to invade Yugoslavia from all sides, including Yugoslav borders with Romania and Bulgaria, due to alliance of these two counties with Axis at the time. Consequently, in the post-WWII era, Bulgaria had neither the moral standing nor the geopolitical clout to confront Marshal Tito—a renowned military leader of the Allies and a national leader of world stature—especially on (internal) issues within the federal jurisdiction and national sovereignty of Yugoslavia. Greece. On the contrary, Greece, having fought fiercely on the side of the Allies, had both the moral standing and the geopolitical weight to raise formally an issue after WWII as to the name of Yugoslavia's southern federal region. Still, Greece opted for colluding with Tito on that matter due to strategic considerations: During the Greek Civil War (1944-1949), an issue of critical military importance to the anticommunist regime of Greece—and consequently a matter of diplomatic focus for both Greece and the U.S.—was to exert diplomatic pressure on Tito to close the Yugoslav-Greek border to the leftist Greek rebel forces. Thereafter, at a geostrategic level of Cold-War discipline, Greece (a member of NATO) did not raise any considerable issue against non-allied Yugoslavia, because the latter was perceived by NATO as a buffer state against Soviet expansionism. Moreover, throughout the Cold War, national reasons induced Greece to collude with p. 13 / 16 Macedonia 1946-1987: Why Greece overslept. John D. Pappas Yugoslavia as to the name of the latter's southern region, at least to the degree that such name aimed to counterbalance Bulgarian irredentism, which had been traditionally considered by the Greek Armed Forces a prime issue of national security. Metaphorically, from a Greek perspective, the name issue of the «...Republic of Macedonia» was kind of an expediently useful genie that was kept by Tito safely inside the bottle (the Yugoslav federation). In such context, the idea of putting the genie («...Republic of Macedonia») inside a similar (although quite smaller) bottle, that would be effected by a constitutional restructuring of fYROM into a federal republic—with 3-4 autonomous regions, one of which to be named «...Republic of Macedonia»—reappeared to the fore in 2010s. To some extent, that rather anachronistic idea calls virtually for a return to status quo ante (1946-1991), whereby the name «...Republic of Macedonia» was to be attributed to an autonomous federal region rather than an independent state. 6. The Greek blunder In any case, the historical fact is that the people in that region (fYROM) had been selfidentifying themselves for long, for almost half a century, as citizens of the «People's Republic of Macedonia» (1946-1963) and thereafter of the «Socialist Republic of Macedonia» (1963-1991). In sum, they had been doing so, as citizens of a federal entity of Yugoslavia, for almost half a century legally (according to international law) and indisputably (due to collusion of both Bulgaria and Greece with Tito's constitutional provisions on the issue), while Greece had been sleeping on the issue: Due to Cold-War discipline but also due to strategic perceptions of the Greek political establishment as to assumedly Bulgarist irredentism—i.e. barely pragmatic (if not obsessive) perceptions, (6) contrary to the fact that Tito, not the Bulgarians, was the juggler of (Macedonist) irredentism in the Cold War—the Greeks failed to realize that Bulgaria had been Greece’s natural ally as to the Macedonian issue: It was the linguistic heritage of Bulgaria and the Macedonian legacy of Greece that Tito was hijacking back then as building blocks of Yugoslavia's Macedonist separatism policies. So the Greeks kept on sleeping. p. 14 / 16 Macedonia 1946-1987: Why Greece overslept. John D. Pappas ENDNOTES & REFERENCES (1) The total area of the above outlined «Geographical Macedonia» amounts to 66,857 km2, mostly as follows: 34,556 km2 (51.39%) within the Greek Territory, 6,788 km2 (10.15 %) within the Bulgarian Territory, and 25,713 km 2 (38.46%) which had constituted the territorial area of fYROM formally as of 1993 by the UN Security Council Resolution 817/1993 and the UN General Assembly Resolution 225/1993. (2) John D. Pappas (2018), The Big Treaties of Peace. Readable and downloadable here: https://www.academia.edu/38196309/The_Big_Treaties_of_Peace (3) Shea, John, 1997. Macedonia and Greece: The Struggle to Define a New Balkan Nation (McFarland & Co.: NC, USA ), p. 13. (4) Rusinow, Dennison I., 1968. “The «Macedonian Question» Never Dies: The San Stefano Trauma Again—or When is a Macedonian Bulgarian?”, American Universities Field Stuff, Inc (AUFS), (Southeast Europe Series) vol. 15.3 (Yugoslavia), p. 9. (CIA document, declassified and approved for release 9/11/2012). (5) Kofos, Evangelos, 1964. Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia (Institute of Balkan Studies: Thessaloniki, Greece), ch. II. (6) Greek perceptions as to (perceived) Bulgarian irredentism during the Cold War, paralyzed not merely the foreign policy of Greece as to Tito-induced (real) Macedonian irredentism throughout that period (1946-1991), but also the defense policy of Greece during the Greek-Turkish War on Cyprus in 1974: The Greeks did not dare to escalate their military response to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus (July 20, 1974), because they had been overwhelmed then by what they perceived as (assumedly) imminent or highly probable Bulgarian invasion of Greek Macedonia at the time. Hellenic Parliament (Greece) and House of Representatives (Cyprus), Cyprus File (Φάκελος Κύπρου), vol. 1, p. 52 (2nd column, 4th paragraph) and pp. 84-86. Readable and downloadable here: https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/userfiles/ebooks/fakelos_kyproy_tomos_1/index.html#zoom=z p. 15 / 16 Macedonia 1946-1987: Why Greece overslept. John D. Pappas “ πρὸς γὰρ τὸ τελευταῖον ἐκβὰν ἕκαστον τῶν πρὶν ὑπαρξάντων κρίνεται. Demosthenes Olynthiac 1.11 p. 16 / 16