The Hamas Military Buildup
Kobi Michael and Omer Dostri
Notwithstanding the existing tension between Hamas’s political wing and
the organization’s military wing, Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, over
strategic priorities, and in tandem with the ongoing and concentrated effort
invested by the military wing in military buildup, there is general agreement
throughout the organization on the question of a direct conlict with Israel at
the present time. The consensus is that under current conditions, particularly
in view of the scale of the casualties and destruction in the Gaza Strip
during Operation Protective Edge, another round of ighting now is not in
the organization’s interest. Hamas’s military infrastructure was severely
damaged in the 2014 conlict, and the Gaza population is in dire straits due
to the damage caused to residential buildings and infrastructure. The overall
economic situation is extremely dificult, and public criticism is directed at
Hamas for inciting a conlict with Israel. Added to these constraints are the
restrictions imposed by Egypt on the movement of residents to and from
the Gaza Strip in the framework of its struggle against Hamas itself, and as
part of its conlict with jihadists active in the Sinai Peninsula, particularly
Wilayat Sinai, identiied with the Islamic State. The region’s economy has
also been affected by the obstruction of the smuggling tunnels on the border
between Egypt and the Gaza Strip.
In order to avoid another conlict with Israel, Hamas has taken action
to prevent attacks against Israel by the jihad factions operating in the Gaza
Strip, and the organization has even established a restraining force that
prevents shooting incidents from the border area with Israel or makes
arrests if shooting incidents occur. Under these conditions, along with the
strengthening of the terrorist infrastructure in East Jerusalem and the West
Bank,1 and the permission granted for controlled popular demonstrations
in the proximity of the border fence between the Gaza Strip and Israel for
The Crisis of the Gaza Strip: A Way Out
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the purpose of letting off steam,2 Hamas is devoting its efforts to a military
buildup and rebuilding its infrastructure of tunnels in the Gaza Strip. This
infrastructure is intended for use if and when another round of conlict
develops between the organization and Israel.
Principles of Force Buildup
The buildup of force relies on an understanding of the asymmetry between
Hamas and Israel and the organization’s effort to compensate for its
military inferiority. Hamas seeks to develop capabilities that will attack
Israel’s weak points and shape rules of the game that will keep Israel from
taking advantage of its military edge as the organization targets Israel’s
technological superiority, modern economy, and the desire of its citizens for
a high quality of life. Consequently, Hamas has invested efforts to develop
high trajectory weaponry and an air and naval force. It seeks to expand its
underground range by digging attack tunnels under the Gaza Strip border
with Israel and command and control tunnels that will enable it to disrupt
ordinary life in Israel, damage essential infrastructure, lengthen the conlict,
and drag Israel into a military response that will expose it to international
pressure and domestic criticism.
The logic in Hamas’s force buildup is the same as that guiding Hezbollah
in its force buildup in Lebanon, which advocates positioning of military
infrastructure in population centers; the use of civilians, including children
and teenagers, as human shields for terrorist operatives; combat against the
IDF from residential buildings and public institutions; the use of civilian
ambulances to evacuate operatives; rocket and mortar ire directed against
Israeli population centers; and training, exercises, and military demonstrations
to improve the operational itness of the organization’s members and raise
morale. In many cases, these actions are conducted in population centers
in order to prevent an Israeli attack.3
The Buildup following Operation Protective Edge
It is estimated that Hamas’s military forces include 16,000 soldiers, in addition
to 16,000 members of the security organs, some of whom are attached to
the military forces in times of need.4 In Operation Protective Edge, Hamas’s
military forces contained six territorial divisions. Elite units, airborne forces
(small UAVs, larger UAVs, and drones), and a naval force were established.
The Hamas Military Buildup
I 51
The military forces also included special units specializing in high trajectory
weapons, air defense, and smuggling.
In Operation Protective Edge, Hamas concealed its rocket launchers
and command and control capabilities in tunnels. As such, it was able to
maintain functional continuity during all 50 days of ighting and use the
attack tunnels infrastructure to penetrate Israeli territory to carry out attacks
and set ambushes for forces. In the meantime, defensive tunnels in the
Gaza Strip were used in order to surprise IDF ground forces with the use
of explosive devices, anti-tank ire, and kidnapping soldiers.5 In addition,
during the ighting, Hamas launched continuous rocket barrages at diverse
targets in Israel in an attempt to penetrate the Iron Dome defensive layer;
tried to launch rockets at strategic targets, such as Ben Gurion Airport, and
to a limited extent at the nuclear reactor in Dimona; and ired mortar shells
at Israeli communities bordering the Gaza Strip and the entry points for the
IDF (after it became clear that long range rocket ire was not having the
expected effect).6
The ground forces: In order to prepare its combat force, Hamas conducts
intensive maneuvers, with an emphasis on penetrating Israel, attacking
Israeli targets, and kidnapping soldiers. Together with rebuilding its regular
force, there are efforts to improve the military itness of the security organs
and train popular militias and youth frameworks as an auxiliary force for
the regular army.7
One of the signiicant attack capabilities being developed by Hamas is an
elite unit – the Nakba Force. The purpose of this unit is to carry out attacks
in Israeli territory through the attack tunnels. The force, which numbers
5,000 soldiers, also practices defensive operations in the Gaza Strip. The
troops train intensively, and are equipped with more advanced and precise
weapons.8 The maneuvers focus on penetration of Israeli territory, assaults on
IDF positions or patrols, killing of soldiers and destruction of weapons, and
retreats through the tunnels with captured IDF soldiers or soldiers’ bodies for
use as bargaining chips in order to obtain the release of Palestinian prisoners.9
Repairing the tunnel system: Hamas has two tunnel systems. One, located
within the Gaza Strip, is used to ensure command and control if the IDF is in
the area and threatens infrastructure above ground. It is used to attack IDF
forces, to transport combatants from place to place and conceal combatants,
and to store equipment and weapons. The second is a system of attack tunnels
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crossing the border into Israeli territory. These tunnels are designed to allow
soldiers to move into Israeli territory, while bypassing the border fence and
IDF activity along the border, with the aim of gaining control over IDF
positions or patrols and carrying out terrorist attacks in Israel with attacks
that will make a major public impact.10
During Operation Protective Edge, the IDF uncovered 100 kilometers
of tunnels in the Gaza Strip and neutralized 32 attack tunnels, a third of
which extended into Israeli territory.11 It was also reported that Hamas had
put to death dozens of tunnel diggers, fearing that they would disclose the
location of the tunnels.12 Following Operation Protective Edge, Hamas
assigned hundreds of members to dig new tunnels and repair those that had
been destroyed. The digging took place seven days a week, at all hours of
the day and night. Hamas reportedly invests about $40 million a year in the
tunnels project and employs some 1,500 operatives from its various area
divisions in digging tunnels. The average wage for a digger varies between
$250 and $400 a month, which is considered a relatively high wage in the
Gaza Strip. The diggers also receive bonuses and incentives for meeting
the timetables set by the military leadership in the Gaza Strip, and their pay
increases according to seniority.13 It is estimated that Hamas has already
invested hundreds of millions of dollars in the tunnels project, and it has
been claimed that this constitutes most of the organization’s budget.14
In April 2016, the IDF uncovered a Hamas attack tunnel in Israeli territory,
and neutralized it in a controlled manner.15A month later, in May 2016, the
IDF discovered another attack tunnel in Israeli territory. IDF sources asserted
that they did not know whether the tunnel was dug before or after Operation
Protective Edge, but the tunnel was discovered to be usable.16
The tunnel-digging project is based on the realization that the pace
of digging should be stepped up as long as Israel has no comprehensive
technological solution to the challenge of locating the tunnels.17 At the same
time, the effort to move ahead with it is encountering another obstacle:
between early 2016 and mid 2017, some 20 tunnels collapsed in the Gaza
Strip, killing approximately twenty members of Hamas and Islamic Jihad.
It is believed that the tunnels’ collapse was caused by natural factors, rain,
or unknown actions by Israel. Speculation about Israel’s involvement in the
collapse of the tunnels was supported when tunnels continued to collapse
at a higher rate during the summer, when there was no rain. On March 22,
The Hamas Military Buildup
I 53
2017, in a hearing of the Knesset State Control Committee, the IDF Chief of
Staff conirmed that the IDF had attacked tunnels on the Gaza Strip border
after Operation Protective Edge, using a new method.18
Military infrastructure along the border with Israel: Following Operation
Protective Edge, Hamas built a series of positions several hundred meters
from Israel’s security fence. Lookout towers were built near them and
manned by members of Hamas’s military wing, and a road was paved next
to the fence. The line of outposts improves Hamas’s ability to enforce its
policy on the jihad factions active in the Gaza Strip, which seek to incite
escalation. Enforcement is carried out in part by a special military and
security force called the “Restraining Force.” At the same time, the new line
enables Hamas to monitor IDF actions along the border relatively effectively,
improve regular security, and initiate offensive operations from close to the
border with Israel when deemed necessary.19
The naval arm: According to IDF naval intelligence, a Hamas commando
unit has been equipped with dozens of diving kits, among the most advanced
in the world, giving its frogmen the ability to dive to various depths for
up to four hours. Hamas’s commandos are also equipped with advanced
computerized diving watches, and even scooters (miniature tools for moving
about underwater) that increase their diving distance and enable them to
reach the Israeli coast more quickly, leaving the diver with enough strength
to ight later on the land.20 During Operation Protective Edge, divers from
the Hamas commando unit succeeded in penetrating Israeli territory from
the sea when ive divers emerged near the Zikim beach. They were spotted
immediately by IDF lookouts and killed by combat soldiers who arrived at
the scene,21 but only after being on the beach for 40 minutes. One of them
managed to attach an explosive device to a tank. The device exploded, but
caused no casualties.22
The unit has multiplied its forces since Operation Protective Edge, and
now has many dozens of trained combat soldiers, who are young and highly
motivated to take advantage of the underwater dimension to deliver a strategic
blow against Israel in the next war in the Gaza Strip. It is believed that Hamas
is planning to have its commandos launch weapons at close range, possibly
advanced anti-tank missiles aimed at the power plant in southern Ashkelon,
with the objective of causing damage that will be photographed, thereby
giving Hamas a victory photo shot. Another possibility is diving to reach
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the area between Ashkelon and Ashdod, quietly coming up on the beach,
and launching missiles from the land at a trading ship coming to anchor
at Ashdod Port, with the aim of paralyzing Israel marine trade during the
ighting.23 In August 2016, the IDF revealed an aerial photo of a marina built
for the naval unit of Hamas’s military wing, including a supervision and
lookout tower. A senior Israeli navy source explained that Hamas’s naval
commando unit was liable to use this infrastructure in future operational
missions and training.24
The air arm: Hamas’s array of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) was
established a decade ago on the basis of knowledge acquired in Iran and
Syria.25 The architect of the plan was Hamas leader Adnan al-Ghoul, who
was killed by Israel in 2004. The array includes UAVs that probably cannot
carry standard weaponry; it may be possible, however, to load explosives on
them in improved fashion, and they are capable of photography missions.
The miniature UAVs can ly a distance of dozens of kilometers from the Gaza
Strip, and can cover the greater Tel Aviv region, and even areas further north.26
A senior IDF source said that if Hamas uses these UAVs as miniature suicide
UAVs, the potential damage would be less than the damage from a rocket.27
On November 16, 2012, during Operation Pillar of Defense, the Israel
Air Force attacked and destroyed a warehouse storing Hamas’s miniature
UAVs. The UAVs were in the advanced stages of development, with precise
attack capabilities and the ability to collect high quality intelligence.28 On
July 14, 2014, during Operation Protective Edge, a Hamas UAV penetrated
into Israel and was intercepted by the air force. The IDF claimed that it
was unclear whether the UAV was booby-trapped or sent for photography
purposes.29 Since Operation Protective Edge, Hamas has been trying to
rebuild its array of miniature UAVs.30 On June 25, 2015, a UAV from the
Gaza Strip penetrated Israeli territory, but disintegrated near the border
fence.31 On September 20, 2016, the Israel Air Force detection system spotted
a Hamas UAV taking off from the Gaza Strip that lew along the Gaza Strip
coastline for several minutes. The UAV was monitored by Israel as soon
as it took off, until it was intercepted with the help of an F-16, although it
never entered Israeli territory.32
In addition to the miniature UAVs, Hamas is training its soldiers to use
other airborne weapons. A Hamas soldier with the rank of squad commander
told the Israel Security Agency in his interrogation that he had been selected in
The Hamas Military Buildup
I 55
2010 for a special force that was sent to Malaysia for training on paragliders
in preparation for terrorist attacks penetrating Israel. Ten other soldiers from
various battalions who had trained there for a week in lying paragliders
were with him. In 2014, the soldier, together with the others who had been
trained with him, were summoned for additional paraglider training, this
time in the Gaza Strip.33
On February 15, 2016, it was reported that Mohamed al-Zawari had
been killed in Tunisia. Al-Zawari was an engineer and light expert who
was a member of Hamas and Hezbollah, and had helped both organizations
improve their array of UAVs, and had even iniltrated the Gaza Strip through
a tunnel in order to train Hamas terrorists in the use of UAVs against Israeli
targets. Sources in Hamas accused Israel of the killing.34
Rockets: On the eve of Operation Protective Edge, Hamas had approximately
11,000 rockets, mostly short range and a few long range (up to 160 kilometers).
At the end of the ighting, as a result of massive iring at Israel (about 4,000
rockets) and attacks by Israel, Hamas was left with a third of that number.
Hamas therefore assigned top priority to increasing its stock of rockets and
mortar shells and improving its technical capabilities. In view of the lessons
from Operation Protective Edge, and following dificulties in smuggling
standard long range rockets from the Sinai Peninsula into the Gaza Strip,
Hamas emphasized the procurement of high trajectory short range weapons.35
About 18 months after Operation Protective Edge, Israel believes that Hamas
has managed to refurbish its stock of rockets that it had before that conlict,
although most of them are short range, while most locally produced rockets
are less accurate than the standard rockets.36
Smuggling production equipment: Since Operation Protective Edge, Hamas
has devoted most of its resources to an extensive campaign to procure and
smuggle goods, including dual purpose materials that are liable to be used
in weapons manufacturing. These materials are brought into the Gaza Strip
in cooperation with dealers from Judea and Samaria and elsewhere in Israeli
territory. Most of the goods, including electronic and electrical equipment,
communications equipment, and raw materials for industry are used to
rebuild and improve the system of attack tunnels; produce weapons, with an
emphasis on rockets; and create technological support systems for warfare.37
Together with the procurement campaign, which has consumed many
inancial resources, Hamas is taking action, including through violent means,
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to gain control over raw materials, among them cement, iron, and wood,
that have been approved for entry into the Gaza Strip in order to support
reconstruction of civilian infrastructure in the area. Few of these materials
are sent to the population; the bulk is coniscated and sent directly to those
engaged in rebuilding and expanding military infrastructure.38 In 2016, the
IDF and the Israel Security Agency thwarted 1,226 attempts at smuggling
forbidden materials into the Gaza Strip, 165 percent more than in 2015. Items
seized included drones, model airplanes, security cameras, communications
equipment, military equipment, military uniforms, auto trailers and engines,
iron and aluminum pipes, metal balls, diving equipment, and snappling
ropes. It is believed that these were sent for Hamas’s military wing and the
terrorist organization’s attempts at military buildup.39
The Hamas military buildup, which necessarily comes at the expense of
reconstructing civilian infrastructure in the Gaza Strip, is also relected in the
exploitation of international aid organizations operating in the Gaza Strip.
For example, in August 2016 the Israel Security Agency exposed a senior
igure in the World Vision international aid organization, who served for
years as a senior agent of Hamas’s military wing. This man covertly diverted
$7.2 million a year designated for Gaza’s civilian population to the Hamas
military wing.40 Likewise, Hamas took control of 2,500 food packages with
a value of $100 per package sent to needy people in the Gaza Strip, and
sent them to its members. Similar interceptions occurred with 3,000 cases
of cleaning and personal care materials worth $80 per package intended for
Gaza Strip residents and diverted to members of Hamas’s military wing.
Families of Hamas members falsely listed their children as injured in order
to get money that was designated for needy children.41
On February 12, 2017, Israel arrested Muhammad Murtaja, head of TIKA,
the Turkish government’s humanitarian aid organization, on suspicion of
acting in the service of Hamas’s military wing over the past decade. Murtaja
transferred millions of shekels for Hamas military personnel in the course
of the ighting during Operation Protective Edge and afterwards, in addition
to food packages contributed by TIKA for the needy population in the Gaza
Strip. At the end of Operation Protective Edge, TIKA inanced a public
event in which Hamas’s military personnel were given grants and beneits.42
The Hamas Military Buildup
I 57
Conclusion
The tension in Hamas between the political leadership and the military wing
mainly concerns the organization’s priorities in allocating resources and
investing efforts. While the political leadership is pushing to speed up the
reconstruction efforts in the Gaza Strip and rebuild Hamas’s relations with
Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the military leadership is setting its sights on the
organization’s military buildup, including the extension of cooperation with
jihad groups operating in the Sinai Peninsula. At the same time, despite the
differences between the two wings, they agree that a large scale military
conlict with Israel is inconsistent with the organization’s interest at the
present time.
Hamas continues to rule in the Gaza Strip. Its authority is indisputable,
and it is succeeding in controlling the pressure resulting from the distress of
the population there, although it is sometimes challenged by the resistance
organizations operating within the Gaza Strip. At the same time, it is possible
that the population’s distress and the provocative activity by recalcitrant
factions against Israel will cause escalation that will drag Israel and Hamas
into another conlict. Under the current conditions, Hamas does not want
a conlict, but it is preparing for the possibility that one will take place
with strenuous efforts to build up its military force. These efforts include
renewing its system of offensive and defensive tunnels, improving its ability
to manufacture arms, and establishing trained special forces.
In order to reduce the likelihood that the distress in the Gaza Strip will
reinforce belligerent tendencies in Hamas’s ranks, and perhaps also in order
to embarrass the Palestinian Authority, undermine its status, and pave the
way for a Hamas takeover in the West Bank, an effort should be made to
rebuild civilian infrastructure in the Gaza Strip, under the assumption that a
heightened reconstruction effort will constitute a restraining factor against
any outbreak of violence. An effort should be made toward external parties
in the reconstruction project, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab
Emirates, and the international community, although creative diplomacy will
be required in order to assemble a broad coalition of this nature, in which the
member countries have different, and sometimes contradictory, interests.
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Notes
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
Amos Harel, “Hamas’s Desire to Increase West Bank Attacks Could Trigger New
Gaza War,” Haaretz, January 12, 2016, http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.
premium-1.696899.
“Two Years after Operation Protective Edge: Security along the Israeli-Gazan
Border,” Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, September 12,
2016, pp. 15-16, http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/21068/.
“Using Civilians as Human Shields,” Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism
Information Center, March 25, 2009, pp. 2-4, http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/
en/18296/.
“Two Years after Operation Protective Edge: Security along the Israeli-Gazan
Border,” pp. 15-16.
Udi Dekel, “Operation Protective Edge: Strategic and Tactical Asymmetry,” in The
Lessons of Operation Protective Edge, eds. Anat Kurz and Shlomo Brom (Tel Aviv:
Institute for National Security Studies, 2014), pp. 16-17, http://www.inss.org.il/
wp-content/uploads/sites/2/systemiles/SystemFiles/Operation%20Protective%20
Edge%20Strategic%20and%20Tactical%20Asymmetry.pdf.
Ibid.
“Two Years after Operation Protective Edge: Security along the Israeli-Gazan
Border,” p. 3.
Amir Buhbut, “Senior Southern Command Oficer: Elite Hamas Unit Being
Reinforced with Thousands of Soldiers,” Walla! News, April 14, 2016, https://
news.walla.co.il/item/2953116.
“Two Years after Operation Protective Edge: Security along the Israeli-Gazan
Border,” p. 39.
Ibid, p. 30.
Ibid.
Daniel Rubenstein, “Hamas’ Tunnel Network: A Massacre in the Making,” Jerusalem
Center for Public Affairs, http://jcpa.org/hamas-tunnel-network/.
Avi Issacharoff, “Hamas Military Wing Budget: $100 million, 40% of it for Tunnels,”
Walla! News, September 8, 2016, http://news.walla.co.il/item/2995401.
Assaf Gibor, “In Gaza, They are Sure that Israel is Involved in the Collapse of
Tunnels,” NRG, August 27, 2016, http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/817/672.
html.
Amir Buhbut, “Watch: This is How IDF Forces Discovered the Tunnel Penetrating into
Israeli Territory,” Walla! News, April 18, 2016, http://news.walla.co.il/item/2953958.
Matan Tzuri and Yoav Zeitun, “IDF Finds another Attack Tunnel,” Ynet, May 5,
2016, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4799687,00.html.
Amir Buhbut, “When the IDF Extends, its Searches, Hamas Digs Deeper: The
Never-Ending Battle of Wits,” Walla! News, October 1, 2016, http://news.walla.
co.il/item/2931794.
The Hamas Military Buildup
I 59
18 Jonathan Lis and Gili Cohen, “Chief of Staff: IDF Attacked Tunnels on Gaza
Border after Operation Protective Edge using New Method,” Haaretz, March 22,
2017, http://www.haaretz.co.il/misc/article-print-page/1.3948294.
19 “Two Years after Operation Protective Edge: Security along the Israeli-Gazan
Border,” p. 3.
20 Yoav Zeitun, “Suspects in the Sea: Hamas’ Naval Commandos Planning Israel
Attack,” Ynet, August 20, 2015, www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4692768,00.
html.
21 Yoav Zeitun, Elior Levy, Ron Ben-Yishai, and Matan Tzuri, “5 Terrorists Killed
Trying to Penetrate to Zikim from the Sea,” Ynet, July 8, 2014, http://www.ynet.
co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4539859,00.html.
22 Itay Blumenthal, “IDF Embarrassment: Clip of Zikim Penetration Leaked,” Ynet,
December 11, 2014, http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4602617,00.html.
23 Zeitun, “Suspects in the Sea: Hamas Naval Commandos Planning Israel Attack.”
24 Yoav Zeitun, “UN-Siphoned Funds Pay for Hamas Commando Marina,” Ynet,
August 10, 2016, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4839849,00.html.
25 Amir Buhbut, “With a Tailwind from Iran and Syria: How Hamas Founded its UAV
Array,” Walla! News, December 17, 2016, https://news.walla.co.il/item/3023234.
26 Yoav Zeitun, “Watch: Hamas’s UAV Can Reach Tel Aviv,” Ynet, November 16,
2012, http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4306837,00.html.
27 Yoav Zeitun, “Hamas Claims Multiple UAVs Launched into Israel,” Ynet, July 14,
2014, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4543077,00.html.
28 Zeitun, “Hamas’s UAV Can Reach Tel Aviv.”
29 Zeitun,“Hamas Claims Multiple UAVs Launched into Israel.”
30 Yoav Zeitun, “Watch: Israeli Air Force Shoots Down Hamas Drone,” Ynet, September
20, 2016, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4857327,00.html.
31 Nir Yagna,“UAV from Gaza that Penetrated Israel Disintegrates on Border,” Walla!
News, June 25, 2015, http://news.walla.co.il/item/2867128.
32 Noam Amir, “Air Force Intercepts Hamas UAV in Gaza Strip,” Maariv, September
20, 2015, http://www.maariv.co.il/news/military/Article-557860.
33 “Hamas Terror Cell Received Advanced Training in Malaysia,” IDF website, July
31, 2014, https://www.idfblog.com/2014/07/31/hamas-cell-received-advancedtraining-malaysia/.
34 Roy Kais, “UAVs for Hamas and Hezbollah: Watch Flight Expert Killed in
Action Attributed to Mossad,” Ynet, February 17, 2017, http://www.ynet.co.il/
articles/0,7340,L-4894163,00.html.
35 “Two Years after Operation Protective Edge: Security along the Israeli-Gazan
Border.”
36 Avi Issacharoff, “Assessment in Israel: Hamas Has Renewed the Stock of Rockets
it Had before Operation Protective Edge,” Walla! News, March 4, 2016.
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37 “Hamas Making Efforts at Military Buildup Using Building Materials Designated
for Civilian Construction and Smuggling Forbidden Materials through Border
Crossings,” Israel Security Agency website, July 26, 2015, https://www.shabak.
gov.il/publications/Pages/study/Skira260715.aspx.
38 Ibid.
39 Yohai Ofer, “165% Increase in Thwarted Smuggling to the Gaza Strip in 2016,”
NRG, January 15, 2017, http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/857/293.html.
40 Yaakov Lappin and Herb Keinon, “Hamas Iniltrated ‘International Gazan Aid
Group,’ Stole Tens of Millions of Dollars,” Jerusalem Post, August 4, 2016, http://
www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conlict/Hamas-iniltrated-international-Gazan-aidgroup-stole-tens-of-millions-of-dollars-463211.
41 Yoav Zeitun and Elior Levy, “Permitted for Publication: UN Employee also
Accused of Working for Hamas,” Ynet, August 9, 2016, http://www.ynet.co.il/
articles/0,7340,L-4838876,00.html.
42 Yoav Zeitun and Elior Levy, “Gaza Coordinator of Turkish Aid Group
Funneled Funds to Hamas,” Ynet, March 21, 2017, https://www.ynetnews.com/
articles/0,7340,L-4938538,00.html.