FRANCE AND THE BALKAN WARS (1912–1913) FRANCE AND THE BALKAN WARS (1912–1913) (Summary) Summary he book France and the Balkan Wars (1912–1913) was written based on unpublished documents of the Diplomatic Archive Centre of the Ministry of Foreign Afairs of France, Archive of Serbia, Military Archive, Archives of Yugoslavia, State Archive of Bulgaria, National Archives of Romania, Archive of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Croatian State Archives, as well as based on published documents, memoirs, relevant historiographic literature and periodicals. he most important in writing the book were French documents which enabled us to understand and explain, in the best possible way, the moves of French diplomacy during the Balkan Wars. he main aim of this book is to comprehensively reconstruct the diplomatic activity of France from spring 1912, i.e. the moment of creation of the Balkan League, until summer 1913, when the Bucharest Conference put an end to the crisis in the Balkans. France was not among those powers that were most interested in the area of the Balkans. herefore, at the start of the research, the question was posed whether it is justiied to deal with the politics of the country which was “only” indirectly involved in the Balkan events. However, during the research we concluded that although the activity of France was not as direct as the activity of Russia or Austria-Hungary, its role in the Balkan Wars was by no means small and negligible. We rightly emphasise that France was an active participant in all diplomatic talks led during 1912 and 1913, and was oten their initiator as well. At the same time, through its diplomatic envoys, special missions and legates, it was present in the Balkan war theatre from the irst to the last day. It should be noted that France’s activity did not remain limited only to the high-level diplomacy domain. he economy and culture were the two most important spheres of inluence of France in the Balkans before the First World War and largely ater it as well. herefore, we dealt in this book also with those aspects of French politics. Ater it found out, in spring and summer 1912, that the Balkan states, under the Russian auspices, created alliances against the Ottoman Empire, France faced a two-fold choice – to withdraw and distance itself from its ally’s politics as it did in the Annexation Crisis or to side with its ally and face all the mounting challenges. From the creation of the Franco-Russian Alliance in 1893/4, the attitudes of Paris and St Petersburg were invariably at odds either in the case of Eastern crises or the crises erupting in the colonies under French protectorate. Russia had no interests in the north of Africa, while on the other FRANCE AND THE BALKAN WARS (1912–1913) (Summary) 443 hand, France tried to politically distance itself from all Eastern crises that Russia meddled into across the Ottoman Empire. For France, the Balkans was “an unwanted dowry” that Russia brought into the alliance. France understood that the Balkan peninsula was a traditional zone of inluence of the Russian Empire and the links connecting Russia and the Balkan, primarily Slavic countries, were deep and very delicate. However, it believed that Russia had no vital interests in the Balkans such as those connecting France to Algeria, Morocco or Tunisia, but that the Russian meddling into the Balkan afairs arose from its need to vie with Austria-Hungary for the sake of greater prestige. Despite the prehistory, the French Government headed by Raymond Poincaré, who came to power in January 1912, dared to make a precedent in autumn 1912. Instead of distancing itself, France decided to stand by its ally Russia. It was the irst time since 1893 that France and Russia jointly embarked on tackling an Eastern issue. Among the French diplomatic corps not everyone wholeheartedly supported Poincaré’s politics. Some French diplomats believed that alliances among small Balkan states, even under the Russian auspices, were too dangerous both for the interests of France and general peace, and that France should share its knowledge with other powers and together with them nip in the bud the entire endeavour. Nonetheless, France did not do that. When the war broke out on 8/17 October 1912, the fact that it did not try to prevent the Balkans from their intent made France, in the eyes of the Balkan states, worthy of trust. It was suiciently distanced so as not to jeopardise them with its pretensions, while at the same time suiciently strong to help them, primarily with capital, in the achievement of the objectives for the sake of which they entered the war against the Ottoman Empire. here is no doubt that France did not want the war in the Balkans in 1912, particularly a war that could easily engulf entire Europe or that could at least jeopardise its enormous inancial investments in the Ottoman Empire and elsewhere across the Balkans. However, although it did not want the war, France readily got to grips with it. hrough its diplomatic network in the Balkans, France carefully followed the end of the war. Its control of the war was facilitated by the great trust that French envoys enjoyed in the capitals of Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro and the Ottoman Empire. Balkan politicians visited French missions every day, asking from ambassadors (Léon-Coullard Descos in Belgrade, Hector-André de Panaieu in Soia, Gabriel-Pierre Deville in Athens, Maurice Bompard in Istanbul, Raymond Aynard in Cetinje) support and advice. Protecting general peace was the most important task to which France subordinated all its diplomatic activities in 1912 and 1913. It was the irst among the great powers which suggested the organisation of a peace conference to deal with issues arising from the First Balkan War. In this regard, it was 444 Биљана Стојић: Француска и балкански ратови (1912–1913) the irst to emphasise the necessity of cooperation of all great powers for the purpose of protecting general peace. France’s attitude was that general peace was a joint achievement of all great powers and that they were all obliged to keep it. In this process, it reserved for itself the role of an arbiter and mediator, both among the warring parties and the great powers. he London Peace Conference, which commenced on 17 December 1912, was made possible owing to great eforts of French diplomacy. he Conference consisted of two meetings which took place at the same time. At the Balkan Conference, the warring parties negotiated the conditions of peace, while at the Conference of the Ambassadors the great powers negotiated the status of Albania, the destiny of islands in the Aegean and Ionian seas, and future borders in the Balkans. Although France was nor rewarded for its eforts with the organisation of the conference in its territory, it turned out that London was a good place for the organisation, as it transpired, of the last meeting of the Concert of the great powers. France was represented by Paul Cambon, who was a worthy representative of the French and joint policy of the Triple Entente. However, this peace conference, planned for such a long time, did not meet the expectations of participants in the war nor, ultimately, of the great powers. he results of the Balkan Conference were nulliied with the coup d'état in Istanbul and the Second Balkan War, while the results of the Conference of the Ambassadors were devalued by the great powers themselves. When in August 1913 the ambassadors held the last meeting, the question of the Aegean islands remained unresolved due to the obstruction by Italy, the Albanian question was only partially resolved, while all other inancial issues and the dispute between Bulgaria and Romania were even before exempted from the ambassadors’ remit. Still, even such conference, with all its deiciencies and weak results, was an unattained ideal in July 1914. From the aspect of France, the London Conference was not a complete failure. Owing to eforts of Paul Cambon, all great powers assumed oversight over the newly created Albanian state, which exempted it from the exclusive zone of inluence of Austria-Hungary and Italy. Also, although the decision was not carried out, all islands in the Aegean and Ionian seas, with the majority Greek population, were nominally assigned to Greece, which for France was a far better solution than Italy’s dominance in the Eastern Mediterranean. hrough the intercession, primarily of France, the decision was made to analyse all inancial issues separately from all other issues on the agenda of the Conference of the Ambassadors. his time, France had the honour to organise a conference under its auspices. he organisation of the inancial conference in June 1913 was the greatest achievement of French diplomacy in the Balkan Wars. In addition, this meeting showed that France and Germany were not “sworn” enemies, but rather bent on cooperation when pursuing the same objective. In this case, the objective was the protection of money invested in the FRANCE AND THE BALKAN WARS (1912–1913) (Summary) 445 Ottoman Empire. Unfortunately, like the London Conference, this conference did not yield the expected results either, both because of the start of the Second Balkan War and due to the fact that the delegates in Paris did not manage to adopt an eicient mechanism to force the Balkan countries to repay a part of the Ottoman debt. Owing to their brilliant military victories over the Ottoman Empire, the Balkan states won the respect of all strata of French society overnight. here was almost no statesman or newspaper, either right- or let-wing, that did not extol the war successes of the Balkan states. he fact that they made it with the help of artillery weapons from French military plants made their success greater and more worthy of praise. he united Balkan states attracted considerable attention of the military leaders as well, who considered the possibility of creating from the alliance of the Balkan states their strategic and political partner in South Eastern Europe. However, instead of strengthening the links with the single Balkan Alliance, France faced once again the danger of having the new war spread from the Balkans to the rest of Europe. he Second Balkan War which broke out on 29/30 June 1913 posed a far greater danger than the previous one as the lame of war crossed the Danube and engulfed Romania, the only Balkan state not afected by the First Balkan War. he war between the recent allies cast a shadow on the great victories of the previous war. French diplomats in the Balkan capitals did not hide their disappointment with such an outcome. heir position became even more delicate as all parties in the war tried to win their support, tempting them to openly side with one party against another. As in the First Balkan War, during the Second Balkan War France endeavoured to remain consistent in its attitude to preserve objectivity and impartiality. Although it did not openly side with any party, as it was done by other states, it did not mean that it excluded itself from the developments. French ambassador to Bucharest Jules-Charles François Blondel was a worthy successor to Paul Cambon in the status of a delegate at the Bucharest Peace Conference which commenced on 30 July. Just like the French Ministry of Foreign Afairs, he began to understand that the future of the Balkans did not rely on an alliance between Serbia and Bulgaria, but that it would be far more favourable for France if the military cooperation between Serbia, Greece, Montenegro and Romania was materialized in a single alliance under the auspices not only of Russia, but France as well. Russia would be the political and France the economic component of the protectorate. he Bucharest Conference put an end to the Second Balkan War on 10 August. Upon its completion, France slowly stepped out from the shadow of Russian politics and began to actively encourage the rapprochement between Belgrade, Athens and Bucharest. Its inluence increased in the economic sphere is well. From autumn 1913, there was no Balkan state which was not, in this way or another, inanced by French capital. Money was used for the removal 446 Биљана Стојић: Француска и балкански ратови (1912–1913) of consequences of the wars, economic recovery, strengthening of the political and military structure. Together with capital, a strong political pressure made its way to the Balkans as well. hough it did not expect that the Balkans and the Balkan Wars would help strengthen its strategic position on the foreign policy arena, ater the two Balkan Wars, France had enough reason to be satisied with the results achieved. Its inluence on the Balkans on the eve of the Great War was manifold and diverse. Indirectly, the military aspect of the wars contributed to the reform of the French army and awareness raising among the French that Europe largely entered the era of modern warfare and that France had to brace itself for all the challenges posed by the future. he experience of the Balkan Wars, but most notably the good impressions that military missions brought to France, helped Poincaré to get support of the National Assembly, in August 1913, to pass the law that restored active military service of the French army to three-year mandatory conscription. he passing of the hree-Year Service Law was accompanied with the adoption of a larger budget for the army and other military measures. Despite a strong opposition on the eve of the Great War, no one could any longer refute the soundness of Poincaré’s vision from early 1912 that the survival of France depended on the strength of its alliance with Russia and its military readiness. Today’s interpretation of the Balkan Wars in French historiography does not have much in common with the conclusions presented in this book. Quite the contrary – the majority of contemporary researchers not only of France, but Germany and Great Britain as well, try hard to refute any more concrete or intentional involvement of France in the Balkan Wars and the First World War. According to their conclusions, France was drawn into the unfortunate string of events by Russia and a few of its imprudent statesmen and diplomats. Such selective interpretation and the fundamentally changed perception of the French Balkan policy open many problems today and bring into the question all facts from historical sources and the conclusions that we have reached in studying those sources and that we have presented in this book. A more thorough analysis of works that most vehemently espouse the revised attitudes about the history of the Balkans leads to the conclusion that they lack scientiic background and are, in the majority of cases, artiicially shaped under the inluence of daily politics. As such, those revisionist attitudes belong to the domain of the contemporary perception of the Balkans in French society and are out of focus of the present research, which is why no considerable attention was devoted to them. Keywords: France, Balkans, First Balkan War, Second Balkan War, peace negotiations, London Conference, Bucharest Conference, Raymond Poincaré.