The EU and Russia in Their &#39;Contested Neighbourhood&#39;

Laure Delcour

The literature on the European Union's influence in its Eastern neighbourhood has tended to focus on EU-level policies and prioritise EU-related variables. This book seeks to overcome this EU-centric approach by connecting EU policy transfer to the domestic and regional environment in which it unfolds. It looks at the way in which the EU seeks to influence domestic change in the post-Soviet countries participating in the European Neighbourhood Policy/Eastern Partnership and domestic receptivity to EU policies and templates. It seeks to disentangle the various dynamics behind domestic change (or lack thereof) in Eastern Partnership countries, including EU policy mechanisms, domestic elites' preferences and strategies, regional interdependences and Russia's policies. Based upon extensive empirical investigation on EU policies in four countries: Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine – and in two pivotal policy sectors – the book provides systematic and nuanced understanding of complex forces at work in the policy transfer process. This text will be of key interest to scholars and students of international relations , European studies, democratization studies, and East European Politics and area studies, particularly post-Soviet/Eurasian studies.

The EU and Russia in Their ‘Contested Neighbourhood’ The literature on the European Union’s influence in its Eastern neighbourhood has tended to focus on EU-level policies and prioritise EU-related variables. This book seeks to overcome this EU-centric approach by connecting EU policy transfer to the domestic and regional environment in which it unfolds. It looks at the way in which the EU seeks to influence domestic change in the post-Soviet countries participating in the European Neighbourhood Policy/Eastern Partnership and domestic receptivity to EU policies and templates. It seeks to disentangle the various dynamics behind domestic change (or lack thereof) in Eastern Partnership countries, including EU policy mechanisms, domestic elites’ preferences and strategies, regional interdependences and Russia’s policies. Based upon extensive empirical investigation on EU policies in four countries: Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine – and in two pivotal policy sectors – the book provides systematic and nuanced understanding of complex forces at work in the policy transfer process. This text will be of key interest to scholars and students of international relations, European studies, democratization studies, and East European Politics and area studies, particularly post-Soviet/Eurasian studies. Laure Delcour is Scientific Coordinator and Senior Research Fellow under the EU-funded FP7 project ‘Exploring the Security-Democracy Nexus in the Caucasus’ (project CASCADE, FMSH, Paris). 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 1 10/25/2016 9:57:02 AM Routledge Studies in European Foreign Policy Series Editors: Richard Whitman, University of Kent, UK Richard Youngs, University of Warwick, UK This series addresses the standard range of conceptual and theoretical questions related to European foreign policy. At the same time, in response to the intensity of new policy developments, it endeavours to ensure that it also has a topical flavour, addressing the most important and evolving challenges to European foreign policy, in a way that will be relevant to the policy-making and think-tank communities. 1 The European Union in International Climate Change Politics Still taking a lead? Rüdiger Wurzel, James Connelly and Duncan Liefferink 2 Theorizing the European Neighbourhood Policy Sieglinde Gstöhl and Simon Schunz 3 EU Security Missions and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Amr Nasr El-Din 4 The EU and Russia in Their ‘Contested Neighbourhood’ Multiple external influences, policy transfer and domestic change Laure Delcour 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 2 10/25/2016 9:57:02 AM The EU and Russia in Their ‘Contested Neighbourhood’ Multiple external influences, policy transfer and domestic change Laure Delcour 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 3 10/25/2016 9:57:02 AM First published 2017 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2017 Laure Delcour The right of Laure Delcour to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data [CIP data] ISBN: 978-1-138-18557-9 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-64437-0 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Apex CoVantage, LLC 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 4 10/25/2016 9:57:02 AM Contents List of tables and boxes Acknowledgments List of abbreviations vi vii viii 1 Introduction: multiple external influences, EU policy transfer and domestic change in the post-Soviet space 2 Research framework 19 3 EU policies in the post-Soviet space: EU rules at the core of an open-ended integration process 38 4 Russia’s (counter-)actions in the post-Soviet space: power without influence? 62 5 Between Brussels and Moscow: the manifold domestic responses to the EU’s offer 83 6 The EU’s policy transfer to the post-Soviet space in a context of rival trade integration frameworks: the case of food safety 103 7 The EU’s policy transfer to the post-Soviet space in a context of multiple influences: the case of migration 126 8 Conclusions: beyond the frontstage: reassessing the impact of external influences on domestic change in the post-Soviet space 155 Index 165 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 5 1 10/25/2016 9:57:02 AM Tables and boxes Tables 2.1 Explanatory factors 5.1 The EU’s offer: state of play in Eastern Partnership countries 6.1 EU food safety demands selected for analysis 6.2 Domestic change in response to the EU: food safety standards 7.1 EU demands selected for analysis in the visa liberalisation process 7.2 Domestic change in response to the EU: visa liberalisation process 26 96 105 120 128 146 Boxes 2.1 2.2 2.3 Domestic-level hypotheses EU-level hypotheses Regional-level hypotheses 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 6 22 23 25 10/25/2016 9:57:02 AM Acknowledgments The research conducted for this book was supported by the French Agence Nationale de la Recherche under the project ‘Exploring the Role of the EU in Domestic Change in Post-Soviet Countries’ (ANR-10-ORAR-0014) co-funded with the ESRC (UK), and by the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/ SSH.2013.4.1.-1) under the project ‘Exploring the Security-Democracy Nexus in the Caucasus’ (CASCADE, grant 613354). 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 7 10/25/2016 9:57:02 AM Abbreviations AA CEECs CFSP CIB CIS COMECON CSTO DCFTA EAEU EaP EC ECU EEC ENP ENP AP ENPARD Association Agreement Central and East European Countries Common Foreign and Security Policy Comprehensive Institution-Building Programmes Commonwealth of Independent States Council for Mutual Economic Assistance Collective Security Treaty Organisation Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement Eurasian Economic Union Eastern Partnership European Commission Eurasian Customs Union European Economic Community European Neighbourhood Policy European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan European Neighbourhood Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development ENPI European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument EPP European People’s Party FTA Free-Trade Agreement GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GDP Gross Domestic Product GOST Gosudarstvennyi standart (State standard) GSP Generalised System of Preferences GUAM/GUUAM Georgia – Ukraine – Azerbaijan – Moldova (with addition of Uzbekistan) HACCP Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point IDP Internally Displaced Persons IFC International Finance Corporation IOM International Organisation for Migration NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NGO Non-governmental Organization JHA Justice and Home Affairs 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 8 10/25/2016 9:57:02 AM Abbreviations ix PCA PDM PLDM PSDM SAPARD SME SPS TAIEX TACIS UES UNDP UNM VLAP WTO 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 9 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement Democratic Party of Moldova Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova Party of Socialists of Moldova Special Accession Program for Agriculture and Rural Development Small and Medium-sized Enterprises Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Standards Technical Assistance and Information Exchange instrument Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States Russian United Energy Systems United Nations Development Programme United National Movement of Georgia Visa Liberalisation Action Plan World Trade Organisation 10/25/2016 9:57:02 AM 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 10 10/25/2016 9:57:02 AM 1 Introduction Multiple external influences, EU policy transfer and domestic change in the post-Soviet space Can the EU be effective in promoting domestic change beyond its borders and if so, under what conditions? These questions have gained salience since the Union has stepped up its role in the post-Soviet space. With the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) created in 2004, and even more so with the Eastern Partnership (EaP) launched in 2009, the EU offers unprecedented guidance for reform combined with monitoring and benchmarking. The EU seeks to support political and economic reforms by ‘facilitating approximation and convergence towards the European Union’ (Council of the European Union 2009) and diffusing its standards and rules to post-Soviet countries included in the ENP/EaP.1 Both the ENP and the EaP are premised on the view that the adoption of EU norms and rules will ultimately bring stability and prosperity to the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood, as was the case in post-war Western Europe and in post-Cold War Central and Eastern Europe. However, domestically, EU-demanded reforms touch upon the heart of postSoviet systems, in which rent-seeking elites are closely connected to business interests. These reforms also entail massive costs in view of post-Soviet countries’ lower level of socio-economic development and weak institutional capacities. Regionally, EU-driven change unfolds in a context characterised by Russia’s attempts to regain influence over the post-Soviet space, among others through regional integration with the launch of the Eurasian Customs Union (ECU) in 2010 and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in 2015. In Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus, Russia’s actions have undermined ENP countries’ sovereignty and territorial integrity (as most vividly illustrated in Ukraine) and thereby added to the daunting challenge of reforms. The overarching aim of this book is to disentangle the various dynamics behind domestic change (or lack thereof) in Eastern Partnership countries. To that purpose, this research explores how domestic preferences, EU incentives and policy mechanisms, and Russia’s policies shape reforms in line with EU demands. The book traces the process of change (or lack thereof) in two sectors (reforms of the food safety system as part of deep trade integration and migration-related reforms as part of the visa liberalisation process) and develops a comparative analysis between four countries (Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine). It 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 1 10/25/2016 9:57:02 AM 2 Introduction looks at the domestic actors who are engaged in sectoral change and scrutinises their strategies and interactions. It examines the instruments used by the EU to diffuse its rules and policies to Eastern Partnership countries and the leverage employed by Russia to maintain its influence over these countries. Finally, it analyses the outcomes that the above factors and actors exert on domestic change in selected countries. In light of the deployment of two deep economic integration projects (the Deep and Comprehensive Free-Trade Areas [DCFTAs] and the ECU), it seeks in particular to explain the linkages (if any) between this macrolevel framework of integration and domestic change at a sectoral level. The book seeks to contribute to the literature on domestic change in response to EU policies in the post-Soviet space (called ‘Neighbourhood Europeanisation’ by Franke et al. 2010). In response to the gaps noted in this literature, it draws upon two other scholarly strands: policy transfer studies and the literature on post-Soviet transformations. ‘Neighbourhood Europeanisation’: analysing the neighbourhood through EU lenses This section provides an overview of how the literature has addressed the issue of EU rule transfer beyond its borders and highlights the analytical and conceptual gaps that still need to be addressed. Enlargement and neighbourhood policies: the limits of comparison The initial literature on the ENP has overwhelmingly viewed the EU’s policies in its neighbourhood through the prism of the enlargement policy. This is because the neighbourhood policy’s discourse, principles and instruments were, to a great extent, inspired by the enlargement toolbox (Tulmets 2005; Kelley 2006), as claimed by EU institutions themselves (European Commission 2004: 6). Considerable scholarly attention has been directed to whether the enlargement toolbox can work under a policy lacking similar incentives (Lavenex 2004; Kelley 2006). While informed by similarities between the two policies, the enlargement prism has limited heuristic value. It overlooks the differences between the enlargement and neighbourhood policies: the latter was designed as a ‘full-fledged external policy’ (Beichelt 2007: 21), integrating different instruments and modes of action via ‘soft frameworks’ (Hillion & Cremona 2006: 2). Importantly, the enlargement prism leads to two major analytical flaws in analysing the EU’s influence in the neighbourhood. First, the ENP is an important shift in EU/post-Soviet relations, yet it is not by any means a tabula rasa. While inspired by the enlargement policy, the neighbourhood policy did not start from scratch in the post-Soviet space (Delcour 2007). It built upon a decade-long record of relations that developed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, with a few exceptions (see e.g. Wolczuk 2009; Langbein 2014), the pre-ENP history of EU/post-Soviet relations has been 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 2 10/25/2016 9:57:03 AM 4 Introduction This focus is entwined with a second flaw, i.e. the strict disconnection between EU, domestic and regional processes. Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009) contrast the institutionalist explanation (which they find the most germane to explain the effectiveness of EU governance in the neighbourhood) with two other sets of accounts. The first of these explanations, the domestic structure explanation, refers to the compatibility of EU rules with domestic institutions and practices. Following this account, ‘the effectiveness of external governance increases (a) with the resonance of EU rules; (b) with the EU compatibility of domestic institutions; (c) as the number of adversely affected veto players decreases’ (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009: 805). This is nonetheless open to criticism both conceptually and empirically. Conceptually, this account refers to EU rules and institutions as the key benchmark against which domestic structures are analysed. Therefore, partner countries are conceived merely in light of EU demands as rule-takers or possibly rule-objectors. Yet ENP countries do contribute to shaping the neighbourhood policy’s outcomes. Reception is not to be understood as a passive absorption process but as an interactive and iterative process that involves both ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors, as ENP countries’ responses are shaped by the interaction between EU stimuli and domestic preferences. Empirically, this account seems to exclude the possibility of EU-driven policy transfer in post-Soviet countries, given the weak resonance of EU rules in some Eastern Partnership countries (Delcour 2013), the initial deep incompatibility with EU institutions (Börzel 2010) and the existence of a number of veto players (Langbein & Wolczuk 2012). However, evidence suggests that transformations have actually taken place, even if selectively (Ademmer & Börzel 2013; Buzogány 2013; Langbein 2013; Langbein & Börzel 2013; Delcour & Wolczuk 2015a). The second explanation outlined by Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, the powerbased account, focuses on the existence of other players in the region (e.g. other international organisations, Russia and the United States) and their interdependences with ENP countries. An effective transfer of EU norms implies that EU rule-takers are more strongly dependent on the EU than on any other player (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009: 803). Russia, for instance, seems to strongly constrain the adoption of EU rules and standards in Ukraine in those policy areas where interdependence is high (Dimitrova & Dragneva 2009). However, scholars have also found that Russia does not necessarily hamper the adoption of EU rules. In conjunction with partner countries’ interests, they sometimes act as facilitators in this process (Langbein 2013). Furthermore, scholars have recently challenged the explanatory weight of interdependence analysed in isolation. After studying energy in Armenia and Georgia, Ademmer demonstrates that EU policies at times still travel to Russia-dependent countries (Ademmer 2015). Recent research also confirms that Armenia (Russia’s strategic ally in the Caucasus) has extensively reformed in line with EU standards between 2010 and 2013 (Delcour & Wolczuk 2015a). Thus, partner countries cannot be considered a mere scene of interaction between external players. They play an active role either in assessing their level of interdependence with external actors or in accommodating and incorporating their norms and policy regimes. External influences are therefore 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 4 10/25/2016 9:57:03 AM Introduction 5 mediated by internal interests, norms and practices, as well as political structures that play a crucial role in the compliance process. This further entails that domestic and regional processes cannot be neatly contrasted with EU variables. Rather, EU norms and standards (as well as Russia’s policies) are expected to be filtered through domestic preferences. Bringing the domestic actors back in: recent research on ‘Neighbourhood Europeanisation’ In recent years, the literature has tried to overcome problems of ‘top-down’ approaches ‘that tend to over-emphasise the role of the EU and legal compliance for (institutional) change’ (Börzel & Risse 2012a: 5). Börzel and Risse’s research design is better suited to the analysis of domestic structures, as they select domestic change as the dependent variable of the research instead of focusing on the effectiveness of EU policies. This enables them to look at the diffusion of EU policy templates from the output side, i.e. as a set of public policies implemented by partner countries. They are then able to move away from EU policies by identifying the conditions under which the adoption of EU policies leads to domestic change (thus implying that the adoption of EU policies, in specific contexts, may not yield any change). Recent literature, then, has exposed the baffling discrepancies in EU-demanded domestic change across countries and sectors and identified a plethora of factors that shape the adoption of EU-demanded reforms. These publications confirm the role of EU-level factors that had been identified in the literature on enlargement policy, i.e. the size and credibility of rewards offered by the EU, policy conditionality and capacity-building measures through assistance projects. However, they connect these variables to the domestic context of implementation and thus broaden existing analytical perspectives by bringing into focus domestic preferences and constraints on reform. These have been identified as primary conditions for the effectiveness of EU policy transfer in the last waves of publications on the ENP. For instance, scholars have found that EU policy conditionality facilitates compliance, yet it only does so if and when the domestic agenda and EU demands fit (Ademmer & Börzel 2013). Likewise, when governments are receptive to the EU’s offer, EU assistance has an enabling impact by building capacities and expertise and increasing exposure to, and understanding of, EU templates (Delcour & Wolczuk 2015a). However, empirically most publications stick to the initial ENP period (i.e. 2004–09) and do not cover the policy mechanisms developed by the EU under the Eastern Partnership. Admittedly, since 2009 the EU has significantly strengthened the size of rewards as well as the use of sector-specific conditionality and capacitybuilding measures. This may bring important nuances to some scholarly findings. For instance, the lack of any reward tied to compliance under the ENP has been identified as a disincentive for domestic actors to adopt EU food safety templates (Langbein 2013). Yet, in contrast to the vague incentives offered as part of the neighbourhood policy, with the DCFTAs the EU now offers a clear and tangible 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 5 10/25/2016 9:57:03 AM 6 Introduction incentive in the form of market access. In a similar vein, scholars who studied EU assistance prior to the Eastern Partnership have found no evidence of a positive impact on the adoption of EU templates because EU capacity-building measures have not focused sufficiently on regulatory convergence (Langbein 2014). However, this is likely to change under the Eastern Partnership, as assistance priorities have shifted toward regulatory convergence in view of DCFTA implementation. By shifting the focus of inquiry to the domestic context in which EU-demanded change is embedded, scholars have paid attention to an increasingly broad range of actors, and they have uncovered a multitude of domestic-level explanatory factors. Next to governments (Ademmer & Börzel 2013; Delcour 2013) that remain the central foci of inquiry, business actors (Dimitrova & Dragneva 2013; Langbein 2015), mid-level bureaucracy (Wolczuk 2009), and transnational civil society (Buzogány 2013) have increasingly drawn scholarly attention. Moving to meso-level explanations, the literature has singled out governments’ sectoral preferences as a key explanatory variable. For Ademmer and Börzel, ‘preferential fit’, which they define as a ‘fit of preferences over outcomes’, is pivotal to explain compliance with EU demands (Ademmer & Börzel 2013: 584). Scholars have also pointed out the role of veto players in blocking the adoption of EU rules (Langbein & Wolczuk 2012; Buzogány 2013; Dimitrova & Dragneva 2013). Furthermore, the recent literature has brought major nuances to the understanding of the role of regional interdependences in the transfer of EU templates. Scholars have recently attempted to analyse jointly the impact of the EU and Russia on domestic sectoral change (Ademmer 2015; Langbein 2015; Ademmer et al. 2016). Their findings bring important nuances to the predominant vision of Russia as an obstacle to the adoption of EU-demanded change. As Langbein points out, Russia is by no means a unitary actor (Langbein 2015): for instance, the Russian government and businesses can sometimes pursue different interests (Langbein 2013 and 2015). This only confirms the findings of research on Russia’s foreign policy: these indicate that even in those cases where Russia pursues aggressive rhetoric and actions (as is the case of Ukraine), its foreign policy is actually fraught with tensions between different concepts and narratives (Laruelle 2015). By (re-)introducing complexity, scholars have thus enriched the understanding of how interdependence affects EU-demanded change (Ademmer & Börzel 2013; Ademmer 2015). In fact, in some cases Russia (either the government or businesses) may even work toward facilitating the adoption of EU templates (Langbein 2013; Delcour & Wolczuk 2015b). This is because what matters is not so much interdependence per se, but how Russia uses it to influence partner countries (Ademmer 2015). For instance, Ademmer demonstrates that the use of negative incentives by Russia can incentivise EU-demanded change, if these incentives are not tied to specific conditions. In contrast, she finds that Russia can undermine EU-demanded change if Russian pressures are tied to specific conditions. 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 6 10/25/2016 9:57:03 AM Introduction 7 However, the research on the impact of EU and Russia on domestic change has only recently started to investigate the effects of the development of two deep economic integration offers (Ademmer et al. 2016). With the Eastern Partnership and the ECU/EAEU, both the EU and Russia have moved away from soft-law modes of integration lacking precision and bindingness (Delcour & Wolczuk 2013: 197). Prior to Association Agreements and DCFTAs, the ENP was based on political commitments, vague incentives and conditionality. In the post-Soviet space, the lack of a clearly identifiable legal framework for regional co-operation undermined previous attempts at multilateral engagement and instead favoured bilateral ties (Dragneva 2013: 42). Therefore, ENP countries were able to combine some degree of integration with both actors. In sharp contrast, membership in the Eurasian Customs Union that was launched in 2010 precludes the signature of a DCFTA with the EU (while the latter is compatible with free-trade agreements signed in the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] or bilaterally). This is due to extensive delegation to common bodies: member countries lose their ability to decide over tariffs, which (among other decisions) are fixed at the Union level. This mutual exclusiveness at the macro-level is despite the potential compatibility of rules and standards at the sector level. Both integration schemes are indeed premised upon the World Trade Organisation (WTO) regime, which in the case of the ECU/EAEU should prevail in the case of non-WTO members too (Dragneva 2013: 47). As a consequence of mutual exclusiveness, however, Eastern Partnership countries no longer have the possibility to cherry-pick elements of both offers. Therefore, as both projects develop, increased attention needs to be paid to both their implications and the effects of the EU’s and Russia’s bilateral policies on domestic change in the ‘contested neighbourhood’. In summation, the recent literature studying the ENP has made clear that the processes and outcomes of compliance with EU demands are shaped by the ‘importing’ context as much as the ‘exporting’ organisation. Yet the literature still misses important conceptual and empirical questions. First, while recent research has shed light on multiple domestic-level and sectorlevel variables (thereby bringing major nuances to the understanding of the EU’s policy transfer), it hardly explains what level of change these variables impact. The literature has indicated that policy change cannot be explained by looking solely at macro-level characteristics (Langbein & Börzel 2013: 574), as these carry little explanatory weight in accounting for sector-specific compliance with EU demands. However, scholars have only recently attempted to analyse how macro-level and sector-specific variables interact to shape domestic change (Ademmer et al. 2016; Delcour 2016). Second, most of the variables outlined (e.g. policy fit, preferential fit) still primarily derive from the literature on Europeanisation and are insufficiently attuned to the post-Soviet context. Therefore, variables identified by Europeanisation studies need to be complemented by explanatory factors derived from area studies. 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 7 10/25/2016 9:57:03 AM 8 Introduction Beyond ‘Neighbourhood Europeanisation’ In response to the above-noted criticisms of the ‘top-down perspective’ of Europeanisation studies (Börzel & Risse 2012a: 2), this book relies on two other strands of literature: policy transfer studies and the literature on post-Soviet transformations. Policy transfer studies In order to ‘move away from Europe’, scholars have couched their analyses of how EU policies spread abroad in the research on transnational diffusion processes (Börzel & Risse 2012a). In this vein, this book builds on policy transfer studies3 as these help broaden the analytical scope beyond the EU and facilitate better incorporation of other variables into the analysis. Policy transfer studies are, first of all, useful for the purposes of this analysis as they have helped uncover how policies are ‘exported’. Dolowitz and Marsh (2000: 13–14) conceptualise policy transfer4 along a continuum ranging from coercive transfer (driven by direct imposition) to lesson-drawing (driven by perfect rationality). Marsh and Shearman (2009) identify four major mechanisms of transfer that also involve different degrees of rationality: learning, competition, mimicry and coercion. Yet these policy transfer mechanisms cannot be easily delineated either conceptually or empirically, as many cases of policy transfer involve both coercive and voluntary dimensions (Dolowitz & Marsh 2000). For instance, ‘what constitutes coercive transfer in the context of international organisations’ (Benson & Jordan 2011: 370)? In this context, governments may be compelled ‘to introduce policy change in order to secure grants, loans or other forms of inward investment’ (Evans 2009: 245). Therefore, while relying on the existing conceptualisation of transfer mechanisms, this research seeks to better explore some aspects of the interaction between different mechanisms of transfer. It examines the interplay between coercive and voluntary elements of policy transfer in countries that go through deep political and economic transformations for which the EU intends to provide guidance and monitoring. Under the ENP, the European Union cannot impose hierarchically its acquis on partner countries (Börzel 2011: 5), yet the relationship is in essence asymmetrical given both the limited capacities of post-Soviet states and the EU’s provision of assistance and investment. Therefore, based upon the case of EU policy transfer to post-Soviet countries, this book seeks to provide further insights into modes of policy transfer when the latter is ‘negotiated’ (Evans 2009: 245). Second, this book embraces policy transfer studies because they explicitly place the emphasis on the role of agents (Dolowitz 2000: 3; see also Ademmer et al. 2016: 5)5 and highlight the role played by different categories of actors in the process of change (Delpeuch, 2009). For instance, Dolowitz and Marsh identify nine categories of actors potentially involved in the transfer process, ranging from elected officials, political parties, bureaucrats/civil servants to think-tanks, pressure groups, non-governmental organisations and consultants 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 8 10/25/2016 9:57:03 AM Introduction 9 (Dolowitz & Marsh 2000: 10). An actor-centred perspective sheds light on the role played by various agents in the policy transfer process (e.g. receivers, producers, senders, facilitators [Wolman & Page 2002; see also Ademmer et al. 2016: 8]). In fact, agents can fulfil several roles in the process (Wolman & Page 2002). The literature on policy transfer has largely dealt with actors’ strategies and interactions in both the ‘transferring’ and ‘borrowing’ contexts, as these influence the outcomes of transfer. For instance, Dezalay and Garth show how actors competing in the domestic arena shift their competition to the international arena using the transfer of norms and ideas (Dezalay & Garth 2002). Likewise, Stone has demonstrated how non-state actors such as thinktanks and policy networks bypass national policymaking processes to influence international organisations (Stone 2004: 561). This literature offers an insightful grid of analysis to study the strategies of post-Soviet actors involved in the policy transfer process. Third, policy transfer studies have attempted to explain ‘when birds sing’, i.e. when ‘borrowing countries’ effectively converge with external norms providing guidance for domestic change and when they don’t (Lenschow et al. 2005: 797). Hence, while underlining the role of international institutions (for instance, in the emergence of legitimacy pressure [Holzinger & Knill 2005: 785]), they have also offered insights into the domestic factors facilitating or hampering responses to external stimuli, such as institutional conditions and cultural characteristics (Strang & Meyer 1993; Lenschow et al. 2005), desire for international acceptance (Dolowitz & Marsh 2000: 13) and domestic problem pressure (Hoberg 2001). Even though the policy transfer literature has only generated broad analytical categories to explain how the domestic context affects the adoption of external policy templates, it is well suited for the purposes of this analysis as it dovetails the role of domestic factors with the various dimensions of policy change. After studying the nature of the social learning process, Peter Hall distinguishes between three kinds of policy change (the level [or settings] of policy instruments, policy goals and policy paradigms [Hall 1993]) and highlights disjunctures between orders of change; Lenschow et al. (2005) have taken his model further by systematically connecting different domestic factors and dimensions of policy change. Their study enables me to develop a dynamic conceptualisation of the relationship between factors and dimensions of change, since they show that the impact of factors varies depending upon the dimension of change considered. The incorporation of dimensions of policy change in the analysis of the transfer’s impact is especially useful for studying the post-Soviet context involving different (and competing) models and multiple connections between different levels of governance. These indeed provide ample opportunities for domestic actors to ‘pick and choose from different norms, but also to use and adjust the “imported” templates to the needs of the local context’ (Ademmer et al.: 6). Therefore, building on previous attempts to connect domestic factors and dimensions of change, this research seeks to enrich the understanding of the impact of policy transfer by incorporating several clusters of variables (domestic, EU and regional) and specifying the level of change that they affect. 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 9 10/25/2016 9:57:03 AM 10 Introduction EU-demanded change and post-Soviet transformations This book also couches its analysis of EU-demanded change in the broader research on post-Soviet transformations. The latter’s strength lies in its attempts to define the specificities of post-Soviet reforms through a focus on actors’ strategies, representations, practices and interests in the transformation process. This research angle is well suited for departing from the teleological understanding of ‘transitions’ that prevailed in the early analyses of political changes in East-Central Europe and the former Soviet Union. While differing on the modes of transition and the criteria against which transformations can be gauged, most of these studies (O’Donnell et al. 1986; Huntington 1991; Linz & Stepan 1996) were premised on the idea of a ‘path’ taken by post-communist countries. The ‘path metaphor’ (Kisilowski 2008) was based upon three fundamental assumptions: the directional nature of change (even though the literature criticised unidirectional understandings of transformations [Huntington 1991: 15]), its sequentiality and the existence of an end-point reflecting the completion of transformations (even though the literature acknowledged the variety of possible endpoints [Linz & Stepan 1996: 38]). However, political developments in the former Soviet Union at the end of the 1990s and in the early 2000s clearly marked ‘the failure of transitions in empirical terms’ (Dufy & Thiriot 2013: 20) and prompted a shift toward the study of political regimes (rather than political change), taking account of this failure. These regimes were labelled as ‘hybrid’, i.e. ‘combining democratic and authoritarian elements’ (Diamond 2002: 23), or alternatively as characterised by competitive authoritarianism, where ‘formal democratic institutions are widely viewed as the principal means of obtaining and exercising political authority’, yet where ‘incumbents violate those rules so often and to such an extent, however, that the regime fails to meet conventional minimum standards for democracy’ (Levitsky & Way 2002: 52). However, while accounting for the diversity of post-communist regimes and bringing important nuances to the initially normative and teleological understanding of ‘transitions’, the study of political regimes leaves crucial questions unexplored (Dufy & Thiriot 2013: 25–26). In particular, it fails to capture the modes of legitimation and the mechanisms of regulation underlying the regimes (Dufy & Thiriot 2013: 32). The literature focusing specifically on the role of informality in post-Soviet transformations has contributed to bridging this gap by highlighting the coexistence of formal and informal institutions and rules (Stewart 2013: 198). Crucially, in post-Soviet countries, informal modes of interactions permeate the state’s formal functioning. This is because there is no clear basis from which to establish the rule of law, ‘defined as a dominance of formal institutions, that is, universal rules and norms that serve as significant constraints on major actors and their strategies within the given polity’ (Gel’man 2003: 92). Therefore, post-Soviet societies are characterised by the ‘ubiquitous nature of informal institutions’, i.e. the reliance on ‘contacts, connections, networks, reciprocal exchanges, one-time gifts, arrangements’, and the ‘interconnectedness of politics, economics and social life’ (Aliyev 2015: 190). Informal practices are mostly (even though not 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 10 10/25/2016 9:57:03 AM Introduction 11 exclusively) inherited from the (late) Soviet period,6 during which informal interactions and individual strategies developed to work around the state system (Ledeneva 1999). In fact, social transactions based upon personal relations are not specific to the post-Soviet area. The interaction between formal rules and informal constraints has been studied in other contexts, with scholars pointing to the different and sometimes opposite effects of their relationship (North 1991). However, in other contexts, informal practices are limited in their scale and scope, while in the post-Soviet context they are both widespread and deeply rooted in social interactions (Aliyev 2015: 185). They actually operate ‘on boundaries between political, economic and civil sectors’ (Aliyev 2015: 183). At the same time, informal and formal institutions are not to be seen as ‘opposite poles’; instead, they form a continuum (Gel’man 2003: 92). For instance, during Soviet times the informal economy contributed to the functioning of the Soviet system by taking care of the needs that were not met by the command economy (Ledeneva 1999: 3). However, informal networks and practices (however different they may be7) also divert and subvert the functioning of formal institutions in the post-Soviet space, thereby hindering their long-term development. For instance, the clientelism and neopatrimonialism that prevail in civil service recruitment in Central Asian republics perpetuate the capture of state resources by the elites and their clans (Laruelle 2013). In a similar vein, the informal economy includes activities that fall outside the scope of the legal framework (as is the case, for example, for housework) but also activities that go against existing regulations and norms (Barsukova 2001: 57), thereby resulting in the creation of a parallel (and conflicting) regulatory system. This creates uncertainty as to which rules effectively apply, since ‘the rulers have the choice of applying formal or informal rules in any given instance’ (Stewart 2013: 199). For Gel’man, ‘the non-existence of the “rule of law” has meant the dominance of informal institutions such as those based on particularistic rules and norms such as clientelism and/or corruption’ (2003: 92). Deeply embedded informal institutions thus undermine the demand for law and underpin what Gel’man calls the ‘unrule of law’, i.e. the precedence of particularistic norms and sanctions (Gel’man 2004: 1021–23). The prevalence of informal practices bears major implications for external actors’ policies. Creed and Wedel offer a convincing demonstration of how informal interactions have permeated external assistance programmes: they show that Western aid to Central European countries in the early 1990s was instrumentalised by specific cliques using assistance as a political resource. In fact, Western aid contributed to reproducing socialist practices that it was supposed to help overcome (Creed & Wedel 1997). The massive ‘export of EU law’ (Dragneva & Wolczuk 2012) upon which the ENP and especially the Eastern Partnership are premised is likely to face similar challenges. First, it is likely to collide with the weak and elusive demand for law in post-Soviet countries. Second, policy transfer is likely to be affected by (post-)Soviet legacies, in particular the interpenetration between the economic and political spheres and 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 11 10/25/2016 9:57:03 AM 12 Introduction the prevalence of informal interactions. As shown by Stewart in the case of public procurement reform in Ukraine, even when reform laws are adopted, entrenched private interests succeed in watering down these laws, thereby moving significant parts of the procurement process from the formal to the informal sector (Stewart 2013). Hence the literature on post-Soviet transformations provides a promising entry point to explain the discontinuous, selective and often shallow nature of the EU’s policy transfer in post-Soviet countries. It does not only suggest that the overhaul of formal institutions (a key EU requirement in all sectors) is shaped by personal relations, loyalties, nepotism and clientelism, but also that institutional reforms may actually mean little in terms of policy practices and values. Contribution to the field As acknowledged by Börzel and Risse, the research on the diffusion of EU institutional models beyond its borders has just begun and needs to develop (Börzel & Risse 2012b: 204). This study makes three contributions to the existing literature. First, it offers an extensive transnational and cross-sector comparison of the EU’s influence on policy and institutional change against domestic preferences and Russia’s policies. In recent years, several studies have analysed the EU’s and Russia’s impact on domestic change on the basis of a comparison across sectors in a single country (Langbein 2015) or two countries (Ademmer 2012; Ademmer & Börzel 2013; Ademmer 2015). Yet this book offers the first wideranging empirical evidence of policy change in the ENP’s Eastern region since the EU stepped up its offer with the Eastern Partnership and Russia launched its own hard-law regional integration project. Second, my study places the analysis of EU-demanded change (or lack of) in the broader temporal context of post-Soviet transformations. Other scholarly works have hinted at the role of post-Soviet practices (for instance, rent-seeking behaviour) in the adoption of EU-demanded reforms (see e.g. Langbein & Wolczuk 2012; Stewart 2013; Langbein 2015). This book seeks to provide a more detailed account by treating practices, norms and beliefs inherited from the Soviet and/or post-Soviet periods (Ledeneva 1999; Barsukova 2001; Gel’man 2004; Stefes 2007; Aliyev 2015) as an explanatory variable (see Chapter 2). Third, while in recent years the literature has combined EU-level accounts with an analysis of domestic and regional variables, this research takes these explanations one step further and (building on policy transfer studies) seeks to advance the understanding of the way in which they interact at different levels of change. A central assumption of this study is indeed that the role of the explanatory variables identified in the analysis varies depending on the dimension of change considered, i.e. selection, adoption and implementation (for a definition, see Chapter 2). 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 12 10/25/2016 9:57:03 AM Introduction 13 Structure of the book Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 presents the research design and methodology: it discusses the dependent variable of the research, broadly defined as domestic legal, institutional and policy sectoral change in response to EU demands under the Eastern Partnership. It identifies three clusters of explanatory variables, which are combined with different levels of change, i.e. rule selection, adoption and application. The chapter also presents the methods, data and cases selected for the research. Chapters 3 and 4 delve into EU and Russian policies in the post-Soviet space since the break-up of the Soviet Union and offer an analysis of the frameworks of integration proposed by the external actors. Chapter 3 shows how relations between the EU and the four selected countries have expanded following the collapse of the Soviet Union and argues that the deepening of relations has gone hand in hand with an increasing emphasis on legal approximation with EU rules and standards: From a mere supporter of political and economic transformations in the 1990s, the EU has turned into a driver of domestic change with the European Neighbourhood Policy and a model for reform under the Eastern Partnership. Chapter 4 traces the changes in Russia’s policy. It shows that in the early 2000s, the country started using regional links as leverage to either support or pressure post-Soviet countries, depending upon their perceived loyalty. The chapter contends that the Eurasian integration project, launched in 2010 in response to the Eastern Partnership, only reinforced the strategic use of regional interdependences, which are employed in connection with post-Soviet countries’ participation (or lack of) in the Eurasian integration project. Chapter 5 explores the reasons behind the sheer variety and contrasting dynamics in the resonance of the EU’s offer in Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. It maps domestic receptivity in the four countries at the selection level and seeks to explain their engagement in the macro-framework of integration with the EU, focusing on membership aspirations, regional interdependences and elites’ strategies. Moving to the sectoral level, Chapters 6 and 7 offer in-depth explanatory analyses of domestic change and compliance patterns with EU demands in the two selected sectors. Chapter 6 seeks to both explore the factors that shape policy change and disentangle different levels of change in the food safety area that has emerged as a pivotal sector in EU-Eastern partners’ negotiations for DCFTAs. Chapter 7 identifies the factors that have facilitated or impeded the adoption and application of EU-demanded change in the migration area as part of the visa liberalisation process, a major expectation of Eastern Partnership countries. Chapter 8 assesses the respective explanatory weight of the variables against which domestic change in response to the EU has been tested throughout the research. It reveals patterns of how these variables shape domestic change and draws broader generalisations from the comparison between the selected sectors and countries. 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 13 10/25/2016 9:57:03 AM 14 Introduction Notes 1 These are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. 2 This is because the ‘post-communist divide’ (Levitsky & Way 2007) between Central Europe and the former Soviet Union was implicitly conceived in the literature as a mere temporal discrepancy. The gap between a democratised Central Europe and an overwhelmingly autocratic post-Soviet Union was thus thought to stem from insufficient linkage with the West and from a lack of leverage on the part of international organisations in the former USSR (Levitsky & Way 2007). Much of the initial ENP literature was therefore based on the implicit assumption that increased engagement by the EU in the post-Soviet area would give an impetus to the adoption of EU rules and thereby to democratic transformations, just as it did in Central Europe. Yet developments in a number of Eastern Partnership countries have shown that increasing linkages with the EU do not necessarily bring about either democratisation or implementation of EU-demanded change. By contrast, they suggest that political transformations can stall (e.g. Armenia) or shift toward greater authoritarianism (e.g. Ukraine under Yanukovych), even when linkages with the EU keep expanding (as they did in both countries in the period covered under this study). This clearly exposes the limitations of a teleological understanding of transformations in post-Soviet countries and the EU’s role in this process. 3 Other strands of literature concerned with the spread of policies across different countries have been labelled ‘diffusion studies’. They define diffusion as ‘as a process where choices are interdependent, that is, where the choice of a government influences the choices made by others and, conversely, the choice of a government is influenced by the choices made by others’ (Braun & Gilardi 2006: 299). However, while policy transfer and policy diffusion studies may be informed by different research angles and disciplines, I side with Marsh and Shearman and find that both strands share ‘an overlapping conceptual core and a complementary interest in a related class of empirical phenomena’ (Marsh & Shearman 2009: 271). While recognising that the two strands of literature are distinct, I focus on their commonalities and hence use ‘policy transfer’ as a generic concept to refer to the spread of policy templates across countries. 4 I use the definition by Dolowitz and Marsh, according to whom policy transfer is ‘a process by which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political setting (past or present) is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political system’ (Dolowitz & Marsh 2000: 5). 5 The focus on agents is yet another reason behind my choice to refer to the concept of policy transfer, as this emphasis is in contrast to some other concepts like policy diffusion that tend to stress structural explanations (Dolowitz 2000: 3; Marsh & Shearman 2009: 274). 6 As Ibañez-Tirado’s anthropological study of temporal narratives shows, the division of history into well-bounded periods (‘Soviet’ and ‘post-Soviet’) has obvious limitations. This is because of two interconnected factors. First, the delineation between ‘Soviet’ and ‘post-Soviet’ can be blurred, given the continuities between both periods. Second, both periods have given rise to a variety of experiences, thereby requiring deconstruction of what ‘Soviet’ and ‘post-Soviet’ mean (Ibañez-Tirado 2015). 7 For a discussion of the differences between informal networks, bribery, fiddling, corruption and blat, see Ledeneva (1999). References Ademmer, E. (2012). A Third Rejoices: Russia, the EU, and Policy Transfer to the PostSoviet Space. Berlin: Freie Universität. Ademmer, E. (2015). Interdependence and EU-Demanded Policy Change in a Shared Neighbourhood. Journal of European Public Policy, 22(5), pp. 671–689. 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 14 10/25/2016 9:57:03 AM Introduction 15 Ademmer, E., & Börzel, T. (2013). Migration, Energy and Good Governance in the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood. Europe-Asia Studies, 65(4), pp. 591–608. Ademmer, E., Delcour, L., & Wolczuk, K. (2016). 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(2015b). Spoiler or Facilitator of Democratization? Russia’ Role in Georgia and Ukraine. Democratization, 22(3), pp. 459–478. 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 15 10/25/2016 9:57:03 AM 16 Introduction Delpeuch, T. (2008). L’analyse des transferts internationaux de politiques publiques: un état de l’art. Questions de recherche (27). Dezalay, Y., & Garth, B. (2002). Global Prescription: The Production, Exportation, and Importation of a New Legal Orthodoxy. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. Diamond, L. (2002). Thinking about Hybrid Regimes. Journal of Democracy, 13(2), pp. 21–35. Dimitrova, A., & Dragneva, R. (2009). Constraining External Governance: Interdependence with Russia and the CIS as Limits to the EU’s Policy Transfer in Ukraine. Journal of European Public Policy, 16(6), pp. 853–872. Dimitrova, A., & Dragneva, R. (2013). Shaping Convergence with the EU in Foreign Policy and State Aid in Post-Orange Ukraine: Weak External Incentives, Powerful Veto Players. Europe-Asia Studies, 65(4), pp. 658–681. Dolowitz, D. (2000). Introduction. Governance, 13(1), pp. 1–4. Dolowitz, D., & Marsh, D. (2000). Learning from Abroad: The Role of Policy Transfer in Contemporary Policy-Making. Governance, 13(1), pp. 5–23. Dragneva, R. (2013). The Legal and Institutional Dimensions of the Eurasian Customs Union. In R. Dragneva, & K. Wolczuk (eds.), Eurasian Economic Integration: Law, Policy and Politics (pp. 34–61). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Dragneva, R., & Wolczuk, K. (2012). U Law Export to the Eastern Neighbourhood and an Elusive Demand for Law. In P. Cardwell (ed.), EU External Relations: Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era (pp. 216–240). The Hague: TMC Asser Press. Dufy, C., & Thiriot, C. (2013). Les apories de la transitologie: quelques pistes de recherche à la lumière d’exemples africains et post-soviétiques. Revue internationale de politique comparée, 20(3), pp. 19–40. European Commission. (2004). European Neighbourhood Policy: Strategy Paper. COM (2004) 373 final, Brussels, 12 May. Evans, M. (2009). Policy Transfer in Critical Perspective. Policy Studies, 30(3), pp. 243–268. Franke, A., Gawrich, A., Melnykovska, I., & Schweickert, R. (2010). The European Union’s Relations with Ukraine and Azerbaijan. Post-Soviet Affairs, 26(2), pp. 149–192. Freyburg, T., Lavenex, S., Skripka, T., Schimmelfennig, F., & Wetzel, A. (2011). Democracy Promotion through Functional Cooperation? The Case of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Democratization, 18(4), pp. 1026–1054. Gel’man, V. (2003). Post-Soviet Transitions and Democratization: Towards TheoryBuilding. Democratization, 10(2), pp. 87–104. Gel’man, V. (2004). The Unrule of Law in the Making: The Politics of Informal Institution Building in Russia. Europe-Asia Studies, 56(7), pp. 1021–1040. Hall, P. (1993). Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain. Comparative Politics, 25(3), pp. 275–296. Hillion, C., & Cremona, M. (2006). L’Union fait la force? Potential and Limitations of the European Neighbourhood Policy as an Integrated EU Foreign and Security Policy. Fiesole: European University Institute. Hoberg, G. (2001). Globalization and Policy Convergence. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 3(2), pp. 127–132. Holzinger, K., & Knill, C. (2005). Causes and conditions of cross-national policy convergence. Journal of European Public Policy, 12(5), pp. 775–796. Huntington, S. (1991). The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press. 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 16 10/25/2016 9:57:03 AM Introduction 17 Ibañez-Tirado, D. (2015) ‘How can I be post-Soviet if I was never Soviet?’ Rethinking categories of time and social change – a perspective from Kulob, southern Tajikistan. Central Asian Survey, 34 (2), pp. 190–203. Kelley, J. (2006). New Wine in Old Wineskins: Policy Adaptation in the European Neighborhood Policy. 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When the Birds Sing: A Framework for Analysing Domestic Factors behind Policy Convergence. Journal of European Public Policy, 12(5), pp. 797–816. Levitsky, S., & Way, L. (2002). The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism. Journal of Democracy, 13(2), pp. 51–65. Levitsky, S., & Way, L. (2007). Linkage, Leverage, and the Post-Communist Divide. East European Politics and Societies, 27(21), pp. 48–66. Linz, J., & Stepan, A. (1996). Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Marsh, D., & Shearman, J. (2009). Policy Diffusion and Policy Transfer. Policy Studies, 30(3), pp. 269–288. North, D. C. (1991). Institutions. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(1), pp. 97–112. O’Donnell, G., Schmitter, P., & Whitehead, L. (1986). Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspective. Washington: John Hopkins University Press. Stefes, C. (2007). Understanding Post-Soviet Transitions. Corruption, Collusion and Clientelism. New-York: Palgrave. 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 17 10/25/2016 9:57:03 AM 18 Introduction Stewart, S. (2013). Public Procurement Reform in Ukraine: The Implications of Neopatrimonialism for External Actors. Demokratizatsiya, 21(2), pp. 197–214. Stone, D. (2004). Transfer Agents and Global Networks in the ‘Transnationalization’ of Policy. Journal of European Public Policy, 11(3), pp. 545–566. Strang, D., & Meyer, J. (1993). Institutional Conditions for Diffusion. Theory and Society, 22, pp. 487–511. Tulmets, E. (2005). New Modes of Governance in EU’s External Relations: Explaining the Transfer of Ideas and Cooperation Methods from the Enlargement to the Neighbourhood Policy. In Š. Liekis (ed.), European Union and Its New Neighbourhood: Different Countries, Common Interests (pp. 26–52). Vilnius: Mykolas Romeris University. Wolczuk, K. (2009). Implementation without Coordination: The Impact of EU Conditionality on Ukraine under the European Neighbourhood Policy. Europe-Asia Studies, 61(2), pp. 187–211. Wolman, H., & Page, E. (2002). Policy Transfer among Local Governments: An Information-Theory Approach. Governance, 15(4), pp. 477–501. 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 18 10/25/2016 9:57:03 AM 2 Research framework This chapter presents the research design and methodology. It first discusses the dependent and explanatory variables of the research. It then outlines the choice of methods, data sources and cases selected for the research. Analytical framework This section constructs the analytical framework of the research. It starts by specifying the dependent variable. It then develops the independent variables and derives general hypotheses upon which the empirical analysis is based. Dependent variable The dependent variable is generally defined as domestic legal, institutional and policy sectoral change in response to EU demands under the Eastern Partnership. As an alternative to domestic sectoral change in response to the EU, the literature on ‘Neighbourhood Europeanisation’ has used the concepts of ‘convergence’ (Langbein & Wolczuk 2012) and ‘compliance’ (Ademmer 2012; Ademmer & Börzel 2013). Yet convergence presupposes a tendency to grow more alike (Bennett 1991) that goes well beyond the approximation with EU rules and the adoption of institutional and policy templates studied here (see also Ademmer 2012). In contrast, compliance studies enable the research to focus on the outcomes of change in line with the prescription of an international organisation. Hence, they are generally better suited for the purpose of my analysis than convergence. However, compliance studies take the EU’s law as a ‘given normative focus’ (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009: 810), thereby neglecting the selection of a regulatory model. Yet, as explained below, the selection level matters in a context of different (and competing) macro-integration frameworks. I therefore select a broader dependent variable that enables me to adjust to the research context. Still, I use the concept of ‘compliance patterns’ with a view to tracing processes of change over time in response to EU policy-specific demands. I further break down my dependent variable with a view to measuring the level of domestic sectoral change in line with EU demands. To that purpose, 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 19 10/25/2016 9:57:03 AM 20 Research framework I use Lavenex and Schimmelfennig’s distinction between rule selection, adoption and application (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009; Freyburg et al. 2011). Rule selection ‘measures whether and to what extent EU rules constitute the normative reference point of EU–third-country relations’ (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009: 800). In other words, it can be defined as ‘the undertaking of a commitment to adopt and implement EU rules in official relations’ (Langbein & Wolczuk 2012: 863). Rule adoption is defined in the literature as ‘the formal adoption of laws by national parliaments’ (Langbein & Wolczuk 2012: 863) or ‘the transposition [of EU rules] in domestic legislation’ (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009: 801). However, the EU does not only ask Eastern partners to adopt rules. It also requires them to adopt policy and institutional templates, as well as best practices. Therefore, I depart from a narrow legal understanding and define rule adoption as the transposition of EU rules and demands in the domestic legal and policy framework. Finally, rule application corresponds to their ‘implementation by state and non-state actors’ (Langbein & Wolczuk 2012: 863), in other words, to their translation into policy practice. Alternative concepts deriving from compliance studies include ‘formal’ and ‘behavioural compliance’, in other words, ‘output’ and ‘outcome compliance’ (Ademmer & Börzel 2013: 581–582). However, these focus on the adoption and the application of EU demands, while they do not encapsulate the selection of the EU as a normative reference point. Without a doubt, this focus mirrors the fact that the ENP has now entered into the implementation phase. Yet I argue that even though the adoption and application of EU rules and templates are well under way, the selection level does still matter, and the selection of the EU’s model cannot be taken for granted, especially since Russia has launched its own deep economic integration project. Therefore, I do not envisage the selection, adoption and application levels as a linear process. The literature has highlighted a glaring gap between rule selection, on the one hand, and selective rule adoption and application, on the other (Langbein & Wolczuk 2012; Buzogány 2013), i.e. between formal and behavioural compliance (Ademmer & Börzel 2013). However, I assume that in a rapidly changing context, such as the post-Soviet one, the dimensions and sequencing of policy change can be much more complex. For instance, the selection of the EU as a normative reference point is not irreversible. I assume that it can be reversed as a result, for example, of a shift in ruling elites’ preferences or of the selection of an alternative model. In a similar vein, policy change in line with EU demands (either at the adoption or at the implementation levels) can sometimes occur in anticipation of these demands (and hence of their selection), if it coincides with elites’ and societal preferences. Hence, I use ‘rule selection’, ‘rule adoption’ and ‘rule application’ as analytical categories to map the actors and factors involved in domestic change and to differentiate between outcomes and levels of change. The central assumption upon which my research is based is indeed that the role of explanatory variables varies depending on the dimension of change considered. 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 20 10/25/2016 9:57:03 AM Research framework 21 Explanatory factors This section spells out explanatory factors that are expected to influence domestic legal, institutional and policy change in response to EU demands under the Eastern Partnership. I identify three broad sets of conditions that I break down into specific factors. Following the general assumption of this research, I further combine these factors with the three levels of change identified above. Domestic resonance As indicated in Chapter 1, domestic explanations were secondary in early research on ‘Neighbourhood Europeanisation’ (which primarily used the external governance approach). In sharp contrast, more recently the literature has pointed to their central role. A multitude of domestic factors has been identified, ranging from broad explanations to more specific variables. Börzel and Risse identify the type of regime (degree of democracy) as an important factor influencing domestic change in response to the promotion of EU norms and policies: the more authoritarian a regime is, the less likely the EU is to influence domestic institutional change (Börzel & Risse 2012). For Franke et al., the persistent Soviet-era mentality of incumbent elites in ENP countries may increase adaptation costs linked to EU demands and result in considerable resistance to EU policies (Franke et al. 2010: 155). Langbein and Wolczuk (2012) find that Ukraine’s membership aspirations have influenced the selection of EU rules. After analysing the adoption of EU rules in Armenia and Georgia, Ademmer and Börzel (2013) posit that ‘preferential fit’ (defined as a fit of preferences over outcomes) carries substantial explanatory weight, together with EU policy-specific conditionality. Beyond governmental actors, a number of publications also point to the role of veto players (Langbein & Wolczuk 2012; Buzogány 2013; Dimitrova & Dragneva 2013) as an obstacle to EU-demanded change. While relying broadly upon some of the domestic variables identified in the ‘Neighbourhood Europeanisation’ publications (see below), I also add factors deriving from the literature on Soviet legacies and post-Soviet transformations. These publications have highlighted the persistence of Soviet standards, institutions and practices (including systemic corruption [Stefes 2007]) well after the collapse of the Soviet Union. As stressed by Aliyev, ‘the entrenchment of informality in all spheres of life in post-communist spaces appears to be in a direct association with the effects of the communist legacy’ (Aliyev 2015: 186). Clearly, post-Soviet countries differ in terms of their modes of transformation, thereby yielding different attitudes to, and management of, informal practices. For instance, based upon an in-depth study exploring the causality between modes of ‘regime transition’ and systemic corruption, Stefes highlighted the discrepancy between ‘negotiated transitions’ resulting in a powerful leadership able to maintain a tight control over corruption (as was the case in Armenia) and ‘tumultuous transitions’ characterised at the same time by ‘separate fiefdoms’ within the power structure (hence leading to a decentralised system of corruption) and the 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 21 10/25/2016 9:57:03 AM 22 Research framework emergence of a vibrant civil society (Stefes 2007). Both the preservation of (some) Soviet standards and institutions and ‘post-Soviet informality’ (Aliyev 2015) affect policy change, as demonstrated in the literature. After studying public procurement reforms in Ukraine, Stewart showed that neopatrimonialism carries substantial weight to account for the limited influence of external actors (Stewart 2013). In a similar vein, Lehmbruch and Sanikidze demonstrated how neo-managerialist forms of organisation have been used during Georgian policy reform to camouflage what remains, essentially, a Soviet-style organisation (Lehmbruch & Sanikidze 2014). In line with the general assumption underpinning this research, I combine these domestic-level variables with levels of change. I expect aspirations for further integration with the EU (i.e. membership aspirations, but also aspirations for closer ties) to shape domestic responses at the selection level. I identify domestic elites’ preferences as the primary variable influencing the adoption of EU-demanded change. The adoption of EU-prescribed reforms is more likely if EU demands resonate strongly with domestic elites’ preferences, beliefs and interests. I further outline the role of veto players and the centralisation of decision-making as variables affecting the adoption and implementation of EU reforms. In those countries where the decision-making system is centralised and the government is in favour of reforms, I expect the adoption of reforms to be likely, yet its application to be limited, if implementation hinges on domestic (private, non-state) actors who do not support the reforms. In contrast, in those countries where the decision-making system is fragmented over a number of institutions and bodies, I expect the bureaucracy, business interests and other non-state actors to act as veto players and to block the adoption of reforms if these do not coincide with their own preferences. Finally, I assume that the adoption and application of EU-demanded change is less likely where Soviet standards and institutions still prevail, given the high costs required to reform. I also expect ‘post-Soviet informality’ (Aliyev 2015) to either block the adoption of reforms or hollow out their substance, thereby strongly constraining the implementation of policy change in line with EU demands. Box 2.1 Domestic-level hypotheses The selection of EU templates is more likely when a country aspires to develop closer ties and integration with the EU The adoption of EU templates is more likely if EU demands resonate strongly with domestic elites’ preferences, beliefs and interests The adoption and application of EU-demanded change are less likely where: • The decision-making system is fragmented over a number of bodies, • Domestic non-state actors oppose the reforms, • Soviet sectoral standards and practices still prevail, • Informal interactions constitute an alternative framework, adding uncertainty and watering down the substance of change 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 22 10/25/2016 9:57:03 AM Research framework 23 EU stimuli and policy mechanisms Early research on ‘Neighbourhood Europeanisation’ builds upon the findings of the literature on EU enlargement (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2005) and points to the weakness of incentives offered by the EU as a major obstacle to its influence in its neighbourhood (Lavenex 2004; Kelley 2006). Under the ENP, the lack of any tangible rewards tied to compliance has been identified as a disincentive for domestic actors to adopt EU templates (Langbein 2013). Yet in contrast to the vague incentives offered under the ENP (‘a stake in the Internal Market’, European Commission 2004), with the Association Agreements (AAs), DCFTAs and visa liberalisation, the EU now offers a clear macro-framework for integration and tangible incentives in the form of market access and a visafree regime. Therefore, I expect the size of rewards offered under the Eastern Partnership to increase the likelihood of EU rule selection in ENP countries. Besides the size of rewards, the literature on EU enlargement has pointed to the central role of EU conditionality in explaining the effectiveness of the EU’s rule transfer (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2005). As indicated by the recent ENP literature, in fact the EU’s policy conditionality facilitates compliance when the domestic preferences and EU demands fit (Ademmer & Börzel 2013). The role of policy conditionality is only expected to increase under the Eastern Partnership, as the EU has moved toward much more specific policy conditionality (Delcour 2013). Likewise, the literature has shown that assistance can have an enabling impact on adoption and application by building capacities and expertise and increasing exposure to, and understanding of, EU templates (Delcour & Wolczuk 2015a). Scholars studying EU assistance under the ENP have found that the EU’s assistance to its neighbours has not focused sufficiently on regulatory convergence, thereby resulting in inertia (Langbein 2014). Yet this is likely to change under the Eastern Partnership, as assistance priorities have shifted toward regulatory convergence in view of visa liberalisation and DCFTAs. New mechanisms, such as the Comprehensive Institution-Building Programmes launched in 2010, have been designed to build Eastern partners’ capacities with a view to facilitating the adoption and application of EU demands. Therefore, I assume that highly specific policy conditionality and increased assistance are likely to trigger increased adoption and application of EU-prescribed change. Box 2.2 EU-level hypotheses The selection of EU rules is more likely when the EU offers bigger rewards in exchange for reforms; The adoption of EU rules is more likely when the EU applies highly specific policy conditionality; The application of EU rules is more likely when the EU offers capacity-building assistance in support of reforms. 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 23 10/25/2016 9:57:03 AM 24 Research framework Regional interdependences and Russia’s policies In the years that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, the disruption of production and distribution chains deeply affected economic relations between the newly independent states. Furthermore, most of these countries prioritised state- and nation-building over the pursuit of regional co-operation projects. From the outset, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was grounded in different or even competing visions of integration that proved to be key obstacles to its effective functioning. The increasingly different reform paths adopted by post-Soviet countries only added to these disintegration dynamics (Delcour 2011a). Despite the centrifugal trends that affected the region, Russia retains considerable and multifaceted interdependences with Eastern Partnership countries. Russia is a key trading partner for most, if not all, of them. The Russian language is still, and will remain for some time, the lingua franca in the post-Soviet space. Its predominance is further sustained by the widespread dissemination of Russian media. Mobility and migration are still other instruments of Russian influence. Over the past two decades Russia’s neighbourhood has largely remained visa-free, and Russia’s labour market is attractive both because of its size and the lack of obstacles to mobility. Remittances from migrants working in Russia significantly contribute to their countries’ economies, as is the case in Armenia and Moldova, for instance. Last but not least, Russia has a military presence in a number of post-Soviet countries, including in Eastern Partnership countries (Delcour & Kostanyan 2014). Early scholarly work on the ENP has shown that a tight interdependence with Russia can be an obstacle to the adoption of EU templates (Dimitrova & Dragneva 2009; Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009). Lavenex and Schimmelfennig posit that a greater degree of interdependence with Russia than with the EU is likely to undermine the effectiveness of EU’s external governance (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009). After studying Ukraine, Dragneva and Dimitrova find that interdependence with Russia indeed constrains the transfer of EU rules in foreign policy and energy, partly at the adoption stage and especially at the implementation stage (Dimitrova & Dragneva 2009). More recently, however, the literature has demonstrated that EU-demanded policy change may occur despite a high degree of interdependence with Russia (Ademmer & Börzel 2013; Ademmer 2015; Ademmer & Delcour 2016; Wolczuk 2016). In fact, in some cases, Russian actors may even work toward facilitating the adoption of EU templates. Russia’s businesses and private actors sometimes support the adoption of EU templates if this serves their own interests (Langbein 2013). In addition, Russia can inadvertently push for the adoption of EU templates (Delcour & Wolczuk 2015b). This is because what matters is not so much interdependence per se, but how 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 24 10/25/2016 9:57:03 AM Research framework 25 Russia uses it to influence partner countries (Ademmer 2015). For instance, Ademmer demonstrates that the use of negative incentives by Russia can incentivise EU-demanded change, if these incentives are not tied to specific conditions. In contrast, she finds that Russia can undermine EU-demanded change if Russian pressures are tied to specific conditions. Undoubtedly, the launch by Russia of its own hard-law integration project in 2010 has considerably altered the way in which it uses regional interdependences. This is because the Eurasian integration project was designed in response to the EU’s Eastern Partnership and as an alternative to it (Delcour & Wolczuk 2013). The ECU/EAEU has thus emerged as a pivotal priority that also drives Russia’s bilateral ties with post-Soviet countries. In recent years, Russia has increasingly offered incentives (positive or negative) to postSoviet countries to entice them to join the ECU, in the form of higher or lower energy prices, provision of (in-)security, and facilitation or blockade of trade flows. Alternatively, it has retaliated against Eastern partners’ choices in favour of EU integration (principally, the signature of AAs and DCFTAs) by deploying a broad array of punitive measures (e.g. the cancellation of bilateral agreements or threats thereof, trade embargoes, harsher migration policies, support to breakaway regions and actions to undermine partner countries’ statehood). Therefore, in line with the more recent literature on ‘Neighbourhood Europeanisation’, I posit that Russia’s strategic use of regional interdependences (i.e. the introduction of punitive measures or rewards in connection with partner countries’ choice of integration) is likely to drastically alter the cost-benefit analyses of domestic actors, regardless of both the resonance of the EU’s offer and the actual degree of sectoral change in line with EU demands. I further expect Russia’s offer of incentives (positive and negative) in connection to EAEU membership to affect the selection of EU rules, and Russia’s punitive measures in retaliation of a firm selection of the EU’s model to affect the adoption and implementation of EU-demanded change. Box 2.3 Regional-level hypotheses The selection of the EU’s model is less likely when Russia offers specific incentives tied to partner countries’ choice of macro-integration. The adoption and application of EU rules are less likely when Russia deploys punitive measures in retaliation for the selection of the EU’s model. The table below summarises the variables identified for the research and combines them with the three levels of change identified. 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 25 10/25/2016 9:57:03 AM Table 2.1 Explanatory factors Set of variables Variable Operationalisation Level of change impacted Domestic Domestic resonance Domestic governments prioritise integration with the EU The reforms coincide with incumbent elites’ preferences The decision-making system provides for a clear-cut division of tasks allowing for an effective adoption and application of EU-demanded reforms The reforms coincide with other domestic actors’ (businesses, civil society, bureaucracy) preferences Soviet-inherited sectoral standards and practices still prevail Informal interactions constitute an alternative framework Selection The EU offers clear and tangible incentives in exchange for policy reforms The EU ties policy rewards to the fulfilment of sector-specific conditions The EU provides technical/financial assistance and capacitybuilding measures Selection Russia offers clear and tangible rewards/negative incentives in connection to partner countries’ choice of macro-integration Russia uses existing interdependences and shared legacies to deploy punitive measures in retaliation of further integration with the EU Selection EU Regional 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 26 EU’s offer and policy mechanisms Use of regional interdependences Adoption Adoption and application Adoption and application Application Application Adoption Application Adoption and application 10/25/2016 9:57:03 AM Research framework 27 Research methodology This section presents the methodology that has guided the research and underpinned the comparative analysis presented in the subsequent chapters. It starts with a discussion of the reasons underlying country and sector selection, and then proceeds to introduce the methods of data collection and analysis. Case selection Two sectors were selected for an in-depth analysis of domestic change in line with EU demands under the Eastern Partnership: migration-related reforms (under the visa liberalisation process) and food safety reforms (related to the adoption of EU sanitary-phyto-sanitary standards under the DCFTA). For each of these sectors, I conduct a comparative analysis between four countries: Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Sector selection Mobility, migration and border management (subsumed in the EU’s policy framework for visa liberalisation) lie at the very core of state sovereignty. Yet these are relatively new public policies for the selected countries, as they developed in the wake of the USSR’s collapse. With the Eastern Partnership, visa liberalisation has emerged prominently on the EU-Eastern partners’ agenda of co-operation. Together with Association Agreements and DCFTAs, it is a core element of the EU’s offer. The lifting of Schengen visas is undoubtedly highly attractive to Eastern Partnership countries and thus provides a key incentive for these countries to adopt EU norms and standards. At the same time, the elimination of Schengen visas is a highly sensitive issue for some EU member states. This has prompted the EU to press for reforms in partner countries, thereby deploying a whole gamut of conditions with the view to fostering ‘mobility in a secure environment’ (European Commission 2008). While migration patterns still mirror tight interdependences between the selected countries and Russia, the latter has not displayed any major concerns with respect to the elimination of Schengen visas for post-Soviet countries (Ademmer & Delcour 2016). This is in sharp contrast to the conclusion of Association Agreements and DCFTAs (Dragneva & Wolczuk 2014). Therefore, for all these reasons, migration, borders and mobility are likely cases for domestic change in line with EU demands under the visa liberalisation process. Agriculture is a pivotal sector for the selected countries’ economies. In recent years, sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards (SPS, referred throughout the text as ‘food safety standards’) have also emerged as a crucial area in the negotiations of DCFTAs. This is because the EU regards protection of health and consumer interests as priorities both within the Union and in external relations. For partner countries, DCFTAs are expected to eliminate quotas and both tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, thus improving the existing export opportunities 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 27 10/25/2016 9:57:03 AM 28 Research framework for food and feed products from Ukraine, Moldova and South Caucasus countries. However, before benefits of the DCFTA offer can be reaped, post-Soviet countries face multifaceted challenges in meeting the stringent EU regulatory and administrative requirements in the food safety area (Delcour 2016). Domestically, in light of Soviet legacies (including a food safety system that deeply differed from WTO-compliant standards), approximation with EU SPS standards requires massive reforms and involves high costs for partner countries – to be borne not only by state authorities, but also private businesses. Reforms to comply with EU demands are also closely intertwined with regional interdependencies and Russia’s bilateral and multilateral policies, including the deployment of the ECU/ EAEU, the membership of which is incompatible with a DCFTA. Therefore, for all these reasons, I have selected food safety as a least likely case for domestic change in line with EU demands under the DCFTA. Country selection Four out of the six countries included in the Eastern Partnership were selected for this research: Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. This sample is large enough to yield representative findings in terms of the EU’s influence on domestic change. When this research commenced, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine were offered similar rewards by the EU in terms of contractual framework and trade agreements. Until 2009 the prospect of an enhanced agreement had been on the table only for Ukraine, but with the Eastern Partnership the EU harmonised its approach vis-à-vis post-Soviet countries included in the ENP by offering prospects for negotiations for an enhanced contractual agreement (the Association Agreements) and a DCFTA, progressive visa liberalisation and deeper sectoral co-operation, in particular in the energy area (European Commission 2008). However, the EU’s levelling out of its offer does not entail that all Eastern partners enjoy similar relations with the EU. In fact, the level of interaction is tailored to ‘each partner’s specific situation and ambition’ (European Commission 2008: 3), i.e. the effective adoption and implementation of reforms in line with the Eastern Partnership’s agenda. Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine were initially selected because, on the basis of a similar EU offer, they represented the most likely cases for the EU to influence domestic change in the post-Soviet space. These are indeed the only four Eastern partners with which the EU launched negotiations for an Association Agreement and a DCFTA. In contrast, Azerbaijan and Belarus are unlikely to be involved in such negotiations in the short to medium term, the former because it is not a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (a prerequisite to open DCFTA negotiations) and the latter owing to its distant relationship with the EU since the mid-1990s, its non-membership in the WTO and its membership in the Eurasian Economic Union, which is in essence incompatible with the conclusion of a DCFTA (see Chapters 4 and 5). The four selected countries, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, all completed negotiations 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 28 10/25/2016 9:57:04 AM Research framework 29 for an Association Agreement and a DCFTA. In addition, these four countries are also the most advanced in the visa liberalisation process with the EU (see Chapters 5 and 7). They were the first Eastern Partnership countries to have visa facilitation and readmission agreements in force (although at different points in time) and, for Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, to receive Visa Liberalisation Action Plans (VLAPs). While Armenia is expected to start a dialogue on visa liberalisation shortly, the two remaining Eastern Partnership countries, Azerbaijan and especially Belarus, are lagging behind.1 Despite being subject to similar EU policies and reaching similar outcomes (the completion of negotiations for AA/DCFTA), the four selected countries represent different reform trajectories since the demise of the Soviet Union. For all of them, transformation has not been a smooth and gradual process but has instead been characterised by a series of upheavals, including in the period covered in this study. Therefore, particular attention is paid to the effects of political and economic trajectories, reform options and crises on the selection, adoption and application of EU-demanded change. Two countries, Georgia and Ukraine, experienced a seemingly drastic political shift in the early 2000s. While the so-called Rose and Orange Revolutions were interpreted by many (not least, in Russia) in terms of regime change and crucial shifts toward democratisation, subsequent developments demonstrated that changes induced by the Colour Revolutions are far from leading to democratisation in a straightforward manner. Georgia is the country in which the most far-reaching and wide-ranging reforms have been conducted, in the wake of the 2003 Rose Revolution. At the same time, under the Saakashvili presidency, the presidential practice of power and the dominance of the executive branch over the legislature and the judiciary gave rise to increasing criticisms and protests. While the 2012 elections resulted in a peaceful and democratic alternation (among the first in the post-Soviet space), the reform options supported by the incumbent government are still unclear. This is also the consequence of the heterogeneity of parties included in the Georgian Dream coalition (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014b), even though some of these (e.g. the Free Democrats) left power in the wake of Minister of Defence Irakli Alasania’s dismissal, in autumn 2014. The sharp polarisation of political life, which exacerbated tensions in the run-up to the 2013 presidential elections, has lingered since 2012. In addition, the imprisonment of key political figures of the Saakashvili period (including former Prime Minister Merabishvili), the arrest of the former mayor of Tbilisi, Gigi Ugulava, and the filing of criminal charges against the former president raised concerns about the use of the judiciary as a political tool (Delcour & Wolczuk 2015b). In early November 2015, the decision by a judge to replace the director general of Rustavi 2 (the most popular TV channel in the country) also triggered demonstrations against what was perceived as a government’s move to take over a channel sympathetic to former President Saakashvili’s United National Movement. However, recent polls highlight weak public support for both the ruling Georgian Dream coalition and the United National Movement. In fact, approximately 40 per cent of respondents 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 29 10/25/2016 9:57:04 AM 30 Research framework would not identify themselves with any political party (National Democratic Institute 2016). This signals major uncertainty as to the outcome of elections in the near future and raises important questions concerning the prospects for EU integration, not least in terms of effects on EU-demanded change. While Ukraine experienced a major political rupture in 2004 with the Orange Revolution, the reform process that followed turned out to be piecemeal. Between 2005 and 2010, the country witnessed the organisation of mostly free and fair elections and the development of a vibrant civil society. Yet major reforms (including fighting corruption and enhancing the independence of the judiciary) stalled as a result of competition for power between the ruling elite and the resistance of powerful business interests, among other reasons. If anything, the increasingly authoritarian practice of power by Viktor Yanukovych indicated that the fragile steps toward democratisation were reversible. In the period following his election in early 2010, he gradually gained control over all branches of power, as vividly illustrated by the trial and imprisonment of former Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko. Furthermore, administrative and public resources were increasingly used for the benefit of the ‘family’, i.e. the relatives and close allies of the president. The fight against pervasive corruption, selective justice and monopolisation of power soon became the core demands of the Ukrainian citizens that stood up against the decision to suspend the signature of the Association Agreement with the EU in autumn 2013. The ousting of Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014 marked yet another major shift for the country. While it triggered Russia’s annexation of Crimea and hybrid war in support of separatist rebels in eastern Ukraine, it was also instrumental in clarifying the country’s integration choices. The new authorities (first the interim government formed after the political demise of Yanukovych and then the newly elected President Poroshenko) indeed made a firm commitment to achieving deep integration with the EU, as illustrated by the signature of the Association Agreement and DCFTA in 2014. However, as mentioned in Chapter 1, recent developments highlight persisting obstacles to (EU-demanded) reforms. These derive primarily from the collusion between powerful oligarchs and the corrupt political class (Wilson 2016). In Moldova, the political shift came in 2009 with the arrival into power of the Alliance for European Integration. The country provides yet another illustration of the political fluidity and unpredictability of the post-Soviet space. The reform process there has been hampered by recurrent instability, as illustrated by the inability to elect a president between 2009 and 2012 and the deep crisis that erupted in early 2013, with the Alliance for European Integration falling apart and Prime Minister Filat’s resignation. This only contributed to strengthening the ‘structural lack of public trust in political institutions and political leaders’ in Moldova (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014c: 2). Despite a tight majority in favour of parties supporting EU integration, the Party of Socialists (PSDM) has emerged as the single largest party in the wake of the 2014 parliamentary elections. After a short-lived minority coalition supported by the Communists, the country is now ruled by the same Alliance for European Integration (composed of the Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova [PLDM] and the Democratic Party 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 30 10/25/2016 9:57:04 AM Research framework 31 of Moldova [PDM]) that was in power between 2009 and 2012. However, the massive rallies that were organised in Chişinău by a grassroots movement, the ‘Dignity and Truth’ platform, in spring and early autumn 2015 point to the depleted trust in institutions and authorities. Demonstrations were triggered by the ‘disappearance’ of USD 1 billion (i.e. 15 per cent of the Moldovan Gross Domestic Product [GDP]) from Moldovan banks in 2014. Protesters (consisting either of pro-European parties or pro-Russian parties’ supporters) denounced the capture of administrative and financial resources by incumbent authorities and the oligarchs’ control over state institutions. After three months in the office, the government was dismissed at the end of October 2015 as a result of a motion of censure supported by the socialist, communist and democratic parties. October 2015 also saw former Prime Minister Vlad Filat being charged with corruption (including being involved in siphoning off $1 billion from the Moldovan banking system in 2014, Całus 2016). These major transformations in Moldova’s political system have resulted in reinforcing the hegemony of Vlad Plahotniuc (the country’s major oligarch), who succeeded in sidelining his rival Filat and securing key positions for his associates in the new government (including the position of prime minister) (Całus 2016). This has only increased public discontent with the ruling elite’s corruption and strengthened the criticism from opposition movements and parties, be they in favour of EU integration (e.g. the Civic Platform Dignity and Truth created in 2015) or closer ties with Russia (e.g. the Party of Socialists). In contrast to Georgia and Ukraine (and to a lesser extent Moldova), Armenia has not experienced any large-scale political changes since it became independent. In fact, the conflict with Azerbaijan in the 1990s thwarted the building of democratic institutions and prompted the emergence of influential commodity-based cartels (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014a). However, while the political system seems stable as compared to some other post-Soviet countries, in recent years Armenia has experienced a series of protest movements driven both by political and socio-economic motivations, including the rejection of the ruling elite’s corruption. The 2008 presidential elections that were followed by a violent crackdown on protesters resulted in a profound political crisis, sharp polarisation and persisting tensions in the country. The protests that erupted in the country in spring 2015 have developed as a bottom-up process, driven by a civic initiative without any clear political affiliation. They express frustration over corrupt Armenian commodity-based cartels that are closely tied to the government and, increasingly, to Russia’s big business. The ‘Electric Yerevan’ protests, however, only partially relate to the country’s geopolitical engagement in the Eurasian integration process and primarily target the lack of accountability of the authorities and the restrictions brought to market competition by monopolies tied to the ruling elite (Ademmer et al. 2016). The protests that erupted in June 2016, although initially limited to the fringes of the political opposition, provide yet another illustration of the growing discontent with the country’s economic situation and mode of governance, and they signal an increasing discrepancy between the ruling elites and civil society. 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 31 10/25/2016 9:57:04 AM 32 Research framework The sample of countries also covers different foreign policy options. For three out of the four countries, these options have changed over the period of analysis. In Ukraine, the Orange Revolution clearly enhanced the country’s commitment to a pro-European course. However, during his presidency, Viktor Yanukovych has sought to find and maintain a fragile balance between the EU and Russia. Such a balance existed in Moldova under the communist President Voronin, yet with the arrival into power of the Alliance for European Integration, EU integration became predominant in the foreign policy agenda. The picture is more complex in the Caucasus. While a strong pro-Western orientation emerged in Georgia after the Rose Revolution, President Saakashvili prioritised NATO accession over relations with the EU until the 2008 conflict with Russia; however, the latter resulted in a rapprochement with the EU. Following the appointment of Bidzina Ivanishvili as prime minister, the country attempted to seek normalisation in its relationship with Russia while maintaining integration with the EU as a key foreign policy priority. In Armenia, Russia remained predominant as the key security ally; however, in the 2000s and especially early 2010s, the country started seeking closer ties with the EU. Yet these did not yield any tangible results, since Armenia announced its decision to join the Russian-led Eurasian integration project in September 2013 and became a member of the Eurasian Economic Union in January 2015. A sample of countries diversified in terms of domestic trajectories, yet subject to similar EU policies and reaching similar outcomes, thus enables me to see what variables they have in common to explain the outcomes. Time frame of sector-specific analysis The time frame of the sectoral analysis ranges from 2009 (which corresponds to the launch of the Eastern Partnership in May) to 2014 (which coincides with the signature of Association Agreements and DCFTAs by Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine in June and the provisional entry into force of DCFTAs in Georgia and Moldova). However, I also take into consideration earlier developments as appropriate. In particular, I incorporate previous EU policies and instruments in the analysis as they have coincided with the introduction of specific demands in the selected sectors. Data and sources The research builds upon qualitative research methods and uses a combination of data with a view to informing both macro-level analysis and in-depth case studies. First, the research relies upon policy documents from international organisations, the EU and Eastern Partnership countries. These are used to inform the study of macro-level relations and to trace the reform process over time in each country.2 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 32 10/25/2016 9:57:04 AM Research framework 33 Second, the research is based upon semi-structured interviews and focus groups held in the four selected countries and at the EU’s headquarters in Brussels. Given the scarcity of fieldwork and dearth of data on the diffusion of EU sectorspecific policies to post-Soviet countries when this research started in 2010–11, I conducted a high number of interviews on the ground in order to map the actors involved in the transfer process, understand their interactions and identify the factors facilitating or impeding policy transfer. Approximately 100 semistructured interviews were conducted from the end of 2010 to early 2015 in the four selected countries,3 in Brussels4 and in Moscow.5 Interviews are a compelling source of information insofar as the data included in existing primary documents is fragmented. In fact, while being increasingly diversified and specialised, EU policy documents do not suffice to gain a profound understanding of developments in the field.6 This is also because some of them (e.g. the progress reports prepared annually by the European Commission) rely upon external sources, e.g. indexes prepared by international watchdogs and think-tanks. While they have become a focus of interest over time for both domestic and EU media and experts, in fact these reports say little about the actual implementation of EU policies and assistance programmes. For instance, the demands that were formulated by the EU vis-à-vis Moldova, Georgia and Armenia prior to the opening of negotiations for a DCFTA do not appear as such in any official EU document. Therefore, building the analysis exclusively on primary documents does not allow researchers to construct a detailed picture of the policy transfer process (including the actors involved, the main steps and the outcomes). Moreover, without any associated fieldwork, research carries a risk of misinterpretations. Taking the above example further, relying solely on analysis of EU documents (either ENP strategic documents or country progress reports), one may infer that the EU’s policy mechanisms have not significantly changed under the Eastern Partnership as compared to the ENP – at least until the signature of Association Agreements. However, this would be misleading, since the EU introduced new mechanisms in view of the preparation of negotiations; yet, these remained informal. Therefore, interviews were key to shedding light on how both EU policy and Eastern Partnership countries’ reforms work in practice. In addition, interviews have been especially useful to understand the motivations of actors, their strategies and their interactions. To that purpose, the sample of interviewees was broad and included, at the domestic level, government officials but also non-state actors (e.g. civil society organisations, academics specialising in the selected sectors, business organisations); and at the EU level, EU officials at headquarters, EU staff within the EU Delegations in the four selected countries, diplomats of EU Member states and EU-assigned experts. I then triangulated the narratives and information generated by different types of interviews in order to reconstruct the reform process. Thus, after minimising the risk of biases, interviews were extremely helpful to test the assumptions and variables formulated at the beginning of the research. 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 33 10/25/2016 9:57:04 AM 34 Research framework In addition to interviews, four focus groups (one per country) were organised with non-state actors, i.e. the academic community, the private sector and civil society organisations, with expertise and/or experience in relations with the EU and domestic developments in the two selected sectors. Focus groups have provided invaluable insights about how groups of non-state actors perceive EU policies and domestic change in line with EU demands. They have also been instrumental in mapping potential differences of interpretations between non-state actors and government officials in terms of domestic change in line with EU templates. Overall, the triangulation of different sources (primary EU and domestic documents, secondary literature, interviews and focus groups) has been crucial both to validating interpretations and generating comparative analysis. Moreover, the wealth of data generated during fieldwork has been key to moving beyond a broad overview of EU-partner countries’ relations and gaining a solid understanding of both EU and domestic actors’ strategies. Despite the examination of a variety of sources and triangulation of data, the sources upon which this research builds are not without limitations. These derive both from the comparative research design and the context in which the research was conducted. The relatively broad sample selected for the research (four countries with two sectors in each country) de facto limited time for fieldwork in each country, as it required interviews to be held in all four countries. At the same time, the rapidly changing policy context demanded that several waves of fieldwork be conducted in each country with a view to mapping changes there. As a compromise between these two sets of requirements, two series of fieldwork were conducted in each country. Notes 1 The EU-Azerbaijan visa facilitation and readmission agreements came into force in early 2014; Belarus and the EU have been negotiating similar agreements since 2014, yet negotiations are not yet completed. 2 These documents include: • Country and sectoral reports by the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation and the International Organisation for Migration; • EU country and sectoral reports: the ENP strategy documents, the ENP Action Plans, Association Agendas, EU country progress reports, EU Council conclusions, EU Commission sectoral reports and EU assistance documents (including reports by EU-assigned experts); • Eastern Partnership governmental programmes and policy-planning documents. 3 Interviews in the four selected countries were conducted with government officials such as officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Economy (the former being usually in charge of negotiations for the Association Agreements, the latter being responsible for DCFTA negotiations and in some cases for managing EU assistance); officials from line Ministries (e.g. Agriculture, Interior) and governmental agencies (e.g. Food Safety Agencies, Migration Services); at EU delegations with heads and deputies; project managers in the selected sectors; with technical assistants, experts and consultants in EU-funded projects (e.g. Twinning Resident Advisors, experts of the High-Level Advisory Groups deployed in Armenia and Moldova, experts of the 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 34 10/25/2016 9:57:04 AM Research framework 35 Policy and Legal Advice Centre in Georgia); and with EU Member States’ diplomats. 4 Interviews in Brussels were conducted with European External Action Service officials; European Commission officials (DG TRADE, DG SANCO, DG DEVCO); and partner countries’ representations (Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) 5 In Moscow, interviews were conducted with the Eurasian Economic Commission minister and officials (Trade department; Integration department; Agricultural policy department) and with academics specialising in Eurasian integration and/or in Ukraine, Moldova and the Caucasus. 6 For example, the ENP progress reports include only a few lines on sectoral reforms in each country and generally focus on the adoption (or lack thereof) of laws in line with EU demands, barely mentioning domestic institutions, strategies and challenges in the reform process. 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What is Policy Convergence and What Causes It? British Journal of Political Science, 21(2), pp. 215–233. Bertelsmann Stiftung. (2014a). Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2014: Armenia Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung. Bertelsmann Stiftung. (2014b). Bertelsmann Transformation Index: Georgia Country Report 2014. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung. Bertelsmann Stiftung. (2014c). Bertelsmann Transformation Index: Moldova Country Report 2014. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung. Börzel, T. A., & Risse, T. (2012). From Europeanisation to Diffusion: Introduction. West European Politics, 35(1), pp. 1–19. Buzogány, A. (2013). Selective Adoption of EU Environmental Norms in Ukraine: Convergence à la Carte. Europe-Asia Studies, 65(4), pp. 609–630. Całus, K. (2016). Moldova: From Oligarchic Pluralism to Plahotniuc’s Hegemony, OSW Commentary, 11 April. Delcour, L. (2011a). Shaping the Post-Soviet Space? EU Policies and Approaches to Region-Building. Farnham: Ashgate. Delcour, L. (2011b). 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The Perplexing Case of Armenia’s Europeanisation. Journal of European Integration, 37(4), pp. 491–507. Delcour, L., & Wolczuk, K. (2015b). Spoiler or Facilitator of Democratization? Russia’ Role in Georgia and Ukraine. Democratization, 22(3), pp. 459–478. Dimitrova, A., & Dragneva, R. (2009). Constraining External Governance: Interdependence with Russia and the CIS as Limits to the EU’s Policy Transfer in Ukraine. Journal of European Public Policy, 16(6), pp. 853–872. Dimitrova, A., & Dragneva, R. (2013). Shaping the Convergence with the EU in Foreign Policy and State Aid in Post-Orange Ukraine: Weak External Incentives, Powerful Veto Players. Europe-Asia Studies, 65(4), pp. 658–681. Dragneva, R., & Wolczuk, K. (2014). The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and the Challenges of Inter-Regionalism. Review of Central and East European Law, 39, pp. 213–244. European Commission. (2008). Eastern Partnership. COM (2008) 823 final, Brussels, 3 December. Franke, A., Gawrich, A., Melnykovska, I., & Schweickert, R. (2010). The European Union’s Relations with Ukraine and Azerbaijan. Post-Soviet Affairs, 26(2), pp. 149–192. Freyburg, T., Lavenex, S., Skripka, T., Schimmelfennig, F., & Wetzel, A. (2011). Democracy Promotion through Functional Cooperation? The Case of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Democratization, 18(4), pp. 1026–1054. Kelley, J. (2006). New Wine in Old Wineskins: Policy Adaptation in the European Neighborhood Policy. Journal of Common Market Studies, 44(1), pp. 29–55. Langbein, J. (2013). Unpacking the Russian and EU Impact on Policy Change in the Eastern Neighbourhood: The Case of Ukraine’s Telecommunications and Food Safety. Europe-Asia Studies, 65(4), pp. 631–657. Langbein, J. (2014). European Union Governance towards the Eastern Neigbourhood: Transcending or Redrawing Europe’s East-West Divide? Journal of Common Market Studies, 52(1), pp. 157–174. Langbein, J., & Wolczuk, K. (2012). Convergence without Membership? The Impact of the European Union in the Neighbourhood: Evidence from Ukraine. Journal of European Public Policy, 19(6), pp. 863–881. Lavenex, S. (2004). EU External Governance in Wider Europe. Journal of European Public Policy, 11(4), pp. 680–700. Lavenex, S., & Schimmelfennig, F. (2009). EU Rules beyond EU Borders: Theorizing External Governance in European Politics. Journal of European Public Policy, 16(6), pp. 791–812. Lehmbruch, B., & Sanikidze, L. (2014). Soviet Legacies, New Public Management and Bureaucratic Entrepreneurship in the Georgian Protection Police. Agencifying the Police? Europe-Asia Studies, 66(1), pp. 88–107. 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 36 10/25/2016 9:57:04 AM Research framework 37 National Democratic Institute. (2016). Public Attitudes in Georgia. Tbilisi: National Democratic Institute. Schimmelfennig, F., & Sedelmeier, U. (2005). The Europeanisation of Central and Eastern Europe. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Stefes, C. (2007). Understanding Post-Soviet Transitions: Corruption, Collusion and Clientelism. New-York: Palgrave. Stewart, S. (2013). Public Procurement Reform in Ukraine: The Implications of Neopatrimonialism for External Actors. Demokratizatsiya, 21(2), pp. 197–214. Wilson, A. (2016). Survival of the Richest: How Oligarchs Block Reforms in Ukraine, European Council on Foreign Relations Policy Brief. Wolczuk, K. (2016). Managing the Flows of Gas and Rules: Ukraine between the EU and Russia, Eurasian Geography and Economics, (57)1, pp. 113–137. 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 37 10/25/2016 9:57:04 AM 3 EU policies in the post-Soviet space EU rules at the core of an open-ended integration process Over the past two decades, the EU has significantly stepped up its presence and influence in the post-Soviet space. When the Soviet Union collapsed, the European Community was a newcomer in the region. It had only recently established official links with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) after thirty years of mutual ignorance, it had signed an economic co-operation agreement with the Soviet Union two years before its demise, and it had just set up a technical assistance programme to support economic transformations in the country. In contrast, the EU is now perceived as an influential actor, especially in those areas of the former Soviet Union with which it shares a common border, namely Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus. This is despite the fact that the EU’s influence in its eastern neighbourhood has not grown steadily; it has encountered strong limitations, as abundantly illustrated in recent years and acknowledged by the EU in its 2015 ENP review (High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/European Commission 2015). This chapter takes a look back at the evolution of the EU’s policies since the early 1990s. In doing so, it seeks to map continuity and change in the EU’s toolbox vis-à-vis post-Soviet countries. The chapter shows how relations between the EU and the four selected countries have expanded following the collapse of the Soviet Union, first with the conclusion of Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) in the mid-1990s, then with the launch of the ENP in the early 2000s, and more recently with the Eastern Partnership launched in 2009. It asks whether and to what extent the EU’s increasing influence in its eastern neighbourhood is associated with a shift in EU policy approaches and mechanisms. In particular, has the increasing reliance upon the accession toolbox outside the context of enlargement strengthened (or weakened) the EU’s role as a driver of domestic change in the region? As argued in the analysis, despite an enhanced political profile upon the launch of the ENP and a growing rivalry with Russia in recent years, the EU has not departed from a functional approach prioritising low politics in the post-Soviet space. Support for domestic change (especially in economic and social issues) has been at the core of EU policies in post-Soviet countries ever since the USSR collapsed. However, the EU has gradually reinforced its role as a (potential) 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 38 10/25/2016 9:57:04 AM EU policies in the post-Soviet space 39 anchor in the reform process. It has done so by increasingly attaching post-Soviet countries to its own regulatory system. From a mere supporter of political and economic transformations in the 1990s (first section of the chapter), the EU has turned into a driver of domestic change with the ENP (second section) and a model for reform under the EaP (third section). In other words, the deepening of relations has gone hand in hand with an increasing emphasis on legal approximation with EU rules and standards. This has involved important adjustments in the policy mechanisms mobilised by the EU. In particular, the Eastern Partnership represents a turning point in the EU’s approach to domestic change in the region, as it is a shift toward massive diffusion of the EU’s acquis combined with hard-law integration and sector-specific conditionality. The last section of the chapter offers an in-depth analysis of the Eastern Partnership’s toolbox by moving to the sectoral level. It details EU demands in the two sectors selected for analysis: food safety as part of deep economic integration with the EU and visa liberalisation. Supporting political and economic ‘transitions’: a low-key EU profile after the collapse of the Soviet Union While the creation of the neighbourhood policy in 2004 shifted academic attention toward the EU’s policies in the post-Soviet space, scholars have largely overlooked the pre-ENP history of EU/post-Soviet relations. Yet EU demands for, and support of, domestic change in the four selected countries did not emerge with the ENP/Eastern Partnership, but rather originate in the early years of the post-Soviet period. Despite their limited extent, committees and other formats of dialogue set up in the 1990s, as well as EU assistance projects, have contributed to exposing post-Soviet countries’ officials to EU templates. In the 1990s the EU’s policy in the region remained embryonic due to two tightly interconnected factors. First, the EU (then the European Economic Community [EEC]) and the USSR (more specifically, the economic counterpart of the EEC in the Eastern bloc, the COMECON) only belatedly established official relations in 1988. These relations received an initial impetus with the conclusion of a basic agreement on trade and co-operation in 1989. However, the deliquescence of the Soviet Union then hampered both the familiarisation of the European Community with what was still an unknown area in its external relations and the design of a European strategy for post-Soviet independent states (Delcour 2011). In essence, the EEC was both taken by surprise and ill-equipped to respond to the political upheavals that affected the Soviet Union at the very end of the 1980s and in the early 1990s. At that time, the European Community had limited external competences and no expertise in the USSR. Second, throughout the 1990s the European Community (which was upgraded to a European Union in 1993) concentrated on its own integration process, including the completion of the Internal Market, the construction of a political union and an economic and monetary union, as well as preparations for enlargement to Central European countries, among other issues. To be sure, the post-Soviet 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 39 10/25/2016 9:57:04 AM 40 EU policies in the post-Soviet space space was not identified as a foreign policy priority by a Union that proved utterly unable to address the conflicts in its vicinity, as was the case in the Balkans in the first half of the 1990s. Instead, the EU implicitly hoped for the Russian Federation to act as a ‘tutor’ in a part of the world that it found hard to relate to1 (Delors 1992: 173). Therefore, upon the collapse of the USSR, the European Community only cautiously and incrementally engaged in the region. It first reacted to the political and economic upheavals by launching a technical assistance programme (that was initially created for the Soviet Union and redeployed bilaterally after its collapse). In fact, the TACIS (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States) programme gradually emerged as the backbone of the EEC’s policy vis-à-vis post-Soviet countries in the early 1990s. This is due to the fact that technical assistance was part of the EEC’s external competences and savoir-faire. In contrast, it took more time for the EU to develop a new contractual framework for post-Soviet countries in the form of Partnership and Cooperation Agreements. These were conceived as an ‘intermediary model’ (European Commission 1992: 9–10) between the Trade and Cooperation Agreement signed in 1989 with the USSR on the one hand and Association Agreements signed with Central European countries on the other. These agreements were based on a similar model for all former Soviet republics: they encompassed a political dialogue and wide-ranging economic co-operation. However, the EU introduced some degree of differentiation within this common framework. Ukraine and Russia were the first post-Soviet countries to sign the PCA in June 1994 (Vieira 2015). They were followed by Moldova the same year, whereas negotiations took a bit more time for the Caucasus and Central Asian countries. Furthermore, the PCAs signed with Russia, Ukraine and Moldova set an important additional objective, which was not included in the PCAs signed with South Caucasus and Central Asian countries, i.e. the future establishment of a free-trade area covering all trade in goods. The differentiation sketched in the mid-1990s between Russia, Ukraine and Moldova on the one hand and South Caucasus and Central Asia on the other hand hinged on the future proximity with an enlarged EU. Russia became a neighbour of the EU upon Finland’s accession in 1995; Ukraine and Moldova would share a common land border with the EU after enlargement to Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) (more specifically upon Romania’s accession, in the case of Moldova). Therefore, the inclusion of an ‘evolutionary clause’ (i.e. the provision envisaging the establishment of a free-trade area, Vieira 2015) signalled (even if in vague terms) a possible expansion of relations with these three post-Soviet countries in the aftermath of the EU’s next waves of enlargement. In contrast, the South Caucasus and Central Asia were then regarded as a remote region, without any indication of a subsequent furthering of links. In all post-Soviet countries, the PCAs were given ‘a strong political dimension’ (Hillion 2000: 8), inter alia through the political principles referred to in their preambles. The PCAs introduced basic political conditionality in the form 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 40 10/25/2016 9:57:04 AM EU policies in the post-Soviet space 41 of a so-called suspension clause. Indeed, the agreements provided that ‘Respect for democracy, principles of international law, and human rights as defined in particular in the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, as well as the principles of market economy ( . . . ) constitute an essential element of partnership and of this Agreement’ (Article 2, Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and the Republic of Moldova). Accordingly, the agreements may be suspended in case of a breach of these principles. However, while providing an impetus to the political dialogue and economic co-operation, the PCAs offered weak incentives for post-Soviet countries to reform and contained only limited obligations in this respect. The PCAs offered better access to the EU’s market, based on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’s (GATT) basic principles (e.g. most favoured nation clause; national treatment principle; freedom of transit; general prohibition of quantitative restrictions, with some exceptions such as textile or steel) (Lebullenger 1998). However, the scope of trade concessions was in essence limited by the then status of postSoviet countries’ economies. These were indeed regarded as ‘transition economies’ and therefore subjected (unlike market economies) to trade defence measures. The PCAs also kicked off legal approximation with EU economic and technical regulations; however, the corresponding provisions were not supported by strongly codified conditionality. Legal approximation was regarded as a unilateral voluntary commitment (Matta 2014: 38) taken by post-Soviet countries in economic and market-related sectors. The obligation was limited to ensuring a level of compatibility with EU legislation2 and thus strongly differed in both scope and depth from the EU’s requirements vis-à-vis CEECs candidate countries that envisaged a full alignment with the EU’s acquis. In addition, while the PCAs provided for a gradual approximation process, no specific schedule was foreseen. Therefore, the PCA provisions related to legal approximation were labelled ‘soft approximation commitments’ (Petrov 2014: 150) or ‘best endeavour clauses’ (van der Loo 2014: 68). Overall, in the 1990s the EU primarily sought to support the political and economic reform process by anchoring post-Soviet countries (albeit loosely) to its own values and standards. The PCA signed with Ukraine underlined, for instance, the ‘connection between full implementation of partnership on the one hand, and continuation of the actual accomplishment of Ukraine’s political, economic and legal reform’ (Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, and Ukraine 1998). The ratification of the first Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with Russia in December 1997, followed by Moldova and Ukraine in July 1998, stepped up relations with the EU and paved the way for the institutionalisation of a regular political dialogue between the EU and these countries, enhanced economic co-operation and increased synergy with EU assistance programmes.3 However, the PCAs soon appeared outdated and limited in light of the expanding and multifaceted relationship developing between the EU and Russia and Ukraine, especially. At the end of the 1990s, the EU sought to both step up its engagement and redefine the relationship with these countries by designing 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 41 10/25/2016 9:57:04 AM 42 EU policies in the post-Soviet space Common Strategies, a new instrument of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP) introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam (Haukkala 2010; Vieira 2015). The strategies adopted in 1999 for the Russian Federation (European Council 1999a) and Ukraine (European Council 1999b) highlighted the prioritisation of security issues in the EU’s policy vis-à-vis both countries. In fact, these documents reflected a securitisation of economic and political transformations that had been at the core of the EU’s support since the early 1990s. The consolidation of democracy and the integration of Russia and Ukraine into the world economy were presented as tightly connected to stability in these countries. The strategic objectives pursued by the EU in both countries thus included contributions ‘to the emergence of a stable, open and pluralistic democracy [in Ukraine and in Russia], governed by the rule of law and underpinning a stable functioning market economy’ (European Council 1999a, 1999b). While further democratisation and economic reforms were implicitly seen as prerequisites for stability, EU common strategies also presented a broad list of challenges to stability and security on the European continent, including nuclear safety, environmental degradation, security of energy supplies, organised crime, money-laundering, human trafficking and drug smuggling (European Council 1999a: 3). Yet none of these challenges corresponded to new threats; some of them (e.g. nuclear safety) had figured prominently in EU policies since the demise of the Soviet Union; others (such as organised crime and various traffics) had been identified as widespread scourges in former Soviet republics in the early 1990s (Delcour 2011). Therefore, rather than the emergence of new problems, the Common Strategies primarily reflected new EU perceptions of both developments in the post-Soviet space and its role in addressing them. This shift in EU perceptions at the end of the 1990s was perhaps unsurprising as enlargement to CEECs (bordering either Ukraine or Russia) was approaching. Yet the Common Strategies also mirrored the ‘growing international ambitions’ of the EU in connection to the evolution of the CSFP, the creation of the Common Security and Defence Policy, as well as the emerging external dimension of Justice and Home Affairs (Vieira 2015: 7). Interestingly, while adopted shortly after the PCAs with Russia and Ukraine entered into force, the Common Strategies offered a much more security-driven approach to the relationship with these countries that also signalled a shift toward high politics. This contrasted with the focus on economic and trade that underpinned both the TACIS programme and the PCAs, which the Common Strategies supplemented but did not replace. Launched a few years after the Common Strategies were adopted, the ENP marks a new turning point in EU policies. Shaping the neighbourhood? The ENP’s declared ambitions, fuzzy demands and open-ended integration While ramping up EU involvement in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus, the ENP can be regarded as an attempt to connect the EU’s (relatively new) shift 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 42 10/25/2016 9:57:04 AM EU policies in the post-Soviet space 43 toward high politics as expressed in the Common Strategies with its demands in terms of, and support for, domestic change. In this vein, it can be labelled a ‘cross-pillar’ (Cremona & Hillion 2006) policy reflecting different institutional logics. However, while stepping up the EU’s role in the reform process and introducing extensive guidance for domestic change, the ENP has been fraught with inherent tensions that undermine the EU’s transformative power in post-Soviet countries. The enlargement-foreign policy nexus: an ambitious attempt at ‘external Europeanisation’ From its outset, the ENP has combined a security rationale and an enhanced political profile with a strong drive for domestic change in the Southern Mediterranean and post-Soviet countries. On the one hand, the ENP marks a clear shift away from the EU’s low-key involvement in the post-Soviet space. It signals its ambitions to take up responsibilities commensurate with both its role as a ‘global political player’ (Bengtsson 2008: 598) and its attraction power in the region. As claimed by the European Commission, with the ENP the EU conveys a ‘vision’ of its relationship to its neighbourhood, a term included in most ENP policy documents (e.g. European Commission 2003). The driving force behind the ENP is the EU’s ambition to act as an ‘interventionist actor in its near abroad’ (Charillon 2004), particularly as a ‘motor of European security’ (Bengtsson 2008: 597). In this vein, the ENP mirrors the EU’s security concerns in its new neighbourhood: Even in an era of globalisation, geography is still important. It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed. Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organised crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe. (Council of the European Union 2003) The EU’s ‘vision’ under the ENP reflects its comprehensive approach to security (Cremona & Hillion 2006), embracing non-military threats and connecting security, stability and prosperity. Thus, this approach widens ‘the conventional perspective on security towards a not purely military, territorial and state-centric understanding, but one that includes other security-relevant aspects such as civilian operations in various areas, development, environmental issues, humanitarian aid, structural cooperation and diplomacy’ (Gebhard & Norheim-Martinsen 2011: 225). In this vein, the ENP constitutes a major capability test for European foreign policy (Delcour & Tulmets 2009), especially in terms of the EU’s capacity to integrate different instruments (Cremona & Hillion 2006). This does not mean, 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 43 10/25/2016 9:57:04 AM 44 EU policies in the post-Soviet space however, that the new initiative was entirely crafted from whole cloth by the EU acting as a unitary and purely rational actor. It rather resulted from an incremental process involving several layers of instruments and a number of actors operating with different institutional logics (Cremona & Hillion 2006) aggregating different interests and preferences and reacting to events in the areas concerned. The delineation of the ENP’s geographical scope is a good illustration of this: while the 2002 Patten-Solana letter focused on those postSoviet countries that would share a land border with the EU after enlargement (Patten-Solana 2002), the Southern Mediterranean countries were included in the 2003 ‘Wider Europe’ initiative (European Commission 2003) as a result of EU Southern member states’ lobbying. One year later, the inclusion of the three South Caucasus countries in the new policy followed a similar process, whereby the Commission, backed by the European Parliament, issued a recommendation, which was adopted by the Council in June 2004 (a few months after the Rose Revolution in Georgia). On the other hand, the ENP extensively relies on ‘External Europeanisation’, defined as ‘the extension of EU rules (laws, institutions, practices) beyond the EU’s borders’ (Magen 2006: 386). With the ENP, the EU offers a strong push for comprehensive domestic reforms combined with external monitoring and benchmarking. The EU’s approach is based upon ‘a direct borrowing from the enlargement template’ (Magen 2006: 405), as evidenced by the reliance upon conditionality and socialisation. More specifically, the EU modelled the key ENP instruments (e.g. the ENP Action Plans [ENP AP], the key ENP documents guiding domestic change) after the Accession Partnerships designed for CEECs. The EU also extended to neighbouring countries the technical assistance instruments created in the 1990s for CEECs, e.g. Twinning (an instrument for institutional co-operation between public administrations of EU Member States and partner countries) and TAIEX (Technical Assistance and Information Exchange instrument). Therefore, the ENP’s initial design displays ‘heavy path dependency’ (Magen 2006: 410) and replication of previous EU policies. This is despite the fact that the ENP is distinct from enlargement, as repeatedly stressed by EU leaders in the mid-2000s (see e.g. European Commission 2004: 3). From the outset of the neighbourhood policy, a number of publications have therefore emphasized the lack of a membership perspective as a major obstacle to the transfer of EU rules and policy beyond its borders (Lavenex 2004; Kelley 2006). As Lavenex argues, the ENP consists in the extension of the EU’s legal boundary, yet precludes the opening of its institutional boundary, i.e. membership. However, the lack of membership prospects ‘poses serious limits to external governance’ (Lavenex 2004: 694) and may undermine the EU’s credibility in the neighbourhood. In a similar vein, for Kelley (2006) the lack of the accession reward under the ENP explains the policy’s limited effectiveness. In the absence of any membership perspective, the EU’s leverage is considered too weak to induce the adoption of EU rules. 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 44 10/25/2016 9:57:04 AM EU policies in the post-Soviet space 45 Weak rewards vs. extensive requirements (and low degree of legalisation) In fact, in the ENP the lack of accession perspective is compounded by the vagueness of EU rewards and conditions. The literature on EU enlargement identifies the credibility of rewards (i.e. their size and speed) as a key condition to induce compliance with EU demands (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2005). Yet the rewards offered under the ENP lack both substance and precision. As indicated by the European Commission, the ENP ‘envisages enhanced preferential trade relations and increased financial and technical assistance. It also offers neighbouring countries the prospect of a stake in the EU Internal Market based on legislative and regulatory approximation, the participation in a number of EU programmes and improved interconnection and physical links with the EU’ (European Commission 2004: 14). However, in the initial ENP documents, the EU neither specified the form and scope of these rewards nor offered any tangible incentive in the short-term (with the exception of increased assistance).4 For instance, while from the outset of the policy the EU envisaged new agreements (initially called ‘European Neighbourhood Agreements’, European Commission 2004: 3) to replace the PCAs, it left the scope of these agreements open for further specification, based on the implementation of the ENP APs. In fact, the offer of enhanced trade integration (based upon deep and comprehensive freetrade agreements) emerged only in 2006 as a result of two factors: a reflection initiated within the European Commission on how to strengthen the ENP’s incentives (European Commission 2006b) and the preparations for negotiating this new type of agreement with Ukraine (European Commission 2006a). Yet both the scope and name of the new overarching contractual frameworks with ENP countries remained unspecified. For instance, the European Commission kept referring to ‘the enhanced agreement’ in preparations with Ukraine without further specification (European Commission 2007: 3). This indicates that ENP incentives have been gradually expanded and specified on the basis of policy implementation in the field. Therefore, regulatory convergence in the early years of the ENP appeared disconnected from clearly-specified rewards. In essence, ‘the action plans are process-oriented; they do not prescribe a specific end’ to legal approximation efforts (Lavenex et al. 2009: 820). The fuzziness of the ENP’s incentives and their ‘open-ended nature’ (Wolczuk 2009: 190) appear as important obstacles to the policy’s effectiveness. This is because the ENP’s weak incentives are unlikely to alter the cost-benefit calculations of domestic elites. As acknowledged by the European Commission, an important part of the rewards will only bear fruit at a later stage, while political and economic costs have to be borne upfront by partner countries (European Commission 2006a: 3). Against that backdrop, ENP conditionality lacks sufficient credibility to trigger domestic change. This is due to two factors. First, according to Sedelmeier, in the ENP the coexistence of conditionality with elements of socialisation (through 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 45 10/25/2016 9:57:04 AM 46 EU policies in the post-Soviet space the joint ownership principle) is expected to undermine their respective effectiveness (Sedelmeier 2007). This is because joint ownership provides domestic elites with a leeway to minimise the role of conditionality if the latter is politically sensitive or threatens their survival. Nevertheless, as pointed out by Wolczuk (2009: 190), EU conditionality has taken precedence over joint ownership because of the EU’s role in setting the domestic agenda, deciding upon the size and speed of rewards and linking the conditions and awards. Second, while conditionality has prevailed over joint ownership, it has remained ill-defined and therefore ineffective. The ENP has failed to prioritise reforms to be carried out by partner countries. For instance, the ENP AP mentions 80 priorities for action in the case of Moldova, which are ‘all important’ (EU-Moldova ENP Action Plan 2005: 3). In addition, the ENP APs lack clearly defined benchmarks as well as specific time frames to monitor the reforms to be conducted by partner countries (Sasse 2008: 9).In this context, conditionality is particularly difficult to apply and amounts to a form of ‘conditionality-lite’ (Sasse 2008: 2). Finally, the link with rewards remains vague: as Casier argues, ‘it is unclear which condition an ENP state has to fulfil in order to get a certain reward’ (Casier 2011: 44). Therefore, while they introduce a much more detailed list of requirements as compared to the PCAs, the extent to which ENP APs can act as reference points for domestic reforms is questionable. EU rules as a model for modernisation? The Eastern partnership as a turning point in EU demands for domestic change Like the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Eastern Partnership offers integration without membership. Despite this (important) similarity with the ENP, the EaP marks a shift of paradigm in the EU’s policy vis-à-vis Eastern neighbours. This is because of three interconnected factors. First, under the EaP, the EU has increased the size of rewards as compared to the ENP. The Eastern Partnership’s offer consists of four pillars: an enhanced contractual framework in the form of Association Agreements replacing the PCAs; deeper economic integration with the conclusion of DCFTAs; visa liberalisation, i.e. the lifting of Schengen visa requirements once specific conditions are met; and increased sectoral co-operation, for instance in the energy area. Visa liberalisation is undoubtedly a major expectation of Eastern partners vis-àvis the EU. It is a major step forward as compared to the earlier visa facilitation schemes offered by the EU, and therefore a key incentive for EaP countries to adopt EU norms and standards in the areas of migration, borders and mobility. Likewise, the upgrading of contractual frameworks to Association Agreements (a decision that was taken during the 2008 EU-Ukraine summit) ‘leaves open the way for further progressive developments’ (Council of the European Union 2008) in EU-EaP countries relations and is therefore expected to better reflect partners’ aspirations to a closer integration with the EU than the initially foreseen ‘European Neighbourhood Agreements’. In addition, in the wake of the mixed 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 46 10/25/2016 9:57:04 AM EU policies in the post-Soviet space 47 assessment of the ENP delivered at the end of 2006 (European Commission 2006a), deep economic integration was envisioned as a strong award that the EU could offer to its neighbours to support them more effectively in the reform process. DCFTAs offer enhanced market access by removing import and customs duties and quantitative restrictions, as well as reducing technical barriers to trade on the basis of partner countries’ alignment on EU standards. In the EU’s view, regulatory convergence with trade-related acquis is expected to act as a driver for foreign investments and economic development in post-Soviet countries. Second, the Eastern Partnership mirrors a shift in the EU’s approach to legal approximation. Unlike candidate countries, the EU does not require legal homogeneity from EaP partner countries. Nevertheless, the export of EU acquis as a template for reforms under the EaP has translated into a substantial expansion of both the scope and depth of EU demands for domestic change. For instance, the DCFTAs require partner countries to approximate their legal framework with over 90 per cent of the EU’s trade-related acquis (Duleba et al. 2012: 78). In a similar vein, the EU expects Eastern Partnership countries to adopt and apply a broad range of EU and international standards before it decides to eliminate the obligation of Schengen visas. In fact, the scope of EU-demanded reforms is tightly interwoven with the EU’s enhanced offer under the EaP (van Elsuwege & Petrov 2014: 4). As indicated in the final Declaration of the 2009 Prague Summit, ‘legislative and regulatory approximation is crucial to those partner countries willing to make progress in coming closer to the EU’ (Council of the European Union 2009). Therefore, in sharp contrast to the ENP, the Eastern Partnership clearly promotes a result-oriented approach to legal approximation. Contrary to the ENP APs, legal approximation efforts are geared toward specific goals. It is conceived as an instrument to reach political association, deeper economic integration, and visa liberalisation (van der Loo 2014: 64). Another major difference with the ENP is that legislative approximation provisions under the AAs/DCFTAs are legally binding (Delcour & Wolczuk 2013: 190; van der Loo 2014: 63). Furthermore, in contrast to the PCAs, Association Agreements include specific timetables5 and dispute-settlement mechanisms. As such, and despite the continuous use of the term ‘legal approximation’, they represent a shift away from approximation understood as a loose process geared toward compatibility of legal frameworks (labelled ‘approximation/compatibility’ (Matta 2014: 64) and toward convergence premised upon deep economic integration (named ‘approximation/convergence’, Matta 2014: 64).6 Third, under the Eastern Partnership, the EU has reinforced its policy mechanisms with a view to facilitating domestic change in line with its demands. On the one hand, with the EaP’s multilateral track, the EU has introduced a new framework of exposure to EU norms, relying upon socialisation, emulation and persuasion mechanisms (e.g. exchange of experience and best practices, presentation of EU legislation). It has also designed new bilateral assistance mechanisms, such as the Comprehensive Institution-Building Programmes (CIB) launched in 2010, to build Eastern partners’ capacities in preparation for AAs/DCFTAs. On the other hand, the EU has moved toward ex-ante, sector-specific conditionality. 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 47 10/25/2016 9:57:04 AM 48 EU policies in the post-Soviet space The tough experience of lengthy DCFTA negotiations with Ukraine in 2008–11 prompted the EU to introduce ‘key sectoral recommendations’7 that had to be fulfilled before negotiations for DCFTAs could be launched with Armenia, Georgia and Moldova. Likewise, the Visa Liberalisation Action Plans (VLAPs) handed over by the European Commission to Eastern Partnership countries detail the measures that have to be adopted and enforced before the EU decides to lift the Schengen visa requirement. Overall, in the past two decades (especially since the ENP was launched), the EU has stepped up its engagement through increasing demands for legal and regulatory approximation with its own rules. In the EU’s view, the emphasis on regulatory convergence with EU standards under the Eastern Partnership (especially regarding trade-related standards) is expected to contribute to partner countries’ modernisation (European Commission 2008: 4). Yet the acquis developed as common rules designed for EU member states. Therefore, its export outside the context of enlargement raises key questions in terms of its adaptation to partner countries’ needs. Case studies: toward increasingly specific EU demands in the migration and food safety areas This section scrutinises the way in which the evolution of EU macro-level policies has affected implementation at the sectoral level. It traces the evolution of EU demands for reforms in the two selected policy areas, namely food safety and visa liberalisation, and highlights the expansion of scope and increasing specification of EU demands, including a tighter connection to legally-binding provisions. As the section argues, the EU demands considerable policy, institutional and regulatory change from partner countries in exchange for the rewards offered as part of the Eastern Partnership. Food safety standards As early as the mid-1990s, food safety standards developed into an important area of co-operation between the EU and post-Soviet countries. It was especially pivotal in light of both the economic and agrarian reform process in the region and the development of trade flows with the EU. Though embryonic, legal approximation with EU technical regulations in this area started with PCAs.8 In Ukraine, Moldova and South Caucasus countries, legal approximation efforts were underpinned by EU assistance as part of the TACIS programme. Though mainly channelled through technical assistance, EU support also took the form of sectoral budget support, as was the case in Armenia, Georgia and Moldova for food security in the late 1990s–early 2000s. This instrument served as a leverage to foster domestic 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 48 10/25/2016 10:27:24 AM EU policies in the post-Soviet space 49 reform strategies (Particip et al. 1997: 37) while also introducing conditionality related to public finance management. As compared to the PCA, the European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plans (ENP APs) introduced a much more detailed list of requirements.9 In essence, this reflected three major developments that together influenced EU-partner countries’ relations in the food safety area. First, in this area the acquis communautaire significantly expanded in the early 2000s as a consequence of the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy crisis, which exposed weaknesses in the implementation of food legislation across the EU and prompted an overall reform of the EU’s approach to food safety (Ugland & Veggeland 2006). The scope of legal approximation hence broadened under the ENP as a result of internal EU developments. Second, the very goals of the ENP – ‘develop an increasingly close relationship, going beyond co-operation, to gradual economic integration’ (EU-Ukraine ENP Action Plan 2005: 1) – triggered the introduction of additional requirements in the food safety area. Third, three of the selected countries had joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in the early 2000s,10 which involved massive commitments in the food safety area (not least those stemming from the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures). However, while new references to both EU regulations and international agreements were included in the ENP APs, these were only political documents providing guidance for reforms, without any legally binding effects (Delcour & Wolczuk 2013: 190). Under the Eastern Partnership, as part of DCFTA negotiations, the EU requires partner countries to approximate their legal frameworks to EU sanitary, phyto-sanitary and welfare law.11 However, as noted by van der Loo, ‘the scope of relevant sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards (SPS) acquis for approximation is not yet defined’ (van der Loo 2014: 173). Despite minor differences, all three agreements signed with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine indeed provide that partner countries ‘shall approximate their sanitary and phyto-sanitary and animal welfare legislation to that of the EU’ as set out in a specific Annex to the agreement.12 All three annexes require partner countries to submit an approximation list (called, in the case of Ukraine, a ‘comprehensive strategy’) to the SPS Subcommittee within three months from the entry into force of the agreements. However, while references to the acquis are indeed lacking in the text of the agreements, this does not imply that the EU has not formulated any specific demands in the legal approximation process. On the contrary, interviews conducted both at the European Commission13 and in partner countries show that the EU has clearly specified the corpus of rules to be adopted as part of the Association Agreement/DCFTA. In Ukraine (the first country with 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 49 10/25/2016 10:27:25 AM 50 EU policies in the post-Soviet space which negotiations for a DCFTA were launched, in 2008), the EU referred to the provisions to be approximated during the negotiation process itself.14 In Armenia, Georgia and Moldova, EU demands as to the scope of approximation were put forward in the preparation phase of negotiations.15 As mentioned, for instance, in the text of the EU-Moldova Association Agreement, partner countries have to approximate only ‘relevant acquis’ or ‘pertinent acquis’ (Annex XXIV, EU-Moldova Association Agreement 2013). Yet the body of EU SPS acquis identified for approximation is in fact quite broad. As indicated during interviews, it includes the basic EU regulations on food safety (Council of the European Union/European Parliament 2002) and several regulations known as the ‘hygiene package’.16 These regulations derive from the integrated approach to food safety developed in the Union in the early 2000s, which draws together all aspects of food safety throughout the whole food chain ‘from farm to fork’ (Byrne 2002). This approach lies at the roots of Regulation 178/2002 (Council of the European Union/European Parliament 2002).17 The EU thus exports to Eastern Partnership countries the bulk of technical requirements included in its corpus of rules while leaving aside financial and administrative conditions that apply only to EU Member States (e.g. number of inspectors, etc.).18 Moreover, approximation is required with EU vertical legislation19 for those sectors/products where exports are sought. Therefore, despite being labelled ‘basic’ by the EU,20 the acquis transferred to Eastern partners is actually massive. Partner countries have to demonstrate legal convergence with EU rules on control systems (both for the domestic system and imports), animal health and welfare, food safety, animal by-products, plant health and genetically modified organisms. As also indicated in the Association Agreements, the approximation lists that will be included in annexes within three months from entry into force may be amended to take into account the evolution of EU law. Finally, in addition to its acquis, the EU also transfers soft institutional templates. Among others, it asks to adopt the best institutional practice whereby a single agency bears responsibility for animal health and food safety inspections.21 Regarding the degree of approximation, the EU insists on the fact that partner countries are not expected to fully align their legal framework with all the acquis. According to interviewees,22 the EU seeks first and foremost to diffuse the principles and goals underlying its own corpus of rules, rather than full compliance with these rules. Therefore, the degree of approximation is primarily determined by the finalité of the DCFTAs, namely trade facilitation and liberalisation. Besides the elimination of customs duties, the reduction or elimination of quotas and technical barriers to trade hinges crucially on the recognition of 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 50 10/25/2016 10:27:25 AM EU policies in the post-Soviet space 51 equivalence in the level of sanitary and phyto-sanitary protection.23 In essence, partner countries have to go through legal approximation/convergence with EU rules in order to be able to export to the EU market without non-tariff barriers. In order to ensure an adequate level of protection to its consumers, the EU requires full compliance with the principles underpinning its integrated approach to food safety.24 To that end, partner countries are expected to introduce new regulations (or amend existing ones), to effectively implement approximated rules, and to eliminate any domestic measures or practices that would prove inconsistent with them (Annex XXIV, EU-Moldova Association Agreement 2013). Therefore, while it does not ask full copy from its food safety acquis, the EU actually requires a direct and complete transfer for those technical parts of the legislation that may impinge on trade. This transfer rests on two premises. First, as noted above for partner countries, the adoption of EU templates is expected to contribute to partner countries’ economic modernisation by enhancing the quality of their sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards. Second, for the EU and its consumers it offers a safety guarantee in terms of food products’ access to the EU’s market. Migration and visa liberalisation In contrast to the food safety area, EU/post-Soviet countries’ co-operation on migration issues remained modest in both scope and depth until the early 2000s. Interestingly, a differentiation was sketched out between the PCAs signed with Ukraine and Moldova, on the one hand, and South Caucasus countries, on the other hand. Clearly, migration was not a priority in the agreements signed with Ukraine and Moldova. While focusing exclusively on the fight against irregular migration, these did not mention any specific provision or any obligation in this respect.25 Yet in the PCAs signed with both Armenia and Georgia, co-operation for the prevention and control of irregular immigration was singled out as ‘one of the primary objectives of the Agreement’ (Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, and Georgia 1999; Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, and the Republic of Armenia 1999). In addition, both agreements included legally binding commitments on readmission of nationals illegally present in the territory of the other side (article 72 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, and the Republic of Armenia 1999). This differentiation reflected the perception of South Caucasus countries as potential sources of threats to the EU.26 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 51 10/25/2016 10:27:25 AM 52 EU policies in the post-Soviet space In contrast, the ENP APs contained a similarly extensive list of requirements for all four countries.27 This expansion of EU requirements can be explained by three interwoven factors. First, a growing sense of urgency and public fears developed around the control of migration flows into the European Union in the 1990s, at a time when a borderless area emerged on the continent after the entry into force of the Convention implementing the Schengen agreement (Delcour 2013b). In this context, the forthcoming EU enlargement to Central European countries and the new borders that would result from it raised growing concerns in EU member states as to potentially increasing migration pressure. Irregular migration, in particular, was increasingly presented as a threat in member states’ policy narratives on migration (Vollmer 2011). Second, this perception (also fuelled by European media) gave impetus to coordination between EU member states’ policies and to increased European-level involvement in migration-related policy areas. Immigration and asylum, which emerged as matters of common interest under the Treaty of Maastricht, became a full Community responsibility with the Treaty of Amsterdam. This treaty also paved the way to the development of an external dimension for the EU’s migration policy by calling upon the establishment of an ‘area of freedom, security and justice in which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration’ (article 2, Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts 1997). This entailed creating effective common instruments on immigration, asylum and external borders (Title IV, articles 61–63, Treaty of Amsterdam 1997). Visa policy, i.e. determining the conditions under which a person can enter EU territory, rapidly emerged as a key instrument among these.28 Third, even before the ENP was launched, the EU gave a strong impetus to co-operation on justice and home affairs with its future neighbours, in particular Ukraine and the Russian Federation. The Action Plan on Justice and Home Affairs agreed upon between the EU and Ukraine in 2001 and its initial application29 served as a blueprint for EU-demanded reforms in the area, as reflected in the ENP AP concluded in 2005.30 Like DCFTAs, visa liberalisation is an essential element of the Eastern Partnership agenda. Partner countries, however, are not expected to comply with the full EU acquis that has developed in Justice and Home Affairs over the past decade, but rather to converge with a series of norms that either emanate from other international organisations or have been developed gradually as ad hoc tools and are agreed upon with partner countries (Hernández i Sagrera & Korneev 2012). This confirms that in the context of the ENP, approximation can be established on a basis other than EU norms (Barbé et al. 2009). Under the Eastern Partnership, visa policy follows a ‘phased approach, leading to visa liberalisation under specific conditions and with 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 52 10/25/2016 10:27:25 AM EU policies in the post-Soviet space 53 accompanying measures’ (European Commission 2008: 6). The EU has developed with Eastern Partnership countries a set of milestones toward visa liberalisation inspired both by the agenda developed with Russia (for visa facilitation and readmission agreements) and the Roadmaps concluded with the Western Balkans (for subsequent steps toward visa liberalisation). Eastern partners are first expected to sign visa facilitation and readmission agreements with the EU. While predating the Eastern Partnership, these agreements have indeed been incorporated in the EaP’s toolbox as the first milestone toward a visa-free regime (Delcour 2013b). EU incentives offered under visa facilitation agreements include simplified procedures and shorter delays for obtaining EU visas, reduced visa fees for short-stay visas (€35 instead of €60), as well as simplified criteria for multiple entry visas for certain categories of persons. Readmission agreements31 are the key policy tool to curb irregular migration originating from, or transiting through, partner countries (Trauner & Kruse 2008). They set out clear obligations and procedures for the authorities of partner countries as to when and how to take back people who are illegally residing in EU territory, be they citizens of their country, third country nationals or stateless persons (Delcour 2013b). The next steps of the visa liberalisation process involve the launch of a visa dialogue with a view to determining the conditions to be fulfilled to have the Schengen visa requirement lifted. These conditions are then spelt out in the VLAPs handed over by the European Commission to Eastern Partnership countries. EU requirements under the Eastern Partnership are inspired by the experience of visa liberalisation with the Western Balkans. As was the case during negotiations with Montenegro, Serbia and others, conditions are structured around four blocks: Document Security, Illegal Migration, Public Order and Security, and External Relations, with specific demands being detailed under each block. The Document Security Block includes requirements pertaining to the delivery of machine-readable biometric travel documents in compliance with EC standards but also to the conditions in which they are distributed. Under the Illegal Migration Block, EU requirements include an effectively implemented legal framework governing the movement of persons at the external borders as well as the organisation of border authorities, the admission and stay of third country nationals, and asylum; a monitoring system of migration flows and an effective expulsion mechanism for illegal residents; training for border guards, customs and other officials involved in border management; and relevant infrastructure at the external borders as well as for asylum seekers. Block 3, the Public Order and Security Block, specifies EU demands related to the prevention and fight of organised crime, terrorism and corruption, with corresponding strategies and 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 53 10/25/2016 10:27:25 AM 54 EU policies in the post-Soviet space legislation being effectively implemented; judicial co-operation in criminal matters, namely implementation of Council of Europe conventions, co-operation with EU Member States and working relations with EuroJust; law enforcement co-operation, and data protection. Finally, Block 4, the External Relations Block, encompasses conditions pertaining to freedom of movement and citizens’ rights, including anti-discrimination. In order to ensure compliance with its demands under the visa liberalisation process, the EU extensively relies upon gate-keeping, identified as the EU’s ‘most powerful conditionality tool’ during the enlargement process (Grabbe 2003: 316). Under the Eastern Partnership, VLAPs are divided into two phases: an adoption phase, during which partner countries have to approximate their legal framework with the EU’s requirements, and an implementation phase that requires approximated legislation to be properly enforced. For each phase, evaluation missions are conducted to assess the fulfilment of benchmarks in all four blocks. These missions involve experts from EU Member States accompanied by officials of the Commission services and the External Action Service. Accession to the second phase of the Visa Liberalisation Action Plan is based upon the recommendation of the European Commission. Like was the case for Western Balkans, the decision to introduce a visa-free regime should then be made by the Council and the European Parliament. However, as compared to the Western Balkans, gate-keeping has been significantly reinforced with the introduction of two phases under the VLAP. The scheme employed with EaP partners thus highlights a stronger reliance on conditionality, and accession to subsequent stages is more strictly monitored. This is because of the reluctance expressed by some member states to expand the visa-free regime to new countries.32 Therefore, whatever their source (either EU or international standards) may be, the scope of EU demands to be adopted as part of the visa liberalisation process is in fact massive, and the conditionality applied by the EU is more extensive than was the case in previous visa liberalisation processes. EU demands reflect a dual rationale. On the one hand, the emphasis on document security, effective border management and stricter migration regulation is meant to protect the EU from potential threats from the neighbourhood. On the other hand, in the EU’s narrative the inclusion of requirements related to good governance and human rights is expected to contribute to political transformations in EaP countries. Yet EU demands include socially and politically-sensitive areas for post-Soviet countries, not least the fight against corruption and anti-discrimination provisions. Therefore, as was the case for the food safety area, EU demands under the visa liberalisation process mirror potential tensions between the reliance on EU (and international) standards as transformative instruments and EaP countries’ preferences and context. 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 54 10/25/2016 10:27:25 AM EU policies in the post-Soviet space 55 Conclusions If anything, this brief overview of EU policies in the post-Soviet states highlights a continuous emphasis on regulatory convergence with EU acquis (Magen 2007) and functional co-operation (Lavenex 2008) to induce domestic change. This entails that EU demands for change did not emerge abruptly with the ENP (Delcour 2007). Rather, they were shaped, altered or expanded incrementally as a result of a changing context in the EU (i.e. a growing foreign policy and security profile, an enlarged Union) and enhanced interactions with post-Soviet countries. This is also because the ENP (like many other EU policies) has not developed by substitution but rather by aggregation. At least initially, it has not replaced the existing EU policy framework and instruments (i.e. the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements [PCA], the TACIS assistance programme, sectoral agreements and action plans), but rather proceeded by pursuing this framework and adding yet another layer of tools. Thus, the neighbourhood policy has not only built upon an institutional framework designed after the collapse of the USSR in relations between post-Soviet countries and the EU, but also on habits and socialisation elements embedded in those relations. Yet as compared to earlier EU policies, the ENP has harboured much stronger EU ambitions to act as a driver for reforms in post-Soviet countries with the view to turning the region into a more stable and prosperous area. Therefore, despite elements of continuity and overlaps between policy frameworks and instruments, closer scrutiny of EU policies reveals substantial shifts. With the ENP, the EU has not only stepped up its role as a driver for reforms through a more extensive diffusion of its rules, it has also attempted to increase the congruence between its role as a promoter of domestic change and the projection of its political and security interests in its neighbourhood. Nevertheless, it has failed to offer tangible rewards in return for partner countries’ reforms. This has only been compounded by the fuzziness of EU conditionality in the early ENP years. While falling short of offering a membership perspective and failing to clarify the ENP’s finalité, the EaP offers more tangible rewards in the form of enhanced contractual frameworks, increased market access and easier mobility. Yet it also significantly increases the costs to be borne upfront by partner countries. This is due both to the wholesale diffusion of EU acquis in those sectors where the EU offers rewards and the introduction of ex-ante, sector-specific conditionality. The evolution of EU policy mechanisms in the neighbourhood raises two sets of issues. First, the EU’s reliance on technocratic, functional forms of co-operation (Lavenex 2008) poses the challenge of its potential for influence in the post-Soviet space. In other words, to what extent does the EU’s focus on regulatory convergence and sectoral policy change translate into foreign policy influence? This question is especially salient in light of the presence of alternative poles of influence in the region, primarily Russia, whose policy approaches and toolbox sharply differ (see Chapter 4). Second, the systematic export of EU standards and rules also raises key questions in terms of the EU’s acquis’ capacity to act as a blueprint for development in postSoviet countries, in other words the extent to which the EU can exert a transformative power on post-Soviet countries. Ultimately, the EU’s extensive reliance on the acquis as a foreign policy instrument questions the critical connections between its 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 55 10/25/2016 9:57:04 AM 56 EU policies in the post-Soviet space ‘inherited patrimony’ and ‘unique genetic code’ (Magen 2007: 392), on the one hand, and its transformative power beyond its borders, on the other hand. Therefore, while the reinforcement of EU rewards and policy mechanisms under the EaP is expected to result in enhanced compliance with EU demands (in line with the Europeanisation literature), the discrepancy between the acquis and partner countries’ context may actually hinder the adoption and application of EU templates. This calls for an in-depth analysis of both partner countries’ responses to the EU’s offer of integration (Chapter 5) and key domestic and regional factors behind their varying receptivity in the sectors selected for analysis (Chapters 6 and 7). Notes 1 ‘Will Russia, remembering the pre-communist period, gather its forces to aggregate the ensemble and act as a tutor or as a monitor? There is an additional difficulty: where should Russia or this post-Soviet Union, which belong altogether to Europe and to another world, be placed?’ (Delors 1992: 173, translated from French by the author). 2 See, for instance, article 50 (Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and the Republic of Moldova): ‘The Republic of Moldova shall endeavour to ensure that its legislation will be gradually made compatible with that of the Community’. 3 Following the entry into force of the PCA, TACIS became more tightly linked to the broader political framework of relations. The programme was used as a channel to serve the purposes of the agreements, and conditionality foreseen under the PCA was applied under TACIS, for instance, in 2000 following Russian military intervention in Chechnya (Delcour 2001). 4 The European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument (ENPI)’s financial envelope totalled €11.2 billion for the period 2007–2013, i.e. an increase of 32 per cent compared with the amount available over the period 2000–06 for the MEDA and TACIS programmes. European Commission, EuropeAid, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/funding/ european-neighbourhood-and-partnership-instrument-enpi_en (accessed 15 April 2016). 5 Annexes to the Association Agreements specify the timeframe for the implementation of EU-approximated legislation (for instance, up to seven years in the case of Moldova). Annexes of Title IV – Economic and other Sector Cooperation (EU-Moldova Association Agreement 2013). 6 In this research, I use the term ‘approximation’ understood as ‘approximation/ convergence’. 7 Author’s interview, European Commission, DG Trade, Brussels, October 2011. 8 For instance, the PCA signed with Ukraine provides that ‘The Parties shall also aim at the gradual approximation of Ukrainian standards to Community technical regulations concerning industrial and agricultural food products including sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards’. Article 60 (Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, and Ukraine 1994). 9 Besides accession to, and implementation of, international agreements related to SPS and food safety, these included an assessment of the sanitary and phyto-sanitary control systems, especially at the borders; the preparation of a comprehensive list of measures for gradual convergence toward EU principles of hygiene in food processing; increased convergence of food law with EU food safety principles and EU general foodstuff labelling requirements; the fulfilment of EU requirements on animal health and for the processing of animal products; and the national reference laboratories in the sanitary and phyto-sanitary sectors (Delcour 2013a). 10 Georgia joined the WTO on 14 June 2000, followed by Moldova on 26 July 2001 and Armenia on 5 February 2003. Ukraine joined on 16 May 2008 after a negotiation process of almost 15 years. 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 56 10/25/2016 9:57:05 AM EU policies in the post-Soviet space 57 11 Article 64 (EU-Ukraine Association Agreement 2014); Article 55 (EU-Georgia Association Agreement 2013); Article 181 (EU-Moldova Association Agreement 2013). 12 In contrast to the agreement with Ukraine, the texts signed with Moldova and Georgia explicitly indicate that approximation is a gradual process. The agreement concluded with Georgia further underlines that approximation with EU legislation in the food safety area has already started. ‘Ukraine shall approximate its sanitary and phytosanitary and animal welfare legislation to that of the EU as set out in Annex V to this Agreement’, Article 64 (EU-Ukraine Association Agreement 2014). ‘Georgia shall continue to gradually approximate its sanitary and phytosanitary, animal welfare and other legislative measures as laid down in Annex IV to this Agreement to that of the Union’, Article 55 (EU-Georgia Association Agreement 2013); ‘the Republic of Moldova shall gradually approximate its sanitary and phytosanitary and animal welfare law to that of the Union as set out in Annex XXIV to this Agreement’, Article 181 (EU-Moldova Association Agreement 2013). 13 Author’s interviews, DG SANCO and DG TRADE, Brussels, October 2012. 14 Negotiations took place between 2008 and 2011. Author’s interview, EU Delegation to Ukraine, Kyiv, April 2012. 15 In all three countries, the preparations took place at the end of 2010 and throughout 2011. Negotiations were launched early 2012, first with Georgia and Moldova, then with Armenia. They were completed mid-2013 with all three countries. Author’s interviews, EU High-Level Advisory Group to the Republic of Armenia, Yerevan, November 2011; EU Delegation to Georgia, Tbilisi, November 2011; EU Delegation to Moldova, Chişinău, May 2012. 16 Regulation (EC) No. 852/2004 on the hygiene of foodstuffs; Regulation (EC) No. 853/2004 laying down specific hygiene rules for food of animal origin in order to guarantee a high level of food safety and public health; Regulation (EC) No. 854/2004 putting in place a Community framework of official controls on products of animal origin intended for human consumption. 17 This regulation sets out ‘food safety requirements’ (in particular, that food shall not be placed on the market if it is unsafe, as per article 14); imposes general responsibilities on business operators and states, who must ensure that food and feed satisfy the law’s requirement (article 17); sets out further responsibilities of food business operators regarding withdrawal of food that does not comply with food safety requirements (article 19); and makes provision for the traceability of food, feed and foodproducing animals at all stages of production, processing and distribution (article 18). 18 Author’s interview, European Commission, DG SANCO, Brussels, October 2012. 19 E.g. Council Directive 2001/110/EEC, OJ L 010 of 12.01.2002 on honey; Council Directive 2001/112/EEC, OJ L 010 of 12.01.2002 on fruit juice; Council Directive 2001/114/EC of 20 December 2001 relating to certain partly or wholly dehydrated preserved milk for human consumption OJ L 15 of 17 January 2002. 20 EU-Moldova Association Agreement, Annex XXIV. 21 Author’s interviews, DG SANCO, Brussels, October 2012. 22 Author’s interviews: trade officer, EU Delegation to Georgia, Tbilisi, November 2011; European Commission, DG SANCO, Brussels, October 2012. 23 The procedure implies that Eastern Partnership countries can circumscribe their approximation efforts to those sectors for which they are interested to export to the EU, since equivalence is granted on the basis of a request by the exporting party and can take the form of either an individual measure, a group of measures or application to a sector. Article 66 (EU-Ukraine Association Agreement 2014). 24 The Association Agreements provide the EU with exclusive powers to assess whether food products from Eastern Partnership countries can be imported to its market: ‘the recognition, suspension or withdrawal of equivalence rests solely with the importing Party acting in accordance with its administrative and legislative framework’. Article 66.8 (EU-Ukraine Association Agreement 2014). 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 57 10/25/2016 9:57:05 AM 58 EU policies in the post-Soviet space 25 Article 27 of the EU-Ukraine Partnership and Cooperation Agreement provides that ‘The Co-operation Council shall examine which joint efforts can be made to control illegal immigration taking into account the principle and practice of readmission.’ (Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, and Ukraine 1998). A similar provision is included in the article 26 of the EU-Moldova PCA (Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, and the Republic of Moldova 1998). 26 In the PCAs with South Caucasus countries, irregular migration is subsumed within a broader title on co-operation on prevention of illegal activities, such as money laundering or drug smuggling. 27 For instance, co-operation in the field of justice, freedom and security (in particular, migration and border management) is singled out as a priority in the ENP AP with Georgia. EU requirements include the preparation of a border management strategy, enhanced border management reforms (through a budget increase and a reform of the Ministry of Interior), as well as the establishment of a dialogue with the EU on readmission. 28 In 2001, for the first time the EU established a list covering requirements for Schengen visas (Council of the European Union 2001). 29 In November 2002, the first EU-Ukraine Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) ministerial meeting prioritised readmission, migration and border management. 30 ‘Cooperation in the field of Justice and Home Affairs in the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy will be based on this Action Plan’ (EU-Ukraine ENP Action Plan 2005). 31 As a result of a successful linkage first operated by Russia when negotiating with the EU and then replicated with ENP partner countries, in the EU’s policy toolbox, readmission agreements are combined with visa facilitation schemes (Trauner & Kruse 2008: 11). 32 Author’s interview, Head of EU Delegation to Moldova, Chişinău, May 2012. 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Implementation without Coordination: The Impact of EU Conditionality on Ukraine under the European Neighbourhood Policy. Europe-Asia Studies, 61(2), pp. 187–211. 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 61 10/25/2016 9:57:05 AM 4 Russia’s (counter-)actions in the post-Soviet space Power without influence? While Russia’s policies toward the four selected countries (like those of the EU) have significantly evolved over the past two decades, the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) have consistently ranked high up the list of Russian foreign policy priorities, as illustrated by the successive foreign policy concepts of the Russian Federation. As indicated in the 2000 foreign policy concept, bilateral and multilateral co-operation with CIS countries is key to achieving the security objectives of the Russian Federation, in particular with the view to ‘forming a good-neighbour belt along the perimeter of Russia’s borders, to promoting the elimination of the existing, and preventing the emergence of potential hotbeds of tension and conflicts in regions adjacent to the Russian Federation’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2000). Interestingly, Russia’s narrative on the objectives pursued in its neighbourhood is largely similar (both in wording and substance) to the discourse developed by the EU a few years later, upon the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy. The EU’s ambition to create a ‘ring of friends’ with the ENP (Prodi 2002) echoes the formation of a ‘good-neighbour belt’ around Russia. Likewise, both actors prioritise stability and security as their overarching objectives in adjacent areas. However, the way in which both actors exert influence in their neighbourhood substantially differs. The European Neighbourhood Policy is premised upon the institutional extension of functional co-operation to neighbouring countries (Lavenex 2008; Freyburg et al. 2011). In other words, the EU exerts influence through sector-specific co-operation, conditionality and socialisation. This is because in the EU’s perspective, sectoral reforms are conducive to economic modernisation and democratic governance. In contrast, Russia’s policies in the post-Soviet space have long displayed a much weaker degree of institutionalisation (Ademmer 2015: 673). This is because Russia relied extensively upon the multifaceted interdependencies inherited from the common Soviet past – even though the creation of the Eurasian Customs Union (ECU), upgraded to a Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in early 2015, is a noticeable shift in terms of Russia’s policy approach to the post-Soviet space. Therefore, while CIS countries were identified as a priority right after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 1993) and have remained at the top of the Russian foreign policy 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 62 10/25/2016 9:57:05 AM Russia’s (counter-) actions 63 agenda ever since, Russia’s policy toolbox and its overall influence in the region have gone through major changes. This chapter traces the evolution of Russia’s policies toward the post-Soviet space (and in particular the four selected countries) over the past two decades. While in the 1990s Russia’s actions were fraught with contradictions, thereby resulting in a rather haphazard dominance of the region (first section of the chapter), in the 2000s the country started using regional links as leverage to either support or pressure post-Soviet countries depending upon their perceived loyalty to Russia (second section). The creation of the ECU in 2010 only reinforced the strategic use of regional interdependences: in recent years, Russia has employed these in connection to post-Soviet countries’ (potential) participation in the Eurasian integration project. Haphazard dominance after the break-up of the Soviet Union In the early 1990s, bilateral and multilateral co-operation with members of the CIS emerged as a priority for Russian foreign policy. This is because these countries were regarded as pivotal for Russia’s national security: Ensuring the correspondence of the multilateral and bilateral co-operation with the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States with the tasks of the national security of the country is the priority line of the foreign policy of Russia. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 1993) Therefore, starting with the USSR’s collapse, Russia’s policy vis-à-vis former Soviet republics has been premised upon a vision in which Russia’s security is tightly interwoven with the fate of these countries. The concept of ‘near abroad’ coined by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1993 mirrors the ambiguous relationship developed by Russia with newly sovereign countries of the postSoviet space (some of whom had never been independent prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union). This is tightly linked with the equivocal properties that underpin Russia’s space – a ‘boundless’ space with ‘great polyperipheries’ (Medvedev 1999: 17) that (in Russia’s perspective) retain connections to the (former) centre. On the one hand, Russia recognises the sovereignty of these countries; on the other hand, it regards them as an area of privileged interests where Russia has a special role to play. For some, this denotes an ‘imperial syndrome’ (Lo 2002: 48). Nevertheless (and this is by no means contradictory), Russia’s attitude toward its ‘near abroad’ can also be regarded as defensive. In this vein, Russia’s policies would primarily reflect fear of encirclement by enemies and ‘encroachment by alien powers’ (Valovaya 2005) close to Russian borders. Yet, while CIS countries were identified as a key priority for the Russian Federation, in the 1990s the narrative about Russia’s special role did not translate into a consistent, assertive and far-sighted policy. In fact, Russia’s leverage in 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 63 10/25/2016 9:57:05 AM 64 Russia’s (counter-) actions the post-Soviet space was severely constrained by two factors. First, its capacity to act internationally was severely affected by its hectic internal transformation process in the years that followed the Soviet Union’s collapse. Second, throughout the decade, Russia lacked a conceptual and operational toolbox to develop interstate relations with other post-Soviet republics after decades or centuries of common history as part of the Russian Empire or the USSR (Lo 2002: 73). In essence, the Russian authorities had no clear strategy for the region, and no consensus emerged about it among the political elite (Lo 2002: 75). Therefore, the Russian Federation’s policy in the post-Soviet space was fraught with contradictions (Kuznetsova 2005) and ‘bolted from one extremity to another’ (Valovaya 2005). Overall, throughout the 1990s, policy contradictions resulted in Russia’s passive dominance in the post-Soviet space. Russia’s power derived primarily from interdependences (whether economic, geopolitical or societal) inherited from the past. Therefore, to a large extent, Russia was able to exert influence by nonaction, i.e. by preserving the links rooted in the Soviet period. For instance, by maintaining a visa-free regime, it was able to attract workers from all over the post-Soviet space. Likewise, the fact that post-Soviet leaders shared a common political culture and ‘spoke the same language’ (Valovaya 2005) constituted a resource upon which Russia was able to build, either in bilateral or multilateral frameworks. However, on some other occasions, Russia’s policy was more ambiguous, as was the case for trade. During Soviet times, the economic production of federal republics (whether Ukraine’s agricultural products, Moldovan wine or Caucasian fruits and vegetables) was directed to the centre and ‘harnessed to Soviet political priorities’ (Wallander & Legvold 2004: 14). To a large degree, these deep economic interdependences persisted after the collapse of the USSR, despite disruptions caused by the Soviet break-up and the conflicts in the 1990s. Yet trade offers an interesting illustration of Russia’s chaotic policy. On the one hand, Russia contributed to preserving interdependences and, in fact, to locking post-Soviet countries into a deep and multifaceted dependence on Russia. For instance, it continued subsidising energy prices, thereby preventing the diversification of post-Soviet countries’ energy supplies. On the other hand, Russia itself contributed to undermining economic links by introducing trade measures meant to protect its own market: after studying the EU’s and Russia’s policies vis-à-vis Ukraine in the automotive sector, Langbein (2016) shows that Russia compromised trade linkages with Ukraine for the sake of protecting its own industry. Therefore, both the nature and extent of Russia’s engagement in the post-Soviet space hinged crucially on its (perceived) own interests (whether the state’s or powerful business actors’). Yet Russia’s engagement in regional conflicts highlights inconsistencies in the definition of foreign policy interests. As noted above, the 1993 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation emphasises the importance of CIS countries in ensuring Russia’s national security. It further stresses the need to develop ‘good neighbouring relations’ with these countries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 1993). Accordingly, Russia 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 64 10/25/2016 9:57:05 AM Russia’s (counter-) actions 65 played a pivotal role in both the conflicts that erupted between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as in Georgia and Moldova’s breakaway regions, and the ceasefires that put an end to the hostilities. However, Russia’s role is at best ambiguous. In fact, Russia was both judge and jury in the conflicts: it supported the breakaway regions of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh when these fought against the central authorities of Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan, respectively. At the same time, in a context characterised by the weak security involvement of other external actors in the region, Russia was central in brokering the deals that brought armed hostilities to a conclusion (but did not solve the conflicts) and in providing peacekeepers. In essence, Russia’s actions sent two signals to the governments in Tbilisi, Chişinău and Baku: first, Russia’s capacity to undermine their territorial integrity and power to determine the costs to be borne for reintegrating the breakaway regions, and second, Russia’s monopoly over the mediation of conflicts in the region. The status quo (i.e. the end of active hostilities combined with the persistence of conflict situations) thus provided Russia with powerful leverage over Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan – three countries that, like Ukraine,1 were eager to assert their newly-acquired sovereignty and counterbalance Russia’s influence. In the 1990s these countries and Ukraine adopted a critical stance vis-à-vis attempts at further integration in the post-Soviet space that, in their view, would inevitably result in a new era of Russian domination. In particular, they did not sign the 1995 Minsk agreement on the joint protection of external borders and opposed the presence of Russian borderguards at their borders (Radvanyi 2010: 196) with the view to preserving their sovereignty, as clearly indicated by the Ukrainian president Kuchma: ‘We understand that if there are external borders and no internal borders [within the CIS], there will be no Ukrainian state, there will be one state only’. (Kuchma news conference, Radio Ukraine World Service, 29 May 1995, quoted in Brzezinski & Sullivan 1997: 282). At the CIS summit held in Chişinău in October 1997, the Ukrainian, Georgian, Moldovan and Azerbaijani presidents harshly criticised Russia’s policy in the breakaway regions of the post-Soviet space; in particular, they condemned Russia’s use of peacekeeping forces as an instrument to increase its leverage over the countries concerned (Radvanyi 2010: 200). Therefore, Russia’s policy of ‘managed instability’ (defined as an artificially created instability subsequently managed by Russia, Kuznetsova 2005) yielded results in the short-term, but ran against the country’s own long-term interests (Kuznetsova 2005), be they defined in terms of influence or security. Russia’s policies only contributed to feeding tensions close to its own borders and undermined its credibility and influence in the countries concerned. As argued by Serrano in the case of Georgia (Serrano 2007: 94), Russia’s attempts to destabilise Georgia (either by supporting separatisms or directly intervening across Georgia’s borders) de facto replaced a strategy to effectively exert influence over the country in the long term, even though it was effective in the short-term. In this context, it is perhaps unsurprising that resistance to CIS integration and criticism of Russia’s policies by Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and Azerbaijan were increasingly 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 65 10/25/2016 9:57:05 AM 66 Russia’s (counter-) actions combined with an explicit desire for closer links with the West, even if for different reasons. The establishment of the GUAM as a consultative forum in 1997, and especially its transformation into a regional organisation named ‘GUUAM – Organisation for Democracy and Economic Development’ in 2001,2 provides perhaps the best illustration of this tight connection. Therefore, in the decade that followed the break-up of the Soviet Union, Russia’s foreign policy remained in essence reactive (Lo 2002: 83; Serrano 2007: 93) in that it lacked a clear vision for the new links to be developed with other post-Soviet countries. Russia sought to preserve its role as a patron in the region, yet acted on an ad hoc basis based on a ‘lengthy experience with managed instability’ (Kuznetsova 2005) and hence failed to develop the premises of a long-term, mutually beneficial relationship. ‘Friend or foe’: (geo)political loyalty as a guiding principle of Russia’s foreign policy Russia’s policy toward Eastern European and South Caucasian countries, especially Georgia and Ukraine, substantially changed in the early 2000s. While it had been fraught with inconsistencies in the 1990s, it gained coherence after Vladimir Putin came to power. Russian policy toward its neighbours was re-contextualised within the broader picture of a more assertive Russia in the international arena in connection with impressive economic growth resulting from a surge in oil prices. In Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus, Russia started using regional links rooted in the common Soviet past as leverage to either support or pressure post-Soviet countries, depending upon their perceived loyalty to Russia. Yet again this policy was reactive rather than proactive. It came in response to major shifts in the post-Soviet space, i.e. the eastward enlargements of NATO and the European Union and the eagerness of domestic elites in several post-Soviet countries for closer links with the West. Despite the sheer variety behind post-Soviet countries’ motivations for enhancing relations with the EU, the US and NATO, as well as the different degrees of integration sought with Western structures, Russia regarded these attempts at closer links with the West overall as a threat to its interests in the post-Soviet space. However, its response varied depending upon the perceived loyalty of post-Soviet states to Russia. In both Georgia and Ukraine, the new elites who gained power in the wake of the ‘Colour Revolutions’ did not only come to power with an agenda for domestic reforms and democratisation. They also pursued new foreign policy orientations and prioritised integration with Western security and economic organisations. The Rose Revolution in Georgia at the end of 2003 was instrumental in raising Russia’s concern over a loss of influence in the post-Soviet space (Horvath 2011). Russia’s exasperation only grew in the following years. While the newly elected president Saakashvili paid his first visit abroad to the Russian Federation, tensions soon developed between the two countries over the two breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as the Georgian president 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 66 10/25/2016 9:57:05 AM Russia’s (counter-) actions 67 made the restoration of the country’s territorial integrity a priority. In addition, Saakashvili’s declared ambitions to join the European Union and especially NATO became a major irritant for the Russian authorities. Therefore, between 2004 and 2008, Russia used the manifold ties inherited from the Soviet era to scale up pressure on the Georgian authorities with the view to hindering integration with Western structures (Delcour & Wolczuk 2015). For example, Russian passports were systematically offered to citizens of Abkhazia and South Ossetia with the view to further undermining Georgia’s territorial integrity (pasportizatsiya). In 2006, trade and migration flows were disrupted in the aftermath of a diplomatic crisis between the two countries. Russia banned the import of Georgian wines, water and vegetables and introduced a blockade of transport connections between Moscow and Tbilisi. Moreover, while Russia had already introduced visa requirements for Georgian citizens (an exception in the postSoviet space) in 2001, in the wake of the 2006 espionage controversy the Russian authorities substantially strengthened administrative controls over Georgian migrants living in Russia and deported a significant number of Georgians. Ultimately, Russia intervened militarily a few months after the NATO Bucharest summit agreed that Georgia would become a NATO member (even though the summit did not provide the country with a Membership Action Plan). However, Russia’s disincentives had a limited impact on Georgia’s foreign policy. While the 2008 war seemed to bring integration with NATO to a halt, many of the measures introduced by Russia contributed to eroding the links between the two countries, therefore depriving Russia of its leverage over Georgia. For instance, the trade bans introduced in 2006 prompted a diversification of Georgia’s trade flows. The Orange Revolution in Ukraine only exacerbated Moscow’s irritation on the subversive role of Western democracy promotion policies (Delcour & Wolczuk 2015). It was also interpreted in Moscow as a further move away from postSoviet integration. As noted above, since the break-up of the Soviet Union, Ukraine’s engagement in regional schemes had indeed been highly selective. In fact, Ukraine has been primarily interested in cooperating with other post-Soviet countries on trade (Dragneva & Wolczuk 2014: 226) and therefore entered the CIS Free-Trade Area in 1994 and the Common Economic Space (consisting also of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan) in 2003. However, Ukraine has fiercely resisted political integration within the post-Soviet space. This resistance only increased after the 2004 shift of power. Therefore, the Orange Revolution resulted ‘in the dis-synchronization of Ukraine’s integration with the EU and economic cooperation within the CIS area’ (Dragneva & Wolczuk 2014: 214). However, keeping Ukraine in its sphere of influence has been a major foreign policy objective for Russia ever since the Soviet Union collapsed. This is because of two interconnected factors: Ukraine’s size and strategic location, and close historical links that fuelled Russia’s ‘difficulties with accepting Ukraine’s sovereignty ( . . . ) and doubts regarding the legitimacy and viability of an independent Ukraine’ (Wolczuk 2004: 10). 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 67 10/25/2016 9:57:05 AM 68 Russia’s (counter-) actions In the years that followed the Orange Revolution, tensions between the Russian authorities and the new Ukrainian administration developed around energy issues. Ukraine was highly vulnerable to shifts in Russian energy policy because of a combination of factors. Low gas prices were critical for the country to recover from the 1990s economic recession (Wolczuk 2016: 119), and the country turned into the single biggest importer of Russian gas in the first half of the 2000s (Pirani et al. 2009: 5); at the same time, it had accumulated a huge debt vis-à-vis Gazprom, the details of which were a point of contention between Ukraine and Russia. In a 2005 vote the Russian Duma decided that CIS countries that had benefitted from lower gas prices (i.e. $50–80/mcm) since the 1990s should start paying European prices for Russian gas supplies (Stern 2006: 5). The price increase, however, was enacted only with those countries regarded as unfriendly. At the end of 2005, Ukraine rejected Gazprom’s demand to pay European prices ($230/mcm) for Russian gas by early 2006 and instead asked for a gradual adjustment of energy prices. In response, Gazprom interrupted gas deliveries to Ukraine. While the agreement that brought the dispute to an end did not raise prices for Ukraine up to the European level, it strengthened Russia’s positions in several other respects, such as lower transit fees as compared to Europe (Pirani et al. 2009: 8–9). Yet this first ‘gas crisis’ had important repercussions on relations with the EU. This is because the halting of deliveries to Ukraine (a key transit country for the supply of Russian gas to the EU) also resulted in disrupting supplies to Europe and thereby tarnished Russia’s reputation as a reliable supplier. The damage to Russia’s reputation was only compounded by the 2009 crisis, during which Russia completely cut off gas deliveries to Ukraine and European supplies through the Ukrainian transit network (Pirani et al. 2009: 61). Therefore, despite the fact that the immediate solution to the crisis was in Russia’s favour (with Ukraine paying higher prices for Russian gas3), the severe damage caused to several South-Eastern EU member states triggered the EU’s involvement in the crisis (although not from the beginning). Ultimately, the growing EU interest in alternative energy suppliers runs against Russia’s interests, even if such diversification of supplies is likely to occur only in the long-term. Therefore, ironically, Russia’s pressure over (what it saw) as an unfriendly regime did not have any significant effect (from Russia’s perspective) over Ukrainian domestic politics and foreign policy, but resulted (even if unintentionally) in a growing Western engagement (via the EU) in regional energy issues and damaged Russia’s bilateral energy partnership with the EU. In contrast to Ukraine and Georgia, in some other post-Soviet countries the quest for closer links with the West was disconnected from any change of power and any attempt at democratisation. This was the case with Moldova. As indicated in the above section, like Ukraine and Georgia, Moldova had been reluctant to engage fully in regional integration initiatives in the 1990s. In the early 2000s, they welcomed growing Western engagement (especially from the EU) as an opportunity to countervail Russia’s leverage. Moldova (then led by the communist president, Vladimir Voronin) increasingly sought to balance Russia’s influence by developing a long-term partnership with Moscow and simultaneously seeking 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 68 10/25/2016 9:57:05 AM Russia’s (counter-) actions 69 integration with the EU. The foreign policy concept prepared by the Communist administration in 2002 offers an illustration of this strategy: it both elevated Russia to the status of a long-term strategic partner and prioritised membership in the EU (Weiner 2004: 544). Moldova’s case suggests that Russia’s use of punitive measures was not limited to the countries that experienced ‘Colour’ revolutions but extended to those countries resisting Moscow’s grip (even if not fully aligning with the West). While in the early 2000s the country pursued a balanced foreign policy between Russia and the West, the failure of the Russiansponsored settlement mechanism for the Transnistrian conflict at the end of 2003 was a blow to Russia. Ultimately, under pressure from the US and the EU (Weiner 2004), President Voronin decided not to ratify the so-called Kozak memorandum that foresaw Moldova’s neutrality, Russia’s military presence and the establishment of an asymmetric federation with competences being split between the federation and two ‘subjects’, among which was Transnistria (Vahl & Emerson 2004). This decision prompted the introduction of trade bans and the increasing use of Transnistria as a pressure point over Moldova. Following the rejection of the Kozak memorandum, Russia stopped withdrawing her troops from the Transnistrian region (Wolff 2012). Moreover, it increasingly used the complex energy interdependencies between Chişinău, Tiraspol and Moscow to pressure Moldova. Being dependent on Russia for energy imports, Moldova had indeed accumulated a huge debt vis-à-vis Gazprom. Yet as compared to some other post-Soviet countries, the problem was compounded by the fact that the bulk of this debt originated from Transnistrian energy imports.4 While settling the accounts is a difficult task, Gazprom’s decision to stop subsidising Transnistrian gas in 2000 (Hughes & Sasse 2014: 114) de facto placed Moldova in a complex situation, as Chişinău had to balance between an economic rationale (i.e. pay for its own debt only) and a political rationale (i.e. considering that Transnistria is an integral part of Moldova, to cover its debt). Russia also increased the pressure on Moldova by introducing punitive trade measures. Like in Georgia, this was meant as a clear signal of Russia’s potential for destabilisation if the country were to continue to forge an autonomous path away from Russia’s grip. As was the case in Georgia, Russia introduced in 2006 a wine ban on similar grounds of containing harmful substances and counterfeiting quality certificates. This was potentially damaging for Moldova where 200,000 workers work in the wine sector and wine makes up to 30 per cent of exports, with Russia being a major market (Tolstrup 2009: 938). In addition, Russia also imposed bans on products of plant and animal origin for short periods of time (Popa 2015: 7). However, Russia’s policies had a limited impact and even triggered counterproductive (from Russia’s perspective) effects. For instance, trade bans led to a reduction in trade flows between the two countries5 and prompted a diversification (even if more limited than in Georgia6) of Moldovan exports away from Russia. As compared to Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova, Armenia’s motivations in seeking closer links with the West were to a large extent different. Unlike the three other countries, Armenia had taken part in all Russian-led regional initiatives in the post-Soviet area, especially (given the geopolitical context of the 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 69 10/25/2016 9:57:05 AM 70 Russia’s (counter-) actions country) security schemes such as the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). However, at the initiative of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Vartan Oskanian, the country also sought to develop a diplomacy of complementarity between its multifaceted alliance with Russia, on the one hand, and partnerships with the West, on the other hand: Rather than portraying each other as accessories of the South or the North, as allies of the East or the West, or as each other’s adversaries and competitors, let us instead define ourselves and mold our policies in the spirit of multidimensional partnerships, in the direction of complementarity. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia 2000) Therefore, in contrast to Georgia and Ukraine, Armenia did not seek to pursue a pro-Western orientation and to limit Russia’s influence. Unlike Moldova, it did not give equal weight (even if only in its foreign policy strategy) to Russia and the West. Rather, it tried to develop new partnerships with NATO, the EU and Western countries with the view to opening up new opportunities and complementing its alliance with Russia, the latter remaining pivotal. As explained by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Vartan Oskanian: The complementarity policy is not a policy of balance. A policy of balance requires that what you do with one try to do equally the same with the other so that you create a balance. Complementarity gives us the opportunity to have an asymmetrical relation with two different powers. (Centre for Strategic and International Studies 2004: 15) As Armenia kept prioritising its ‘special relationship’ with Moscow, the evolution of the country’s foreign policy toward complementarity was not (at least not initially) regarded by Russia as a threat. Therefore, in contrast to Georgia, Ukraine and to a lesser extent Moldova, where it sought to destabilise (what it perceived as) unfriendly regimes, in Armenia, Russia conducted a policy of ‘managed stability’ (Tolstrup 2009). It intervened both directly and indirectly to back the ruling regime and reinforce its control over the country’s economy in exchange for its role as a security guarantor. Since the early 2000s, Russia’s military presence in Armenia (with the 102nd military base located in Gyumri and an airbase at Yerevan’s Erebuni Airport) has only strengthened. In 2010, Armenia agreed to extend until 2044 the lease on the Gyumri base, which is home to S-300 anti-aircraft missiles and Mikoyan MiG-29 fighters and where approximately 3,000 Russian soldiers are stationed. While offering protection to Armenia, this increasingly close co-operation is also key for Russia to buttress its influence in the South Caucasus. Russia has also sought to extend its grip over the country’s economy by taking over major Armenian assets in the energy, transportation and telecommunication sectors7 and by offering lower gas rates if Yerevan cedes additional assets (Morel 2008). However, while Russia’s acquisition of major assets only heightened Armenia’s dependence by extending it to key economic 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 70 10/25/2016 9:57:05 AM Russia’s (counter-) actions 71 sectors, the Kremlin’s support for the ruling regime contributed to undermining Russia’s image among the Armenian population as it became increasingly associated with unpopular governments (Mirzoyan 2010: 52). Overall, Russia’s management of its newly-acquired assets indicated that it prioritised its own interests at the expense of Armenia’s development (McGinnity 2010; for a similar analysis on Ukraine, see Langbein 2016).This fuelled the growing perception of a ‘colonial and unequal relationship’ (Mirzoyan 2010: 53). Therefore, in the mid-2000s a pro-Russian orientation (or ‘pro-Russianness’, Kobrinskaya 2004) became the overarching principle guiding Russia’s diplomacy in the post-Soviet space. Russia started using strategically the broad array of interdependences inherited from the Soviet period, with energy, trade and security emerging as foreign policy tools to ‘secure’ pro-Russianness in Armenia (even if by exerting pressure) and to retaliate against a pro-Western orientation in the three other selected countries. However, in spite of the multifaceted and often deep interdependences binding post-Soviet countries to the core of the former empire, Russia’s sectoral measures had a limited impact. They did not succeed in reversing the foreign policy orientation of Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova nor, as in the case of Armenia, in broadening the country’s pro-Russianness beyond its current foundation in security concerns and regime survival. Arguably, Russia lacked a longterm project that could help to cement ties and attract post-Soviet countries. The ECU/EAEU: economic vehicle or countervailing instrument? The Eurasian project that was launched in 2010 was meant to bridge this gap and serve as a driver of integration for post-Soviet republics. However, its first years of existence have revealed tensions between the economic and (geo-) political rationales underpinning Eurasian integration (Zagorski 2015). The ECU was presented as yet another example of a (potentially successful) regional trade bloc created in the context of the global economic crisis with a view to identifying new sources of growth and helping modernise member states’ economies (Putin 2011). However, it developed primarily as a reactive integration process (Bordachev & Skriba 2014: 19), i.e. a (geo-)political instrument used by Russia to counter the EU’s growing influence in its eastern neighbourhood. In essence, the creation of the ECU mirros a shift in Russia’s attitude to regional integration in the post-Soviet space. In the 2000s, the Russian authorities understood that ‘great powers do not dissolve in some other integration projects, but forge their own’ (Bordachev & Skriba 2014: 17) and therefore started seeing integration projects as a foreign policy tool. As a result, in contrast to previous projects, Russia was prepared to incur the costs of regional integration as it serves its own foreign policy objectives (Vinokurov 2007). Therefore, regional integration and the defence of Russia’s interests became conflated in Russian authorities’ view. However, this twofold objective could not be achieved in the framework of the existing regional structures, especially the CIS. True, the CIS had contributed to preserving links among post-Soviet countries after 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 71 10/25/2016 9:57:05 AM 72 Russia’s (counter-) actions the collapse of the USSR. Like its predecessors, the Eurasian integration project was intended to prevent further disintegration between countries that were still tied together (Vinokurov & Libman 2012a). In an article presenting his views on Eurasian integration, Vladimir Putin clearly posited continuity between the ECU and all the regional co-operation projects that had been promoted (and failed) since the breakdown of the Soviet Union. The path . . . was not easy and until now it has been convoluted. It started twenty years ago, when the Commonwealth of Independent States was founded after the collapse of the Soviet Union. (Putin 2011) However, the ECU was meant to be more effective than any other regional scheme in the post-Soviet space and, ultimately, to reach a much higher degree of integration. In fact, shortly after its creation, it appeared that it had ‘more chances than its predecessors’ (Vinokurov & Libman 2012a). This was because of three reasons. First, the ECU pursued a clear and narrow objective (i.e. trade integration, Vinokurov & Libman 2012a) contrasting with the vague and all-encompassing agenda of the CIS. Second, it was initially limited in size, and its small membership entailed less scope for disagreement, in contrast to the broadly-based postSoviet organisations such as the CIS (Vinokurov & Libman 2012a). Third, it is based upon hard-law integration and delegation to supranational institutions. This is in contrast to the CIS: while the latter has become increasingly complex (Cooper 2013: 31) and in fact encompasses a set of different regimes and institutional patterns, soft integration prevails as it allows for accommodation of sovereignty concerns (Dragneva 2004). As a result, the Eurasian project deepened at a much faster pace than many other regional integration projects in the post-Soviet space (Dragneva & Wolczuk 2013: 3). Between 2010 and 2015, it developed from a Customs Union with a common external tariff and a common customs code to a Single Economic Space and then a Eurasian Economic Union Moreover, the ECU was presented in a drastically different light as compared to its predecessors. In the Russian authorities’ narrative, it appeared to be underpinned by an economic rationale. Despite disruptions, post-Soviet countries have maintained trade links between themselves while also opening up to extra-regional players after the break-up of the USSR (Vinokurov & Libman 2012b). Therefore, the ECU and the EAEU would both strengthen intra-regional ties and serve as a stepping stone to integrate Eurasian countries into the world economy, thereby favouring their modernisation and increasing their competitiveness. Ultimately, the Eurasian Union would ‘serve as an effective link between Europe and the AsiaPacific region’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2013). In this vein, the EAEU (in light of its economic justification and expected benefits) appears as ‘a positive sum, mutually beneficial game within the post-Soviet space’ (Kazantsev 2015: 216). In other words, it is the creation of an association ‘not through conquest, but by building common institutions and norms’ (Bordachev & Skriba 2014: 16). Indeed, the ECU/EAEU is indeed the first integration project 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 72 10/25/2016 9:57:05 AM Russia’s (counter-) actions 73 that actually ‘has an acquis’ (Zagorski 2015: 5), even if all the integration objectives have not yet been achieved. However, the narrative of ‘modernisation by integration’ soon appeared to lack substance – especially as the Eurasian integration project does not delve into any issue area that would be politically sensitive for the ruling elites in member countries yet proved crucial for their countries’ modernisation, such as strengthening the rule of law or the fight against corruption. Above all, the economic rationale justifying Eurasian integration is at odds with the geopolitical motivations that underpin the project. In fact, for Russia (as well as some other EAEU members) the economic benefits of Eurasian integration are doubtful (Bordachev & Skriba 2014; Zagorski 2015). Yet the authorities are prepared to incur the economic costs associated with it, as the EAEU is ‘viewed above all else as a geopolitical project’ (Zagorski 2015: 4) meant to counter the EU’s growing influence in the post-Soviet space, especially in those countries included in the ENP. The creation of the Eastern Partnership, in particular, was specifically perceived as an ‘anti-Russian initiative’ (Bordachev & Skriba 2014: 19) and exacerbated Russia’s concerns over what it perceived as the EU’s encroachment in its sphere of influence. This is because, unlike the ENP, the Eastern Partnership is premised upon hard-law integration and thereby significantly enhances the prospects of Eastern European and South Caucasian countries’ integration with the EU. Therefore, Russia launched the ECU in response to the changing regional context, with the view to maintaining its influence over the countries of the ‘contested neighbourhood’. Yet by proposing a higher level of integration than the EU, it rendered both offers incompatible (Delcour and Wolczuk forthcoming). This is because the creation of a Customs Union entails the establishment of a common external tariff and the cession of sovereignty to a supranational institution (Dragneva & Dimitrova 2007: 193), thereby excluding the conclusion of free-trade agreements with third countries. Moreover, the way in which Russia has sought to enlarge ECU/EAEU membership contradicts the picture of ‘a free association of nations’ (Kazantsev 2015: 216). In fact, beyond the three founders, the Eurasian project has failed to attract a broad membership. This is due to two reasons. First, the ECU/EAEU requires that new members adhere to and implement all the obligations deriving from the Treaties. This is in contrast to its predecessors that were mostly based on soft law and ‘did not commit anyone to anything concrete’ (Zagorski 2015: 5). Second, while appearing as the driving force behind Eurasian integration, Russia is not regarded as a credible source of policy templates for modernisation (Delcour & Wolczuk 2015b: 502). This is especially the case in the countries of the ‘contested neighbourhood’, where the EU is perceived as a much more attractive model. Yet in Russia’s perspective enlarging the ECU/EAEU was crucial in order to effectively counter the Eastern Partnership and regain its influence in the region. The country had an ambitious list of potential new members including Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Ukraine (Glazyev 2015: 86) nonetheless it failed to attract new members at the beginning of Eurasian integration. Therefore, Russia has combined a high degree of integration with extensive and multifaceted pressure on post-Soviet countries for full membership of the 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 73 10/25/2016 9:57:05 AM 74 Russia’s (counter-) actions ECU/EAEU. Ukraine, in particular, soon emerged as a key target for the newly created ECU: As a union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, [the Customs Union] is only an interesting prototype. But if Ukraine, with its large market and potential for a strong and diversified economy, joins, it could become a major force to be reckoned with. (Lukyanov 2012) However, while it pursued a cautious and selective approach to post-Soviet integration (Dragneva & Wolczuk 2014), deep integration with the EU had been a long-standing priority for Ukraine. Therefore, from the outset of the Eurasian integration project Russia launched a campaign to deter Ukraine from signing an Association Agreement with the EU and instead lure the country into the ECU (Delcour & Wolczuk 2013). On the one hand, the campaign insisted on the immediate benefits of joining the ECU, on the ground that it would act as a driver of Ukraine’s modernisation, while association with the EU would be premised on unequal integration (with the EU protecting its markets) and would entail massive costs to be borne upfront by Ukrainian state actors and businesses (Delcour & Wolczuk 2013). On the other hand, Russia implied that it would resort to punitive measures should Ukraine pursue integration with the EU. In May 2013, Ukraine signed a memorandum for deepening relations with the ECU; nevertheless, Russia stepped up its pressure using trade as leverage. In summer 2013, it enhanced border controls for imports from Ukraine and introduced a ban on confectionary producer Roshen. Thus Russia clearly signalled the costs that Ukraine would have to incur should it sign the AA with the EU. In Armenia, Russia pursued a similar strategy, yet used levers targeting the country’s specific vulnerabilities. Like Ukraine, Armenia signed a memorandum with the ECU in spring 2013; however, it planned to sign an AA and a DCFTA with the EU and ruled out ECU membership, as clearly indicated by the former Prime Minister Tigran Sargsyan (now ironically serving as chairman of the Board of the Eurasian Economic Commission): That would make no sense. The whole point of a customs union is to have commercial exchanges without customs control. In our case, that is impossible as we have to pass through the territory of a neighboring state and twice undergo customs administration. Our Russian colleagues understand this situation. We are looking for ways of cooperation without the customs union. (quoted in Arevian, no date) Yet in spring and summer 2013, Russia exerted substantial and multifaceted pressure over Armenia to draw the country into the Eurasian integration process. It threatened to increase energy prices by approximately 70 per cent, to ban Armenian imports, to block private money transfers to Armenia via Russian 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 74 10/25/2016 9:57:05 AM Russia’s (counter-) actions 75 banks, to deport Armenian migrant workers from the Russian Federation and to destabilise the political situation in the country, thereby potentially triggering a regime change (Grigoryan 2014: 106). However, the strongest signal (Russia’s massive arms sales to Azerbaijan, Armenia’s adversary over Nagorno-Karabakh) was associated with Armenia’s key vulnerability, i.e. security. Therefore, Russia’s threats yielded different results in the cases of Armenia and Ukraine when it comes to joining the EAEU. In essence, its specific context made Armenia much more vulnerable to Russia’s pressure in that Russia’s role as a security guarantor (seemingly) precluded any other policy option for Yerevan. When failing to ‘induce’ post-Soviet states into joining the EAEU, Russia deployed a broad array of punitive measures. vis-à-vis those countries that chose association with the EU. In Moldova, Russia retaliated against the signature of the AA/DCFTA by imposing a series of trade restrictions and cancelling the tariff-free preferences under the 2011 Russia-Moldova CIS Free Trade Agreement for 19 categories of products (Cenusa et al. 2014: 5). Moreover, since 2013–14 Russia has increasingly supported those Moldovan political and societal actors (e.g. the Church) who are less lenient toward EU values. It has also backed the emergence of new political actors (such as the Party of Socialists that emerged as the single largest political party from the November 2014 elections) in favour of cancelling the AA signed with the EU (Delcour 2015). Last but not least, Russia has increasingly used breakaway and autonomous regions as pressure points over Moldova. Besides supporting the breakaway region of Transnistria, Russia has especially sought to empower pro-Russian forces in the autonomous region of Gagauzia. Examples of Russia’s counteracting strategy include support for the organisation of a referendum on the Eurasian Customs Union in 2014 (with 98 per cent of voters in favour of joining the ECU) and to the new governor of Gagauzia elected in March 2015. In Georgia, Russia reacted surprisingly softly to the signature of an AA/DCFTA with the EU. This is because of the specific context in bilateral relations. In the 2000s, Russia had already used its whole array of punitive measures against the country, ranging from the introduction of visa requirements and trade bans to military interventions. However, the initialling of the AA/DCFTA in November 2013 and its signature in June 2014 coincided with Georgia’s attempts to normalise its relations with Russia after the change of power in Tbilisi in 2012–13. Soon after the departure of Mikheil Saakashvili, Russia started removing some of its punitive measures. Since 2013, it has gradually lifted its bans on Georgian wines, mineral water and fruits. While the Russian authorities expressed concerns over the possible impact of the DCFTA on bilateral trade, they have refrained from suspending the bilateral free-trade agreement signed with Georgia in 1994. Furthermore, in late 2015 the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced the facilitation of the visa regime for Georgian citizens, including the possibility of issuing multiple entry visas for business, work, educational, humanitarian or private purposes. This came only a few days after President Putin suggested lifting visa obligations for Georgian citizens travelling to Russia. Yet in parallel with the normalisation of relations between the two countries, Russian-backed 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 75 10/25/2016 9:57:05 AM 76 Russia’s (counter-) actions actors launched a campaign to vilify the key elements of the EU’s offer, in particular the DCFTA and the visa liberalisation process that would induce Georgia to adopt values running against its traditions (see Chapter 7). In addition, in sharp contrast to the renewed incentives provided to Georgia, Russia has indirectly stepped up its pressure over the country by signing treaties of Alliance and Strategic Partnership with the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. These envisage an alignment of the secessionist territories with the EAEU through the creation of a common social and economic space with Russia, and could therefore undermine the implementation of the DCFTA. In particular, Abkhazia should adapt its customs regulatory framework to that of the EAEU within three years of the entry into force of the treaty signed with Russia (Dogovor mezhdu Rossijskoj Federaciej i Respublikoj Abhazija 2014). However, nowhere has Russia used coercion more extensively than Ukraine. In early 2014, it retaliated against the ousting of President Yanukovych and the arrival into power of an interim government determined to sign the Association Agreement with the EU by undermining Ukraine’s territorial integrity, i.e. annexing Crimea and supporting rebels in eastern Ukraine. Upon the signature of the AA between Ukraine and the EU in June 2014, Russia interfered with the view to propose adjustments to the DCFTA and requested that a trilateral dialogue between itself, the EU and Ukraine be organised to address its concerns. The first of these was that Russian products would be excluded from the Ukrainian market owing to the EU’s requiring compliance with its standards for all products sold in Ukraine. However, the EU recalled that the DCFTA does not foresee the alignment of Ukrainian technical regulations with EU regulations for all products; in fact, only 27 sectorial regulations are concerned (European Commission 2015). Second, Russia expressed the fear that EU products transiting through Ukraine would benefit from the CIS FTA and flood the Russian market (Dragneva & Wolczuk 2014: 234). However, the enforcement of provisions on rules of origin would make this scenario impossible. Another Russian concern related to the application of the DCFTA’s SPS provisions proved equally void of substance, since these provisions would not apply for those Ukrainian products exported to the CIS (Dragneva & Wolczuk 2014: 234). Therefore, the EU rejected Russia’s demands for longer transition periods in the DCFTA, as well as exclusions of 20 per cent of the tariff lines from the agreement (Dragneva & Wolczuk 2014: 234). As a compromise, during the consultation process that was launched in July 2014 at the ministerial level, it was agreed to postpone the entry into force of the DCFTA until 1 January 2016. However, a few days before the fixed date (and despite the EU’s reassurance on the role of rules of origin) Russia decided to unilaterally withdraw trade preferences granted to Ukraine as part of the CIS Free-Trade Agreement (CIS FTA) signed in 2011. Yet this activation of annex 6 of the CIS-FTA would have required consultation with the other parties to the agreement, as well as the demonstration by Russia that the DCFTA caused a massive increase in imports from Ukraine. However, Russia did not comply with the provisions of annex 6 (European Commission 2006). This only confirmed that Russia was prepared 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 76 10/25/2016 9:57:05 AM Russia’s (counter-) actions 77 to use post-Soviet regional schemes for the sake of its own foreign policy interests, in this case retaliating against a country’s integration choice. Therefore, both the attempts at expanding EAEU membership and, failing that, Russia’s punitive measures confirm that for Russia, ‘Eurasian economic integration is first and foremost a political project’ (Bordachev & Skriba 2014: 21). This has important implications for the EAEU itself, as politically-motivated decisions have increasingly prevailed over economic ones (Zagorski 2015). However, Russia’s policies had even bigger effects on the ‘contested neighbourhood’, where they resulted in creating or deepening dividing lines both between and within post-Soviet countries (using breakaway regions as pressure points). Conclusions This overview of Russia’s policies in the four selected countries highlights both continuities and important shifts. Since the break-up of the USSR, Russia’s primary objective has been to retain or regain its influence in the post-Soviet space. The corollary of this is that Russia has persistently sought to limit other actors’ (especially NATO’s and the EU’s) influence in the region. Yet the toolbox used for that purpose has changed. While circumscribed to conflicts in the 1990s and applied in the 2000s in reaction to post-Soviet countries’ perceived (geo-)political choices, Russia’s positive and negative measures are now more tightly attached to engagement in deep economic integration schemes. Therefore, like the EU, Russia’s policies have become increasingly centred on its integration project, the Eurasian Customs Union that was launched in response to the EU’s Eastern Partnership initiative. However, in contrast to those of the EU, Russia’s policies and requirements are hardly codified (Ademmer et al. 2016). This is despite the fact that the linking of rewards to the fulfilment of specific conditions has increasingly been visible in the official narrative, especially in recent years. Moreover (and closely connected to the first point), Russia’s incentives and disincentives are tailored to the situation of post-Soviet countries. In other words, the fact that Russia’s policy in the post-Soviet space is less formalised enables the country to adapt its strategy and toolbox to the context of each country. This is also because Russia is able to use a whole gamut of measures in the post-Soviet space, building on the multifaceted links inherited from the past. In sum, Chapters 3 and 4 have highlighted glaring differences between the EU’s and Russia’s policies. As argued elsewhere, while the EU relies on conditionality to push for policy-specific changes, Russia uses (dis-)incentives to influence broad integration choices that affect its interests in the region (Ademmer & Delcour 2016). In other words, Russia’s sector-specific measures are primarily meant to deter post-Soviet countries from – or, failing that, to undermine – further integration with the EU. Therefore, the two actors do not operate on the same level. This calls for an in-depth examination of post-Soviet countries’ responses both in terms of integration choices (Chapter 5) and sectoral reforms (Chapters 6 and 7). 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 77 10/25/2016 9:57:05 AM 78 Russia’s (counter-) actions Notes 1 In the 1990s, Russia also attempted to destabilise Ukraine, inter alia by offering dual citizenship to the ‘compatriots’ in Crimea. 2 The organisation was created as ‘GUAM’ (Georgia – Ukraine – Azerbaijan – Moldova). Two years after Uzbekistan joined, the organisation’s name changed to ‘GUUAM’. However, Uzbekistan withdrew in 2005, and the organisation was renamed ‘GUAM’. 3 For the first quarter of 2009, the agreement reached on 19 January 2009 fixed the price at $360/mcm (i.e. 20 per cent less than the European price). The agreement envisages a quarterly revision of this price according to the average of 50 per cent gas oil/50 per cent fuel oil prices over the previous three quarters (Pirani et al. 2009: 26). 4 Author’s interview, State Chancellery, Chişinău, May 2012. 5 Russia’s share in Moldovan exports fell from 24 per cent in 2005 to 17 per cent in 2007 (Popa 2015: 8). 6 This is also because Russia’s punitive trade measures lasted much longer in Georgia (seven years) than in Moldova (two years). 7 In 2003 the country handed over five strategic assets to Russia as a payment for its debt. A few years later, in exchange for reduction in energy prices, the Armenian government agreed to concede to Russia the majority stake in the Tabriz-Yersakh gas pipeline, which otherwise could have reduced the country’s dependence vis-à-vis Russian energy sources (McGinnity 2010: 7–8). In 2008, Armenian Railways awarded a concession to Russian Railways, which established South Caucasus Railway as a wholly owned subsidiary. Russian investors also play an important role in telecommunications, e.g. with shares in mobile operators VivaCell-MTC and ArmenTellBeeLine. Finally, the Metzamor nuclear plan, which accounts for approximately one third of Armenia’s energy needs, is managed by the Russian United Energy Systems (UES) group (Galstyan 2013; Bertelsmann Foundation 2006) References Ademmer, E. (2015). Interdependence and EU-Demanded Policy Change in a Shared Neighbourhood. Journal of European Public Policy, 22(5), pp. 671–689. Ademmer, E., & Delcour, L. (2016). With a Little Help from Russia? The European Union and Visa Liberalization with Post-Soviet States. Eurasian Geography and Economics, 57(1), pp. 89–112. Ademmer, E., Delcour, L., & Wolczuk, K. (2016). Beyond Geopolitics: Exploring the Impact of the EU and Russia in the ‘Contested Neighborhood’. Eurasian Geography and Economics, 57(1), pp. 1–18. Arevian, G. (no date). Armenia Again Rules Out Entry into Russian Customs Union. Armenian Community Council of the United Kingdom, Retrieved May 15, 2014, from http://www.accc.org.uk/armenia-again-rules-out-entry-into-russian-customs-union/ Bertelsmann Foundation. (2006). Bertelsmann Transformation Index, Country Report Armenia. Berlin: Bertelsmann Foundation. Bordachev, T. V., & Skriba, A. S. (2014). Russia’s Eurasian Integration Policies. In D. Cadier (ed.), Geopolitics of Eurasian Integration (pp. 16–22). London: London School of Economics. Brzezinski, Z., & Sullivan, P. (1997) Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States: Documents, Data, and Analysis, New-York/London: M.E. Sharpe. Centre for Strategic and International Studies. (2004, June 14). Statesmen’s Forum: ‘Armenia’s Evolving Relations with United States, Europe’. Washington: CSIS. 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 78 10/25/2016 9:57:05 AM Russia’s (counter-) actions 79 Cenusa, D., Emerson, M., Kovsiridze, T., & Movchan, V. (2014, September). Russia’s Punitive Trade Policy Measures towards Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. CEPS Working Document (400). Brussels: CEPS. Cooper, J. (2013). The Development of Eurasian Economic Integration. In R. Dragneva, & K. Wolczuk (eds.), Eurasian Economic Integration: Law, Policy and Politics (pp. 15–33). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Delcour, L. (2015). Between the Eastern Partnership and Eurasian Integration: Explaining Post-Soviet Countries’ Engagement in (Competing) Region-Building Projects’. Problems of Post-Communism, 62(6), pp. 316–327. Delcour, L., & Wolczuk, K. (2013). Eurasian Economic Integration: Implications for the EU’s Eastern Policy. In R. Dragneva, & K. Wolczuk (eds.), Eurasian Economic Integration: Law, Policy and Politics (pp. 179–203) Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Delcour, L., & Wolczuk, K. (2015). Spoiler or Facilitator of Democratization? Russia’s Role in Georgia and Ukraine. Democratization, 22(3), pp. 459–478. Delcour, L., & Wolczuk, K. (2015b). The EU’s Unexpected ‘Ideal Neighbour’? The Perplexing Case of Armenia’s Europeanisation. Journal of European Integration, 37(4), pp. 491–507. Delcour, L., & Wolczuk, K. (forthcoming). Between the Eastern Partnership and the Eurasian Economic Union: Competing Region-Building Projects in the ‘Common Neighbourhood’. In S. Gstöhl, & S. Schunz (eds.), Theorizing the European Neighbourhood Policy, London: Routledge. Dogovor mezhdu Rossijskoj Federaciej i Respublikoj Abhazija o sojuznichestve i strategicheskom partnerstve [Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Abkhazia on Integration and Strategic Partnership]. (2014). Retrieved May 20, 2015, from http://www.apsnypress.info/: http://www.apsnypress.info/documents/ dogovor-mezhdu-rossiyskoy-federatsiey-i-respublikoy-abkhaziya-o-soyuznichestve-istrategicheskom-par Dragneva, R. (2004). Is ‘Soft’ Beautiful? Another Perspective on Law, Institutions, and Integration in the CIS. Review of Central and East European Law, 29(3), pp. 279–324. Dragneva, R., & Dimitrova, A. (2007). Patterns of Integration and Regime Compatibility: Ukraine between the CIS and the EU. In K. Malfliet, L. Verpoest, & E. Vinokurov (eds.), The CIS, the EU and Russia: The Challenges of Integration (pp. 170–201). Basingstoke: Palgrave/McMillan. Dragneva, R., & Wolczuk, K. (eds.) (2013). Eurasian Economic Integration: Law, Policy and Politics. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Dragneva, R., & Wolczuk, K. (2014). The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and the Challenges of Inter-Regionalism. Review of Central and East European Law, 39, pp. 213–244. European Commission. (2006a). Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy, COM (2006) 726 final, Brussels, 4 December European Commission. (2015). Trilateral Talks on EU-Ukraine DCFTA. Distinguishing between Myths and Reality. Retrieved January 17, 2016, from http://trade.ec.europa. eu/doclib/docs/2015/december/tradoc_154127.pdf Freyburg, T., Lavenex, S., Skripka, T., Schimmelfennig, F., & Wetzel, A. (2011). Democracy Promotion through Functional Cooperation? The Case of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Democratization, 18(4), pp. 1026–1054. Galstyan, N. (2013). ‘The Main Dimensions of Armenia’s Foreign and Security Policy’, NOREF Policy Brief. 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 79 10/25/2016 9:57:05 AM 80 Russia’s (counter-) actions Glazyev, S. (2015). Russia and the Eurasian Union. In P. Dutkiewicz, & R. Sakwa (eds.), Eurasian Integration: The View from within (pp. 84–96). London/New-York: Routledge. Grigoryan, A. (2014). Armenia: Joining Under the Gun. In S. F. Starr, & S. Cornell (eds.), Putin’s Grand Strategy: The Eurasian Union and Its Discontents (pp. 98–109). Washington: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program. Horvath, R. (2011). Putin’s ‘Preventive Counter-Revolution’: Post-Soviet Authoritarianism and the Spectre of Velvet Revolution’. Europe-Asia Studies, 63(1), pp. 1–25. Hughes, J., & Sasse, G. (2014). Ethnicity and Territory in the Former Soviet Union: Regions in Conflict. London: Routledge. Kazantsev, A. (2015). Eurasian Perspectives on Regionalism: Central Asia and beyond. In P. Dutkiewicz, & R. Sakwa (eds.). Eurasian Integration: The View from within (pp. 207–225). London/New-York: Routledge. Kobrinskaya, I. (2004). Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Space: New Priorities for New Challenges? PONARS Policy Memo 332. Kuznetsova, Y. (2005, February 8). The Near Abroad: Increasingly Far Away from Russia. Russia in Global Affairs. Retrieved March 14, 2016, from http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/ number/n_4411 Langbein, J. (2016). (Dis-)Integrating Ukraine? Domestic Oligarchs, Russia, the EU, and the Politics of Economic Integration. Eurasian Geography and Economics, 57(1), pp. 19–42. Lavenex, S. (2008). A Governance Perspective on the European Neighbourhood Policy: Integration beyond Conditionality? Journal of European Public Policy, 15(6), pp. 938–955. Lo, B. (2002). Russia’s Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era: Reality, Illusion and Mythmaking. London: Palgrave. Lukyanov, F. (2012, September 7). The Form and the Essence of Eurasian Integration. Russia in Global Affairs. Retrieved December 13, 2015, from http://eng.globalaffairs. ru/redcol/The-Form-and-the-Essence-of-the-Eurasian-Union-15660 McGinnity, I. (2010). Selling Its Future for Short: Armenia’s Economic and Security Relations with Russia, CMC Senior Theses No. 58, Claremont McKenna College. Medvedev, S. (1999). Power, Space and Russian Foreign Policy. In T. Hopf (ed.), Understandings of Russian Foreign Policy (pp. 15–56). University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia. (2000, September 28). Speech by Vartan Oskanian, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, before the International Conference on ‘Prospects for Regional and Transregional Cooperation’. Retrieved January 25, 2016, from http://www.mfa.am/en/speeches/ item/2000/09/28/vo/ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. (1993). Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, Moscow. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. (2000). Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. Retrieved March 5, 2016, from http://archive.mid.ru//Bl.nsf/ arh/1EC8DC08180306614325699C003B5FF0?OpenDocument Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. (2013). Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. Retrieved March 9, 2016, from http://archive.mid. ru//brp_4.nsf/0/76389FEC168189ED44257B2E0039B16D Mirzoyan, A. (2010). Armenia, the Great Powers and the West. London/New-York: Palgrave/Mc Millan. 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 80 10/25/2016 9:57:05 AM Russia’s (counter-) actions 81 Morel, M. (2008). Russian Relations and Foreign Policy in Armenia and the Caucasus: Analysis of the Republic of Armenia and the Greater Caucasus Region’s Current Relations with the Russian Federation, Beginning with the Disintegration of the Soviet Union. Paper for Presentation at The Armenian Center for National and International Studies, Yerevan. Retrieved April 20, 2016, from http://acnis.am/old/publications/2008/ Russian%20Relations%20and%20Foreign%20Policy%20in%20Armenia%20and%20 the%20Caucasus.pdf Pirani, S., Stern, J., & Yafimava, K. (2009). The Russo-Ukrainian Gas Dispute of January 2009: A Comprehensive Assessment. Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. Retrieved February 15, 2016, from https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/ uploads/2010/11/NG27-TheRussoUkrainianGasDisputeofJanuary2009AComprehensiveAssessment-JonathanSternSimonPiraniKatjaYafimava-2009.pdf Popa, A. (2015). Moldova and Russia: Between Trade Relations and Economic Dependence. Chişinău: Expert-Grup. Prodi, R. (2002, December 5–6). A Wider Europe – A Proximity Policy as the key to stability, Speech 02/619 before the Sixth ECSA-World Conference ‘Peace, Security And Stability International Dialogue and the Role of the EU’. Retrieved February 24, 2016, from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-02–619_en.htm Putin, V. V. (2011, October 3). Novyj integratsionnyj proekt dlja Evrazii – budushchee kotoroe rozhdaetsja segodnja’ [A New Integration Project for Eurasia – A Future That Is Being Born Today]. Izvestia. Radvanyi, J. (2010). La Russie et son ‘étranger proche’. In G. Favarel-Garrigues, & K. Rousselet (eds.), La Russie contemporaine (pp. 93–105). Paris: Fayard. Serrano, S. (2007). Géorgie. Sortie d’empire. Paris: CNRS éditions. Stern, J. (2006). The Russian-Ukrainian Gas Crisis of January 2006. Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. Retrieved February 15, 2016, from https://www.oxfordenergy.org/ wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/Jan2006-RussiaUkraineGasCrisis-JonathanStern.pdf Tolstrup, J. (2009). ‘Studying a Negative External Actor: Russia’s Management of Stability and Instability in the ‘Near Abroad.’ Democratization, 16(5), pp. 922–944. Vahl, M., & Emerson, M. (2004). Moldova and the Transnistrian Conflict. In B. Coppieters (ed.), Europeanization and Conflict Resolution: Case Studies from the European Periphery (pp. 149–190). Gent: Academia Press. Valovaya, T. (2005, May 18). The Post-Soviet Space in the Era of Pragmatism. Russia in Global Affairs. Retrieved March 20, 2016, from http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/ number/n_4958 Vinokurov, E. (2007). Russian Approaches to Integration in the Post-Soviet Space. In K. Malfliet, L. Verpoest, & E. Vinokurov (eds.), The CIS, the EU and Russia: The Challenges of Integration (pp. 22–46). Basingstoke: Palgrave/McMillan. Vinokurov, E., & Libman, A. (2012a, June 24). Post-Soviet Integration Breakthrough. Russia in Global Affairs. Retrieved April 15, 2016, from http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/ number/Post-Soviet-Integration-Breakthrough-15580. Vinokurov, E., & Libman, A. (2012b). Eurasia and Eurasian Integration: Beyond the Post-Soviet Borders. In E. Vinokurov (ed.), EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook (pp. 80–95). Almaty: Eurasian Development Bank. Wallander, C. A., & Legvold, R. (2004). Economics and Security in the Post-Soviet Space. In R. Legvold, & C. A. Wallander (eds.), Swords and Sustenance: The Economics of Security in Belarus and Ukraine (pp. 1–21) Cambridge: The MIT Press. Weiner, R. (2004). The Foreign Policy of the Voronin Administration. Demokratizatsiya, 12(4), pp. 551–558. 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 81 10/25/2016 9:57:06 AM 82 Russia’s (counter-) actions Wolczuk, K. (2004b). Integration without Europeanisation: Ukraine and Its Policy towards the European Union, EUI Working Papers. Fiesole: European University Florence. Wolczuk, K. (2016). Managing the Flows of Gas and Rules: Ukraine between the EU and Russia. Eurasian Geography and Economics, 57(1), pp. 113–137. Wolff, S. (2012). The Transnistrian Issue: Moving beyond the Status Quo. Brussels: European Parliament, DG EXPO. Zagorski, A. (2015). Caught between Economy and Geopolitics. In F. Hett, & S. Szkola (eds.), The Eurasian Economic Union: Analyses and Perspectives from Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia (pp. 4–7). Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 82 10/25/2016 9:57:06 AM 5 Between Brussels and Moscow The manifold domestic responses to the EU’s offer As shown in Chapter 3, with the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership, the EU has stepped up its role as a driver for domestic change and a model for reform in post-Soviet countries. However, if anything, the Vilnius Eastern Partnership Summit, which took place in November 2013, blatantly exposed both the diversity of post-Soviet countries’ responses to EU stimuli and the role of Russia as a counteracting power in the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood. While two countries, Azerbaijan and Belarus, remained on the side-lines in terms of negotiating Association Agreements and Deep and Comprehensive Free-Trade Areas, two others, Georgia and Moldova, initialled the AAs in Vilnius. Yet the summit was dominated by the decision of the then-president of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, to suspend the signing of the AA; a few weeks after the summit, Yanukovych accepted Russia’s offer of a financial bailout (without accepting membership in the Russia-driven Eurasian Customs Union, though). The Vilnius Summit also raised questions as to how EU-Armenian relations could be taken further, a few weeks after President Sargsyan’s decision to join the ECU despite the completion of negotiations for an AA/DCFTA. What, then, explains the baffling discrepancies in Eastern Partnership countries’ responses to EU policies? Moreover, what are the factors behind the variation over time in Eastern Partnership countries’ responses to the EU? What prompts a country to select the macro-framework of relations proposed by the EU or, conversely, to reverse its initial choice and engage in another integration scheme? This chapter seeks to explore the reasons behind the sheer variety and contrasting dynamics in the resonance of the EU’s offer in Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. It maps domestic receptivity in the four selected countries at the selection level, i.e. the extent to which ‘EU rules constitute the normative reference point of EU–third-country relations’ (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009: 800). This chapter also focuses on partner countries’ engagement in the macroframework of integration with the EU, i.e. their participation in the key components of the EU’s offer under the ENP/Eastern Partnership, namely the AAs, the DCFTAs and the visa liberalisation process. Research on the ENP has identified EU membership aspirations (Langbein & Wolczuk 2012) and the perceived legitimacy of EU norms (Barbé et al. 2009; Delcour & Wolczuk 2015a) as the key variables behind partner countries’ 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 83 10/25/2016 9:57:06 AM 84 Domestic responses to the EU’s offer selection of the EU macro-framework of integration. A country is more likely to select the EU’s model if (i) it has ambitions to join the Union and/or (ii) EU norms have strong resonance domestically. In other words, domestic actors engage with the EU ‘if they consider the regional community of states represented by the EU as a valid a priori reference group whose collective values and norms they share, whose acceptance they seek, and with which they wish to be identified’ (Magen 2006: 421). The chapter also examines the impact of domestic elites’ strategies on engagement with the EU’s Eastern Partnership. The literature has shown that domestic elites can adopt EU norms with the view to either consolidating their power (Börzel & Pamuk 2012) or pursuing their own reform agenda (Casier 2011). In a similar vein, the elites can instrumentalise the selection of the EU’s macro-framework of integration for the sake of their own political survival and legitimacy-seeking (Casier 2011: 46). In addition to these variables, this chapter brings into focus yet another set of factors accounting for both heterogeneous responses among partner countries and shifting attitudes to EU policies, i.e. the regional context. Building on Ademmer (Ademmer 2015), the chapter explores the impact of partner countries’ sensitivity (i.e. the costs of Russia’s policies without changing their own policies, Ademmer 2015: 675) and vulnerability (i.e. the availability and cost of policy alternatives, Ademmer 2015: 675) to Russia’s policies’ selection of EU rules. The chapter highlights how, in Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, the role of these variables differs between each country and shifts according to changes in their unique domestic contexts. For each of the four selected countries, the chapter starts by scrutinising reform trajectories and elites’ strategies; it then assesses the impact of regional factors on countries’ changing patterns of receptivity to the EU’s influences. Armenia Despite the lack of any aspirations to join the EU, Armenia undertook to reform in line with the EU’s model, as evidenced by the opening of negotiations for an Association Agreement in 2010 and for a DCFTA in early 2012. Armenia’s acceptance of EU rules derives from the high resonance of the EU model in the country and its coincidence with the government’s agenda and preferences against a perceived complementarity with a security alliance with the Russian Federation (Delcour & Wolczuk 2015a). While the country had introduced structural reforms after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the transformation process was largely affected by the conflict with Azerbaijan. The latter thwarted further attempts at reform and led to the emergence of powerful commodity-based cartels tightly connected to the political elite (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014: 3–4). However, the country’s attitude toward reform and response to the EU’s offer drastically changed at the end of the 2000s as a result of both geopolitical and domestic factors. The 2008–09 economic crisis hit the country severely and exposed its structural weaknesses, including an overreliance on remittances. In the wake of the crisis, Armenia suffered from 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 84 10/25/2016 9:57:06 AM Domestic responses to the EU’s offer 85 a rise in poverty and widening socio-economic disparities. The deep impact of the crisis, combined with a sharp deterioration in the regional environment as a result of the conflict in Georgia and the failed rapprochement with Turkey, prompted the authorities to reform with a view to reducing the country’s vulnerability (Delcour & Wolczuk 2015a: 498). Modernisation also emerged as an imperative for Armenian authorities’ survival in the wake of the 2008 presidential elections that were marred by post-electoral violence and resulted in sharp political polarisation. In this context, the EU’s deep economic integration offer under the Eastern Partnership was very much welcomed in Yerevan. For South Caucasus countries, the Eastern Partnership held significant promise as it offered greater proximity with the EU through extending to Caucasus countries tangible incentives that had so far been on the table with Ukraine only, i.e. an enhanced contractual framework, DCFTAs and visa liberalisation. The Armenian authorities, in particular, perceived the Eastern Partnership as an opportunity to carry out their own reform agenda and regarded the EU acquis as a template for modernisation. As summarised by President Sargsyan: The European Union has not only become one of our most important partners in the world but also plays a significant role inside Armenia, assisting us in the implementation of the reforms and in strengthening economic and overall stability of the country.1 In a highly polarised political climate after the 2008 post-electoral violence, an overarching consensus thus emerged amongst political domestic actors on the benefits of closer relations with the EU. For the incumbent elites, this was seen as a means to defuse tensions with the political opposition while also offering the promise of tangible results in terms of modernisation. In addition, the EU’s offer under the Eastern Partnership minimised the political costs to be incurred by a ruling elite closely connected to commodity-based cartels and unwilling to engage in deep and comprehensive democratisation. This is because the EU focused on technical, acquis-centred requirements as part of the preparations for a DCFTA (Delcour & Wolczuk 2015a). The coincidence between the EU’s enhanced offer and Armenia’s modernisation agenda is thus the key factor explaining the country’s compliance with EU sector-specific conditions. Nonetheless, compliance with EU demands was also premised on the perceived compatibility of a DCFTA with existing close ties with Russia (Delcour & Wolczuk 2015a). EU-driven change was perceived as broadly compatible with existing regional economic arrangements (e.g. the CIS Free-Trade Area) and, above all, with the security alliance with Russia (especially under the Collective Security Treaty Organisation). Yet in 2013 Russia increased its pressure on Armenia (e.g. threats of a 70 per cent surge in energy prices and, especially, the conclusion of a deal with Azerbaijan envisaging the sale of weapons for the sum of approximately €4 billion [Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum 2015: 51]). This was interpreted in Yerevan as a clear signal not to sign the Association Agreement with the EU. 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 85 10/25/2016 9:57:06 AM 86 Domestic responses to the EU’s offer While largely unnoticed in Brussels, Russia’s pressure was instrumental in the Armenian president’s decision not to initial the DCFTA. This is because Armenia’s policy is filtered through the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which has been the defining feature of its post-Soviet existence (Delcour & Wolczuk 2015a). In the early 2010s, the country stepped up its creeping strategy of complementarity between a Russian security umbrella and a European model of development, yet this strategy stumbled against Russia’s pressure (Delcour 2014). By targeting Armenia’s core priority, Russia was able to overturn the country’s plans for a macro-framework of economic integration. In 2013, when President Sargsyan announced his decision to join the ECU, Armenia offered an unprecedented (and unexplored in the literature) example of ‘de-selection’ of the EU model. Therefore, the role of the EU as a normative reference point in Armenia appeared to be short-lived. However, the decision to join a competing integration project has seemingly not altered the preferences of domestic actors in terms of an economic model. Unlike the DCFTA, EAEU membership is not perceived per se as a vector of modernisation. Instead, for some Armenian businessmen, it is a clear opportunity to maintain joint legacies from the Soviet period and avoid the costs of reforms (Grigoryan 2014). Accession to the EAEU has also enabled the preservation of powerful business interests and rent-seeking practices. For instance, the Armenian authorities secured an exemption from customs duties for raw sugar2, a product which is at the core of Samvel Aleksanyan’s (one of the country’s major oligarchs and a member of the Parliament) business, provided that raw sugar is processed in Armenia and will not be re-exported to other EAEU countries, the exemption was granted until 2025, i.e. three years longer than most other exemptions negotiated in the Accession Treaty. In addition, while Armenia’s backtracking from EU integration derives primarily from its security concerns, the decision to join the Eurasian Economic Union was made despite the economic costs to be incurred by the country. The Eurasian Customs Union’s initial common external tariff was broadly aligned with Russia’s tariff schedule and therefore much higher than Armenia’s. Like Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the country nearly had to double its average tariff to adopt the common tariff. Therefore, applying EAEU tariffs was expected to result in an increase in the price of imported goods while Armenia would gain only limited benefits from the redistribution of common customs duties.3 In addition, as a consequence of its joining the EAEU and applying higher tariffs, Armenia would have to go through complex renegotiations of tariffs with affected WTO members – a process that had not been discussed within the EAEU upon the country’s accession.4 However, the actual scope of renegotiations with WTO members remains to be ascertained. While the Treaty on Accession to the EAEU provides Armenia with a transition period (until 2022) for such renegotiations, no clear mechanism for compensation was envisaged by the Eurasian Economic Commission a few months after Armenia’s accession.5 This is also because the EAEU average common external tariff is decreasing (as a result of the gradual implementation by Russia of its WTO commitments) below Armenia’s 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 86 10/25/2016 9:57:06 AM Domestic responses to the EU’s offer 87 WTO-bound average tariff (Tarr 2016: 8). Therefore, the negative consequences of EAEU accession in terms of tariffs and WTO renegotiations may actually be much more limited than initially expected. However, there are still questions regarding the implications of EAEU membership for Armenia’s competitiveness. Even if (theoretically) premised on WTO rules, a number of EAEU standards and policies are still in the making. In contrast to the EAEU’s uncertain benefits, according to a study commissioned by the EU, the DCFTA would have implied a 2.3 per cent increase in Armenia’s GDP, while having no negative impact on Armenia’s trade with third countries (ECORYS/CASE 2013: 13). In particular, the DCFTA would have offered increased opportunities for foreign investment, and it would also have enhanced the competitiveness of Armenia’s economy based upon regulatory convergence with the EU’s advanced technical standards. Despite joining the EAEU in January 2015, the Armenian authorities still hope to preserve their key objectives in terms of domestic reforms and foreign policy, including some degree of complementarity by signing a relatively ambitious agreement with the EU.6 The Armenian government intends to ‘act as a bridge’ between the EU and the EAEU,7 and more specifically to promote EU standards (whenever possible) within the Eurasian Union.8 This narrative suggests that the EU integration process has not been fully reversed in the country. Instead, it is now subsumed within a broader narrative emphasizing the role of the EU as a model for Eurasian integration and calling for a bloc-to-bloc dialogue. Ironically, the experience of DCFTA negotiations is regarded by Armenian authorities as a very important capacity-building exercise, which helped them during EAEU accession negotiations.9 Armenia managed to secure a high number of exemptions (approximately 800) during the accession negotiations to the EAEU. While most of these are temporary, the country will not have to comply fully with EAEU standards before 2022. The preservation of a degree of autonomy is also made possible by the current climate of uncertainty after the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union. Georgia Since the Rose Revolution at the end of 2003, Georgia has repeatedly expressed its intention to join the European Union. As argued in the literature (Langbein & Wolczuk 2012), membership aspirations carry substantial explanatory weight to account for the selection of the EU’s model. However, closer scrutiny of Georgia’s attitudes to EU policies until 2012–13 highlights a disjuncture between, on the one hand, declared membership aspirations and, on the other hand, the limited resonance of the EU as a normative reference point in the country. At the end of the 1990s and throughout the 2000s, the Georgian authorities developed a narrative emphasising the country’s European identity and aspirations. A few years before the Rose Revolution, Zurab Zhvania’s (then-chairman of the Parliament) declaration before the Council of Europe epitomised the country’s sense of belonging to Europe: ‘I am Georgian and therefore I am 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 87 10/25/2016 9:57:06 AM 88 Domestic responses to the EU’s offer European’ (Council of Europe 1999: 136). Throughout the 2000s, the Georgian narrative on the EU remained framed in terms of civilisational choice and political values; yet it was not exempt from ambiguities. In fact, while the country has asserted its European identity and though the ENP was designed as a template for domestic reforms, the Georgian authorities predominantly regarded European integration in terms of foreign policy (not least as a balancing act against Russia and Russia-driven regional organisations in the post-Soviet space [Oskanian 2016]). This is abundantly illustrated in the discourse of former Minister of Foreign Affairs Grigol Vashadze: Allow me to start off with the foreign policy agenda, which was shaped and driven by the desire of Georgia to return into the family of European nations and finally become an unalienable part of the western civilisation. With our foreign policy goal set, we have pursued our long-term policy of integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic institutions, which are seen as staunch promoters of democratic values. We move steadily toward the European family of democratic nations – a natural habitat for Georgia. That is where we see ourselves, for we share with Europe common values and belong there geographically, historically and culturally.10 However, in spite of the discursive emphasis on Georgia’s European identity, throughout the 2000s integration with the EU was not the country’s top foreign policy priority. In fact, between 2004 and 2008, NATO membership and the relationship with the US took precedence over the Europeanisation agenda (Di Puppo 2010: 7). This is because the US and NATO were broadly seen as potential security guarantors against a threatening Russia. In contrast, for the Georgian authorities, the EU suffered from a weak involvement in the region’s unresolved conflicts, and its soft, long-term vision of security diverged from the short-term concerns of the Georgian government (Di Puppo 2009: 111). Interestingly, the EU and NATO were conflated in the government of Georgia’s institutional arrangements for integration with Western institutions, a unique feature in Eastern Partnership countries: The Office of the State Minister on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration indeed covers both organisations. Nevertheless, foreign policy priorities evolved after the conflict with Russia. While the NATO Bucharest summit in April 2008 agreed that Georgia would become a member (yet refrained from offering a Membership Action Plan), the prospect of NATO integration became bleaker in the aftermath of the August 2008 war, and the links with the US grew more distant. This gave new significance to the relationship with the EU (Di Puppo 2010: 7). Under the Saakashvili Presidency (2004–13), the country’s approach to the EU as a foreign policy priority also overshadowed the low resonance of Europeanisation as a model for domestic change. Whereas the ENP is often presented as a major impetus for reforms in the Eastern neighbourhood, in Georgia, reforms pre-existed the operationalisation of the ENP. In comparison 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 88 10/25/2016 10:32:32 AM Domestic responses to the EU’s offer 89 to other Eastern Partnership countries, early attempts at reform made Georgia special.11 However, the wide-ranging reform process launched in 2004–05 was driven by an ultra-liberal approach to the role of the state in economic policy, which in many respects differed from the EU’s recommendations. Georgian authorities at the time favoured an open and business-friendly economy attractive to foreign investment, based upon deregulation and administrative simplification. Strong criticism against the EU even developed among proponents of the deregulation model, for whom integration into the EU was deemed incompatible with the successful path of reforms adopted by Georgia. Therefore, despite vocal membership aspirations, Georgia initially resisted the selection of the EU’s model as envisaged in the ENP and especially in the Eastern Partnership. The discussions around the AA/DCFTA in 2008 offer a good illustration of this discrepancy. In fact, the then-government of Georgia opposed the very concept of a DCFTA and favoured a simple free-trade agreement instead. The country had been a beneficiary of the EU’s Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) since 1999 and was included in the new GSP+ scheme in 2005. The latter gave up to 7,200 Georgian products customs a reduced or zero rate access to the EU market (Eisenbaum 2007: 3). According to the Georgian authorities, a simple free-trade agreement would have offered more favourable conditions for Georgian exports than the GSP+ system (which applied to approximately half of Georgian products) by covering a wider range of products. At the same time, it would not have entailed a far-reaching legal approximation process that many in Georgia considered risky for the country’s economic performance. Yet an EU-commissioned feasibility study found that the country would benefit most from a DCFTA as compared to a simple freetrade agreement (CASE 2008: 15). Another study estimated that Georgian exports would increase by 12 per cent, while imports would rise by 7.5 per cent and average wages by 3.6 per cent as a result of the DCFTA (ECORYS/ CASE 2012). Despite its low resonance with the Georgian authorities, deep free-trade soon emerged as a non-questionable model of economic agreement for the EU. This was in contrast to the initial flexibility on economic integration with Eastern neighbours. In the non-paper presenting the Commission’s approach in enhancing the trade and economic component of the ENP, deep economic integration was seen as voluntary, gradual and beneficial for EU neighbours: Deeper economic integration between the EU and its neighbours is a shared interest of all concerned. It is neither benevolence on the part of the EU, nor an imposition. . . . The EU’s neighbours are highly diverse, as are the EU’s relations with each of them. (. . .) This means that any approach to economic integration must take a long-term perspective and be tailored to each country’s specific situation . . . . Yet the challenge with regard to most ENP partners is how to engage them to pursue their ongoing reform processes and to lock in the results. Any approach will need to be gradual.12 (European Commission 2006: 1–2) 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 89 10/25/2016 9:57:06 AM 90 Domestic responses to the EU’s offer However, in the discussions conducted with the Georgian authorities throughout 2008, the EU linked the conclusion of Association Agreements (a major expectation of the Georgian government) to that of a DCFTA (Delcour 2013: 348–349). Ultimately, Georgian authorities had little choice but to accommodate EU requirements in the wake of the conflict with Russia. In fact, the country was left with no other foreign policy alternative than further integration with the EU. Yet the war with Russia also resulted in the EU’s enhancing its offer to Georgia. In particular, the EU envisaged visa facilitation measures in the immediate aftermath of the conflict. The lack of a visa facilitation agreement had been a long-standing grievance of the Georgian authorities, especially in light of the entry into force of the visa facilitation and readmission agreements with the Russian Federation in 2007. Even if unintentionally, the latter indeed enhanced the attractiveness of Russian passports for citizens of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Therefore, the 2008 conflict prompted the EU to launch negotiations for a visa facilitation and readmission agreement with Georgia with the view to counteracting the effects of Russia’s passportisation policy. The decision was announced at the Extraordinary European Council held in the immediate aftermath of the conflict (Council of the European Union 2008). Therefore, in a context characterised by the discrepancy between EU membership aspirations and the perceived low legitimacy of EU rules, the combination of EU macro-level conditionality and the sharp deterioration in the country’s security situation prompted the initial selection of the EU’s model as a normative reference point in Georgia. The country’s engagement in the macro-framework of integration was confirmed and expanded after 2012. The Georgian Dream coalition, who gained power in the wake of the October 2012 elections, indeed abandoned the ultra-liberal approach that had underpinned reforms under the Saakashvili Presidency. This enhanced the resonance of EU rules in Georgia, in a context where Russia was still predominantly regarded as a threat to the country’s security. However, while there is a widespread consensus both within the Georgian political elite and the general public regarding EU integration, surveys conducted in 2015 indicate an erosion of public support for EU membership (60 per cent in favour, down from 79 per cent in 2014, National Democratic Institute 2016). This is against the backdrop of a perceived deterioration of the country’s situation: in 2015, for the first time since 2010, the majority of Georgian citizens (55 per cent) felt that their country is going in the wrong direction (International Republican Institute 2015), and this percentage increased to 70 per cent in 2016 (International Republican Institute 2016). In fact, for some in Georgia (mostly in the regions), there is a growing feeling that EU integration does not yield tangible benefits and in particular does not contribute to curing Georgia’s economic woes, even though support for EU integration increased again to 77 per cent in 2016 (National Democratic Institute 2016) after the European Commission recommended a visa-free regime with Georgia. This discrepancy derives from the fact that the selection of the EU’s macro-framework of integration is still primarily viewed in civilisational and geopolitical terms, i.e. as a means to assert the country’s European identity and to distance itself from Russia. However, the gap between the rewards gained in exchange for EU-demanded 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 90 10/25/2016 9:57:06 AM Domestic responses to the EU’s offer 91 reforms and the country’s political and economic realities may result in a more significant decline in support for EU integration if the latter fails to bring substantial and tangible benefits. Moldova As shown in Chapter 4, in the early 2000s Moldova had sought to pursue a balanced (or ‘dual’, Schmitdke & Chira-Pascanut 2011: 469) foreign policy and to develop integration with the EU in parallel with its strategic partnership with Russia. However, under the presidency of Vladimir Voronin, aspirations for closer integration with the EU were primarily shaped by foreign policy considerations rather than underpinned by a high resonance of EU templates for reform. In fact, they developed in response to the deterioration of relations with Russia after the failure of the Kozak memorandum. In the mid-2000s, Moldova came to regard the EU as a major partner to mitigate the effects of Russia’s punitive measures and diversify the country’s trade. While for some this only reflected an ‘unclear external alignment’ (Hagemann 2013: 768), the EU actually emerged as a necessary counterweight to Russia for Moldova. In other words, the country’s ambivalence (which is in fact deeply rooted in its history) was meant to ensure its survival (Schmitdke & Chira-Pascanut 2011: 474). However, until the late 2000s, Moldova’s engagement under the European Neighbourhood Policy was not sustained by consistent adoption and effective implementation of EU templates for reforms. Despite the substantial expansion of relations, the country fell short of translating the commitments into practice (Korosteleva 2010: 1275). The EU itself reported limited progress in transferring its rules and norms to Moldova (Bosse 2010: 1306). The country’s positive attitude toward integration with the EU was seemingly reinforced as a result of the shift of power resulting from the so-called ‘Twitter revolution’13 in 2009. The three parties forming the new ruling coalition14 had made achieving European integration the centrepiece of their campaign for the 2009 parliamentary elections. The new Moldovan authorities perceived the EU’s enhanced offer under the Eastern Partnership as a pathway to modernisation. This perception was widely shared by the general public, for whom the EU is primarily associated with economic prosperity (Korosteleva 2010: 1281).15 . Therefore, Moldova’s engagement in the EU’s macro-framework of integration seemed driven by both membership aspirations and high resonance of the EU’s model for reforms both with the elite and the general public. The arrival into power of the Alliance for European Integration coincided with the EU’s enhanced offer under the Eastern Partnership and prompted an enhanced commitment to adopting EU templates: ‘The government is fully committed to EU integration. We have daily contacts. Before 2009, we did not have such an access to domestic institutions’.16 During the negotiations for an Association Agreement together with a DCFTA, Moldovan authorities proved both receptive to EU demands and, unlike some other Eastern Partnership countries, reluctant to bargain despite the short-terms costs to be incurred as a result of compliance with EU conditions. 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 91 10/25/2016 9:57:06 AM 92 Domestic responses to the EU’s offer However, closer scrutiny of developments in Moldova suggests that EU integration has been instrumentalised by the incumbent elite as a political survival strategy (see Börzel and Pamuk’s analysis on the South Caucasus 2012). In fact, the domestic political context since 2009 has been characterised by instability owing to struggles for power within the ruling coalition and the collusion between the various political factions and powerful business interests and their control over state institutions (Globsec Policy Institute 2013a). In this context, EU integration has served to cement the coalition, especially upon its creation (Hale 2013). In subsequent years, the Moldovan authorities have attempted to consolidate their power by bringing results related to EU integration. Hence they developed a narrative about carrying out fast-track reforms that would result in a quicker integration. For instance, the Moldovan government indicated that they would implement the second phase of the Visa Liberalisation Action Plan (VLAP) in parallel with the first phase, though they were not requested to do so. Likewise, the Minister of Foreign Affairs indicated that ‘we hope that 90% of the Association Agreement will be implemented before its ratification’.17 This narrative was matched by the EU’s discourse that consistently presented Moldova as the Eastern Partnership’s frontrunner. For the EU, the rise to power of the Alliance for European Integration marked ‘a pro-European shift’ that translated into a ‘very ambitious reform agenda clearly reflecting Moldova’s European aspirations and commitment to the goals of political association and economic integration with the EU’ (Füle 2010). The EU’s positive narrative about Moldova only developed after the deterioration of EU-Ukraine relations in 2011–12. However, surveys indicate that a vast majority of Moldovan citizens fail to see a connection between their government’s policy and EU integration. In fact, 44 per cent of respondents feel that the actions undertaken by the country’s leadership corresponds to the orientation of Moldova toward European integration only to a small extent, and 27 per cent feel that they do not correspond at all (Institutul de Politici Publice 2015). This is because in practice the defence by the ruling elite of its political, business and personal interests override the overarching objective of EU integration. In fact, the adoption and implementation of reforms has lagged behind in those policy areas that are politically sensitive for the elite, in particular the fight against corruption, the reform of law enforcement agencies and the reform of the judiciary (Hagemann 2013; Parmentier 2014). These reforms would indeed put at risk the practices of Moldova’s ‘self-serving elite’ (Kostanyan 2016), including pervasive corruption and capture of state resources by the countries’ key oligarchs. However, while running counter to the short-term interests of the elite, such reforms would improve the country’s business environment and overall economic performance. State capture by (competing) elites, combined with the lack of domestic change in politically sensitive areas, has contributed to delegitimising public institutions among Moldovan citizens and thereby to undermining the Moldovan state itself (Tudoroiu 2015). As of November 2015, as many as 88 per cent of Moldovans felt their country was heading in the wrong direction – an increase of 33 per cent as compared to 2009, a few months after 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 92 10/25/2016 9:57:06 AM Domestic responses to the EU’s offer 93 the Alliance for European Integration came into power (Institutul de Politici Publice 2015). Discontent spans the whole spectrum of government policies, with especially high levels in fighting corruption (72 per cent), salaries and pensions (70 per cent and 74 per cent, respectively). While, as noted above, Moldovan citizens find a disconnect between their government’s reforms and EU integration, the depletion of trust in Moldovan authorities and institutions has gone hand in hand with the erosion of support for EU integration. This is because the EU has been perceived as a partisan player in Moldova (Globsec Policy Institute 2013b). It has failed to impose any costs on the ruling elite for non-compliance in politically-sensitive areas; in fact, the EU has only issued soft recommendations in its annual progress reports18 while continuing to deliver massive financial support to Moldova. It is only in early 2016 (almost two years after USD 1 billion ‘disappeared’ from Moldovan banks) that the EU took a much firmer stance and expressed its concerns about the lack of prioritisation of ‘reforms aimed at addressing the politicisation of state institutions, systemic corruption, public administration reform aimed inter alia at enhancing the effectiveness of regulatory bodies, transparency and accountability in the management of public finances as well as with regard to policy making’ (Council of the European Union 2016). The lack of strong EU pressure on, and perceived proximity with, the ruling elite has negatively affected the EU’s image within civil society19 (Delcour 2015) and contributed to diminishing support for EU integration in Moldova (Kostanyan 2016). However, this has only moderately translated into increased support for EAEU membership: as of November 2015, 48 per cent of the Moldovan population was in favour of joining the EAEU and 45 per cent the EU, as compared to 45 per cent and 44 per cent, respectively, in April 2014 (Institut de Politici Publice 2015).20 This also confirms Russia’s limited leverage (and in fact moderate attempts to influence developments) over the country (Devyatkov 2016). In fact, Russia’s actions (i.e. punitive trade measures imposed by Russia in retaliation for signing the AA/DCFTA and support for those political and societal actors who are less in favour of EU integration, see Chapter 4) did not significantly affect the country’s pro-European course. Therefore, even in a context of competition between two integration projects (with Moldovan public opinion being deeply divided between the EAEU and the EU), domestic developments (in particular, elites’ strategies and instrumentalisation of EU integration) emerge as a decisive factor to explain Moldova’s integration choice (Devyatkov 2016; Kostanyan 2016). Ukraine Among the four selected countries, Ukraine was the first to select the EU as a ‘normative reference point’ (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009: 800). In fact, Ukraine has pursued a pro-European course ever since it became independent (Wolczuk 2004a). Yet both the reasons behind this choice and the degree of Ukraine’s commitment have evolved over time. Under the Kuchma presidency, the country’s ‘European choice’ emerged as a foreign policy priority motivated by geopolitical and security 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 93 10/25/2016 9:57:06 AM 94 Domestic responses to the EU’s offer considerations (Wolczuk 2004b: 10), i.e. the preservation of a newly gained sovereignty. As early as 1996, Ukraine expressed its intention to join the EU, and in 1998, the president adopted a Strategy of Ukraine’s integration to the European Union. Still under the Kuchma presidency, a legal approximation mechanism was created within the Ukrainian institutional system. In 2004, a State Department on Legislation Approximation subordinated to the Ministry of Justice was established to implement the legal approximation agenda deriving from the newly adopted Law on the National Programme of Legal Adaptation of Ukraine’s Legislation to the Acquis Communautaire (Delcour 2007; Wolczuk 2009: 195). Clearly, Ukraine’s modelling of its institutional system after Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) shows that the country positioned itself as a pre-candidate state. However, Europeanisation remained declarative (Wolczuk 2004b) because it was primarily rooted in foreign policy motivations (as a means to emphasise difference from Russia, Wolczuk 2004b: 27) and as a resource in domestic politics rather than in a domestic reform agenda. Crucially, public opinion was divided over foreign policy choices and EU integration in particular; this is despite the fact that in the early 2000s Ukrainian citizens had little awareness of both EU policies and the implications of closer integration with the EU for their country. Following the Orange Revolution at the end of 2004, deeper integration with the EU became the country’s overarching priority. In particular, the Orange Revolution raised aspirations for an enhanced contractual framework governing relations with the EU. Yet the EU offered nothing more than ‘accession conditionality without accession’ (Wolczuk 2009: 188) and vague incentives (as demonstrated in Chapter 3). Ukraine was thus deeply dissatisfied with the European Neighbourhood Policy. Nevertheless, the EU introduced and tested with Ukraine on an ad hoc basis a broad range of policy instruments that were later extended to other ENP countries. In fact, these were initially meant as rewards for the country’s political course toward democratisation (Casier 2011: 48). For instance, Ukraine was the first ENP country with which the EU signed visa facilitation and readmission agreements21 and decided to launch an Association Agreement and a DCFTA;22 the EU also selected Ukraine as the main recipient of its newly created ‘Governance Initiative’. This conveyed a clear message to the Ukrainian authorities: in order to enhance relations with the EU, they were expected to implement the priorities of the ENP Action Plan (Petrov 2006: 59). This seemingly resulted in Ukraine’s move toward ‘real integration’ (Shumylo 2005: 3) with evidence of reforms in the area of human rights, some achievements in the economic area and extensive convergence with the EU on foreign policy and security issues (Barbé et al. 2009) . Therefore, despite Ukraine’s deep disappointment with the ENP, progress in EU-Ukraine relations reinforced the Ukrainian authorities’ acceptance of the ENP as a ‘temporary framework’ (Wolczuk 2009: 198) that would ultimately lead to accession. However, overall the EU integration process was hampered by power struggles within the elite, frequent changes in the institutional framework for EU matters (Wolczuk 2009: 202) and lack of reforms in some politically-sensitive areas such as the judiciary, identified as the most non-transparent branch of power in Ukraine and associated with corruption (Petrov 2006: 63). 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 94 10/25/2016 9:57:06 AM Domestic responses to the EU’s offer 95 The Eastern Partnership, launched in 2009, did not significantly change the picture for Ukraine. This is because of two factors. First, the EaP failed to clarify the ENP’s ultimate goal (its finalité) and in particular, to offer a membership perspective – a criterion according to which Ukraine has always assessed the EU’s policy (Solonenko 2011). This was despite the fact that the enhanced EU offer of an Association Agreement with a DCFTA provided Ukraine with enhanced incentives to comply. In particular, a DCFTA was expected to bring increased benefits as compared to other trade scenarios that were then envisaged by the EU (especially as compared to a simple free-trade agreement).23 Second, Ukraine had already been offered the key elements of the EaP: it had started negotiations for a new contractual agreement (that was named ‘Association Agreement’ in September 2008) in 2007 and for the DCFTA in 2008; it had signed a visa facilitation and readmission agreement in 2007 and started a visa dialogue in view of a future liberalisation of the visa regime in 2008. Therefore, Ukraine was already engaged in the EU’s macro-framework for integration even before the latter was formally launched in the form of the Eastern Partnership. However, the selection of the EU’s model was subsequently subject to major shifts, even though it was not reversed. This was blatantly exposed in November 2013, when then-President Yanukovych decided to suspend the signature of the Association Agreement (which had been initialled in 2011) a few weeks before the Vilnius Eastern Partnership Summit. In contrast to Armenia, Ukraine did not suspend the signature with the view to joining the Russian-led Eurasian Customs Union. This was despite the negative incentives deployed by Russia over the summer of 2013 (a ban on confectionary producer Roshen and enhanced border controls for imports from Ukraine) to deter the country from signing the AA and induce Kyiv into joining the ECU (see Chapter 4). In spite of Russia’s pressure and campaign inside the country (Delcour & Wolczuk 2013), the Ukrainian authorities resisted accession to the ECU as the benefits offered (even if short-term) were unclear. For instance, Russia proposed a reduction of the gas price to $160/mcm (Delcour & Wolczuk 2013: 193). This was a substantial offer for Ukraine’s high energy-consuming exporting industries (e.g. metallurgy), yet this offer was valid for a trimester only. Nevertheless, Russia’s (implicit) threats to limit market access for Ukrainian imports were a major source of concern for Ukrainian business, including the oligarchs. In essence, joining the ECU would strongly limit not only the country’s sovereignty, but also the oligarchs’ capacity to pursue their rentseeking practices when confronted by the more powerful Russian businesses (Stewart 2014: 25). While the political and economic elites feared Russian domination should the country joined the ECU, they were also reluctant to engage further with the EU. This is because the EU’s (belated) stricter political conditionality as of 2012 (especially the emphasis on the release of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko) emerged as a challenge for President Yanukovych, who sought only to consolidate his stranglehold over the country. Therefore, while refraining from joining the Customs Union, the incumbent authorities also attempted to eschew further commitments with the EU (not least with the view to bargaining both with the EU and Russia). To some extent, as was the case in the early 2000s24, this ambivalence was echoed in the Ukrainian population: surveys conducted in 2013 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 95 10/25/2016 9:57:06 AM 96 Domestic responses to the EU’s offer indicated that 42 per cent of respondents supported integration with the EU and 33 per cent joining the Customs Union (Razumkov Centre 2013).25 However, Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the Association Agreement in November 2013 triggered mass protests and ultimately resulted in his demise in February 2014. It is only after the shift of power that the EU’s model was definitively selected with the signature of the AA/DCFTA in June 2014. Therefore, while membership aspirations have been the key factor driving the selection of the EU’s macro-framework of integration in Ukraine (Langbein & Wolczuk 2012), other variables have played a role as well. These include, in particular, sensitivity to Russia’s pressure (that in fact have prompted the country to distance itself from Russia) and elites’ strategies for their own political survival (that explain in particular the balancing game played by Yanukovych). Conclusions As demonstrated in this chapter and summarised in the table below, domestic responses to the EU’s Eastern Partnership mirrors baffling discrepancies not only among countries, but also over time. Table 5.1 The EU’s offer: state of play in Eastern Partnership countries Country Association Agreement DCFTA Visa facilitation & readmission agreement Visa Visa dialogue/ liberalisation action plan Armenia ———— (negotiated 2010–13) ———— (negotiated 2012–13) In force January 2014 ———— ———— Azerbaijan ———— ———— In force September 2014 ———— ———— Belarus ———— ———— Negotiations opened 2014 ———— ———— Georgia Signed June 2014 In force July 2016 Signed June 2014 In force September 2014 In force March 2011 Action Plan 2013, 2nd phase 2014 (recommended by the European Commission 2015) Moldova Signed June 2014 In force July 2016 Signed June 2014 In force September 2014 In force 2008 Action May 2014 Plan 2010, completed 2013 Ukraine Signed Signed March 2014 June 2014 In force January 2016 In force 2008 Action Plan 2010, 2nd phase 2014 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 96 (recommended by the European Commission 2016) 10/25/2016 9:57:06 AM Domestic responses to the EU’s offer 97 In attempting to explain these variations, this chapter has shed light on a variety of factors. First, the chapter confirms the findings of the literature: as illustrated by the cases of Moldova and especially Ukraine, membership aspirations are a major driver when it comes to engagement with the EU’s offer. However, as shown by the case of Armenia in 2010–13, a desire for closer integration with the EU decoupled from any membership aspirations can also provide the necessary impetus to engage in an association process with the EU. Second, interdependence with Russia carries explanatory weight to account for the selection (or non-selection) of the EU’s macro-framework for integration. The depth and breadth of interdependence (and in fact, the degree of dependence vis-à-vis Russia) determines the way in which Russia’s policies play out and affect the selection of the EU’s model (see Ademmer 2015). In the case of Armenia, the country’s vulnerability explains its de-selection of the EU’s integration framework and its accession to the EAEU. In the three other cases, the country’s sensitivity (but not vulnerability, Ademmer 2015: 672) to Russia has incentivised the selection of the EU’s macro-framework of integration. In other words, Russia’s threats to the countries’ territorial integrity, military interventions in Georgia and Ukraine, and punitive trade measures have had counter-productive effects, since they induced Eastern Partnership countries to embrace the EU’s offer. This was especially salient in Georgia: while the authorities had opposed a DCFTA (in spite of declared membership aspirations), the conflict with Russia left them with no other alternative than to accept the EU’s macro-framework of integration. Third, the strategy of incumbent elites also plays a crucial role in the selection of the EU’s macro-framework of integration. Armenia, Moldova and Ukraine offer clear illustrations of the way in which survival strategies have affected EU integration. In Armenia, the authorities’ initial engagement in the AA/DCFTA negotiations was underpinned by the need to re-build their legitimacy through economic modernisation; this was combined with the lack of any EU political conditionality that could have threatened their survival. However, should the country have engaged further with the EU and signed an Association Agreement, the EU’s pressure for deeper political reforms would have significantly increased, while it remained low during DCFTA negotiations that focused on technical approximation with EU acquis. Domestic demand for democratisation, which was already strong in the wake of the marred 2008 elections, would only have added to the EU’s pressure; it is likely that both the incumbent elite and the opposition would not have withstood this situation (Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum 2015: 57). Therefore, the security of the regime, as much as of the country, prompted the de-selection of the EU’s model. In a similar vein, Ukraine offers a blatant example of the intertwining between external actors’ offers and demands, on the one hand, and incumbent authorities’ struggle for survival, on the other hand. With stricter political conditionality since 2012, association with the EU carried political risks for the regime of President Yanukovych and his Party of Regions in preparation for the planned 2015 presidential elections (Delcour & Wolczuk 2015b: 465). At the same time, while 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 97 10/25/2016 9:57:06 AM 98 Domestic responses to the EU’s offer using Russia’s pressure and financial incentives as a bargaining tool with the EU, the Ukrainian elites refrained from engaging in Eurasian integration, as this also threatened the survival of the Ukrainian oligarchs who supported the Yanukovych regime. With the ENP developing and moving toward implementation, the literature has naturally shifted from discussions of the selection of EU rules and toward the adoption and the application of those rules; this has also entailed a move away from broad country studies to sectoral analyses. Scholars indicated that policy change cannot be explained by looking solely at macro-level characteristics, as these carry little explanatory weight to account for sector-specific compliance with EU demands (Langbein & Börzel 2013: 574). However, this chapter brings the selection (and hence the macro-level) back into the analysis. This is because the selection of a macro-framework of integration cannot be taken for granted in a fast-changing and complex context characterised by competing offers, as vividly illustrated by the examples of Ukraine in 2013 and especially Armenia. Notes 1 President Sargsyan, speech before the plenary meeting of the 20th Congress of the European People’s Party (EPP), Marseille, 7 December 2011, available at: http://www.president.am/ en/foreign-visits/item/2011/12/07/news-344/ (accessed on 30 December 2011) 2 Paragraph 42, Annex 3 ‘Terms and Transitional Provisions’, Dogovor o prisoedinenii Respubliki Armenya k Dogovoru o Evraziiskom ekonomicheskom soyuze [Agreement on the accession of the Republic of Armenia to the Agreement on the Eurasian Economic Union], 2014 3 1.13 per cent of the total (Dogovor o prisoedinenii Respubliki Armenya k Dogovoru o Evraziiskom ekonomicheskom soyuze [Agreement on the accession of the Republic of Armenia to the Agreement on the Eurasian Economic Union], 2014) 4 Author’s interview, Eurasian Economic Commission, Moscow, May 2015. 5 Author’s interview, Armenian Minister, Eurasian Economic Commission, Moscow, May 2015. 6 In spring 2015, the EU and the Armenian government finalised the ‘scoping exercise’, i.e. the identification of areas that could be included in a new EU-Armenia agreement, taking into account Armenia’s new commitments vis-à-vis the Eurasian Union. Interview, political officer, EU Delegation to Armenia, March 2015. 7 Author’s interview, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Yerevan, March 2015. 8 Author’s interview, Ministry of Economy, Yerevan, March 2015. 9 Author’s interview, Ministry of Economy, Yerevan, March 2015. 10 Speech by Grigol Vashadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs, New York University, 15 April 2010, available at: http://www.mfa.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_ id=50&info_id=13048 (accessed on 30 November 2011) 11 Author’s interview, Chief Economic Advisor to the Prime Minister, Tbilisi, November 2010. 12 Bold emphasis in the original text. 13 As demonstrated by Hale, in fact the shift of power had more to do with succession politics and elite networks coordination than with social media (Hale 2013). 14 The governing coalition Alianţa pentru Integrare Europeană was formed in August 2009 and gathered three parties: the Liberal Party, the Liberal-Democratic Party and the Democratic Party. 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 98 10/25/2016 9:57:06 AM Domestic responses to the EU’s offer 99 15 According to a survey conducted by the Eurasia Foundation in 2008, 82.4 per cent of respondents believed that accession to the EU would strengthen the country’s development. Overall, 77 per cent of respondents supported Moldova’s membership to the EU (quoted in Schmitdke & Chira-Pascanut 2011: 478). 16 Author’s interview, Head of EU Delegation to Moldova, Chişinău, May 2012. 17 Minister of Foreign Affairs’ speech before the Civil Society conference, Eastern Partnership Summit, Vilnius, November 2013 (author’s participation in the conference). 18 See e.g. ‘Moldova is invited to: intensify the fight against corruption at all levels’, European Commission/High Representative, 2014. 19 Focus group organised in Chişinău, May 2014. 20 In 2013, support to EU and ECU accession totalled 51 and 52 per cent, respectively; yet only 23 per cent of respondents opposed joining the ECU, while 30 per cent opposed accession to the EU (Tudoroiu 2015: 672). 21 Outside the ENP framework, these had first been negotiated and concluded with Russia. 22 Negotiations for a new agreement replacing the PCA were launched in March 2007. It is only in September 2008 that the EU and Ukraine decided that the ‘new agreement’ would be an ‘Association Agreement’ ‘leaving open the way for further progressive developments in EU-Ukraine relations’ (Council of the European Union 2008). Negotiations for a DCFTA were also launched in 2008, upon Ukraine’s WTO accession. 23 According to studies that have been conducted prior to the launch of negotiations, the DCFTA is expected to increase welfare in Ukraine by at least 2 per cent (ECORYS/ CASE 2007) and up to 7 per cent (CEPS/IfW/ICPS 2006). 24 Surveys conducted in the early 2000s suggested that many Ukrainians were in favour of reinforcing integration with both the EU and Russia/the CIS (Wolczuk 2004b: 12) 25 Yet, as was the case in the mid-2000s (Shumylo 2005), these figures covered sheer regional disparities with a massive support to EU integration in western regions (with a staunch opposition to ECU accession) and a clear majority in favour of the ECU in eastern regions. References Ademmer, E. (2015). Interdependence and EU-Demanded Policy Change in a Shared Neighbourhood. Journal of European Public Policy, 22(5), pp. 671–689. Barbé, E., Costa, O., Herranz Surrallés, A., & Natorski, M. (2009). Which Rules Shape EU External Governance? Patterns of Rule Selection in Foreign and Security Policies. Journal of European Public Policy, 16(6), pp. 834–852. Bertelsmann Stiftung. (2014). Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2014: Armenia Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung. Börzel, T., & Pamuk, Y. (2012). Pathologies of Europeanisation: Fighting Corruption in the Southern Caucasus. West European Politics, 35(1), pp. 79–97. Bosse, G. (2010). The EU’s Relations with Moldova: Governance, Partnership or Ignorance. Europe-Asia Studies, 62(8), pp. 1291–1309. CASE. (2008). Economic Feasibility, General Economic Impact and Implications of a Free-Trade Agreement between the European Union and Georgia. Warsaw: CASE. Casier, T. (2011) To Adopt or Not to Adopt: Explaining Selective Rule Transfer under the European Neighbourhood Policy, Journal of European Integration, (33)1, pp. 37–53 CEPS/IfW/ICPS. (2006) The Prospect of Deep Free Trade Between the European Union and Ukraine. Brussels: CEPS. 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 99 10/25/2016 9:57:06 AM 100 Domestic responses to the EU’s offer Council of Europe. (1999). 1999 Ordinary Session: Official Report of Debates. Strasbourg: Council of Europe. Council of the European Union. (2008). EU-Ukraine Summit: Conclusions. Paris, 9 September, 12812/08 (Presse 247). Delcour, L. (2007). Does the European Neighbourhood Policy Make a Difference? Policy Patterns and Reception in Ukraine and Russia. European Political Economy Review, (7), pp. 118–155. Delcour, L. (2014). Faithful But Constrained? Armenia’s Half-Hearted Support to Russia’s Regional Initiatives in the Post-Soviet Space. In D. Cadier (ed.), Geopolitics of Eurasian Integration (pp. 38–45). London: London School of Economics. Delcour, L. (2015). Between the Eastern Partnership and Eurasian Integration: Explaining Post-Soviet Countries’ Engagement in (Competing) Region-Building Projects, Problems of Post-Communism, (62)6, pp. 316–327. Delcour, L., & Wolczuk, K. (2013). Eurasian Economic Integration and Implications for the EU’s Policy in the Eastern Neighbourhood. In R. Dragneva, & K. Wolczuk (eds.), Eurasian Economic Integration: Law, Policy, and Politics (pp. 179–203). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Delcour, L., & Wolczuk, K. (2015a). The EU’s Unexpected ‘Ideal Neighbour’? The Perplexing Case of Armenia’s Europeanisation. Journal of European Integration, 37(4), pp. 491–507. Delcour, L., & Wolczuk, K. (2015b). Spoiler or Facilitator of Democratization? Russia’ Role in Georgia and Ukraine. Democratization (22)3, pp. 459–478. Devyatkov, A. (2016). Moldova: The end of the Star Wars Era, Intersectionproject.eu, Retrieved on February 16, 2016, from http://intersectionproject.eu/article/ moldova-end-star-wars-era Di Puppo, L. (2009). The Externalization of JHA Policies in Georgia: Partner or Hotbed of Threats? European Integration, 31,pp. 103–118. Di Puppo, L. (2010). Between Hesitation and Commitment: The EU and Georgia after the 2008 War. Washington: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program. Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, Open Society European Policy Institute, International Renaissance Foundation, PASOS. (2015). European Integration Index 2014 for Eastern Partnership Countries. ECORYS/CASE (2007). Global Analysis for the EU-Ukraine TSIA, Rotterdam: ECORYS. ECORYS/CASE. (2012). Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment in support of negotiations of a DCFTA between the EU and Georgia and the Republic of Moldova. Rotterdam: ECORYS. ECORYS/CASE. (2013). Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment in support of negotiations of a DCFTA between the EU and the Republic of Armenia. Rotterdam: ECORYS. Eisenbaum, B. (2007). GSP+: Enhancing Georgian Exports Diversifying Georgian Foreign Trade. Tbilisi: Delegation of the EU to Georgia. European Commission. (2006). ENP – A Path towards Further Economic Integration. Non-paper expanding on the proposals contained in the communication COM (2006) 726 final. Brussels, 4 December. European Commission (2015), Trilateral talks on EU-Ukraine DCFTA. Distinguishing between Myths and Reality. Retrieved June 10, 2016, from http://trade.ec.europa.eu/ doclib/docs/2015/december/tradoc_154127.pdf Füle, S. (2010). Speech at EPP public hearing on EU-Moldova relations, Brussels, European Parliament, 9 June, SPEECH/10/296. 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(2012). Convergence without Membership? The Impact of the European Union in the Neighbourhood: Evidence from Ukraine. Journal of European Public Policy, 19(6), pp. 863–881. Lavenex, S., & Schimmelfennig, F. (2009). EU Rules beyond EU Borders: Theorizing External Governance in European Politics. Journal of European Public Policy, 16(6), pp. 791–812. Magen, A. (2006) The Shadow of Enlargement: Can the European Neighbourhood Policy Achieve Compliance? Columbia Journal of European Law, 12, pp. 383–427. National Democratic Institute. (2016). Public Attitudes in Georgia. Tbilisi: National Democratic Institute. Oskanian, K. (2016, April 11). The Balance Strikes Back: Power, Perceptions, and Ideology in Georgian Foreign Policy, 1992–2014. Foreign Policy Analysis. Retrieved, from http:// dx.doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orw010 Parmentier, F. (2014). Moldova. In Cadier, D. (ed.), Geopolitics of Eurasian Integration (pp. 46–53). London: London School of Economics. Petrov, R. (2006). Past and Future Action on Approximation of Ukrainian Legislation to that of the EU. In Copsey, N. & Mayhew, A. SEI Seminar Papers Series No 1, pp. 58–66. Razumkov Centre (2013). Customs Union or Europe? The Public Opinion, National Security and Defence No. 4-5, pp. 104–132. Schmitdke, O., & Chira-Pascanut, C. (2011). Contested Neighbourhood: Toward the Europeanization of Moldova? Comparative European Politics, 9(4–5), pp. 467–485. Shumylo, O. (2005) The Debate on the EU Membership Prospects of Ukraine. Warsaw: Institute of Public Affairs. 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 101 10/25/2016 9:57:06 AM 102 Domestic responses to the EU’s offer Solonenko, I. (2011). Added Value? Eastern Partnership and EU–Ukraine Bilateral Relations, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung: Berlin. Stewart, S. (2014). Ukraine. In Cadier, D. (ed.), Geopolitics of Eurasian Integration (pp. 23–30). London School of Economics. Tarr, D. (2016). The Eurasian Economic Union among Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia and the Kyrgyz Republic: Can It Succeed Where its Predecessor Failed?, Eastern European Economics, 54(1), pp. 1–22. Tudoroiu, T. (2015). Democracy and State Capture in Moldova. Democratization, 22(4), pp. 655–678. Wolczuk, K. (2004a). Ukraine’s European Choice. London: Centre for European Reform. Wolczuk, K. (2004b). Integration without Europeanisation: Ukraine and Its Policy towards the European Union. EUI Working Papers. Fiesole: European University Florence. Wolczuk, K. (2009). Implementation without Coordination: The Impact of EU Conditionality on Ukraine under the European Neighbourhood Policy. Europe-Asia Studies, 61(2), pp. 187–211. 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 102 10/25/2016 9:57:06 AM 6 The EU’s policy transfer to the post-Soviet space in a context of rival trade integration frameworks The case of food safety1 Deep economic integration (defined as integration ‘going beyond free trade in goods and services . . . , addressing non-tariff barriers and progressively achieving comprehensive convergence in trade and regulatory areas’ [European Commission 2006: 4]) is a cornerstone of the EU’s offer under the Eastern Partnership. In recent years, it has moved to the centre stage of both the EU’s policy transfer and rivalry with Russia in the ‘contested neighbourhood’. Trade bans imposed by Russia on several Eastern Partnership countries and EU counter-measures suggest that the effectiveness of EU-driven change in trade-related areas is challenged by a number of factors that entangle domestic reforms and competing integration regimes. For EaP countries, the ambitious agenda set by the DCFTAs requires massive reforms before the benefits can be reaped. This is especially the case for agriculture. This sector (of key importance for most Eastern Partnership countries) is expected to benefit from lower customs duties and improved access to the EU market based upon regulatory convergence with EU sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards. Nonetheless, approximation with EU acquis in the food safety area is likely to be prohibitively costly for post-Soviet countries given their lower level of development and initially deeply different food safety system and standards. In addition, the EU’s offer of deep economic integration has been fiercely opposed by Russia on the grounds that it allegedly forces Eastern Partnership countries to choose between the DCFTA and free-trade agreements signed in the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States, and thus threatens existing links between post-Soviet countries (Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the European Union 2015). The adoption of EU sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards is of particular concern to the Russian authorities, who have pointed to the damage to Russian companies exporting to Eastern Partnership markets. The literature has shown that domestic change in line with EU demands is often selective and patchy, especially at the adoption level. Domestically, it has identified the lack of ‘preferential fit’ over outcomes (Ademmer & Börzel 2013) and the role of veto players (Langbein & Wolczuk 2012; Buzogány 2013) as key variables accounting for the selective adoption of EU norms; however, the 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 103 10/25/2016 9:57:06 AM 104 EU’s policy transfer: food safety impact of lingering post-Soviet informality on EU-demanded change remains underexplored (for an exception, see Stewart 2013). Regionally, the literature indicates that Russia’s recent regional integration project appears as a powerful instrument to undermine EU integration. This is because it has increasingly entailed a veto on post-Soviet countries’ engagement with the EU (Dragneva & Wolczuk 2014). However, this literature has ignored the effects of this instrument on the adoption and implementation of EU-demanded change and thereby falls short of exploring the interactions between macro-frameworks of integration and micro-processes of policy transfer. In a context of mutually exclusive offers, one would expect a cumulative effect of the above-mentioned variables. The costs of reforms to achieve the DCFTAs are expected to be increased domestically by the role of veto players and lingering post-Soviet informality, and regionally by Russia’s competing project and retaliatory measures (Delcour 2016). Therefore, one would expect the engagement in a deep economic integration regime either to be blocked or to translate into compliance with the selected standards at the sectoral level. Yet I show that the macro-level framework of integration and sectoral compliance hardly coincide. For instance, the country that has more extensively adopted EU food safety standards and templates in the early 2010s, Armenia, abruptly decided not to sign a DCFTA with the EU and eventually joined the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union. My empirical findings thus point to a complex and multifaceted relationship between engagement in a macro-level framework of integration and shifting sectoral compliance patterns. This chapter seeks to explain this puzzle by exploring the factors that shape EU-demanded policy change in the food safety area and disentangling the different levels of change. Chapter 5 demonstrated that the selection of EU rules hinges on Eastern Partnership countries’ prioritisation of EU integration, Russia’s use of (dis-)incentives in connection to EAEU membership, and elites’ strategies. In this chapter, I look at the interplay between domestic preferences, EU policy mechanisms and Russia’s policies, and I scrutinise their impact more specifically on the adoption and implementation of EU demands. The first part of the chapter presents EU demands for domestic change selected for an in-depth analysis in the food safety area. The second part traces the process of change in line with EU demands in the four selected countries and applies the explanatory variables identified in Chapter 2. EU demands for change selected for analysis in the food safety area From the EU demands presented in Chapter 3, I select several specific requirements for an in-depth investigation of the reforms’ outcomes in partner countries. I focus on those demands that have been put forward by the EU either in the preparation phase of negotiations for a DCFTA or during the negotiation process. These demands also correspond to the different levels of change identified in the second chapter of this work. I identify the opening of negotiations for a DCFTA 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 104 10/25/2016 9:57:06 AM EU’s policy transfer: food safety 105 Table 6.1 EU food safety demands selected for analysis Level of change in response to the EU EU demands Selection Opening of negotiations for a DCFTA Adoption Adoption of a Food Safety Law, Strategy, Action Plans; Setting-up of a Food Safety Agency Introduction of the HACCP system Implementation Application of inspections by the state; Application of HACCP by private operators as the main EU demand to be scrutinised at the selection level since it reflects ‘the undertaking of a commitment to adopt and implement EU rules in official relations’ (Langbein & Wolczuk 2012: 863). Adoption, in the traditional legal approach, refers to the transposition of EU rules into domestic law. However, in the broader sense that is used here, it also pertains to the creation of institutions and the adoption of policy documents required by the EU. In the food safety area, the EU has placed the emphasis on the introduction of a structured approximation process with key EU regulations and on institutional reform to ensure better protection of food and feed products. Therefore, I select the following EU demands for an in-depth analysis at the adoption level: the adoption of a Food Safety Law complying with EU acquis (together with a Food Safety Strategy structuring the approximation process and the corresponding Action Plan) and the setting-up of a Food Safety Authority (promoted as a best practice by the EU) responsible for ensuring food/feed safety and carrying out state control over the fulfilment of hygiene, veterinary-sanitary and phyto-sanitary requirements. More specifically, I also check whether this law introduces the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) system (a monitoring system for food production, storage and distribution introduced by the UN Codex Alimentarius). Finally, at the implementation level, I select the application of HACCP by private operators, as well as the introduction of food inspections by the state. Domestic change in Eastern partnership countries in the food safety area Armenia As noted in Chapter 5, Armenia belatedly, yet extensively, engaged in EU integration under the Eastern Partnership and showed evidence of substantial domestic change in line with EU templates. Yet the country’s choice in favour of the EU’s integration regime appeared short-lived since President Sargsyan announced in September 2013 that his country would eventually join the Russia-led EAEU. Therefore, Armenia offers an unprecedented example of ‘de-selection’ of the EU 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 105 10/25/2016 9:57:06 AM 106 EU’s policy transfer: food safety model. However, patterns of change at the adoption and implementation levels reveal a more complex picture. While Armenia started converging with EU food safety standards in the mid2000s, compliance was both shallow and circumscribed to specific demands. For instance, while drawing upon EU general food safety regulation (Council of the European Union/European Parliament 2002), the Armenian law on Food Safety adopted in 2006 did not offer sufficient protection regarding hazard. It recognised HACCP as the major control system but did not specify any timetable for its effective introduction in the food production and processing system. However, as indicated in chapter 5, modernisation emerged as an imperative for Armenia at the end of the 2000s (Delcour & Wolczuk 2015a). Agriculture was identified as a key sector to reduce Armenia’s economic vulnerability. This is because of two interconnected factors. The agro-alimentary complex provides over 21 per cent of the GDP and thus plays a major role in Armenia’s economy (Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of Armenia 2011). At the same time, the sector’s potential was untapped, with local production covering slightly more than half of the needs. In 2010, the government approved a strategy for agriculture and sustainable development for 2010–20 that envisaged a substantial increase in agricultural production capacities and export volumes. Against that backdrop, the Armenian authorities perceived the EU’s offer under the Eastern Partnership as an opportunity to carry out their own reform agenda. In essence, the EU’s acquis was regarded as a chance to modernise the country’s food production and to develop competitive products, in contrast to the lowerquality food products that are exported to the Russian and CIS markets. Therefore, following the launch of the Eastern Partnership, substantial reforms were carried out between 2010 and 2013 to meet EU food safety requirements. A major step was the establishment by governmental decree of a State Service for Food Safety in December 2010, replacing previous bodies2 and creating a united authority as demanded by the EU. The establishment of the State Service for Food Safety kicked off reforms in the area (Delcour & Wolczuk 2015a: 496). The drafting of a food safety strategy and the related action plan for its implementation in 2011 was yet another major step in the convergence process with EU norms. The strategy envisaged approximate full approximation of national legislation with EU standards. On this basis, laws such as ‘On food safety’, ‘On veterinary’, ‘On phytosanitary’, ‘On organizing and carrying out inspections’, as well as numerous subordinate normative acts, were adopted in 2011 and developed a general legislative framework in line with EU templates. An intergovernmental working group, composed of food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary experts, was also established to ensure further approximation of national legislation with EU requirements (Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of Armenia 2011), especially regulations of hygiene package, as well as vertical legislation. HACCP started to be effectively introduced and inspections (which were initiated on a limited scale at the end of the 2000s) were strengthened and expanded.3 Upon the launch of negotiations for a DCFTA early 2012, Armenia had adopted key EU policy-specific demands and started applying them. The 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 106 10/25/2016 9:57:06 AM EU’s policy transfer: food safety 107 implementation process was developed in 2012–13, in parallel with negotiations. While the coincidence between governmental preferences and the EU’s offer is a pivotal explanatory factor, the country’s top-down decision-making system and the EU’s conditionality and assistance also contribute to explaining the rapid adoption of EU rules and their effective implementation in 2010–13. Despite the involvement of a number of institutions in the management of EU integration (Ghazaryan 2014), the vertical nature of the Armenian decisionmaking system has facilitated compliance with EU demands at the adoption and application stages. Yet this does not mean that EU rules have been imposed from above. For instance, prior to the launch of DCFTA negotiations, the government launched consultations with food producers and associations in order to identify the products for which Armenia would seek license to export to the EU market. In fact, all interviews conducted with Armenian officials (whether high- or midlevel) point to a high resonance of EU standards that are still perceived as highly legitimate after accession to the EAEU: ‘EU advisors opened our eyes. We have achieved a lot in terms of modernisation over the past few years.’4 This also explains the impact of EU sector-specific conditionality and socialisation in the reform process. With the Eastern Partnership, the EU significantly reinforced sector-specific conditionality to ensure effective implementation of key EU demands. This was achieved by formulating ‘key recommendations’ to be fulfilled before the negotiations for DCFTAs could be launched (Delcour & Wolczuk 2013). While it was criticised in Georgia, in Armenia EU conditionality structured the whole reform process, as underlined by the adoption in 2011 of a ‘Strategy for accelerating the reforms in the Republic of Armenia within the framework of the Eastern Partnership’. In fact, Armenian authorities and officials envisioned the spelling out of EU conditions as a necessary learning process in order to benefit from the elimination of non-tariff barriers under the DCFTA: ‘We want to understand what we should do to export to the EU’s market’.5 Moreover, the EU’s offer under the Eastern Partnership coincided with enhanced socialisation and increased assistance, which were equally instrumental in familiarising Armenian officials with EU rules and its approach to food safety. From 2011 onwards, the provision of EU long-term sectoral expertise as part of an EU High-Level Advisory Group (a group of experts based in those Armenian ministries and bodies that were identified as key institutions for the preparation of the AA/DCFTA) significantly improved the understanding of EU requirements by Armenian civil servants. In the food safety area, the EU advisor worked closely with the State Service for Food Safety to draft major legal and policy documents in line with EU demands and helped strengthen Armenia’s capacities to control the quality of food products.6 Given the country’s limited capacities, TAIEX and Twinning projects proved equally crucial to bolster compliance with EU demands. In particular, Armenia benefitted from a Twinning project to upgrade the safety controls system for animal origin food and feed that helped Armenian officials better understand the EU’s approach to traceability. 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 107 10/25/2016 9:57:07 AM 108 EU’s policy transfer: food safety However, in September 2013 President Sargsyan’s decision to join the Russian-led Eurasian integration process7 abruptly put an end to deep economic integration projects with the EU. Yet, despite joining the EAEU, Armenian civil servants still hope to retain some EU templates and practices adopted under DCFTA negotiations: ‘We don’t want to lose with Eurasian integration what we have learnt from the EU’.8 Even after the decision not to sign a DCFTA was made public, the Armenian authorities continued developing the legislative approximation process with EU regulations foreseen as part of the 2011 Action Plan.9 As also envisaged by the Food Safety Strategy drafted in line with EU demands (Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of Armenia 2011), inspection capacities were strengthened and working groups were established to promote HACCP implementation by food business operators, especially through training and delivery of methodological guidelines. Accession to the Eurasian Economic Union in early 2015, however, prompted the adoption of a series of legal amendments to comply with the EAEU’s food safety requirements. These include, for instance, decisions on the procedure of the recognition of equivalence of SPS measures and the procedure of risk assessment, as well as on the registration system of business entities and products. However, this does not mean that all changes introduced in the early 2010s in response to EU demands have been abruptly eliminated. In fact, the actual impact of accession to the Eurasian Union (effective as of 2 January 2015) on EU-demanded domestic change still needs to be ascertained. This is because of three interconnected factors. First, as underlined by Armenian officials,10 there is still a lack of clarity about the EAEU itself, and therefore about what is required from member countries. Second, Armenia has secured around 800 exemptions during the negotiation process to join the EAEU. While most of these are temporary, the country will not have to comply fully with EAEU standards before 2022. Some exemptions relate to agricultural products and sanitary/phyto-sanitary measures and thereby provide the country with some leverage (even if temporary) over the transfer of EAEU standards. Third, as both the DCFTA and the EAEU are (in principle) based upon WTO rules, some of their standards are compatible. Armenia will thus be able retain some elements of the food safety reforms introduced under the Eastern Partnership (e.g. HACCP). Therefore, previous compliance with EU demands is broadly seen as an asset for Armenia in the Eurasian integration project. In fact, as a result of both its early WTO membership and especially its substantial adoption of EU templates in 2010–13, Armenia is regarded as a frontrunner compared to other EAEU members. Interestingly, the Eurasian Economic Commission refers to Armenia as an example from which other countries could draw inspiration in a number of sectors.11 Therefore, after selecting the EU’s model under the Eastern Partnership, Armenia has substantially adopted and started implementing EU food safety templates. This results from a number of factors. The high resonance of EU norms carries major explanatory weight, while the country’s top-down 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 108 10/25/2016 9:57:07 AM EU’s policy transfer: food safety 109 decision-making process and EU policy mechanisms (conditionality and capacitybuilding) have facilitated sectoral domestic change. While security imperatives prompted Armenia to engage in the Eurasian integration process, evidence suggests that the resonance of EU sectoral standards and norms remains high. While the adoption of EU rules has formally stopped, the impact of accession to the EAEU on EU-driven domestic change currently remains unclear. This is due to the transition periods secured by Armenia and the emerging and rapidly changing character of Eurasian integration in the food safety area. Georgia Despite a strong Western foreign policy orientation and vocal EU membership aspirations after the Rose Revolution, Georgia fiercely resisted the adoption of EU food safety templates in the 2000s. Until recently, EU rules were only selectively adopted and hardly implemented. This was primarily due to the strong normative dissonance between the EU’s templates and the former authorities’ reform agenda. However, since 2013 the country has shifted toward full compliance with EU food safety demands as a result of changing elites’ preferences. Like Armenia, Georgia is a traditionally agricultural country. Agriculture is a key sector in terms of employment, with 53.1 per cent of the total workforce employed in the sector in 2011 (Food Agricultural Organisation 2012: 9). Despite its social importance, the sector’s contribution to the GDP has been shrinking. This is due to land fragmentation, lack of machinery and technologies, and the high costs of agriculture inputs.The privatisation process from the 1990s indeed gave rise to a subsistence-oriented agriculture, with land owners classified as self-employed in agriculture (Food Agricultural Organisation 2012: 9). In addition, in Georgia the GOST (Gosudarstvennyi standard) system (which provided for some degree of protection) was totally dismantled in the 1990s as a consequence of the economic collapse that followed the country’s independence.12 Despite these challenges, agriculture has been no exception in the laissez-faire approach, which prevailed in the 2000s during the Saakashvili presidency. Unlike Armenia, Georgia did not adopt a specific development strategy for the sector. While introducing some of the changes required by external actors (primarily the EU and the WTO), the authorities de facto watered down the substance of these changes at the adoption and/or implementation stage. This is because EU demands for increased control of food safety production thwarted the elites’ liberal convictions and did not coincide with their deregulation agenda (Delcour 2013: 350). For instance, the Law on Food Safety and Control adopted in 2005 was in line with the key EU and international standards. In particular, it envisaged the establishment of a National Food Agency and shifted away from the Soviet GOST system by placing the emphasis on the prevention of risks during the production process. However, the two amendments which were subsequently passed (in 2006 and 2007) resulted in the suspension of the law’s core articles, especially those pertaining to traceability. This resulted in moving the food safety system away from EU standards. 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 109 10/25/2016 9:57:07 AM 110 EU’s policy transfer: food safety Perhaps paradoxically, while posing a clear threat to a sector that was largely oriented toward the Commonwealth of Independent States’ (CIS) market and prompting the country to diversify its exports, the 2006 trade bans imposed by Russia did not trigger a more comprehensive adoption of EU food safety templates under the ENP Action Plan. Together with Moldova, Georgia was among the first post-Soviet countries to experience Russian trade bans; in the case of Georgia, however, these were both extensive and long-lasting. It resulted in a steep decline in agricultural production and prompted the country to diversify its export markets. However, this did not lead to increased compliance with EU food safety demands under the ENP Action Plan. Ironically, it is after the Russian embargo (in 2007) that the Georgian government passed amendments moving food safety standards away from the EU’s. In 2008–09, the strengthening of EU’s sector-specific conditionality prior to the opening of DCFTA negotiations was instrumental in triggering initial compliance efforts in a broader context of regional vulnerability after the 2008 war with Russia. In 2009, the EU prepared a matrix of preconditions for opening DCFTA negotiations (Messerlin et al. 2011). In the food safety area, these included strengthening the institution in charge of food safety, drafting a national strategy on food safety and applying pending legislation on inspections. While the introduction of ‘EU key recommendations’ was criticised by the Georgian authorities,13 as a result of stricter EU conditionality, several important legal and institutional changes were introduced in 2010–11. The status of the body in charge of food safety was enhanced from a state service to a state agency, with resources from the national budget.14 In addition, the National Food Agency was restructured with a view to unifying fragmented bodies (a best practice recommended by the EU), more staff was hired so that the Agency could assume its growing responsibilities and an annual training needs programme was introduced. By the end of 2010, 40 per cent of staff had been trained on existing legislation and objectives to be reached, as well as on testing methodologies.15 A comprehensive Strategy and Legislative Approximation Programme in the Sphere of Food Safety was approved in December 2010, and a series of government resolutions were adopted between 2010 and 2012 to comply with the EU’s ‘hygiene package’. The previously suspended articles of the Law on Food Safety and Quality, namely those related to registration of food business operators and implementation of inspections, also started to be implemented. Registration of food business companies began in February 2010, inspection of food business operators commenced a few months later and fines for violating food safety requirements were enacted in 2011. Georgia’s compliance with EU norms, however, was in many respects minimal.16 Between 2009 and 2012, the adoption of key policy and legal documents in line with EU demands was not followed by their effective application. For instance, while introducing food inspections (an EU demand), the Georgian authorities suggested having them conducted by private bodies. However, this was not compatible with EU demands on the role of the state in controlling food safety. In a similar vein, the country introduced the HACCP system, yet suggested limiting its application to those companies that would export to the EU market. 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 110 10/25/2016 9:57:07 AM EU’s policy transfer: food safety 111 In fact, the Georgian authorities only formally complied with EU demands and kept bargaining with the EU about the scope of conditions.17 The government tried to legitimise its stance by emphasising the costs that the Georgian agricultural sector would have to bear to comply with EU conditions. For the country, approximation with EU standards would not only entail high economic costs in a politically sensitive sector (given the high percentage of employment), it would also disrupt, or put an end to, traditional agricultural practices, for instance slaughtering pigs in backyards. However, in essence the authorities’ reluctance derived primarily from the dissonance between EU demands and the liberal reform agenda pursued by Georgia since 2004: ‘Georgia and the EU have different approaches. Georgian authorities’ policy is about making business easily. The EU’s policy is about exporting standards and rules’.18 The strong deregulative approach favoured by authorities at the time also resulted in limiting EU assistance in the food safety area. For several years, the Food Safety Agency opposed the delivery of Twinning projects because their procedures were perceived as exceedingly burdensome and lengthy. The pervasiveness of the deregulative approach was also favoured by the top-down nature of the ENP-related decision-making process: decisions on legal approximation with EU acquis were centralised at the State Commission under the Prime Minister’s office, while line Ministries (and thus sector experts) were hardly consulted. More recently however, the change of power in the country explains the shift toward more systematic compliance, against the lack (for the time being) of sector-specific pressure by Russia. Developments in the food safety area since 2013 have reflected a more thorough application of provisions related to both HACCP and inspections.19 The application of HACCP also received a significant impetus with the new Code on Food Safety, Veterinary and Plant Protection that came into force early May 2014. This shift toward full compliance from 2013 onwards derives primarily from a change in the government’s preferences. The new authorities who gained power after the October 2012 elections abandoned the ultra-liberal approach that had underpinned the whole reform process under the Saakashvili presidency. They also conferred more powers to line Ministries and agencies in order to enable the development of EU-related expertise there.20 Domestic change in line with EU demands was also facilitated by the EU’s increased assistance, with two objectives: foster the preparation of DCFTAs in key sectors and help address the economic and social costs of compliance (which had been invoked by the previous authorities to justify limited compliance). In line with the first objective, the National Food Safety Agency was selected as a core institution in the framework of the Comprehensive Institution-Building Programmes (CIB) designed to strengthen the administrative capacity of those bodies involved in DCFTA negotiations (European Commission 2010). As such, it benefitted from a number of TAIEX initiatives as well as a Twinning project. In line with the second objective, the EU has broadened the scope of its assistance programmes with the view to strengthening the private sector’s capacities – a major issue for Georgia. In Georgia, the EU has allocated €40 million to the European Neighbourhood Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 111 10/25/2016 9:57:07 AM 112 EU’s policy transfer: food safety (ENPARD [EU Neighbourhood Info Centre 2013]), inspired by the Special Accession Program for Agriculture and Rural Development (SAPARD), which was designed to assist candidate countries in reforming their agriculture in the 1990s. Through support for farmers, ENPARD aims at promoting the development of a more competitive and modern agriculture and creating a favourable environment for export to the EU market. However, while the DCFTA has been provisionally applied since September 2014, much remains to be done to comply with EU sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards. For instance, the number of inspections has increased, yet remains very low.21 This is no longer because of the low resonance of EU rules, but because of the weak capacities of the National Food Agency (23 inspectors at the central office, while many regional offices have no inspectors).22 In parallel with the signature of the AA/DCFTA, the normalisation with Russia sought by the new authorities since 2013 has made Georgia more sensitive (even if to a limited degree) to Russia’s policies. By subjecting Georgia to extensive trade bans since 2006, Russia had de facto cut off trade interdependences. Yet the resumption of links in 2013 has provided Russia with renewed leverage over the country. The lifting of bans in Russian-Georgian trade relations has been gradual, starting with wines, mineral water and fruits, and proceeding company by company (Cenusa et al. 2014: 8). Despite this incremental move, the Russian market quickly regained importance for Georgian producers. Russia, Georgia’s fourth largest trading partner in 2013, moved to third place in 2014 with a 9.5 per cent increase over 2013 (Civil.ge 2015). Yet Russia’s economic leverage is limited due to two interconnected factors. First, the economic crisis in Russia seems to have brought the expansion of trade flows to a halt. The country now accounts for 9.6 per cent of Georgia’s exports (with wine and mineral water being the key export products). Second, in contrast to Moldova and Ukrain, Russia reacted surprisingly softly to the signature of an AA/DCFTA between Georgia and the EU. As noted in Chapter 4, while the Russian authorities expressed concerns over the possible impact of the DCFTA on bilateral trade, they have so far refrained from suspending the bilateral free-trade agreement signed with Georgia in 1994. Therefore, the case of Georgia’s food safety reforms blatantly exposes the limited impact of external influences on domestic change, especially when domestic actors resist this change. As shown in Chapter 5, both the EU and Russia (even if unintentionally for the latter) have influenced the selection of EU rules in Georgia; however, this chapter shows that none of them accounts for their adoption and application (or lack thereof). Georgia’s commitment to the EU’s macro-framework of integration remained largely deprived of any policy substance until the end of 2012, due to the low resonance of EU food safety standards within the incumbent elite. The authorities fiercely resisted the transposition of EU rules, which they considered harmful for its economy. It is only after the change of government (a few months before the end of DCFTA negotiations), bringing Georgian elites’ preferences closer to EU demands, that the country started systematically adopting and enforcing EU-demanded change. 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 112 10/25/2016 9:57:07 AM EU’s policy transfer: food safety 113 Against that backdrop, while the DCFTA has provisionally entered into force in September 2014, there is no evidence of Russia’s impact (be it exerted through positive measures, e.g. re-establishment of trade flow, or negative incentives, e.g. increased grip over the breakaway regions) on EU-demanded change for the time being. Moldova In the food safety area, Moldova only belatedly complied with EU demands. Despite some reform measures after the collapse of the Soviet Union and early accession to the WTO (in 2001), in the 1990s and 2000s Moldova failed to introduce key reforms in line with the WTO Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Agreement and EU requirements. While the 2009 shift of power (coinciding with the launch of the Eastern Partnership) resulted in the firm selection of EU integration, this only translated into selective sectoral reforms, with limited adoption and implementation. In fact, the factors that have hindered domestic change (i.e. the fusion between economic and political interests, the fragmentation of state institutions and the weight of Soviet legacies) still carry substantial weight for explaining the country’s selective compliance. In the early 2000s, the launch of the ENP and the more extensive list of EU requirements in the ENP AP did not trigger any substantial compliance shift in Moldova. This is despite the fact that agriculture is the most important sector in Moldova’s economy. It contributes approximately 21 per cent of the GDP, and it is the most important sector in terms of employment, with 40 per cent of the working population employed in agriculture (World Bank 2007b: 7). In fact, compliance with EU demands in the food safety area was hampered by two factors. First, a number of institutions retained were involved in the management of the food safety and agricultural health system and thereby retained a vested interest in the preservation of the status quo. Yet this only resulted in overlapping responsibilities and unnecessary equipment; for instance, despite the country’s extreme poverty, each of these institutions was still equipped with their own labs. Second, technical and legal legacies from the Soviet period still prevailed in Moldova. In the mid-2000s, the country still predominantly relied upon thousands of regulatory and technical standards inherited from the Soviet GOST system, as these were fully transposed onto Moldovan legislation after independence. Overall, the Soviet-style management of food safety, combined with the persistence of GOST standards, proved costly for the country. Nonetheless, the prevalence of Soviet legacies also made it easier for Moldovan producers to export to CIS markets, which accounted for 75% of agricultural exports in the mid-2000s (World Bank 2007b). Against that backdrop, perhaps paradoxically the imposition of a Russian ban on wine in 200623 had only very limited effects on EU-demanded change in Moldova. It contributed (together with the extension of EU trade preferences beyond Generalised System of Preferences [GSP]+ level in 2008) to changing the geographical structure of Moldovan trade. Whereas until the mid-2000s 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 113 10/25/2016 9:57:07 AM 114 EU’s policy transfer: food safety Russia and other CIS countries figured prominently in Moldova’s trade, in 2007 the EU accounted for 50.6 per cent of the country’s exports and 45.6 per cent of its imports. Yet despite the losses incurred by the country,24 Russia’s ban did not trigger any substantial reforms in the food safety area. As shown in Chapter 5, the arrival into power of the Alliance for European Integration in 200925 prompted an enhanced commitment to adopting EU templates. This shift of the governmental agenda and preferences coincided with the EU’s enhanced offer under the Eastern Partnership, in particular the preparation of negotiations for a DCFTA. At the end of 2010, the EU formulated key recommendations to be fulfilled before the opening of DCFTA negotiations. These included the adoption of a Food Safety Strategy and the related Action Plan, as well as the creation of a single institution responsible for food safety management.26 Sector-specific conditionality was instrumental in triggering the adoption of key reforms in Moldova. A Food Safety Strategy 2011–15 (Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry of the Republic of Moldova 2011), a plan for approximating legislation with EU acquis and a Food Safety Law in line with EU acquis were adopted in 2011 and 2012, respectively. In addition, increased EU assistance under the Eastern Partnership facilitated the reform process in a country with weak administrative capacities. The Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry benefitted from a number of TAIEX activities and a Twinning on Plant Health. Following the Armenian example, an EU HighLevel Policy Advice Mission to the Republic of Moldova (funded by the EU and implemented by the United Nations Development Programme [UNDP]) was deployed to support the government in the implementation of the EU integrationrelated reforms, in particular in view of the Association Agreement and DCFTA. In the food safety area, the assistance of the EU advisor to the Ministry of Agriculture was pivotal in drafting the key policy documents, such as the Plan for approximating Moldovan legislation to the EU acquis. However, while policy advice was considered helpful in the reform process, staff at the Ministry of Agriculture was more critical of some other assistance mechanisms. In particular, like their Georgian counterparts, Moldovan officials denounced the cumbersome procedures of Twinning, which resulted in outdated projects. For instance, a specific Twinning was foreseen to support the creation of the Food Safety Agency, yet it started once the Agency was operational and the Twinning project description (Twinning fiche) had to be thoroughly revised.27 For Moldova, the lack of administrative capacities emerged as a major problem in the absorption of EU (and other donors’) assistance. At the Ministry of Agriculture, an understaffed unit had to deal with a variety of procedures under different assistance mechanisms and projects funded by the EU, the World Bank, USAid and the European Investment Bank.28 The lack of well-trained and motivated staff29 strongly constrained the delivery of EU assistance and thus its impact. Despite the reforms conducted in 2011–12, the adoption of other EU demands stumbled against the vested interests of the various institutions involved in the management of sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards. For instance, bureaucratic power struggles hindered the creation of the National Food Safety Agency. The initial proposal envisaged placing the new Agency under the authority of the 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 114 AuQ1 10/25/2016 9:57:07 AM EU’s policy transfer: food safety 115 Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry. However, in line with the Romanian model, the Agency was finally subordinated directly to the government. This entails a disconnection between policy formulation (which still lies with the Ministry of Agriculture) and implementation (for which the Agency is responsible). In addition, only part of the functions of the four institutions involved in food safety management30 were transferred to the Food Safety Agency,31 thus undermining the latter’s competences and creating scope for overlaps. For instance, the Ministry of Health is still responsible for controlling the application of sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards in restaurants. While the adoption of EU food safety templates has been hampered by weak coordination and inter-institutional fights, their application is also particularly challenging for Moldova. EU-driven reforms are expected to bring substantial benefits to the country. According to an EU-commissioned study, as a result of the DCFTA with the European Union, Moldova’s GDP should increase by 5.4 per cent and its exports to the EU by 16.2 per cent (ECORYS/CASE 2012). The first economic indicators published after the (still partial) elimination of EU quotas and other barriers seem to confirm that Moldova is already benefiting from easier access to the EU market (Expert Grup 2014).32 However, the greater benefits of GDP growth and increased exports to the EU will be reaped only in the mid- to long-term, when Moldovan products meet the stringent EU requirements and can fully access the EU market.33 For the time being, the application of EU standards (for instance HACCP) by private operators stumbles against the persistence of Soviet legacies. With the adoption of WTO and EU standards, the responsibility for food safety compliance has shifted to the private sector. The costs of adjustment therefore primarily hinge on businesses (World Bank 2007a). However, farmers and food operators have only limited understanding of the food safety approach promoted by the EU. This is despite the fact that this approach is broadly similar to the WTO’s, an organisation that Moldova joined in 2001. Businesses still regard the state as the primary locus of responsibility for controlling food quality, while they should actually perform preventive controls throughout the control chain. Yet, as put by the head of a fruit producers association: ‘Our farmers and agribusiness operators are oriented to produce, not to sell’.34 Farmers actually have little, if any, interest and experience in controlling the quality of their production since this was systematically checked by the state under the Soviet GOST approach that was maintained in Moldova after the country’s independence. In addition, trade patterns in the post-Soviet space have contributed to perpetuating Soviet standards and practices since, until recently, the bulk of exports within the Commonwealth of Independent States were still based on GOST certification (World Bank 2007b: 21). Therefore, regional trade interdependences also undermined the adoption of EU standards, as it was easier for most producers to comply with GOST standards and thus to export to Russia or other CIS countries. It is in this context that Russia retaliated against the signature of the DCFTA by imposing a series of trade restrictions and cancelling tariff-free preferences under the 2011 Russia-Moldova CIS Free Trade Agreement for 19 categories of products (Cenusa et al. 2014: 5). The punitive trade measures introduced by 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 115 10/25/2016 9:57:07 AM 116 EU’s policy transfer: food safety Russia in 2013–14 have furthered the diversification of Moldovan trade flows away from Russia. The decrease in exports to Russia has only been exacerbated by the economic crisis that hit the country in 2014. In that year exports to the Russian Federation accounted for 18 per cent of Moldova’s total exports, as compared to 30 per cent in 2012 (Popa 2015b: 8). This is because of two interconnected factors. First, the EU has responded to Russia’s bans by cutting tariffs and increasing quotas for Moldovan products, thereby facilitating their access to the EU’s market. Second, given the lack of stable and transparent rules of the game, Moldovan producers ‘understand that the Russian market is no longer an option, as the application of standards is opaque and the threat of an embargo is permanent’.35 By removing any credible alternative to the EU’s market, Russia’s trade measures – meant to compromise Moldova’s EU integration – may actually yield the opposite effect. However, the EU’s counter-measures did not compensate for the harm inflicted by Russian trade bans on Moldovan agricultural exports, given their low competitiveness on the EU market and the existence of non-tariff barriers (Kostanyan 2016). In addition, there is no conclusive evidence of a push effect of Russia’s disincentives on compliance with EU-demanded change, as was the case in other countries and/or sectors (see Buzogány 2016). In fact, Moldova still needs to implement major reforms in order to comply with DCFTA requirements (Popa 2015a). Therefore, the reorientation of Moldovan exports toward the EU market36 is only a long-term perspective given the weak competitiveness of Moldovan products and the limited capacities of Moldovan companies. In Moldova, the firm selection of the EU’s model after the change of power in 2009 (which coincided with the launch of the Eastern Partnership) has only been followed by the selective adoption and limited application of EU food safety rules. The vested interests of the institutions involved in the agricultural sector hindered the transposition of EU rules, while practices inherited from the Soviet Union strongly constrained their application. In particular, food operators’ practices are still deeply framed by the Soviet approach to sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards. In this context, EU policy mechanisms carry substantial weight to explain increased sectoral change in line with EU templates in 2012–13. Together with DCFTA negotiations, EU sector-specific conditionality structured the process of approximation, while assistance improved domestic bureaucracy’s understanding of EU requirements and its capacity to address them. The analysis of reforms undertaken by Moldova in the food safety area highlights the clash of different timescales. With the DCFTA, the EU requires rapid and wide-ranging reforms that entail massive costs in the short-term for domestic actors, while benefits can be reaped only in the longer term. In this context, regional interdependences and institutional arrangements contribute to explaining the bumpy reform process until 2011. Indeed, intra-CIS markets (based upon similar standards) have until recently offered an alternative to Moldovan producers. Russia’s disincentives since 2013 (in the form of trade bans and the cancellation of trade preferences under the CIS Free Trade Agreement) have massively increased the cost of this alternative. However, it is too early to gauge 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 116 10/25/2016 9:57:07 AM EU’s policy transfer: food safety 117 whether or not Russia’s measures will contribute to overcoming domestic actors’ resistance to EU-demanded change in the food safety area. Ukraine Over the past decade the selection of the EU as a normative reference point has not been followed by the systematic transposition of EU rules in Ukrainian legislation and their effective application. In particular, in the food safety area, EU demands for reform have only belatedly translated into legal adoption and policy implementation. In essence, in this sector emerging compliance can be observed only in 2014, i.e. six years after DCFTA negotiations were launched, and two and a half years after they were completed. This is despite the fact that amongst Eastern partners, Ukraine has the greatest potential to export (e.g. dairy, meat, cereals, fruits) to the EU market. Agriculture is a major sector of the Ukrainian economy and a significant share of its exports, especially to the EU (European Commission DG Trade 2015). Yet regulatory convergence with EU demands in the food safety area has been characterised by inertia throughout the 1990s and the 2000s (Langbein 2013). As suggested in the literature, the key factor behind inertia is the lack of tangible rewards tied to the adoption of EU sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards (Langbein 2013: 650). Therefore, the DCFTA is expected to change the structure of incentives for Ukraine, since it offers a clear reward (in the form of enhanced access to the EU market) in exchange for the (costly) adoption of EU food safety standards. While the country is expected to substantially benefit from access to the EU market, what explains the belated compliance with EU demands for reform? The lack of specific EU conditionality tied to DCFTA negotiations contributes significantly to explaining poor compliance outcomes. Unlike Armenia, Georgia and Moldova, Ukraine was not subject to ‘key recommendations’ to be fulfilled before the launch of negotiations for a DCFTA. This means that EU demands on Ukraine in the food safety area have been based upon the non-binding and limited requirements included in the ENP Action Plan with hardly any prioritisation. Moreover, while the DCFTA holds the promise of enhanced EU market access, benefits cannot be gained immediately. In particular, the import of products to the EU market is contingent upon post-Soviet countries meeting the stringent EU vertical legislation for the product concerned. In other Eastern Partnership countries, preconditions have played a key role in fostering compliance in the absence of short-term benefit, yet they have not done so in Ukraine, where no key recommendations were offered. As a consequence, the preparations for a DCFTA have not per se altered the costs-benefit analyses of Ukrainian domestic actors. These carry substantial explanatory power for interpreting the reform process and compliance patterns with EU templates. First, ‘the exchange of economic resources against political support’ (Puglisi 2003) and the role of oligarchs are defining features of the context in which the reform process unfolds. In Ukraine, business interests have captured the state, and access to state power enables them to secure their own interests (Dimitrova 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 117 10/25/2016 9:57:07 AM 118 EU’s policy transfer: food safety & Dragneva 2013: 663). They act as informal veto players in the adoption and application of EU rules (Dimitrova & Dragneva 2013: 663) whenever these are perceived as constraining their interests. This is abundantly illustrated in the food safety area. Throughout the 2000s, all the institutions involved in the management of the food safety system have retained a vested interest in the status quo. They were especially interested in the preservation of a fragmented management system, which enabled all of them to maintain a rent-seeking behaviour and take bribes from private actors. The status quo was thus backed by powerful agribusiness actors that had only limited interest in moving toward EU practices (in the absence of market access). As a result, the laws that were adopted in the food safety area provided for unclear obligations that would not harm the interests of large business companies. For instance, the 2005 law on food safety provided that food business operators should implement HACCP or any other food safety monitoring system. In other words, the law did not only fail to introduce mandatory HACCP (a demand formulated by the EU in the ENP AP), it also failed to provide an adequate legal framework for food control since no definition of ‘other food safety monitoring system’ was provided. Second, complying with EU demands was costly for state institutions in light of poor coordination and weak capacities (Wolczuk 2009). This explains, in particular, limited effectiveness in conducting inspections. State officials lack expertise in HACCP and therefore cannot adequately inspect compliance or ‘judge whether an appropriate food safety system is in place’ (International Finance Corporation 2009). As a result of overlapping responsibilities and low coordination, food business operators can be requested to provide samples to different state institutions for the same food safety indicators (USDA Foreign Agricultural Service 2009). This is also because state institutions view inspections as a source of additional revenues. Third, EU assistance has had a limited role so far in building institutional capacities in the food safety area. Starting with TACIS,37 the EU has supported the strengthening of the food safety control system in line with WTO-SPS requirements. Yet, even though they included training on inspections, as indicated elsewhere (Langbein 2014: 164), EU-funded technical assistance projects primarily focused on the elimination of trade barriers and discrimination against EU exporters to Ukraine. After the European Neighbourhood Policy was launched, TAIEX and Twinning projects were launched in support of food safety reforms. Yet these projects were implemented prior to, or at the beginning of, DCFTA negotiations and therefore remained disconnected from the substance of negotiations. With the Eastern Partnership, the focus of the EU’s assistance shifted toward building the capacities of state institutions for DCFTAs’ preparation and implementation. However, the EU’s capacity-building activities became hostages to the shortcomings they were supposed to overcome. Together with state aid control and migration, sanitary and phyto-sanitary capacity was identified as a key priority in the Comprehensive Building Program framework document signed in October 2010. Nevertheless, the approval of the Institutional Reform Plan on SPS capacity (a prerequisite to the deployment of EU assistance) was delayed because of both the uncertainty connected to legal and institutional changes and competition between 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 118 10/25/2016 9:57:07 AM EU’s policy transfer: food safety 119 institutions in the food safety area.38 Therefore, the first projects funded under the CIB only started in 2014, just a few weeks before the DCFTA was signed. Finally, Ukrainian businesses still display little understanding of EU templates and limited interest in applying them. Despite the lack of clear legal provisions for the food control system, HACCP has been introduced by large food operators exporting to the EU. Yet the extent to which it is effectively implemented remains to be ascertained, as some businesses find it easier to bribe officials than to invest in the application of EU procedures and related controls.39 While the largest Ukrainian companies have shown interest in EU templates and procedures, even with the perspective of a DCFTA, many Ukrainian SMEs can hardly see any benefit in adopting EU standards. This is because meeting the stringent EU requirements is costly for them, especially since they have little chance of gaining market access in the short-term. Despite deeply-entrenched domestic opposition, Ukraine shows evidence of emerging compliance with EU demands in the food safety area. Clearly, the factors that prohibited the adoption of EU templates have not vanished. For instance, in 2014 the adoption of a new food safety law gave rise to competition between two projects supported by different lobbies.40 However, Russia’s policies toward Ukraine in 2013–14 prompted a sense of urgency about reforms and left the country with no other alternative than opting for EU-demanded change. At the macro-level, the emergence of Russia as a direct security threat (with the annexation of Crimea and support for rebels in eastern Ukraine) only resulted in consolidating the commitment to further integration with the EU (Delcour & Wolczuk 2015b). At the sectoral level, Russia’s negative incentives clearly pushed the country toward compliance with EU demands. While the measures introduced in 2013 proved insufficient to induce Ukraine to join the Eurasian Customs Union, throughout 2014 Russia significantly expanded trade bans (e.g. on cheese, potatoes, poultry from a large Ukrainian producer, raw milk and dairy products, alcohol) in retaliation for both domestic developments and the signature of an Association Agreement with the EU (Cenusa et al. 2014). This resulted in a seemingly durable deterioration of perceptions of the Russian market among Ukrainian producers and enhanced their interest vis-à-vis EU templates.41 Most Ukrainian oligarchs had been in favour of the DCFTA after negotiations were launched, as they feared the threat of absorption by larger Russian companies should Ukraine join the Eurasian Union.42 The annexation of Crimea and Russia’s support for rebels in eastern Ukraine only resulted in fostering support of agribusiness actors (whether large or small) for integration with the EU. Therefore, while evidence for the actual degree of compliance with EU demands is lacking (since key pieces of legislation are not yet in force), Russia’s combination of actions threatening the existence of the Ukrainian state and targeted punitive measures has facilitated the adoption of EU-prescribed change. This is primarily because the scope of Russian pressure has not only increased the attractiveness of the EU’s offer but also prohibited any other policy alternative for Ukraine. To sum up, Ukraine was the first ENP country to engage with the EU’s deep economic integration model. However, in many respects Europeanisation remained declarative (Wolczuk 2003). While all political leaders (regardless of their affiliation) have prioritised closer ties with the European Union, institutional 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 119 10/25/2016 9:57:07 AM 120 EU’s policy transfer: food safety fragmentation and unclear responsibilities, as well as the vested interests and rent-seeking practices of domestic bodies involved in the reform process, have hampered efforts to translate the selection of the EU’s model into effectively adopted and implemented EU templates While at the end of 2013 President Yanukovych’s swings between the EU and Russia only indicated the shallowness of the ruling elite’s engagement, Russia’s threats to the country’s security resulted in a firm selection of the EU’s model as a reference point for the reform process. Yet, despite recent progress in adoption of EU templates, this commitment has not yet fully materialised. More than any other Eastern Partnership country, Ukraine thus illustrates the disjuncture between the selection of EU rules (seemingly envisaged as a mere foreign policy declaratory exercise) and their transposition into domestic reforms. Conclusions The analysis of compliance patterns with EU demands in the food safety area reveals counter-intuitive findings that are summarised in the table below. Table 6.2 Domestic change in response to the EU: food safety standards Selection Adoption Application Armenia Negotiations for DCFTA concluded (2013) Agreement not signed Selection of another deep economic integration model (accession to the EAEU, 2015) Food Safety Law, Food Safety Strategy and Action Plan in line with EU requirements (2011) Food Safety Agency (2010) HACCP & inspections introduced in 2010–11, continuous application despite the non-signature of the DCFTA Georgia Agreement signed (2014) Food Safety Law revised in line with EU requirements (2011) Food Safety Agency (2011) Limited inspections & HACCP introduced in 2010–11; extended in 2013 Moldova Agreement signed (2014) Food Safety Law (2012), Food Safety Strategy (2011) and Action Plan in line with EU requirements Food Safety Agency (2013) Inspections introduced in 2012–13 HACCP introduced, but limited application Ukraine Agreement signed (2014) Food Safety Law (2014) Food Safety Agency (2014) HACCP introduced, but limited application 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 120 10/25/2016 9:57:07 AM EU’s policy transfer: food safety 121 In all four countries (with the exception of Armenia between 2010 and 2013), empirical analysis highlights a disjuncture between engagement in deep economic integration frameworks and sectoral change in trade-related areas. This is because the variables identified (the costs of reforms, the role of veto players, Russia’s competition and informal practices) do not have cumulative, but varying and opposite effects on the EU’s policy transfer (Delcour 2016). Closer scrutiny of sectoral change at the adoption and application levels highlights glaring discrepancies in the countries’ responses to the EU’s and Russia’s policies, as well as variation over time in the policy transfer process within a given country. Overall, the findings suggest that the influence of external actors decreases during the adoption and application of selected templates. Without a doubt, as indicated in Chapter 5 the EU’s enhanced offer under the Eastern Partnership has triggered a stronger interest from partner countries, yet it has not yielded systematic compliance and carries only limited explanatory power at the adoption and application levels. Likewise, Russia’s policies do have an impact on the selection of a macro-framework for integration, but there is little evidence of Russia’s influence at further stages of the policy transfer process. This clearly points to the predominant role of domestic factors at the adoption and application levels. At the adoption level, while EU policy-specific conditionality has played the role of a trigger in Moldova and a facilitator in Armenia and Georgia, I find that none of the domestic-level variables identified in the literature alone can account for the selective adoption of rules. Rather, the comparison across four countries enables me to shed light on the sheer diversity of factors that explain this discrepancy. In Armenia and Georgia, elites’ preferences play a crucial role in either pushing for (Armenia, Georgia after 2013) or in resisting (Georgia until 2013) the adoption of EU templates. In Moldova and Ukraine, I find that institutional vested interests and poor coordination are key obstacles in transposing EU rules. The application level unveils the relevance of other factors that are common to Eastern Partnership countries. In particular, together with weak administrative capacities, the persistence of Soviet and post-Soviet practices (e.g. the notion of state vs. individual responsibility, the intertwining between economic and political power, the lack of involvement of non-state actors in the policy process) strongly influences the (lack of) application of EU food safety standards. As a result, the current food safety system is still a hybrid. States have limited capacities for overseeing the enforcement of standards and practices, as well as little experience in engaging in a dialogue with the private sector. Within the private sector, WTO-compliant standards are applied by a limited number of businesses, primarily large, export-oriented operators; small businesses operating within the internal market still retain practices inherited from the Soviet system, even though the Soviet standards themselves have not been consistently applied after the collapse of the USSR. 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 121 10/25/2016 9:57:07 AM 122 EU’s policy transfer: food safety Notes 1 This chapter draws on Delcour (2016, 2017) for the empirical data on developments in Armenia, Georgia and Ukraine. 2 Before the creation of the State Service for Food Safety, two directorates under the Ministry of Agriculture dealt respectively with phyto-sanitary standards and with veterinary and food safety standards. Author’s interview, State Service for Food Safety, Yerevan, November 2011. 3 Author’s interview, deputy director, State Service for Food Safety, Yerevan, February 2014. 4 Author’s interview, Ministry of Economy, Yerevan, March 2015. 5 Author’s interview, Director of the Food Safety Service, Yerevan, November 2011. 6 Author’s interview, EU’s SPS expert, EU High-Level Advisory Group, Yerevan, November 2011. 7 The decision was announced on 3 September 2013, five weeks after the negotiations for a DCFTA were completed and two months before the Vilnius Eastern Partnership Summit, where the EU and Armenia should have initialled the Association Agreement. 8 Author’s interview, Ministry of Economy, Yerevan, March 2015. 9 Author’s interview, deputy director, State Service for Food Safety, Yerevan, February 2014. 10 Author’s interviews, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Economy, State Service for Food Safety, Yerevan, March 2015. 11 Author’s interview, Department of Integration, Eurasian Economic Commission, Moscow, May 2015. 12 Author’s interview, Project Officer in charge of sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards, Tbilisi, November 2011. 13 The authorities pointed to the absence of any ex-ante conditions in the negotiations for Association Agreements with Central European countries in the 1990s. Author’s interview, chief negotiator for the Association Agreement, Tbilisi, November 2010. 14 Author’s interview, SPS task manager, EU Delegation, Tbilisi, November 2011. 15 Author’s interview, Deputy Director of the National Food Agency, Tbilisi, November 2011. 16 Author’s interviews, European Commission, DG TRADE and DG SANCO, Brussels, October 2012. 17 Author’s interview, project officer in charge of sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards, Tbilisi, November 2011. 18 Author’s interview, Team Leader, Georgian Policy and Legal Advice Centre, Tbilisi, November 2010. 19 Author’s interviews, Director of the National Food Agency, Tbilisi, March 2013; Trade officer, EU Delegation to Tbilisi, April 2014. 20 Author’s interview, Deputy Head of Department, Office of the State Minister for Euro-Atlantic Integration, March 2013. 21 It is estimated that 1.3 per cent of the registered food business operators were inspected in 2013 (Food Agricultural Organization 2014) 22 Author’s interview, Director of the National Food Agency, Tbilisi, March 2013. 23 This embargo resulted from the sharp deterioration of relations with Moldova after the rejection of the proposed Russian plan for the resolution of the conflict in Transnistria, the Kozak memorandum, which was initially presented in 2003. 24 In 2006–07, the losses for Moldovan exports were estimated at USD 400 million (Centre for Eastern Studies 2010). 25 The governing coalition Alianţa pentru Integrare Europeană was formed in August 2009 and gathered three parties: the Liberal Party, the Liberal-Democratic Party and the Democratic Party. 26 Author’s interview, deputy head, International Relations Division, Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry of the Republic of Moldova, Chişinău, May 2014. 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 122 10/25/2016 9:57:07 AM EU’s policy transfer: food safety 123 27 Author’s interview, Head of the Monitoring and Evaluation Division, Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry of the Republic of Moldova, Chişinău, May 2014. 28 The Unit was initially staffed with three people, yet at the time of interview only one was operational. Ibid. 29 This is due in particular to high turnover, owing to low salaries. These range from €70 for a junior civil servant to €300 for a senior official. Author’s interviews, Head of EU Delegation to Moldova, Chişinău, May 2012; and EU advisor on food safety, High-Level Policy Advice Mission to Moldova, Ministry of Agriculture, Chişinău, May 2014. 30 These included the Ministry of Health and Social Protection (State Sanitary and Epidemiological Service (Saniped)); the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry (State Sanitary Veterinary Service, Central State Inspectorate for Plant Protection, and the Food Industry and Technical Regulations Division); the State Phytosanitary Quarantine Service; and the Standardisation and Metrology Service (The World Bank 2007b: 20). 31 Author’s interview, deputy head, International Relations Division, Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry of the Republic of Moldova, May 2014. 32 For instance, wine exports to the EC grew by 26 per cent as compared to 2013. 33 Currently, Moldova is only eligible to export honey to the EU market. Eligibility to export (materialised by a licence number) is granted by the European Commission deciding on the basis of a detailed questionnaire and a technical audit by the EC’s DG SANCO and the EU’s Food and Veterinary Office, once the country has sent a request for a specific product. 34 Author’s interview, head of the Fruit Producers and Exporters Association ‘Moldova Fruct’, Chişinău, May 2014. 35 Ibid. 36 The EU already plays a predominant role in the country’s trade flows: in 2013, the EU accounted for 46.4 per cent of Moldova’s overall trade (49.8 per cent of its exports and 45.2 per cent of its imports) (European Commission DG Trade 2015). 37 TACIS (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States) was the assistance programme launched by the EU to support transformations toward a market economy and democratisation in the post-Soviet space. It was replaced in 2007 by the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). 38 Author’s interview, EU official, EU delegation to Ukraine, Kyiv, April 2012. 39 Ibid. 40 Author’s interviews, civil society expert specialising in food safety and International Finance Corporation (IFC) Project Manager, Kyiv, June 2014. 41 Author’s interview, director of the Ukrainian Agribusiness Club, Kyiv, June 2014. 42 Author’s interview, Ukrainian project officer, EU delegation to Ukraine, Kyiv, April 2012. References Ademmer, E., & Börzel, T. (2013). Migration, Energy and Good Governance in the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood. Europe-Asia Studies, 65(4), pp. 591–608. Buzogány, A. (2013). Selective Adoption of EU Environmental Norms in Ukraine: Convergence à la Carte. Europe-Asia Studies, 65(4), pp. 609–630. .Buzogány, A. (2016). EU-Russia Regulatory Competition and Business Interests in PostSoviet Countries: The Case of Forestry and Chemical Security in Ukraine. Eurasian Geography and Economics, 57(1), pp. 138–159. Cenusa, D., Emerson, M., Kovsiridze, T., & Movchan, V. (2014, September). Russia’s Punitive Trade Policy Measures towards Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. CEPS Working Document 400, Brussels. Civil.ge. (2015). Georgia’s 2014 Foreign Trade. Retrieved April 13, 2015, from http:// www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=27984 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 123 10/25/2016 9:57:07 AM 124 EU’s policy transfer: food safety Council of the European Union/European Parliament. (2002, February 1). Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and the Council Laying Down the General Principles and Requirements of Food Law, Establishing the European Food SafetyAuthority and Laying Down Procedures in Matters of Food Safety. Official Journal of the European Communities, L31. Delcour, L. (2013). Meandering Europeanisation: EU Policy Instruments and Policy Convergence in Georgia under the Eastern Partnership. East European Politics, 29(3), pp. 344–357. Delcour, L. (2017). Competition in Policy and Institutional Transfer: The EU and Russia in the ‘Contested Neighbourhood’. In M. Hadjiisky, L. Pal, & C. Walker (eds.), The Micro-Dynamics and Macro-Effects of Policy Transfer. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Delcour, L., & Wolczuk, K. (2013). Eurasian Economic Integration and Implications for the EU’s Policy in the Eastern Neighbourhood. In R. Dragneva, & K. Wolczuk (eds.), Eurasian Economic Integration: Law, Policy, and Politics (pp. 179–203). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Delcour, L., & Wolczuk, K. (2015a). The EU’s Unexpected ‘Ideal Neighbour’? The Perplexing Case of Armenia’s Europeanisation. Journal of European Integration, 37(4), pp. 491–507. Delcour, L., & Wolczuk, K. (2015b). Spoiler or Facilitator of Democratization? Russia’ Role in Georgia and Ukraine. Democratization, 22(3), pp. 459–478. Dimitrova, A., & Dragneva, R. (2013). Shaping the Convergence with the EU in Foreign Policy and State Aid in Post-Orange Ukraine: Weak External Incentives, Powerful Veto Players. Europe-Asia Studies, 65(4), pp. 658–681. Dragneva, R., & Wolczuk, K. (2013). Eurasian Economic Integration: Law, Policy and Politics. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Dragneva, R., & Wolczuk, K. (2014). The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and the Challenges of Inter-Regionalism. Review of Central and East European Law, 39, pp. 213–244. ECORYS/CASE. (2012). Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment in Support of Negotiations of a DCFTA between the EU and Georgia and the Republic of Moldova. Rotterdam: ECORYS. EU Neighbourhood Info Centre. (2013, March 15). Georgia: €40 Million for Agriculture Sector through Newly Launched EU-Funded Programme. EU Neighbourhood Info Centre. Retrieved March 26, 2014, from http://www.enpi-info.eu/eastportal/news/latest/32372/ Georgia:-%E2%82%AC40-million-for-agriculture-sector-through-newly-launched-EUfunded-programme European Commission. (2006). Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy. COM (2006) 726 final, Brussels, 4 December. European Commission. (2010). Comprehensive Institution Building Programme: Framework Document 2011–2013, Georgia. Brussels, 4 December. European Commission DG Trade. (2015, April 10). Trade Statistics: Ukraine. Retrieved April 23, 2015, from European Commission, DG Trade: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/ docs/2006/september/tradoc_113459.pdf Expert Grup. (2014). Kakovy pervye rezul’taty Soglašenija ob Associacii meždu Moldovoj i ES [What are the initial outcomes of the Association Agreement between Moldova and the EU]. Retrieved November 21, 2014, from http://www.budgetstories.md/ rezultate-aa-ru/ Food Agricultural Organisation. (2012). Assessment of the Agriculture and Rural Development Sectors in Eastern Partnership Countries: Georgia. Budapest: FAO. 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 124 10/25/2016 9:57:07 AM EU’s policy transfer: food safety 125 Food Agricultural Organization. (2014). Food Safety in Georgia: Challenges and Opportunities. Tbilisi: FAO. Ghazaryan, N. (2014). The European Neighbourhood Policy and the Democratic Values of the EU. Oxford: Hart Publishing. International Finance Corporation. (2009). Reforming Food Safety Regulation in Ukraine: Proposals for Policymakers. Washington: IFC. Kostanyan, H. (2016). Why Moldova's European Integration is Failing, CEPS Commentary, Brussels: CEPS, 3 March. Langbein, J. (2013). Unpacking the Russian and EU Impact on Policy Change in the Eastern Neighbourhood: The Case of Ukraine’s Telecommunications and Food Safety. Europe-Asia Studies, 65(4), pp. 631–657. Langbein, J. (2014). European Union Governance towards the Eastern Neigbourhood: Transcending or Redrawing Europe’s East-West Divide? Journal of Common Market Studies, 52(1), pp. 157–174. Langbein, J., & Börzel, T. (2013). Introduction: Explaining Policy Change in the European Union’s Eastern Neighbourhood. Europe-Asia Studies, 65(4), pp. 571–580. Messerlin, P., Emerson, M., Jandieri, G., & Le Vernoy, A. (2011). An Appraisal of the EU’s Trade Policy toward Its Eastern Neighbours: The Case of Georgia. Brussels: CEPS. Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry of the Republic of Moldova. (2011). Strategic Priorities for the Activities of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry of the Republic of Moldova in the Years 2011–2015, Retrieved June 1, 2016, http://maia.gov. md/sites/default/files/article/1459548_md_mafi_strategic.doc Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of Armenia. (2011). The Republic of Armenia Food Safety System Development Strategy. Yerevan: State Service for Food Safety. Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the European Union. (2015, March 18). Ambassador Vladimir Chizhov’s Interview with Mainichi Newspaper. Retrieved April 14, 2015, from Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the European Union: http:// www.russianmission.eu/en/news/ambassador-vladimir-chizhov%E2%80%99s-interviewmainichi-newspaper Popa, A. 2015a. DCFTA between Moldova and EU after one year, Chişinău: Expert-Grup. Popa, A. 2015b. Moldova and Russia: Between Trade Relations and Economic Dependence, Chişinău: Expert-Grup. Puglisi, R. (2003). The Rise of Ukrainian Oligarchs. Democratization, 10(3), pp. 99–123. Stewart, S. (2013). Public Procurement Reform in Ukraine: The Implications of Neopatrimonialism for External Actors. Demokratizatsiya, 21(2), pp. 197–214. USDA Foreign Agricultural Service. (2009). Ukraine Food and Agricultural Import Regulations and Standards. FAIRS Country Report. Kyiv: US Foreign Agricultural Service. Wolczuk, K. (2003). Ukraine’s Policy towards the European Union: A Case of Declarative Europeanization. Warsaw: Batory Foundation. Wolczuk, K. (2009). Implementation without Coordination: The Impact of EU Conditionality on Ukraine under the European Neighbourhood Policy. Europe-Asia Studies, 61(2), pp. 187–211. World Bank. (2007a). Food Safety and Agricultural Health Management in CIS Countries: Completing the Transition. Washington: The World Bank. World Bank. (2007b). Moldova: Managing Food Safety and Agricultural Health: An Action Plan. Washington: The World Bank. 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 125 10/25/2016 9:57:07 AM 7 The EU’s policy transfer to the post-Soviet space in a context of multiple influences The case of migration Migration is a core policy area in light of the objectives pursued by the European Union in its neighbourhood. In line with the objectives set in the Treaty of Amsterdam,1 since the beginning of the last decade, the Union has increasingly sought to pursue its migration policy externally, especially at its borders. This is because neighbours play a crucial role in migration flows to the EU, either as countries of origin or transit countries. The Eastern Partnership is expected to lead to ‘visa liberalisation in a secure environment’ (European Commission 2008: 4) and thereby reflects the two potentially conflicting objectives behind the EU’s agenda: values and security (Leonard 2009). On the one hand, with the ENP, the EU aims at preventing the emergence of ‘new dividing lines’ across the continent (European Commission 2003) and favouring legal mobility. On the other hand, neighbouring countries play the role of filter to ‘protect [EU] internal security from outside threats’ (Wolff et al. 2009: 12). Cooperation between the EU and neighbouring countries aims to stop irregular migrants either before their attempt to enter the EU’s territory or during their migration trip to the Union.2 Neighbours also have a selection function for asylum seekers who may, based upon their selection, either be returned or ultimately reach the EU. Finally, the neighbourhood has emerged as a region to which member states extradite irregular migrants who have crossed the EU’s borders (Delcour 2013b). The increasing devolution of migration control to neighbouring countries raises key questions in terms of their capacity to undertake substantial reforms in line with EU requirements. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, migration has remained largely unregulated in Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and beyond them, in Central Asia. A number of borders there have been belatedly delineated and are reportedly porous, thus allowing migrants to cross post-Soviet countries toward Europe. At the same time, Eastern Partnership countries are heterogeneous in terms of both migration movements and policy approaches. Since the early 1990s, they have developed diverse preferences as a result of various factors, including socio-economic stability, migration patterns and security context. Therefore, the EU’s visa liberalisation policy is likely to resonate differently depending upon governmental preferences. In particular, the EU’s requirements 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 126 AuQ2 10/25/2016 9:57:07 AM EU’s policy transfer: migration 127 are likely to resonate more strongly in those countries that prioritise the regulation of migration (Ademmer & Delcour 2016). In addition, since the early 1990s the post-Soviet space has broadly remained a visa-free area, with only a few exceptions (Delcour 2011). This translates into strong interdependences with Russia. For all four countries selected as case studies, Russia is a major destination for labour migration and a major source of remittances (especially for Armenia and Moldova). This, in turn, provides the Russian Federation with key policy leverage over Eastern Partnership countries. However, unlike trade, migration has not developed into an area of competition between the EU and Russia in their ‘contested neighbourhood’. Since the mid2000s, the substance of EU policy in Eastern Partnership countries has not significantly differed from that in Russia and other post-Soviet countries.3 In addition, the reward offered by the EU (the elimination of Schengen visas) is a major expectation for all post-Soviet countries, including the Russian Federation itself. Yet visa liberalisation takes place in a context of growing rivalry between the EU and Russia. Therefore, as noted for other policy areas, Russia is expected to make a differentiated use of its migration leverage based upon the macro-level framework of integration selected by post-Soviet countries. In particular, it is expected to use migration with a view to undermining further integration with the EU in those countries that have signed an Association Agreement. Despite the heterogeneity of selected countries in terms of migration movements and policies as well as regional interdependences and Russia’s policies, I find strikingly similar compliance patterns in all of them. Over the period of investigation, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine showed increasing compliance with EU requirements, though at different points in time. This chapter seeks to explain this conundrum by unravelling the ‘travelling’ process of EU migration templates and identifying the factors that have facilitated or impeded their adoption and application in Eastern Partnership countries. The first part of the chapter briefly presents EU demands for domestic change selected for an in-depth analysis in the migration area under the preparations for visa liberalisation. Taking the domestic context and preferences as a starting point, the chapter then applies the explanatory variables identified in chapter 2 to each country, focusing specifically on the adoption and application of EU demands. EU demands for change in the migration area Out of the sheer volume of norms to be adopted by partner countries as part of the visa liberalisation process, I pick a few requirements for an in-depth analysis. In this sample I include demands from the first, second and fourth blocks of conditions singled out in the visa liberalisation process (respectively: document security; border management, migration and asylum; and external relations and fundamental rights). The adoption of legislation on, and delivery of, biometric identity documents are selected because the EU was the first external actor to formulate such a request vis-à-vis Eastern Partnership countries, and therefore 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 127 10/25/2016 9:57:07 AM 128 EU’s policy transfer: migration Table 7.1 EU demands selected for analysis in the visa liberalisation process Level of change in response to the EU EU demands Selection Signature of Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements Conclusion of a Visa Liberalisation Action Plan Adoption Adoption of legislation on biometric identity documents Adoption of anti-discrimination legislation Creation of a unified Migration Authority Setting-up of a migration data base Implementation Implementation of the Readmission Agreement Delivery of biometric identity documents its influence can be clearly traced through this process.4 The selection of the readmission agreement (signature and implementation) is justified by the fact that this is the only legally binding commitment taken by partner countries in visa co-operation with the EU. In contrast, I also select best practices (e.g. the creation of a unified migration authority and the setting-up of a migration database) for an in-depth analysis of reforms. Domestic change in Eastern Partnership countries in the migration area Armenia Outflow migration has been a salient issue in Armenia since the country’s independence. In the period following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the volume of emigration from the Republic of Armenia drastically increased. Between 1991 and 1995, the country reportedly lost 100,000 persons annually (Yeghiazaryan et al. 2003; Republic of Armenia 2004). Outflow migration cannot be explained monocausally: as pointed out by Genov, ‘there are numerous push and pull factors interacting at various structural levels with varying intensity and effects’ (Genov 2011: 22). While initially driven by conflicts,5 outflow migration from Armenia in the 1990s can primarily be explained by the sharp deterioration of living conditions resulting from the breakdown of the USSR.6 Despite variations over time and a slowdown in emigration in the early 2000s, it is estimated that 700,000 to 1,300,000 people left the country between 1990 and 2005 (Gevorgyan 2008: 10; Chobanyan 2012: 2). The precise volume of emigration flows, however, is difficult to determine because of the lack of a comprehensive data collection 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 128 10/25/2016 9:57:07 AM EU’s policy transfer: migration 129 and information system (Gevorgyan 2008: 10). This only adds to the complexity of migration in post-Soviet Armenia. Outflow migration, in particular, encompasses different waves and types of migration.7 Despite the massive outflows from Armenia in the 1990s, migration did not rank high on the country’s political agenda until the early 2000s. While major laws were adopted in the early 1990s,8 there was no comprehensive migration strategy. The first strategic document (Concept of State Regulation of Migration in the Republic of Armenia) was adopted in 2000 and revised in 2004 (Republic of Armenia 2004). Both Concepts (as well as other governmental documents) mirror the growing perception of migration as a key challenge for the country: in the 2004 Concept, emigration is defined as ‘a threat to the social, economic, and geopolitical sustainability of the country’s development’ (Republic of Armenia 2004). Furthermore, the 2007 National Security Concept identifies ‘negative demographic trends’ (including unregulated migration) as ‘threats to national security’ (Republic of Armenia 2007). This is due to the fact that Armenia’s geopolitical situation (the conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh and the increasing demographic differential between the two countries) only adds to Armenia’s economic and societal woes resulting from emigration. At the same time, labour migration is a major source of income through remittances,9 thus contributing (at least until the 2008–09 economic and financial crisis) to the country’s socio-economic stability. Since the early 2000s, Armenian migration policies have thus followed a twofold agenda. On the one hand, they aim at halting migration flows from Armenia and, on the other hand, they are geared toward facilitating legal migration with the view to preserving socio-economic and political stability. Nonetheless, until the early 2010s, legislation governing migration remained scattered over a number of laws and governmental decisions (Kabeleova et al. 2007: 5), especially the Law on Foreigners regulating the entry, stay and residency of foreigners in the territory of Armenia. In light of governmental preferences, EU requirements in the visa facilitation/ liberalisation process were welcomed in Yerevan as an opportunity to achieve the country’s objectives in terms of migration regulation. The introduction of readmission agreements (a cornerstone of the EU’s migration policy in the neighbourhood, which triggered criticism and resistance in some other ENP countries [Delcour 2013b]) was actually in line with the Armenian authorities’ prioritisation of regulating migration flows. In a similar vein, the introduction of biometric passports (a policy preference held by the Armenian police since 2004) also served as an opportunity to improve the management of population data. Whereas the substance of EU demands was in line with governmental preferences overall, EU requirements resulted in empowering the State Migration Service vis-à-vis other institutions (e.g. the police) involved in migration issues. While the police were strengthened in the wake of the clashes that followed the 2008 presidential elections (Ademmer 2011: 19), the EU’s best practice of establishing a single institution for migration management eventually worked to the advantage of the State Migration Service.10 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 129 AuQ3 10/25/2016 9:57:07 AM 130 EU’s policy transfer: migration Nevertheless, despite the high degree of ‘preferential fit’ over outcomes (Ademmer & Börzel 2013: 584) in the migration area, the fight against corruption and anti-discrimination have emerged as examples of low resonance of EU norms and non-compliance with EU demands. According to the EU, measures introduced by Armenia to fight corruption ‘lack convincing results’, including in the police and the judiciary (European Commission 2014: 2). Regarding antidiscrimination, Armenia has not yet adopted a law on anti-discrimination in line with EU requirements; like in other Eastern Partnership countries, this is due to societal reluctance to specifically combat discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. However, it should be noted that for the time being the country does not have to comply with these specific EU demands. This is due to the fact that Armenia is a latecomer in the visa facilitation and liberalisation process. The country has not yet received the Visa Liberalisation Action Plan, a key document that spells out key measures to be adopted before Schengen visas can be lifted. While the visa liberalisation offer has officially been on the table since the Eastern Partnership was launched in 2009, it was only at the end of 2011 that the European Commission proposed to launch negotiations for visa facilitation and readmission agreements (the first step in the visa liberalisation process) (European Commission 2011). Therefore, EU policy conditionality and assistance carry only limited explanatory weight in the relatively quick and substantial reform process in the migration area. The mandate to start negotiations on visa facilitation and readmission was provided to Armenia in December 2011, when some major reforms (e.g. the creation of a State Migration Service, the adoption of the 2010 Concept of the State Regulation of Migration) had already been initiated. Some of these reforms (e.g. the introduction of biometric passports11) were actually not even required under the visa facilitation and readmission process. In fact, the visa facilitation and readmission agreements were signed only at the end of 2013 and entered into force in early 2014 (Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Armenia on the readmission of persons residing without authorisation 2013). It can thus be inferred that Armenia has anticipated key EU demands under the visa liberalisation process when these coincided with its own policy agenda in the migration area. EU conditionality did not per se trigger policy change, as it kicked in at a very late stage of the process (with the visa facilitation/readmission agreement). However, despite the lack of policy-specific conditionality until 2011, priorities formulated for the migration area in the ENP Action Plan served as guidance in the reform process. Like in the food safety area, Armenian authorities started systematically using migration standards promoted by the EU as a template for reform and modernisation (Delcour & Wolczuk 2015a). The role of the EU as an anchor in the reform process is expressly acknowledged in the 2010 Concept of the State Regulation for Migration. Unlike its 2000 and 2004 predecessors, the document explicitly mentioned EU integration as a priority and incorporated key demands formulated by the EU under the ENP Action Plan (Makaryan & Chobanyan 2014: 60). 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 130 10/25/2016 9:57:07 AM EU’s policy transfer: migration 131 Given both the high resonance of EU demands and Armenia’s weak capacities in migration management,12 the Armenian government made extensive use of EU assistance. In the migration area, Armenia benefitted from both TAIEX and Twinning projects to strengthen the legal and institutional migration framework in line with EU requirements. In 2010, the Ministry of Diaspora asked for a TAIEX project to draft a law on repatriation complying with EU acquis (Ademmer 2011). Between 2012 and 2014, the State Migration Service benefitted from a Twinning project aimed at further adapting Armenian legislation to EU legislation and strengthening co-operation among Armenian authorities involved in migration.13 Finally, policy advice channelled through the EU High-Level Advisory Group helped the Armenian authorities considerably in drafting the migration management concept and the related national action plan.14 Overall, as was observed in Chapter 6 for the food safety area, reinforced EU assistance under the Eastern Partnership (with the increase in Twinning and TAIEX projects and the creation of ad hoc tools such as the High Level Advisory Group) enhanced Armenian officials’ exposure to EU templates and facilitated the adoption of reforms. Perhaps paradoxically, the country’s shift away from the Association Agreement and the DCFTA in September 2013 resulted in a greater prioritisation of migration co-operation between the EU and Armenia and enhanced EU incentives in this respect (Ademmer & Delcour 2016). After the country decided to join the Eurasian Economic Union, migration initially emerged as the main area of co-operation since the dialogue on trade regulatory convergence had abruptly come to an end.15 In this context, while terminating trade-related assistance projects and policy advice, the EU maintained support related to migration. The EU also considered moving to a visa dialogue and upgrading the mobility partnership. Therefore, while governmental preferences in the sector remain unchanged, the overall geopolitical shift away from the EU did not affect support for policy change in line with EU demands in the migration area. At the same time, Armenia’s migration patterns reflect a close interdependence with Russia. While not homogeneous and consisting of several waves, the large Armenian group living in Russia16 is a key instrument of Russian influence over Armenia. Migrants’ remittances significantly contribute to the Armenian economy: they totalled $839.1 million in 2010 in Armenia, and 80–90 per cent of those come from the Russian Federation (Poghosyan 2011; Karapetyan & Harutyunyan 2013). Over the past few years, Russia has successively used both leverage to pressure Armenia and incentives fitting with the domestic agenda. The choice of policy instruments has hinged crucially on Armenia’s engagement in regional trade integration schemes. In the early 2010s, the upgrading of the programme ‘Compatriots Living Abroad’17 was clearly perceived as a threat in Armenia (Hovhannisyan 2013) and raised massive criticism in the country, first within the opposition and then (from 2011) from the authorities themselves (Ademmer 2011). This programme is based on the 1999 Federal Law on the ‘State Policy of the Russian Federation towards Compatriots Living Abroad’. The Law 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 131 AuQ4 10/25/2016 9:57:07 AM 132 EU’s policy transfer: migration considers everyone who ever held a Soviet passport as a ‘compatriot’. In the second half of the 2000s, Russia introduced amendments to the law abolishing specific identity documents for ‘compatriots’ living abroad, giving the same rights and obligations to Russian citizens living abroad as those in the country and introducing resettlement measures for ‘compatriots’ moving to Russia. By offering citizenship and benefits for resettlement, the programme was likely to result in massive migration and brain-drain from Armenia.18 This was interpreted as a clear signal (among others) from Russia to deter the country from further integration with the EU (Delcour 2014) at a time when Armenia was engaged in negotiations for an Association Agreement and a DCFTA. At the same time, over the past five years Russia’s influence over Armenia in the migration area has been constrained by Russia’s own economic problems. The 2008–09 economic and financial crises that severely hit Russia reportedly triggered a sharp decrease in remittances.19 Likewise, while also affecting Armenia’s currency, the depreciation of the Russian rouble in 2014 resulted in a noticeable drop in Armenian workers’ remittances from Russia. In June, July, August and September 2014, the transferred amounts from Russia were, respectively, 6.2, 8.7, 9.1, and 8.6 per cent lower as compared to the same months of 2013 (Grigoryan 2015). This decrease in remittances comes at a time when Armenia’s economy is becoming increasingly interdependent with Russia’s as a result of the country’s accession to the Eurasian Economic Union. The impact of EAEU membership in the migration area remains to be ascertained. On the one hand, Armenia is not affected by the shift in Russia’s migration policies toward stricter conditions and quotas for CIS workers, since labour migration is quota-free between members of the Eurasian Union. On the other hand, the lack of quotas, combined with relaxed conditions to get Russian citizenship,20 sparks concerns in a country where the demographic situation (in particular outflow migration) ranks high on the agenda (Grigoryan 2014). However, neither membership in the Eurasian Union nor changes in Russian migration policies (which are not targeted at EAEU members) constrain Armenia’s ability to develop migration co-operation with the EU. In the migration area, Armenia is in essence able to pursue complementarity between the European Union and Russia (Ademmer & Delcour 2016) – a major objective that it has failed to achieve in trade integration. Overall, reform processes in the migration area in Armenia point to contrasted compliance patterns. At the selection level, Armenia has not yet undertaken the commitment to fully comply with all EU demands since it is bound to readmission obligations only. Despite limited commitments vis-à-vis the EU thus far, the reforms conducted over the past five years highlight substantial adoption and application of EU demands in the first and second blocks of visa liberalisation requirements. In contrast, no progress has been made in the fourth block, but in the absence of a Visa Liberalisation Action Plan, the country is not formally required to initiate reforms. In Armenia, distributional factors, governmental and societal preferences carry substantial explanatory power to account for the adoption and application of EU 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 132 10/25/2016 9:57:08 AM EU’s policy transfer: migration 133 templates in some issue areas (biometric documents, regulation of migration) and the lack of reforms in other areas (anti-discrimination). In contrast, EU conditionality, regional interdependences and Russia’s policies analysed separately fail to explain compliance outcomes at either the selection or adoption and application levels. In contrast to trade-related areas, the selection of EU templates is not constrained by membership in the Eurasian Economic Union, as there is no incompatibility with EU demands in the migration area. Moreover, owing to its membership in the EAEU, Armenia has so far been immune from the increasingly restrictive Russian migration policy. Patterns of interdependence (e.g. as a result of dwindling remittances from Russia) may change over time; however, their effects on migration patterns and migration policy can only be observed in the medium- to long-term. Regarding adoption and implementation, EU conditionality and assistance have facilitated reforms in line with EU demands; however, they kicked in late in the reform process and therefore cannot account for its results. Georgia In contrast to Armenia and Moldova, regulating migration has not been a priority for the Georgian government until recently. This does not mean, however, that the country has not been affected by migration. Like Armenia and Moldova, it experienced substantial migration outflows in the years that followed the breakup of the Soviet Union. As a result, it is estimated that by 2003 Georgia had lost 20 per cent of its 1989 population, i.e. approximately 1.1 million (Danish Refugee Council 2007: 5).21 The conflicts that burst out in the early 1990s in Abkhazia and South Ossetia led to massive movements of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and substantial outflows of non-ethnic Georgians. As a consequence of the 1990s conflicts, the migration agenda in Georgia has predominantly addressed internal migration. This was reflected in the institutional framework of migration management with the Ministry of Refugees and Accommodation being responsible for issues related to immigration regulation and control (International Organisation for Migration 2008: 38). While migration inflows primarily derived from conflicts, the chaos that prevailed in the early 1990s spurred emigration of high-skilled Georgians to neighbouring countries (especially Russia), hence causing significant brain-drain (Danish Refugee Council 2007: 7; Badurashvili 2011). In the 1990s, labour migration was also adopted as a survival strategy by a number of Georgian households and intensified during the second Shevardnadze presidency (Danish Refugee Council 2007: 10). With policy efforts concentrating on the relocation of internally displaced persons, mobility and migration remained largely unaddressed by the Georgian authorities in the 1990s and 2000s. Thus, while discussed and politicised in the country, debates on migration have failed to translate into a comprehensive migration agenda (Makaryan & Chobanyan 2014: 54), and the area remained unregulated. Until the early 2010s, the country had no written policy document in the migration area (International 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 133 10/25/2016 9:57:08 AM 134 EU’s policy transfer: migration Organisation for Migration 2007). The legal framework pursued a very liberal approach to visa categories, visa issuance and employment of foreigners. The 2006 Law on Aliens clearly prioritised the facilitation of mobility and the protection of foreigners over the fight against irregular migration (Government of Georgia 2006). According to this law, there were only two visa categories (‘ordinary’ and ‘students’). In addition, the country did not require visas for citizens from a number of countries worldwide. Nationals from over 100 countries could enter Georgia and stay there for up to one year without a visa. In addition, those persons who entered the country legally were not required to have a work permit for them to work. Therefore, while the 2006 ENP Action Plan agreed upon with the EU placed the emphasis on border management and the prevention and control of irregular migration (EU-Georgia European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan 2006), the Georgian legal framework for migration developed in the mid-2000s clearly favoured a liberal agenda where migration was seen as an opportunity. Yet the demands included in the ENP AP were both very broad22 and lacking legally binding obligations. The formulation of EU policy-specific conditionality under the visa facilitation and readmission agreements gave impetus to Georgia’s initial reforms in line with EU demands in the migration area. In the wake of the 2008 conflict with Russia, the EU explicitly linked its offer of a visa facilitation agreement to the conclusion of a readmission agreement, a key EU instrument to curb illegal migration (Trauner & Kruse 2008). The EU also made it clear that effective implementation of the readmission agreement was a prerequisite to further steps in the visa liberalisation process. The EU’s sector-specific conditionality was thus instrumental in triggering convergence with migration templates in Georgia, in a context of regional vulnerability. In preparation for the next stage of the process (i.e. the opening of a visa dialogue and the preparation of a VLAP), between 2010 and 2012 the Georgian government made substantial progress in adopting EU templates. A State Commission on Migration Issues fostering coordination between the 12 institutions involved in migration management was created in 2010, biometric passports including fingerprints in the electronic chip were introduced and an integrated database for migration was set up. Nonetheless, the incentives offered by the EU under the visa facilitation scheme were only of limited interest to Georgia. As pointed out by a civil society expert, the small reduction of visa fees was not particularly attractive for Georgian citizens, given both the costs of flights to the EU (much more important than from Ukraine or Moldova because of the country’s remoteness) and the small number of EU consulates in Tbilisi.23 Overall, despite the introduction of policy-specific conditionality focusing on readmission, the adoption of EU legal and policy templates remained selective owing to the dissonance between EU requirements and the Georgian governmental preferences in the migration area (Ademmer & Börzel 2013; Delcour 2013a). In particular, the Georgian authorities fiercely resisted the adoption of norms regulating the entry and residence of foreigners in the country. This is because 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 134 10/25/2016 9:57:08 AM EU’s policy transfer: migration 135 the government’s approach to migration was underpinned by the new authorities’ liberal approach to economic reforms (Delcour 2013a, 2013b) and the absence of state intervention (Badurashvili 2011: 109). Migration was considered a pillar of the authorities’ economic strategy, which primarily sought to attract foreign investment. In this context, an open-door policy was considered a prerequisite to creating a favourable business environment.24 Between 2011 and 2013, Georgia’s shallow compliance was also made possible by the (still) limited use of conditionality which, at the time, focused on the readmission agreement. The shift toward a more systematic adoption of EU rules from 2013 onwards resulted from a combination of factors. After the change of power in the aftermath of the October 2012 elections, the new authorities’ migration policy preferences appeared less strong than its UNM predecessors did. The new authorities maintained a liberal approach to migration, as was especially visible in the 2013–15 Migration Strategy that was prepared under the previous government and adopted in March 2013 with few substantial changes. Yet despite the emphasis on the ‘positive effect of the migration process’ on the country’s development (Government of Georgia 2013: 2), the Ivanishvili government seemed less determined to maintain an open-door policy, especially if such a policy was not compatible with EU demands.25 This was reflected in the drafting of a new law providing for stricter rules for entrance into Georgian territory.26 In fact, the Georgian government also shifted toward greater regulation of migration flows as a result of distributional factors, i.e. changing migration movements (Wunderlich 2012: 1418) and perceptions thereof (Government of Georgia 2013). While labour migration from Turkey, India and China has steadily increased in the past decade (Migration Policy Centre 2013), crises and conflicts in the Southern Mediterranean and the Near East resulted in a surge of unregulated migration flows and visa/asylum applications, especially by Christian populations from Syria and Egypt.27 Distributional factors increased the resonance of EU-driven migration regulation policies and gave impetus to compliance with EU templates at a time when the country became subject to stricter EU monitoring and conditionality under the Visa Dialogue that started in June 2012, and especially under the Visa Liberalisation Action Plan that was granted in early 2013. Georgia’s move toward the second phase of the action plan, in 2014, indicates that the country has quickly completed the approximation of its legal framework with EU demands. This was despite strong societal resistance against specific EU demands, for instance the adoption of a comprehensive anti-discrimination law (an obligation under the VLAP). Like in other Eastern Partnership countries, the broad definition of discrimination triggered a wave of protests, especially by the Church. The Ministry of Justice, in charge of preparing a draft law, consulted the Patriarchate of Georgia in 2013. While amendments to the draft law were brought with a view to changing mechanisms for punishing offenders, at a later stage the Church protested against the inclusion of ‘sexual orientation’ and ‘gender identity’ in the law when the latter was discussed before the human rights committee of the Parliament in April 2014.28 Despite the fact that the law 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 135 AuQ5 10/25/2016 9:57:08 AM 136 EU’s policy transfer: migration was passed and entered into force in May 2014, there are persistent doubts related to its enforcement. The Public Defender, given a central role in raising public awareness, mediation and prevention of offences, as well as repression, needs additional resources to fulfil these tasks. Moreover, law enforcement hinges crucially on the role of the government and the society at large in the fight against discrimination (Transparency International Georgia 2014). In particular, the way in which derogations will be applied is a litmus test for the effective application of the law (European Commission 2015: 9). Recent developments in the regulation of visas also highlight tensions between, on the one hand, Georgia’s interests (as perceived by NGOs and society at large) and, on the other hand, EU demands (as interpreted by Georgian authorities). The Law on the Legal Status of Foreigners and Stateless Persons, adopted as part of the visa liberalisation process and in force since September 2014, decreased the length of visa-free stays for foreigners in Georgia from 360 days to 90 days in any 180-day period. The law also cancelled the visa-free regime with twentyfour countries and abolished the issuing of visas at the state border of Georgia. In addition, it introduced visa categories (an EU requirement) and new regulations for receiving residence permits. Even though they were praised by international organisations (International Centre for Migration Policy Development 2014), both the way in which the law was adopted and its substance were harshly criticised in Georgia. Both NGOs and the business community denounced the lack of consultations with civil society, the inefficiency of the information campaign conducted in the country and the absence of a transition period for the introduction of visa categories (Caucasus Business Week 2014; Khoshtaria et al. 2015). As a consequence of the latter, a number of aliens in Georgia (up to 2,000 people) were deprived of a legal basis for being in the country, and were subject to a fine or expulsion for not meeting the necessary requirements for receiving a residency permit (Khoshtaria et al. 2015: 1). In addition, the law was regarded as a disincentive for tourism or applying for residency to work, study or reside in Georgia. For instance, the law provides for visas to be issued by Georgian embassies in those countries for which a visa is needed. Yet in 92 of the 99 countries for which a visa is required, there is no Georgian diplomatic mission (Khoshtaria et al. 2015: 9). Even in those countries with a Georgian embassy, the abolition of the previous visa-free regime caused a rapid decrease of tourism and flights. This was especially the case for Iran, an important country for Georgia in terms of tourist numbers and a significant trade and investment partner (Kakachia 2011). Importantly, the EU indicated that while the law was moving Georgia closer to EU standards, there were no obligations imposed by the EU in terms of the countries for which Georgia should require a visa.29 In response to the harsh criticisms on the Law on Foreigners, the Georgian Parliament thus adopted in May 2015 a package of amendments to the law that re-introduce 360-day visa-free stays for citizens and permanent residents of 94 countries listed in a governmental decree (Democracy & Freedom Watch 2015). This demonstrates how deeply entrenched the liberal approach to migration is in Georgia, 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 136 AuQ6 10/25/2016 9:57:08 AM EU’s policy transfer: migration 137 where an open-door policy is seen as crucial to the country’s economy (Ademmer & Delcour 2016). In the migration area, EU-demanded change has not been hampered by regional interdependences and Russia’s policies at any stage of the process. As is the case with Armenia, Ukraine and Moldova, Georgia’s interdependence with Russia in the migration area is much higher than with the EU. Approximately 650,000 Georgian migrants lived in Russia in 2010 (World Bank 2010), and remittances from Russia to Georgia amounted to USD 1,223 million in 2014 (World Bank 2014). As compared to other Eastern Partnership countries, however, Georgia experienced Russia’s pressures much earlier. While the post-Soviet space has largely remained a visa-free area, Russia introduced visa requirements for Georgian citizens in the early 2000s. Simultaneously, Russia started distributing Russian passports to the citizens of the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (pasportizatsiya, or passportisation policy). In the aftermath of the deep political crisis between the two countries in 2006, Russia also deported a significant number of Georgian migrants. However, Russia’s measures were introduced at a time when EU demands for change were still embryonic and thus did not undermine Georgia’s (potential) compliance. Nonetheless, as noted in Chapter 5, the passportisation policy actually had an effect (even if delayed and indirect) on both the EU’s offer and Georgia’s reforms: the 2008 conflict prompted the EU to launch negotiations for a visa facilitation and readmission agreement with Georgia with the view to countervailing the effects of Russia’s passportisation policy. This, in turn, reinforced EU sector conditionality and thereby triggered domestic change (Ademmer & Delcour 2016). Paradoxically, however, Russia’s extensive use of its power substantially weakened the interdependence between the two countries and thus significantly reduced its leverage vis-à-vis Georgia. While the conflict fostered Georgia’s convergence with EU demands (even if initially shallow), there was little Russia could do after 2008 to undermine convergence since most ties had been cut. However, this has recently changed. First, Russia figured prominently in the debate on the anti-discrimination law in Georgia. When the law was discussed in the Georgian Parliament, the Parliament’s speaker, Davit Usupashvili, discursively framed the debate in terms of a choice between Europe and Russia: It is about the following issue: either we go towards Europe and we recognise that we should not chase people with sticks, we should not fire people from job if we do not share their opinions and their way of life, or else we stay in Russia, where it is possible to expel from a city those people, whom you dislike, to ban from entry to shops those people, whom you do not like, and simply to go and invade a territory of others if you like that territory. (Civil Georgia 2014) In fact, the Russian Orthodox Church has supported the conservative agenda of the Georgian Orthodox Church with the view to swaying Georgia away from Western values and integration with the EU (Makarychev 2016). While this has 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 137 10/25/2016 9:57:08 AM 138 EU’s policy transfer: migration not prevented the adoption of anti-discrimination legislation as requested by the EU, ‘religious diplomacy’ (Makarychev 2016) remains one the major channels of influence over Georgia. Second, Russia recently provided renewed incentives to Georgia in the migration area. In late 2015 the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced the facilitation of the visa regime for Georgian citizens, including the possibility to issue multiple entry visas for business, work, educational, humanitarian or private purposes. This came only a few days after President Putin suggested lifting visa obligations for Georgian citizens travelling to Russia. Georgia’s migration reform thus shed light on meandering patterns of compliance. While visa liberalisation has long been a declared priority for the Georgian government (Pataraia 2011), incentives to reform were in fact limited until the end of the 2000s, owing both to the lack of linkages with the EU and the government’s low receptivity to EU migration demands. The introduction of EU policyspecific conditionality (even if limited to readmission) gave impetus to the adoption of EU templates, especially as it coincided with enhanced regional vulnerability after the conflict with Russia. The adoption and application of EU demands became more systematic after the change of power and the reinforcement of policy-specific conditionality under the VLAP. Nevertheless, the authorities are trying to find a balance between EU-demanded change and the preservation of the country’s specific migration policy, in line with its economic interests. Moldova Like Armenia, outward migration has emerged as a major policy challenge for post-Soviet Moldova. The conflict that burst out in Transnistria in 1992 caused a first wave of emigration (primarily to Ukraine and Russia). However, the key factor behind emigration since independence has been the country’s extreme poverty and lack of job opportunities (International Organisation for Migration 2003). Despite the lack of comprehensive and reliable data (owing, among other reasons, to the lack of control over the country’s eastern border), it is estimated that migrants represent 17.3 per cent of the country’s total population (Migration Policy Centre 2013: 2). Since 1990, outflows of migration have constantly been on the rise, with emigrants totalling 859,400 in 2013 (World Bank 2013). Remittances make up 22.3 per cent of the country’s GDP and, despite a recent slowdown, remain a key driver of economic growth (Migration Policy Centre 2013: 3). A legal framework governing migration was developed in the early 1990s with the adoption of a Law on Migration (adopted in December 1990), a Law on Exit from and Entry into the Republic of Moldova (adopted in 1994) and a Law on Asylum (adopted in 1994). However, this legal framework was shaped by the political context of the early 1990s: for instance, the Law on Migration focused on preserving the ethno-national identity of the Moldovan republic and preventing irregular immigration to Moldova from other former USSR republics (International Organisation for Migration 2008: 20). 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 138 10/25/2016 9:57:08 AM EU’s policy transfer: migration 139 In the early 2000s, the authorities became increasingly aware of the economic, political and societal challenges associated with migration and further developed the policy and institutional framework governing migration. The government tried primarily to facilitate legal migration of Moldovan workers and to defend their rights abroad (International Organisation for Migration 2008: 21). As part of this effort, it created an institutional framework for migration management. However, political struggles within the elite and vested interests of the bureaucratic institutions involved in the migration area resulted in the adoption of successive, yet substantially different reforms, de facto limiting their effectiveness. For instance, the State Migration Service, whose tasks were extensive upon its creation in 2001 under the auspices of the Cabinet of Ministers, was downgraded to a Department of Migration, whose tasks were determined by the Parliament in 2002. In a similar vein, the reforms that were introduced in 2006–08 to update migration legislation and improve migration management tended to be partial and shallow. For instance, new laws on labour migration and asylum were adopted, as well as national action plans for protection of Moldovan citizens abroad and for stimulation of migrants’ return. Yet these plans were not fully implemented (European Commission 2009), and according to the International Organisation for Migration, ‘no concrete policy has been formulated to encourage return of Moldovans abroad’ (International Organisation for Migration 2008). However, despite the lack of any substantial reform, in the mid-2000s Moldova significantly expanded co-operation with the EU in the migration area. The EU-Moldova agreements on visa facilitation and readmission entered into force in 2008, shortly after those signed between the EU and Ukraine. Moldova also emerged as a pilot country for the new EU policy mechanisms and instruments in the sphere of migration and mobility. In 2007, it was the first country (and the only Eastern Partnership country to date) in which the EU opened a Common Visa Application Centre (hosted by the Hungarian Embassy) (Delcour & Tulmets 2015). Moldova also volunteered to be a pilot country for the mobility partnerships, an instrument launched by the EU at the end of 2006 as part of the Global Approach to Migration that actually fits with the country’s preferences. These partnerships indeed go beyond the exclusive focus on readmission and security, and incorporate (even if to a limited extent) (Cassarino 2009) issues related to the reintegration of migrants. Patterns of compliance have changed significantly since the 2010s, when Moldova gradually emerged as a frontrunner in the visa liberalisation process with the EU (Popescu 2011). In May 2014, Moldova was the first post-Soviet country with which the EU decided to eliminate Schengen visas, based upon full compliance with EU requirements in all four blocks of conditions (European Commission 2013a). This record seems paradoxical, given that most Moldovans hold a Romanian passport and can therefore enter the EU’s territory without a visa. What, then, explains the shift from limited change under the ENP AP toward more systematic reforms under the visa liberalisation process? The first factor is the general impetus given to EU integration since the Alliance for European Integration gained power in 2009. Migration emerged as a policy 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 139 AuQ7 10/25/2016 9:57:08 AM 140 EU’s policy transfer: migration area where Moldova could perform well in terms of EU integration.30 In addition, the shift in governmental preferences on migration explains the increasing resonance of EU standards and requirements in the country. Over the past few years, Moldovan authorities have become increasingly aware of the fact that they cannot prevent emigration. Instead, they are increasingly seeking to control migration outflows and to encourage migrants’ return to Moldova. Therefore, increased receptivity to EU demands (in particular, those related to migration data and reintegration of migrants) carries substantial weight to explain the proactive approach of Moldovan authorities under the visa liberalisation process. After Moldova received the VLAP at the end of 2010, the Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (in charge of leading and coordinating the process)31 pushed for a simultaneous engagement of the concerned Moldovan institutions in the adoption and implementation of EU-demanded reforms.32 In the visa liberalisation process, Moldova was the only Eastern Partnership country to adopt a National Annotated Agenda (in February 2011), a document listing the domestic measures to be taken with a view to complying with the VLAP’s requirements. These were applied shortly after their adoption. As a result, the first report issued by the EC on the implementation phase of the VLAP found that the country largely met the benchmarks in terms of migration management, public order and security, and required further action only on a limited number of issues (e.g. continuing implementation of justice sector reform, European Commission 2013a). Despite the high overall resonance of EU demands on visa liberalisation, specific EU requirements triggered resistance by different domestic actors. For instance, Moldova belatedly complied with EU requirements related to the fight against corruption, as these went against the vested interests of oligarchs linked to the ruling elite. Despite the adoption of a National Anti-Corruption Strategy in 2011, the implementation of many measures of the related Action Plan (for 2012–13) was delayed. In addition, some areas emerged as persisting causes for concerns, such as public procurement or lenience in cases of high-level corruption (European Commission 2012b). However, the EU was criticised by Moldovan NGOs33 for being more lenient on the shortcomings of the fight against corruption than on some other requirements (e.g. anti-discrimination) because of its proximity with the incumbent authorities.34 Moreover, a heterogeneous coalition of domestic actors, including the Communist Party and the Orthodox Church, fiercely opposed the adoption of a law on anti-discrimination including provisions on discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation.35 A first attempt to pass the law failed in 2010; yet, as part of the legislative package adopted in 2011–12, Moldova was the first post-Soviet country to adopt a comprehensive law on anti-discrimination, in May 2012 (European Commission 2012b). While NGOs conducted information campaigns throughout the country to explain the implications of the law, the Church continued to mobilise against the law (regarded as ‘an action going against Christian moral norms’ [Orthodox Church of Moldova, Metropolis of Chişinău and all Moldova 2012]). It called on the government to repeal it and threatened to excommunicate the members of the government should they fail to do so (Orthodox Church of Moldova, Metropolis of Chişinău and 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 140 AuQ8 10/25/2016 9:57:08 AM EU’s policy transfer: migration 141 all Moldova 2013). EU policy-specific conditionality is the key factor that prompted the adoption of the law. The EU made it very clear to the Moldovan authorities that the lack of a comprehensive anti-discrimination law was the last obstacle to proceeding further with the second phase of the Visa Liberalisation Action Plan (Ursu 2012). Beyond the specific example of the anti-discrimination law, EU policy-specific conditionality and assistance strongly bolstered compliance with VLAP demands, as they enabled the Moldovan government to implement its migration agenda. The Moldovan authorities welcomed EU requirements under the visa liberalisation framework as an opportunity for the country to strengthen their capacities in migration management and to improve the accuracy of migration data and the management of migration flows. For instance, while this was not a major EU condition, they readily engaged in preparing an Extended Migration Profile (a tool for migration data collection). Like in Armenia, some of the reforms demanded by the EU had already been introduced prior to the adoption of a VLAP in December 2010. However, EU-demanded reforms significantly expanded after the VLAP was adopted. For instance, Moldova had been delivering biometric passports since 2008; from early 2011 the country ceased the production of non-biometric passports and modernised the equipment (devices for document expertise, e-chip readers) of half of its 81 Border Crossing Points (Litra 2012). EU assistance (e.g. delivery of expertise to the Moldovan government under the High-Level Advisory Group, TAIEX and Twinning under the Comprehensive Institution-Building Programme and funding of projects implemented by international organisations) proved equally crucial for the Moldovan authorities, given the country’s limited capacities. At the same time, increased funding (especially through budget support) raises important challenges in light of these capacities. The Moldovan authorities have been promised €21 million upon visa liberalisation in the form of budget support, yet the government has limited administrative resources to manage such a massive amount of funding and adopt the measures that are attached to it.36 While it now benefits from a visa-free regime with the EU, Moldova also retains a high degree of interdependence with Russia. According to the World Bank (World Bank 2013), the number of Moldovan migrants living in the Russian Federation totals approximately 285,000, but the actual figures may be much higher. Remittances from Russia-based workers amounted to USD 671 million in 2012 (World Bank 2012). In this context, the changes recently introduced in Russian migration legislation may affect Moldova’s post-compliance efforts. Since early 2014, tighter limitations for labour migration have been in application in Russia. In particular, these de facto exclude the possibility of exiting from Russian territory after a 90-day period and re-entering straight away (Russian Federation 2014). In addition, the amendments brought to the Federal Law on the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation in November 2014 introduce both administrative liability for foreign citizens who violate Russian migration legislation and mandatory state fingerprint registration of foreign citizens who apply for a license 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 141 AuQ9 10/25/2016 9:57:08 AM 142 EU’s policy transfer: migration to work. These conditions may result in the deportation of the bulk of Moldovan migrants. An overwhelming majority of them (around 70 per cent) indeed stay and work in Russia illegally.37 By deporting them, Russia would create significant costs for their reintegration. Secessionist territories supported by Russia have also emerged as a major challenge in the post-compliance phase. The impact of visa liberalisation on Transnistria is not yet clear: while the Moldovan passports may become more attractive to the citizens of Transnistria (an assumption shared by the EU and the Moldovan former prime minister), it may also just result in ‘passport-shopping’ and increased traffics from the breakaway region. In addition, Russia is increasingly using Gagauzia as a pressure point over the Moldovan government; for instance, in early 2015 the Russian authorities discussed labour migration for the citizens of Gagauzia to Russia with a delegation including both members of the Socialist Party of Moldova (which obtained the most votes in the 2014 elections and favours a rapprochement with Russia and the Eurasian Union) and Gagauzian political figures (Federal Migration Service of the Russian Federation 2015). Hence, while Moldova is unlikely to reverse its pro-European course, Russia’s initiatives may make the implementation of EU demands more difficult. Overall, with the elimination of Schengen visas, Moldova has been presented as a ‘success story’ by the EU.38 However, while the visa-free regime has so far been operating smoothly (Council of the European Union 2015), it is also a fragile achievement. A number of factors raise questions as to the sustainability of reforms during the ‘post-compliance’ phase. While the government prioritised the elimination of the Schengen visas, interest in visa liberalisation remains limited for Moldovan citizens. This is a consequence of both the wide number of EU (Romanian) passports in the country and the lack of prospects for labour migration in the EU under the visa liberalisation scheme (Cenuşă 2015). In addition, by restricting access to its labour market, Russia may also hamper compliance with EU requirements, as this may cause a reorientation of labour migration flows to the EU and thus distort the use of the visa-free regime, designed for short-term stays without labour purposes (Cenuşă 2014; Ademmer & Delcour 2016). Ukraine Over the past decade, the elimination of Schengen visas has been a major expectation of both Ukrainian elites and society. The country unilaterally abolished visas for EU citizens in 2005, after the Orange Revolution, and hoped for a quick reciprocal move.39 After EU enlargement, mobility was to a large extent preserved, due to the flexible visa policy implemented by Central European Member States. In the mid-2000s, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia issued over 820,000 visas annually for Ukrainian citizens (Boratynski et al. 2006). However, the accession of Central European countries to the Schengen area at the end of 2007 triggered a sharp decrease in visas issued to Ukrainian citizens (Wasilewska 2009). Ukraine now ranks second (after Russia) when it comes to the number 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 142 10/25/2016 9:57:08 AM EU’s policy transfer: migration 143 of Schengen visas applications (1.3 million in 2012) (European Commission, DG Home 2012). Ukraine was the first ENP country to sign visa facilitation and readmission agreements in 2007 and to receive a VLAP, in November 2010. The granting of the VLAP indicated that Ukraine effectively implemented the readmission agreement (a precondition for the EU to launch the visa dialogue and provide a VLAP [EU-Ukraine Action Plan on Visa Liberalisation 2010]);40 subsequent EU monitoring confirmed this positive assessment (European Commission 2012a: 2). Yet despite the early selection of the EU’s migration and mobility rules and a positive record in applying readmission, the country only completed the first phase of the VLAP by 2014. This suggests that Ukraine has only selectively adopted EU-demanded reforms. This is despite the fact that between the end of 2010 and mid-2012, Ukraine adopted more than 30 legal and policy acts in the spheres of migration management, data protection, countering human trafficking, border management and protection of asylum seekers.41 In particular, these included the adoption of a law ‘On Refugees and Persons in Need of Subsidiary and Temporary Protection’ in July 2011 and the revision of the law ‘On the legal status of foreigners and stateless persons’ in September 2011. In February 2011, the Cabinet of Ministers also established a Coordinating Centre for VLAP implementation, chaired by the first Deputy Prime Minister. In May 2011, a migration strategy (‘On the National Migration Policy Concept’) was adopted by presidential decree (Decree of the President of Ukraine #622/2011). This Concept highlights clear preferences for regulating migration flows. It points to the ‘absence of legislative definition of state migration policy’ at a time when Ukraine is faced with major challenges deriving from demographic decline, outflow migration and irregular migration (Decree of the President of Ukraine #622/2011). Therefore, combined with strong expectations on visa liberalisation at the macro-level, Ukraine’s sectoral preferences for migration regulation suggest a dissatisfaction with the status quo in migration policy and a high resonance of EU requirements, both identified as important conditions for domestic change. However, reforms have been conducted only selectively. While substantial reforms were launched to comply with EU requirements on migration and border management (the second block of the visa liberalisation process), Ukraine has been slow in meeting EU demands on biometric passports, anti-discrimination and anti-corruption. This results from the contestation of domestic veto players, inter-institutional struggles, vested interests and rent-seeking practices. Like in the food safety sector and other policy areas, migration reforms have been deeply affected by poor coordination among state institutions. The Coordinating Centre for VLAP implementation, created in 2011 and gathering all the institutions involved in the visa liberalisation process, met only twice a year. In addition, it did not introduce proper reporting and evaluation procedures. A State Migration Service (an EU requirement) was set up within the Ministry of Internal Affairs in December 2010, yet it became operational only in 2013 and was still understaffed in light of its broad competences, including both legal and irregular migration.42 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 143 AuQ10 AuQ11 10/25/2016 9:57:08 AM 144 EU’s policy transfer: migration Like in other Eastern Partnership countries, anti-discrimination legislation requested by the EU as part of the block of human rights conditions triggered strong resistance from domestic actors in Ukraine, in particular Churches (either the Ukrainian Orthodox or Catholic Church). A draft law punishing references to homosexuality in the media and criminalising ‘homosexual propaganda’ was voted in first reading to the Rada in 2012, yet as a result of the mobilisation of human rights activists, it was not submitted in second reading.43 A Law on the principles of preventing and combating discrimination in Ukraine was finally adopted in September 2012. It defined the concept of discrimination and identified the bodies responsible for preventing and combating discrimination. Yet both domestic human right groups44 and the EU underlined the law’s shortcomings and its failure to fully meet EU requirements (European Commission 2013b: 22). For instance, the law did not provide sufficient legal certainty as regards the prohibition on discrimination on the grounds of gender identity and sexual orientation (especially with respect to access to employment). In addition, it did not adequately protect the rights of victims, as the reversal of the burden of proof was not introduced. A new law project was prepared in 2014 with the view to effectively forbid any kind of discrimination;45 however, it has not been adopted yet. While it was the first country to launch a visa dialogue with the EU and to receive a Visa Liberalisation Action Plan, until recently, Ukraine considerably lagged behind some other Eastern Partnership countries (particularly Moldova) in meeting key EU demands under the first block of requirements. Biometric passports, which were introduced in 2008 and 2010 in Moldova and Georgia, respectively, were only just introduced in 2014 in Ukraine. The intertwining of political elites and business clans has been instrumental in delaying reforms for biometric passports. For instance, in 2011–12, the adoption of the law ‘On Documents Identifying a Person and Confirming Citizenship of Ukraine’ (introducing biometric passports) was repeatedly blocked at the Verkhovna Rada due to disagreements on the criteria for production of biometric passports – a lucrative process for some interest groups.46 All Cabinet initiatives regulating the introduction of biometric passports were not supported by the parliamentary majority owing to the ties between members of this majority and businesses interested or involved in the production of biometric passports. While the law entered into force in December 2012, its application raises significant problems in terms of the capacity to issue a large number of biometric passports. In addition, as a result of the law ‘On the Unified State Demographic Register’,47 the delivery of passports is subject to the submission of extensive personal data. While this law meets the EU’s requirements pertaining to biometric passports (e.g. the digitised photo and the signature as biometric features to be captured), it failed to provide adequate data protection (another EU requirement under the third block of conditions).48 Ukraine has also failed to meet EU requirements regarding the fight against corruption. A revised anti-corruption law was adopted in second reading in April 2011 and was followed by the adoption of a National Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2011–15. Yet both the legal provisions (e.g. related to public procurement) 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 144 10/25/2016 9:57:08 AM EU’s policy transfer: migration 145 and the institutional structure were assessed as insufficient by the EU and the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO 2011). A National Anti-Corruption Committee was established in February 2010, yet it met only twice a year without any practical results. Without a doubt, the regime change of early 2014 has marked a major shift toward compliance with EU conditions in the above areas. The new government readily proposed a package of laws or amendments on those issues which were pending, e.g. on the reference to fingerprints as an obligatory biometric feature, on public procurement and the declaration of assets as part of the fight against corruption, and on anti-discrimination to strengthen existing legislation (European Commission 2014). However, this is a case of minimal compliance. For instance, Ukraine has yet to reform the rules on lifting immunity for members of Parliament and to incorporate a reference to sexual orientation as a ground for discrimination. Nevertheless, the European Commission proposed in May 2014 to launch the second phase of the Visa Liberalisation Action Plan with Ukraine. Undoubtedly, Russia’s actions in Ukraine played a key role in this decision. The de facto annexation of Crimea triggered a sense of urgency in the EU for the need to remove obstacles to the movement of people and to provide the new authorities with substantial incentives to reform. Some EU Member States were reluctant to proceed further with visa liberalisation under the Eastern Partnership due to the fear of a surge in asylum requests and illegal migration. However, developments in eastern Ukraine changed the nature of the debate inside the EU. They prompted the EU to be more flexible as to the assessment of benchmarks. While the EU Foreign Affairs Ministers reiterated their commitment to enhance peopleto-people contacts (Council of the European Union 2014), the European Commission included support for the acceleration of the visa liberalisation process as part of the bilateral aid package offered to Ukraine in March 2014. Overall, in the migration area (as was the case in the food safety area), the early selection of EU rules as part of the VLAP has not translated to their adoption and application in Ukraine. While Russia’s policies have (even if unintentionally) fostered the adoption of some EU demands and increased the EU’s flexibility, the implementation phase of the VLAP is a litmus test for the incumbent Ukrainian authorities’ capacity and willingness to carry out structural reforms. The conditions set by the EU to lift Schengen visas indeed touch upon very sensitive areas for Ukraine, not least the fight against corruption. Conclusions The analysis of EU-demanded change as part of the visa liberalisation process reveals both similarities with the food safety area and specific features. As noted in trade-related sectors, the adoption and application of EU demands is selective. Yet all four countries (whatever their engagement in macro-frameworks of relations) have displayed increasing compliance with EU demands in the period covered under this study, even if the sequencing of reforms strongly differ among the four cases. This is because of the combination of several factors. 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 145 10/25/2016 9:57:08 AM 146 EU’s policy transfer: migration Table 7.2 Domestic change in response to the EU: visa liberalisation process Selection Adoption Application Armenia Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreement in force (2014) State Migration Service (2009), yet limited competences Concept of the State Regulation of Migration in the Republic of Armenia (2010) No comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation No data on the implementation of the readmission agreement Biometric passports delivered (2012) Georgia Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreement in force (2011) National Migration Management Strategy (2012) Anti-discrimination law (2014) No State Migration Service Satisfactory implementation of the readmission agreement Biometric passports delivered (2011) Moldova Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreement in force (2008) Elimination of Schengen visas (2014) Migration and Asylum Strategy and Action Plan (2011) Anti-discrimination law (2012) Extended Migration Profile (2011–12) Satisfactory implementation of the readmission agreement Biometric passports delivered (2008) Ukraine Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreement in force (2008) State Migration Service (2010) Concept on Migration and Asylum (2011) Law on the principles of preventing and combating discrimination in Ukraine (2012) Amendments to the Anti-discrimination law (2014) Satisfactory implementation of the readmission agreement Biometric passports delivered (2014) As noted in Chapter 5, in contrast to trade-related areas, Russia’s policies have not hindered integration with the EU at the selection level, as both the visa facilitation and the visa liberalisation processes are broadly compatible with existing regional interdependences and Russia’s own policies. 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 146 10/25/2016 9:57:08 AM EU’s policy transfer: migration 147 With respect to the adoption level, patterns of compliance highlight similarities with the food safety area. While visa facilitation and readmission agreements are legally binding, this is not the case of the visa liberalisation process. Yet the phased approach, combined with the definition of clear benchmarks and criteria for each phase, provides the EU with major leverage over Eastern partners. In response to some EU member states’ concerns over inflows of refugees and irregular migrants, the EU extensively uses policyspecific conditionality and gate-keeping under the visa liberalisation process. These carry significant weight to account for the adoption of EU demands. However, the primary explanatory factor lies in governmental preferences and their coincidence (or lack thereof) with EU demands. ‘Preferential fit’ (Ademmer & Börzel 2013) explains the (sometimes anticipatory) adoption of EU demands in Moldova and in Armenia (for blocks 1 and 2 of requirements). ‘Preferential misfit’ accounts for Georgia’s resistance to the adoption of EU rules on the entry into the territory and residence permits, while the (initial) shift in the ruling elite after the 2012 elections explains the more systematic adoption of EU demands. While the literature has so far focused on governments as key actors in the migration area (Ademmer & Börzel 2013), I demonstrate that societal preferences and veto players do also matter in the compliance process with specific EU rules. In all four countries, the role of Churches as veto players and strong societal reluctance toward EU demands on anti-discrimination (block 3 of EU requirements) carry substantial weight to explain the delayed adoption of anti-discrimination laws or, in countries that are not yet asked to do so (Armenia), their non-adoption. The adoption level is also sensitive to rentseeking practices and the interpenetration of economic and political interests, as shown in the case of Ukraine and the introduction of biometric documents. Finally, while they do not impede the selection of EU rules, Russia’s policies can have an impact (even if not systematic) at the adoption and even implementation levels. They can work toward facilitating compliance with EU templates, as illustrated in Ukraine after the annexation of Crimea and support to rebels in the eastern part of the country. Alternatively, they could hinder the application of EU demands even at the post-compliance phase, as suggested in the case of Moldova if Russia’s threats to deport migrants materialise. Notes 1 This treaty also paved the way for development of an external dimension for the EU’s migration policy by calling upon the establishment of an ‘area of freedom, security and justice in which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration’. Title IV, Articles 61–63, Treaty on the European Union (1997]) OJ C224 2 As indicated by FRONTEX, however, ‘the scale of irregular migration at the eastern borders is much smaller than on any other migratory route into the EU and amounts to around 2% of the total’ (FRONTEX 2015). Since 2008, the number of illegal border crossings from the Eastern neighbourhood has remained stable, oscillating around 1,000 each year. 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 147 10/25/2016 9:57:08 AM 148 EU’s policy transfer: migration 3 EU visa facilitation and readmission agreements with ENP countries were modelled after the agreement signed with the Russian Federation, which successfully bargained for visa facilitation in exchange for the readmission agreement that the EU wanted to negotiate (Trauner & Kruse 2008). Regarding visa liberalisation, the substance of EU requirements under the ‘common steps’ jointly agreed upon with Russia in 2011 does not significantly differ from the Visa Liberalisation Action Plans handed over to Eastern Partnership countries. 4 As mentioned in Chapter 4, the post-Soviet space has largely remained visa-free, and no visa is required to travel to Russia and most other CIS countries. As far as other countries are concerned, the US and Canada required biometric passports from 2012 onwards, i.e. well after the introduction of EU demands under the Eastern Partnership. 5 Emigration actually started at the end of the 1980s, before Armenia became an independent country (Gevorgyan 2008). This was a result of two factors: first, the 1988 earthquake, and second, rising tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the beginning of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (Yeghiazaryan et al. 2003). 6 The GDP per capita plummeted by 44 per cent between 1990 and 1993, from USD 636.7 to USD 356.5. Source: World Bank, Data on GDP per capita, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?page=4 (accessed 14 May 2015) 7 While initially driven by humanitarian and security factors, since the mid-1990s outflow migration from Armenia has been predominantly caused by economic factors (Kabeleova et al. 2007). A high proportion of migration outflows is in fact seasonal, which makes data collection and management even more complex (Gevorgyan 2008; Chobanyan 2012). 8 E.g. the Law on the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Republic of Armenia (1994), the Law on Citizenship (1995), the Law on Refugees (1999), the Law on IDPs (2000) (Poghosyan 2011). 9 Armenia is one of the 15 largest remittances recipients in the world. On average, remittances totalled 16 per cent of the GDP between 2007 and 2012, i.e. approximately 40 per cent higher than the country’s exports, two times higher than foreign direct investment, eight times higher than bank flows, and four times higher than official government inflows (Ghazaryan & Tolosa 2012). Remittances make up to 80 per cent of the income of receiving households (Poghosyan 2011). 10 Author’s interview, Deputy Head and Head of External Relations, State Migration Service, Yerevan, November 2011. 11 The legal framework introducing biometric passports was adopted in 2011. The first passports were delivered in 2012. 12 In 2011, the State Migration Service was staffed with 40 people. However, low remuneration caused high turnover, difficulties in recruiting and, for some staff, weak motivation. Author’s interview, EU expert on migration, High Level Advisory Group, Yerevan, November 2011. 13 Author’s interview with the resident Twinning advisor, Yerevan, February 2014. 14 Author’s interviews, EU expert on migration, High Level Advisory Group, Yerevan, November 2011 and February 2014; director, State Migration Service, February 2014. 15 Author’s interview, political officer, EU Delegation to Armenia, February 2014. 16 There is no accurate data on the number of Armenian migrants in the Russian Federation. This is at least partially due to the fact that migrations from Armenia have actually taken place at different points in time, and many migrants have become citizens of the Russian Federation. The last Russian census recorded approximately 1.2 million Armenians living in the Russian Federation in 2010 (http://www.rusemb. org.uk/russianpopulation/); it is estimated, however, that the actual figure exceeds 2 million. In a similar vein, the estimated number of ethnic Armenians living in Moscow ranges between 160,000 and over 500,000 (Galkina 2006). 17 A ‘National Programme to Assist Voluntary Resettlement of Compatriots’ was launched in 2006, covering the period 2006–12 (Migration Policy Centre 2013a). 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 148 10/25/2016 9:57:08 AM EU’s policy transfer: migration 149 18 Between 2012 and early 2013, 2,600 people already resettled and another 26,000 were waiting for resettlement in early 2013 (Hovhannisyan 2013). 19 According to Poghosyan, a decrease by 40 per cent was observed in the wake of the crisis (Poghosyan 2011). 20 In April 2014, President Putin signed a law easing requirements for obtaining citizenship for those fluent in Russian or whose ancestors lived in the USSR or the Russian Empire. Article 33.1 (Federal Law ‘On the introduction of changes to the Federal Law ‘On Citizenship of the Russian Federation’’ 2014) 21 Estimates vary between 300,000 and 1.5 million (Danish Refugee Council 2007). The International Organisation for Migration indicates 1,025,000 emigrants (International Organisation for Migration 2008) 22 For instance, demands included under the heading ‘cooperation on migration issues’ mentioned the need to ‘elaborate and start implementing a coherent, comprehensive and balanced national action plan on migration and asylum issues; support training activities in the field of immigration and asylum’ (EU-Georgia European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan 2006). 23 Author’s interview, expert on visa liberalisation, Tbilisi, November 2011. 24 Author’s interview at the Civil Registry Agency of Georgia, Head of International Relations Department, Tbilisi, November 2011. 25 Author’s interview, Public Service Development Agency (formerly the Civil Registry Agency), Tbilsi, March 2013. 26 The Law on the Status of Aliens and Stateless persons was approved by the government on 30 October 2013 and entered into force on 1 September 2014. 27 In 2013, the number of visas issued for Egyptians increased almost ten times as compared to 2012. ‘Christians from Syria and Egypt Seek Refuge in the Caucasus’, 27 July 2013, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/europe/130726/ syria-egypt-christians-copts-refugees-georgia-armenia 28 Patriarch Ilia II sent a message to the Parliament indicating that ‘Introducing the definitions of “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” in this important draft Law for the country’s development causes huge turmoil among the public because the individual rights of our citizens are equally protected by the current legislation of Georgia. Believers view non-traditional sexual relations as a mortal sin, and in its current form, this legislation provides propaganda and legality to this sin’ (Jomarjidze 2014). 29 According to the EU Ambassador to Georgia: ‘The new system meets the benchmarks set by the visa liberalisation plan. However, it is a sovereign decision of the Georgian government to decide how these requirements are implemented.’ Cecilia Malmström, then EU Commissioner for Home Affairs, said in October 2014 that the Commission ‘has not been recommending limiting access to Georgia for citizens of any specific countries.’ (Ellena 2015) 30 Author’s interview, International Centre for Migration Policy Development, Chişinău, May 2012. 31 A working group on visa liberalisation was created in early 2011. It gathered all the institutions involved in the process (e.g. the Ministry of Justice, the Bureau of Interethnic Relations, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Labour) at the deputyminister level and was chaired by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. 32 Author’s interview, official responsible for the visa liberalisation process, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Moldova, Chişinău, May 2012. 33 Focus group with civil society experts, Chişinău, May 2014. 34 This proximity was explicitly acknowledged by the EU Delegation: ‘The EU wants to be a fair player but has a political interest in the country’. Author’s interview, EU official, Delegation of the EU to Moldova, Chişinău, May 2012. 35 Author’s interview, Head of EU Delegation, Chişinău, May 2012. 36 Author’s interviews, official responsible for the visa liberalisation process, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Moldova; and International Centre for Migration Policy Development, Chişinău, May 2014. 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 149 10/25/2016 9:57:08 AM 150 EU’s policy transfer: migration 37 Ibid. 38 According to Commissioner Malmström, ‘This is a great achievement and the beginning of a new chapter in our relations. We launched our Visa Dialogue with Moldova on June 2010, and less than four years later travelling to the Schengen zone without a visa will become a reality for Moldovan citizens. This shows that the efforts by the Moldovan authorities have paid off and that the EU is committed to deliver on engagements with third countries wishing to work with us. This is also an excellent example for other countries of the region, demonstrating that a strong political commitment and the effective implementation of reforms bring tangible results’ (European Commission 2014). 39 Author’s interviews, expert on visa liberalisation, Kyiv, May 2012. 40 The agreement on readmission between the EU and Ukraine entered into force in January 2008. It has applied to third countries’ nationals since January 2010 (Sushko et al. 2012). 41 Author’s interviews, expert on visa liberalisation, Kyiv, May 2012; Ministry of Interior of Ukraine, Kyiv, May 2012. 42 199 officials worked at the State Migration Service in Kyiv in 2013 (European Commission 2013b). 43 Author’s interviews, expert on visa liberalisation, Kyiv, May 2012. 44 For instance, the network of human rights group ‘Bez Kordoniv’ (No Borders) conducted an analysis of the shortcomings of the draft law ‘On the principles of preventing and combating discrimination in Ukraine’. 45 Author’s interview, Deputy Minister of Justice, Kyiv, June 2014. 46 Author’s interview with civil society experts, Kyiv, May 2012 and June 2014 47 Law of Ukraine No. 5492 on the Single State Demographic Registry and the documents confirming citizenship of Ukraine, identity of the person and his/her special status. 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Yerevan: Ameria Legal. 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 154 10/25/2016 9:57:08 AM 8 Conclusions Beyond the frontstage: reassessing the impact of external influences on domestic change in the post-Soviet space In recent years, the rivalry between EU and Russian deep integration projects has moved to the centre stage in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus. It reached its climax in Ukraine in 2013–14, when President Yanukovych’s decision not to sign an Association Agreement triggered massive protests that ended up in a change of power, followed by Russia’s annexation of Crimea and hybrid warfare in Eastern Ukraine (Ademmer et al. 2016: 1). This suggests that the policy transfer process of EU norms and standards in the post-Soviet space is increasingly shaped by macro-level variables that predominantly involve external actors. However, the study of macro-processes alone fails to explain the baffling discrepancies in the countries’ responses to the EU’s and Russia’s policies, let alone variation across sectors and over time in the policy transfer process within a given country (Delcour 2017). Taking the important variations across countries and over time as a starting point, this research contributes to the literature on EU policy transfer beyond its borders by developing an analytical framework that systematically connects variables and levels of policy change and by offering in-depth empirical analysis of how EU policy transfer unfolds in post-Soviet countries. Based upon a comparison between two sectors and four countries, the research reveals complex patterns of how (competing) external influences shape domestic change in the post-Soviet space. First, the book finds a disjuncture between the frontstage (the engagement with external actors’ macro-integration projects) and the backstage (micro-dynamics of policy transfer at the sectoral level) of the transfer theatre (Delcour 2017). Second, the book demonstrates that the pathways on which EU templates and policies travel to the post-Soviet space are not straightforward and unidirectional, but meandering and multidirectional. This is because the identified variables can have varying and opposite effects on the EU’s policy transfer. Overall, the findings highlight a differentiated impact of explanatory variables according to the dimension of policy change considered. They suggest that while EU and regional factors shape the selection of a macro-framework for integration, their importance decreases at the adoption and application levels, where domestic factors are key to determining the outcomes of policy transfer. The concluding chapter of this book summarises the research and wraps up the empirical findings. In light of these, it proceeds to offer generalisations about 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 155 10/25/2016 9:57:08 AM 156 Conclusions EU policy transfer in countries where enlargement is precluded. The conclusion ends by outlining avenues for future research. Summary of the research and empirical findings The research starts from the observation of diverse responses to the EU and variations over time in these responses. While the ‘Neighbourhood Europeanisation’ literature has increasingly sought to account for the baffling discrepancies between countries (among others by exploring the respective role of different sets of factors), the review of the literature presented in Chapter 1 shows that it leaves important research angles unexplored, both empirically and conceptually. Empirically, the literature has mostly focused on the early years of the ENP (e.g. 2005–10) and has therefore fallen short of incorporating the emergence of two competing macro-frameworks for integration into the analysis. As a result of this empirical focus, scholars have mostly concentrated on the adoption of EU templates, thereby neglecting both the selection of the EU’s model and the application of EU rules (that had only recently started at the time of most research). In particular, most publications were premised on the assumption that partner countries’ engagement in the ENP or the Eastern Partnership reflected a firm and definitive commitment to adopt EU rules. As a consequence, the selection of the EU’s model was implicitly taken for granted, and the literature failed to grasp the debates that developed around the EU’s offer of Association Agreements and DCFTAs – either in countries that were torn between two competing offers, like Armenia and, to a lesser extent, Yanukovych’s Ukraine, or in countries in which some components of the EU’s model had very limited resonance, like Georgia. Furthermore, as a consequence of the conceptual lens (rational choice institutionalism) that has prevailed in the literature on Neighbourhood Europeanisation, insufficient attention has been paid to the influence of past choices and legacies on current preferences and EU-prescribed change. In particular, Soviet and postSoviet legacies (such as rent-seeking behaviour) have only been analysed to the extent that they shape actors’ interests and are likely to alter their cost-benefit analyses in relation to EU-demanded change. Nevertheless, notwithstanding cost-benefit calculations of domestic actors, Soviet/post-Soviet legacies can also affect EU-demanded policy change by producing unintended effects and prompting the emergence of informal practices impinging on formal change. For instance, even though the elimination of Schengen visas coincides with domestic actors’ preferences and interests, it has given rise to the emergence of specific modes of transactions and clientelism. A concrete illustration is the emergence, in the streets of Kyiv, of ads offering Moldovan citizenship only a few weeks after the EU lifted the obligation of Schengen visas with Moldova.1 This testifies to the fact that even in cases of extensive adoption and application of EU standards (as was the case with Moldova for visa liberalisation), EU-demanded domestic change can be diverted, exploited as a resource by state, non-state or even non-domestic actors and re-shaped through informal rules and practices. 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 156 10/25/2016 9:57:08 AM Conclusions 157 To bridge these gaps, the research makes three contributions. First, it provides the first transnational and cross-sector comparison of the EU’s influence on domestic change since the EU stepped up its offer with the Eastern Partnership and since Russia launched the Eurasian integration process. Second, by adding insights from the literature on post-Soviet transformations, the research builds strong connections between domestic actors’ preferences and the social and political context in which they develop, i.e. post-Soviet transformations. Third, the research deconstructs domestic change in response to EU templates according to different dimensions of change (i.e. selection, adoption and implementation). Indeed the main assumption underpinning my research is that, while different explanatory variables matter in the policy transfer process, they do so to different degrees depending on the dimension of change considered. The research confirms the central role of domestic-level variables in explaining the extent of policy transfer, while EU-level and regional-level variables have either a facilitating or obstructing impact at the selection and adoption levels. These findings (partially) run against the emphasis that has been placed in recent years on EU-Russian competition as the main factor structuring change in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus (for a different approach, see Ademmer et al. 2016). Indeed, since the early 2010s (and even more so since 2013), policymakers, analysts and academics have increasingly approached the countries located between the European Union and Russia through a geopolitical prism. Much has been written about the rivalry between the two macro-integration projects in what has increasingly become a contested neighbourhood. As a result of successive crises – starting with gas crises in Ukraine and the conflict in Georgia, and culminating with the recent crisis in Ukraine – academic debates have concentrated on the EU-Russian rivalry.2 Some have challenged the predominant view of the EU as a normative power (Casier 2013), thus nuancing the assumption that Russia and the EU offer drastically different approaches to their neighbourhood (Averre 2009). Others have argued that competition in the postSoviet space develops between a ‘neo-imperial’ EU and a ‘post-imperial’ Russia (Torbakov 2013: 173). However different their conclusions may be, scholars have focused on the drivers and instruments underpinning the EU’s and Russia’s policies, thereby neglecting the ‘in-between countries’ (Torbakov 2013: 173) that have frequently been perceived as a playground for large neighbouring actors (Ademmer et al. 2016). Yet this book demonstrates that, while shaping the macro-level of relations and affecting partner countries’ engagement at this level, external actors (whether the EU or Russia) can only influence the domestic political economy of reforms to a limited degree. In fact, the book points to a discrepancy between the macro-selection of a ‘model’ (in this case a deep economic integration scheme) and sector-specific reform processes. Such conclusions may seem paradoxical given that the research provides ample evidence of EU policy transfer (even if the transfer is selective at the adoption level and limited at the application level) in the two sectors studied. Clearly, in all four countries, policy change has taken place in line with EU demands. As illustrated in tables included in Chapters 6 and 7, legal frameworks, institutional 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 157 10/25/2016 9:57:08 AM 158 Conclusions structures and policy templates have evolved considerably in response to EU stimuli under the ENP and especially the Eastern Partnership. This is especially visible in the migration area, given the low degree of regulation that prevailed in many post-Soviet countries and the shared legacy of free movement in the post-Soviet space. In the food safety area, all four countries have reformed with a view to incorporating (to different degrees) EU demands. It is important to note that while a number of external actors and international organisations have been active in the post-Soviet space since the early 1990s, policy change in both sectors has occurred specifically in response to the EU (see also Delcour & Wolczuk 2015a). In the migration area, the EU has been the first external actor to put forward specific demands (such as biometric passports) and to bring together a series of migration-related requirements (based on either the EU’s or other international standards) under an umbrella framework (the visa liberalisation process). In the food safety area, other international organisations (primarily the WTO, in the framework of its Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Agreement or the Codex Alimentarius) had already introduced some of the demands that were formulated by the EU prior to the launch of negotiations for DCFTAs, e.g. the application of the HACCP food monitoring system). Yet despite the fact that Georgia, Armenia and Moldova had joined the WTO in the early 2000s, none of them had actually complied with this requirement until it was introduced by the EU as part of the DCFTA negotiations. This abundantly illustrates the EU’s influence on sectoral policy change in Eastern Partnership countries. However, the findings presented in this book also demonstrate that external actors are not the main drivers behind this change. In addition, while their influence is strong on the selection of a macro-model for integration, it decreases during the adoption and application of selected templates. Without a doubt, the European Union’s enhanced offer under the Eastern Partnership has triggered stronger interest from partner countries, especially Moldova, Armenia and Georgia, for whom an Association Agreement and a DCFTA had not been on the table (unlike Ukraine). In contrast to the ENP’s initially vague offer (‘a stake in the Internal Market’, European Commission 2004), the Eastern Partnership’s bigger and more tangible incentives (either in the form of enhanced contractual agreements, market access or a visa-free regime) have prompted EaP countries’ selection of the EU rules as a reference point. This enhanced offer has triggered all four partner countries’ engagement in the EU’s macro-model for integration, whether they have membership aspirations (as is the case for Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) or not (as is the case for Armenia). Partner countries were even more willing to engage with the EU’s model as Russia’s objections to the Eastern Partnership did not immediately translate into punitive measures vis-à-vis those countries that had started negotiations for an Association Agreement and a DCFTA. Therefore, the first EU-level hypothesis presented in Chapter 2 (‘The selection of EU rules is more likely when the EU offers bigger rewards in exchange for reforms’) is confirmed. However, I find that EU-level variables carry only limited explanatory power at the adoption and application levels. On the one hand, the introduction of 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 158 10/25/2016 9:57:09 AM Conclusions 159 sector-specific conditionality and the increased provision of capacity-building assistance under the Eastern Partnership have facilitated the adoption and application of EU templates. For instance, the formulation of key recommendations prior to launching DCFTA negotiations triggered Georgia’s initial efforts at compliance with EU food safety requirements, while the increased assistance activities and detachment of experts enhanced Armenia’s exposure to EU templates and, in fine, the understanding of EU practices. On the other hand, while conditionality acted as a trigger or a facilitator, it has not yielded systematic compliance with EU templates. In Georgia, in both sectors the adoption of EU rules has remained selective even after negotiations for a DCFTA were launched and after the country received a Visa Liberalisation Action Plan. Moreover, enhanced assistance has not (at least not yet) resulted in improved application of EU-approximated rules. Overall, all four countries display (at best) a piecemeal implementation of EU templates. Therefore, the second and third hypotheses presented in Chapter 2 (‘The adoption of EU rules is more likely when the EU applies highly specific policy conditionality’; ‘The application of EU rules is more likely when the EU offers capacity-building assistance in support of reforms’) are only partially confirmed. Likewise, Russia’s policies have played a role (even if negatively) in shaping partner countries’ engagement in a macro-level framework of integration. Yet in sharp contrast to the EU, Russia has exerted influence through coercion rather than attraction (de Tinguy 2008: 203). This is despite the fact that for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia proposed a model for deep economic integration in the early 2010s (Dragneva & Wolczuk 2013). This role as a driver is in sharp contrast to the 1990s, when despite the fact that the postSoviet space remained a priority area for Russian foreign policy, Russia was too concerned with its own internal transformation process and too weak at the time to act as a driver of regional integration (Delcour 2011). According to the Russian president, the Eurasian integration project is beneficial for all participating countries (Putin 2011). Yet it primarily derives from a geopolitical objective of reasserting Russia’s influence over the post-Soviet space (Vinokurov 2007). At the end of the 2000s, regional integration started to be seen as a vehicle for asserting Russia’s leading role in an area where other external players (primarily the EU in the west and China in the east) were increasingly influential. However, the way in which the Eurasian integration project has developed and enlarged mirrors a continuous ‘exploitation of power relationships’ (de Tinguy 2008: 85) with the view to either inducing post-Soviet countries into joining the Eurasian project or deterring them from joining other integration schemes. Either way, Russia has predominantly relied on negative incentives based on the multifaceted interdependences inherited from the Soviet Union. Russia has sought to countervail further integration with the EU by using primarily (even if not exclusively) macro-level (security and geopolitical) instruments. Russia’s actions, however, have yielded different outcomes in terms of partner countries’ selection of a macro-model of integration. In Armenia, Russia’s pressure has prompted the country to join the Eurasian Economic Union. Yet in Ukraine, it has only 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 159 10/25/2016 9:57:09 AM 160 Conclusions resulted in Yanukovych’s decision to suspend the signature of the Association Agreement – a decision that was reversed a few months later after Yanukovych was ousted. Overall, in all countries except Armenia, the provision of negative incentives did not result in halting EU policy transfer but instead supported policy change in line with EU templates. This demonstrates the limited explanatory power of the role of Russia’s policies as an explanatory variable limiting the effectiveness of EU policy transfer if analysed in isolation. In other words, the first regional-level hypothesis presented in Chapter 2 (‘The selection of the EU’s model is less likely when Russia offers specific incentives tied to partner countries’ choice of macro-integration’) is mostly not confirmed. Instead, three out of my four cases confirm the findings of the literature on the facilitating role inadvertently played by Russia (Ademmer 2015; Delcour & Wolczuk 2015b). Therefore, while Russia’s policies do have an impact on the selection of a macroframework for integration, they can yield opposite results and mostly support (even if unintentionally) the selection of the EU’s model. Differences stem from the fact that Russia’s influence at the macro-level crucially hinges on domestic elites’ perceived vulnerability vis-à-vis Russia. Ultimately, Russia’s policies (just like the EU’s) are filtered by domestic interests, preferences and beliefs. As is the case for the EU, the outcomes of Russia’s actions on EU policy transfer at the adoption and application level, though, are less evident. In the two sectors selected for analysis, Russia’s governmental policies contribute little to an understanding of the scope of compliance with EU templates. In Georgia, while EU incentives and policy conditionality have triggered only shallow compliance, Russia’s policies (whether trade embargoes or further integration with breakaway regions) carry little explanatory weight to account for the country’s adoption (or lack thereof) of EU standards. While Russia’s use of the country’s vulnerability has reversed the initial selection of EU templates in Armenia, the actual impact of accession to the EAEU on domestic change still needs to be ascertained. In fact, while the effects of Eurasian integration on trade-related sectors are still unclear (Delcour 2016), Armenia’s engagement in the EAEU may, perhaps paradoxically, enable the country to safeguard integration with the EU in those areas that fall outside the scope of EAEU competences, such as visa liberalisation (Ademmer & Delcour 2016). In Moldova, Russia’s punitive measures and threats thereof have not significantly affected the country’s compliance patterns in both the food safety and visa liberalisation area. In a similar vein, it is too early to discern whether Ukraine’s recent adoption of EU food safety and visa liberalisation3 templates (an outcome of Russia’s pressure after almost a decade of inertia in compliance patterns with EU standards) will foster effective implementation. Therefore, my findings do not confirm the hypothesis presented in Chapter 2, according to which the adoption and the application of EU rules are less likely when Russia deploys punitive measures in retaliation for the selection of the EU’s model. As the research shows, ultimately the selection, and especially the adoption and application, of external templates crucially hinge on the elites’ preferences and the actors’ constellation of interests in each country. Overall, the domestic-level 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 160 10/25/2016 9:57:09 AM Conclusions 161 hypotheses are confirmed. First, the adoption of EU templates is more likely if EU demands resonate strongly with domestic elites’ preferences, beliefs and interests. EU-prescribed change under the Eastern Partnership was perceived as a unique opportunity to modernise in Armenia and prompted substantial efforts to adopt and start applying EU templates. Conversely, Georgia under Saakashvili offers an interesting counter-example, as the elites’ resistance to the substance of EU norms was the key driver behind the selective adoption of EU templates. While a high resonance of EU templates for reform with the domestic elites is a prerequisite for domestic change, I find that a number of additional factors can hinder the adoption and application of EU-prescribed reforms. First, my hypothesis on the negative impact of a fragmented decision-making system is confirmed overall. The Armenian and Georgian examples confirm that a centralised, top-down decision-making process facilitates reforms in line with EU prescriptions, once the decision to reform is taken at the highest state level. In contrast, poor coordination among state bodies and institutional struggles, combined with political instability and weakness within the executive branch of power, have hindered the adoption and application of EU-demanded reforms in Moldova and Ukraine. The role of veto players is also confirmed. In all four countries, I find that the Churches and some media outlets have acted as veto players in the visa liberalisation process for the adoption of a law against discrimination. Even though their opposition has been overcome in Georgia, Moldova and recently in Ukraine, their influence is likely to undermine the implementation of these laws. My findings also confirm the obstructive role of powerful business interests, as shown by the blockade of the laws on biometric documents and food safety in the Ukrainian Parliament, as long as these business interests have no or limited interest in moving toward EU practices. The role of informal veto players is tightly connected to the predominance of informal interactions in the post-Soviet space. In both the food safety and the visa liberalisation areas, rent-seeking behaviour, clientelism and personal networks take precedence over laws and standards that are supposed to rule stakeholders’ action. This does not only apply to domestic bureaucracies and powerful business interests at the adoption level, but also small businesses and citizens at the application level (as illustrated by the above-mentioned example of offers of Moldovan citizenship in Ukraine). Hence, informal interactions corrode the substance of change brought about by the adoption of new laws and standards. Implications for the analysis of policy transfer and future research avenues With a focus on EU-demanded change in post-Soviet countries, this research has set out to enrich the understanding of how policy transfer works beyond the EU’s borders, i.e. in a context where the EU cannot hierarchically impose its rules (Börzel 2011). It makes two contributions in this respect. First, while in the absence of a membership perspective, the adoption of EU templates in the neighbourhood is in essence voluntary, my research also sheds 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 161 10/25/2016 9:57:09 AM 162 Conclusions light on indirectly coercive modes of policy transfer. Process-tracing based upon a careful description of change and sequencing thereof has enabled me to highlight the emergence of new transfer mechanisms under the ENP and to assess their impact on domestic change. In contrast to scholarly conclusions reached during the early ENP period (Sasse 2008), my findings highlight an extensive EU reliance on sector-specific conditionality as well as the introduction of gatekeeping in the framework of the Eastern Partnership. Partner countries are required to introduce policy change in order to secure benefits in their relationship with the EU, be they provided in the form of assistance or tangible rewards, such as visa liberalisation or market access. In a similar vein, under the Eastern Partnership the EU has relied upon a much more precise and unambiguous model for policy transfer as compared to the ENP’s initial toolbox, either in the form of the acquis communautaire for trade-related policy areas or in the form of an extensive list of international and EU standards for visa liberalisation. Clearly, these new modes of policy transfer have had important effects on policy change. In particular, they have triggered and structured the reform process in all selected countries (with the exception of Ukraine, which was not subjected to ex-ante conditionality in the food safety area and other trade-related sectors). However, my research also indicates that domestic change remains shallow if it is not embraced by local elites and actors. My second major finding indeed confirms that domestic actors play the role of filters in the policy transfer process (Dumoulin & Saurugger 2010: 14). EU policy and institutional templates are perceived and used as either resources or constraints by domestic actors. As a result of interpretations by different constellations of actors, they may gain different meanings in the context of reception (Allal 2010). Hence, the contextualisation of the transfer process is crucial to understanding its outcomes. This is because (as historical institutionalists argue) actors’ preferences are framed within a given context and influenced by past choices and legacies. These contribute to shaping the way in which domestic actors understand and use the models transferred. However, while pointing out the role of continuities and legacies, my work also provides evidence of actual domestic change. What my research demonstrates is that the policy transfer process is in fact a process of translation, ‘understood as a cognitive process re-creating a model and resulting from negotiations among different policy actors’ (Hassenteufel & de Maillard 2013: 377). The research thus highlights iterative dynamics, whereby the ‘transfer’ is not limited to institutional and policy change but is embedded in and alters social relations and (in the case of the post-Soviet space) regional links. This research is not without limitations. In light of the dearth of empirical data on EU-demanded domestic change under the Eastern Partnership when this research commenced, this book has primarily endeavoured to identify the actors and factors involved in the policy transfer process. To that purpose, it has brought into focus different levels of change. These are however ideal types that were primarily designed as analytical categories and that only reflect the sheer complexity of the transfer process to a very limited extent. In particular, they 15037-0086-FullBook.indd 162 10/25/2016 9:57:09 AM Conclusions 163 do not capture deeper processes such as the transformation of local capacities and the relationship between state and business (Langbein 2015: xx). Hence, my research is only a first step that needs to be taken further and complemented, in particular, by an actor-centred approach. This would also contribute to bridging a gap in the existing literature: most publications have so far focused on the mechanisms and outcomes of EU policy transfer, whereas less attention has been dedicated to the agents of transfer. Further steps include, for instance, an in-depth analysis of the constellation of actors engaged in the policy transfer process in the reception context and an exploration of how interactions between transfer agents re-shapes the paradigms, norms and instruments that lie at the root of policy transfer. Notes 1 Author’s observation during fieldwork in Kyiv, June 2014. 2 This paragraph draws upon Ademmer et al. (2016). 3 The Ukrainian Parliament finally adopted a law against discrimination in November 2015. References Ademmer, E. (2015). Interdependence and EU-Demanded Policy Change in a Shared Neighbourhood. Journal of European Public Policy, 22(5), pp. 671–689. Ademmer, E., & Delcour, L. (2016). With a Little Help from Russia? The European Union and Visa Liberalization with Post-Soviet States. Eurasian Geography and Economics, 57(1), pp. 89–112. Ademmer, E., Delcour, L., & Wolczuk, K. (2016). Beyond Geopolitics: Exploring the Impact of the EU and Russia in the ‘Contested Neighborhood’. Eurasian Geography and Economics, 57(1), pp. 1–18. Allal, A. (2010). Les configurations développementistes internationales au Maroc et en Tunisie: des policy tranfers à portée limitée. Critique Internationale, 3(48), pp. 97–116. Averre, D. (2009). Competing Rationalities: Russia, the EU and the ‘Shared Neighbourhood’. Europe-Asia Studies, 61(10), pp. 1689–1713. Börzel, T. (2011). Move Closer! New Modes of Governance and Accession to the European Union. Vienna: Institute for European Integration Research. Casier, T. (2013). The EU–Russia Strategic Partnership: Challenging the Normative Argument. Europe-Asia Studies, 65(7), pp. 1377–1395. Delcour, L. (2011). Shaping the Post-Soviet Space? 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