Supermax Prisons
What We Know, What We Do Not
Know, and Where We Are Going
The Prison Journal
Volume 88 Number 1
March 2008 23-42
© 2008 Sage Publications
10.1177/0032885507310530
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Jesenia M. Pizarro
Raymund E. Narag
Michigan State University, East Lansing
Supermax prisons have substantially increased in popularity during the last
20 years. This article presents an examination of the current state of knowledge on supermax prisons, in terms of both case law and criminal justice
research, to assess the potential future of these facilities. Three research questions are posed: (a) What does the academic community know or not know
about supermax prisons? (b) How have U.S. courts ruled in supermax prison
litigation? and (c) Do current supermax case law and research indicate that
their administration, existence, and operation will change in the near future?
Keywords:
supermax; solitary confinement; inmate rights
T
he increase in the U.S. prison population during the past 20 years has
contributed to numerous problems within correctional facilities, such as
overcrowding and violence (Wooldrege, Griffin, & Pratt, 2001). In the face
of these issues, prison administrators have sought new means for dealing
with disruptive inmates in an efficient manner. Consequently, during the past
two decades, a number of new policies in corrections have developed—one
of which is the placement of “disruptive inmates” in supermaximum, or
“supermax,” prisons (Pizarro, Stenius, & Pratt, 2006).
The National Institute of Corrections (NIC, 1997) defined supermax
prisons as “free-standing facilities, or a distinct unit within a facility, that
provides for the management and secure control of inmates who have been
officially designated as exhibiting violent or seriously disruptive behavior
while incarcerated” (p. 1). More than 95% of state prison wardens who were
surveyed in a recent study concurred with this definition (Mears, 2006).
Authors’ Note: We would like to thank Chris E. Smith for his helpful comments in the preparation of this article.
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The purpose of these facilities is to house the “worst of the worst” inmates
(NIC, 1997; Riveland, 1999). In doing this, they make use of the latest
architectural and technological security advances (Horwitz, 2001; Neal,
2003) to control and monitor inmates designated by corrections practitioners
as violent, assaultive, and/or a major escape risk (Mears, 2006; NIC, 1997;
Pizarro & Stenius, 2004; Riveland, 1999). The rationale behind these practices is to segregate the most dangerous inmates to protect prison staff and
inmates in the general prison population while at the same time having a
deterrent effect on inmates who are contemplating engaging in violent or
disruptive acts while incarcerated (Mears, 2006). As such, it is a form of
double incapacitation, in which inmates are isolated not only from the rest
of society but also from other prisoners and staff.
Supermax prisons have substantially increased in popularity during the
past 20 years. The number of supermax institutions in the United States has
grown from only 1 confirmed facility in 1984, the Federal Penitentiary
at Marion, Illinois (King, 1999; Kurki & Morris, 2001), to approximately
60 facilities in 1999 (Briggs, Sundt, & Castellano, 2003). A recent study
revealed that as of 2004, 44 states throughout the country are operating one
or more supermax facilities (Mears, 2006). Current estimates indicate that
approximately 25,000 inmates are serving their sentence in one of these
institutions (Mears, 2006). The growing popularity of these facilities has
made them “one of the most dramatic features of the great American experiment with mass incarceration during the last quarter of the 20th century”
(King, 1999, p. 163).
A review of the penology literature suggests that supermax prisons have
gained support during recent years because of changes in the ideologies that
drive corrections. Garland (2001) and other penologists (i.e., Ambramsky,
2002; Feeley & Simon, 1992; Gonnerman, 1999; Roberts, Stalans,
Indermaur, & Hough, 2003) have attributed the shifts in penal policy to the
decline of rehabilitation as a guiding philosophy of corrections, which has
led to changes in the goals of the penal institution. The decline of the rehabilitation ideal had a major impact in the popularity of supermax prisons
because, in the absence of rehabilitation as a primary aim in corrections,
prisons have acquired a different reason for being (Pizarro et al., 2006). The
prisons of today are intended to punish offenders, to prevent them from committing new offenses, and to deter others from engaging in criminal behavior.
Within this context, a new managerial style in corrections developed. Feeley
and Simon (1992) coined the term new penology, which refers to a new management style in corrections that focuses on managing risk. The new penology is not concerned with responsibility, fault, moral sensibility, diagnosis, or
Pizarro, Narag / Current Knowledge on Supermax Prisons
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intervention and treatment of offenders but with techniques to identify,
classify, and manage groups sorted by levels of perceived dangerousness
(Feeley & Simon, 1992).
Despite the reason for their popularity, the advent of these institutions is
not without controversy. Supermax prisons impose on inmates unique
deprivations not found in maximum-, medium-, or minimum-security prisons. Some scholars and practitioners consider that these unique deprivations push constitutional limits on conditions of confinement (Weidman,
2004). Opponents argue that supermax institutions violate prisoners’ constitutional rights, contribute to inmates’ psychological problems, and are
extremely costly (Fellner & Mariner, 1997). Conversely, proponents claim
that the “toughening” of the inmate population, increased gang activity, and
difficulties associated with maintaining order in severely crowded prisons
necessitate supermax facilities (Mears, 2005; Mears & Castro, 2006; Riveland,
1999). Some proponents also assert that these institutions increase safety,
order, and control throughout the prison system by incapacitating disruptive
and dangerous inmates and deterring those who may contemplate engaging
in disruptive behavior (Mears, 2005).
This article presents an examination of the current state of knowledge on
supermax prisons, in terms of both case law and criminal justice research,
to assess the potential future of these facilities. Three research questions are
posed: (a) What does the academic community know or not know about
supermax prisons? (b) How have U.S. courts ruled in supermax prison litigation? (c) Do current supermax case law and research indicate that their
administration, existence, and operation will change in the near future?
In answering these questions, a review of the supermax prison literature follows. This review includes an overview of the management of these facilities, types of inmates serving their sentence in supermax, the effect these
institutions have on inmates and the general prison population, and supermax
case law. We then offer a discussion of the potential future of these facilities
and avenues for future research.
What We Know and What We Do Not Know
Operation
Jurisdictions vary considerably in their use, operation, and management
of supermax facilities (Mears, 2006; NIC, 1997). Nevertheless, research has
demonstrated that all supermax facilities share certain defining features.
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For example, inmates are confined in a 7 ft. by 12 ft. single, often windowless,
cell for 22 to 23 hours per day (Mears, 2006; NIC, 1997; Pizarro & Stenius,
2004; Rhodes, 2005; Riveland, 1999). Meals and treatment programs are
restricted exclusively to inmates’ cells. In some jurisdictions, inmates are
fed nutra-loaf, a tasteless but nutritious food that requires no utensils to eat
(Kurki & Morris, 2001; Pettigrew, 2002). Should rehabilitation workers
visit the inmates, no physical contact is allowed. Education instructors, for
example, stand in front of inmates’ cells and talk to them through openings
in cell doors (Pizarro & Stenius, 2004). Physical contact happens only in
periods when correctional officers place handcuffs and other restraints on
inmates. Inmates go out of their cells only for showers, which are accorded
to them approximately 3 times a week, and for alone exercise a couple of
times a week.
When inmates refuse to obey orders or become violent, correctional officers
may use proportionate and reasonable force to subdue inmates (Atherton,
2001; Pizarro & Stenius, 2004). For example, correctional officers can conduct cell extractions—the forceful removal of a prisoner from a cell—when
inmates refuse to come out of their cell or cover the glass window in their
cell door (Atherton, 2001; Fellner & Mariner, 1997). Administrators can
also use the four-point restraint (i.e., the strapping of inmates to their beds),
placement of inmates in special cells that have no amenities such as beds or
toilet, and the denial of services such as food delivery (Collins, 2004;
Pizarro & Stenius, 2004).
Entry and Exit Criteria
The criteria for the placement and release from these facilitates are not
fully defined. States vary considerably in their criteria for placing inmates in
these facilities (Mears, 2006; NIC, 1997; Pizarro & Stenius, 2004; Riveland,
1999; Toch, 2001). Some jurisdictions house less than 1% of their inmate
population in these facilities (e.g., Pennsylvania), whereas others house more
than 10% of their population (e.g., Mississippi) (Mears, 2006). In most
jurisdictions, admission into a supermax does not depend on a formal disciplinary hearing or a court-imposed sentence but is based on the criminal
and behavioral history of an inmate while incarcerated (Riveland, 1999).
The Federal Bureau of Prisons appears to be the exception to this rule because
some inmates (e.g., Zacarias Moussaoui) are sentenced to the federal supermax at Florence, Colorado (“Moussaoui Defiant,” 2006).
In most jurisdictions, the decision to place an inmate in a supermax is
made by prison administrators. Prison administrators are permitted to base
Pizarro, Narag / Current Knowledge on Supermax Prisons
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their decision on factual evidence or simply the perception that an inmate
poses a threat to the orderly operation of the general population prisons. For
example, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation has
implemented policies that target gang members for placement in a supermax, even if they do not engage in an overt type of violence (Morris, 2002).
Similarly, the Wisconsin Department of Corrections defines gang involvement as a criterion that may be used in determining placement in a supermax (DeMaio, 2001). In Wisconsin, inmates who are labeled as prison gang
members by other inmates (i.e., prison snitches) and are confirmed by a
correctional gang investigator to be members of a gang could be placed in
a supermax (DeMaio, 2001).
Some states, however, have elaborate placement procedures. For example,
Ohio’s Department of Corrections established placement criteria that require
potential supermax inmates to receive “factual basis” of why they are candidates for incarceration in such a facility (Wilkinson v. Austin, 2005). This
criterion requires the Department of Corrections to provide inmates with
evidence of why they are eligible for supermax placement. In addition, the
inmates are allowed to defend themselves against the allegations brought
against them. Once placed in the supermax, the inmates also have the right
for a review of the confinement within 30 days of their placement and an
annual review thereafter.
The amount of time an inmate serves in a supermax facility also varies
across jurisdictions (Riveland, 1999). Some jurisdictions have determinate
periods to be served, but most have indeterminate placement. In 22 jurisdictions, inmates can complete their court-ordered sentence while in a
supermax institution (NIC, 1997). Only 6 jurisdictions surveyed by the NIC
(1997) indicated that inmates placed in supermax prison go through a transitional program (e.g., move inmates from supermax prison into a maximumsecurity prison, let inmates participate in group activities, place inmates in
institutional jobs) before they are released into society or into the general
prison population.
Generally, the criteria for release from a supermax are not published
or revealed to prisoners (Pizarro & Stenius, 2004; Riveland, 1999). The
amount of time served may depend on the perceived risk the inmate presents, changes in an inmate’s mental health, and the amount of time left on the
inmate’s sentence (Riveland, 1999). In some jurisdictions (i.e., California
and Wisconsin), inmates can be released if they properly debrief and cooperate with authorities. This process typically involves renouncing gang
membership and providing information about other gang members and
gang activities (DeMaio, 2001).
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Inmate Composition
Most of what we know in this area comes from survey research that
focuses on the perceptions of prison administrators (e.g., Mears, 2006; Wells,
Johnson, & Henningsen, 2002) or from surveys distributed to state and federal departments of corrections (e.g., NIC, 1997; Riveland, 1999). The only
study to date that has specifically focused on deciphering the characteristics
of supermax prison was conducted in the state of Washington. This case
study showed that supermax inmates, when compared to the general inmate
population of the state (a) are more likely to have convictions for violent
offenses, (b) are more likely to have engaged in infractions that are serious
while in prison, (c) are younger, and (d) are serving longer sentences (Lovell,
Cloyes, Allen, & Rhodes, 2000). Lovell and colleagues (2000) also found
that inmates who engage in violence while in prison are not the sole occupants
of these facilities. Instead, the supermax prison population is composed of
an array of inmates, such as (a) inmates in protective custody, (b) inmates
who have difficulty coping with life in prison, (c) inmates who committed
rule infractions while in prison, and (d) inmates who are suffering from
mental illnesses (Lovell et al., 2000).
Similarly, survey research suggests that the inmate composition of supermax prisons is mixed. For example, Wells and his colleagues (2002) found
that supermax facilities tend to house inmates who violate institution rules, are
in protective custody, or are alleged to belong to a gang. In addition, research
has also shown that in some jurisdictions death row inmates and prisoners
on routine segregation are housed in supermax facilities because of a lack of
resources in regular maximum-, medium-, and minimum-security prisons
(Lynch, 2005; Mears, 2006; NIC, 1997; Riveland, 1999).
Of interest, contrary to popular belief, some supermax inmates are there
on a voluntary basis. Wardens in some jurisdictions (e.g., Ohio) point out
that some inmates request to be placed in a supermax facility, and if their
request is not met, they engage in violent behavior to be placed in a supermax
(Mears, 2006). The warden of the Ohio State Penitentiary reports that in his
jurisdiction there is a waiting list for getting into their supermax. Prison
wardens suggest numerous reasons for this (Mears, 2006). For example,
some inmates would rather not share their living space with others. Others
view supermax as a ticket to getting out of prison work and programs, whereas
others prefer supermax confinement because they fear being injured in the
general prison population. Finally, other inmates prefer supermax because
the facilities are cleaner and newer than those used to house the general
prison population (Mears, 2006).
Pizarro, Narag / Current Knowledge on Supermax Prisons
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The Impact of Supermax Prisons
Institutional effect. Prison administrators assert that supermax prisons are
effective management tools because they serve as a general deterrent within
the correctional population—that their presence leads to effective prison
management because they curb violence and disturbances within penal
institutions (King, 1999; Riveland, 1999). A recent survey administered to
601 prison wardens suggested that, overall, wardens agree with the notion
that supermax prisons serve to increase systemwide safety, order, and control
(Mears & Castro, 2006). Some wardens asserted that supermax facilities
helped significantly reduce the number of assaults on correctional officers and
that their existence provides a deterrent to gang members and to inmates
who endanger prisoners and correctional staff (Angelone, 1999; Mears, 2006;
Mears & Castro, 2006). Indeed, 95% of the wardens reported that supermax
prisons are successful in increasing the safety, order, and control in the general prison population (Mears & Castro, 2006). Most of the wardens also
reported that the presence of supermax prisons as a management tool builds
confidence in their penal establishment. They also believed that the mere
fact that supermax exists is an important deterrent to potential disruptive
inmates (Mears & Castro, 2006).
There is, however, no empirical evidence to support the notion that
supermax prisons are effective (Kurki & Morris, 2001). Rather, this belief
is primarily supported by anecdotal reports from correctional departments
throughout the country or descriptive studies that do not control for possible spurious effects. For example, the Texas Department of Criminal Justice
claimed that supermax is effective in restoring order and breaking up gangs.
They reported that homicides in their jurisdiction decreased to fewer than
10 incidents since the opening of their supermax units (Austin, Repko,
Harris, McGinnis, & Plant, 1998). Likewise, the Colorado Department of
Corrections reported that since the opening of its supermax facility in 1993,
they experienced a 50% drop in their number of violent incidents (Atherton,
2001). Similarly, Irwin and Austin (2001) speculated that the reason for the
decline of gang violence in California prisons is because of the extensive
use of supermax segregation units.
Only one study to date has attempted to empirically assess with robust
analytic methods whether supermax prisons contribute to a decrease in
prison violence. This study assessed the effect of supermax confinement in
Illinois, Arizona, and Minnesota and found that the opening of a supermax
facility in these jurisdictions did not reduce the levels of inmate-on-inmate
violence (Briggs et al., 2003). Out of the three jurisdictions that were studied,
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only in Illinois did the opening of a new supermax facility coincide with
reductions in assaults against staff. The authors, however, are reluctant to
attribute this decrease to the supermax facility because of numerous confounding factors. For example, the Illinois Department of Corrections
changed its policies regarding the control of inmates, organizational management, and staffing after opening the supermax facility.
Individual effect. A major concern voiced by critics of supermax facilities
is their potential effect on inmates’ mental health because of the isolation
and lack of activity imposed in these facilities. Only a handful of studies
have directly examined the impact that supermax prisons have on those
confined in them (i.e., Cloyes, Lovell, Allen, & Rhodes, 2006; Haney, 2002,
2003; Korn, 1088; Kupers, 1996). A recent study conducted in Washington
State’s supermax found that inmates housed in the state supermax on average suffer from moderate levels of psychosocial impairment (Cloyes et al.,
2006). Other studies corroborate this finding by showing that supermax
institutions have the potential to damage inmates’ mental health (Haney,
2002, 2003). Kupers (1996) and Haney (2002, 2003), for example, show that
inmates placed in an environment as stressful as that of a supermax prison
begin to lose touch with reality and exhibit symptoms of psychiatric decomposition, including difficulty concentrating, heightened anxiety, intermittent
disorientation, and a tendency to strike out at people. Similarly, Korn (1988)
notes that conditions in control units, such as supermax units or facilities,
produce feelings of resentment, rage, and mental deterioration.
Contrary to the bulk of studies, King (2005) found through interviews
with 42 supermax inmates that these institutions might have a positive effect
on inmates. His findings suggested that some inmates reflect on the wrongfulness of their actions. Inmates also reported that they learned how to be
patient and practice self-control because of their stay in supermax. Other
inmates reported that placement in the supermax allowed them to release
themselves from the negative influences of other problematic inmates in the
general prison population.
Another recent study, which examined inmates who were released from
supermax confinement from the Federal Penitentiary at Marion and from
Alcatraz, suggested that placement in federal supermax facilities did not exacerbate inmate mental health but instead was beneficial to inmates because
it served as a specific deterrent (Ward & Werlich, 2003). According to Ward
and Werlich (2003), only 16.0% of the 1,020 inmates who served time at the
Federal Penitentiary at Marion from 1983 to 1994 returned to supermax after
release. They also found that only 3.1% of 520 inmates who served time in
Pizarro, Narag / Current Knowledge on Supermax Prisons
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Alcatraz were returned to isolation for engaging in disruptive and/or violent
behavior. They further reported that out of 80 inmates released from Marion
to the community (i.e., who completed their court-ordered sentence), less
than half of them recidivated and thus returned to prison. In terms of mental
health, their findings suggest that overall placement in these institutions did
not negatively affect inmate’s mental health. Only 8.0% of Alcatraz and
3.1% of Marion inmates had to be transferred to a mental institution because
of developing a mental illness while housed in these facilities.
Most, if not all, of these studies, however, are methodologically weak. For
example, these studies did not administer a pretest or examine the inmates’
past psychological and behavioral records. In the absence of information on
inmates’ presegregation psychological status, it is difficult to make valid
assessments of changes in status because inmates could have been suffering
from psychological problems before being placed in isolation. In addition,
some of these studies draw inferences based on inmates under special circumstances, such as a class-action suit against a jurisdiction for the treatment they
received in isolation (i.e., Haney, 2002, 2003; Korn, 1988; Kupers, 1996),
which makes it difficult to generalize to other populations. Another limitation
stems from the researchers’ lack of control for rival causal factors (Ward &
Werlich, 2003). Finally, making general inferences from studies using small
sample sizes is similarly problematic (King, 2005; Korn, 1988).
Supermax Case Law
In recent years, the controversies surrounding these institutions have
reached the U.S. judiciary. The debate over legal aspects of the existence
and operation of these institutions is no longer an academic or practitioner
debate but one in which judges have begun to examine controversial issues.
As with other aspects of corrections law, new legal issues arise within the
context of the contemporary U.S. Supreme Court’s generally deferential
posture toward actions of corrections administrators that are justified by
claims of safety and security. In particular, the Supreme Court’s decision in
Turner v. Safely (1987) instructed lower court judges to evaluate prisoners’
rights claims with a deferential eye toward administrators’ assertions that
specific policies and practices are essential to institutional safety and security
needs. The Turner standard does not preclude rights claims in the context of
supermax prisons. Indeed, many federal judges feel responsible for ensuring
that correctional practices are not needlessly restrictive or harsh. However,
the Supreme Court’s deferential stance generally limits the range of possible
claims that prisoners may successfully assert through litigation.
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The bulk of supermax litigation concentrates on challenges based on
either Eighth Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment issues (Collins,
2004). Challenges to the existence of supermax prisons based on the Eighth
Amendment stem from issues related to the mental health of inmates, use
of force, and conditions of confinement. Specifically, inmates claim that
specific policies and practices in the supermax context violate their right to
be protected against cruel and unusual punishments. Challenges based on
the denial of the due process rights as granted by the Fourteenth Amendment
stem from inmates’ challenges to placement criteria used to send offenders
to these facilities.
Eighth Amendment challenges. When inmates present Eighth Amendment
challenges against supermax prisons, they ask the courts to consider whether
the conditions in supermax constitute cruel and unusual punishment. The
difficulty with challenges of this nature is that there is no precise definition
of what truly constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Indeed, the U.S.
Supreme Court’s stance on the definition of cruel and unusual punishment is
that it is not a static concept but instead draws its meaning from the evolving standards of society (Trop v. Dulles, 1958). Hence, the meaning of cruel
and unusual punishment changes over time.
The Supreme Court initially spoke of the need to examine the “totality of
conditions” in institutions to identify Eighth Amendment violations that may
exist because of the “wanton and unnecessary” infliction of pain or conditions that are grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime (Rhodes v.
Chapman, 1981). If this language alone still constituted the sole guiding
standard for lower court judges, then challenges to conditions to supermax
prisons would seem to have greater prospects for success. However, two
developments that began with Rhodes have effectively diminished the
prospects for successful Eighth Amendment challenges.
First, Justice Lewis Powell’s majority opinion in Rhodes itself seemed to
warn lower court judges to show deference to corrections officials in Eighth
Amendment conditions of confinement cases by saying that “courts cannot
assume that state legislatures and prison officials are insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to the . . . problems of how best to achieve
the goals of the penal function.” This message of deference was reiterated
in the non–Eighth Amendment context by the specific tests articulated in
the aforementioned Turner v. Safely (1987) decision and appears to have
become a dominant theme in corrections law.
Second, the Supreme Court increased its emphasis on a subjective standard for determining Eighth Amendment violations. In Estelle v. Gamble
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(1976), the Court ruled that an Eighth Amendment violation exists when there
is a deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of prisoners. Later,
Justice Antonin Scalia seized on this subjective standard and expanded its
application to all Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement cases
(Wilson v. Seiter, 1991). In effect, the Court made it much more difficult to
prove Eighth Amendment violations because of the need to demonstrate the
thoughts and motives of corrections officials and the objective conditions
that cause, for example, “unnecessary and wanton” inflictions of pain.
This concern with the difficult to prove subjective motivations of corrections officials also affects Eighth Amendment claims concerning use of force.
In Whitley v. Albers (1986), a case in which corrections officials seeking to
quell a disturbance mistakenly shot a prisoner who was not involved in the
situation, the Supreme Court said that the officers did not violate his rights
unless their actions were taken “maliciously and sadistically for the very
purpose of causing harm.” This standard gives corrections officials a great
deal of leeway—but not unlimited discretion and authority—for the use of
reasonable force as long as they can claim that their actions were intended
to ensure the security of the institution and the safety of prisoners and staff.
Eighth Amendment challenges to supermax prisons primarily focus on (a)
the claim that prolonged isolation constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
because it may lead to the deterioration of an inmate’s mental health, (b) use
of force tactics employed, and (c) conditions of confinement. Traditionally,
the courts have held the stance that the Eighth Amendment does not preclude
prison administrators from altering the conditions of confinement or tightening institutional security (Bruscino v. Carlson, 1988). Some legal scholars
have interpreted this approach to mean that the courts validated the concept
of the supermax prison by accepting prison administrators’ authority to establish and operate these facilities (Feeley & Rubin, 1998).
Nonetheless, some federal judges have expressed alarm over the possible
psychological consequences supermax prisons may have on inmates. The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit described these facilities as hovering “on the edge of what is humanly tolerable” (Madrid v. Gomez, 1995).
Despite this statement by one particular federal court, the courts have repeatedly ruled that the placement of mentally and physically fit inmates in supermax settings does not constitute a violation to their Eighth Amendment
right against cruel and unusual punishment. In short, the courts have established that the conditions in supermax prisons are constitutional for healthy
inmates but not for ill inmates (Jones ‘El v. Berge, 2001; Madrid v. Gomez,
1995; Ruiz v. Johnson, 1999).
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Another area in which supermax prisons have been challenged under the
Eighth Amendment pertains to the use of force tactics employed by correctional officers. As previously stated, corrections officers are allowed to use
“reasonable” force to make inmates comply with institutional rules. The use
of force in one supermax facility was formally challenged in Madrid v. Gomez
(1995). The court acknowledged that in supermax prisons, like other correctional settings, the use of force may be necessary; however, it established
that in Pelican Bay (the California institution under examination) officers
were using excessive force in their cell extractions and unjustified beatings
of inmates. Consequently, the court emphasized the subjective element of
officers’ motives by ruling that force is deemed legitimate only if it is applied
in a “good faith” effort to maintain or restore discipline.
The courts have also ruled on specific conditions of confinement in
supermax facilities that may violate inmates’ Eighth Amendment rights. For
example, courts have ruled in cases dealing with inmate safety, nutritional
needs, and the regimes imposed on inmates. In Rich v. Bruce (1997), the
Fourth Circuit Court ruled that deliberate disregard of inmates’ safety constitutes a violation of their Eighth Amendment protection. This case involved an
inmate-on-inmate assault inside Maryland’s supermax facility. In another
case, the courts ruled that feeding an inmate nutra-loaf or denying an inmate
out-of-cell exercise does not constitute a violation of Eighth Amendment
rights. Feeding inmates nutra-loaf does not constititute a violation of Eighth
Amendment rights because it provides the inmates with an excess of the daily
required nutritional intake. The denial of out-of-cell exercise is not unconstitutional because of the dangerousness of inmates. In short, the court stated that
an inmate “has the key to his cell through his own behavior” (Collins, 2004,
p. 38). Finally, the Seventh Circuit Court ruled that denial of food to inmates
when they refuse to adhere to the prison-imposed rules of food distribution
does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment because the inmates choose
not to adhere by the rules of the prison (Freeman v. Berge, 2003).
Fourteenth Amendment challenges. The due processes clauses of the
Fourteenth (state) and Fifth (federal) Amendments provide the basis for
challenges concerning the procedures used to select and transfer offenders to
the supermax setting. In deferential context of corrections law, the Supreme
Court has limited many procedural due process protections to those instances
in which prisoners possess a protected “liberty interest.” If prisoners are
transferred from one prison facility to another, typically no due process
rights are at issue because they are merely moving from one restricted environment to another restricted environment. However, the Supreme Court
Pizarro, Narag / Current Knowledge on Supermax Prisons
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kept open the possibility that due process rights may exist, thereby requiring
specific hearings or other procedures if a prisoner is transferred, for example,
from a regular prison to a secure psychiatric facility (Vitek v. Jones, 1980).
A liberty interest triggering the existence of due process protections may be
found to exist if a transfer “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the
inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life” (Sandin v. Conner,
1995). Such liberty interests were found not to exist in transfers to isolated
conditions of disciplinary segregation for relatively brief periods, such as a
30-day punishment, but obviously the long detentions in supermax create
the possibility that courts will view that situation differently.
In Wilkinson v. Austin (2005), the U.S. Supreme Court examined whether
placement in a supermax as imposed by the Ohio Department of Corrections
violates an inmate’s Fourteenth Amendment due process protections. As
previously discussed, inmates placed in Ohio’s supermax go through in an
informal process in which they have the right to defend themselves from the
allegations made against them and may object to their placement. In this case,
the Court ruled that inmates have a “liberty interest” in avoiding transfer to
Ohio State Penitentiary; hence, placement in a supermax prison is subject
to scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment. According to the Court, the
severe conditions and indefinite placement at Ohio State Penitentiary, combined with the loss of parole eligibility, impose an “atypical and significant
hardship on inmates” (Wilkinson v. Austin, 2005). Despite this observation,
the Court ruled that the less formal processes in which inmates are given
avenues to evaluate their placement in a supermax meet the standards of due
process required by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court justices pointed out that their ruling was based on two very important factors.
First, the due process rights granted to inmates are more limited than those
granted to individuals who have not been convicted of a crime. Second,
courts must give deference to prison management when they conclude that
a prisoner has engaged in disruptive behavior.
In this case, the Court was focused on whether the Ohio procedures met
constitutional standards. The justices did not purport to establish specific
procedures to be applied for transfers to supermax in all states. However,
the case gives rise to the possibility that federal courts will require the existence of certain procedures prior to transfer to supermax. However, in light
of the limited nature of the due process right as discussed in this case, the
expected procedures will be relatively minimal in scope and are unlikely to
impede corrections officials’ ability to transfer offenders to supermax when
there is any basis to make claims concerning potential dangerousness, violence, persistent rule violations, gang affiliations, or other matters that affect
institutional safety and security.
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The Future of Supermax Prisons
Overall, the previous review of both academic and legal literature suggests
that supermax prisons are here to stay. Despite a dearth of empirical findings
to prove their effectiveness and efficacy, and despite the possible detrimental
effects they may pose for individual inmates’ psychological health, supermax
prisons will continue to be a fixture of the United States correctional system.
There are three reasons that are indicative of this trend. First, supermax prisons provide a semblance of operational efficacy, which prison administrators
view as indispensable for the management of unruly prisoners. Second,
American courts have generally maintained a posture of deference to prison
management, and since the early 1980s the Supreme Court has warned lower
court judges away from intervening too actively in prison operations. Third,
and most important, supermax prisons provide a symbolic meaning that
subscribes to a societal bent toward a more punitive stance on crime.
Semblance of Operational Efficacy
Supermax prisons provide wardens with a tool to manage unruly prisoners. As earlier noted, 95% of the state wardens believe that supermax
prisons provide order and safety to correctional institutions by incapacitating
violent offenders (Mears, 2006; Mears & Castro, 2006). Overall, wardens
approve of supermax prisons because they increase their arsenal in the control
of unruly prison populations. In doing this, these facilities build the confidence of prison officials in their capacity to deal with different inmate populations. Though perceptual, this provides a powerful drive to justify their
presence (Mears & Castro, 2006).
Along this line, these facilities have become a sort of “waste management”
approach to correctional administration. According to prison administrators
and the courts, incorrigible inmates, who are not amenable to any kind of
treatment and who pose threats to others, deserve a special form of control
(Collins, 2004; Mears, 2006). U.S. legislators and prison administrators alike
point out that there is currently no better strategy available for dealing with
disruptive and violent inmates (Mears & Castro, 2006; Wells et al., 2002).
Echoing the analysis of Feeley and Simon (1992), supermax is a mechanism
of “herding a specific population that cannot be disaggregated and transformed but only maintained—or a kind of waste management function”
(p. 470). However, this operational efficacy has not been empirically proven
(Pizarro et al., 2006). As reported earlier, research by Briggs and colleagues
(2003) found that prison order and violence are not associated with the
Pizarro, Narag / Current Knowledge on Supermax Prisons
37
operation of supermax prisons in three states. Likewise, the composition of
inmates in the supermax, coupled with the lack of criteria for placement,
mutes the deterrent value of supermax (Mears & Reisig, 2006; Pizarro &
Stenius, 2004).
Courts’ Limited Intervention
Another key factor that will contribute to the continued operation of supermax prisons is the courts’ acceptance of the legality of supermax prisons.
First, there is a Supreme Court–mandated posture of American courts to show
deference toward correctional administrators (Weidman, 2004). Specifically,
this is exemplified by the Court’s view that managing prisons requires
expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commitment of resources that
is within the purview of corrections administrators and generally beyond the
scope of judges’ expertise and authority (Weidman, 2004).
This posture of judicial deference is reflected in judicial rulings on Eighth
Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment challenges to supermax prisons and
other correctional institutions. In these cases, some federal judges expressed
their alarm over the conditions of supermax facilities and the possible effects
to the inmates’ mental health. However, in general, the courts’ decisions
ultimately deferred to prison managers on the need of supermax institutions
for the efficient control of prisons and the advancement of correctional
goals. In the eyes of some critics, instead of engaging in a detailed analysis
of the challenged conditions of the supermax, the courts relied on the strategy
of shifting the focus to the characteristics of the inmates and tied relief to
the vulnerability of a subgroup of mentally ill prisoners (Weidman, 2004).
Although removing mentally ill inmates from supermax is a partial victory for
inmate rights groups, it legitimizes the use of supermax for non–mentally
ill inmates. According to some legal scholars, this strategy is used by the
courts to defuse the tension between their desire to intervene and their
obligation to defer (Weidman, 2004).
The supermax thrives by providing only minimal yet still constitutional
services to the inmates. Thus, supermax prisons have become the “least
lawful, lawful prisons” (Weidman, 2004) or what other scholars term a “modern constitutional prison” (Feeley & Simon, 1992; Kurki & Morris, 2001).
For example, the courts accept the provision of minimum physical necessities such as warmth, clothing, shelter, hygiene, and services such as a minimally adequate law library, minimally adequate health services, and mental
care. In addition, they approve prolonged isolation, use-of-force practices
such as forced cell extractions, and limited, punitive denials of food and
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exercise (Freeman v. Berge, 2003; Kurki & Morris, 2001; LeMaire v. Maass,
1993; Madrid v. Gomez, 1995). There is always an expectation that supermax
prisons and other institutions will meet minimum habitability standards and
make efforts to keep prisoners safe and secure. However, the posture of
judicial deference that guides the federal judiciary effectively means that
corrections officials have a significant range of control over the specific
policies and practices in their institutions, even when those policies and
practices may produce special hardships for supermax inmates. Moreover,
it is important to note that the Supreme Court’s decision in Wilkinson v.
Austin (2005) was unanimous, and thus there is no reason to believe that
any foreseeable shift in the Court’s composition will alter the current state
of the law with respect to supermax prisons.
Symbolic Meaning
Another aspect that influences the future of supermax prisons is the
symbolic meaning it portrays. As Ward and Werlich (2003) indicate, the
first supermax unit was constructed not to control prison troublemakers but
to serve as a powerful symbol of the consequences for serious criminal
conduct. The NIC (1997) reports that supermax prisons have become a political symbol of how “tough” a jurisdiction has become, with recommendations for the construction of supermax coming not from correction officials
but from the legislatures.
Supermax is a powerful representation of how crime does not pay and an
indication that the state is willing to use its resources against criminals.
Consequently, the symbolic significance of these institutions transcends the
prisons walls and influences society. Inside the walls, these institutions symbolize the consequences of engaging in violent or deviant acts. They are
there to remind offenders that their misbehaviors will not be tolerated and
that misbehaving will result in uncomfortable consequences (Mears, 2006).
Outside the walls of prisons, supermax symbolizes toughness and that the
state will protect society from criminals. The claims by prison administrators that supermax prisons house the “worst of the worst” inmates is one of
the biggest selling points of these institutions because it provides the public
and prison administrators with an additional sense of safety (Alarid &
Cromwell, 2002; Mears, 2006) while at the same time portraying the state
as tough on crime. The reality of supermax prisons, however, is that these
assertions have not been empirically demonstrated and are based on speculation (Pizarro et al., 2006).
Pizarro, Narag / Current Knowledge on Supermax Prisons
39
Conclusion and Implications for Future Research
Although some studies have examined supermax prisons, there are more
questions about these facilities than answers. There is still a dearth in
knowledge of the characteristics of inmates placed in these institutions, the
covariates that influence the decision to place an inmate in a supermax, the
effect these institutions have on individual inmates, the general prison population, and the community. Only one study to date has specifically examined the characteristics of inmates placed in supermax (Lovell et al., 2000).
Because of its focus on only one state, however, its generalizability suffered.
Similarly, only one study has examined with robust analytic methods the
impact these institutions have on the general prison population (Briggs et al.,
2003). Furthermore, the studies that have examined the impact these institutions have on the mental health of inmates suffered from methodological
limitations. This gap in supermax knowledge is exacerbated by the fact that
no study to date has systematically examined the covariates that determine
which inmates are placed in the supermax or the true impact litigation such
as Madrid v. Gomez (1995) has had on the operation and management of
these facilities. As seen in the literature, although the federal courts have
ruled that it is unconstitutional to house mentally ill inmates in supermax
prisons, some jurisdictions (e.g., Washington) still practice this.
Despite the dearth in knowledge, supermax prisons have increased in
popularity in recent years. In the past 22 years, the number of these facilities
has increased from 1 to approximately 60 (Briggs et al., 2003). As Massing
(2001) pointed out, it seems that everybody wants one. Consequently, supermax facilities represent an area in need of research. Future research on supermax prisons should try to uncover the effects that these institutions have on
the behavior of individual inmates—it is necessary to examine whether
supermax prisons damage inmates’ mental health. Furthermore, there is a
need for more research on the general deterrent influence these institutions
have, or do not have, on the general prison population. Future research should
also focus on the implications these institutions have for reoffending and
other community concerns (i.e., employment, need for mental health services,
homelessness), as inmates housed in these facilities could be released from
prison into the community. In terms of corrections departments and institutions, research should focus on how these institutions affect overall policies.
Another area worth examining is the impact that these institutions have on
the staff who work there. In addition, researchers should also examine the
impact that current supermax case law has had on the operation of these
facilities. Finally, there is also need to assess the cost-effectiveness of these
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institutions (Mears, 2006). Indeed, if these institutions are going to continue
to be a fixture of the American correctional system, it is necessary to determine whether they are more beneficial to society than detrimental.
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Jesenia M. Pizarro is an assistant professor in the School of Criminal Justice at Michigan
State University. She earned her PhD from the School of Criminal Justice at Rutgers University,
Newark, New Jersey. Her research interests focus on homicide and corrections policy. Her
recent work has appeared in Criminal Justice Policy Review, Journal of Criminal Justice, and
Victims & Offenders.
Raymund E. Narag is a Fulbright doctoral student in the School of Criminal Justice at
Michigan State University. His research interests focus on criminal victimization and corrections
policy in the Philippines, comparative criminal justice systems, punishment philosophies, and
restorative justice.