German Foreign Policy and the Libya Crisis

German Politics ISSN: 0964-4008 (Print) 1743-8993 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fgrp20 German Foreign Policy and the Libya Crisis Alister Miskimmon To cite this article: Alister Miskimmon (2012) German Foreign Policy and the Libya Crisis, German Politics, 21:4, 392-410, DOI: 10.1080/09644008.2012.739610 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2012.739610 Published online: 19 Nov 2012. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 2752 View related articles Citing articles: 11 View citing articles Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fgrp20 Download by: [Royal Holloway, University of London] Date: 01 December 2016, At: 06:36 German Foreign Policy and the Libya Crisis ALISTER MISKIMMON German foreign policy has come under scrutiny due to its decision to abstain in the vote on UN Security Council Resolution 1973 in March 2011 on the Libyan no fly zone. Germany’s decision not to support France, the UK and the USA ensured that no common EU position emerged and NATO’s response to the crisis proved difficult. German foreign policy was caught between enlarging its influence and role in crisis management and reserving the right to reject involvement in operations that do not fit with its national interest. Drawing on the work of Robert Gilpin, the article argues that Germany’s decision to abstain on United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 can be explained by understanding the cost/benefit calculations of the German government, pressured by the protracted Eurozone crisis. INTRODUCTION On 17 March 2011 Peter Wittig, Germany’s Ambassador to the United Nations made the following statement: Decisions on the use of military force are always extremely difficult to take. We have carefully considered the options of using military force, its implications as well as its limitations. We see great risks. The likelihood of large-scale loss of life should not be underestimated. If the steps proposed turn out to be ineffective, we see the danger of being drawn into a protracted military conflict that would affect the wider region. We should not enter a military confrontation on the optimistic assumption that quick results with few casualties will be achieved. Germany, therefore, has decided not to support a military option as foreseen particularly in OP 4 and OP 8 of the resolution. Furthermore, Germany will not contribute to such a military effort with its own forces.1 With this pronouncement Peter Wittig declared Germany’s decision to abstain in the vote on United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973. The result of the abstention was that Germany found itself taking a different position to its main allies, France, the UK and the USA and found itself alongside Russia, China, India and Brazil. This article seeks to explain the reasons behind Germany’s abstention on UN1973. The decision to abstain on UN1973 presents us with a microcosm of German foreign and security policy under the Merkel government. Domestic pressures related to the Eurozone crisis and a desire to reduce Germany’s involvement in multinational crisis management operations lay at the heart of the decision to abstain on the Libya no fly zone. Despite accruing significant experience in the former-Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and elsewhere, Germany still struggles with deploying aggressive military German Politics, Vol.21, No.4, December 2012, pp.392–410 ISSN 0964-4008 print/1743-8993 online http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2012.739610 # 2012 Association for the Study of German Politics GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LIBYA CRISIS 393 force.2 Germany’s involvement in Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in 1999 was for some a seminal moment in Germany’s involvement in military crisis management in which Germany cast off former reservations concerning the aggressive use of military force.3 The decision not to take part in the Libya operation suggests that Germany will continue to assess each military operation on its own terms, rather than mirror British and French policy. This article argues that domestic considerations reinforce a trajectory in German foreign policy which suggests that its traditional foreign policy alignments are becoming more fluid and adaptable in the face of new challenges and calculations.4 Germany’s decision to abstain in the vote on United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 (UN1973) in March 2011 signalled Berlin’s distancing from the position of London, Paris and Washington, Germany’s traditional allies. While this may not be a sign of shifting alignment, divergence in foreign policy from the UK, France and the USA raises a number of important implications. Rather than signalling acquiescence to the resolution, Germany was very vocal in stating its concerns with the decision to deploy military power, making the decision to abstain more interesting in understanding the current state of German foreign policy.5 Currently Germany appears unable to commit to a greater leadership role in military crisis management. This will impact on the future of the emerging Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the EU. There are several plausible explanations for Germany’s behaviour regarding the Libyan no fly zone; German political culture continues to demonstrate significant reluctance when it comes to the aggressive use of military force. Second, Germany did not consider involvement in a military operation to be in its national interest. Domestic political calculations forced the governing coalition to privilege domestic priorities over foreign policy. Germany’s growing self-confidence in foreign policy means that it will only commit to multinational operations that are in its direct national interest.6 Third, Germany’s foreign policy lacks coherence and foreign minister Guido Westerwelle did not fully consider the implications of the abstention. This article will examine these explanations for German foreign policy, highlighting a German foreign policy characterised by increasing cost – benefit calculations driven by economic pressures facing Berlin. These explanations correspond to the logic of state foreign policy behaviour expressed in Gilpinian realism, principally, that the direction of a state’s foreign policy can be explained by examining the interaction of security and economic interests and their articulation through domestic political pressures. There are three implications of German foreign policy following this Gilpinian logic. First, German strategic culture has been more resistant to adaptation as a result of socialisation effects of CSDP and NATO than suggested. Second, today’s generational cohort of German leaders is willing to privilege short-term calculations ahead of traditional multilateral commitments. Third and finally, this willingness to find greater room for manoeuvre has the danger of undervaluing existing partners and creating a more overt sense of German foreign policy interests. These explanations and conclusions, and inferences about the understandings, expectations and motives of foreign policy makers presented here, are based upon 394 GERMAN POLITICS primary interviews conducted in Berlin in 2011 with officials at the Federal Ministry of Defence, Foreign Ministry, Chancellory, British Embassy, political parties and several think tanks. The identity of interview participants has been anonymised. Further support and triangulation of interview data was generated by analysis of policy statements and documents and by examination of domestic party politics prior to, during and in the months after the Libya crisis. THE EVOLUTION OF GERMAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY Since unification, considerable attention has been given over to the development of German foreign policy.7 Freed from the formal constraints of division and the Cold War, foreign policy was an area in which Germany was expected to play a more active role.8 Germany has displayed significant caution in the speed and scope of its post-unification foreign policy, particularly in the deployment of military force. Germany participated in Operation Allied Force in 1999 only after a protracted domestic political debate throughout the second half of 1998 and early 1999.9 German politicians, notably Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer (Greens) argued that Germany had a responsibility to prevent acts of genocide due to its history. However, examples of Germany’s judgement not to participate in the invasion of Iraq in 200310 and the challenge of deploying troops in Afghanistan11 are pointed to as instances which suggest that significant adaptation on the basic principles guiding the deployment of military force have not substantially changed in the years since 1990. According to Berenskoetter and Giegerich,12 Germany’s foreign policy cannot outstrip its ontological security – what they define as the norms defining Germany’s security and defence identity. Debates within German foreign policy have been characterised by divergence over whether Germany should feel compelled to participate more actively in military crisis management due to historical responsibility; or Germany’s past actions should mean the privileging of non-military solutions to international crises and a reluctance to consider the deployment of military forces. This tension is summed up by Hellmann who states, The Bonn Republic had a clear idea of what they wanted to avoid. ‘Never again Weimar’ was their credo in the beginning. Achieving this came comparatively easy. For the ‘self-confident’ Berlin Republic, it is considerably more difficult to contrast a new, positive foreign policy with the past.13 The Libya crisis presents evidence of a protracted adjustment to an altered international environment characterised by increasing challenges to the German state. Hellmann compellingly argues that Germany’s growing self-confidence stems from a greater awareness of its power.14 But the lack of sure-footedness of German foreign policy on the Libya crisis suggests that despite Germany’s more self-assured position, it is still reconciling questions of power, interests and identity. Chafetz, Spirtas and Frankel suggest this when they assert, ‘We can not know what we want if we do not know who we are. This insight holds for foreign policy as much as it does for personal preferences.’15 GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LIBYA CRISIS 395 Germany’s struggle to reconcile these competing demands figures strongly in the narrative of German foreign policy makers. German politicians stress that Germany is a dependable and predictable partner for its allies and a positive contributor to international peace. In a major foreign policy speech in October 2010 Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle outlined the core aspects of German foreign policy stating, German foreign policy is based on the continuity of the previous decades. It is dependable and predictable, orientated by our values and interests and it is a motor for political openness and economic development. German foreign policy stands for equality and fair reconciliation of interests.16 Germany has developed a reputation as the multilateral partner par excellence. Taking a position which differed from its major allies without a coherent explanation for doing so called German policy into question.17 As the Libya crisis developed, concerns grew within Germany at how Germany’s position has been perceived and the impact of Germany’s abstention on its future foreign policy.18 With uncertainty over the future of NATO after its Afghanistan operation winds down, lack of unity on Libya suggests that Germany’s role in European security co-operation will continue to show hesitancy. The decision to abstain on the Libya no fly zone raises comparisons with Germany’s decision to recognise Croatia and Slovenia in 1991 ahead of EU partners and the decision to oppose the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Crawford argues that the decision to break ranks from EU partners and prematurely recognise Croatia and Slovenia was the result of domestic political priorities.19 On the Iraq issue, Dettke argues that normative principles of German foreign policy trumped external pressure to act as a partner to the USA.20 We assert that Germany’s decision not to participate in NATO’s Libya no fly zone operation was not primarily the result of normative dissonance with London, Paris and Washington, DC. Rather the decision was driven by domestic political pressures facing the coalition government, pressures which outweighed traditional tenets of German foreign policy. THE EMERGENCE OF THE LIBYA CRISIS The crisis in Libya gained momentum during February 2011. Taking inspiration from events in Tahrir Square in Cairo, calls for greater freedoms in Libya were met with proposals from Guido Westerwelle for a ‘transformation partnership’ with the Middle East to encourage education and business links between Europe and the Middle East.21 A series of protests by Libyan civilians in four cities on 17 February were quickly suppressed by Colonel Gaddafi leading to widespread unrest across the country. The unrest quickly escalated to the point that EU member states put in place measures to repatriate citizens. In the run up to the commencement of the no fly zone, on the 26 February 2011 the German air force rescued 134 employees of Wintershall AG, twenty-two of which were German citizens and flew them to the island of Crete.22 The decision to rescue the employees of Wintershall AG is interesting in the context of the crisis as it demonstrates swift and decisive action on the part of the German government to intervene. Looking at the reasons behind the decision to abstain raises a 396 GERMAN POLITICS number of interesting points. Merkel’s involvement in the lead-up to the UN vote was to stress the importance of a regional approach to the crisis and to call for a UN resolution to legitimise any action taken. France and the UK provided what chancellor Merkel was asking for – a regional approach which brought in Arab League support and a UN resolution. Despite this, what is overwhelming in the justifications given by the majority of the main players in the decision is the centrality of German domestic considerations. These considerations focused on the risk of German forces becoming embroiled in an extended conflict and German political assertions in German domestic politics that the crisis could be resolved through diplomatic and economic tools. Guido Westerwelle became a central figure in the decision to abstain on UN1973. As the crisis developed, however, Westerwelle’s handling of the crisis and its wider implications for German foreign policy drew in the government as a whole for criticism, raising question marks over Angela Merkel’s handling of foreign policy. WESTERWELLE’S REPONSE TO CRITICISM OF GERMANY’S ABSTENTION Merkel stated her sadness at the criticism the German government received within Germany and from EU and NATO partners in abstaining on UN1973.23 However, it was Guido Westerwelle’s handling of the Libya crisis which came under most criticism, despite the government’s public support for his actions. Criticism was directed at Westerwelle for a number of reasons. First, the decision to abstain marked a divergence in opinion between Germany and France, the UK and the USA. Second, due to Germany’s abstention Westerwelle was criticised for effectively isolating German influence on Libya. Westerwelle was criticised in Berlin for a lack of thought explained by what was perceived as a lack of foreign policy expertise.24 Finally, former foreign minister Joschka Fischer’s vocal criticism of Westerwelle asserted that the decision to abstain marked a low point of German foreign policy influence and threatened to damage future German foreign policy and the EU’s attempts to forge a more influential role in international affairs. Fischer claimed that, ‘Germany has lost its credibility in the United Nations and in the Middle East . . . German hopes for a permanent seat on the Security Council have been permanently dashed and one is now fearful of Europe’s future.’25 Westerwelle’s defence of the decision to abstain on UN1973 focused on the risks to the German armed forces if they participated in the no fly zone and his disagreement with France, the UK and the USA of a military solution to the Libya crisis: We calculated the risk. If we see that three days after this intervention began, the Arab League already criticises (it), I think we had good reasons . . . This does not mean that we are neutral, it does not mean that we have any sympathy with Colonel Gaddafi, but it means that we see the risks.26 Westerwelle claimed that Germany would not have been able to avoid involvement in the enforcement of the no fly zone if it had voted yes on the UN resolution: If we had have voted yes, Germany would have come under severe pressure as the largest European member of NATO to participate militarily. We would no GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LIBYA CRISIS 397 longer be debating whether we send soldiers to Libya. Rather we would be dealing with the question: how many soldiers do we send?27 A further justification which Westerwelle drew on in defence of the decision to abstain focused on concerns that there should be no assumption of military involvement to support the aspirations of citizens involved in the Arab Spring. Speaking on German radio, Westerwelle stated, I warn against having a discussion in Europe about a military intervention every time there is injustice in north Africa or in Arabia . . . I am convinced that there can only be a political solution in Libya . . . At the end of the day it is important that we clearly stand by the democrats . . . But it is also clear that we cannot threaten military action against every country in north Africa where there is injustice.28 Westerwelle’s defence of his position stressed the risks of involvement in any military operation, with clear allusions to the NATO experience in Afghanistan: ‘It is not because we have some sort of lingering soft spot for Gaddafi’s system that we decided not to send German troops to Libya, but because we also have to see the risks of a lengthy mission.’29 In arguing that using non-military means was the correct strategy to depose Gaddafi Westerwelle was arguing a key tenet of Genscherism by attempting to find a peaceful diplomatic solution and to limit German military involvement in the NATO operation.30 When the Libyan rebels entered Tripoli in late August 2011 signalling the beginning of the end of the Gaddafi regime Westerwelle claimed that sanctions and political pressure driven by Germany had undermined the Libyan leader and had played a major role in his downfall.31 GERMANY IS SIDELINED There are important additional factors which shaped Germany’s response to the Libya crisis. There was considerable unease within Berlin based on perceptions of being excluded from the Franco-British diplomacy to acquire UN support for a robust policing of the no fly zone and the protection of civilians in Libya.32 Berlin considered the mission had not been thought through and that a lack of planning and clear sense of what the mission’s aims were would perpetuate NATO’s role in Libya.33 German government criticism at what they conceived as the poorly prepared resolution festered in the German government’s justification for not participating in the NATO mission. In a thinly veiled attack on Franco-British planning, Defence Minister de Maizière stated, ‘Our decision not to participate in the military part of the Libya mission was based on carefully considered reasons. It remains correct.’34 As well as this criticism of the planning of the NATO mission and France’s sidelining of Germany, de Maizière supported Westerwelle’s reservation on the policy of military intervention by stating, The responsibility to protect a country’s civilian population if its government violates human rights is firmly anchored in international law. But does that mean we are allowed to intervene? Or does that mean we’re actually required 398 GERMAN POLITICS to? I believe that each military operation must be analysed to determine whether its goals can be achieved with appropriate means and within an appropriate time frame as well as how one gets out at the end. Every one.35 De Maizière’s caution on the military intervention in Libya was most pithily expressed in the following manner: ‘Although the heart says yes (to a military mission), the cool head says: leave it alone.’36 Another factor in Germany’s decision was that policy makers in Berlin were caught somewhat by surprise by the USA’s decision to support the Franco-British plan.37 Because of the reservations on the no fly zone coming out of Washington, policy makers in Berlin calculated that Germany would not be exposed diplomatically in its opposition to the mission, if the USA failed to support London and Paris.38 When on 16 March 2011 it became clear that the USA would support France, the UK, the Lebanon and the Arab League’s draft resolution, the German government was put under intense pressure to decide on its position within a very short period of time. In the late hours of 16 March and early 17 March Guido Westerwelle, Angela Merkel and Thomas de Maizière discussed Germany’s position on the UN resolution. On the eve of the vote in the UN Security Council the UK Prime Minister David Cameron and Foreign Minister William Hague telephoned Berlin to urge support of the resolution.39 Despite the external pressure on Germany to vote yes on the resolution, Germany’s abstention was not excessively criticised by London and Paris, with Cameron and Sarkozy more focused on leading the mission than negotiating its remit with Germany.40 Germany’s sidelining was also in evidence with the Franco-British agreement of November 2010. Despite often very public differences, London and Paris have sought greater co-operation bilaterally rather than including Germany. While there remain strong ties between the German, French and British armed forces it is on the question of rapid deployability in moments of crisis that the cracks in relations between the EU’s big three become pronounced. Once German forces are in place they demonstrate themselves to be able contributors to multinational forces.41 The ‘cost’ of Germany’s abstention was the reinforcement of Germany troops in Afghanistan.42 Germany sent 300 personnel to man AWACS flights in Afghanistan to free up NATO forces for the Libya no fly zone operation. PARTY POLITICS Despite external pressure from London, Paris and Washington to support the resolution, there was no cohesive domestic constituency pushing the government to support it. Parties were split on the response to the abstention on UN1973. Special party meetings were held on the evening of 17 March 2011 to discuss the UN vote and prepare positions for the debate on 18 March in the Bundestag. Despite Paterson’s assertion that foreign policy has become a more contested area of politics in Germany in recent years since the CDU/ CSU – SPD Grand coalition (2005– 09),43 political parties in the Bundestag, with the exception of the Left, were divided over the UN resolution – no clear party political lines were drawn.44 The speed of the diplomacy moving to the resolution also caught the parties by surprise.45 GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LIBYA CRISIS 399 Paradoxically, although foreign policy may have become more of a contested political topic, at the same time it has slipped down the scale of importance in German politics. The abstention on UN1973 was partly an FDP electoral tactic in light of the upcoming state elections in Baden-Württemberg on 27 March 2011. With concerns that the FDP might not pass the 5 per cent electoral threshold, Westerwelle calculated that an abstention would prove helpful. In a poll by Emnid for Bild am Sonntag on 20 March 2011, 62 per cent of respondents were for a military mission in Libya with 31 per cent against. But, when asked whether the German armed forces should participate, 65 per cent of respondents answered ‘no’ with 29 per cent responding ‘yes’.46 Members of the Green Party were most forceful in their criticism of the government’s position. The Green Party’s co-leader, Cem Özdemir, criticised the government’s abstention in an interview with Der Spiegel: Despite the risks associated with a no-fly zone, Germany should have voted on the side of its European partners like France and Great Britain . . . The core of our actions must be the prevention of Gaddafi’s war against his own people as well as providing aid for the refugees using proportionate means . . . I am pleased by the decision and I sincerely hope that it hasn’t come too late.47 Green Party member, Jürgen Trittin, added: ‘It is good that the abstention did not block the resolution.’48 The SPD’s leader Sigmar Gabriel was initially more sympathetic to the government’s decision stating that, ‘I can understand the skepticism, and for that reason the abstention was the right move.’49 However, as pressure grew on Germany, Gabriel’s position shifted to criticism of the government’s position. In light of the abstention, Gabriel argued that ‘it looks as if Germany is knuckling down under the power of this oil Mafioso (Gaddafi)’.50 In a marked difference to the debate in London, the question of the principle of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) did not feature prominently in German discussions on the pros and cons of supporting the UN resolution.51 In the Bundestag debate on UN1973 on 18 March Renate Künast (Greens) and Heide Wieczorek-Zeul (SPD) were the only members of parliament to raise R2P as a factor.52 Another Green Party member, Tom Koenigs, argued that it was ‘not worthy of Germany’ – to ignore human rights in their decision on UNSC Resolution 1973.53 Instead, the parliamentary debate in Berlin focused on the impact of German abstention on German foreign policy and its standing in the world and the reasons behind the abstention. The Left Party’s position on the Libya decision was consistent with its longstanding criticism of NATO and the alliance’s growing role in crisis management operations.54 The decision to increase Germany’s commitment in Afghanistan to ease the burden on NATO’s operation in Libya was viewed as deeply problematic and inconsistent. Wolfgang Gehrcke, the experienced foreign policy specialist from the Left Party stressed what he saw as the inherent contradiction of the German position in his criticisms of Westerwelle and Merkel’s Libya policy. Gehrcke complained that, ‘It’s a perverse logic to exacerbate the war in Afghanistan because one doesn’t want to get involved in a war in Libya.’55 Criticism of Westerwelle’s position was 400 GERMAN POLITICS not confined to opposition parties. Ruprecht Polenz of the CDU, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Bundestag suggested that rather than abstention, ‘You can show solidarity with the alliance without being right up at the front line.’56 This policy of political and economic support of NATO without frontline support of its operations has been a means of avoiding being forced into the aggressive use of military force.57 Berlin decided not to exercise the option of supporting the aims of the Libya mission by not providing aggressive military support. With no clear party political lines on the Libya case, pressure on the government to consider its position was limited. Merkel, who was concentrating on the Eurozone crisis and managing the domestic political fall-out of any German support of a rescue package for ailing Eurozone members, failed to make the issue a top priority. Chancellor Merkel has overseen an increase in German personnel in Afghanistan but has been conservative over other military deployments. The Red/Green government of 1998 – 2005 was more revolutionary in breaking down some of the barriers to Germany’s increased role in military crisis management. Under the current government there has been a scaling back of ambition in security and defence policy stemming from the CDU/CSU– FDP Coalition Treaty of 2009. On page 124 of the treaty the government committed itself to the establishment of a Bundeswehr Commission on cutting the costs of defence and for the streamlining of the leadership and administration of the Bundeswehr.58 The Bundeswehr Commission which emerged – the Structure Commission chaired by Frank-Jürgen Weise, head of the Federal Labour Agency – was primarily driven by aims for financial cuts rather than strategic use of the Bundeswehr.59 Consequently there was little sense of what the German armed forces should be used for, despite the external pressures on Germany. While some attention was given to examples of reforms in the UK and France, domestic solutions prevailed.60 The focus has been on maintaining the status-quo in a period of fiscal consolidation, rather than the development of new capabilities and objectives. This was in contrast to the von Weizsäcker Commission in 2000 which had a much more strategic outlook on Germany’s growing role in crisis management in the wake of Operation Allied Force.61 Interviews in the Federal Ministry of Defence suggest that the main aim of the reforms is to concentrate on building multilateral territorial defence capabilities with smaller partners in Europe.62 The main drive behind the ‘Ghent initiative’ – focused on pooling and sharing capabilities, initially in the EU but now within NATO as well – which was sparked by former Defence Minster zu Guttenberg is to maintain a status quo in what the Bundeswehr can offer, rather than revolutionising defence in Europe. Through this Germany hopes to retain as broad a spectrum of defence capabilities as possible in the face of fiscal challenges. The Libya decision and recent developments in Franco-British defence co-operation reinforce a preference in Berlin for focusing on territorial defence with London and Paris leading on expeditionary warfare.63 Under the recent reforms and recommendations of the Strukturkommission der Bundeswehr, Germany’s ‘level of ambition’ has been reduced to 10,000 from 16,000 personnel – but this is in keeping with UK and French moves and is a sign of the new budgetary limitations which all EU states face in defence policy.64 GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LIBYA CRISIS 401 EXPLAINING GERMANY’S ABSTENTION Explaining why Germany decided to abstain on the Libya vote presents a number of puzzles. In another example of Germany going its own way, Crawford’s analysis of Germany’s early recognition of Croatia and Slovenia highlights four possible factors: realist explanations focusing on material power; cultural explanations highlighting Germany’s social context; pluralist understandings of domestic political debates; and finally, institutional accounts examining European decision-making structures and their limitations.65 Institutionalist arguments point to a breakdown in EU foreign policy machinery which resulted in no unified position and accentuated the roles of London and Paris in pushing for a UN resolution. Le Monde castigated the EU for its failure to reach a common policy: The European Union, for its part, has failed miserably. ‘Institutional’ Europe has not faced up to the challenge. In the North African saga it does not exist. It is incapable of agreeing on how to act, on whether to recognise the Libyan opposition and most, of all, on the legitimacy of the use of force. The disunity is total and particularly striking when it is a question of deciding on war – that is to say when history becomes tragedy and it is necessary to move from frothy rhetoric about the rights of man.66 Failure to reinforce the fledgling foreign policy institutions outlined in the Lisbon Treaty ensured that fault lines re-emerged between member states. This is not solely Germany’s fault. Yet, Gunther Hellmann et al.67 argue that Germany is failing to live up to the expectations it established in the EU in the post-Amsterdam Treaty period – this applies for developments in crisis management, where Germany picks and chooses rather than plays a dependable and predictable role. The Franco-British defence agreement of November 2010 excluded Germany because of concerns that Germany could not be relied upon and as a way to profile Franco-British defence dominance.68 The ‘pooling and sharing’ initiative also suggests that Germany is more comfortable with bilateral or small multilateral groupings within the EU, rather than working through the EU at 27. Germany’s position could be interpreted as ‘freeriding’ at a time of immense pressure on the government. The robust defence of Germany’s decision from Westerwelle and de Maizière, in particular, suggest that while ‘free-riding’ cannot be ruled out, the German government displayed divergent policy preferences than France and the UK which indicate a proactive opposition to the Libya decision, rather than a passive acceptance of the resolution. Insights from Foreign Policy Analysis have been dominated by the bureaucratic politics model to explain government decision making in foreign policy crises.69 Despite tensions between the foreign policy-related ministries, there was no substantial conflict within Berlin concerning what course of action Germany should take on the UN vote.70 Westerwelle, Merkel and de Maizière all agreed that German involvement was out of the question. Traditionally, the leader of the junior coalition partner takes the position of Foreign Minister which can lead to competition between the Chancellery and the Foreign Ministry over who directs German foreign policy. Foreign Minister Westerwelle has been criticised for his handling of his brief, but on the issue of 402 GERMAN POLITICS Libya there was widespread support within the government for his decision.71 The bureaucratic model approach, therefore has limited explanatory value in the case of the Libya crisis. Explaining Germany’s decision to diverge from France, the UK and the USA from a realist standpoint also presents a mixed picture. Realism has often been dismissed as lacking explanatory power when it comes to German foreign policy. (West) Germany’s multilateral instincts have often contradicted realist expectations of Berlin pursuing more national interest driven foreign policy objectives.72 Realist scholars expect that powerful states will pursue ‘security first’ foreign policies, even if economic interests are affected.73 Westerwelle’s abstention was met with consternation by Joschka Fischer and former General Inspector of the Bundeswehr Klaus Naumann for jeopardising Germany’s attempt to get a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, an objective that has united recent German governments.74 Involvement in the operation could have increased Germany’s influence within the NATO operation and in the post-conflict environment. Economic indicators suggest that Libya is not of vital importance to the German economy. In 2010 Libya was ranked sixty-sixth in countries receiving German exports and thirty-eighth in terms of imports to Germany.75 Prior to the crisis 14 per cent of Libya’s oil went to Germany, with 32 per cent of oil exports to Italy and 10 per cent to France.76 By abstaining alongside Russia, China, India and Brazil, Germany could be positioning itself with emerging economies. In contrast the UK and France have targeted Libya in recent years for crude oil supplies as a result of declining North Sea supplies.77 This explanation highlights a German grand strategy which has favoured economic success of military dominance in the international system mirroring a recent description of Germany as a geoeconomic power.78 In abstaining, realism would suggest that Germany is avoiding multilateral constraints on its foreign policy and avoiding any unnecessary commitments in order to pursue relative gains. Robert Gilpin’s realism suggests that economic interests and security first foreign policy strategies need not be in opposition.79 Gilpin asserts than states follow several objectives at any given time. Rather than following a policy of power maximisation, states consider the costs and opportunities of a given strategy. Germany’s decision to abstain was, according to realist views, driven by material incentives which would not have been best served by involvement in enforcing the Libya no fly zone. Taking Gilpin’s assumptions and applying them more broadly to German foreign policy, the decision to reduce spending on defence and a clear preference for avoiding military intervention signals a state not driven by security concerns, but one which is attempting to reinforce its economic strength in the face of mounting challenges to the German economic model. Gilpin’s realism has explanatory power for Germany, in that Germany did not view the Libya crisis of such importance that it considered it a direct threat to its security – thus lowering the probability of involvement in the no fly zone. In light of the economic pressures associated with the Eurozone crisis, a volatile political climate within Germany, and an energy strategy privileging relations with Russia and the former Soviet republics, rather that the Middle East, Germany saw no clear interest in becoming involved in the NATO operation. The UK and France’s GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LIBYA CRISIS 403 growing dependence on Libyan oil suggests that for London and Paris security and economic interests coincided, making their attempts to stabilise Libya in their national interests.80 Germany’s strategic interests have focused on Eastern Europe to secure energy supplies for the future, with concerns about the impact of peak oil becoming increasingly important in German foreign policy making.81 Constructivist explanations have consistently stressed Germany’s social context as a defining factor of its foreign policy, leading Germany to pursue different preferences than are to be expected from a major power.82 In the case of Libya constructivist analysis could explain Germany’s decision as a consistent reticence to deploy military force and the primacy of multilateral diplomatic solutions to crises.83 In this regard, Germany had a different conception of appropriate action than France, the UK and the USA which led it to consider an alternative strategy.84 Westerwelle’s understanding of what was an appropriate response to the crisis was shared by Merkel and de Maizière, who considered the risks of military intervention too great and the strategy of sanctions more effective. German diplomacy therefore had to try and walk a tightrope of disagreeing with its allies’ strategy while supporting the aims of Operation Odyssey Dawn and Operation Unified Protector. This would have been made easier if Germany had voted yes to UN1973 and took a back seat in the military operation. As Stelzenmüller puts it, Germany was caught up in a classic foreign policy dilemma; having a choice between two high-risk options with little sense of clarity on either course of action.85 Debates on the decision to abstain in the Bundestag suggest that there was disagreement over the normative principles underlying the decision to abstain. SPD and Green Party members of parliament argued that the government was in fact going against normative principles of German foreign policy established in the former Yugoslavia, which should have compelled Germany to participate.86 Germany’s actions during Operation Unified Protector suggest, therefore, that normative explanations for Germany’s abstention do not tell the whole story. Germany’s reason for abstention was driven by an assessment of the case before it, rather than a normatively grounded opposition to the use of military force. Germany’s main criticisms of the resolution were lack of planning, the risk of becoming involved in a protracted campaign and concerns over pressure to intervene as a matter of course without exhausting non-military options. The electoral incentives for abstention to position the FDP in regional elections were a motivating factor as well as a sense in Berlin that they were being harried into participation in the no fly zone by London and Paris, without due consultation.87 Rather than an outward looking strategy, Jürgen Habermas has suggested that Germany’s reluctant foreign policy is the result of domestic concerns taking precedence over ambitious foreign policy objectives: The new German intransigence has deeper roots. In the wake of reunification, Germany’s perspective had already changed in an enlarged country preoccupied with its own problems. But there was a more sweeping change in the mentalities after Helmut Kohl. With the exception of a too quickly exhausted Joschka Fischer, since Gerhard Schröder took office a normatively unambitious 404 GERMAN POLITICS generation has been in power that has become preoccupied with a short-winded approach to the day-to-day problems of an increasingly complex society. Conscious of the diminishing room for political manoeuvre, these people shy away from farsighted goals and constructive political projects, let alone an undertaking like European unification.88 These domestic concerns which have sharpened in the past decade have made the German government focus on the details of addressing the Eurozone crisis to the exclusion of a foreign policy strategy with a more ambitious scope. The CDU/CSU – FDP government took the decision to abstain on UN1973 because it was not seen as a priority and Westerwelle firmly believed that the goals of France, the UK and the USA could be achieved with sanctions.89 CONCLUSION: EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF GERMANY’S ABSTENTION Germany’s response to the Libya crisis challenges us to consider its impact on the development of German foreign policy. Gilpinian realism, which addresses both security and economic factors, suggests that German policy makers did not consider the Libya crisis to be a security threat which Germany needed to respond to. In addition, economic challenges from the Eurozone spilling over into electoral pressure on the government provided the government with incentives not to become involved in unpopular crisis management commitments. Germany’s reluctance to intervene is further evidence of what Laidi views as the wider conception that the EU is risk averse.90 Concerns over domestic political instability in Germany caused by a protracted campaign and the implications of the Eurozone crisis, coupled with an energy security strategy focused on Russia ensured that Germany did not calculate involvement in the NATO operation to be in its interest. The first main implication of this study is to outline that the failure of the EU’s big three to agree on a common position indicates that German strategic culture has been more resistant to adaptation as a result of the socialisation effects of CSDP and NATO than suggested.91 Westerwelle and de Maizière’s scepticism of British and French stressing of R2P on the surface indicates normative dissonance between the EU’s leading military states. An alternative explanation to this is, however, that German policy makers, faced with being sidelined from Franco-British diplomacy took an opposing view in protest at their exclusion. Germany’s behaviour appears to have been motivated by national interests which diverged from France and the UK. Giplin’s realist interpretation of German behaviour is useful in assessing the motivations of the German government concerning the material incentives for abstention. However, it remains to be seen whether Libya signals a longer-term trend in German foreign policy which is defined by similar behaviour, or whether short-term calculations, as Steltzenmüller suggests, resulted in Germany taking the worst of the two decisions before it. Elite interviews and an analysis of the domestic political context facing the German government make clear that Germany’s stance on Libya was more of an aberration than a statement of a new self-interested German foreign policy. The constant cycle of electoral competition GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LIBYA CRISIS 405 coupled with pressures from the Eurozone and the legacy of the Energiewende after the Fukushima nuclear disaster appear to have overwhelmed German foreign policy makers, who privileged short-term calculations over traditional multilateral commitments, without fully assessing the implications of this course of action. This second implication of the analysis presented here suggests that German foreign policy is going through a period of transition to address new challenges to Germany. The coalition was already stretched by crisis managing EU policy and minimising the electoral fall-out of rescuing the Euro. Cameron and Sarkozy’s understanding of the German government position was in part an acceptance of the pressures Merkel was under domestically – although French and British leadership on the issue was a useful way to profile Cameron and Sarkozy in the face of a perceived increase in German political influence in the EU.92 Timothy Garton Ash criticised Germany for its, ‘leave me alone attitude and desire to be a greater Switzerland’, themes which hark back to the years immediately after German unification when Germany’s future foreign policy orientation was being debated.93 Germany is on the one hand a forceful negotiator aware of its power and national interests within the EU94 – particularly when demanding fiscal responsibility from Eurozone partners, and it has incrementally increased its role in Afghanistan as part of NATO’s operations. If the case of Libya demonstrates that ‘made in Berlin’ solutions will be more prevalent in German foreign policy, this would mark a break from the Bonn republic and the consolidation of the Berlin republic. Former Federal President Roman Herzog argued that with Germany’s involvement in Bosnia in the 1990s the united Germany had undertaken new responsibility in international affairs. He suggested that, Germany belongs to the concert of the great democracies whether it likes it or not, and if one of these democracies stands aside she inevitably damages not only the others, but in the analysis herself as well . . . We see ever more clearly that risk-averse inaction can in the long run be more risky than potentially risky action . . . If we do not confront risks locally, they will come to us.95 Germany’s decision to abstain on UN1973 highlights tensions within Germany’s traditional partners. Foreign Minister Westerwelle has attempted to address this through a policy to, ‘reinforce old partnerships and establish new partnerships’.96 A third implication of this study for German foreign policy is that this attempt to establish greater room to manoeuvre has the danger of undervaluing existing partners and creating the perception that German foreign policy is re-aligning according to a more overt sense of German foreign policy interests. Germany has not deepened its involvement in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Germany is more comfortable with intergovernmental co-operation with smaller partners in the EU focusing on territorial defence, than transforming its armed forces. The Swedish-German Ghent process of ‘pooling and sharing’ suggests that co-operation within smaller EU partners is envisaged as an attempt to reinforce German capabilities in a difficult financial environment, rather than considering building new and improved capabilities to meet future needs.97 Germany’s stress on the Weimar Triangle (France, Germany and Poland) to 406 GERMAN POLITICS attempt to reinvigorate discussions on a joint civ – mil operations headquarters is another example of Germany’s preference for small group co-operation in security and defence. 98 Maull argues that in contrast to the Eurozone crisis, Germany’s room for manoeuvre in the Libya crisis was considerably greater, but suggests that domestic political pressure within the governing coalition and embedded scepticism within policy elites of the utility of military force shaped Germany’s decision to abstain.99 Germany’s role in the Libya crisis suggests that German policy makers faced with the financial crisis and its potential ramifications for Germany’s role in Europe sought to limit Germany’s international commitments and declined to become involved in enforcing the no fly zone. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author would like to thank the journal editors, Prof Ben O’Loughlin, Dr Luis Simón and the anonymous reviewers of this article for their helpful comments in improving this article. ABOUT THE AUTHOR Alister Miskimmon is Senior Lecturer in European Politics and International Relations at Royal Holloway, University of London. His research interests include German and EU foreign and security policy and strategic narratives in international affairs. NOTES 1. P. Wittig, ‘Explanation of Vote by Ambassador Wittig on the Security Council Resolution on Libya’, 17 March 2011, available from http://www.new-york-un.diplo.de/Vertretung/newyorkvn/en/__pr/ Speeches/PM__2011/20110317_20Explanation_20of_20vote_20-_20Libya.html?archive=2984642 (accessed 1 September 2011). 2. C. Schwegmann (ed.), Bewährungsproben einer Nation: die Entsendung der Bundeswehr ins Ausland (Berlin: Dunker & Humblot, 2011). 3. A. 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Dyson, Neoclassical Realism and Defence Reform in Post-Cold War Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010); T. Noetzel and B. Schreer, ‘All the Way? The Evolution of German Military Power’, International Affairs 84/2 (2008), pp.211– 21. 9. A. Miskimmon, Germany and the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007); Miskimmon, ‘Falling into Line’. 10. Dettke, Germany Says No. GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LIBYA CRISIS 407 11. Noetzel and Schreer, ‘All the Way?’. 12. F. Berenskoetter and B. Giegerich, ‘From NATO to ESDP: A Social Constructivist Analysis of German Strategic Adjustment after the End of the Cold War’, International Security 19/3 (2010), pp.407–52. 13. Hellmann, ‘Normatively Disarmed, But Self-Confident’, p.46. 14. Ibid. 15. G. Chafetz, M. Spirtas and B. Frankel, ‘Introduction: Tracing the Influence of Identity on Foreign Policy’, in G. Chafetz, M. Spirtas and B. Frankel (eds), The Origins of National Interests (London: Frank Cass, 1999), p.xvi. 16. G. Westerwelle, ‘Speech to the German Council on Foreign Relations’, 21 October 2010, available from http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2010/101021-BM-dgapgrundsatzrede.html (accessed 1 September 2011). 17. C. Stelzenmüller, ‘Germany’s Unhappy Abstention from Leadership’, Financial Times, 28 March 2011, available from http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2490ab8c-5982-11e0-baa8-00144feab49a,dwp_uuid= 73adc504-2ffa-11da-ba9f-00000e2511c8,print=yes.htm (accessed 3 September 2011). 18. Sueddeutsche Zeitung, ‘Kohl geisselt deutsche Aussenpolitik’, 24 August 2011, available from http:// www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/kritik-vom-altkanzler-kohl-geisselt-deutsche- aussenpolitik-1.1134478 (accessed 24 August 2011). 19. B. Crawford, ‘Explaining Defection from International Cooperation: Germany’s Unilateral Recognition of Croatia’, World Politics 48/4 (1996), pp.482– 521. 20. Dettke, Germany Says No. 21. The Times, ‘West Urged to Seize the Chance to Boost Arab Democracy with Huge Aid Plan; Arab Spring’, 21 February 2011, pp.8–9. 22. Financial Times Deutschland, ‘Geheimflug in Gaddafis Hinterland’, 28 February 2011, p.12. 23. Der Spiegel, ‘Merkel Cabinet Agrees AWACS for Afghanistan’, 23 March 2011, available from http:// www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,752709,00.html (accessed 21 August 2011). 24. Interviews with representatives of foreign policy think tanks in Berlin, July 2011. 25. Der Spiegel, ‘Fischer Joins Criticism of German Security Council Abstention’, 22 March 2011, available from http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,752542,00.html (accessed 21 August 2011). 26. S. Tisdall, ‘Libya: Reaction: Britain and France Appear Ever More Isolated as World Opinion Turns Hostile: China, Russia, Germany, Brazil Voice Objections NATO Also Divided as Turkey Blocks Agreement’, Guardian, 22 March 2011, p.6. 27. Frankfurter Rundschau, ‘Wir sind nicht isoliert’, interview with Guido Westerwelle, 14 April 2011, available from http://www.fr-online.de/politik/-wir-sind-nicht-isoliert-/-/1472596/8341026/-/index. html (accessed 21 August 2011). 28. European Voice, ‘French German Libya Rift Deepens’, 25 March 2011, available from http://www. europeanvoice.com/article/2011/march/french-german-libya-rift-deepens/70661.aspx (accessed 21 August 2011). 29. Deutsche Welle, ‘Germany Defends Cautious Approach to Libya, Denies Isolation’, 21 March 2011, available from http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,14926360,00.html (accessed 21 August 2011). 30. For a detailed account of Genscher’s time as foreign minister see H.-D. Genscher, Rebuilding a House Divided (New York: Broadway Books, 1998). 31. Die Welt, ‘Gaddafis Sturz und Deutschlands beitrag’, 22 August 2011, available from http://www.welt. de/politik/deutschland/article13559302/Gaddafis-Sturz-und-Deutschlands-Beitrag.html (accessed 22 August 2011). 32. Interviews in the Federal Chancellery, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Defence Ministry, July 2011. 33. Ibid. 34. Der Spiegel, ‘Merkel Cabinet Agrees AWACS for Afghanistan’. 35. Ibid. 36. Deutsche Welle, ‘Germany Defends Cautious Approach to Libya, Denies Isolation’. 37. Ibid. 38. For a good summation of the debate in the USA on whether to support UN1973 see A.-M. Slaughter, ‘Op Ed: Fiddling While Libya Burns’, New York Times, 14 March 2011, available from http://www. nytimes.com/2011/03/14/opinion/14slaughter.html?_r=2 (accessed 29 August 2011); see also A. Applebaum, ‘The New Alliance: For the First Time since Suez, America Is Taking a Back Seat to Britain and France in a Military Operation’, Spectator 315 (26 March 2011), p.12. 39. Interviews, British Embassy, Berlin, July 2011. 40. Interviews in Berlin, July 2011. 408 GERMAN POLITICS 41. J. Vollmer, ‘Im Einsatz mit Partner’, in C. Schwegmann (ed.), Bewährungsproben einer Nation, pp.185– 96. 42. Der Spiegel, ‘Merkel Cabinet Agrees AWACS for Afghanistan’. 43. W.E. Paterson, ‘The Reluctant Hegemon: Germany Moves Centre Stage in the EU’, Journal of Common Market Studies 49/S1 (2011), pp.57–75. 44. Interviews with policy advisers of German political parties, July 2011. 45. Ibid. 46. Bild am Sonntag, ‘Krieg in Libyen: Über 60 Prozent der Deutschen befürworten den Angriff’, 20 March 2011, available from http://www.bild.de/politik/2011/libyen-krise/aber-mehrheit-lehnt-beteiligung-ab16933388.bild.html (accessed 21 August 2011). 47. 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Schäfer, ‘Die Parlamentsbeteiligung in Regierung und Opposition: Die Linke’, in Schwegmann (ed.), Bewährungsproben einer Nation, pp.155– 60. 55. New York Times, ‘Germany Steps Away from European Unity’, 23 March 2011, available from http:// www.nytimes.com/2011/03/24/world/europe/24germany.html?_r=1 (accessed 21 August 2011). 56. Deutsche Welle, ‘Germany Defends Cautious Approach to Libya, Denies Isolation’. 57. G. Hellmann, ‘Goodbye to Bismarck? The Foreign Policy of Contemporary Germany’, Mershon International Studies Review 40/1 (1996), pp.1– 39. 58. CDU, CSU, FDP, Wachstum, Bildung, Zusammenhalt: Der Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und FDP, 17 (2009). Legislaturperiode, available from http://www.cdu.de/doc/pdfc/091026koalitionsvertrag-cducsu-fdp.pdf (accessed 1 September 2011). 59. Strukturkommission der Bundeswehr, Bericht der Strukturkommission der Bundeswehr, October 2011, available from http://www.bmvg.de/resource/resource/MzEzNTM4MmUzMzMyMmUzMTM1Mz MyZTM2MzEzMDMwMzAzMDMwMzAzMDY3NzA3NTc1MzU2NjM0NjYyMDIwMjAyMDIw/ Bericht%20der%20Strukturkommission%20der%20Bundeswehr.pdf (accessed 21 August 2011). 60. Interviews, Federal Ministry of Defence, Berlin, July 2011. 61. Von Weizsäcker Kommission der Bundeswehr, ‘Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr’, (2000), available from http://www.spdfraktion.de/rs_datei/0,,1663,00.pdf (accessed 1 September 2011). 62. Interviews, Federal Ministry of Defence, Berlin, July 2011. 63. Interviews in Foreign Ministry, Defence Ministry and Chancellery, Berlin, July 2011. Such a division of labour would call in to question commitments to greater burden sharing in military crisis management, both within NATO and the EU and is likely to be resisted by France and the UK. 64. For an in-depth examination of recent German defence reforms, see T. Dyson, ‘Condemned Forever to Becoming but Never to Being? The Weise Commission and German Military Isomorphism’, German Politics 20/4 (2011), pp.545–67; and T. Dyson, ‘Managing Convergence: German Military Doctrine and Capabilities in the 21st Century’, Defence Studies 11/2 (2011), pp.244– 70. 65. Crawford, ‘Explaining Defection from International Cooperation’. 66. A. Menon, ‘European Defence Policy from Lisbon to Libya’, Survival 53/3 (2011), pp.75– 90, p.76. 67. G. Hellmann, R. Baumann, M. Bösche and B. Herborth, ‘De-Europeanization by Default? Germany’s EU Policy in Defence and Asylum’, Foreign Policy Analysis 1/1 (2005), pp.143– 64. 68. B. Gomis, ‘Franco-British Defence and Security Treaties: Entente While it Lasts?’, Royal Institute for International Affairs/Chatham House, Programme Paper: ISP PP 2001/01 (March 2011); B. Jones, ‘Franco-British Defence Co-operation: A New Engine for European Defence?’, Occasional Paper No. 88, European Union Institute for Security Studies (2011), available from http://www.iss.europa. eu/uploads/media/op88-Franco-British_military_cooperation-a_new_engine_for_European_defence. pdf (accessed 1 September 2011); C. Taylor ‘Franco-British Defence Co-operation’, House of GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LIBYA CRISIS 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 409 Commons Standard Note, SN/IA/5750 (8 November 2010), available from http://www.parliament.uk/ briefing-papers/SN05750.pdf (accessed 10 November 2010). G. T. Allison and P. Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd edn (New York: Longman, 1999). Interviews in Chancellery, Foreign Ministry and Defence Ministry, July 2011. Ibid. J. 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Katzenstein, ‘Same War – Different Views: Germany, Japan and Counterterrorism’, International Organization 57/4 (2003), pp.731– 60; M. Zehfuss, Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Studies by Longhurst and Dalgaard Nielsen have highlighted the durability of a distinctive German strategic culture which is resistant to change. See Kerry Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force: The Evolution of German Security Policy 1989– 2003 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003); Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, Germany, Pacificism and Peace Enforcement (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006). C. Wagnsson, ‘Divided Power Europe: Normative Divergences among the EU “Big Three”’, Journal of European Public Policy 17/8 (2010), pp.1089– 105. C. Stelzenmüller, ‘Libyen, eine Deutschstunde’, Sueddeutsche Zeitung (15 April 2011), p.2. Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 17/97. 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The Libya operation is also significant as the USA appeared happy to let France and the UK lead politically. See Applebaum, ‘The New Alliance’, p.12. T. Garton Ash, ‘France Plays Hawk, Germany Demurs: Libya Has Exposed Europe’s Fault Lines’, Guardian, 24 March 2011, available from http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/mar/24/ france-hawk-germany-demurs-libya-europe (accessed 21 August 2011). 410 GERMAN POLITICS 94. S. Bulmer and W.E. Paterson, ‘Germany and the EU: From “Tamed Power” to Normalized Power?’, International Affairs 86/5 (2010), pp.1051–73; Paterson, ‘The Reluctant Hegemon’; M. Wolf, ‘The Riddle of German Self-Interest’, Financial Times, 30 May 2012, p.13. 95. B. Simms, ‘Review Article: From the Kohl to the Fischer Doctrine: Germany and the Wars of the Yugoslav Succession, 1991– 1999’, German History 21/3 (2003), pp.394–414. 96. Westerwelle, ‘Speech to the German Council on Foreign Relations’. 97. Interviews, Federal Ministry of Defence, Berlin, July 2011. 98. Menon, ‘European Defence Policy from Lisbon to Libya’. 99. H. Maull (2012) ‘Aussenpolitischen Entscheidungsprozesse in Krisenzeiten’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 10 (2012), pp.34– 40.