Holes and Other Superficialities

Lo Squaderno, 2022

The article provides a first attempt to draw a phenomenology of holes by highlighting their significant social dimension. Understood in their metaphorical and practical meaning, holes interestingly recall geographer Edward Soja’s concept of thirdspace.

in G. Marsico and L. Tateo (eds.), Ordinary Things and Their Extraordinary Meanings, Charlotte (NC), Information Age Publishing, 2019

Some thoughts on holes and the challenging metaphysical conundrums they raise, beginning with the obvious question: are there such things, or are holes mere entia representationis, as-if entities, linguistic noise?

Logic and Logical Philosophy, 1996

Due to their peculiar nature, shadows and holes are a promising source of insight about the representation of physical objects in cognition. The article investigates the extent to which shadows and holes are represented as object-like.

Cognition, 2003

The shape of holes can be recognized as accurately as the shape of objects (Palmer, S. E. (1999). Vision science: photons to phenomenology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), yet the area enclosed by a hole is a background region, and it can be demonstrated that background regions are not represented as having shape. What is therefore the shape of a hole, if any? To resolve this apparent paradox, we suggest that the shape of a hole is available indirectly from the shape of the surrounding object. We exploited the fact that observers are faster at judging the position of convex vertices than concave ones (Perception 30 (2001) 1295), and using a figural manipulation of figure/ground we found a reversal of the relative speeds when the same contours were presented as holes instead of objects. If contours were perceived as belonging to the hole rather than the surrounding object then there would have been no qualitative difference in responses to the object and hole stimuli. We conclude that the contour bounding a hole is automatically assigned to the surrounding object, and that a change in perception of a region from object to hole always drastically changes the encoded information. We discuss the many interesting aspects of holes as a subject of study in different disciplines and predict that much insight especially about shape will continue to come from holes.

In this paper I argue that holes are not objects, but should instead be construed as properties or relations. The argument proceeds by first establishing a claim about angles: that angles are not objects, but properties or relations. It is then argued that holes and angles belong to the same category, on the grounds that they share distinctive existence and identity conditions. This provides an argument in favour of categorizing holes as one categorizes angles. I then argue that a commitment to the existence of properties to be identified with holes provides sufficient resources to account for true claims about holes.

Sergio Lopez-Pineiro, “Things as Holes: Voids within Patterns,” a+t, no. 46 (Autumn 2015): 92-103. In English and Spanish.

2009