

The Inventory is Dark and Full of Misinformation:

Understanding Ad Inventory Pooling in the Ad-Tech Supply Chain

Paper: <https://tinyurl.com/darkpooling>

Code & Data: <https://tinyurl.com/darkpooling-code-data>



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
IOWA

¹University of California, Davis


Iowa

²University of


Programmatic Online Advertising




How does an ad for a reputed brand end up on a misinformation site?



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
Is brand safety effective against dark pooling?



Research Questions

- Compliance of ads.txt and sellers.json transparency standards
- Prevalence of dark pooling
- Effectiveness of brand safety in the face of dark pooling

Data Collection



Results (RQ1) : Compliance

Misrepresentations amongst our data:

ads.txt Misrepresentation	Misinformation	Control
Misrepresented direct relationships	64%	51%
Fabricated publisher/seller IDs	83%	65%
Conflicting relationships	49%	33%

sellers.json Misrepresentation	>= 1 Misinformation Site	0 Misinformation Site
Invalid Seller Type	0%	0.7%
Invalid Domain names	54.8%	0.8%
Confidential Sellers	46.1%	0.1%
INT w/o sellers.json	49.8%	13.3%
Non-unique IDs	95.3%	62.6%

RQ2: Dark Pooling

Publisher IDs are shared by organizationally-unrelated publishers



publisherA.com/ads.txt

adexchange.com, 153, DIRECT



publisherB.com/ads.txt

adexchange.com, 153, DIRECT



adexchange.com/sellers.json

```
"seller_id": "153",  
"seller_type": "PUBLISHER",  
"domain": "publisherA.com",  
"name": "Publisher Name A"
```



publisherA & publisherB owned by the same Parent Company



publisherA & publisherB are NOT owned by the same Parent Company

RQ2: Classifying Dark Pools

Based on Parent Organization of pooled publishers



1. Homogenous Pools

publisherA.com/ads.txt

TXT

adexchange.com, 12345, DIRECT

publisherB.com/ads.txt

TXT

adexchange.com, 12345, DIRECT

adexchange.com/sellers.json

JSON

```
"seller_id": "12345",  
"seller_type": "PUBLISHER",  
"domain": "publisherA.com",  
"name": "A Times"
```

OR

```
"seller_id": "12345",  
"seller_type": "PUBLISHER",  
"domain": "ABgroup.com",  
"name": "AB Group"
```

A Times }
B Times } **AB Group**
(Parent Organization)

A Times and B Times authorize 12345 as their direct seller. AdExchange recognizing 12345 as belonging to either A Times (or B Times) or AB Group are *all valid cases* of Id sharing since A Times and B Times *are related (same parent)*.



2. Heterogenous Pools

publisherA.com/ads.txt

TXT

adexchange.com, 12345, DIRECT

publisherB.com/ads.txt

TXT

adexchange.com, 12345, DIRECT

adexchange.com/sellers.json

JSON

```
"seller_id": "12345",  
"seller_type": "PUBLISHER",  
"domain": "publisherA.com",  
"name": "A Times"
```

A Times }
B Times } **No relation**
between the two
publishers

A Times and B Times authorize 12345 as their direct seller. AdExchange recognizes 12345 as belonging to A Times (or B Times). This type of Id pooling is *incorrect* since A Times and B Times *are unrelated*.

Results (RQ2) : Static Pooling

Pool Type	Pools w/ Misinformation Sites		Pools w/o Misinformation Sites	
	# Pools	Pool Size	# Pools	Pool Size
Homogenous	0.4%	2.6	9.6%	2.6
Potential Homogenous	9.1%	18.8	26.6%	7.0
Heterogenous	85.0%	482.5	41.0%	42.2
Unknown	5.6%	4.3	22.7%	3.9

Results (RQ2) : Dynamic Pooling

- Unique misinformation pools: 297
- Majorly we observed syndication based ad-networks involved in pooling
- Pools with highest misinfo. sites sharing the same PubID
 - PubID owner: 33Across (30 Misinfo Domains) (issuer: Pubmatic)
 - [Principia-scientific.org](#)
 -
 - PubID owner: Gourmet Ads (23 Misinfo Domains) (issuer: Pubmatic)
 - [Principia-scientific.org](#)
 -

PubID owner domains*:

- *confidential_seller: 198*
- *33across.com: 39*
- *gourmetads.com: 33*

PubID issuers*:



- *pubmatic.com: 279*
- *google.com: 243*
- *rubiconproject.com: 54*

*common across multiple pools (*total across 2 crawls*)

Results (RQ3) : Brand Analysis

We collected a total of 4246 (2068 distinct brands) ads from 669 Misinformation websites.

- Most prevalent brands were: **Amazon, Alibaba, Yahoo**
- Top advertiser categories: **business, shopping, computers, health, & finance**
- *We observed that reputable brands advertised more on the misinformation sites which were part of more pools.*



Recommendations

1. Better *standards* and *compliance*
2. *Trust delegation*: Better *vetting* of publishers in ad syndication networks
3. *Regulation*
 - a. Digital Services Act (DSA)
 - b. Digital Services Oversight and Safety Act (DSOSA)

Research Paper
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