Books by Annemarie Kalis
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Papers by Annemarie Kalis
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2024
Traditionally, self-control is conceptualized in terms of internal processes such as willpower or... more Traditionally, self-control is conceptualized in terms of internal processes such as willpower or motivational mechanisms. These processes supposedly explain how agents manage to exercise self-control or, in other words, how they act on the basis of their best judgment in the face of conflicting motivation. Against the mainstream view that self-control is a mechanism or set of mechanisms realized in the brain, several authors have recently argued for the inclusion of situated factors in our understanding of self-control. In this paper, we review such recent attempts from the perspective of situated accounts of cognition and argue that even though these accounts integrate situational features, they ultimately still rely on an orthodox, neurocentric view of self-control. Instead, we will argue that in order to develop a really situated account it is necessary to radically rethink what self-control is. Building on recent work on extended skill, we will develop an outline of a really situated account of self-control.
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Philosophical Psychology, 2022
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Theory & Psychology, 2020
According to Oude Maatman (2020), our recent suggestion (Borsboom et al., 2019) that symptom netw... more According to Oude Maatman (2020), our recent suggestion (Borsboom et al., 2019) that symptom networks are irreducible because they rely on folk psychological descriptions, threatens to undermine the main achievements of the network approach. In this article, we take up Oude Maatman's challenge and develop an argument showing in what sense folk psychological concepts describe features of reality, and what it means to say that folk psychology is a causal language.
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2019
In the past decades, reductionism has dominated both research directions and funding policies
in ... more In the past decades, reductionism has dominated both research directions and funding policies
in clinical psychology and psychiatry. The intense search for the biological basis of mental
disorders, however, has not resulted in conclusive reductionist explanations of psychopathology.
Recently, network models have been proposed as an alternative framework for the analysis
of mental disorders, in which mental disorders arise from the causal interplay between
symptoms. In this target article, we show that this conceptualization can help explain why
reductionist approaches in psychiatry and clinical psychology are on the wrong track. First,
symptom networks preclude the identification of a common cause of symptomatology with
a neurobiological condition; in symptom networks, there is no such common cause.
Second, symptom network relations depend on the content of mental states and, as such, feature
intentionality. Third, the strength of network relations is highly likely to depend partially
on cultural and historical contexts as well as external mechanisms in the environment. Taken
together, these properties suggest that, if mental disorders are indeed networks of causally
related symptoms, reductionist accounts cannot achieve the level of success associated with
reductionist disease models in modern medicine. As an alternative strategy, we propose to
interpret network structures in terms of D. C. Dennett’s (1987) notion of real patterns, and
suggest that, instead of being reducible to a biological basis, mental disorders feature biological
and psychological factors that are deeply intertwined in feedback loops. This suggests that neither
psychological nor biological levels can claim causal or explanatory priority, and that a
holistic research strategy is necessary for progress in the study of mental disorders.
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Frontiers in Psychology, 2019
In their paper "Why we may not find intentions in the brain," Uithol et al. (2014) convincingly a... more In their paper "Why we may not find intentions in the brain," Uithol et al. (2014) convincingly argue that "the processes underlying action initiation and control are considerably more dynamic and context sensitive than the concept of intention can allow for." Their paper could be seen as a critical note to the widespread tendency to search for identifiable neurocorrelates of mental concepts. Their more specific suggestion is that the absence of clear neural correlates undermines the traditional understanding of intention. In this paper I will try to take their argument a step further. First of all, I will argue that our folk psychology leaves room for various understandings of intentions, and that the concept of intention discussed by Uithol et al. is an academic concept that has its roots in the causal theory of action and in functionalist approaches to cognition. I will argue that both these paradigms are contested, and that there seems to be theoretical wiggle room for alternative understandings of intention. Subsequently I outline such an alternative perspective based on Wittgensteinian philosophy of psychology, emphasizing the regulative role of intention talk. However, the proposed understanding raises the question how to think about neural realization: is intention talk "just" talk, or do intentions really exist? I will propose that intention talk should be understood as a form of pattern recognition, and that the patterns involved are extended in both space and time. The conclusion outlines some important implications for the neuroscientific investigation of intentions.
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Ratio, 2017
Recently, two apparent truisms about self-control have been questioned in both the philosophical ... more Recently, two apparent truisms about self-control have been questioned in both the philosophical and the psychological literature: the idea that exercising self-control involves an agent doing something, and the idea that self-control is a good thing. Both assumptions have come under threat because self-control is increasingly understood as a mental mechanism, and mechanisms cannot possibly be good or active in the required sense. However, I will argue that it is not evident that self-control should be understood as a mechanism, suggesting that we might also argue the other way around: if we have independent reason to hold onto the idea that self-control is inherently good and active, the conclusion might be that self-control cannot be a mechanism. I will show that Aristotle's original analysis of self-control actually offers grounds for both assumptions: he took there to be conceptual connections between self-control and goodness / activity. By examining these connections, I argue that an Aristotelian approach could offer promising leads for a contemporary non-mechanistic understanding of self-control as a normative capacity.
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte, 2016
Among many academic philosophers, philosophy for the general public has a bad reputation. In this... more Among many academic philosophers, philosophy for the general public has a bad reputation. In this paper I give an overview of the main points of criticism, and use these to develop a positive account of what good philosophy for the general public could be. As a first step towards such a account, I outline different views on how philosophy for the general public can relate to academic philosophy. Subsequently, I argue that what makes philosophy for the general public 'good', is just what makes philosophical work in general 'good': good philosophical work has a philosophical aim, employs philosophical methods and employs these methods in a sound way. Finally I argue that communicability of philosophical ideas should not be seen as a bonus feature but as the sine qua non of philosophical thinking: if academic philosophy paid more attention to communicability, we might not even need a distinct discipline of philosophy for the general public. I conclude with some concrete suggestions for improving the such communicability.
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 2015
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Psychopharmacology, 2014
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 2013
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Filosofie & Praktijk, 2013
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 2014
The paper discusses the relevance of decision-making models for evaluating the impact of mental d... more The paper discusses the relevance of decision-making models for evaluating the impact of mental disorder on legal responsibility. A three-stage model is presented that analyzes decision making in terms of behavioral control. We argue that understanding dysfunctions in each of the three stages of decision making could provide important insights in the relation between mental disorder and legal responsibility. In particular, it is argued that generating options for action constitutes an important but largely ignored stage of the decision-making process, and that dysfunctions in this early stage might undermine the whole process of making decisions (and thus be- havioral control) more strongly than dysfunctions in later stages. Lastly, we show how the presented framework could be relevant to the actual psychiatric assessment of a defendant's decision making within the context of an insanity defense.
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
AI & Society, 2014
Autonomous e-coaching systems offer their users suggestions for action, thereby affecting the use... more Autonomous e-coaching systems offer their users suggestions for action, thereby affecting the user’s decision-making process. More specifically, the sugges- tions that these systems make influence the options for action that people actually consider. Surprisingly though, options and the corresponding process of option genera- tion—a decision-making stage preceding intention forma- tion and action selection—have received very little attention in the various disciplines studying decision making. We argue that this neglect is unjustified and that it is important, particularly for designers of autonomous e-coaching systems, to understand how human option generation works. The aims of this paper are threefold. The first aim is to generate awareness with designers of autonomous e-coaching systems that these systems do in fact influence their users’ options. The second is to show that understanding the interplay between a person’s options and the e-coaching system’s suggestions is important for improving the effectiveness of the system. The third is that the very same interplay is also crucial for designing e-coaching systems that respect people’s autonomy.
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Frontiers in Psychology, 2013
Most empirical studies on decision-making start from a set of given options for action. However, ... more Most empirical studies on decision-making start from a set of given options for action. However, in everyday life there is usually no one asking you to choose between A, B, and C. Recently, the question how people come up with options has been receiving growing attention. However, so far there has been neither a systematic attempt to define the construct of “option” nor an attempt to show why decision-making research really needs this construct. This paper aims to fill that void by developing definitions of “option” and “option generation” that can be used as a basis for decision-making research in a wide variety of decision-making settings, while clarifying how these notions relate to familiar psychological constructs. We conclude our analysis by arguing that there are indeed reasons to believe that option generation is an important and distinct aspect of human decision-making.
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Cognitive Affective & Behavioral Neuroscience, Jan 1, 2008
This article focuses on both daily forms of weakness of will as discussed in the philosophical de... more This article focuses on both daily forms of weakness of will as discussed in the philosophical debate (usually referred to as akrasia) and psychopathological phenomena as impairments of decision making. We argue that both descriptions of dysfunctional decision making can be organized within a common theoretical framework that divides the decision making process in three different stages: option generation, option selection, and action initiation. We first discuss our theoretical framework (building on existing models of decision-making stages), focusing on option generation as an aspect that has been neglected by previous models. In the main body of this article, we review how both philosophy and neuropsychiatry have provided accounts of dysfunction in each decision-making stage, as well as where these accounts can be integrated. Also, the neural underpinnings of dysfunction in the three different stages are discussed. We conclude by discussing advantages and limitations of our integrative approach.
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 2010
In contemporary moral psychology, an often-heard claim is that knowing how we make moral judgment... more In contemporary moral psychology, an often-heard claim is that knowing how we make moral judgments can help us make better moral judgments. Discussions about moral development and improvement are often framed in terms of the question of which mental processes have a better chance of leading to good moral judgments. However, few studies elaborate on the question of what makes a moral judgment a good moral judgment. This article examines what is needed to answer questions of moral improvement and develop- ment. It distinguishes 3 types of claims that are at stake: descriptive claims, metaethical claims, and normative claims. To find out what makes certain moral judgments better than others, one needs to have insight in the psychological processes and capacities underlying moral judgment formation. However, one also needs to address the question of what makes a moral judgment justified, and this in turn requires a view on the nature of moral goodness and on the question of what makes a judgment moral at all. The author discusses possible ways in which philosophical theories in the areas of metaethics and normative ethics can contribute to the answering of such questions. Also, she provides concrete suggestions for doing interdisciplinary research that is able to address those questions in moral psychology that have both normative and descriptive aspects.
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Cognitive Affective & Behavioral Neuroscience, Jan 1, 2008
What decisions should we make? Moral values, rules, and virtues provide standards for morally acc... more What decisions should we make? Moral values, rules, and virtues provide standards for morally acceptable decisions, without prescribing how we should reach them. However, moral theories do assume that we are, at least in principle, capable of making the right decisions. Consequently, an empirical investigation of the methods and resources we use for making moral decisions becomes relevant. We consider theoretical parallels of economic decision theory and moral utilitarianism and suggest that moral decision making may tap into mechanisms and processes that have originally evolved for nonmoral decision making. For example, the computation of reward value occurs through the combination of probability and magnitude; similar computation might also be used for determining utilitarian moral value. Both nonmoral and moral decisions may resort to intuitions and heuristics. Learning mechanisms implicated in the assignment of reward value to stimuli, actions, and outcomes may also enable us to determine moral value and assign it to stimuli, actions, and outcomes. In conclusion, we suggest that moral capabilities can employ and benefit from a variety of nonmoral decision-making and learning mechanisms.
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Komt een filosoof bij de dokter… (Ed. M Boenink, G Meynen & M Schermer). Meppel: Boom, 2013
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Vrijheid, noodzaak en liefde. Een kritische inleiding tot de filosofie van Harry Frankfurt (Eds K. Schaubroeck & T. Nys). Kapellen: Pelckmans. , 2011
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Uploads
Books by Annemarie Kalis
Papers by Annemarie Kalis
in clinical psychology and psychiatry. The intense search for the biological basis of mental
disorders, however, has not resulted in conclusive reductionist explanations of psychopathology.
Recently, network models have been proposed as an alternative framework for the analysis
of mental disorders, in which mental disorders arise from the causal interplay between
symptoms. In this target article, we show that this conceptualization can help explain why
reductionist approaches in psychiatry and clinical psychology are on the wrong track. First,
symptom networks preclude the identification of a common cause of symptomatology with
a neurobiological condition; in symptom networks, there is no such common cause.
Second, symptom network relations depend on the content of mental states and, as such, feature
intentionality. Third, the strength of network relations is highly likely to depend partially
on cultural and historical contexts as well as external mechanisms in the environment. Taken
together, these properties suggest that, if mental disorders are indeed networks of causally
related symptoms, reductionist accounts cannot achieve the level of success associated with
reductionist disease models in modern medicine. As an alternative strategy, we propose to
interpret network structures in terms of D. C. Dennett’s (1987) notion of real patterns, and
suggest that, instead of being reducible to a biological basis, mental disorders feature biological
and psychological factors that are deeply intertwined in feedback loops. This suggests that neither
psychological nor biological levels can claim causal or explanatory priority, and that a
holistic research strategy is necessary for progress in the study of mental disorders.
in clinical psychology and psychiatry. The intense search for the biological basis of mental
disorders, however, has not resulted in conclusive reductionist explanations of psychopathology.
Recently, network models have been proposed as an alternative framework for the analysis
of mental disorders, in which mental disorders arise from the causal interplay between
symptoms. In this target article, we show that this conceptualization can help explain why
reductionist approaches in psychiatry and clinical psychology are on the wrong track. First,
symptom networks preclude the identification of a common cause of symptomatology with
a neurobiological condition; in symptom networks, there is no such common cause.
Second, symptom network relations depend on the content of mental states and, as such, feature
intentionality. Third, the strength of network relations is highly likely to depend partially
on cultural and historical contexts as well as external mechanisms in the environment. Taken
together, these properties suggest that, if mental disorders are indeed networks of causally
related symptoms, reductionist accounts cannot achieve the level of success associated with
reductionist disease models in modern medicine. As an alternative strategy, we propose to
interpret network structures in terms of D. C. Dennett’s (1987) notion of real patterns, and
suggest that, instead of being reducible to a biological basis, mental disorders feature biological
and psychological factors that are deeply intertwined in feedback loops. This suggests that neither
psychological nor biological levels can claim causal or explanatory priority, and that a
holistic research strategy is necessary for progress in the study of mental disorders.