skip to main content
10.1145/3196494.3201587acmconferencesArticle/Chapter ViewAbstractPublication Pagesasia-ccsConference Proceedingsconference-collections
poster

Poster: Physics-Based Attack Detection for an Insider Threat Model in a Cyber-Physical System

Published: 29 May 2018 Publication History

Abstract

To ensure the proper functioning of critical systems, it is important to design secure Cyber Physical Systems (CPS). Since CPS are connected systems, most studies consider external adversaries as a threat model, which might not be able to cater for an insider threat with the physical access to the system. In this article, we proposed an attack detection mechanism for an insider who has physical access to a CPS. The proposed method exploits the dynamics of the system and detects an attack based on the laws of Physics. Based on the mass flow equations, we analyze the rate of change in the plant's process and create a feature vector based on the process dynamics. The model has been trained by passing rate of change in system's state as input to Support Vector Machine (SVM), to detect the abnormal behavior in the system. Based on the proposed framework, experiments are performed on a real water treatment testbed, to validate our model and to measure the efficiency of the plant in normal and under attack scenarios. The detection result shows that proposed scheme can detect attacks with accuracy as high as $96%$.

References

[1]
2010. http://news.oreilly.com/2008/07/coverage-of-terry-childs.html. (2010).
[2]
2012. http://www.computerworld.com/article/2489761/technology-lawregulation/it-pro-gets-4-years-in-prison-for-sabotaging-ex-employer-ssystem.html. (2012).
[3]
2013. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/21/bradley-manning-35- years-prison-wikileaks-sentence. (2013).
[4]
2013. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/edward-snowden-nsawhistleblower-surveillance. (2013).
[5]
Marshall Abrams. 2008. Malicious control system cyber security attack case study--Maroochy Water Services, Australia. (2008).
[6]
C. M. Ahmed, S. Adepu, and A. Mathur. 2016. Limitations of state estimation based cyber attack detection schemes in industrial control systems. In 2016 Smart City Security and Privacy Workshop (SCSP-W). 1--5.
[7]
C. M. Ahmed and A. P. Mathur. 2017. Hardware Identification via Sensor Fingerprinting in a Cyber Physical System. In 2017 IEEE International Conference on Software Quality, Reliability and Security Companion (QRS-C). 517--524.
[8]
Chuadhry Mujeeb Ahmed, Carlos Murguia, and Justin Ruths. 2017. Model-based Attack Detection Scheme for Smart Water Distribution Networks. In Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ASIA CCS '17). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 101--113.
[9]
Sharon Gaudin. 2000. Case study of insider sabotage: the Tim Lloyd/Omega case. (2000).
[10]
Naman Govil, Anand Agrawal, and Nils Ole Tippenhauer. 2018. On Ladder Logic Bombs in Industrial Control Systems. In Computer Security, Sokratis K. Katsikas, Frédéric Cuppens, Nora Cuppens, Costas Lambrinoudakis, Christos Kalloniatis, John Mylopoulos, Annie Antón, and Stefanos Gritzalis (Eds.). Springer International Publishing, Cham, 110--126.
[11]
A. P. Mathur and N. O. Tippenhauer. 2016. SWaT: a water treatment testbed for research and training on ICS security. In 2016 International Workshop on Cyber-physical Systems for Smart Water Networks (CySWater). 31--36.
[12]
Qadeer R., Murguia C.and Ahmed C.M., and Ruths J. 2017. Multistage Downstream Attack Detection in a Cyber Physical System. In CyberICPS Workshop 2017, in conjunction with ESORICS 2017.
[13]
M. Rocchetto and N. O. Tippenhauer. 2016. CPDY: Extending the Dolev-Yao Attacker with Physical-Layer Interactions. ArXiv e-prints (2016).
[14]
André Teixeira, Daniel Pérez, Henrik Sandberg, and Karl Henrik Johansson. 2012. Attack Models and Scenarios for Networked Control Systems. In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on High Confidence Networked Systems (HiCoNS '12). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 55--64.
[15]
David I Urbina, Jairo A Giraldo, Alvaro A Cardenas, Nils Ole Tippenhauer, Junia Valente, Mustafa Faisal, Justin Ruths, Richard Candell, and Henrik Sandberg. 2016. Limiting the impact of stealthy attacks on industrial control systems. In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. ACM, 1092--1105.

Cited By

View all

Recommendations

Comments

Information & Contributors

Information

Published In

cover image ACM Conferences
ASIACCS '18: Proceedings of the 2018 on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security
May 2018
866 pages
ISBN:9781450355766
DOI:10.1145/3196494
Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the Owner/Author.

Sponsors

Publisher

Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 29 May 2018

Check for updates

Author Tags

  1. cyber-physical system
  2. insider threat
  3. physics-based attack

Qualifiers

  • Poster

Conference

ASIA CCS '18
Sponsor:

Acceptance Rates

ASIACCS '18 Paper Acceptance Rate 52 of 310 submissions, 17%;
Overall Acceptance Rate 418 of 2,322 submissions, 18%

Contributors

Other Metrics

Bibliometrics & Citations

Bibliometrics

Article Metrics

  • Downloads (Last 12 months)27
  • Downloads (Last 6 weeks)2
Reflects downloads up to 06 Jan 2025

Other Metrics

Citations

Cited By

View all

View Options

Login options

View options

PDF

View or Download as a PDF file.

PDF

eReader

View online with eReader.

eReader

Media

Figures

Other

Tables

Share

Share

Share this Publication link

Share on social media