skip to main content
research-article

Information Leaks in Structured Peer-to-Peer Anonymous Communication Systems

Published: 01 March 2012 Publication History

Abstract

We analyze information leaks in the lookup mechanisms of structured peer-to-peer (P2P) anonymous communication systems and how these leaks can be used to compromise anonymity. We show that the techniques used to combat active attacks on the lookup mechanism dramatically increase information leaks and the efficacy of passive attacks, resulting in a tradeoff between robustness to active and passive attacks.
We study this tradeoff in two P2P anonymous systems: Salsa and AP3. In both cases, we find that, by combining both passive and active attacks, anonymity can be compromised much more effectively than previously thought, rendering these systems insecure for most proposed uses. Our results hold even if security parameters are changed or other improvements to the systems are considered. Our study, therefore, shows the importance of considering these attacks in P2P anonymous communication.

References

[1]
Back, A., Möller, U., and Stiglic, A. 2001. Traffic analysis attacks and trade-offs in anonymity providing systems. In Proceedings of the Information Hiding Workshop. I. S. Moskowitz Ed., Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 2137. Springer, 245--247.
[2]
Bauer, K., McCoy, D., Grunwald, D., Kohno, T., and Sicker, D. 2007. Low-resource routing attacks against Tor. In Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society. T. Yu Ed., ACM, New York, NY, 11--20.
[3]
Bellovin, S. M. and Wagner, D. A., Eds. 2003. In Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. IEEE Computer Society Press, Los Alamitos, CA.
[4]
Berthold, O., Federrath, H., and Köhntopp, M. 2000. Project “anonymity and unobservability in the Internet”. In Proceedings of the 10th Conference on Computers, Freedom and Privacy. L. Cranor Ed., ACM, New York, NY, 57--65.
[5]
Borisov, N. 2005. Anonymous routing in structured peer-to-peer overlays. Ph.D. thesis, UC Berkeley.
[6]
Borisov, N., Danezis, G., Mittal, P., and Tabriz, P. 2007. Denial of service or denial of security? How attacks on reliability can compromise anonymity. In Proceedings of the 14th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security. 92--102.
[7]
Boucher, P., Shostack, A., and Goldberg, I. 2000. Freedom systems 2.0 architecture. White paper, Zero Knowledge Systems, Inc.
[8]
Castro, M., Druschel, P., Ganesh, A., Rowstron, A., and Wallach, D. S. 2002. Secure routing for structured peer-to-peer overlay networks. In Proceedings of the USENIX Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation. D. Culler and P. Druschel Eds., USENIX, Berkeley, CA, 299--314.
[9]
Ciaccio, G. 2006. Improving sender anonymity in a structured overlay with imprecise routing. In Proceedings of the 6th Workshop on Privacy Enhancing Technologies. 190--207.
[10]
Clarke, I., Sandberg, O., Wiley, B., and Hong, T. W. 2001. Freenet: A distributed anonymous information storage and retrieval system. In Proceedings of the International Workshop on Designing Privacy Enhancing Technologies: Design Issues in Anonymity and Unobservability. Springer Verlag, Berlin, 46--66.
[11]
Cooke, E., Jahanian, F., and McPherson, D. 2005. The zombie roundup: Understanding, detecting, and disrupting botnets. In Proceedings of the Steps to Reducing Unwanted Traffic on the Internet Workshop. USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA, 6--6.
[12]
Daly, D., Deavours, D. D., Doyle, J. M., Webster, P. G., and Sanders, W. H. 2000. Möbius: An extensible tool for performance and dependability modeling. In Computer Performance Evaluation. Modelling Techniques and Tools. B. R. Haverkort, H. C. Bohnenkamp, and C. U. Smith Eds., Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1786. Springer, 332--336.
[13]
Danezis, G. 2003. Statistical disclosure attacks: Traffic confirmation in open environments. In Proceedings of the IFIP TC11 18th International Conference on Information Security (SEC). D. Gritzalis, S. di Vimercati, P. Samarati, and S. Katsikas Eds., 421--426.
[14]
Danezis, G. and Clayton, R. 2006. Route fingerprinting in anonymous communications. In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing. IEEE Computer Society, Los Alamitos, CA, 69--72.
[15]
Danezis, G. and Golle, P., Eds. 2006. In Proceedings of the Privacy Enhancing Technologies. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 4258. Springer, Berlin.
[16]
Danezis, G. and Syverson, P. 2007. Bridging and fingerprinting: Epistemic attacks on route selection. In Proceedings of the Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium. N. Borisov and I. Goldberg Eds., Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 5134. Springer, Berlin, 151--166.
[17]
Danezis, G., Dingledine, R., and Mathewson, N. 2003. Mixminion: Design of a Type III anonymous remailer protocol. In Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. 2--15.
[18]
Diaz, C., Seys, S., Claessens, J., and Preneel, B. 2002. Towards measuring anonymity. In Proceedings of the Workshop on Privacy Enhancing Technologies. 184--188.
[19]
Dingledine, R. and Syverson, P., Eds. 2002. In Proceedings of the Workshop on Privacy Enhancing Technologies. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 2482. Springer.
[20]
Dingledine, R., Mathewson, N., and Syverson, P. 2004. Tor: The second-generation onion router. In Proceedings of the USENIX Security Symposium. M. Blaze Ed., USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA, 303--320.
[21]
Douceur, J. 2002. The sybil attack. In Proceedings of the 1st Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems. 251--260.
[22]
Druschel, P., Kaashoek, F., and Rowstron, A., Eds. 2002. In Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems (IPTPS). Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 2429. Springer, Berlin.
[23]
Federrath, H., Ed. 2000. In Proceedings of the International Workshop on Design Issues in Anonymity and Unobservability. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 2009. Springer, Berlin.
[24]
Freedman, M. J. and Morris, R. 2002. Tarzan: A peer-to-peer anonymizing network layer. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security. R. Sandhu Ed., ACM, New York, NY, 193--206.
[25]
Goodin, D. 2007. Tor at heart of embassy passwords leak. The Register.
[26]
Holz, T., Steiner, M., Dahl, F., Biersack, E., and Freiling, F. 2008. Measurements and mitigation of peer-to-peer-based botnets: A case study on storm worm. In Proceedings of the 1st USENIX Workshop on Large-scale Exploits and Emergent Threats. F. Monrose Ed., USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA.
[27]
Hopper, N., Vasserman, E. Y., and Chan-Tin, E. 2007. How much anonymity does network latency leak? In Proceedings of the 14th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security. 82--91.
[28]
I2P. 2003. I2P anonymous network. http://www.i2p2.de/index.html.
[29]
Kaashoek, M. F. and Karger, D. R. 2003. Koorde: A simple degree-optimal distributed hash table. In Proceedings of the International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems (IPTPS). F. Kaashoek and I. Stoica Eds., Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 2735. Springer, Berlin, 98--107.
[30]
Kapadia, A. and Triandopoulos, N. 2008. Halo: High-assurance locate for distributed hash tables. In Proceedings of the Network and Distributed System Security Symposium. C. Cowan and G. Vigna Eds., Internet Society, Reston, VA, 61--79.
[31]
Kesdogan, D., Agrawal, D., and Penz, S. 2002. Limits of anonymity in open environments. In Proceedings of the Information Hiding Workshop. F. A. Petitcolas Ed., Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 2578. Springer, Berlin, 53--69.
[32]
Mathewson, N. and Dingledine, R. 2004. Practical traffic analysis: Extending and resisting statistical disclosure. In Proceedings of the Workshop on Privacy Enhancing Technologies. D. Martin and A. Serjantov Eds., Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 3424. Springer, Berlin, 17--24.
[33]
McLachlan, J., Tran, A., Hopper, N., and Kim, Y. 2009. Scalable onion routing with torsk. In Proceedings of the 16th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS’09). ACM, New York, NY, 590--599.
[34]
Mislove, A., Oberoi, G., Post, A., Reis, C., Druschel, P., and Wallach, D. S. 2004. AP3: Cooperative, decentralized anonymous communication. In Proceedings of the ACM SIGOPS European Workshop. M. Castro Ed., ACM, New York, NY, 30.
[35]
Mittal, P. and Borisov, N. 2009. Shadowwalker: Peer-to-peer anonymous communication using redundant structured topologies. In Proceedings of the 16th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS’09). ACM, New York, NY, 161--172.
[36]
Möller, U., Cottrell, L., Palfrader, P., and Sassaman, L. 2003. Mixmaster Protocol---version 2. IETF Internet Draft.
[37]
Murdoch, S. J. 2006. Hot or not: Revealing hidden services by their clock skew. In Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security. 27--36.
[38]
Murdoch, S. J. and Danezis, G. 2005. Low-cost traffic analysis of Tor. In Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. V. Paxson and M. Waidner Eds., IEEE Computer Society Press, Los Alamitos, CA, 183--195.
[39]
Murdoch, S. J. and Zieliński, P. 2007. Sampled traffic analysis by Internet-exchange-level adversaries. In Proceedings of the Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium. N. Borisov and P. Golle Eds., Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 4776. Springer, 167--183.
[40]
Nambiar, A. and Wright, M. 2006. Salsa: A structured approach to large-scale anonymity. In Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Secuity. 17--26.
[41]
Nambiar, A. and Wright, M. 2007. The Salsa simulator. http://ranger.uta.edu/~mwright/code/salsa-sims.zip.
[42]
Panchenko, A., Richter, S., and Rache, A. 2009. Nisan: Network information service for anonymization networks. In Proceedings of the 16th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS’09). ACM, New York, NY, 141--150.
[43]
Rajab, M., Zarfoss, J., Monrose, F., and Terzis, A. 2006. A multifaceted approach to understanding the botnet phenomenon. In Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference. P. Barford Ed., ACM, New York, NY, 41--52.
[44]
Raymond, J.-F. 2000. Traffic analysis: Protocols, attacks, design issues, and open problems. In Proceedings of the International Workshop on Design Issues in Anonymity and Unobservability. 10--29.
[45]
Reiter, M. and Rubin, A. 1998. Crowds: Anonymity for Web transactions. ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Sec. 1, 1, 66--92.
[46]
Rennhard, M. and Plattner, B. 2002. Introducing MorphMix: Peer-to-peer based anonymous Internet usage with collusion detection. In Proceedings of the Workshop on Privacy in Electronic Society. ACM, New York, NY, 91--102.
[47]
Rowstron, A. and Druschel, P. 2001. Pastry: Scalable, distributed object location and routing for large-scale peer-to-peer systems. In Proceedings of the IFIP/ACM International Conference on Distributed Systems Platforms (Middleware). G. Goos, J. Hartmanis, and J. van Leeuwen Eds., Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 2218. Springer, Berlin, 329--350.
[48]
Serjantov, A. and Danezis, G. 2002. Towards an information theoretic metric for anonymity. In Proceedings of the Workshop on Privacy Enhancing Techonologies. 259--263.
[49]
Sherr, M., Loo, B. T., and Blaze, M. 2007. Towards application-aware anonymous routing. In Proceedings of the 2nd USENIX Workshop on Hot Topics in Security. USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA, 4:1--4:5.
[50]
Sit, E. and Morris, R. 2002. Security considerations for peer-to-peer distributed hash tables. In Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer System. 261--269.
[51]
Stoica, I., Morris, R., Liben-Nowell, D., Karger, D. R., Kaashoek, M. F., Dabek, F., and Balakrishnan, H. 2003. Chord: A scalable peer-to-peer lookup protocol for Internet applications. IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw. 11, 1, 17--32.
[52]
Syverson, P., Tsudik, G., Reed, M., and Landwehr, C. 2000. Towards an analysis of onion routing security. In Proceedings of the International Workshop on Design Issues in Anonymity and Unobservability. 96--114.
[53]
Tabriz, P. and Borisov, N. 2006. Breaking the collusion detection mechanism of MorphMix. In Proceedings of the 6th Workshop on Privacy Enhancing Techonologies. 368--383.
[54]
The Tor Project. Tor metrics portal, http://metrics.torproject.org/ (last accessed 2/11).
[55]
Wallach, D. 2002. A survey of peer-to-peer security issues. In Proceedings of the International Symposium on Software Security. M. Okada, B. Pierce, A. Scedrov, H. Tokuda, and A. Yonezawa Eds., Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 2609. Springer, Berlin, 253--258.
[56]
Wang, Q., Mittal, P., and Borisov, N. 2010. In search of an anonymous and secure lookup: Attacks on structured peer-to-peer anonymous communication systems. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS’10). A. D. Keromytis and V. Shmatikov Eds., ACM.
[57]
Wright, M., Adler, M., Levine, B. N., and Shields, C. 2002. An analysis of the degradation of anonymous protocols. In Proceedings of the Network and Distributed System Security Symposium. P. van Oorschot and V. Gligor Eds., The Internet Society, Reston, VA, 39--50.
[58]
Wright, M., Adler, M., Levine, B. N., and Shields, C. 2003. Defending anonymous communication against passive logging attacks. In Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. 28--41.
[59]
Wright, M., Adler, M., Levine, B. N., and Shields, C. 2004. The predecessor attack: An analysis of a threat to anonymous communications systems. ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur. 4, 7, 489--522.
[60]
Wright, R. and di Vimercati, S. D. C., Eds. 2006. In Proceedings of the The 13th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security. ACM, New York, NY.
[61]
Wright, R. and Syverson, P., Eds. 2007. In Proceedings of the 14th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security. ACM, New York, NY.
[62]
Zetter, K. 2010. Wikileaks and Tor. http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/06/wikileaks-documents/.

Cited By

View all

Recommendations

Comments

Information & Contributors

Information

Published In

cover image ACM Transactions on Information and System Security
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security  Volume 15, Issue 1
Special Issue on Computer and Communications Security
March 2012
126 pages
ISSN:1094-9224
EISSN:1557-7406
DOI:10.1145/2133375
Issue’s Table of Contents
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

Publisher

Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 01 March 2012
Accepted: 01 June 2011
Revised: 01 February 2011
Received: 01 March 2009
Published in TISSEC Volume 15, Issue 1

Permissions

Request permissions for this article.

Check for updates

Author Tags

  1. Anonymity
  2. attacks
  3. information leaks
  4. peer-to-peer

Qualifiers

  • Research-article
  • Research
  • Refereed

Funding Sources

Contributors

Other Metrics

Bibliometrics & Citations

Bibliometrics

Article Metrics

  • Downloads (Last 12 months)17
  • Downloads (Last 6 weeks)1
Reflects downloads up to 14 Sep 2024

Other Metrics

Citations

Cited By

View all

View Options

Get Access

Login options

Full Access

View options

PDF

View or Download as a PDF file.

PDF

eReader

View online with eReader.

eReader

Media

Figures

Other

Tables

Share

Share

Share this Publication link

Share on social media