Andreas Kallergis
Andreas Kallergis is Professor of Law at the University of La Réunion since January 2023 and a Junior member of the Institut universitaire de France (2024).
His work focuses on public law (domestic, international and comparative tax law, public finance, administrative law, constitutional law and theory of the State, general international law and international investment law).
A full professor since 2022, he holds a PhD in public law (2016, Pantheon-Sorbonne University, mention at the Prix Mitchell B. Carroll of the International Fiscal Association, International Law Association award (French branch), Société française des finances publiques thesis award, Special award of the French Court des comptes, Dalloz publisher Nouvelle bibliothèque de thèses award, Lévy-Ullmann award of the Chancellerie des Universités de Paris, Sorbonne-Fiscalité award, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne award) and a Tax Law LLM (Pantheon-Sorbonne).
Andreas Kallergis teaches general tax law, tax litigation, international tax law, public finance law, international law, constitutional law, law of public property and administrative institutions.
After being a rapporteur for the "BiHaCoTax" research programme co-financed by the ANR in France and the DFG in Germany on the harmonisation of corporate taxation, rapporteur of the "International Tax Law" Study Group of the International Law Association, and a visiting researcher at the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance (Munich), he is currently leading a research project in the Institut universitaire de France on the topic " The citizen taxpayer. A comparative study on the link between individuals and States through the lens of tax".
His work focuses on public law (domestic, international and comparative tax law, public finance, administrative law, constitutional law and theory of the State, general international law and international investment law).
A full professor since 2022, he holds a PhD in public law (2016, Pantheon-Sorbonne University, mention at the Prix Mitchell B. Carroll of the International Fiscal Association, International Law Association award (French branch), Société française des finances publiques thesis award, Special award of the French Court des comptes, Dalloz publisher Nouvelle bibliothèque de thèses award, Lévy-Ullmann award of the Chancellerie des Universités de Paris, Sorbonne-Fiscalité award, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne award) and a Tax Law LLM (Pantheon-Sorbonne).
Andreas Kallergis teaches general tax law, tax litigation, international tax law, public finance law, international law, constitutional law, law of public property and administrative institutions.
After being a rapporteur for the "BiHaCoTax" research programme co-financed by the ANR in France and the DFG in Germany on the harmonisation of corporate taxation, rapporteur of the "International Tax Law" Study Group of the International Law Association, and a visiting researcher at the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance (Munich), he is currently leading a research project in the Institut universitaire de France on the topic " The citizen taxpayer. A comparative study on the link between individuals and States through the lens of tax".
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Books by Andreas Kallergis
Thèse sous la direction du Pr. Ludovic Ayrault soutenue publiquement le 14 décembre 2016 à l'Université Panthéon-Sorbonne. Mention: Très honorable avec félicitations, thèse proposée pour l’obtention d’un prix de thèse. Distinctions: Mention honorable au Prix Mitchell B. Carroll de l'International Fiscal Association 2017; Prix de la branche française de l'Association de droit international (International Law Association); Prix de la Société française des finances publiques 2017; Prix spécial de la Cour des comptes 2017; Prix de thèse Sorbonne-Fiscalité 2017; Prix de l'Université Panthéon-Sorbonne 2017; Prix Dalloz 2017 (Nouvelle bibliothèque de thèses 2018); Prix de thèse Lévy-Ullmann de la Chancellerie des Universités de Paris 2017
Résumé:
Pour identifier des limites internationales de la liberté de l’État en matière fiscale, il convient d’étudier non seulement sa compétence fiscale —envers qui il peut exercer le pouvoir fiscal — mais aussi son pouvoir fiscal — ce qu’il peut faire dans l’exercice de ce pouvoir. Ces éléments sont éclaircis à travers l’analyse de la pratique étatique et de la jurisprudence internationale. La compétence fiscale de l’État ne repose pas sur une habilitation par l’ordre juridique international, mais doit être appréhendée sous le prisme des deux faces de l’État : personne publique et sujet de droit international. D’une part, les États disposent d’un pouvoir fiscal originaire de leur constitution comme personnes publiques souveraines. D’une autre part, en tant que sujets de droit international, ils peuvent se reconnaître des droits et des obligations subjectifs, et donc aménager l’exercice de leurs pouvoirs fiscaux par la détermination des sphères de leurs compétences par la conclusion d’engagements interétatiques. En dehors de cette hypothèse, les critères de rattachement fiscal sont des représentations d’une relation entre l’État et le sujet ou l’objet de l’impôt selon l’appréciation de l’État normateur, et non pas des règles certaines de compétence internationale. La liberté de l’État de déterminer le contenu de son pouvoir fiscal est encadrée de manière rudimentaire par le droit international. Cet encadrement implique essentiellement l’inopposabilité des normes fiscales d’effet extraterritorial et l’interdiction de réalisation d’opérations matérielles en territoire étranger. Pour autant, parce qu’il est souverain, l’État peut consentir à des limitations de son pouvoir fiscal dans le cadre de la coopération ou l’intégration internationale, sans que le titre de son pouvoir ne soit contesté.
Jurisdiction to Tax
Ph.D. thesis (supervisor Prof. Dr. Ludovic Ayrault) defended on 14 December 2016, Sorbonne Law School. Grade: summa cum laude. Awards: Honourable mention at the 2017 Mitchell B. Carroll Prize of the International Fiscal Association; 2017 International Law Association Thesis Award (French branch); 2017 Award of the French Society of Public Finance; 2017 French Court of Auditors Special Award; 2017 Sorbonne Tax Thesis Award; 2017 Pantheon-Sorbonne University Thesis Award; Dalloz publisher Award 2017 (Nouvelle bibliothèque de thèses 2018); 2017 Lévy-Ullmann Prize of the Chancellerie des Universités de Paris.
Abstract
In order to determine the international limits of State freedom in tax matters, one should take into account not only the scope of the power to tax (i.e. the competence to tax), but also its content, in relation to the exercise of the power to tax. Therefore, jurisdiction to tax is a twofold concept: it entails a competence to tax — with regard to whom a State may exercise its power to tax — and a power to tax — what a State may do while exercising this power. Its analysis is based on State practice and international case law.
Competence to tax is not based on an empowerment by international law. Its analysis has to be guided by the idea that States have two facets: they are public persons and at the same time international law subjects. First, the creation of States as sovereign
public persons marks the origin of their jurisdiction to tax. Secondly, as international law subjects, States may recognize rights and assume obligations.
Thus, they can adjust the exercise of their power to tax by establishing their scope through double taxation conventions. In all other cases, tax nexus criteria do not constitute certain rules of jurisdiction, but merely depict the way States conceive their relationship with a tax subject or object. International law restrictions to the exercise of the power to tax are minor. Indeed, these restrictions mainly entail the unenforceability of tax rules with extraterritorial effect and the prohibition of material acts of enforcement on foreign territory. Therefore, as sovereign subjects, States are free to allow restrictions to their powers through international cooperation and integration. Such restrictions do not challenge the foundations of their power to tax.
Publications by Andreas Kallergis
Driven by a concern for economy or the efficiency of administrative activities, the use of private entities for the enforcement of tax law is multi-faceted. In the light of of its governing rules, this private third party involvement may present certain risks for the authorities, for private third parties or for taxpayers.
L'étude montre que la détermination du champ d’application territorial des conventions fiscales internationales est tributaire de considérations géographiques, politiques et temporelles de l’État contractant, qui conduisent à un alignement de l’étendue spatiale du système fiscal de l’État contractant au champ d’application territorial des conventions.
The study shows that the territorial scope of application of double taxation treaties is determined by geographical, political and temporal considerations of the contracting State, which lead to an alignment of the spatial scope of the tax system of the contracting State with the territorial scope of application of the treaties.
[EN: In a ruling issued on 13 April 2023 and set against the backdrop of the complex Commisimpex litigation saga, the Cour de cassation held that a foreign State's general waiver of immunity from enforcement allows any enforcement measure to be taken against a debtor of that State located in France, including the seizure of the foreign State's tax claims in the hands of that debtor. While this solution is very favourable to the creditors of foreign States whose taxpayers are established in France, it can also be a source of difficulties for the foreign establishments of French companies. The article shows the weakness of the reasoning and the incompleteness of the method used by the French Supreme Civil Court in civil enforcement proceedings against foreign States and their assets.]
[english version] Effective minimum global taxation under the test of international tax treaty law: The article is based on an analysis of the OECD/G20 "Pillar Two" blueprint and model rules under the prism of international tax treaties. It shows that the project promoting an effective global taxation of multinational companies is based on a new conception of tax base allocation between States. While the OECD maintains that the project is compatible with tax treaties to avoid the preparation of a new multilateral treaty, the study shows that this new design is threefold incompatible with tax treaties: “Pillar Two” is incompatible with the treaty principles of allocation of the tax base, the scope of treaty-based distributive rules as well as of the non-discrimination clause.
En premier lieu, l’incidence de la liste est beaucoup plus importante que l’opprobre jeté sur un État tiers pour son absence de mise en œuvre des standards de « bonne gouvernance fiscale ». En tant que technique de droit souple, la liste permet à l’Union d’animer sa stratégie fiscale extérieure tout en suggérant des mesures défensives fiscales et non fiscales. Justifiée par la compétence interne de l’Union en matière de réglementation concernant la circulation des capitaux entre l’Union et les États tiers, elle présage une compétence externe exclusive de l’Union en la matière.
En second lieu, la liste étant le fruit d’un acte non décisoire, ses actualisations sont épargnées du recours en annulation. Toutefois, il n’est pas exclu d’envisager un renvoi en interprétation ou en appréciation de validité de cet acte ou de la législation apparentée qu’il inspire. Enfin, en tant que fondement de mesures défensives nationales, la liste peut être à l’origine d’un contrôle de compatibilité de ces mesures par rapport au droit européen et au droit international économique.
[EN] Inspired by French and EU case law on challenging soft law, this study aims to answer the following question: if the effects of inclusion in the EU list of non-cooperative tax jurisdictions can be important both for third countries and for those who conduct financial flows to or from these countries, is it possible to challenge this listing or its effects? In the first place, the impact of the list is far more important than the stigma attached to a third country for its failure to implement "good tax governance" standards. As a soft law technique, the list allows the EU to drive its external tax strategy while suggesting defensive tax and non-tax measures. Justified by the EU's internal competence to regulate the movement of capital between the EU and third countries, it paves the way for an exclusive external competence of the EU in this area. Secondly, as the list is the result of a non-decision-making act, its updates are not subject to annulment. However, it is possible to consider a preliminary reference for interpretation or assessment of the validity of this act or of the related law on which it is based. Finally, as a basis for national defensive measures, the list may be the origin of a review of the compatibility of these measures with European and international economic law.
Elle montre que la définition du « territoire » dans les traités bilatéraux d’investissement désigne uniquement le champ d’application de ces traités et ne se confond pas avec celle de l’espace qui sert de support de la souveraineté étatique. Une diversité de situations territoriales dans lesquelles ces traités sont susceptibles de produire des effets peut alors être constatée.
Ensuite, elle suggère que l’inapplication d’un tel traité par rapport à des zones contestées, sans préjuger ou promouvoir la résolution du différend territorial sous-jacent, est sans incidence sur l’obligation de non-reconnaissance des situations internationalement illégales.
Enfin, elle montre que la compétence des tribunaux arbitraux saisis des différends relatifs à des investissements dans ces zones ne peut être mise en échec ni par l’objection du tiers indispensable à l’instance ni par la défaillance de la partie défenderesse à l’instance.
Infra-State tax autonomy can be linked to the theory of political forms. The fact that a political form grants or denies such autonomy within its territory can be explained by specific political aims, but does not allow qualifying the nature of that political form.
Analysis of the creation of rules applying to cross-border tax situations shows an unchanging identity of rule-makers and a fluctuation of aims born by these rules.
[The European Union has no tax autonomy: in fact, the Union is a non sovereign political form. As such, it has a limited power to create taxes and to benefit from tax revenue. Thus, it is necessary to define the concept of EU taxes in order to appreciate the form that EU taxes could take.]
[L'article analyse la convention fiscale entre Andorre et la France de 2013, incluant une clause visant à lutter contre les effets de l'"exil fiscal", liée à une imposition fondée sur la nationalité]
Presentations by Andreas Kallergis
Thèse sous la direction du Pr. Ludovic Ayrault soutenue publiquement le 14 décembre 2016 à l'Université Panthéon-Sorbonne. Mention: Très honorable avec félicitations, thèse proposée pour l’obtention d’un prix de thèse. Distinctions: Mention honorable au Prix Mitchell B. Carroll de l'International Fiscal Association 2017; Prix de la branche française de l'Association de droit international (International Law Association); Prix de la Société française des finances publiques 2017; Prix spécial de la Cour des comptes 2017; Prix de thèse Sorbonne-Fiscalité 2017; Prix de l'Université Panthéon-Sorbonne 2017; Prix Dalloz 2017 (Nouvelle bibliothèque de thèses 2018); Prix de thèse Lévy-Ullmann de la Chancellerie des Universités de Paris 2017
Résumé:
Pour identifier des limites internationales de la liberté de l’État en matière fiscale, il convient d’étudier non seulement sa compétence fiscale —envers qui il peut exercer le pouvoir fiscal — mais aussi son pouvoir fiscal — ce qu’il peut faire dans l’exercice de ce pouvoir. Ces éléments sont éclaircis à travers l’analyse de la pratique étatique et de la jurisprudence internationale. La compétence fiscale de l’État ne repose pas sur une habilitation par l’ordre juridique international, mais doit être appréhendée sous le prisme des deux faces de l’État : personne publique et sujet de droit international. D’une part, les États disposent d’un pouvoir fiscal originaire de leur constitution comme personnes publiques souveraines. D’une autre part, en tant que sujets de droit international, ils peuvent se reconnaître des droits et des obligations subjectifs, et donc aménager l’exercice de leurs pouvoirs fiscaux par la détermination des sphères de leurs compétences par la conclusion d’engagements interétatiques. En dehors de cette hypothèse, les critères de rattachement fiscal sont des représentations d’une relation entre l’État et le sujet ou l’objet de l’impôt selon l’appréciation de l’État normateur, et non pas des règles certaines de compétence internationale. La liberté de l’État de déterminer le contenu de son pouvoir fiscal est encadrée de manière rudimentaire par le droit international. Cet encadrement implique essentiellement l’inopposabilité des normes fiscales d’effet extraterritorial et l’interdiction de réalisation d’opérations matérielles en territoire étranger. Pour autant, parce qu’il est souverain, l’État peut consentir à des limitations de son pouvoir fiscal dans le cadre de la coopération ou l’intégration internationale, sans que le titre de son pouvoir ne soit contesté.
Jurisdiction to Tax
Ph.D. thesis (supervisor Prof. Dr. Ludovic Ayrault) defended on 14 December 2016, Sorbonne Law School. Grade: summa cum laude. Awards: Honourable mention at the 2017 Mitchell B. Carroll Prize of the International Fiscal Association; 2017 International Law Association Thesis Award (French branch); 2017 Award of the French Society of Public Finance; 2017 French Court of Auditors Special Award; 2017 Sorbonne Tax Thesis Award; 2017 Pantheon-Sorbonne University Thesis Award; Dalloz publisher Award 2017 (Nouvelle bibliothèque de thèses 2018); 2017 Lévy-Ullmann Prize of the Chancellerie des Universités de Paris.
Abstract
In order to determine the international limits of State freedom in tax matters, one should take into account not only the scope of the power to tax (i.e. the competence to tax), but also its content, in relation to the exercise of the power to tax. Therefore, jurisdiction to tax is a twofold concept: it entails a competence to tax — with regard to whom a State may exercise its power to tax — and a power to tax — what a State may do while exercising this power. Its analysis is based on State practice and international case law.
Competence to tax is not based on an empowerment by international law. Its analysis has to be guided by the idea that States have two facets: they are public persons and at the same time international law subjects. First, the creation of States as sovereign
public persons marks the origin of their jurisdiction to tax. Secondly, as international law subjects, States may recognize rights and assume obligations.
Thus, they can adjust the exercise of their power to tax by establishing their scope through double taxation conventions. In all other cases, tax nexus criteria do not constitute certain rules of jurisdiction, but merely depict the way States conceive their relationship with a tax subject or object. International law restrictions to the exercise of the power to tax are minor. Indeed, these restrictions mainly entail the unenforceability of tax rules with extraterritorial effect and the prohibition of material acts of enforcement on foreign territory. Therefore, as sovereign subjects, States are free to allow restrictions to their powers through international cooperation and integration. Such restrictions do not challenge the foundations of their power to tax.
Driven by a concern for economy or the efficiency of administrative activities, the use of private entities for the enforcement of tax law is multi-faceted. In the light of of its governing rules, this private third party involvement may present certain risks for the authorities, for private third parties or for taxpayers.
L'étude montre que la détermination du champ d’application territorial des conventions fiscales internationales est tributaire de considérations géographiques, politiques et temporelles de l’État contractant, qui conduisent à un alignement de l’étendue spatiale du système fiscal de l’État contractant au champ d’application territorial des conventions.
The study shows that the territorial scope of application of double taxation treaties is determined by geographical, political and temporal considerations of the contracting State, which lead to an alignment of the spatial scope of the tax system of the contracting State with the territorial scope of application of the treaties.
[EN: In a ruling issued on 13 April 2023 and set against the backdrop of the complex Commisimpex litigation saga, the Cour de cassation held that a foreign State's general waiver of immunity from enforcement allows any enforcement measure to be taken against a debtor of that State located in France, including the seizure of the foreign State's tax claims in the hands of that debtor. While this solution is very favourable to the creditors of foreign States whose taxpayers are established in France, it can also be a source of difficulties for the foreign establishments of French companies. The article shows the weakness of the reasoning and the incompleteness of the method used by the French Supreme Civil Court in civil enforcement proceedings against foreign States and their assets.]
[english version] Effective minimum global taxation under the test of international tax treaty law: The article is based on an analysis of the OECD/G20 "Pillar Two" blueprint and model rules under the prism of international tax treaties. It shows that the project promoting an effective global taxation of multinational companies is based on a new conception of tax base allocation between States. While the OECD maintains that the project is compatible with tax treaties to avoid the preparation of a new multilateral treaty, the study shows that this new design is threefold incompatible with tax treaties: “Pillar Two” is incompatible with the treaty principles of allocation of the tax base, the scope of treaty-based distributive rules as well as of the non-discrimination clause.
En premier lieu, l’incidence de la liste est beaucoup plus importante que l’opprobre jeté sur un État tiers pour son absence de mise en œuvre des standards de « bonne gouvernance fiscale ». En tant que technique de droit souple, la liste permet à l’Union d’animer sa stratégie fiscale extérieure tout en suggérant des mesures défensives fiscales et non fiscales. Justifiée par la compétence interne de l’Union en matière de réglementation concernant la circulation des capitaux entre l’Union et les États tiers, elle présage une compétence externe exclusive de l’Union en la matière.
En second lieu, la liste étant le fruit d’un acte non décisoire, ses actualisations sont épargnées du recours en annulation. Toutefois, il n’est pas exclu d’envisager un renvoi en interprétation ou en appréciation de validité de cet acte ou de la législation apparentée qu’il inspire. Enfin, en tant que fondement de mesures défensives nationales, la liste peut être à l’origine d’un contrôle de compatibilité de ces mesures par rapport au droit européen et au droit international économique.
[EN] Inspired by French and EU case law on challenging soft law, this study aims to answer the following question: if the effects of inclusion in the EU list of non-cooperative tax jurisdictions can be important both for third countries and for those who conduct financial flows to or from these countries, is it possible to challenge this listing or its effects? In the first place, the impact of the list is far more important than the stigma attached to a third country for its failure to implement "good tax governance" standards. As a soft law technique, the list allows the EU to drive its external tax strategy while suggesting defensive tax and non-tax measures. Justified by the EU's internal competence to regulate the movement of capital between the EU and third countries, it paves the way for an exclusive external competence of the EU in this area. Secondly, as the list is the result of a non-decision-making act, its updates are not subject to annulment. However, it is possible to consider a preliminary reference for interpretation or assessment of the validity of this act or of the related law on which it is based. Finally, as a basis for national defensive measures, the list may be the origin of a review of the compatibility of these measures with European and international economic law.
Elle montre que la définition du « territoire » dans les traités bilatéraux d’investissement désigne uniquement le champ d’application de ces traités et ne se confond pas avec celle de l’espace qui sert de support de la souveraineté étatique. Une diversité de situations territoriales dans lesquelles ces traités sont susceptibles de produire des effets peut alors être constatée.
Ensuite, elle suggère que l’inapplication d’un tel traité par rapport à des zones contestées, sans préjuger ou promouvoir la résolution du différend territorial sous-jacent, est sans incidence sur l’obligation de non-reconnaissance des situations internationalement illégales.
Enfin, elle montre que la compétence des tribunaux arbitraux saisis des différends relatifs à des investissements dans ces zones ne peut être mise en échec ni par l’objection du tiers indispensable à l’instance ni par la défaillance de la partie défenderesse à l’instance.
Infra-State tax autonomy can be linked to the theory of political forms. The fact that a political form grants or denies such autonomy within its territory can be explained by specific political aims, but does not allow qualifying the nature of that political form.
Analysis of the creation of rules applying to cross-border tax situations shows an unchanging identity of rule-makers and a fluctuation of aims born by these rules.
[The European Union has no tax autonomy: in fact, the Union is a non sovereign political form. As such, it has a limited power to create taxes and to benefit from tax revenue. Thus, it is necessary to define the concept of EU taxes in order to appreciate the form that EU taxes could take.]
[L'article analyse la convention fiscale entre Andorre et la France de 2013, incluant une clause visant à lutter contre les effets de l'"exil fiscal", liée à une imposition fondée sur la nationalité]