The article reconstructs and critically assesses some of the most recurring arguments in legal an... more The article reconstructs and critically assesses some of the most recurring arguments in legal and political philosophy to the effect that social rights are different in structure from, and necessarily incompatible with, the more familiar civil and political liberties. The author shows that social rights and civil and political liberties have in common more than meets the eye, and so they are different in degree rather than in kind. Moreover, while these rights can certainly happen to conflict one against the other in particular instances, they prove not only to be compatible but even mutually reinforcing as far as their respective axiological foundations are concerned.
The paper assesses the widespread use of the test of proportionality in fundamental rights adjudi... more The paper assesses the widespread use of the test of proportionality in fundamental rights adjudication. While constitutional and human rights courts all over the world appear to be consistently engaged in deploying the test of proportionality in order to assess the permissibility of a given rights limitation, this approach is under severe criticism insofar as it is considered an attack to the very idea of fundamental rights. The paper will discuss this criticism of the use of proportionality, and will provide a defense of its use by courts in light of some basic features of the contemporary discourse of fundamental rights.
Questo intervento è la mia replica al dibattito sul mio libro Teoria analitica del diritto I. La ... more Questo intervento è la mia replica al dibattito sul mio libro Teoria analitica del diritto I. La norma giuridica, al quale hanno partecipato Gaetano Carlizzi, Vincenzo Omaggio, e Vito Velluzzi. Colgo l’occasione di questo intervento, e delle perspicue osservazioni emerse nel dibattito, per chiarire un paio di punti specifici del mio libro, e per ritornare sul progetto complessivo che lo anima. This is my rejoinder to the debate with Gaetano Carlizzi, Vincenzo Omaggio, and Vito Velluzzi on my book Teoria analitica del diritto I. La norma giuridica. I gladly use this opportunity, and the insightful remarks provided by my commentators, to clarify a couple of points that I already made in my book, and to restate the general jurisprudential project thereof.
The essay argues that the rule of recognition, as it has been conceived by H. L. a. Hart, is eith... more The essay argues that the rule of recognition, as it has been conceived by H. L. a. Hart, is either a redundant, and hence mostly useless, concept, or it is a concept with limited explanatory potential in either case, at best a concept whose scope is much narrower, in contemporary legal systems, than the one envisaged by Hart. it will also be argued that the rule of recognition, if subject to a possible (and plausible) reformulation, can nevertheless play a significant, non-redundant role. This, however, will require to assign the rule of recognition a rather different job than the one proposed by Hart, as well as by most post-Hartian positivist literature, namely it will require to locate the rule of recognition not in the theory of the legal system, but in the theory of legal reasoning. * professore di Filosofia del diritto, università di palermo. email: [email protected]. indirizzo: diGispo, sezione diritto e società, università di palermo piazza Bologni 8, 90134, palermo. ri...
The article reconstructs and critically assesses some of the most recurring arguments in legal an... more The article reconstructs and critically assesses some of the most recurring arguments in legal and political philosophy to the effect that social rights are different in structure from, and necessarily incompatible with, the more familiar civil and political liberties. The author shows that social rights and civil and political liberties have in common more than meets the eye, and so they are different in degree rather than in kind. Moreover, while these rights can certainly happen to conflict one against the other in particular instances, they prove not only to be compatible but even mutually reinforcing as far as their respective axiological foundations are concerned.
The paper assesses the widespread use of the test of proportionality in fundamental rights adjudi... more The paper assesses the widespread use of the test of proportionality in fundamental rights adjudication. While constitutional and human rights courts all over the world appear to be consistently engaged in deploying the test of proportionality in order to assess the permissibility of a given rights limitation, this approach is under severe criticism insofar as it is considered an attack to the very idea of fundamental rights. The paper will discuss this criticism of the use of proportionality, and will provide a defense of its use by courts in light of some basic features of the contemporary discourse of fundamental rights.
Questo intervento è la mia replica al dibattito sul mio libro Teoria analitica del diritto I. La ... more Questo intervento è la mia replica al dibattito sul mio libro Teoria analitica del diritto I. La norma giuridica, al quale hanno partecipato Gaetano Carlizzi, Vincenzo Omaggio, e Vito Velluzzi. Colgo l’occasione di questo intervento, e delle perspicue osservazioni emerse nel dibattito, per chiarire un paio di punti specifici del mio libro, e per ritornare sul progetto complessivo che lo anima. This is my rejoinder to the debate with Gaetano Carlizzi, Vincenzo Omaggio, and Vito Velluzzi on my book Teoria analitica del diritto I. La norma giuridica. I gladly use this opportunity, and the insightful remarks provided by my commentators, to clarify a couple of points that I already made in my book, and to restate the general jurisprudential project thereof.
The essay argues that the rule of recognition, as it has been conceived by H. L. a. Hart, is eith... more The essay argues that the rule of recognition, as it has been conceived by H. L. a. Hart, is either a redundant, and hence mostly useless, concept, or it is a concept with limited explanatory potential in either case, at best a concept whose scope is much narrower, in contemporary legal systems, than the one envisaged by Hart. it will also be argued that the rule of recognition, if subject to a possible (and plausible) reformulation, can nevertheless play a significant, non-redundant role. This, however, will require to assign the rule of recognition a rather different job than the one proposed by Hart, as well as by most post-Hartian positivist literature, namely it will require to locate the rule of recognition not in the theory of the legal system, but in the theory of legal reasoning. * professore di Filosofia del diritto, università di palermo. email: [email protected]. indirizzo: diGispo, sezione diritto e società, università di palermo piazza Bologni 8, 90134, palermo. ri...
El objeto de este breve texto es poner de relieve alguna duda acerca de un específico, aunque no ... more El objeto de este breve texto es poner de relieve alguna duda acerca de un específico, aunque no marginal, aspecto de la compleja teoría de los derechos fundamentales construida por Ferrajoli: el problema del conflicto entre derechos fundamentales. En primer lugar, ofreceré un sumario bastante genérico sobre la presencia (por lo menos aparente, o potencial) de conflictos entre derechos fundamentales en el panorama constitucional contemporáneo. De ahí pasaré a ilustrar la estrategia elaborada por L. Ferrajoli para argumentar la tesis de la ausencia o, al menos, la extremadamente reducida y marginal presencia de los conflictos entre derechos fundamentales. Por último, mostraré algunas posibles críticas a la estrategia de Ferrajoli.
En el ensayo Constitucionalismo principialista y constitucionalismo garantista, Luigi Ferrajoli o... more En el ensayo Constitucionalismo principialista y constitucionalismo garantista, Luigi Ferrajoli ofrece una oportuna clarificación teórica y conceptual sobre el así llamado neoconstitucionalismo. Por mi parte, en esta contribución intentaré desarrollar algunas observaciones sobre tres puntos acerca de los cuales me encuentro en relativo desacuerdo con el análisis de Ferrajoli: el tratamiento de la distinción entre reglas y principios, la interpretación de la práctica de la ponderación, y el problema de la separación entre Derecho y moral. Además, ofreceré un panorama de los significados del (neo)constitucionalismo, y, respecto a tal panorama, consideraré el modo en el cual Ferrajoli sitúa su propia posición teórica.
Artosi, A., Baghramian, M., Barberis, M., Bianchi, C., Coliva, A., Dell'Utri, M., et al. (20... more Artosi, A., Baghramian, M., Barberis, M., Bianchi, C., Coliva, A., Dell'Utri, M., et al. (2010). Il Relativismo: temi e prospettive (PG Maniaci Giorgio, a cura di). Roma : Aracne. ... Artosi, A; Baghramian, M; Barberis, M; Bianchi, C; Coliva, A; Dell'Utri, M; Frega, R; Lecaldano, E; O' ...
Che cosa è un diritto indisponibile? E può un diritto essere indisponibile? A queste domande il s... more Che cosa è un diritto indisponibile? E può un diritto essere indisponibile? A queste domande il saggio cerca di rispondere impiegando un apparato concettuale di tipo hohfeldiano, in primo luogo; e in secondo luogo, utilizzando la presunta categoria dei diritti indisponibili come banco di prova per la teoria della volontà e la teoria dell'interesse.
What is an inalienable right? Can a right be inalienable? This article seeks the answers to these questions, in the first place, by employing a hohfeldian-type conceptual apparatus. Secondly, it uses the supposed category of inalienable rights as a test-case for the will theory and the interest theory of rights.
Avviso di selezione pubblica per l'ammissione ai corsi di dottorato di ricerca (XXXVII ciclo form... more Avviso di selezione pubblica per l'ammissione ai corsi di dottorato di ricerca (XXXVII ciclo formativo-A.A.
Avviso di selezione pubblica per l'ammissione ai corsi di dottorato di ricerca (XXXVI ciclo forma... more Avviso di selezione pubblica per l'ammissione ai corsi di dottorato di ricerca (XXXVI ciclo formativo-A.A. 2020/2021)
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What is an inalienable right? Can a right be inalienable? This article seeks the answers to these questions, in the first place, by employing a hohfeldian-type conceptual apparatus. Secondly, it uses the supposed category of inalienable rights as a test-case for the will theory and the interest theory of rights.