Legal knowledge based systems JURIX 94: The Foundation for Legal Knowledge Systems, 1994
This article marks the transition in my research from technical work on the logic of reasoning wi... more This article marks the transition in my research from technical work on the logic of reasoning with rules to the philosophical underpinning of it. It anticipates (much) later research in which a close connection is made between the validity of arguments and the psychology and sociology of argumentation. The article distinguishes between the container metaphor of reasoning which underlies the traditional semantic notion of logical validity and the colliding forces metaphor which treats arguments and reasons as a kind of forces which pull the audience towards accepting a conclusion. It argues that the colliding forces metaphor is more suitable for reasoning with rules, (amongst others) because reasoning with rules is defeasible.
Mark Van Hoecke, Methodologies of Legal Research. , 2011
Topic: Legal Method
Final version published in: Mark Van Hoecke, Methodologies of Legal Research.... more Topic: Legal Method Final version published in: Mark Van Hoecke, Methodologies of Legal Research. Which kind of method for what kind of discipline? Hart Publishing 2011, pp. 19-44. -------------------------------------------- This paper contains an argument to the effect that the proper method for legal science depends on what one takes to be the nature of science, the nature of the law and the kind of questions that are addressed in legal science. It starts from three assumptions, namely that: a. science is the collaborative pursuit of knowledge, b. the law consists of those norms which ought to be enforced by collective means; c. the proper standard to determine what ought to be enforced is what maximises the long term happiness of all sentient beings (the H-standard). On the basis of these assumptions the following positions are argued: 1. Legal science, in the sense of a description of the law, is not impossible for the reason that it is a normative science. 2. In abstract the method of all sciences, including legal science, is to create a coherent set of positions that encompasses ‘everything’, and therefore also beliefs about the law. 3. The proper method for a normative legal science consists primarily of the methods of sociology, psychology and economics, because the ultimate question to be answered is the collective enforcement of which norms satisfies the H-standard. The more traditional hermeneutic methods only play a role to the extent that they establish positive law that contributes to happiness by providing legal certainty. (See also ‘The limited role of hermeneutics in law’)
The aim of this article is to argue that the nature of law influences the logic of legal reasonin... more The aim of this article is to argue that the nature of law influences the logic of legal reasoning and to give an impression of how this ‘works’. The argument consists of three steps. In the first step it is shown how classical logic is based on an underlying view of the world. This view has no place for rules and as a result, classical logic wrestles with rules and their role in (legal) reasoning. In the second step, an alternative view of the world is presented. In this view, a central place is taken by social reality and by the role of rules in it. In the third step, it is shown how traditional forms of legal reasoning are better suited than classical logic to deal with legal rules and that these traditional forms better fit the ‘social’ image of law that was presented in the second step.
Historically, there has been a close connection between law and reason. At the same time, law has... more Historically, there has been a close connection between law and reason. At the same time, law has a firm foundation in what people do, in social practices. A heavily debated question is what the law is if our social practices appear to be unreasonable. Legal positivists have argued that our social practices are decisive for what the law is. If these practices are unreasonable, we have unreasonable or bad law. Non-positivists, including adherents of natural law, have claimed that unjust (unreasonable) law is not law at all, or at best a defective kind of law. This contribution aims to show how the opposition between positivists and non-positivists can be explained from a difference in views about social reality, which in its turn depends on different views of how our minds shape social reality. The sections 2 and 3 focus on the question of how law can have an independent existence, independent of what is rational, while at the same time legal reasoning seems to assign an important role to reason. The second part, sections 4 and 5, argues for an answer to this question. This answer is that law is a part of social reality that consists of what will be called constructivist facts and that this characteristic explains the ambiguous nature of law. To justify this answer, it is explained how social reality and constructivist facts exist.
There are many issues around rules and related concepts. By developing a theory about the existen... more There are many issues around rules and related concepts. By developing a theory about the existence of social reality, this article aims to address these issues by discussing: - the relation between rules and norms, - the difference between deontic normativity and the normativity of reason, - the (im)possibility of prescriptive rules, - two kinds of constitutive rules, and - the function of rules as constraints on possible worlds.
The notion of objectivity derives its sense from the view that there is a reality that does not d... more The notion of objectivity derives its sense from the view that there is a reality that does not depend on beliefs or opinions, or on any operation of the mind, and that ideally our knowledge is a faithful reflection of parts of this reality. This view supports two notions of objectivity. One notion is the objectivity of a mind-independent world; the other notion is the objectivity of a faithful representation of this world. In connection to law, the first notion concerns the objectivity of law, while the second notion concerns the objectivity about law. The objectivity about law seems to depend on the objectivity of law, because if the law itself is not objective, it is doubtful whether objectivity about law is at all possible. This article investigates whether, and to what extent, the distinction between objectivity about law and objectivity of law makes sense
1 A FIRST IMPRESSION Neil MacCormick has, in the course of his rich academic career, written on m... more 1 A FIRST IMPRESSION Neil MacCormick has, in the course of his rich academic career, written on many central issues of both legal philosophy and jurisprudence. From the point of view of this paper, his work on the institutional theory of law has been crucial. In this paper I will focus on a phenomenon which is, in my opinion, best elucidated by means of this institutional theory of law, namely the phenomenon of legal transactions. The notion of a legal transaction (legal act, act-in-the-law, Rechtsgeschäft, acte juridique) does not play an important role in the common law tradition, but in the civil law tradition of the European continent it is one of the basic legal notions. Legal transactions are the means by which legal subjects can change the legal positions of themselves or other persons intentionally. Examples from private law are contracts, terminations of contracts, last wills, transfers of rights, and the creation of rights in rem such as usufruct and mortgage. Examples fro...
International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue internationale de Sémiotique juridique
This article describes how the facts in social reality take an intermediate position between obje... more This article describes how the facts in social reality take an intermediate position between objective facts and purely subjective ‘facts’. In turn, these social facts can be subdivided into constructivist and non-constructivist facts. The defining difference is that non-constructivist facts are completely determined by an approximate consensus between the members of a social group, while constructivist facts are founded in such a consensus but can nevertheless be questioned. Ought fact are such constructivist facts. Because they are founded in social reality, a naturalistic theory of ought facts is attractive. Because constructivist facts are always open to questioning, we can explain why the facts in social reality may found ought facts but are nevertheless not the final word about them.
In recent years, impressive progress has been made in the development of logical tools for the mo... more In recent years, impressive progress has been made in the development of logical tools for the modeling of legal argument. The focus has been primarily on the technical development of these tools, and only in the second place on their practical adequacy for modeling legal argument.
The question is addressed whether it makes sense to speak of a logic of law. It is shown that wha... more The question is addressed whether it makes sense to speak of a logic of law. It is shown that what counts as valid inference depends to a large extent on context-dependent choices. This suggests that our question has a simple answer, namely that a logic of law can exist. After noticing that one logic can serve as the background of another, it is explicated that a more subtle answer can be given. On the one hand a logic of law can exist, and on the other hand it can be possible to reduce such a logic to a set of legal premises in a more abstract logic. It is posited how a ‘contextual logic’ approach and an ‘abstract logic’ approach can lead to different priorities in the formalization of legal reasoning.
There are two competing views on what makes propositions of law true. The one, legal realism, tak... more There are two competing views on what makes propositions of law true. The one, legal realism, takes it that propositions of law are true because they reflect an independently existing reality of legal facts. Thes e fac ts wo u ld be gen erat ed by l egal r ul es whi ch wo u ld o pera te autonomously, without need for human intervention. The institutional theory of law illustrates this view. On this view it is the function of legal arguments to reconstruct the results of the autonomous rule application. T h e o t h e r v i e w i s l e g a l c o n s t r u c t i v i s m , a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h propositions of law are true because they are the conclusion of the best (possible) legal argument. On this view the function of legal argumentation is constitutive: argumentation determines the contents of the law. This paper argues that legal realism is not very plausible because it is based on metaphysical assumptions which cannot be verified or falsified. Legal constructivism would ...
This paper argues for a proper position for legal logic in between a general theory of legal reas... more This paper argues for a proper position for legal logic in between a general theory of legal reasoning and a general theory of valid reasoning. In discussion with McCarty it argues that legal logic should not be seen as a general theory of legal rea- soning, but rather as a theory of what counts as valid reasoning in the legal field. In discussion with earlier work by Verheij and the author himself, and of Prakken and Sartor, the paper argues that legal logic should employ a conceptual framework that is as close to that of the legal domain as possible. A simpler logic, how attractive as it might seem at first sight, has the disadvantage that it leads to problematic formaliza- tions of the domain theory and to marginalization of the logic as means to evaluate the validity of informal arguments.
Legal knowledge based systems JURIX 94: The Foundation for Legal Knowledge Systems, 1994
This article marks the transition in my research from technical work on the logic of reasoning wi... more This article marks the transition in my research from technical work on the logic of reasoning with rules to the philosophical underpinning of it. It anticipates (much) later research in which a close connection is made between the validity of arguments and the psychology and sociology of argumentation. The article distinguishes between the container metaphor of reasoning which underlies the traditional semantic notion of logical validity and the colliding forces metaphor which treats arguments and reasons as a kind of forces which pull the audience towards accepting a conclusion. It argues that the colliding forces metaphor is more suitable for reasoning with rules, (amongst others) because reasoning with rules is defeasible.
Mark Van Hoecke, Methodologies of Legal Research. , 2011
Topic: Legal Method
Final version published in: Mark Van Hoecke, Methodologies of Legal Research.... more Topic: Legal Method Final version published in: Mark Van Hoecke, Methodologies of Legal Research. Which kind of method for what kind of discipline? Hart Publishing 2011, pp. 19-44. -------------------------------------------- This paper contains an argument to the effect that the proper method for legal science depends on what one takes to be the nature of science, the nature of the law and the kind of questions that are addressed in legal science. It starts from three assumptions, namely that: a. science is the collaborative pursuit of knowledge, b. the law consists of those norms which ought to be enforced by collective means; c. the proper standard to determine what ought to be enforced is what maximises the long term happiness of all sentient beings (the H-standard). On the basis of these assumptions the following positions are argued: 1. Legal science, in the sense of a description of the law, is not impossible for the reason that it is a normative science. 2. In abstract the method of all sciences, including legal science, is to create a coherent set of positions that encompasses ‘everything’, and therefore also beliefs about the law. 3. The proper method for a normative legal science consists primarily of the methods of sociology, psychology and economics, because the ultimate question to be answered is the collective enforcement of which norms satisfies the H-standard. The more traditional hermeneutic methods only play a role to the extent that they establish positive law that contributes to happiness by providing legal certainty. (See also ‘The limited role of hermeneutics in law’)
The aim of this article is to argue that the nature of law influences the logic of legal reasonin... more The aim of this article is to argue that the nature of law influences the logic of legal reasoning and to give an impression of how this ‘works’. The argument consists of three steps. In the first step it is shown how classical logic is based on an underlying view of the world. This view has no place for rules and as a result, classical logic wrestles with rules and their role in (legal) reasoning. In the second step, an alternative view of the world is presented. In this view, a central place is taken by social reality and by the role of rules in it. In the third step, it is shown how traditional forms of legal reasoning are better suited than classical logic to deal with legal rules and that these traditional forms better fit the ‘social’ image of law that was presented in the second step.
Historically, there has been a close connection between law and reason. At the same time, law has... more Historically, there has been a close connection between law and reason. At the same time, law has a firm foundation in what people do, in social practices. A heavily debated question is what the law is if our social practices appear to be unreasonable. Legal positivists have argued that our social practices are decisive for what the law is. If these practices are unreasonable, we have unreasonable or bad law. Non-positivists, including adherents of natural law, have claimed that unjust (unreasonable) law is not law at all, or at best a defective kind of law. This contribution aims to show how the opposition between positivists and non-positivists can be explained from a difference in views about social reality, which in its turn depends on different views of how our minds shape social reality. The sections 2 and 3 focus on the question of how law can have an independent existence, independent of what is rational, while at the same time legal reasoning seems to assign an important role to reason. The second part, sections 4 and 5, argues for an answer to this question. This answer is that law is a part of social reality that consists of what will be called constructivist facts and that this characteristic explains the ambiguous nature of law. To justify this answer, it is explained how social reality and constructivist facts exist.
There are many issues around rules and related concepts. By developing a theory about the existen... more There are many issues around rules and related concepts. By developing a theory about the existence of social reality, this article aims to address these issues by discussing: - the relation between rules and norms, - the difference between deontic normativity and the normativity of reason, - the (im)possibility of prescriptive rules, - two kinds of constitutive rules, and - the function of rules as constraints on possible worlds.
The notion of objectivity derives its sense from the view that there is a reality that does not d... more The notion of objectivity derives its sense from the view that there is a reality that does not depend on beliefs or opinions, or on any operation of the mind, and that ideally our knowledge is a faithful reflection of parts of this reality. This view supports two notions of objectivity. One notion is the objectivity of a mind-independent world; the other notion is the objectivity of a faithful representation of this world. In connection to law, the first notion concerns the objectivity of law, while the second notion concerns the objectivity about law. The objectivity about law seems to depend on the objectivity of law, because if the law itself is not objective, it is doubtful whether objectivity about law is at all possible. This article investigates whether, and to what extent, the distinction between objectivity about law and objectivity of law makes sense
1 A FIRST IMPRESSION Neil MacCormick has, in the course of his rich academic career, written on m... more 1 A FIRST IMPRESSION Neil MacCormick has, in the course of his rich academic career, written on many central issues of both legal philosophy and jurisprudence. From the point of view of this paper, his work on the institutional theory of law has been crucial. In this paper I will focus on a phenomenon which is, in my opinion, best elucidated by means of this institutional theory of law, namely the phenomenon of legal transactions. The notion of a legal transaction (legal act, act-in-the-law, Rechtsgeschäft, acte juridique) does not play an important role in the common law tradition, but in the civil law tradition of the European continent it is one of the basic legal notions. Legal transactions are the means by which legal subjects can change the legal positions of themselves or other persons intentionally. Examples from private law are contracts, terminations of contracts, last wills, transfers of rights, and the creation of rights in rem such as usufruct and mortgage. Examples fro...
International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue internationale de Sémiotique juridique
This article describes how the facts in social reality take an intermediate position between obje... more This article describes how the facts in social reality take an intermediate position between objective facts and purely subjective ‘facts’. In turn, these social facts can be subdivided into constructivist and non-constructivist facts. The defining difference is that non-constructivist facts are completely determined by an approximate consensus between the members of a social group, while constructivist facts are founded in such a consensus but can nevertheless be questioned. Ought fact are such constructivist facts. Because they are founded in social reality, a naturalistic theory of ought facts is attractive. Because constructivist facts are always open to questioning, we can explain why the facts in social reality may found ought facts but are nevertheless not the final word about them.
In recent years, impressive progress has been made in the development of logical tools for the mo... more In recent years, impressive progress has been made in the development of logical tools for the modeling of legal argument. The focus has been primarily on the technical development of these tools, and only in the second place on their practical adequacy for modeling legal argument.
The question is addressed whether it makes sense to speak of a logic of law. It is shown that wha... more The question is addressed whether it makes sense to speak of a logic of law. It is shown that what counts as valid inference depends to a large extent on context-dependent choices. This suggests that our question has a simple answer, namely that a logic of law can exist. After noticing that one logic can serve as the background of another, it is explicated that a more subtle answer can be given. On the one hand a logic of law can exist, and on the other hand it can be possible to reduce such a logic to a set of legal premises in a more abstract logic. It is posited how a ‘contextual logic’ approach and an ‘abstract logic’ approach can lead to different priorities in the formalization of legal reasoning.
There are two competing views on what makes propositions of law true. The one, legal realism, tak... more There are two competing views on what makes propositions of law true. The one, legal realism, takes it that propositions of law are true because they reflect an independently existing reality of legal facts. Thes e fac ts wo u ld be gen erat ed by l egal r ul es whi ch wo u ld o pera te autonomously, without need for human intervention. The institutional theory of law illustrates this view. On this view it is the function of legal arguments to reconstruct the results of the autonomous rule application. T h e o t h e r v i e w i s l e g a l c o n s t r u c t i v i s m , a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h propositions of law are true because they are the conclusion of the best (possible) legal argument. On this view the function of legal argumentation is constitutive: argumentation determines the contents of the law. This paper argues that legal realism is not very plausible because it is based on metaphysical assumptions which cannot be verified or falsified. Legal constructivism would ...
This paper argues for a proper position for legal logic in between a general theory of legal reas... more This paper argues for a proper position for legal logic in between a general theory of legal reasoning and a general theory of valid reasoning. In discussion with McCarty it argues that legal logic should not be seen as a general theory of legal rea- soning, but rather as a theory of what counts as valid reasoning in the legal field. In discussion with earlier work by Verheij and the author himself, and of Prakken and Sartor, the paper argues that legal logic should employ a conceptual framework that is as close to that of the legal domain as possible. A simpler logic, how attractive as it might seem at first sight, has the disadvantage that it leads to problematic formaliza- tions of the domain theory and to marginalization of the logic as means to evaluate the validity of informal arguments.
Abstract
Topics: Legal Method and Coherentism
Final version published in: Informal Logic 39 v... more Abstract
Topics: Legal Method and Coherentism
Final version published in: Informal Logic 39 vol.2 (2016), pp. 271-287.
--------------------------------------------
The aim of this contribution is to give an interpretation of doctrinal legal science which makes the value of doctrinal legal science visible. The backbone of the argument consists of two theses. The first thesis is that coherence plays a crucial role in legal science. The second thesis is that, as any science, doctrinal legal science is a social enterprise and that this should be taken into account in any attempt to make sense of it. Based on these two theses, a picture of doctrinal legal science is given according to which it consists of parallel distributed construction of consistent, comprehensive and expansive sets of legal beliefs. Given this picture, seeming weaknesses of doctrinal legal science turn out to be actual strengths.
Because of its emphasis on coherentism, this paper is the third part of a triptych of papers on (law and) coherence. The first and the second part are ‘Law and Coherence’ and ‘Three Kinds of Coherentism’. The main difference between the first two papers of the triptych and the present one is that this paper pays special attention to the practical use of coherentism in legal science and on the social aspect of creating a coherent ‘theory of everything’.
Coherence: Insights from Philosophy, Jurisprudence and Artificial Intelligence, 2013
Topic: Coherentism
Final version published in: Michal Araszkiewicz and Jaromír Šavelka (eds.), Co... more Topic: Coherentism Final version published in: Michal Araszkiewicz and Jaromír Šavelka (eds.), Coherence, Insights from Philosophy, Jurisprudence and Artificial Intelligence, Springer, Dordrecht 2013, pp. 1-32. -------------------------------------------- This paper is the second part of a triptych on coherentism. The first part is ‘Law and Coherence’ and the third part is ‘Anything goes’. The purposes of the present paper are: 1. to provide coherentism with a sound theoretical foundation; 2. to show what makes coherentism attractive in comparison to its main competitor, foundationalism; 3. to show that constraint satisfaction is not the most attractive way to give content to the notion of coherence. In order to achieve these purposes, the paper distinguishes between three kinds of coherentism: epistemic, constructivist and integrated coherentism. a. Epistemic coherentism treats coherence as a test for knowledge about a world which exists independently (ontological realism). b. Constructivist coherentism uses coherence as a standard to determine what the facts are in a particular domain. This is a form of ontological idealism. Usually, both epistemic and constructivist coherentism apply the coherence test only to a part of the positions (beliefs etc.) which a person accepts (narrow coherentism). Typically, the definition of, and standards for coherence, logic, and the standards for belief revision are kept outside the process of making a position set coherent. c. Integrated coherentism differs by including everything in the coherence creating process (broad coherentism). A set of positions is integrated coherent if and only if it satisfies the standards for coherent position sets that are included in the position set itself.
The paper argues that integrated coherentism best fits with the ideas underlying coherentism and that it is incompatible with coherence as constraint satisfaction.
Topic: Coherentism
Final version published in: Ratio Juris 17 (2004), pp.87-105.
----------------... more Topic: Coherentism Final version published in: Ratio Juris 17 (2004), pp.87-105. -------------------------------------------- This paper is the first of three papers in which I develop my view on law and coherence. The other two papers are ‘Three kinds of coherentism’ and ‘Anything goes. An apology for parallel distributed legal science’. In contrast to the other two papers about law and coherentism, the emphasis of this paper is on the way in which an integrated coherent theory reflects on itself. Law and Coherence deals with the questions whether the law should be coherent and what this coherence would amount to. In this connection so-called ‘integrated coherentism’ is introduced. According to integrated coherentism, an acceptance set is coherent if and only if it contains everything that should rationally be accepted according what else one accepts and does not contain anything that should rationally be rejected according to what else one accepts. Such an acceptance set is ideally a theory of everything, including amongst others standards for rational acceptance. On the assumption that the law, as a social phenomenon, is what the best theory about the law says it is, the law must be coherent, because the best theory of the law is part of an integrated coherent theory of everything.
This papers belongs to a project that deals with juridical acts, powers and competences. It is pr... more This papers belongs to a project that deals with juridical acts, powers and competences. It is primarily meant for a readership with an interest in implementing juridical acts in a knowledge-based system, but only the final part of the paper is technical. Most of the paper is devoted to creating an understanding of what goes on when the law makes it possible to intentionally create or modify legal facts. To this purpose, there is special attention for the concept of a juridical acts and for the different kinds of rules which make it possible to change the 'world of law' by means of intentional acts.
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Papers by Jaap Hage
Final version published in: Mark Van Hoecke, Methodologies of Legal Research. Which kind of method for what kind of discipline? Hart Publishing 2011, pp. 19-44.
--------------------------------------------
This paper contains an argument to the effect that the proper method for legal science depends on what one takes to be the nature of science, the nature of the law and the kind of questions that are addressed in legal science.
It starts from three assumptions, namely that:
a. science is the collaborative pursuit of knowledge,
b. the law consists of those norms which ought to be enforced by collective means;
c. the proper standard to determine what ought to be enforced is what maximises the long term happiness of all sentient beings (the H-standard).
On the basis of these assumptions the following positions are argued:
1. Legal science, in the sense of a description of the law, is not impossible for the reason that it is a normative science.
2. In abstract the method of all sciences, including legal science, is to create a coherent set of positions that encompasses ‘everything’, and therefore also beliefs about the law.
3. The proper method for a normative legal science consists primarily of the methods of sociology, psychology and economics, because the ultimate question to be answered is the collective enforcement of which norms satisfies the H-standard. The more traditional hermeneutic methods only play a role to the extent that they establish positive law that contributes to happiness by providing legal certainty. (See also ‘The limited role of hermeneutics in law’)
- the relation between rules and norms,
- the difference between deontic normativity and the normativity of reason,
- the (im)possibility of prescriptive rules,
- two kinds of constitutive rules, and
- the function of rules as constraints on possible worlds.
Final version published in: Mark Van Hoecke, Methodologies of Legal Research. Which kind of method for what kind of discipline? Hart Publishing 2011, pp. 19-44.
--------------------------------------------
This paper contains an argument to the effect that the proper method for legal science depends on what one takes to be the nature of science, the nature of the law and the kind of questions that are addressed in legal science.
It starts from three assumptions, namely that:
a. science is the collaborative pursuit of knowledge,
b. the law consists of those norms which ought to be enforced by collective means;
c. the proper standard to determine what ought to be enforced is what maximises the long term happiness of all sentient beings (the H-standard).
On the basis of these assumptions the following positions are argued:
1. Legal science, in the sense of a description of the law, is not impossible for the reason that it is a normative science.
2. In abstract the method of all sciences, including legal science, is to create a coherent set of positions that encompasses ‘everything’, and therefore also beliefs about the law.
3. The proper method for a normative legal science consists primarily of the methods of sociology, psychology and economics, because the ultimate question to be answered is the collective enforcement of which norms satisfies the H-standard. The more traditional hermeneutic methods only play a role to the extent that they establish positive law that contributes to happiness by providing legal certainty. (See also ‘The limited role of hermeneutics in law’)
- the relation between rules and norms,
- the difference between deontic normativity and the normativity of reason,
- the (im)possibility of prescriptive rules,
- two kinds of constitutive rules, and
- the function of rules as constraints on possible worlds.
Topics: Legal Method and Coherentism
Final version published in: Informal Logic 39 vol.2 (2016), pp. 271-287.
--------------------------------------------
The aim of this contribution is to give an interpretation of doctrinal legal science which makes the value of doctrinal legal science visible. The backbone of the argument consists of two theses. The first thesis is that coherence plays a crucial role in legal science. The second thesis is that, as any science, doctrinal legal science is a social enterprise and that this should be taken into account in any attempt to make sense of it. Based on these two theses, a picture of doctrinal legal science is given according to which it consists of parallel distributed construction of consistent, comprehensive and expansive sets of legal beliefs. Given this picture, seeming weaknesses of doctrinal legal science turn out to be actual strengths.
Because of its emphasis on coherentism, this paper is the third part of a triptych of papers on (law and) coherence. The first and the second part are ‘Law and Coherence’ and ‘Three Kinds of Coherentism’. The main difference between the first two papers of the triptych and the present one is that this paper pays special attention to the practical use of coherentism in legal science and on the social aspect of creating a coherent ‘theory of everything’.
Final version published in: Michal Araszkiewicz and Jaromír Šavelka (eds.), Coherence, Insights from Philosophy, Jurisprudence and Artificial Intelligence, Springer, Dordrecht 2013, pp. 1-32.
--------------------------------------------
This paper is the second part of a triptych on coherentism. The first part is ‘Law and Coherence’ and the third part is ‘Anything goes’. The purposes of the present paper are:
1. to provide coherentism with a sound theoretical foundation;
2. to show what makes coherentism attractive in comparison to its main competitor, foundationalism;
3. to show that constraint satisfaction is not the most attractive way to give content to the notion of coherence.
In order to achieve these purposes, the paper distinguishes between three kinds of coherentism: epistemic, constructivist and integrated coherentism.
a. Epistemic coherentism treats coherence as a test for knowledge about a world which exists independently (ontological realism).
b. Constructivist coherentism uses coherence as a standard to determine what the facts are in a particular domain. This is a form of ontological idealism.
Usually, both epistemic and constructivist coherentism apply the coherence test only to a part of the positions (beliefs etc.) which a person accepts (narrow coherentism). Typically, the definition of, and standards for coherence, logic, and the standards for belief revision are kept outside the process of making a position set coherent.
c. Integrated coherentism differs by including everything in the coherence creating process (broad coherentism). A set of positions is integrated coherent if and only if it satisfies the standards for coherent position sets that are included in the position set itself.
The paper argues that integrated coherentism best fits with the ideas underlying coherentism and that it is incompatible with coherence as constraint satisfaction.
Final version published in: Ratio Juris 17 (2004), pp.87-105.
--------------------------------------------
This paper is the first of three papers in which I develop my view on law and coherence. The other two papers are ‘Three kinds of coherentism’ and ‘Anything goes. An apology for parallel distributed legal science’. In contrast to the other two papers about law and coherentism, the emphasis of this paper is on the way in which an integrated coherent theory reflects on itself.
Law and Coherence deals with the questions whether the law should be coherent and what this coherence would amount to. In this connection so-called ‘integrated coherentism’ is introduced. According to integrated coherentism, an acceptance set is coherent if and only if it contains everything that should rationally be accepted according what else one accepts and does not contain anything that should rationally be rejected according to what else one accepts. Such an acceptance set is ideally a theory of everything, including amongst others standards for rational acceptance. On the assumption that the law, as a social phenomenon, is what the best theory about the law says it is, the law must be coherent, because the best theory of the law is part of an integrated coherent theory of everything.