Papers by Emilia Simison
The Journal of Legislative Studies
The Argentinian Dictatorship and its Legacy, 2019
Political institutions under Argentina’s last dictatorship are understudied beyond the factionali... more Political institutions under Argentina’s last dictatorship are understudied beyond the factionalization of politics. The literature assumes that dictators had ultimate power to override the legislative and federal institutions they had set up. This chapter shows the opposite: that Argentina’s collective dictatorship had designed a horizontal and vertical division of power that enabled both the legislature and the provincial governors to block and amend the Executive’s policies. Building on data from the archives of the legislative body active during the period, the Legislative Advisory Commission, and case studies of federal legislation, we demonstrate that the interplay between institutional design and factional politics resulted in high rejection and amendment rates of Executive bills, and in substantial changes to federal legislation against the Executive’s original intent.
El objetivo del articulo es identificar las variables que explican la distribucion intergubername... more El objetivo del articulo es identificar las variables que explican la distribucion intergubernamental de transferencias discrecionales en contextos de centralizacion fiscal y desnacionalizacion del sistema de partidos. Para ello se contrastan hipotesis derivadas de tres conjuntos de respuestas identificados en la literatura —consideraciones de equidad, caracteristicas estructurales de las unidades subnacionales que afectan su poder de negociacion y el comportamiento estrategico del gobierno nacional respecto de los gobiernos provinciales— con informacion de Argentina en el periodo 2002-2011. La relevancia del caso deriva de las particularidades del federalismo fiscal, la importante variacion en los montos recibidos por las provincias y en el modo en que las caracteristicas del periodo afectan los incentivos de los actores politicos. Asi, se estudian las transferencias discrecionales en conjunto en un periodo aun no sistematicamente estudiado, y se encuentra que su distribucion es pr...
Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, 2019
The variation offered by Latin American legislatures makes them empirically and theoretically rel... more The variation offered by Latin American legislatures makes them empirically and theoretically relevant to the field of legislative studies. Since the 1980s, the study of these legislatures has experienced significant growth, widening the range of topics covered and the territorial scope of the analysis. Legislative-executive relations, elections and careers, and legislative behavior continue to be the most studied topics. In addition, by the 2010s a greater number of empirical analyses have made use of cross-national comparisons of the region and studied both subnational legislatures and how internal processes and institutions shape legislative outcomes. This academic interest still coexists with a low level of citizen confidence in the legislatures, which are considered to be ineffective in policymaking. In between lies representation. Its study has attracted increased attention in a context of significant changes in descriptive representation in the region, such as the increased p...
Do supporters and opposition behave differently in authoritarian legislatures? This paper examine... more Do supporters and opposition behave differently in authoritarian legislatures? This paper examines this question by analysing legislative activity in an authoritarian regime with a multiparty legis...
This paper studies the territorial scope of the bills presented by members of the Chamber of Depu... more This paper studies the territorial scope of the bills presented by members of the Chamber of Deputies (the lower chamber of the Argentine National Congress) during Juan Domingo Perón’s first two terms in office (1946–1955). Its main objective is to observe the effect that modifying the electoral system (switching from incomplete party ballots in multimember districts to relative majorities in single-member districts) had on that scope. Experimental techniques (an interrupted time-series and a within-subjects design) are used to analyze a novel database including every bill presented in the Chamber of Deputies during the period in question. Contrary to theoretical expectations, an increase is observed in the share of bills with a territorial scope that goes beyond deputies’ districts – especially for those presented by legislators from the opposition and from larger provinces. In addition, by separately analyzing the effect on the ruling party and the opposition, the paper uncovers a plausible explanation for previous nonconclusive findings.
El consenso historiográfico sobre la última dictadura militar, construido a partir de entrevistas... more El consenso historiográfico sobre la última dictadura militar, construido a partir de entrevistas, información de prensa, y algunos documentos reservados, sostiene que estuvo caracterizada por la fragmentación del poder político y los problemas derivados de ella. La reciente desclasificación de los archivos completos de la Comisión de Asesoramiento Legislativo (CAL) ha ampliado la base empírica, brindando acceso a datos sobre el funcionamiento cotidiano de una organización crucial para el proceso decisorio. Esta nota de investigación da cuenta de esa evidencia emergente y discute sus implicancias para la interpretación del Proceso. Los datos muestran que la fragmentación fue la norma cotidiana y extendida más allá de las principales arenas decisorias y de las políticas más notorias, que la dictadura nunca logró constituir un centro político, y que, en consecuencia, numerosas iniciativas de política pública fueron enmendadas o rechazadas por las facciones en competencia e influidas por variados intereses económicos privados.
The literature on authoritarian regimes assumes legislatures are inconsequential because dictator... more The literature on authoritarian regimes assumes legislatures are inconsequential because dictators ultimately retain their hold on power. We challenge this assumption arguing that legislatures embedded in power-sharing arrangements are costly to ignore, their design affects lawmaking patterns, and they are more influential when executives are collective, rather than personal. We test these arguments on a case for which complete records exist: the Legislative Advisory Commission in Argentina’s last military dictatorship. Our findings show that the combination of tripartite power-sharing by the armed forces, a collective executive, shared legislative power, and decentralized agenda power led to higher rates of government legislative defeats and bill amendments than typical in authoritarian regimes. These findings support the theory that legislatures under authoritarianism are more influential when power-sharing arrangements include collective executives.
El presente artículo presenta una revisión de la literatura sobre el rol que los partidos polític... more El presente artículo presenta una revisión de la literatura sobre el rol que los partidos políticos cumplieron en los procesos de descentralización política, económica y administrativa en América Latina, tanto como variable dependiente como independiente. Dicha revisión realiza un aporte a la comprensión de los sistemas políticos de la región y su evolución reciente y provee explicaciones para las diferencias encontradas entre los distintos países de la región. Además, permite observar desde una óptica distinta de la usual fenómenos relevantes para el estudio de América Latina. Especialmente significativos son la conformación y cambio de los sistemas de partidos nacionales, la interrelación partidaria entre niveles nacionales y subnacionales y las motivaciones de los políticos y de los partidos políticos en tanto organizaciones con objetivos definidos.
El objetivo del artículo es identificar las variables que explican la distribución intergubername... more El objetivo del artículo es identificar las variables que explican la distribución intergubernamental de transferencias discrecionales en contextos de centralización fiscal y desnacionalización del sistema de partidos. Para ello se contrastan hipótesis derivadas de tres conjuntos de respuestas identificados en la literatura –consideraciones de equidad, características estructurales de las unidades subnacionales que afectan su poder de negociación y el comportamiento estratégico del gobierno nacional respecto de los gobiernos provinciales con información de Argentina en el período 2002-2011. La relevancia del caso deriva de las particularidades del federalismo fiscal, la importante variación en los montos recibidos por las provincias y en el modo en que las características del período afectan los incentivos de los actores políticos. Así, se estudian las transferencias discrecionales en conjunto en un período aún no sistemáticamente estudiado, y se encuentra que su distribución es principalmente explicada por las consideraciones estratégicas del gobierno nacional.
Se analizan las estrategias distributivas presidenciales en países federales en contextos cambian... more Se analizan las estrategias distributivas presidenciales en países federales en contextos cambiantes de centralización fiscal y nacionalización del sistema de partidos, a través del estudio de la distribución de transferencias discrecionales a las provincias argentinas y comparando dos períodos en que presidentes del mismo partido enfrentaron contextos diferentes: 1) descentralización fiscal y nacionalización partidaria durante las presidencias de Carlos Menem; y 2) centralización fiscal y desnacionalización del sistema de partidos durante las presidencias de Néstor Kirchner y Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. El análisis muestra que la distribución obedeció a consideraciones estratégicas, aunque en el primer contexto se premió a los distritos sobrerrepresentados en el Congreso Nacional y, en el segundo, a aquellas provincias cuyos gobernadores pertenecían al mismo partido que el presidente.
Tesis by Emilia Simison
El objetivo de la presente tesis es explicar la distribución intergubernamental de transferencias... more El objetivo de la presente tesis es explicar la distribución intergubernamental de transferencias discrecionales en contextos de centralización fiscal y desnacionalización del sistema de partidos. Con dicho fin se contrastarán hipótesis derivadas de los tres conjuntos de respuestas identificados en la literatura – aquellos basados en consideraciones de equidad, características estructurales de las unidades subnacionales que afectan su poder de negociación o el comportamiento estratégico del gobierno nacional respecto de los gobiernos provinciales- con información del caso argentino en el período 2002-2011. La relevancia del caso deriva de las particularidades del federalismo fiscal argentino, la importante variación en los montos recibidos por las provincias y en el modo en que las condiciones políticas y económicas del período afectan los incentivos de los actores. Además, se estudia un período aún no sistemáticamente analizado tomando las transferencias discrecionales en conjunto. Se encuentra que la distribución de transferencias discrecionales siguió criterios distintos que la distribución de transferencias de baja discrecionalidad y que se explica principalmente por las consideraciones estratégicas del gobierno nacional.
Ponencias/ Conference Papers by Emilia Simison
The aim of this paper is to analyze presidents’ distributive strategies in federal countries unde... more The aim of this paper is to analyze presidents’ distributive strategies in federal countries under different contexts of fiscal centralization and party system nationalization. To achieve this aim, the focus was placed on the allocation of the complete set of discretionary fiscal transfers to the Argentine provinces, comparing two periods in which presidents from the same political party (Peronist) operated under different contexts: one of fiscal decentralization and party system nationalization during Carlos Menem’s presidencies (1989-1999); and another of fiscal centralization and party system denationalization during the presidencies of Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2003-2014). The results support the hypothesis that changes in fiscal centralization and party system nationalization yield different determinants of discretionary transfer allocations. While under fiscal decentralization and party system nationalization the bargaining power of the provinces is the main explanatory variable, the co-partisanship of provincial governors and presidents explains allocation under fiscal centralization and party system denationalization. A strong effect is found, as well, which shows that presidents benefit the province where they started their political careers.
The literature on authoritarian regimes assumes legislatures are inconsequential for lawmaking be... more The literature on authoritarian regimes assumes legislatures are inconsequential for lawmaking because dictators ultimately retain their hold on power. We challenge this assumption arguing that legislative institutions embedded in power-sharing arrangements are costly to ignore, so their design affects the lawmaking process and its outcomes, and they are more influential when Executives are collective, rather than personal. We test these arguments on a case for which complete records of lawmaking activity exist: the Legislative Advisory Commission in Argentina's last military dictatorship (1976-1983). Our findings show the combination of tripartite power-sharing by the Armed Forces, a collective Executive, shared legislative power, and decentralized agenda power led to comparatively high rates of government legislative defeats and bill amendments. We also compare these findings with those available on other legislatures in authoritarian regimes. Our comparison supports the theory that legislative institutions under authoritarianism are more influential when power-sharing arrangements include collective Executives.
How do authoritarian leaders in regimes with legislative institutions form coalitions for lawmaki... more How do authoritarian leaders in regimes with legislative institutions form coalitions for lawmaking? How do fiscal federal institutions influence coalition formation? The literature generally considers both questions moot on account of two assumptions: that dictators ultimately hold power and thus override legislative bodies; and that dictatorial power nullifies fiscal federal institutions. This paper challenges both. Building on the literature on limited authoritarian government and federal institutions, we argue that 1) the legislative institutions adopted within power-sharing arrangements shape lawmaking processes and outcomes, 2) the federal administrative institutions adopted or retained from democratic regimes create incentives for subnational administrators to lobby for intergovernmental transfers, and 3) subnational demands are regularly accommodated for the purpose of maintaining power-sharing arrangements. To test this argument we analyze lawmaking processes in the Legislative Advisory Commission (CAL) of Argentina's last military regime (1976-1983) – a nominally consultative body staffed by military officers selected by the Junta, but which according to the regime’s rules had necessary intervention in lawmaking, and in accordance with power-sharing arrangements granted decision-making autonomy to its members. Combining statistical analysis and case studies of major fiscal legislation, we show that the Armed Forces representatives at the CAL 1) had influence on lawmaking processes,1) were influenced by the balance of power among the Forces and by subnational demands, 2) actively opposed the restrictive fiscal federal policies advocated by the Finance Ministry, and 3) successfully lobbied for transfer increases during lawmaking processes as conditions for their support of the Executive's fiscal federal initiatives.
The aim of this paper is to study the territorial scope of the law initiatives presented by the m... more The aim of this paper is to study the territorial scope of the law initiatives presented by the members of the lower chamber of the Argentinean Congress (Honorable Cámara de Diputados de la Nación) during Juan Domingo Perón’s first two terms in office (1946-1955). Particularly, its main objective is to observe the effect on that scope as a result of the modification in the way those members were elected – i.e. from incomplete party ballots in multi-member districts to relative majority in single-member districts. In order to achieve this, experimental techniques (Interrupted Time Series and Within Subjects analysis) were used to analyze a database built from the sessions’ records, including every bill presented in the lower chamber during the period. Contrary to what was theoretically expected, the change in the electoral system seems to have increased the proportion of bills with a broader territorial scope. That was especially the case of the bills presented by legislators from big provinces and from the main opposition party, the UCR. Besides, by analyzing separately the effect the reform had on the ruling party and the opposition, the paper points out a plausible explanation for previous non-conclusive findings.
El objetivo de la ponencia es estudiar el rol que cumplen las transferencias intergubernamentales... more El objetivo de la ponencia es estudiar el rol que cumplen las transferencias intergubernamentales en las estrategias de supervivencia política en regímenes autoritarios federales. A partir de la literatura sobre el rol de las instituciones en contextos autoritarios y de la distribución de recursos en países federales, se espera que las instituciones tengan un efecto sobre las estrategias distributivas de los gobernantes observable en la diferente utilización de distintos tipos de transferencias. Los resultados del análisis empírico del caso argentino durante la última dictadura militar (1976-1983) dan apoyo a esta idea y muestran que las instituciones no sólo hicieron necesaria la distribución de recursos entre niveles de gobierno, sino que, de manera similar a lo que ocurre en gobiernos democráticos, también limitaron el uso discrecional que el presidente pudo hacer de las mismas. En consecuencia, su uso estratégico sólo se observa en aquellas transferencias en que contó con un mayor nivel de discrecionalidad.
Reseñas by Emilia Simison
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Papers by Emilia Simison
Tesis by Emilia Simison
Ponencias/ Conference Papers by Emilia Simison
Reseñas by Emilia Simison