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Asiatica Ambrosiana, 2023
Taking its cue from Yājñavalkya's famous one-off cryptic pronouncement in favour of meat-eating, ... more Taking its cue from Yājñavalkya's famous one-off cryptic pronouncement in favour of meat-eating, and building on the ground-breaking work by Alsdorf and others, this essay attempts to draw a passably coherent picture of the development of Indian vegetarianism out of the daunting mass of the diverse and often contradictory statements found scattered throughout the śāstras (‘codes of the law’). To summarize, whereas it is not doubtful, despite the outrage of many contemporary Brahmanic Hindus, that sacrificed animals (and even cows!) were consumed in Vedic times, meat-eating fell gradually into disfavour chiefly owing to the rise of the ideal of ahiṁsā (‘non-violence’) as brandished mainly as an anti-sacrificial weapon by the heterodox VI cent. BC (and earlier) śrāmaṇa movements such as Jainism and Buddhism. It should be noted, however, that ahiṁsā did not automatically entail a strict. ethically motivated vegetarianism in both religions (and a vegetarian diet is still not compulsory for Buddhists to this day), as it seems to have originally been held mostly on tabuistic grounds. Ahiṁsā was later adopted by Brahmanic Hinduism and provided with a sounder philosophical grounding (although magico-tabuistic preoccupations did survive to some extent) in the two core upaniṣadic doctrines of advaita (‘monism’) and rebirth: where all is One, the animal I kill is (my)Self; where everybody reincarnates, the animal I kill is but the fallen condition of one who was once a man: hence animals must not be killed.
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The topic of the proofs of God’s existence in the context of Indian philosophy is usually brought... more The topic of the proofs of God’s existence in the context of Indian philosophy is usually brought up in connection with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, and particularly with the “the crown and glory of the literature bearing on this subject” (G. Bhattacharyya), i.e. the Nyāyakusumañjali of Udayana. While the problem of the foundation of a rational theology became central for the above school between ca. 600 and 900 CE, an intriguing anticipation at a much earlier date can be descried in the still rudimentary theology sketched in a cluster of aforisms in the Samādhi Pāda of the Yogasūtras. In particular, YS I, 15 (tatra niratiśayaṃ sarvajñabījam, translated by Woods as «in this [Īśvara] the germ of the omniscient is at its utmost excellence») sounds like an argument of sorts for God’s existence, and as such it has been regarded by the commentators, who have taken pains to make explicit the logical structure of the proof. This paper will discuss some of the interpretations offered, pointing out and briefly discussing the striking resemblance in theoretical structure of the proof (in particular as expounded by Vijñānabhikṣu) to the classical argument “ex gradibus entium” of scholastic theology.
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M. Angelillo, C. Bulfoni, F. Fasulo a cura di), Forme e interpretazioni reciproche delle diversità in Asia, Milano (Asiatica Ambrosiana 10-11), 2021
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[The «Renaissance Orientale and the Imagination of India in the Literature of Romanticism]
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M. Angelillo (a cura di), M. K. Gandhi. Storia, diaogo e influenze cristiane, ICOO-Luni, 2022
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Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica, 2022
The motto of the Delphic oracle, γνῶθι σεαυτόν (nosce te ipsum, “know thyself”), has enjoyed an i... more The motto of the Delphic oracle, γνῶθι σεαυτόν (nosce te ipsum, “know thyself”), has enjoyed an immense fortune in Western philosophical culture; among the early Greek thinkers it became particularly associated with Socrates as we know him through Plato, who mentions the motto in connection with Socrates’ attitude to philosophical enquiry in no less than five dialogues (Philebus, Phædrus, Charmides, Protagoras, Timaeus, Alcibiades I). On the other side, exhortations to know (one’s)self are rife in the Indian Upaniṣads, beginning with Yājñavalkya’s famous admonishment to his beloved “philosophical” wife, Maitreyī, that the ātman alone should be contemplated, listened to, reflected and meditated upon. But what is the “self” which is the object of the quest in both philosophical traditions? On the Indian side, its equation with the spiritual principle is more straightforward, since the term ātman covers at once both the function as the reflexive pronoun and the meaning of “soul”. On the Greek side, on the other hand, the equation of tò autó with psychḗ is not immediately apparent, and must be gained through philosophical investigation. In both traditions, however, access to the real essence of the ātman/psychḗ is difficult to obtain through rational discourse, and extra-rational devices are sometimes resorted to in order to assist and catalyze the theoretical insight. Among them, surprisingly enough, the metaphor of the pupil of the eye, named equivalently kórē and kanīnikā in either language, is applied on very similar terms in the story of Prajāpati’s teaching to Indra and Virocana narrated in the eighth chapter of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad and in Socrates’ instruction to Alcibiades in the dialogue named after the latter.
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Ἀλεξάνδρεια/Alessandria, 2022
Il lessico della “legge” in ambito indiano, come in tutte le culture, annovera una varietà di les... more Il lessico della “legge” in ambito indiano, come in tutte le culture, annovera una varietà di lessemi, tra cui spiccano, nella piú antica epoca vedica, dhā́man (e affini), dhárman (in seguito dharma), r̥tá e l’elusivo vratá. Dopo un breve excursus sulle rispettive pertinenze linguistiche, si prenderanno in esame le due nozioni piú caratterizzanti, quella piú specialmente vedica di r̥ta e quella per certi versi piú complessa di dharma, che perviene a soppiantare quasi del tutto la prima nella letteratura del periodo epico-classico. Per il lessema r̥ta gli studiosi sono divisi sulla derivazione dalla rad. 3. er- ‘muoversi’ (ἕρχομαι, orior) o dalla rad. 1. ar- (< H2er) ‘adattare’ (ἀραρίσκω, rītus), mentre dharma(n) si riconnette certamente alla rad. 2. dher- ‘mantenere, sostenere’ (θρόνος, firmus): appare dunque già fondata nell’etimologia la differente connotazione, rispettivamente dinamica e statica, delle due nozioni, la prima delle quali significa, si potrebbe dire sinteticamente e tenendo conto di entrambe le derivazioni proposte, il ‘cursus’ ordinato e armonioso delle cose (in una dimensione piú metafisica che riecheggia nel concetto greco (etimologicamente imparentato) di ἁρμονία); mentre la seconda, in qualche modo subordinata alla prima, designa piuttosto i ‘pilastri’ su cui tale ordine si regge, in una dimensione piú rituale ed etico-sociale che cosmica, e tenendo conto degli apporti “pratici” della prassi rituale e del costume (mōs). Per ciò che riguarda la discussa etimologia di r̥ta, mentre la maggioranza degli studiosi (Grassmann, Bergaigne, Darmester, Renou, Benveniste etc.) ha favorito la derivazione da √ar- ‘adattare’, la derivazione da √er- ‘muoversi’, originariamente proposta da Oldenberg e poi ripresa da Apte, ha di recente trovato una nuova fautrice in Jurewicz, nel quadro delle nuove prospettive metodologiche aperte dalla linguistica cognitiva. A prescindere dall’etimologia, non si può omettere di menzionare il significato di ‘verità’ che già per Lüders, recentemente ripreso da Brereton, costituisce il nucleo semantico del termine, capace di dar conto di tutti gli usi vedici, per continuare poi come significato esclusivo in età classica (segnatamente nel privativo an-r̥ta ‘falsità’). Emerge comunque pur nella varietà delle prospettive una dimensione ontologico-metafisica della nozione di r̥ta di cui Franklin e Chaturvedi hanno messo in rilievo gli addentellati con le analoghe valenze della presocratica ἁρμονία: si cercherà di mostrare come specialmente in ambito indiano tale dimensione sia pervasiva, elaborandosi fin da epoca antica (il Nāsadīya Sūkta del R̥g Veda) quella concezione della Realtà come tensione armonica degli opposti (l’eraclitea παλίντροπος ἁρμονίη!) che impronterà durevolmente di sé il pensiero filosofico-religioso indiano successivo che dal Veda trae alimento, tanto in ambito mitico che speculativo, dal mitologema brahmanico e poi epico-puranico del daivāsura alla dottrina teologica vaisnavita dell’avatāra (per non citare che due esempî tra i piú significativi).
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Indian Philosophy and Yoga
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In the introduction to his Rājamārtaṇḍa commentary to the Yogasūtras, king Bhoja, the XI sec. phi... more In the introduction to his Rājamārtaṇḍa commentary to the Yogasūtras, king Bhoja, the XI sec. philosopher Paramāra ruler, proudly vaunts the terseness and perspicuity of his commentatorial work in contradistinction to the practice of others who, as he remarks with some irony, are wont to obscure what is clear by much unnecessary philosophical prattle, whereas they quickly dispose of what is really in need of explanation with an easy spaṣṭam (“[the sense is] plain”). In reality, Bhoja’s commentary sometimes gives the impression of a certain shallowness as compared to the “standard” commentary going by the name of Vyāsa, and at places it even seems to betray a poor understanding of the root text, or indeed a faulty conception of its philosophical implications. After giving some relevant examples, the paper concentrates on one major instance, where at three different places (II, 6; III, 35; III, 55) Bhoja seems to deny the kartṛtva of prakṛti, contradicting the basic Sāṃkhya tenet, also shared by Yoga, which ascribes unconscious agency to Nature and idle consciousness to Spirit. The misconception is noticed also in the Kiraṇa subcommentary to the Rājamārtaṇḍa by Śrīkṛṣṇavallabhācārya, who tries to exhonerate Bhoja from blame, albeit with only partial success.
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S. Piano / V. Agostini (a cura di), Atti del Quarto e del Quinto Convegno Nazionale di Studi Sanscriti (Torino, 24 gennaio 1986 - Milano, 8 novembre 1988), 1991
The paper offers some insights on the pertinence of the notion of īśvara to the conceptual frame ... more The paper offers some insights on the pertinence of the notion of īśvara to the conceptual frame of Pātañjala Yoga, arguing for its unsystematic origin in the mystical experience of the yogin, against the backdrop of puranic bhakti theism casting the paremeśvara in the role of the supreme yogin emanating and reabsorbing the universe in a yogic alternation of enstasis and alienation. Within the compass of the rudimentary attempt towards a theoretical integration of the experiential notion of īśvara in the seven relevant sūtras of the I book of the Yoga Sūtras, the paper highlights what amounts to a “proof of God’s existence” in YS I,25, discussing its interpretation by the chief commentators, and the resemblance in theoretical structure of a variant of the proof as expounded by Vijñānabhikṣu to the classical proof “ex gradibus entium” of scholastic theology.
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Ἀλεξάνδρεια/Alessandria, 2019
Uno dei piú celebri episodi upanisadici che hanno per protagonista il famoso maestro Yājñavalkya ... more Uno dei piú celebri episodi upanisadici che hanno per protagonista il famoso maestro Yājñavalkya lo vede trionfare in una disputa teologica su numerosi avversari, l’ultimo dei quali, Vidagdha Śākalya, subisce un atroce destino per aver avuto l’ardire di sfidarlo oltre il lecito: l’interrogativo finale che gli propone Yājñavalkya si rivela per lui un vero rompicapo, di nome e di fatto: incapace di rispondere, tasya hā mūrdhā vipapāta, ovvero, secondo una delle traduzioni piú correnti, “la sua testa andò in frantumi”. Si tratta dell’unico caso in cui un testo ci presenta l’attuazione effettiva dell’enigmatica minaccia di esplosione della testa che costituisce un topos del brahmodya, ovvero la ‘disputa sul brahman’, nelle sue varie forme. Già molti studiosi si sono cimentati a delucidare, da un lato, il reale significato dell’espressione formulare che coinvolge la rad. vi-pat — se da intendersi in una valenza variamente metaforica (‘perder la testa’ nel senso di andare in confusione, oppure ‘perdere la faccia’) ovvero letterale; d’altro lato, l’origine dell’espressione stessa, che taluno colloca, come già detto, nell’ambito teologico del brahmodya, ma talatro ritiene duplice, affiancando all’ambito teologico un ambito giuridico, le due radici originariamente distinte essendo poi confluite in un tronco unico; o ancora, le circostanze e i contesti nei quali la minaccia trova applicazione, attraverso l’analisi di una varietà di narrazioni desunte dai Brāhmaṇa, dalle Upaniṣad, dal canone pāli del Buddhismo, fino a storie piú recenti del Rāmāyaṇa e del Mahābhārata. Sulla base di questi antecedenti, il presente contributo intende mostrare come le diverse modalità con cui ricorre il topos dello ‘scoppio della testa’ si possano in realtà ricondurre sotto la rubrica comune di una divaricazione tra parola e verità: lo scoppio della testa minaccia chi dice e non sa, oppure chi, in un modo o nell’altro, sa e non dice. Questo secondo aspetto, già presente in alcuni testi collaterali già noti ma relativamente meno studiati afferenti all’argomento, risulta chiaramente dall’esame di un nuovo testo che ora per la prima volta (a mia conoscenza) viene introdotto nella discussione: nella raccolta di novelle della Vetālapañcaviṁśati, la “Venticinquina del demone”, un re vincolato all’ingrato compito di portare a spalla un cadavere fino al luogo in cui deve esser utilizzato per un rituale di magia nera si sente apostrofare dalla salma, posseduta da un vetāla, che gli racconta una storia conclusa da un indovinello e gli ingiunge di dichiararne la soluzione, qualora ne sia a conoscenza, sotto pena di scoppio della testa; rispondendo, il re scampa alla minaccia, ma infrange un tabú della favella, ciò che lo costringe a riprendere da capo l’ordalia, in una fatica di Sisifo da cui l’unica via d’uscita è che il re, non sapendo, non dica.
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P. Balcerowicz (ed.), World View and Theory in Indian Philosophy, Delhi, 2012
Apūrvaṃ vyākaraṇakauśalam ity āstām: “let it remain an example of unprecedented grammatical skill... more Apūrvaṃ vyākaraṇakauśalam ity āstām: “let it remain an example of unprecedented grammatical skill” — thus sarcastically remarks the Dvaitin commentator Jayatīrtha on Śaṅkarācārya’s sleight of hand to turn written saṃbhūti into asaṃbhūti at one of the many difficult turns the Īśa Upaniṣad has in store for his strictly monistic stance. But Jayatīrtha’s own master Madhva is renowned in his own right for his “unprecedented skill” in conjuring up whole unattested smṛti passages to corroborate his interpretations. Indeed, more specimens of “unprecedented skill” are displayed in turn by each of the great bhāṣyakāras of the three conflicting schools — Advaita, Dvaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita — on this Upaniṣad, which on account of its extreme pithiness is singularly suited to demonstrate the length dārśanikas are willing to go to make an authoritative text square each with his own preconceived philosophical outlook.
A most telling example of the preemptive force of world-views on actual theoretical practice in the Indian context.
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Comparative Studies
Textos y contextos (II). Exégesis y hermenéutica de obras tardoantiguas y medievales, Mar del Plata 2012, 2012
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Richard Seaford (ed.), Universe and Inner Self in Early Indian and Early Greek Thought, Edinburgh, 2016
The intriguing similarity between the allegories of the soul chariot in Plato’s Phædrus and in th... more The intriguing similarity between the allegories of the soul chariot in Plato’s Phædrus and in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad has been pointed out — if not thoroughly investigated — by several scholars, accompanied with varying assessments, largely dependent on each individual scholar’s assumptions concerning the bare possibility or the degree of likelihood of contacts and influences between early Greek and Indian thought, the significance (or otherwise) of the intercultural comparative endeavour, or, indeed, the methodological soundness of even positing the question, in the almost complete absence of pertinent historical documentation.
Because assessments are to such a great extent influenced by theoretical assumptions, the paper will start with some methodological considerations in order to define the grounds, scope and limits of the attempted comparison, also drawing on the methodological discourses of other related fields, like mythology and folklore.
A review of the relevant texts of the Phædrus and the Kaṭhopaniṣad will come next, setting out both the congruencies and the discrepancies in the treatment of the chariot allegory. A detailed survey of kindred passages in both literary traditions (which I have presented elsewhere) lies outside the purview of this paper, but a summary reference to its results will help substantiate the contention that the allegory of the soul chariot is integral to upaniṣadic thought in a way that is unparalleled in Greek thought, thus supporting the conjecture of diffusion in a westward direction.
Finally, the paper will briefly discuss what I regard as the paramount difference — i.e. the conspicuous absence of the idle passenger in the Phædrus allegory vs. his centrality to the allegory of the Kaṭha — and its significance as a theoretical watershed between Upaniṣad-based Indian and Plato-influenced Greek philosophy.
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Indian Philosophy and Yoga
A most telling example of the preemptive force of world-views on actual theoretical practice in the Indian context.
Comparative Studies
Because assessments are to such a great extent influenced by theoretical assumptions, the paper will start with some methodological considerations in order to define the grounds, scope and limits of the attempted comparison, also drawing on the methodological discourses of other related fields, like mythology and folklore.
A review of the relevant texts of the Phædrus and the Kaṭhopaniṣad will come next, setting out both the congruencies and the discrepancies in the treatment of the chariot allegory. A detailed survey of kindred passages in both literary traditions (which I have presented elsewhere) lies outside the purview of this paper, but a summary reference to its results will help substantiate the contention that the allegory of the soul chariot is integral to upaniṣadic thought in a way that is unparalleled in Greek thought, thus supporting the conjecture of diffusion in a westward direction.
Finally, the paper will briefly discuss what I regard as the paramount difference — i.e. the conspicuous absence of the idle passenger in the Phædrus allegory vs. his centrality to the allegory of the Kaṭha — and its significance as a theoretical watershed between Upaniṣad-based Indian and Plato-influenced Greek philosophy.
A most telling example of the preemptive force of world-views on actual theoretical practice in the Indian context.
Because assessments are to such a great extent influenced by theoretical assumptions, the paper will start with some methodological considerations in order to define the grounds, scope and limits of the attempted comparison, also drawing on the methodological discourses of other related fields, like mythology and folklore.
A review of the relevant texts of the Phædrus and the Kaṭhopaniṣad will come next, setting out both the congruencies and the discrepancies in the treatment of the chariot allegory. A detailed survey of kindred passages in both literary traditions (which I have presented elsewhere) lies outside the purview of this paper, but a summary reference to its results will help substantiate the contention that the allegory of the soul chariot is integral to upaniṣadic thought in a way that is unparalleled in Greek thought, thus supporting the conjecture of diffusion in a westward direction.
Finally, the paper will briefly discuss what I regard as the paramount difference — i.e. the conspicuous absence of the idle passenger in the Phædrus allegory vs. his centrality to the allegory of the Kaṭha — and its significance as a theoretical watershed between Upaniṣad-based Indian and Plato-influenced Greek philosophy.
This paper fits into the author’s ongoing undertaking to approach some fundamental philosophical themes in the kindred Greek and Indian philosophical traditions from a comparative perspective, showing how such approach can benefit both sides by fostering a deeper understanding of shared philosophical questions. In relation to the present object, it will be shown how the frame of the Platonic anámnēsis can help throw light on the import of a hitherto neglected group of pātañjala sūtras, while intimating a new possibility for the interpretation of a moot passage in Plato’s Meno which has so far defied the perspicacity of the scholars.
In my paper I purpose first of all a survey of the extant material by presenting, besides the well-known versions of the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, Mahābhārata, Matsya and Bhāgavata Purāṇa, to which the analysis has usually been confined so far, some other less known versions, like those of the Viṣṇudharmottara and Kālikā Purāṇa, which add highly significant traits to the picture. Secondly, on the basis of that material, I intend to show as the Indian myth as a whole exhibits its own peculiar structure, quite different from the structure of the myths of the other great traditions, except for a couple of very generic features, which are, I should think, almost unavoidable in any deluge myth by reason of its very internal structure, and are as such quite worthless in either establishing or denying any historical relationship whatsoever.
It had already been remarked, in this connection, that the Indian myth lacks all kind of ethical motivation, as the deluge itself is part of the ongoing cosmogonic process, hence naturally grounded; or that the closing sacrifice has an utterly different meaning in the Indian and semitic myth. However, scholars had hitherto failed to notice, as I believe, the specifically Indian import of the symbolism of the ship — tipically preexistent, and not fashioned by the protégé —, the peculiarity of the symbolic plexus of the ship and fish, later enriched by the rope as third element, and its solidarity with other mythical representations, with which a deep-rooted homology unexpectedly comes to light in spite of the seeming eterogeneity.
In conclusion, the Indian deluge myth shows unmistakable original traits in its indissoluble connection with such typically Indian themes as (to mention but a few) the multilevel cyclical cosmic structure, the notion of residue, the avatāra, the divine monoceros, the earth foundering under the burden of the living.
As a prominent instance of so-called “substance-powers” or Daseinsmächte, as Glasenapp originally termed them, meaning by such term “hypostases of qualities and processes conceived as self-standing substances”, tejas shares the transferability which is an essential property of substances — in contradistinction to qualities, which, existing only in alio and not enjoying an independent status, cannot be transferred as such. (As has already been noted, Indian thought is apt to hypostatize what would elsewhere be counted a mere quality: a well known case in point is puṇya, i.e. ‘virtue/merit’, which is not regarded in the śāstras as the inherent attribute of the virtuous, but rather as a stock of goods liable to be alienated to someone else).
The basic mechanics of tejas transfer, configuring either an increment or a decrement, can be further specified according to a fourfold typology: i) bestowal with inception of being; ii) bestowal with promotion of status; iii) withdrawal with demotion from status; iv) withdrawal with cessation from being. Such fourfold typology depends on a twofold acception of the notion of tejas, either (in a broader sense, brought out, e.g. in Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa I, 171, 2-7: ajeyaṃ vaiṣṇavaṃ tejas tac ca nityaṃ ca jantuṣu | nāśam āyānti te sarve hīnā vaiṣṇavatejasā) as the Lord’s selfsame cosmic life-sustaining energy, or (in a more restricted sense, brought out, e.g. in Bhagavad Gītā 10, 41: yad yad vibhūtimat sattvaṃ śrīmad ūrjitam eva vā | tat tad evāvagaccha tvaṃ mama tejo’mśasaṃbhavam) as a special supererogatory dispensation, building up the pre-eminence of exceptionally powerful beings. Whereas the bestowal and withdrawal of tejas in the general sense cannot but entail, respectively, origination and dissolution, the shift of (supererogatory) tejas in the special sense can have less drastic consequences.
Although the word tejas occurs only sparingly in the Ṛg Veda, and regularly only in connection with the root meaning, as other tij-derivatives, the germs are already visible of a metaphorical extension of the basic meaning of ‘sharpness’ pointing to the later acception. The frequency increases considerably in the Atharva Veda, where tejas is usually found associated with other ‘Daseinsmächte’ such as varcas, ojas and the like. In the Brāhmaṇas tejas is consistently connected with fire as a specific ‘energy’. The upanisadic usage is heterogeneous, but a few passages can be singled out in which tejas comes decidedly to the foreground as one of the ultimate constituents of reality. Such doctrines as the well known teaching of Uddālaka Aruṇi to his son Śvetaketu in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad on the threefold propagation of being through the hierarchy of tejas, āpas and anna, and still more some later Maitrāyaṇī doctrines, may be regarded as the early antecedents of the distinctive epic-puranic development of the notion of tejas as a (kind of) energy wielded by the supreme Lord for the accomplishment of his cosmic tasks.
Tejas plays a central role in some of the most characteristic mythical themes of each of the great gods of Hinduism, such as Viṣṇu’s avatāras, Śiva’s interrupted love-making to Pārvatī and Skanda’s unnatural birth from the spilt seed, the severing of Brahmā’s unauspicious fifth head, the origin of Devī, and Sūrya’s shaping on Viśvakarman’s lathe, to mention but a few.
By analysing the vast corpus of tejas myths motive-wise it is possible to enucleate from the context its most significant traits, and thereby gain a deeper insight into its authentic meaning. Only a few can be mentioned here. In the Purāṇas tejas is a kind of energy with fiery connotations. In spite of its ancient association with procreation and seed, it is typically destructive — or if at all creative, it regularly carries destructive implications or undertones. Its dangerous potential can be traced back to the notion of excess which is already inherent in the rigvedic usage. Tejas may be congenital in some overpowerful beings, both animate — such as gods, demons, seers, kings — and inanimate — such as weapons and poison, but its ultimate source is the supreme Lord, who can infuse it either directly or indirectly. Hence tejas is not permanent, like a property: rather, as is appropriate to a substance-power, it is eminently liable to be lost or transferred or withdrawn in consequence of sin, impurity, defeat, death or simply purposelessness ensuing from final success. Although on the one hand the Bhagavad Gītā’s proclaim holds good that all tejas comes from the Lord, yet it also obeys its intrinsic laws, which the Lord himself cannot infringe — a paradoxical impotence on which is built the common pattern of so many avatāra myths. An explanation is to be sought in the enduring dialectic rooted deep in Indian culture and sprouting along the course of its development the conflicting branches of monism and theism, ritualism and devotion, belief in magic and surrender to grace. "
The story runs basically as follows: Paraśurāma has heard about Rāma’s wondrous feat of the breaking of Śiva’s bow at the court of Janaka, which has earned him the hand of princess Sītā, and comes raging to challenge him. This time Rāma shall prove his strength by stringing Viṣṇu’s bow, receiving it from Paraśurāma’s hands. Rāma is successful, Paraśurāma is punished for his arrogance and retreats to mount Mahendra without further ado.
Apart from the Rāmāyaṇa, a variant of the story is found in the Vulgate, which has however been discarded by the CE of the Mahābhārata. In the Purāṇas the episode occurs rather inconspicuously in the Padma, Narasiṁha and Viṣṇudharmottara. It appears, however, to have found greater favour with kāvya: after Kalidāsa’s masterly reworking in the Raghuvaṁśa other mahākāvyas featuring (or at least mentioning) our episode include Bhaṭṭi’s Rāvaṇavadha and Kumāradāsa’s Jānakīharaṇa. Playwrights seem to have been particularly keen on the theme; dramatic works featuring it include the Yajñaphala ascribed to Bhāsa, Bhavabhūti’s incomplete Mahāvīracarita, and Rājaśekhara’s Bālarāmāyaṇa. The episode likewise figures prominently in late bhakta and śākta Rāmāyaṇas both sanskrit and vernacular, such as the sanskrit Adhyātma and Adbhutarāmāyaṇa, the tamil Kamparāmāyaṇam, the hindi Rāmcaritmanas by Tulsīdās, as well as other medieval works like the Rāmavijaya by Śaṅkaradeva.
In this paper I purpose to focus on an analysis of the way Kalidāsa’s retelling in the Raghuvaṁśa relates to its epic model, as well as on the way it has in turn influenced later versions of the episode.
Outside the tantric context, however, the Purāṇas have been regarded as the authoritative Scriptures also for the present age of degeneration, and they have fulfilled their role as custodians and upholders of the living tradition by various strategies aimed at striking a difficult and sometimes precarious balance between conservation and innovation. Indeed, the notion of constant adaptive evolution is built-in in the very name of the Purāṇas, which according to a long-established (para)etymology defines them as “from of old becoming ever new”. This paper will analyze some of the ways the authors of this remarkable class of texts have gone about their wondrous task of making for change while ensuring continuity.
This interpretation is corroborated by the odd re-emergence of some key themes and motifs in the most diverse contexts in other narratives featuring Uttaṅka as a ṛṣi in his post-discipleship career, among which most prominent are the story of the killing of the asura Dhundhu and the aetiological myth about the origin of so-called “Uttaṅka’s clouds” (uttaṅkamegha). Although to unravel the complex net of relationships linking these stories with one another as well as with sundry narratives pertaining to other mythical characters would exceed by far the limits of the present paper, a couple of especially noteworthy instances may be pointed out. The theme of ambrosia disguised under loathsome appearances is common to both the quest and the aetiological myth, under reversed circumstances: either readily offered and reluctantly (and unwittingly) accepted, or reluctantly offered and unwittingly refused. The motif of the netherworld and the fiery subterranean stallion (elsewhere the fiery submarine mare) links the quest and the Dhundhumāra myth in an even more elusive yet intriguing fashion, while evoking other well known destructive underworld stallions, such as Sagara’s missing aśvamedha horse responsible for the burning of his sixty thousand sons (to mention but the most obvious).
Twelve of the articles primarily concern aspects of the Mahābhārata and its khila, the Harivaṃśa. Two of these explore the relationship of the Mahābhārata to Buddhism. Two papers offer stimulating discussions of matters arising from the preparation of the concluding volume to the 30-year Princeton Rāmāyaṇa translation project, a landmark in Indological research. The remaining six papers analyse aspects of the Purāṇas, three within the broader mythological and ideological contexts shared by the epics and Purāṇas, and three in regard to the regional traditions represented by Sthala- Purāṇas and Māhātmyas.
The sum of this volume’s parts demonstrate the vibrancy of the fields to which it contributes, a vibrancy underscored by the diversity of their methodological approaches and insights. Many of these insights will endure; some chart new and promising directions in Indological research. Above all, this volume further reinforces the foundational and enduring importance of these immense texts to the literatures, histories and cultures of South Asia and beyond.