Disappointing Systems in Ukraine - From imprecise precision munitions to explosive IFVs
The Australians at PERun have spent a lot of time in the past talking about systems that have been called 'game changers' or arguably overperformed in Ukraine, relative to either expectations, costs, or both.
Today, they look at some of the opposite - systems that may not be having the expected impact, and which might prompt some thinking in planners observing the Ukrainian experience.
Patreon:
/ perunau
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Reading and Sourcing:
- DoD Reimbursable Rates FY2023 https://comptroller.defense.gov/Porta...
- BMD-4M Product Information https://roe.ru/eng/catalog/land-force...
- US Army - FY 2025 Budget Estimates - Aircraft Procurement,
- Army https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72...
- Program Acquisition Cost by Weapon System United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2025 Budget Request https://comptroller.defense.gov/Porta...
- Chatham House - Assessing Russian Plans for Military Regeneration https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/de...
- Excalibur announcement and initial arrival reporting https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Sto... https://interestingengineering.com/vi...
- Reporting on Polish AH-64 purchase https://www.dsca.mil/sites/default/fi... https://www.reuters.com/world/poland-... https://breakingdefense.com/2024/08/a...
- Reporting on Russian EW https://www.businessinsider.com/us-ga... https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/25/wo...
- Roger McDermott "Shamanov Fights for VDV’s Future" - 2012 https://jamestown.org/program/shamano...
- Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) - AH-64E Apache New Build - Dec 2022 https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Do...
- Reporting on FARA https://www.flightglobal.com/defence/... https://www.defensenew s.com/air/2024/02/08/us-army-spent-billions-on-a-new-helicopter-that-now-will-never-fly/
- Russian Ultra-nationalist rally report 2007 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ru...
- Japan https://www.australiandefence.com.au/... interceptor drone vs Helicopter https://www.twz.com/air/ukraine-situa...
- Hellfire 2 https://www.lockheedmartin.com/conten...
- JAGM https://www.lockheedmartin.com/conten...
- Polish Chunmoo order https://www.janes.com/osint-insights/...
- Reporting on EW in Ukraine https://kyivindependent.com/the-invis... https://www.afr.com/world/europe/russ... Spike NLOS + AH-64 https://www.defenceconnect.com.au/joi...
Caveats & Comments:
All normal caveats and comments apply. In particular – I would like to note as always that this material has been created for entertainment purposes and is not intended to be a complete or comprehensive examination of the topic in question and should not be relied upon to inform financial or other similar decisions.
Any content relating to the conduct or political views and/or activities of any person or character in this video is included for entertainment purposes and does not represent an assertion of fact on those matters.
Timestamps:
- 00:00 — Opening Words
- 00:54 — What Am I Talking About?
- 03:08 — Rating This
- 05:15 — When Precision - Isn't
- 07:30 — Excalibur 12:51 — GLSDB
- 20:10 — The Paradrop Problem
- 32:19 — Speaking Of Attack Helicopters
- 35:45 — Attack Helicopter Losses
- 41:08 — Polish Figures
- 47:04 — What Could It Be Instead?
- 54:01 — Not The End For Rotary...
- 58:13 — Channel Update
Video Summary
Here's a summary of the key points from the video:
1. The video discusses military systems and concepts that have underperformed or may be under pressure in the Ukraine conflict.
2. It establishes criteria for judging if a system is underperforming, including efficacy, efficiency, broad trends, future requirements, and potential alternatives.
3. The video examines several categories of systems:
a) Non-jam resistant Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs):
- Some PGMs like Excalibur rounds and Ground Launched Small Diameter Bombs (GLSDB) have become less effective due to Russian electronic warfare.
- This has led to decreased accuracy and increased costs per successful strike.
- Alternatives like jam-resistant PGMs or wide-area effect munitions are being considered.
b) Specialized Airborne equipment (e.g., BMD-4 infantry fighting vehicle):
- These vehicles are designed to be air-droppable but have proven highly vulnerable in combat.
- They have a high rate of catastrophic destruction when hit, potentially due to design trade-offs.
- Some airborne units are moving away from truly airborne-capable equipment to more conventional armor.
c) Attack helicopters:
- Both Russian and Ukrainian attack helicopters have suffered significant losses.
- They've been limited in their operations due to vulnerability to various air defense systems.
- Their cost-effectiveness is questioned when compared to alternatives like fixed-wing aircraft or long-range missile systems.
- The increasing prevalence of drones and air defense systems may further threaten their viability.
4. The video suggests that these experiences in Ukraine may lead to reassessment of investment in these systems by militaries worldwide, with some countries already scaling back plans for attack helicopters in favor of unmanned systems or other alternatives.
5. The presenter cautions that while these systems may be under pressure, it doesn't necessarily signal their immediate obsolescence, but rather a potential shift in how aggressively they're invested in or utilized in future conflicts.
1. The video discusses military systems and concepts that have underperformed or may be under pressure in the Ukraine conflict.
2. It establishes criteria for judging if a system is underperforming, including efficacy, efficiency, broad trends, future requirements, and potential alternatives.
3. The video examines several categories of systems:
a) Non-jam resistant Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs):
- Some PGMs like Excalibur rounds and Ground Launched Small Diameter Bombs (GLSDB) have become less effective due to Russian electronic warfare.
- This has led to decreased accuracy and increased costs per successful strike.
- Alternatives like jam-resistant PGMs or wide-area effect munitions are being considered.
b) Specialized Airborne equipment (e.g., BMD-4 infantry fighting vehicle):
- These vehicles are designed to be air-droppable but have proven highly vulnerable in combat.
- They have a high rate of catastrophic destruction when hit, potentially due to design trade-offs.
- Some airborne units are moving away from truly airborne-capable equipment to more conventional armor.
c) Attack helicopters:
- Both Russian and Ukrainian attack helicopters have suffered significant losses.
- They've been limited in their operations due to vulnerability to various air defense systems.
- Their cost-effectiveness is questioned when compared to alternatives like fixed-wing aircraft or long-range missile systems.
- The increasing prevalence of drones and air defense systems may further threaten their viability.
4. The video suggests that these experiences in Ukraine may lead to reassessment of investment in these systems by militaries worldwide, with some countries already scaling back plans for attack helicopters in favor of unmanned systems or other alternatives.
5. The presenter cautions that while these systems may be under pressure, it doesn't necessarily signal their immediate obsolescence, but rather a potential shift in how aggressively they're invested in or utilized in future conflicts.
Summary A, C, or F Systems
Separating the systems into three categories based on their performance as described in the video:
2. Ground Launched Small Diameter Bomb (GLSDB)
3. BMD-4 (and BMD-2) infantry fighting vehicle
4. Russian Attack Helicopters (Ka-52, Mi-28, Mi-35)
5. Ukrainian Attack Helicopters (Mi-24)
2. Hellfire and AGM-179 missiles
2. Man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS)
3. K239 Chunmoo multiple rocket launch system
4. Fixed-wing aircraft (F-35, F-16, Su-34)
This categorization is based on the video's analysis of each system's performance in the context of the Ukraine conflict and potential future scenarios. It's worth noting that the assessment of some systems, particularly those in the "Potential Fail" category, is based on concerns about their effectiveness in future conflicts rather than their current performance.
F = Fail:
1. M982 Excalibur guided artillery shell2. Ground Launched Small Diameter Bomb (GLSDB)
3. BMD-4 (and BMD-2) infantry fighting vehicle
4. Russian Attack Helicopters (Ka-52, Mi-28, Mi-35)
5. Ukrainian Attack Helicopters (Mi-24)
D = Potential Fail:
1. AH-64 Apache Attack Helicopter2. Hellfire and AGM-179 missiles
C = Meets or Exceeds Expectations:
1. Russian Kh-59 missile2. Man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS)
3. K239 Chunmoo multiple rocket launch system
4. Fixed-wing aircraft (F-35, F-16, Su-34)
This categorization is based on the video's analysis of each system's performance in the context of the Ukraine conflict and potential future scenarios. It's worth noting that the assessment of some systems, particularly those in the "Potential Fail" category, is based on concerns about their effectiveness in future conflicts rather than their current performance.
Specific Weapon Systems Mentioned
Here's the combined list with both the characterization and the meeting/failing expectations:
1. M982 Excalibur guided artillery shell:
- Precision-guided 155mm artillery round
- Initially effective but became less accurate due to Russian electronic warfare
- Success rate dropped from 55% to as low as 6-7%
- Cost per successful strike increased from $300,000 to $1.9 million
- Failing: Initially effective but became significantly less accurate due to Russian electronic warfare
2. Ground Launched Small Diameter Bomb (GLSDB):
- Combination of rocket motor with air-delivered small diameter bomb
- Intended to extend Ukraine's strike range to 150 km
- Proved vulnerable to Russian jamming, affecting its precision
- Failing: Proved vulnerable to Russian jamming, affecting its precision
3. BMD-4 (and BMD-2) infantry fighting vehicle:
- Russian air-droppable armored vehicle
- Described as highly vulnerable in combat
- High rate of catastrophic destruction when hit (85% fully destroyed vs 70% for BMP-2/3)
- Characterized as having insufficient armor for ground combat
- Failing: Highly vulnerable in combat, insufficient armor for ground combat
4. Russian Attack Helicopters (Ka-52, Mi-28, Mi-35):
- Initially effective but became vulnerable to Ukrainian air defenses
- Suffered significant losses
- Limited in operations due to vulnerability
- Failing: Became vulnerable to Ukrainian air defenses, limited in operations
5. Ukrainian Attack Helicopters (Mi-24):
- Limited by lack of advanced weapons
- Often used as "hypermobile airborne grad" (rocket artillery)
- Failing: Limited by lack of advanced weapons, reduced to less sophisticated roles
6. AH-64 Apache Attack Helicopter:
- Expensive to procure and operate ($100+ million per unit in recent Polish deal)
- Range of anti-tank missiles (like Hellfire) potentially too short for modern threats
- Potentially failing: Expensive to procure and operate, range of weapons potentially too short for modern threats
7. Hellfire and AGM-179 missiles:
- Main armaments for Apache helicopters
- Range (7-8 km) characterized as potentially too short against modern threats
- Potentially failing: Range characterized as potentially too short against modern threats
8. Russian Kh-59 missile:
- Long-range air-to-surface missile used by Russian attack helicopters
- Allowed for stand-off attacks beyond the range of short-range air defenses
- Meeting expectations: Allowed for effective stand-off attacks
9. Man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS):
- Increasingly threatening to helicopters
- Examples like Starstreak have ranges approaching those of helicopter-launched missiles
- Exceeding expectations: Increasingly threatening to helicopters, effective against various air targets
10. K239 Chunmoo multiple rocket launch system:
- Presented as a potentially more cost-effective alternative to attack helicopters for long-range strikes
- Meeting/Exceeding expectations: Presented as a cost-effective alternative for long-range strikes
11. Fixed-wing aircraft (F-35, F-16, Su-34):
- Characterized as potentially more versatile and survivable than attack helicopters
- Able to perform multiple roles in both permissive and contested environments
- Meeting/Exceeding expectations: Characterized as more versatile and survivable than attack helicopters
This list combines the detailed descriptions with the assessment of whether each system is meeting, exceeding, or failing expectations based on the document's analysis.
1. M982 Excalibur guided artillery shell:
- Precision-guided 155mm artillery round
- Initially effective but became less accurate due to Russian electronic warfare
- Success rate dropped from 55% to as low as 6-7%
- Cost per successful strike increased from $300,000 to $1.9 million
- Failing: Initially effective but became significantly less accurate due to Russian electronic warfare
2. Ground Launched Small Diameter Bomb (GLSDB):
- Combination of rocket motor with air-delivered small diameter bomb
- Intended to extend Ukraine's strike range to 150 km
- Proved vulnerable to Russian jamming, affecting its precision
- Failing: Proved vulnerable to Russian jamming, affecting its precision
3. BMD-4 (and BMD-2) infantry fighting vehicle:
- Russian air-droppable armored vehicle
- Described as highly vulnerable in combat
- High rate of catastrophic destruction when hit (85% fully destroyed vs 70% for BMP-2/3)
- Characterized as having insufficient armor for ground combat
- Failing: Highly vulnerable in combat, insufficient armor for ground combat
4. Russian Attack Helicopters (Ka-52, Mi-28, Mi-35):
- Initially effective but became vulnerable to Ukrainian air defenses
- Suffered significant losses
- Limited in operations due to vulnerability
- Failing: Became vulnerable to Ukrainian air defenses, limited in operations
5. Ukrainian Attack Helicopters (Mi-24):
- Limited by lack of advanced weapons
- Often used as "hypermobile airborne grad" (rocket artillery)
- Failing: Limited by lack of advanced weapons, reduced to less sophisticated roles
6. AH-64 Apache Attack Helicopter:
- Expensive to procure and operate ($100+ million per unit in recent Polish deal)
- Range of anti-tank missiles (like Hellfire) potentially too short for modern threats
- Potentially failing: Expensive to procure and operate, range of weapons potentially too short for modern threats
7. Hellfire and AGM-179 missiles:
- Main armaments for Apache helicopters
- Range (7-8 km) characterized as potentially too short against modern threats
- Potentially failing: Range characterized as potentially too short against modern threats
8. Russian Kh-59 missile:
- Long-range air-to-surface missile used by Russian attack helicopters
- Allowed for stand-off attacks beyond the range of short-range air defenses
- Meeting expectations: Allowed for effective stand-off attacks
9. Man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS):
- Increasingly threatening to helicopters
- Examples like Starstreak have ranges approaching those of helicopter-launched missiles
- Exceeding expectations: Increasingly threatening to helicopters, effective against various air targets
10. K239 Chunmoo multiple rocket launch system:
- Presented as a potentially more cost-effective alternative to attack helicopters for long-range strikes
- Meeting/Exceeding expectations: Presented as a cost-effective alternative for long-range strikes
11. Fixed-wing aircraft (F-35, F-16, Su-34):
- Characterized as potentially more versatile and survivable than attack helicopters
- Able to perform multiple roles in both permissive and contested environments
- Meeting/Exceeding expectations: Characterized as more versatile and survivable than attack helicopters
This list combines the detailed descriptions with the assessment of whether each system is meeting, exceeding, or failing expectations based on the document's analysis.
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