Papers by Ilaria D'Angelo
Metodo. International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy, 2014
Hegel e la fenomenologia trascendentale, Jun 2015
In the third part of Being and Nothingness Sartre elaborates a critique against Husserl and Hegel... more In the third part of Being and Nothingness Sartre elaborates a critique against Husserl and Hegel regarding solipsism and the problem of the existence of others. I hereby intend to take into consideration such a critique in order to analyze its main contents and develop its meaning beyond Sartre's intention. In particular, I shall address the problem of the circular reference between realism and idealism, the difference between ontological and epistemological approaches to the problem of others, and the nexus between solipsism and solitude. These points will uncover the need to further clarify some aspects of Sartre's critique – starting from the meaning of solipsism and solitude – which I shall be dealing with by taking into consideration Hannah Arendt's distinction between solitude and loneliness.
In light of this clarification, I will conclude that the most interesting part of Sartre's critique does not lie in Sartre's arguments against Husserl and Hegel. Rather, it seems that this critique actually prepares the ground for rethinking and reshaping the relationship between Husserl and Hegel on themes such as the concrete being of others and the solitude of thinking beyond simplistic patterns of thought.
Metodo. International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy Vol.II, No II On Virtuality, Nov 2014
Reviews by Ilaria D'Angelo
Edited Volumes by Ilaria D'Angelo
Call for Papers by Ilaria D'Angelo
Interview by Ilaria D'Angelo
Francesco Orlando intervistato da Ilaria D'Angelo e Annastella Giannelli
Dissertations by Ilaria D'Angelo
In my dissertation, I proposed a study of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and, in particul... more In my dissertation, I proposed a study of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and, in particular, of those peculiar characters that define the transcendental perspective elaborated from the first decade of the twentieth century until the later years of Husserl's philosophical activity.
I started this investigation by illustrating the fragmented image of transcendental phenomenology that stems from a number of different positions and critical judgments expressed by many scholars about Husserl's philosophical reflection. Such criticisms mainly focus on the ability of transcendental phenomenology to deal with the cultural crisis of rationality that characterized the first part of the twentieth century, cast a fresh look on the problem, and forge a new effective method of reflection to address it. However, my aim was not to respond to every single critique, but to question this fragmented image and account for the sense of Husserl's transcendental project leaving aside ready-made labels such as realism or idealism.
Thus, I primarily took into considerations J.N. Mohanty's description of two models of transcendental philosophy: one is the Kantian transcendental phenomenology that appeals to a set of principles and is concerned with transcendental subjectivity only to the extent of finding the source of these principles that constitute scientific knowledge. The second model, instead, is that of a concrete subjectivity which uses a method of reflection to lay bare the founding stratum of experience. In this case we can speak of a transcendental reflection that aims to show the constituting intentional experience – namely, that aims at bringing acts of knowledge and experience to evidence.
This evidenz-theoretisch transcendental phenomenology was the main object of my study, which firstly aimed to clarify this notion of evidence and this basic idea of laying bare and clearly grasping what really characterizes acts of knowledge and experience by bringing them back to evidence. On the other hand, with this kind of study I tried to provide some clues not only to overcome the fragmented image of transcendental phenomenology given by the post-Husserlian scholarship, but also to lay the groundwork for reassessing its actual contribution to contemporary philosophical debates.
With this end in mind, I dedicated the first three chapters of the work to the development of the phenomenological transcendental perspective based on evidence in order to grasp its meaning throughout three different phases and stages of phenomenology starting from the first decade of the twentieth century, and ending with the changes and revisions of the later years of Husserl's phenomenology.
In particular, I focused on Husserl's effort of clarifying acts of knowledge and objective meaning between the Logical Investigations and Ideas I, which leads us to the discovery of the immanent evident givenness of consciousness as a new territory of givenness, as well as to the definition of the phenomenological standpoint on consciousness and mental experiences different from the psychological one. Furthermore, by taking into account the analyses dedicated to time consciousness, imaginative consciousness and the lectures where Husserl introduced the method of reduction, I tried to present the direction taken by the phenomenological clarification after the Investigations and highlight
some meaningful notions such as ‘evident perception’, ‘immanent and internal consciousness’ and ‘phenomenological pure seeing’ (or phenomenological perception), which I believe are very important for understanding how Husserl envisioned the project of pure phenomenology and the transcendental perspective.
In the second chapter, I primarily referred to the project of a pure, transcendental phenomenology in order to further understand and highlight the basic insight of transcendental phenomenology in Ideas I. In this regard, I had a twofold aim in mind: on the one hand I tried to clarify the significance of evidence in Husserl's project of a rigorous scientific philosophy, and, on the other hand, I attempted to clear the air from some misunderstandings regarding transcendental phenomenology and the idea of a change of attitude or a change of vision.
Therefore, in view of this twofold end I focused on Ideas I and tried to retrace the path of a new transcendental attitude and its main outcomes, starting from what Husserl called the Principle of all principles and then addressing the problem of how the absolute immanent consciousness actually fits into the project of pure phenomenology. Furthermore, I also tried to provide an interpretation of the meaning of the phenomenological change of attitude which entails the possibility of assuming a pure first-person standpoint from which analyzing and examining through pure acts of reflection the lived experience as it is lived by the subject. This means also that from the pure transcendental standpoint it is possible to carry on the phenomenological task of clarification by learning to see and look and look again at what lies within view: namely, the necessary and essential structures of consciousness, the contingent contents as well as the constitutive functions of the unity of meaning.
Regarding the later years of transcendental phenomenology, I illustrated in the third chapter the main trends of the process of revision and change underwent by the phenomenological perspective. In particular, I argued that, thanks to this process of revision which entails the discovery of the genesis of sense (and of the genetic historical dimension of the stream of consciousness) as well as the radicalization of the transcendental perspective, it is possible to understand not only the most interesting aspects of Husserl's phenomenology (like, for instance, the pre-predicative layers of experience, the role of the Body and the notion of empty presentation) but also the advancement of the transcendental perspective towards a theory of reason.
Finally, in the fourth chapter, I came back to the problem of the fragmented image of phenomenology, which I believe can be overcome by taking into consideration the self-evident immanent givenness of consciousness that shows the shortcomings of both realist and idealist positions. Moreover, there is also a positive role for transcendental phenomenology in the contemporary philosophical debates such as that between internalism and externalism to be taken into consideration, namely, a positive contribution that transcendental phenomenology can provide to the actual problems of knowledge and experience. In particular, I tried to lay the groundwork to assess this contribution by taking into account the notion of transcendental experience, its meaning and its relation with ordinary experience, through which I believe it is possible to restore to the account of the mind-world relation the complexity that it deserves.
About the conclusions of this work, I wanted to come back to the meaning of Husserl's philosophy as a transcendental philosophy based on evidence and on the problem of how this evidence can really provide a new way of being of the foundations of knowledge and rationality. I believe that the answer to this question come from the realization that, through the phenomenological method of reflection, you will never reach a dogmatic “new” foundational ground that will substitute the world or the reality that we know in the natural attitude. However, what can be actually gained is a new trusting relationship with the experience as it is lived by me, the subject, which is actually the basic starting point to gain also a higher clarity about the world and reality – a higher clarity that, however, does not coincide with a passive, contemplative acceptance of a true form or a true reality, but that can only stems from a relentless effort to see what lies within view.
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Papers by Ilaria D'Angelo
In light of this clarification, I will conclude that the most interesting part of Sartre's critique does not lie in Sartre's arguments against Husserl and Hegel. Rather, it seems that this critique actually prepares the ground for rethinking and reshaping the relationship between Husserl and Hegel on themes such as the concrete being of others and the solitude of thinking beyond simplistic patterns of thought.
Reviews by Ilaria D'Angelo
Edited Volumes by Ilaria D'Angelo
Call for Papers by Ilaria D'Angelo
Interview by Ilaria D'Angelo
Dissertations by Ilaria D'Angelo
I started this investigation by illustrating the fragmented image of transcendental phenomenology that stems from a number of different positions and critical judgments expressed by many scholars about Husserl's philosophical reflection. Such criticisms mainly focus on the ability of transcendental phenomenology to deal with the cultural crisis of rationality that characterized the first part of the twentieth century, cast a fresh look on the problem, and forge a new effective method of reflection to address it. However, my aim was not to respond to every single critique, but to question this fragmented image and account for the sense of Husserl's transcendental project leaving aside ready-made labels such as realism or idealism.
Thus, I primarily took into considerations J.N. Mohanty's description of two models of transcendental philosophy: one is the Kantian transcendental phenomenology that appeals to a set of principles and is concerned with transcendental subjectivity only to the extent of finding the source of these principles that constitute scientific knowledge. The second model, instead, is that of a concrete subjectivity which uses a method of reflection to lay bare the founding stratum of experience. In this case we can speak of a transcendental reflection that aims to show the constituting intentional experience – namely, that aims at bringing acts of knowledge and experience to evidence.
This evidenz-theoretisch transcendental phenomenology was the main object of my study, which firstly aimed to clarify this notion of evidence and this basic idea of laying bare and clearly grasping what really characterizes acts of knowledge and experience by bringing them back to evidence. On the other hand, with this kind of study I tried to provide some clues not only to overcome the fragmented image of transcendental phenomenology given by the post-Husserlian scholarship, but also to lay the groundwork for reassessing its actual contribution to contemporary philosophical debates.
With this end in mind, I dedicated the first three chapters of the work to the development of the phenomenological transcendental perspective based on evidence in order to grasp its meaning throughout three different phases and stages of phenomenology starting from the first decade of the twentieth century, and ending with the changes and revisions of the later years of Husserl's phenomenology.
In particular, I focused on Husserl's effort of clarifying acts of knowledge and objective meaning between the Logical Investigations and Ideas I, which leads us to the discovery of the immanent evident givenness of consciousness as a new territory of givenness, as well as to the definition of the phenomenological standpoint on consciousness and mental experiences different from the psychological one. Furthermore, by taking into account the analyses dedicated to time consciousness, imaginative consciousness and the lectures where Husserl introduced the method of reduction, I tried to present the direction taken by the phenomenological clarification after the Investigations and highlight
some meaningful notions such as ‘evident perception’, ‘immanent and internal consciousness’ and ‘phenomenological pure seeing’ (or phenomenological perception), which I believe are very important for understanding how Husserl envisioned the project of pure phenomenology and the transcendental perspective.
In the second chapter, I primarily referred to the project of a pure, transcendental phenomenology in order to further understand and highlight the basic insight of transcendental phenomenology in Ideas I. In this regard, I had a twofold aim in mind: on the one hand I tried to clarify the significance of evidence in Husserl's project of a rigorous scientific philosophy, and, on the other hand, I attempted to clear the air from some misunderstandings regarding transcendental phenomenology and the idea of a change of attitude or a change of vision.
Therefore, in view of this twofold end I focused on Ideas I and tried to retrace the path of a new transcendental attitude and its main outcomes, starting from what Husserl called the Principle of all principles and then addressing the problem of how the absolute immanent consciousness actually fits into the project of pure phenomenology. Furthermore, I also tried to provide an interpretation of the meaning of the phenomenological change of attitude which entails the possibility of assuming a pure first-person standpoint from which analyzing and examining through pure acts of reflection the lived experience as it is lived by the subject. This means also that from the pure transcendental standpoint it is possible to carry on the phenomenological task of clarification by learning to see and look and look again at what lies within view: namely, the necessary and essential structures of consciousness, the contingent contents as well as the constitutive functions of the unity of meaning.
Regarding the later years of transcendental phenomenology, I illustrated in the third chapter the main trends of the process of revision and change underwent by the phenomenological perspective. In particular, I argued that, thanks to this process of revision which entails the discovery of the genesis of sense (and of the genetic historical dimension of the stream of consciousness) as well as the radicalization of the transcendental perspective, it is possible to understand not only the most interesting aspects of Husserl's phenomenology (like, for instance, the pre-predicative layers of experience, the role of the Body and the notion of empty presentation) but also the advancement of the transcendental perspective towards a theory of reason.
Finally, in the fourth chapter, I came back to the problem of the fragmented image of phenomenology, which I believe can be overcome by taking into consideration the self-evident immanent givenness of consciousness that shows the shortcomings of both realist and idealist positions. Moreover, there is also a positive role for transcendental phenomenology in the contemporary philosophical debates such as that between internalism and externalism to be taken into consideration, namely, a positive contribution that transcendental phenomenology can provide to the actual problems of knowledge and experience. In particular, I tried to lay the groundwork to assess this contribution by taking into account the notion of transcendental experience, its meaning and its relation with ordinary experience, through which I believe it is possible to restore to the account of the mind-world relation the complexity that it deserves.
About the conclusions of this work, I wanted to come back to the meaning of Husserl's philosophy as a transcendental philosophy based on evidence and on the problem of how this evidence can really provide a new way of being of the foundations of knowledge and rationality. I believe that the answer to this question come from the realization that, through the phenomenological method of reflection, you will never reach a dogmatic “new” foundational ground that will substitute the world or the reality that we know in the natural attitude. However, what can be actually gained is a new trusting relationship with the experience as it is lived by me, the subject, which is actually the basic starting point to gain also a higher clarity about the world and reality – a higher clarity that, however, does not coincide with a passive, contemplative acceptance of a true form or a true reality, but that can only stems from a relentless effort to see what lies within view.
In light of this clarification, I will conclude that the most interesting part of Sartre's critique does not lie in Sartre's arguments against Husserl and Hegel. Rather, it seems that this critique actually prepares the ground for rethinking and reshaping the relationship between Husserl and Hegel on themes such as the concrete being of others and the solitude of thinking beyond simplistic patterns of thought.
I started this investigation by illustrating the fragmented image of transcendental phenomenology that stems from a number of different positions and critical judgments expressed by many scholars about Husserl's philosophical reflection. Such criticisms mainly focus on the ability of transcendental phenomenology to deal with the cultural crisis of rationality that characterized the first part of the twentieth century, cast a fresh look on the problem, and forge a new effective method of reflection to address it. However, my aim was not to respond to every single critique, but to question this fragmented image and account for the sense of Husserl's transcendental project leaving aside ready-made labels such as realism or idealism.
Thus, I primarily took into considerations J.N. Mohanty's description of two models of transcendental philosophy: one is the Kantian transcendental phenomenology that appeals to a set of principles and is concerned with transcendental subjectivity only to the extent of finding the source of these principles that constitute scientific knowledge. The second model, instead, is that of a concrete subjectivity which uses a method of reflection to lay bare the founding stratum of experience. In this case we can speak of a transcendental reflection that aims to show the constituting intentional experience – namely, that aims at bringing acts of knowledge and experience to evidence.
This evidenz-theoretisch transcendental phenomenology was the main object of my study, which firstly aimed to clarify this notion of evidence and this basic idea of laying bare and clearly grasping what really characterizes acts of knowledge and experience by bringing them back to evidence. On the other hand, with this kind of study I tried to provide some clues not only to overcome the fragmented image of transcendental phenomenology given by the post-Husserlian scholarship, but also to lay the groundwork for reassessing its actual contribution to contemporary philosophical debates.
With this end in mind, I dedicated the first three chapters of the work to the development of the phenomenological transcendental perspective based on evidence in order to grasp its meaning throughout three different phases and stages of phenomenology starting from the first decade of the twentieth century, and ending with the changes and revisions of the later years of Husserl's phenomenology.
In particular, I focused on Husserl's effort of clarifying acts of knowledge and objective meaning between the Logical Investigations and Ideas I, which leads us to the discovery of the immanent evident givenness of consciousness as a new territory of givenness, as well as to the definition of the phenomenological standpoint on consciousness and mental experiences different from the psychological one. Furthermore, by taking into account the analyses dedicated to time consciousness, imaginative consciousness and the lectures where Husserl introduced the method of reduction, I tried to present the direction taken by the phenomenological clarification after the Investigations and highlight
some meaningful notions such as ‘evident perception’, ‘immanent and internal consciousness’ and ‘phenomenological pure seeing’ (or phenomenological perception), which I believe are very important for understanding how Husserl envisioned the project of pure phenomenology and the transcendental perspective.
In the second chapter, I primarily referred to the project of a pure, transcendental phenomenology in order to further understand and highlight the basic insight of transcendental phenomenology in Ideas I. In this regard, I had a twofold aim in mind: on the one hand I tried to clarify the significance of evidence in Husserl's project of a rigorous scientific philosophy, and, on the other hand, I attempted to clear the air from some misunderstandings regarding transcendental phenomenology and the idea of a change of attitude or a change of vision.
Therefore, in view of this twofold end I focused on Ideas I and tried to retrace the path of a new transcendental attitude and its main outcomes, starting from what Husserl called the Principle of all principles and then addressing the problem of how the absolute immanent consciousness actually fits into the project of pure phenomenology. Furthermore, I also tried to provide an interpretation of the meaning of the phenomenological change of attitude which entails the possibility of assuming a pure first-person standpoint from which analyzing and examining through pure acts of reflection the lived experience as it is lived by the subject. This means also that from the pure transcendental standpoint it is possible to carry on the phenomenological task of clarification by learning to see and look and look again at what lies within view: namely, the necessary and essential structures of consciousness, the contingent contents as well as the constitutive functions of the unity of meaning.
Regarding the later years of transcendental phenomenology, I illustrated in the third chapter the main trends of the process of revision and change underwent by the phenomenological perspective. In particular, I argued that, thanks to this process of revision which entails the discovery of the genesis of sense (and of the genetic historical dimension of the stream of consciousness) as well as the radicalization of the transcendental perspective, it is possible to understand not only the most interesting aspects of Husserl's phenomenology (like, for instance, the pre-predicative layers of experience, the role of the Body and the notion of empty presentation) but also the advancement of the transcendental perspective towards a theory of reason.
Finally, in the fourth chapter, I came back to the problem of the fragmented image of phenomenology, which I believe can be overcome by taking into consideration the self-evident immanent givenness of consciousness that shows the shortcomings of both realist and idealist positions. Moreover, there is also a positive role for transcendental phenomenology in the contemporary philosophical debates such as that between internalism and externalism to be taken into consideration, namely, a positive contribution that transcendental phenomenology can provide to the actual problems of knowledge and experience. In particular, I tried to lay the groundwork to assess this contribution by taking into account the notion of transcendental experience, its meaning and its relation with ordinary experience, through which I believe it is possible to restore to the account of the mind-world relation the complexity that it deserves.
About the conclusions of this work, I wanted to come back to the meaning of Husserl's philosophy as a transcendental philosophy based on evidence and on the problem of how this evidence can really provide a new way of being of the foundations of knowledge and rationality. I believe that the answer to this question come from the realization that, through the phenomenological method of reflection, you will never reach a dogmatic “new” foundational ground that will substitute the world or the reality that we know in the natural attitude. However, what can be actually gained is a new trusting relationship with the experience as it is lived by me, the subject, which is actually the basic starting point to gain also a higher clarity about the world and reality – a higher clarity that, however, does not coincide with a passive, contemplative acceptance of a true form or a true reality, but that can only stems from a relentless effort to see what lies within view.