

CHAPTER VIII

OPERATIONS AT BODO, MO AND MOSJOEN

48. Object of Operations

[PLAN 12]

The object of the supplementary landings which took place in the Bodo-Mosjoen area on the collapse of the campaign in Central Norway was to delay the German advance northward towards Narvik, and especially the increasing reach of their air power.

The Government had considered sending small bodies of troops to intermediate positions between the main areas of hostilities while the British and French troops were still fighting in Central Norway. Thus as early as 21st April a trawler was sent to report on the facilities of Mosjoen, at the head of Vefsen Fjord, some 90 miles north eastward from Namsos; and on the 25th there came a suggestion from Sir Charles Forbes to use Mosjoen or Kongsmoen 'if suitable landing ground could be found in their vicinity', apparently to relieve Namsos, where they were feeling the strain of continual attacks from the air on an overcrowded base. Two days later he again 'urged on the Admiralty . . . necessity of landing in Mosjoen or Mo area, properly organised', the *Penelope* having reported several spots suitable for landing grounds on the island of Heroy in that neighbourhood.¹ In view of the decision that day to withdraw from Central Norway, the Commander-in-Chief added: 'Landing will now only be with object of denying area to enemy air force to start with. If he establishes air force in Mosjoen or Bodo area, same state of affairs will shortly take place at Narvik as at Aandalsnes and Molde'.

49. The First Landings

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Positive orders came on 29th April, when Lord Cork was told he must occupy the head of Salt Fjord, near the mouth of which lies Bodo, to prevent the enemy from arriving by parachute. Accordingly, he sent first a destroyer, which reported there were no Germans nor shipping of any sort in the neighbourhood, and then a company of the Scots Guards, which landed at Bodo and worked eastward. General Carton de Wiart had orders the same day to send a party from Namsos to Mosjoen, so the *Janus* (Commander Tothill) sailed the following night with 100 chasseurs-alpins and a section of British light anti-aircraft guns; she landed her party late on 2nd May unopposed and unobserved. Commander Tothill remarked on this point:—

'The success of the operation depended entirely on not being observed by reconnaissance planes. Mosjoen is within range of enemy dive bombing planes; the fjords are in places narrow, with no room to manoeuvre and, owing to the shortness of darkness, the fjords have to be navigated during daylight hours. Now that the enemy air force are no longer occupied with forces operating further to the southward, sea communication with Mosjoen is not considered to fall within the limits of a justifiable risk.'

¹ Kongsmoen is the same as Kongsmo in 64° 55' N., 12° 35' E., at the head of Indre Folden Fjord and half-way between Namsos and Mosjoen.

Captain Yates of the *Penelope* received and passed on much general intelligence during his ship's stay at Skjel Fjord, repairing to go home after her grounding near Bodo.

By this, presumably, he meant that troops must rely on the country to replenish supplies.

On 1st May, the Admiralty ordered Lord Cork to send a destroyer to Mo to prevent an enemy landing, and made the 'excellent proposal'¹ to the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, that a Destroyer Division should be established to patrol the coast from Namsos to the northward, to prevent the movement of enemy troopships by sea. Unfortunately, owing to shortage of destroyers, this suggestion could not be carried out. Two flying boats were sent from the United Kingdom to reconnoitre airfields in the Bodo area, but they were caught in the water and put out of action by enemy aircraft on 4th May.

The next military landing took place at Mo, situated at the head of North Ranen Fjord, some 45 miles to the northward of Mosjoen. The troops consisted of the 1st Independent Company—300 men or double the strength of an ordinary battalion company—which arrived from the United Kingdom in the transport *Royal Ulsterman*, escorted by the *Mohawk*, on 4th May and accomplished their landing 'apparently unobserved'.

Three more independent companies went out a few days after the party for Mo, two companies to Mosjoen, in the *Ulster Prince* with Colonel Gubbins, the Senior Officer of all these out-lying forces, and one to Bodo, in the *Royal Scotsman*. They sailed from home together, escorted by four destroyers, parting company off the coast of Norway to go to their respective destinations; both landed on the 9th, and the *Ulster Prince* brought away the chasseurs-alpins from Mosjoen. Altogether, five independent companies went to Norway, the last arriving at Bodo on 13th or 14th May in the *Royal Ulsterman*, escorted by the *Matabele*.

50. Area placed under Narvik command

Before this, however, various changes had taken place in Norway. On the 4th, Lord Cork had asked the Admiralty to explain 'the general policy regarding Bodo, Mo and Mosjoen', saying also: 'It seems most important to hold in force the Mo road leading north', but 'it appears the forces being sent are hardly adequate for this purpose, and with such weak detachments in the air another naval commitment comes into being'. The Admiralty answered on the 5th, as Lord Cork records, 'that it was not possible to maintain large forces in face of enemy air superiority well in advance of established fighter aerodrome, that Bodo was the only place south of Narvik where such could be established, that small parties only would be maintained at Mo and Mosjoen with the object of obstructing enemy advance and to prevent landings by sea and air'; and on the 7th the Government put the independent companies directly under the Narvik command. The Germans were then pressing northward, the Norwegians in those parts were tiring, and as soon as he arrived at Mosjoen, on the 9th, Colonel Gubbins seems to have decided he must begin to withdraw, agreeably to his instructions to harass and delay the enemy, but to go back gradually to Mo and Bodo. Thereupon, Lord Cork arranged to send reinforcements, apparently anticipating a signal from home (A.T. 0053/10), which ran thus: 'Essential Bodo should be held pending full examination of problem involved, which is now in progress; if necessary, garrison must be reinforced from resources at your disposal'.

¹ Lord Cork's despatch.

51. German landing at Hemnes

[PLAN 12]

But the Germans moved first. In the evening of 10th May they landed some 300 troops at Hemnes, in Ranen Fjord, 15 miles west of Mo, part from aircraft and part from a captured coasting steamer, while another captured steamer probably landed troops at or near Mosjoen the same evening. Lord Cork had news of their coming up the coast, the first message reaching him at 1100 and reporting two steamers in the Inner Lead a little north of Namsos; and he ordered the *Calcutta* and *Zulu* to intercept them.¹ The steamer for Hemnes arrived there about 1900, and her troops landed after the town had been bombed and set on fire, other troops coming by air at the same time. The British ships arrived two hours afterwards, too late to stop the landing of troops, but in time to sink the transport with nearly all the stores still on board. They went on to Mo, which they found unmolested, and the *Zulu* picked up some soldiers who had escaped from Hemnes, where part of the independent company at Mo had been stationed; then they went to join the *Penelope*, which was to sail in tow from Skjel Fjord that night to go home under their escort.

Colonel Gubbins heard of the German movement by sea at some time in the afternoon or early evening of the 10th, and he believed they would land at Elsfjorden, south of the Hemnes peninsula. Had he doubts before about withdrawing, the enemy's landing behind him must have made plain the need to do so. He left Mosjoen that night, and retired by land and by water up Vefsen Fjord, and went to Sandnesjoen on the western shore of Alsten Island in the Inner Lead, some 20 miles from Mosjoen and 45 miles from Mo. The Germans occupied Mosjoen soon after he had gone. The army headquarters passed on this news to Lord Cork and suggested that a 'little warship should try to keep in touch with Gubbins'. As we have seen, Lord Cork had now but few ships at his command. The *Calcutta* and *Zulu* had sailed already for Hemnes, and must return to escort the *Penelope* as soon as they had finished their work there; other ships were about to sail for Mo with the Scots Guards; the French attack on Bjerkevik was making ready; and, apart from these things, the usual services in Vaags Fjord and Ofot Fjord had to go on. However, in the afternoon of the next day, the 11th, he recalled the *Jackal* and *Javelin*, which had arrived that morning with a convoy from home, and sailed again when they had oiled, having Admiralty orders to go home immediately. He told them to go on to Mo and 'report fully on situation . . . from naval point of view'; to gain touch with Colonel Gubbins, who was last reported at Sandnesjoen, and help him to 'establish himself'.

Commander Napier, of the *Jackal*, knew no more than this signal told him, but he met the *Penelope's* convoy and gained 'a little information' from the *Calcutta*. He went on at 25 knots to Mo, where he landed an officer, who learned, among other things, that Colonel Gubbins was still at Sandnesjoen, and wished Commander Napier to go to him, but first to bombard Sund near the town of Hemnes. This he did, each ship firing 30 rounds with no opposition, and he remarked in a signal to Lord Cork that 'this position is particularly open to naval attack'. On the way back down Ranen Fjord he met the *Enterprise*, with other ships, bringing the Scots Guards to Mo, so he went on board her to give what news he had. He arrived at Sandnesjoen at 0300, the

¹ The *Calcutta* had proceeded to sea the day before to reinforce the *Jackal* and *Javelin* which were escorting an east-bound convoy, and was some 50 miles W.N.W. of Skomvaer, when Lord Cork's signal (timed 1150/10) reached her at 1301. The *Zulu* was at Skjel Fjord. They effected a rendezvous off Myken Light about 1700 (the earliest the *Zulu* could get there), and shaped course for Mo, which had been indicated in a further signal from Lord Cork as the possible destination of the enemy.

12th, to find Colonel Gubbins with 450 men ready and waiting to go to Bodo. 'I was deeply impressed with the personality and leadership of the commanding officer', he writes, 'and the quality of his officers and men. They had lost all their gear, were short of food and sleep, and had been hard at it fighting a delaying action against superior forces, unsupported, in a strange country, and subjected to the complete German air superiority. They were of a very fine type, and their cheerfulness and enthusiasm beyond praise'. The *Jackal* took the Colonel and 100 men accordingly; the rest were already on board a local steamer which the *Javelin* escorted by another route; both parties reached Bodo by midday. The *Jackal*, arriving first, spared the little column several thousands of small-arms cartridges and two months' allowance of provisions, and went out to meet the *Javelin*; together they distracted the attention of some German aircraft, while the transport went safely in. Then they set course for Scapa, still dodging bombs for another hour or so. 'It appeared to me', remarks Commander Napier, 'that an air position is rapidly developing in Northern Norway similar to that complete ascendancy established with such unfortunate results in Aandalsnes and Namsos areas'.¹

52. Mo and Bodo reinforced

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In the meantime, three companies of the Scots Guards with four field and four light anti-aircraft guns had sailed on 11th May for Mo, if it should prove to be still in friendly hands, or for Bodo otherwise. The *Enterprise*, *Hesperus* and *Fleetwood* carried the troops between them, the stores going in the transport *Margot*; and the *Cairo* was joined to the convoy at the request of Captain Annesley of the *Enterprise*, who asked also for protection by fighters from the *Ark Royal*. The ships reached Mo in the morning of the 12th, having fired on the wharf at Hemnes on their way. The troops were all on shore before 0800, but the Germans attacked from the air and hindered the unloading of the *Margot*, which took nine hours even with the help of a working party from the *Hesperus*. Two or three fighters patrolled overhead for some hours, as they had for a time during the convoy's passage the day before, but no more aircraft could be spared, for the *Ark Royal* had to provide patrols over the *Penelope* at the same time. The *Cairo* and *Fleetwood*, said Captain Annesley, were of the greatest value on the occasion, armed as they were entirely with high-angle guns, though the *Fleetwood* spent all her ammunition. Apparently the *Enterprise* sailed alone for Bodo in the afternoon, firing on Hemnes again as she went out, and 'was bombed continuously from Hemnes to open sea'. The *Cairo* brought away the rest of the convoy later; they escaped further attention from the German bombers, being 'favoured by bad visibility and low clouds'.

Both the *Enterprise* and *Cairo* signalled to Lord Cork afterwards suggesting the use of small craft for supplying the troops in future, the *Cairo* adding: 'Passage through Ranen Fjord could not be made in clear weather by slow convoy without extreme probability of loss and damage due to large scale of attacks by dive and level bombers'. And Captain Annesley remarked on these points again after consulting with Colonel Gubbins and a Norwegian naval captain at Bodo: 'All emphatic that no large ships, with possible exception A.A. cruisers, should enter Ranen Fjord. . . . Supplies should be conveyed in puffers or small coasters, and troops in destroyers'. They also suggested destroyer patrols in the approaches to Ranen and Vefsen Fjords and motor boats for service inshore. The army asked that the *Cairo* should stay at Mo

¹ A signal from the army headquarters to the War Office says 500 to 1000 Germans with four guns and several tanks were reported advancing north of Mosjoen on the 13th.

until they could mount heavy anti-aircraft guns there, as ships had been stationed off Namsos and Aandalsnes in April, and that other ships should cruise near Hemnes to hamper the German advance and stop reinforcements from coming down Els Fjorden. Unluckily there were not ships for every service required or desirable.

On 13th May came the Foreign Legion's landing at Bjerkvik. Directly afterwards General Auchinleck took over from General Mackesy, and deciding to use all the British troops in the force to the southward, he put Brigadier Fraser in command of the whole, with orders 'to hold Bodo permanently and Mo for as long as he could'. The Norwegian Generals Ruge and Fleischer also stressed the importance of these places; indeed, they longed 'to pass from the defensive to the offensive and recapture Mosjoen'. Brigadier Fraser embarked in the *Somali* in the evening of the 13th, when she had finished her part in the Bjerkvik landing, and she sailed from Tjeldsundet with the French destroyer *Foudroyant* next morning. They were to visit Mo, that the Brigadier might see how the land lay before he set up his headquarters at Bodo; and whilst he was on shore at Mo, the ships were to harass the German communications on the Hemnes peninsula and in Els Fjorden. This they did in the evening of the 14th, the *Foudroyant* shelling Hemnes and sinking boats and seaplanes in the fjord, while the *Somali* fired on a party of the enemy near Finneid, where there was a British outpost. Early next morning, the 15th, on the way back to Bodo with the Brigadier, news came that the Polish transport, *Chrobry*, which was taking the Irish Guards and other troops to Bodo, had been bombed in Vest Fjord some 30 miles short of her destination. The *Somali* and *Foudroyant* steered towards her, but aircraft attacked them in their turn as they steamed through Traen Fjorden, south of Bodo, and a near miss damaged the *Somali* so much that Captain Nicholson decided to go straight home, escorted by the *Foudroyant*. As Brigadier Fraser had thus to go home, too, he signalled his impressions to General Auchinleck; he thought that 'to continue holding Mo is militarily unsound so long as German air superiority continues'.¹ On the other hand, Lord Cork told the Admiralty the same day, 'I feel we must hold on and fight at Mo; if that goes the whole Narvik situation becomes precarious'.

53. Loss of the *Chrobry* and *Effingham*

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The *Chrobry* had sailed from Tjeldsundet in the evening of 14th May, escorted by the *Wolverine* and *Stork*. She had on board her the 24th Brigade Headquarters, the Irish Guards, some anti-aircraft guns, and a troop of the 3rd Hussars, besides some sappers and a field ambulance. German aircraft attacked the ships before they left the anchorage without effect, but they saw no more of the enemy till a little before midnight, when dive bombers attacked the *Chrobry* three times in five minutes in the middle of Vest Fjord, setting her on fire, exploding ammunition, and killing several army officers and men. The *Wolverine* went alongside the blazing troopship and took on board nearly 700 men, while the *Stork* lay off to guard against further attack. Then the *Wolverine* made the best of her way to Harstad. Meanwhile, the *Stork* had driven off three more aircraft that threatened attack, and when her consort left her she turned to rescuing the rest of the troopship's passengers and crew, going afterwards to Harstad also; she did not wait to sink the troopship, for

¹ Brigadier Fraser later succeeded in transferring to the *Curlew* and returned to Harstad; but he was suffering from a wound previously received at Ankenes, and was invalided home by a Medical Board.

she had 300 passengers to think of, and aircraft were still about. In the end, aircraft from the *Ark Royal* sank the *Chrobry* on the 16th, the guns, the tanks, and the rest of the equipment going to the bottom in her.¹

Early on the 17th the South Wales Borderers sailed for Bodo, a battalion of Poles having relieved them on the Ankenes peninsula. They sailed in the *Effingham* from Harstad, escorted by the *Coventry* (flag, Rear-Admiral Vivian), *Cairo* and two destroyers.² Instead of taking the short way through Tjeldsundet, they went outside the islands to lessen the risk of attack from the air. When approaching Bodo in the evening, however, they tried a short cut, this time to lessen the danger from submarines, and the *Effingham* and the *Matabele* ran on shore between Briksvaer and the Terra Islands. The destroyer escaped with slight damage, but the *Effingham* was lost. The other ships and some local vessels sent for from Bodo took off the troops and ship's company and part of the large consignment of stores the cruiser was carrying, including some of the machine-gun carriers; attempts to tow off the ship into deep water failed, so she was torpedoed where she lay.

In the end the Borderers and the Irish Guards went to Bodo by detachments in destroyers and local small craft ('puffers'), landing between 20th and 25th May. On the 21st Colonel Gubbins had been made a brigadier and appointed to command all the outlying troops—some 4000 men with four field pieces. He had small chance indeed against the growing strength of the German advance from the south. By the 23rd they, too, were believed to have 4000 men, but with ample artillery and tanks, in the Mo-Mosjoen area and, according to General Auchinleck, 'the operations . . . were marked throughout by an unrelenting pressure on the enemy's part, both on the ground and in the air, and by a steady resistance by our troops, handicapped as they were by an almost complete absence of any support in the air or any means of hitting back at their enemy'.

The whole business, whether of maintaining the force in action or of bringing it away, naturally depended very largely on the shipping available. Lord Cork's destroyers now numbered eight, besides which he had two sloops and some 30 trawlers. Most of the latter were anti-submarine craft or minesweepers; but a small trawler force under Acting-Commander W. R. Fell arrived from England at Skjel Fjord on 18th May for work in the Bodo area. These vessels proved quite unsuitable but Commander Fell organised a force of 10 puffers and took them south a few days later, where they became known as the Gubbins Flotilla. 'They performed remarkable work and were almost continuously in action for seven days'.³

By then the efforts in the Bodo area were nearing their conclusion, for on the 25th the Government decided to order the complete withdrawal of all forces from Norway. The evacuation of Bodo force will be dealt with in Chapter X.

¹ The signal 'Rupert' force to War Office, 1915/14th May, details the troops that were to have sailed in the *Chrobry*, but the field guns referred to in this signal were countermanded.

² *Matabele, Echo*.

³ Lord Cork's despatch.

THE EXPEDITION TO NARVIK: PHASE II (7TH-28TH MAY)

54. Development of Base : Harstad Area

[PLAN 14]

While the operations described in the previous chapter were in progress to the southward and preparations were maturing for the direct assault on the port of Narvik, much attention was being paid to the development and defence of the base in the Harstad area.

The facilities at Harstad left much to be desired, and the unloading of transports was a continual difficulty. There were only two wharves and the average rate of discharge was two ships in five days. Disembarkation of personnel was usually done while the ships were in Bygden anchorage; destroyers and H.M.S. *Protector* did good service in connection with this work. Large numbers of local craft were hired for the various water transport services; but they were not very reliable, being prone to disappear into neighbouring fjords at the sound of an air raid warning and to remain there for a considerable time afterwards.¹ As there were over 140 raids on Harstad during the eight weeks of the operations, a good deal of time was lost by this practice.

The use of Harstad—itself on an island—as Military Headquarters and main point of disembarkation meant that the Navy had a very large area to protect against submarines and aircraft; at the same time offensive patrols to harass the enemy in the Narvik region had to be maintained. In addition Skjelfjord (some 90 miles distant) required protection so long as the *Penelope* and other damaged ships were there (till 10th May).

A preliminary request for guns for fixed defences and for harbour defence Asdics was sent on 22nd April and on the 28th the Admiralty informed Lord Cork that the M.N.B.D.O. would be sent to mount the guns and asked for site prospecting to be carried out. The next day Read-Admiral Lyster was appointed to command the defences and their development; he arrived by air on 5th May, and assumed the responsibility.

Meanwhile, the following proposals had been signalled to the Admiralty on the 1st:—

The main Naval Base to be in Tjeldsundet with a large ship anchorage to the west of Holsflva, other ships in Lavangsfjord and west of Skaanland; advanced anchorages at Bogen and Ballangen. A minefield extending $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles 310° from Baroen on Baroy Island. 6-in. battery south of Lodingen Church, 4·7-in. battery north of Kvitnes. 12-pdr. battery on west side of Tjeldsundet 1 mile south of Staksvollholm. Further batteries considered desirable for south and north ends of Tjeldsundet. Minefields N.E. and south of Steinvaer. Harbour defence Asdics off S.W. corner of Baroy Island and Botvaer Island, with control station off Lodingen. Port war signal station on Rotvaer Island. B.1 indicator net and gate west of Staksvollholm. Indicator net or mines at northern entrance to Tjeldsundet from Taakeboen beacon to Hella.²

¹ Discontinuance of the warning system led to a strike among the Norwegian labourers and small craft crews.

² The finalised details of these proposals are given in Lord Cork's despatch.

These proposals never actually came to fruition. The *Mashobra* arrived with the Royal Marine Fortress unit under Lieutenant-Colonel H. R. Lambert, on 10th May ; their work, both in mounting A.A. guns and preparing the surface defences, 'merited the highest praise'.¹ But by the time the evacuation was ordered, none of the coast defence guns had been mounted, though the sites had been prepared ; mining had not got beyond the planning stage ; and though progress had been made in laying the nets and booms they had not been completed.² The defence of the bases throughout the operations, therefore, really depended on surface patrols, which were established early and worked regularly, supplemented by A/S air patrols when the necessary Walrus aircraft were available.

Actually, after the sinking of *U.49* on 15th April, no contacts with enemy submarines occurred, though there were many reports of their being sighted. An Irish Guardsman fishing at Bogen landed a used escape apparatus belonging to *U.64*.

The possibility of enemy minelaying by aircraft always had to be envisaged, but this most awkward form of attack does not seem to have been resorted to until 29th May, when five enemy aircraft were seen laying mines in Tjeldsundet South Channel ; subsequent sweeping operations exploded four mines, two by non-magnetic sweep and two by magnetic.

But defence against enemy bomber attack was the prime necessity. This started on the day the first convoy arrived and continued throughout the campaign, greatly increasing in frequency and intensity after the Allied withdrawal from the Trondheim area.

'Fighter aircraft of the Fleet Air Arm³ and Royal Air Force, in those periods when they were available, wrought great havoc among the enemy and afforded a very welcome relief'¹ ; but from the earliest days the establishment of airfields was a major preoccupation. The problem presented unusual difficulties, the land being covered by snow, three or more feet deep, but the work of clearing the Norwegian airfield at Bardufoss was put in hand, and a suitable ground was found at Skaanland in Lavangs Fjord, between Harstad and Tjeldsundet. It was hoped to have these landing grounds in operation by 15th May, but the lateness of the thaw caused a 'depressing delay'¹ and it was not till 21st May that the first Gladiator Squadron landed at Bardufoss.

So for the greater part of the campaign, reliance had to be placed on A.A. artillery and H.M. ships with good A.A. armament. This need was emphasised in a telegram to the Admiralty on 25th April ; the reply came on the 30th, that 48 3·7-in. H.A. guns and 48 Bofors (in addition to 12 already in the area) would be sent ; two A.A. cruisers were to join Lord Cork's forces on completion of certain other operations. 'The next day, as if to emphasise the matter, the enemy obtained a direct hit on the building used for Naval accommodation in Harstad, fortunately killing only two ratings. At the same time they bombed the Hospital Ship *Atlantis*, anchored wide away from all other ships, and a Norwegian Hospital ship, causing many casualties in the latter'.¹

The first 3·7-in. A.A. guns arrived on 6th May, and four of them were in action at Harstad on the 9th, four more being on their way to Bardufoss, which had already received Bofors guns on the 7th. 'Men bombed on shore could now begin to feel that they had some chance of hitting back ; a psychological factor of considerable importance'.¹

¹ Lord Cork's despatch.

² At the evacuation, all nets were sunk and all traces were removed.

³ See Sec. 25 *ante*.

The allotment of the limited guns available was made on the principle that it was only possible to give a minimum degree of protection to really vital areas and that smaller and less important areas must go without.¹

The final distribution of anti-aircraft artillery at the end of May was:—

SITUATION	HEAVY GUNS	LIGHT GUNS
Bardufoss	12	12
Sorreisa	—	2
Elvenes	—	4
Tromsø	4	4
Harstad	12	5
Skaanland	15	10
Ballangen	—	4
Ankenes	—	4
Bjerkvik	—	4
Bodo	—	2
Loaded for Bodo	4	4
In a 'Q' ship	—	1

55. The Landing at Bjerkvik 12/13th May

[PLAN 14

To return to the operations against Narvik itself, which had made little direct progress since the bombardment on 24th April.

The detached squadron, strengthened for a few days early in May by the *Resolution*, continued its activities in Ofot Fjord. It stopped traffic by water; it worked with the South Wales Borderers along the shore near Ankenes; it fired on parties of German troops and on piers and bridges, ammunition stores and gun positions; it tried, but unsuccessfully, to stop the enemy from moving men and stores by air; and in the intervals the destroyers searched outlying fjords for submarines and carried out regular anti-submarine patrols. The Germans retaliated chiefly from the air. They failed in an attempt upon the *Aurora* with the General on board her; but later on, when attacking 'on an average once daily', they sank the *Grom* (4th May), disabled a turret in the *Aurora* (7th), and damaged one or two other ships.² Later on, in the middle of May, Rear-Admiral Vivian relieved Captain Hamilton with the *Coventry*, and for a while the *Cairo*, but having other duties as well these ships spent less time in the fjord than had Captain Hamilton's cruisers.

The plan finally adopted for the assault on Narvik was to be carried out in two stages, firstly a landing at Bjerkvik at the head of Herjans Fjord, with the object of securing Oydejord and obtaining control of Rombaks Fjord; and secondly, after these positions had been consolidated, a direct attack on Narvik from Oydejord across Rombaks Fjord.

The landing in Herjans Fjord was planned to take place in the early hours of 13th May, served by the following ships: *Effingham*, *Resolution* and *Aurora*; *Somali*, *Havelock*, *Fame*, *Wren* and *Basilisk*; *Vindictive* and *Protector*—with

¹ On 20th May it was decided that the best disposition would be as follows, but for various reasons, this could not be adhered to:—

SITUATION	HEAVY GUNS	LIGHT GUNS
Bardufoss	8 (16)	12 (24)
Harstad and Skaanland	24 (48)	18 (36)
Bodo	8 (16)	12 (12)
Tromsø	8 (24)	16 (24)

The figures in brackets show the number of guns considered necessary to give really adequate protection in each area. (General Auchinleck's despatch.)

² See App. H.

two trawlers, four assault landing craft, and three motor landing craft. They were to assemble near Ballangen the day before to embark the Legion, and sail about 2100 to reach their destination 20 miles away by midnight. An advance guard of 120 men of the first battalion were to make the whole passage in the four assault landing craft under their own power; the rest of the 1500 infantry in the *Vindictive* and *Protector* and the two cruisers, from which they were to land in ships' boats and assault landing craft in turns; there were also five tanks, which took passage in the *Resolution*, and were to land in the motor landing craft.¹ The trawlers' task was to tow the motor landing craft to the fjord, and then to patrol against submarines outside. This left the destroyers, unhampered by other duties, to support the soldiers with their fire from positions within a few cables' lengths of the shore, while the big ships lay further out. Lastly, fighter protection for ships and troops, reconnaissance of the enemy's positions, and bombing attacks were to be supplied by aircraft from the *Ark Royal* which had been working off the coast since the 6th.

Three tanks were to land first, followed by the advance guard already in its landing craft, then the rest of the first battalion—'when ordered by the flagship'—in flights of 350 in men-of-war's boats or 120 in the assault landing craft; all to land on the beach, near Bjerkvik, at the top of the fjord. The second battalion was to go on shore in the same way later, headed by the other two tanks, but landing at Meby about a mile to the right of the first battalion. Lord Cork's original orders laid down that there should be no 'preliminary bombardment unless the enemy open fire on the force during the approach or is sighted by ships or aircraft'. For this, the *Resolution*, the cruisers, and all five destroyers had target areas allotted to them along the foreshore, the targets being chiefly machine-gun posts in houses, along the beach, and on the wooded hillsides beyond the villages; and the orders ran: 'Every effort should be made to locate targets in these areas, but fire is not to be withheld because targets have not been located, as the object is to produce the maximum volume of fire on possible enemy positions'. Lord Cork revised this plan later by ordering the leading destroyers, as soon as they should reach their stations off the pier, 'to open fire without further orders and destroy all houses in Bjerkvik, particularly those near the landing beach; if troops are seen leaving houses they are to be engaged in preference to the houses'. A naval officer was to go on shore with the second flight of infantry to control the fire of the ships in support of the troops as they moved inland.

The ships arrived punctually in their stations at midnight the 12th/13th. General Bethouart was in the *Effingham* with the Admiral, as was General Auchinleck, who had arrived from the United Kingdom the day before to succeed General Mackesy. The *Somali*, *Havelock* and *Fame* immediately opened fire on the village of Bjerkvik, while the *Resolution* hoisted out the tanks, and the *Effingham* and *Aurora* hauled up the boats they had already in tow. This preliminary bombardment lasted a quarter of an hour, setting houses ablaze and exploding stores of ammunition, but the Germans continued to reply with machine-guns, so the Admiral ordered a general bombardment that went on till 0100, the 13th. Then, in the growing light, the tanks went on shore, and the advance guard, and the second flight in its open boats, followed by the rest of the first battalion in due course. Most of the battalion had to edge away to the left and land near Haugen, a mile or so west of Bjerkvik; helped by the tanks, however, the legionaries soon fought their way back to the village and began their northward advance up the Elvenes road to join hands with the chasseurs.

¹This was the first occasion on which tanks were landed in a combined operation.

The ships had shifted their fire inland, 'a creeping barrage', the *Wren* called it, but at 0200 they left off, their work over until the time came to prepare the way for the second battalion. The enemy's fire obliged these latter troops, too, to seek a better landing place. With the ships firing overhead, they began to land about 0300, rather south of Meby; they worked north-eastward to seize Elvegaarden, at the foot of the mountain Mebyfjeldet, and secured the coastwise road to Oydejord—their two tanks, says an officer of the Legion, 'frisking about like young puppies, firing all the time, in the midst of fields which were here free from snow'.

About 0600 General Bethouart reported to Lord Cork that he no longer required the support of H.M. Ships, beyond those normally on patrol in that area, and went on shore. Soon afterwards Lord Cork and General Auchinleck returned to Harstad in the *Effingham*, the other big ships departing as the last troops left them, while some of the destroyers stayed to support the attack. Later in the day the Polish battalion from Bogen arrived by land to join the Legion.

That afternoon (13th May), on arrival at Harstad, General Auchinleck assumed command of the military and air forces in accordance with his instructions from the War Office.¹

Thus the attack succeeded, and with very little loss to the legionaries. It is hard to judge from the scanty reports how much the ships' guns contributed to this result. Captain Stevens of the *Havelock* remarked that 'enemy machine-gun posts were immediately, but only temporarily, silenced by a few rounds of 4.7-in. shell. These posts were well concealed and probably equipped with light automatic guns, which could be lowered and raised as easily as a rifle'. General Auchinleck called the bombardment heavy and the landing completely successful in spite of 'appreciable opposition' from the German machine-guns. 'Although I was present in the capacity of a spectator only,' he went on, 'I am constrained to express my admiration for the way in which the whole operation was conceived and effected by all concerned. I was particularly struck by the businesslike efficiency of the French Foreign Legion. . . . That the landing was not interfered with by enemy aircraft was almost certainly due to the fortunate weather conditions prevailing at the time. At this period there were no land-based aircraft available in Norway with which to counter enemy air attacks, and a bombing raid might well have turned the operation from a success into a failure'.

The weather also affected the *Ark Royal's* aircraft. Patrols of three fighters at a time flew above the embarking troops near Ballangen in the evening of the 12th, but by 2200 the clouds were as low as 500 ft., so they had to give up. Nor could flying start again before 0200 on the 13th, which meant that the first fighter patrol for the landing arrived only when the second battalion was going on shore, and the bombers had not time to reach the positions near Lake Hartvig, 3 miles east of Bjerkvik, that Lord Cork wished them to attack during the landing—instead, rather later in the morning, they attacked the railway near Sildvik and Hunddalen, about 9 and 12 miles beyond Narvik respectively. Low clouds and fog made effective reconnaissance impossible. Several aircraft had to land in Vaags Fjord, prevented by thick fog from returning to their

¹ General Auchinleck was appointed G.O.C.-in-C. designate of the Anglo-French land forces and of the British Air Component in the theatre of operations. It was the intention of the C.I.G.S. that he should take over when the Government decided to end the system of unified command under Lord Cork, but that if, on arrival, local conditions appeared to necessitate the step, he was to assume the command, placing himself under Lord Cork.

ship, after carrying out their various tasks. On the other hand, no German aircraft appeared at all on either day; and after the landing Lord Cork made the following signal to Admiral Wells in the *Ark Royal*: 'Many thanks for your close support this morning. It was most comforting to see them'.¹

The French soon occupied Oydejord, and went on to master the north shore of Rombaks Fjord, General Diel withdrawing his troops to the mountains to the north and east. General Auchinleck points out that possession of this shore would give a larger choice of landing places, avoiding 'difficult beaches which were believed to be strongly defended by machine-guns'. It would allow of using the French field guns to support the landing, and it would make possible some degree of surprise, for the landing craft could assemble secretly under a mile from their destination instead of being 'marshalled in Ofot Fjord in daylight in full view of the enemy'. The ships stationed in Vest Fjord worked with the French troops to gain possession; and Commander Walter of the *Fame* took 150 chasseurs-alpins to Lilleberg, half-way to the narrows, and landed them in 'puffers' in the little harbour on the 21st, the *Cairo* and the big French destroyer *Milan* coming inside the fjord in support; there the chasseurs joined forces with other French soldiers and pushed further eastward. On the other side of Narvik a Polish battalion relieved the South Wales Borderers on the Ankenes peninsula, that the Borderers might reinforce Bodo, while the Poles made ready to attack towards the head of Beisfjord.

56. Preparations for assault on Narvik

So far as the army was concerned, the assault on Narvik might have taken place a day or two after the little expedition to Lilleberg. But the danger from the air seemed to grow worse. In contrast with the lucky day of the landing at Bjerkvik, despite the gallant efforts of the *Ark Royal*'s few machines up to her leaving for home on 21st May, in the fortnight after Bjerkvik, the German aircraft destroyed or damaged above a dozen ships of war, transports and storeships, beginning with the troopship *Chrobry*, on the 14th, and ending with the *Curlew*, which they sank in Tjeldundet on the 26th. Lord Cork and the generals therefore resolved they must have adequate protection for the assault: in the Admiral's words, 'either such weather conditions as were likely to largely reduce or abolish any danger of air attack or the ability to provide efficient fighter protection overhead'. The need of shore-based aircraft to counter enemy attacks appeared more urgent with each German raid, but the airfields at Bardufoss, and at Skaanland, for the Royal Air Force fighters that the *Glorious* and *Furious* were to bring from home, were not yet ready. The squadron from the latter ship landed at Bardufoss on the 21st, but Skaanland could not receive aircraft until the 26th. This determined the date of the assault; for besides the wish to have as many aircraft as possible for that occasion, the two remaining motor landing craft were busy up to the last moment transporting guns and stores of all kinds for the airfields.² The view

¹ The *Ark Royal* could not spare fighters before the evening of the 12th, though Lord Cork asked to have them in the forenoon, because they had been protecting the *Penelope*, which was going home in tow after her temporary repair in Skjel Fjord, and the *Enterprise* and her convoy of troops, who landed that day at Mo.

² The delay at Skaanland meant that the *Glorious* had to go home again to oil before landing her squadron of aircraft; and in the end Skaanland would not do, so all the machines worked from Bardufoss.

The *Cairo* records that she engaged enemy aircraft every day but two between 11th and 27th May, and in that period she expended 5,700 rounds of 4-in.

of the commanders appears in the following signal, which Lord Cork made on 20th May in answer to messages from home that 'expressed . . . increased disappointment at stagnation round Narvik and at delay in occupying town' and urged its immediate capture:—

'I fully understand that the occupation of the town of Narvik is desired, and am anxious to report its capture. The most important work at the moment, however, is the completion and protection of the aerodromes, and for these all motor landing craft are required. If we are to maintain our position here, it is of paramount importance that we can operate aircraft as quickly as possible and be able to counter German bombers; indeed, it might be described as a necessary preliminary to a combined operation on whatever scale . . .

It would be folly under existing conditions, to switch off from the essential preparation of aerodromes to that of attacking Narvik, a place which does not affect the main issue and can be got on with at the end of this week. A delay there does not matter. A delay with aerodromes has become dangerous.'

Only a few days after this—the 24th—the Government decided to retreat from Norway altogether. They wished, however, to have the port of Narvik and the railway destroyed, and they thought the defeat of the German troops in the district would make easier the task of withdrawing. The commanders agreed, General Auchinleck remarking that, 'apart from the desirability of making sure whether the facilities for shipping ore from Narvik had, in fact, been destroyed as thoroughly as had been reported, the chances that a successful attack would do much to conceal our intention to evacuate . . . would outweigh the possible disadvantages involved in extending our commitments by establishing troops in close contact with the enemy on the Narvik peninsula, where his main force was thought to be located'.

Accordingly, they resolved to attack in the night of 27th-28th May, by which time the second squadron of fighters should be ready for service.

57. Plan of Operations

[PLAN 14

'The plan is open to criticism in details—its great merit, however, was in that it was the plan of those who had to carry it out. The weak point in the plan was that owing to the paucity of transport available—a less bold man than General Bethouart might well have made this an excuse for inaction—it was necessary to leave the First Flight . . . unsupported for an unduly long time . . .'¹

The two battalions of the Foreign Legion, the Narvik battalion of the Norwegian Army, and four tanks were to attack across Rombaks Fjord. They would land on the beach east of Orneset, at the mouth of the fjord, supported by the fire of the ships and of two batteries of French field pieces and one of Norwegian mountain guns posted on Hill 145 about a thousand yards inland from Oydejord. The first flight would come round from Lindstrand or Saegnes in Herjangs Fjord, in the three assault and two motor landing craft (the only vessels of these types remaining) and keep the shore close on board as long as possible to hide themselves, whereas later flights were to embark at Oydejord and thence cross direct. The first flight would thus number 290 men, which the generals thought dangerously weak, especially as these troops must fight alone for three-quarters of an hour before the next flight could join them; moreover, as the motor landing craft would then be wanted for the tanks, the next few flights of infantry would muster only 90, with perhaps a few more

¹ Lord Cork's despatch.

in fishing smacks. As it happened, all went well in that respect, but General Auchinleck wrote of 'the barest margin of safety' and commented on the landing as follows:—

'Had the enemy been able to launch an immediate counter-attack the result might have been disastrous. It must always, in my opinion, be unwise to embark on operations of this character unless landing craft are available to land a first flight of adequate strength and, in addition, provide an adequate floating reserve to meet unforeseen contingencies. Moreover, the absence of bomber aircraft deprived the attack of one of the most effective means of repulsing an enemy counter-attack . . . The broken and intricate nature of the ground prevented accurate observation by the supporting ships and artillery. The risk, however, was in my opinion worth taking, and as things turned out it was justified.'

Besides this main attack, the chasseurs from Lilleberg and farther east were to feint towards the head of Rombaken, the inner part of Rombaks Fjord; and the Poles, with two field guns and two tanks, were to attack Ankenes and march towards the head of Beisfjord to threaten the German line of retreat south-east of Narvik.

The soldiers had much less support from the sea than they might have had in April or for the attack projected early in May. Lord Cork had now no capital ship; and he had only one ship with 6-in. guns, the *Southampton* (Flag, Rear-Admiral Clarke), the *Enterprise* and *Aurora* having gone home. The table below gives the arrangements for the preliminary bombardment: each ship lay about 1000 yards off shore with a firing range of roughly 2000 yards, except that the *Southampton* was over 4000 yards from Fagernes.

SHIP	TARGET
<i>In Rombaks Fjord:</i>	
<i>Beagle</i>	Stromnes railway station.
<i>Fame</i>	The mouths of two railway tunnels behind Forsneset.
<i>Havelock</i> ..	The mouth of a tunnel behind Djupviken.
<i>Walker</i>	The mouth of a tunnel behind the landing beach near Orneset.
<i>In Ofot Fjord:</i>	
<i>Cairo</i> (Flag) ..	The hill east of Vaasvik 'to destroy enemy positions there'.
<i>Firedrake</i> ..	Ditto. The hill east of Lillevik.
<i>Coventry</i> ..	The ridge north of Framnesodden.
<i>Southampton</i> ..	(1) Fagernes promontory 'to destroy enemy positions there and to prevent reinforcements proceeding from there to the Ankenes Peninsula'. (2) The village of Ankenes, east of the church—actually, she fired on the second target first.

The orders said 'there has been considerable enemy activity in the railway tunnels east of Narvik, but with what object is not known'; apparently the Germans were believed to use the tunnels as shelters for troops and guns. The bombardment was to start twenty minutes before the first flight of legionaries reached the shore. The ships inside Rombaks Fjord were to leave off as the first landing craft passed them. Signals from the flagship would govern the firing of the ships outside. After the landing, naval officers attached to the troops would signal the targets to be attacked by reference to a gridded map. Besides the eight bombarding ships, there was the *Stork* sloop to protect the landing craft from air attack.

58. The capture of Narvik, 28th May 1940

[PLAN 14]

The ships arrived in their stations independently just after 2330, the 27th, with Generals Auchinleck and Bethouart on board the *Cairo* in which Lord Cork was wearing his flag. They immediately began engaging, as did the field guns above Oydejord. The bombardment, said General Auchinleck, 'was heavy and accurate, but close support of the attacking troops was hampered throughout by the broken nature of the terrain and the difficulty of accurate observation in the birch scrub which covered the lower slopes of the hills'; and Captain Stevens of the *Havelock* remarked—as he did after Bjerkvik—that 'while 4.7-in. fire immediately silenced enemy machine-guns, it did not apparently succeed in destroying them,' though he quickly destroyed a German machine-gun and its crew with his own half-inch machine-gun at 1800 yards range. The first flight of legionaries landed punctually at midnight without loss, the opposition 'weaker than expected' according to Lieutenant Francklin, who commanded the landing flotilla. The next party, however, was not ready at Oydejord when the landing craft came there; German field guns and mortars opened a galling fire on the pier, while the party was embarking; and the French sent round their later flights to embark at Saegnes in Herjangs Fjord, which 'slowed up the operation very considerably' and prevented the use of fishing smacks to supplement the landing craft, owing to the shallow water. None the less, the first battalion of the Legion and the Narvik battalion were both on shore by 0400, the 28th, or sooner, which was well within the time table. On the other hand, the first couple of tanks—apparently the only tanks put on shore that side—stuck in the soft mud and sand of their landing beach at Taraldsvik, and did no service.

It was as well that the landing so far had gone punctually, for German bombers appeared about 0500, apparently 30 or more, with the air to themselves. The Royal Air Force fighter patrols which had been arranged to protect the ships and troops became fog-bound at Bardufoss some twenty minutes before the Germans appeared over Narvik. For two hours the German aircraft attacked. They seem to have helped their comrades on the ground in a counter-stroke that gave the Allies a hard fight to hold what they had won, and to have hindered the landing of the second battalion of legionaries. Although the aircraft actually hit the *Cairo* only¹ each ship had to manoeuvre to avoid bombs in a way that made it impossible to support the troops with gunfire. Luckily the ships had virtually finished their task, and General Bethouart wanted now but two destroyers, and was ready to go on shore himself. Lord Cork withdrew accordingly about 0630, leaving Admiral Vivian to attend on the soldiers with the *Coventry*, *Firedrake* and *Beagle*, to which were added the *Delight* and *Echo* in the afternoon.

According to one report the German counter-stroke came when they saw the ships retire. The Allies were then attacking Hill 457, a plateau south-east of the landing beach, and the Germans drove them back across the railway and up the hill by Orneset. They also brought machine-guns to bear on the beach, where part of the second battalion of the Legion was still coming on shore, so another landing place was found further to the westward. The first battalion renewed its attack, with the *Beagle* and the field guns at Oydejord supporting, and before long the legionaries and the Norwegians gained the plateau. Later on the second battalion seized the high ground north and west of Narvik.

¹ The *Cairo* was hit by two small bombs and lost 30 men, killed and wounded. The casualties to the landing forces from the bombing amounted to only one small landing craft loaded with ammunition.

German aircraft attacked the troops again in the evening, and nearly hit the *Coventry*; this time some British fighters came to the rescue, though with what effect the reports do not say.

By 2200 that night, the whole of Narvik peninsula west of a line from Fagernes to Forsneset had fallen to the Allies. To the south, the Poles had stiff fighting round Ankenes. They eventually established themselves on the side of a hill above that village, overlooking Narvik harbour. The *Southampton* had supported them in the morning, firing on Ankenes and Nyborg and across the harbour on Fagernes; for a time, too, the *Firedrake* engaged German machine-guns near the Ore Quay. Admiral Clarke remarked that 'in general, the shore signal station was not helpful in communicating clearly what was wanted, in fact, it did not appear always to know', and that none of the *Southampton's* targets 'was really identified, although the result of the bombardment appeared to be what was wanted'—certainly the Poles seem to have been entirely satisfied.

In the two days following the capture of Narvik, the French continued their advance along both sides of Rombaks Fjord as far as the narrows by Stromsnes (where the *Eskimo* had been torpedoed on 13th April). General Fleischer's division lay north and east of the fjord in touch with the Chasseurs-Alpins, except that his Narvik battalion lay as garrison in its name town. The Poles reached the head of Beisfjord, and had three battalions in the district between Ankenes and the head of the fjord by the end of the month. All these troops were in touch with the enemy.

The German General Dietl was in fact in a critical situation, and had it been possible for the Allies to carry the operations to their logical conclusion, must soon have been faced with the alternatives of surrender or withdrawal across the Swedish frontier. Actually, provisional arrangements were made for the latter.

'Thus ended an operation', wrote General Auchinleck, 'which, in my opinion, reflects great credit on the judgment and pertinacity of General Bethouart and on the fighting qualities of his troops. Reconnaissance after the capture of the town revealed the full difficulties of landing on the beaches close to the town and the wisdom of the plan finally adopted. Though he knew of the decision to evacuate Norway before the operation started, General Bethouart persevered with his plan; and the vigour with which the advance eastwards was pressed after the capture of the town drove the enemy back on to his main position covering Sildvik and Hunddalen, thus making it difficult for him to attempt a counter-attack against Narvik at short notice; this enabled the subsequent evacuation to be carried out under more favourable conditions than at one time seemed likely'. But he said too:—

'The plans for the landing on the peninsula north of Narvik had continually to be changed and postponed, owing to the lack of proper landing craft, particularly of motor landing craft, which were required to land tanks. These motor landing craft were also in constant demand for the vital task of landing heavy anti-aircraft guns for the protection of the base area. The landing at Narvik was also successful thanks to the most effective co-operation of the Royal Navy, the excellent support given by the guns of H.M. ships, and the skill and determination of General Bethouart's troops; but with the facilities available the transfer of three battalions across a narrow fjord some 1500 yards wide took over seven hours, and the strength of the first ^{Army} had to be limited to 300 men. The landing of such a small advanced party on a hostile shore entailed considerable risk; and in view of the likelihood of such operations having to be repeated in other theatres of war, it is urgently necessary that an ample supply of modern landing craft should be provided without further delay. It is unfair to expect any troops to undertake such hazardous operations with such inadequate means.'

THE RETREAT FROM NORTHERN NORWAY

59. The Decision to Withdraw

The British and French Governments' decision to leave Norway altogether reached Lord Cork during the night of 24th/25th May in the following signal from the Chiefs of Staff (A.T. 2004/24) :—

' His Majesty's Government has decided your forces are to evacuate Northern Norway at earliest moment.

Reason for this is that the troops, ships, guns and certain equipment are urgently required for defence of United Kingdom.

We understand, from military point of view, operations evacuations will be facilitated if enemy forces are largely destroyed or captured. Moreover, destruction of railways and Narvik port facilities make its capture highly desirable. Nevertheless, speed of evacuation, once begun, should be of primary consideration in order to limit duration maximum naval efforts. Two officers will be sent at once from United Kingdom to concert evacuation plans with you and General Auchinleck. Evacuation of all equipment, vehicles and stores will clearly take too long: following are required to be evacuated in order of importance from point of view of defence of United Kingdom, (a) personnel, (b) light anti-aircraft guns and ammunition, (c) 25-pounders, (d) heavy anti-aircraft guns and ammunition. Tactical conditions must rule; but, so far as they permit, plan should be framed accordingly.

Norwegian Government have not yet been informed and greatest secrecy should be observed.'

The following morning Lord Cork discussed the matter with General Auchinleck; both were agreed that the safety of the force made secrecy vital and that the information should only be imparted to those Senior Officers it was imperative should know it. Next day (26th) General Bethouart was informed. He received the news with 'characteristic calm, though one point upon which he was insistent was that for reasons of national honour he could not abandon the Norwegian Army he had been working with, in the lurch on the field of battle. The whole question was discussed and it was agreed that pressure on the enemy must be kept up until the last, that the attack on Narvik . . . must go on, and that this operation would of itself be the best possible way of concealing our intentions from the enemy'.¹

There remained the difficult question of breaking the news to the Norwegians. Clearly, it was only fair that this should be done as soon as possible. After communication with the Foreign Office, the decision was taken on 1st June that Sir Cecil Dormer (H.B.M. Minister to Norway) should inform the King of Norway in the morning of 2nd June and that the Norwegian Cabinet and the Commander-in-Chief, General Ruge, should be informed later that day. Vice-Admiral Cunningham, who had been operating in the Tromsø area since 10th May, was also told and directed to arrange for the passage of the King and Government.

' Naturally, at first, there was a feeling of soreness and disillusionment among the Norwegians on learning of the evacuation, but on the whole the decision was received as being inevitable under the circumstances and every help was

¹ Lord Cork's despatch.

given to facilitate the withdrawal'. Cordial letters were exchanged between Lord Cork and the Norwegian Admiral Diesen, who undertook to send all effective Norwegian ships, including submarines, to the Shetlands and to destroy the rest.

As a first step, it was decided to evacuate the troops from the Bodo area. Brigadier Gubbins had already reported that he must retire not later than 1st June unless reinforcements could be sent to him and this was under consideration, but the idea was necessarily abandoned in view of the new policy, and orders for withdrawal were accordingly issued.

60. Withdrawal from Mo and Bodo

[PLAN 12]

The situation in the Bodo area when the decision was taken to withdraw was as follows.

The Scots Guards had been falling back from Mo since 18th May; a week later they reached Rognan, at the head of Saltdals Fjord, some 40 miles by water to the eastward of Bodo and 12 miles south of the main position near Fauske, where the Irish Guards and the five independent companies lay. The Brigadier's plan was to bring back the Scots Guards from Rognan to Hopen, about 10 miles east of Bodo, when the troops near Fauske were to retreat through them and embark; the Scots Guards were to retreat in turn through the South Wales Borderers, posted nearer in, and the whole force was to leave Bodo in destroyers in three flights between 29th May and 1st June.

Commander Fell's flotilla of puffers had reached the area on 24th May, and it was on these craft that the programme principally fell in the first place. His first task was to ferry troops to Bodo on the 25th. Thenceforward the flotilla worked unceasingly in the service of the troops between Rognan and Bodo until the last straggler had embarked on 1st June. The ships and their native crews might change—they were not fighting units and 'most of the Norwegian crews took flight or sabotaged their engines, if left for a moment unguarded' under fire—but the work went on with new puffers and new crews.

On 29th May, the day the retreat from Bodo began, the Admiralty had signalled to Lord Cork that 'aircraft carriers and four fast liners will arrive Bodo area on 2nd June for evacuation of garrison' and 'it appears undesirable to attempt embarking Bodo garrison without fighter protection from carriers'. It was, however, decided not to wait and to carry on with the evacuation by destroyers as planned, though less than half a dozen aircraft could be spared from the two British squadrons at Bardufoss and the airfield at Bodo only became operational on 26th May. Nor were there any anti-aircraft guns worth mentioning.

During the last few days before the embarkation German bombers raided Bodo and attacked the troops several times, but the enemy's main concern was with attacks on the base at Harstad and the shipping in the fjords to the northward. On 26th and 27th May the few Royal Air Force fighters shot down three or four Germans, a number almost equal to their own strength. On the 28th the enemy arrived in force and destroyed the town and damaged the airfield. Fortunately they missed the quay from which the embarkation was to take place and they did not appear while the troops were actually going on board; the evacuation was successfully completed on 29th, 30th and 31st May, 1000 men being taken direct to the United Kingdom in the *Vindictive* and the

remainder to Harstad in destroyers¹ and small craft. A considerable amount of equipment was brought away, but four 25-pdr. guns, four Bofors, and three Bren carriers which had been salvaged from the *Effingham*, together with such material as could not be moved by the men had to be abandoned.

Mention should be made of the useful work of s.s. *Ranen*, a small Norwegian passenger steamer which had been taken up and armed with one Bofors, one Oerlikon and numerous machine guns as a decoy ship. Commanded by Commander Sir Geoffrey Congreve and manned by a mixed party of naval ratings, Irish Guardsmen and Borderers, she harried the enemy in their advance up the coast from Bodo. She also added to General Dietl's perplexities by cutting the telephone cables by which the Germans communicated their progress northwards.

61. Plan of general withdrawal

Meanwhile, plans had been got out for the general withdrawal.

By this time Germany had all Holland and nearly all Belgium in her power; her advancing armies, well inside France, seriously threatened the Channel ports. The evacuation of the British Army from Dunkirk was in full swing² and the Admiralty had warned Sir Charles Forbes that the risk of invasion by airborne and seaborne troops, perhaps assisted by 'the Fifth Column', was thought to be 'very real'. In these circumstances, plans for retreat—which followed hard upon the heels of the final plans for taking Narvik—must rely as little as possible on outside help, whether for ferrying the troops and stores to the transports or for protection during the passage home. As Admiral Forbes put it: 'The naval effort during evacuation will of necessity be large and prolonged, unless a disaster is courted, and will take place at a time when our naval effort might well be required in the North Sea, 1000 miles away'.

Lord Cork's plan had three phases. Under the first he sent home certain stores, including some French tanks and guns, before the end of May in ships he had already in Norway, escorted by some of his own trawlers. For the main embarkation, to be carried out in the two later phases, he needed ships to take the rest of the stores and some 24,500 troops—all the expeditionary force except the 1000 men that went direct from Bodo. These transports were to arrive in two groups during the first week in June.

As for ships of war, the Admiral expected to have one large cruiser, three anti-aircraft cruisers and about 10 destroyers of his own; he asked for five more destroyers to maintain his patrols, whilst the bulk of the flotilla ferried troops to the transports at rendezvous in the outer fjords or at sea, but the Admiralty could spare him only three. As things turned out, the *Curlew* was sunk before the end of May, and the *Cairo* and a destroyer had to go home disabled, all the result of attacks from the air; thus the actual strength was considerably less than Lord Cork had counted on.³

¹ *Fivedrake, Vanoc, Arrow, Havelock, Echo.*

General Auchinleck in his despatch remarked:—

'The swiftness and efficiency with which the evacuation was carried out reflects great credit on Brigadier Gubbins and his staff. The destroyers of the Royal Navy were very well handled and carried out the programme laid down to the minute.'

² The evacuation from Dunkirk started on the 26th May and ended on the 4th June.

³ See Appendix C (3).

On the other hand, the expedition was to have invaluable protection in the air up to the last moment of embarking, and indeed during the passage home, for Vice-Admiral Wells arrived off the coast with the *Ark Royal* and *Glorious* in the evening of 2nd June. The *Ark Royal* had fighters to patrol above the embarking troops and bombers to attack the German troops and communications—for instance, the airfield at Bodo and troops at Fauske, both places so lately in British hands, besides their old targets of a few weeks before, the railway at Hunddalen and Sildvik. When the last troops sailed she went most of the way home with them, and her aircraft patrolled round the convoy. The *Glorious* had come to carry home the Royal Air Force fighters from Bardufoss. That the cloudy weather of their last few days in Norway favoured the departing troops does not lessen the credit due to the Royal Air Force, who in General Auchinleck's words had inspired their opponents with a 'genuine fear' of their prowess, and who shared in the work of protecting the troops until a few hours before the rearguard left the shore.

The following arrangements were made to protect the expedition during its passage home. All the ships of the Narvik squadron were needed for embarking troops or giving local protection to the end, so Lord Cork originally intended to keep the first group at one of his distant rendezvous until the last soldiers had embarked, when four destroyers would go ahead to join it, while the rest of the squadron escorted the other troopships and the main storeship convoy. But the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, asked the Admiralty on 30th May to keep him posted with the situation, 'particularly as regards' the sailing of the two groups of troopships, 'and also whether battlecruiser may be required to provide cover'. Although Lord Cork does not seem to have intercepted this signal, he answered it in effect next day, when he told Admiral Forbes his arrangements, and said 'much appreciate if some covering protection could be given'. Then, the Admiralty having desired that the troops should return as soon as possible to fit in with other movements they had to provide for, Lord Cork further informed him that the first group would leave the rendezvous on the 7th in charge of the *Vindictive*, but without other escort; and he asked, 'Could covering force be provided, and convoy met, where you consider necessary—all destroyers in area required for rapid embarkation last flight'. Sir Charles replied that 'cover and anti-submarine escort will be sent to meet Group One', adding later that the *Valiant* (Captain Rawlings) would sail from Scapa on the 6th to accompany this first group as far south as 61° N., and then go north again to meet the second group in its turn, also that destroyers would join the first group and stay with it to the Clyde.

Admiral Forbes had meant originally to send the *Renown* and *Repulse*, but on the 5th 'two unknown vessels', possibly raiders, were sighted about 200 miles north-east of the Faeroes steering towards the Iceland-Faeroes passage, and Vice-Admiral Whitworth with the two battlecruisers, the *Newcastle*, *Sussex* and five destroyers¹ was sent to intercept them. Two days later, Admiral Whitworth's force proceeded to the coast of Iceland, on a report of an enemy landing there; but on the 8th the Admiralty ordered the *Renown* and two destroyers back to Scapa, as it was considered 'there should not be less than two capital ships available to proceed south in case of invasion'.

Thus it came about in the event that during the evacuation the Home Fleet heavy forces were considerably dispersed.

¹ *Zulu, Kelvin, Maori, Forester, Foxhound.*

62. The withdrawal

[PLAN 15]

The transports for the two later phases of the withdrawal went out singly or in small groups, some with escorts for the whole or part of the way, some with none. Most of the storeships went to Harstad to load, and sailed again in the evening of 7th June as an independent group—the slow convoy—with an escort of its own that joined it next day when the last troops had sailed; but a few storeships loaded at Tromsø, whence they sailed also on 7th June, meeting an escort of trawlers later. The fifteen troopships, two of which were not used, went first to one or other of two distant rendezvous appointed by Lord Cork about 180 miles from the coast,¹ where the two main groups were to assemble before closing the coast to receive troops, and where individual ships were to wait after loading or between partial loadings until their group was ready to go home. Rear-Admiral Vivian in the *Coventry*, in general charge of the embarking, met the main groups at sea as they approached the coast to give them their instructions and to protect them from air attack while near the shore, and three or four of the hard-worked destroyers gave them anti-submarine protection in the intervals between turns of ferrying. Three of the troopships were small cross-channel steamers, two of which shipped men and stores at Harstad; the others got their passengers from destroyers in outlying fjords or at rendezvous some 40 miles out at sea. The soldiers left the shore at night, when experience taught that German aircraft gave least trouble, though it was daylight all round the clock. They embarked from places in Ofot Fjord and Tjeldsundet, from Harstad and the little fjords or sounds north of it, sometimes from puffers into destroyers, sometimes direct into destroyers, which carried them to the troopships, and all the time the airmen of both Services watched over them, and destroyers and the *Stork* and trawlers patrolled against possible submarines. The first main group of troopships, six large merchantmen and the *Vindictive*, took nearly 15,000 men in three early morning loadings between 4th and 6th June. The second group, four large and three small merchantmen, took a little under 10,000 men on 7th and 8th June.

Moreover, 'a great deal more stores and equipment was loaded' than the General had hoped, though most of the anti-aircraft guns and many wagons were abandoned.

All the troops had left the shore by the early morning of the 8th without hindrance from the enemy. General Auchinleck had been anxious lest German troops advancing from the Bodo district should embarrass the departure of the troops round Narvik, who were in touch with the enemy to the last. But General Bethouart² skilfully withdrew his rearguard, a battalion each of Poles and the Foreign Legion; and the nearest the Germans got to interfering was the landing of a few men by parachute near Ballangen in the afternoon of the 7th, as reported by the *Stork*. When in due course they re-occupied Narvik, they found it in a sorry state. Ore quays and electric power had been totally destroyed and the railway line for 2 miles east of Narvik partially destroyed. It was estimated that the ore quays and electrical supply would take nine months to repair; and this, combined with clearing the harbour, in which some 20 ships had been sunk, would preclude the export of ore in appreciable quantities for about a year.²

During the last few days before the retirement, steps were taken to deny to the enemy anything of value that could not be taken away in the area held

¹ Rendezvous A. Lat. 70° 30' N., Long. 7° 20' E.

Rendezvous B. Lat. 69° 30' N., Long. 6° 40' E.

² Actually the first iron ore steamer sailed from Narvik on the 8th January, 1941.

by the Allies. The M.N.B. ship *Mashobra* which had been bombed on the 25th May and beached was blown up; the 7,000-ton oiler, *Oleander*, severely damaged by a near miss on the 26th, was sunk; disabled trawlers were destroyed; harbour defence booms and nets were sunk and all traces removed. An attempt was made to tow away the A.L.C.s, but finally they and the M.L.C.s were scuttled.

Nor was the destruction confined to what the Allies had brought with them. For example, Sir Geoffrey Congreve in the *Ranen*, with the trawler *Northern Gem*, destroyed the oil tanks at ^{SOLFOLLA}Svolvær¹ (on the north shore of Vest Fjord) in the night of the 7th June. 'This successful exploit ended with a most spirited engagement, on his part, with the enemy'.² The bombing attack by the Walrus aircraft on the installations at Solfolla has already been mentioned (see Sec. 25 ante).

The last men to be embarked in the transports were the ground staff of Bardufoss airfield. The Gladiators had been flown on board the *Glorious*, but it was feared that the eight Hurricanes that remained efficient would have to be abandoned. The Royal Air Force had orders to keep in action to the last, and then destroy their aircraft, should the enemy air activity necessitate it; but the cloudy weather and their own quality enabled them to take their aircraft away in the *Glorious*. 'The courageous action of the pilots in volunteering to fly their machines on to the flying deck of *Glorious* and of Group Captain Moore in allowing it to be done resulted in all eight being got safely away—an achievement which deserved a better fate than that which befell the gallant men who had carried it out successfully'.³

The organisation of the convoys carrying the expedition to the United Kingdom was as follows:—

GROUP I

escorted by the *Vindictive*

<i>Monarch of Bermuda</i>	<i>Franconia</i>
<i>Batory</i>	<i>Lancastria</i>
<i>Sobieski</i>	<i>Georgic</i>

GROUP 2

escorted by *Coventry*, *Southampton*, *Havelock*, *Fame*, *Firedrake*, *Beagle*, *Delight*

<i>Oronsay</i>	<i>Ulster Prince</i>
<i>Ormonde</i>	<i>Ulster Monarch</i>
<i>Arandora Star</i>	<i>Duchess of York</i>
<i>Royal Ulsterman</i>	<i>Vandyck</i> ⁴

SLOW CONVOY

STORESHIPS FROM HARSTAD

escorted by *Stork*, *Arrow*, 10 trawlers

<i>Blackheath</i>	<i>Theseus</i>
<i>Oligarch</i>	<i>Acrity</i>
<i>Harmattan</i>	<i>Coxwold</i>
<i>Cromarty Firth</i>	<i>Couch</i>

¹ Lat. 68° 40' N., Long. 14° 34' E.

² Lord Cork's despatch.

³ Lord Cork's despatch.

All these pilots were lost in the *Glorious* on the way home.

⁴ The *Vandyck* failed to make the rendezvous and was subsequently sunk off Andsnes by German aircraft.

STORESHIPS FROM TROMSÖ

escorted by 4 trawlers

Oil Pioneer
*Yermont**Arbroath* (A.S.I.S.)
Nyakoä (A.S.I.S.)

some Norwegian vessels.

Under the arrangements come to with the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet (see Sec. 61), the first group set out from the distant rendezvous early on 7th June and duly met the *Valiant* and her screen of four destroyers¹ about 0100, 8th, in 65° 30' N., 1° 50' W., roughly half-way between the rendezvous and 61° N., where the *Valiant* was to part company. The five destroyers² for the troopships were late, but in spite of thick fog off the Faeroes they joined the convoy at about 2300 that night in roughly 61° N., 6° W.; then the *Valiant* and her screen turned north again, while the convoy stood on for the Clyde. The troopships' passage was uneventful except for an attack on the 8th by a single aircraft, which the *Vindictive* drove away by her fire.

The store convoys sailed from Harstad and Tromsö on the 7th, and that evening Vice-Admiral Cunningham embarked H.M. the King of Norway, the Crown Prince and various notables³ in the *Devonshire* at Tromsö, sailing at 2030 independently for the Clyde.

The last group of transports had cleared And Fjord by 2300, 8th June, and left its distant rendezvous in the morning of the 9th, escorted by the *Southampton*, *Coventry* and five destroyers. Rear-Admiral Vivian was placed in charge of the convoy and Lord Cork, who was accompanied by Generals Auchinleck and Bethouart, wore his flag in the *Southampton*. The *Glorious* had been detached at 0300, 8th, owing to shortage of fuel, and ordered to proceed home independently with the *Acasta* and *Ardent* as screen; but the *Ark Royal*, with her screen of three destroyers,⁴ accompanied the convoy, some of her aircraft searching for enemy surface craft in the most probable direction of their approach and others providing overhead cover against air attack.

At midnight, 9th/10th June, being clear of Norwegian waters, the operations came under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, and Lord Cork accordingly hauled down his flag, having directed that the *Southampton* was to remain with the convoy for the passage.

But before this, misfortune had overtaken the expedition. Since the middle of April, both men-of-war and transports had crossed and re-crossed the North Sea, in ones or twos or in weakly protected convoys, with never a sign that German surface craft might interrupt their passage. On 8th June, however, they suddenly appeared in force off Northern Norway, where they caught and sank six ships going home independently of the convoys.

¹ *Tartar*, *Mashona*, *Bedouin*, *Ashanti*.

² *Atherstone*, *Wolverine*, *Witherington*, *Antelope*, *Viscount*.

³ The party included H.M. the King of Norway, the Crown Prince and their attendants; H.B.M. Minister, the French and Polish Ministers, and members of the *Corps diplomatique*; the Norwegian Prime Minister, 10 ministers, staffs and families; certain members of the Norwegian Air Force; political refugees; 33 British officers and 306 other ranks—a total of 435 men and 26 women.

⁴ *Diana*, *Achevon*, *Highlander*.

63. The German Naval Sortie (Operation Juno)

[PLAN 15]

The presence of the German ships off Northern Norway was entirely fortuitous so far as the British evacuation was concerned. Of this, the secret had been well kept; the Allied Commanders had disguised the movements of troops and shipping with 'conflicting rumours and bogus instructions' and the Germans were quite unaware of what was in hand.

The object of their operation, known as Operation Juno, was to relieve the German land forces in Narvik by attacking enemy transports and warships in the Narvik-Harstad area, and for this purpose a force consisting of the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, the *Hipper* and four destroyers, the *Galster*, *Lody*, *Steinbrink* and *Schoemann* under Admiral Marschall, had left Kiel at 0700, 4th June, with orders to carry out a surprise attack on And and Vaags Fjords, the destruction of enemy warships, transports and installations found there being the object: if, however, later reports showed that an attack on Ofot Fjord and Narvik itself would be profitable, this would then become the principal task.

At 2000, 6th June, the force was in 68° N., 2° 30' W., and during the night the *Hipper* and destroyers completed with oil from the store ship *Dittmarschen*, which had previously been ordered to a waiting position in this neighbourhood.

It was not until the 7th June that the first report of an Allied convoy being at sea off the coast of Norway reached the German ships. This placed four large and three small ships in 67° 57' N., 3° 50' E., steering southerly at 0700, 7th, that is some 150 miles south east of the Germans.

Admiral Marschall took no notice of this report, as he supposed them to be empty transports returning to the United Kingdom; but later that day, at 1955, came a report of an Allied convoy on a westerly course just off the entrance to And Fjord at 1325 and two aircraft carriers about 45 miles north of Andenes at 1400; and then, suspecting that a general withdrawal from Norway was in progress,¹ he decided to postpone the attack on Harstad, which he had planned for the night of the 8th/9th,² and steered to intercept these ships instead, informing the Admiral, Group West, at 0300, 8th June, of his intention. This change of plan was not approved by Group Command, West, and a signal in reply was sent at 0430 pointing out that the main objective remained the 'destruction of enemy naval forces in the area Harstad-Narvik'.

An hour later Admiral Marschall fell in with his first victims. These were the 5000-ton tanker *Oil Pioneer* from Tromsø, with her escorting trawler, the *Juniper*, which the German ships sighted at 0531/8th, and sank an hour and a half later in 67° 26·5' N., 4° 23' E., picking up 25 survivors from the tanker, and four from her escort.

The *Scharnhorst* and *Hipper* then each flew off an aircraft to search for further prey. These soon reported a 12,000-ton merchant ship and a hospital ship to the north, and a cruiser and a merchant ship to the south. The *Hipper* was ordered to deal with the former, which proved to be the 20,000-ton troopship *Orama* and the hospital ship *Atlantis*, which had left the Norwegian coast the day before, the troopship being sent home alone and empty³ because she had arrived without sufficient oil or water to wait for the rest of her group. The *Hipper* sank the *Orama* at 1106 in 68° 2' N., 3° 36' E., picking up a total

¹ Admiral Marschall's War Diary.

² Log of *Scharnhorst*, 6th June, 1940.

³ About 100 German prisoners were embarked in her.

of 275 survivors. The Germans were successful in jamming the S.O.S. signals of all these three ships; as the *Atlantis* observed strictly the provisions of the Geneva Convention and did not use her wireless, they respected her privilege of immunity from attack and let her go unmolested.

The *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* meanwhile, after vainly searching for the ships reported to the south, had turned to a northerly course and the whole force proceeded in company till 1400, when the *Hipper* with the destroyers was detached and ordered to Trondheim¹ while Admiral Marschall, who still had no reconnaissance reports of Harstad and was convinced that Vaags Fjord no longer offered a worth while objective, continued to the north with the battlecruisers, in the somewhat vague hope of falling in with the aircraft carriers which had been located in the Andenes area several times during the last few days. His luck was in and he had not long to wait. At 1545 a masthead was sighted to the eastward; course was altered to close and in a few minutes it was identified as a large aircraft carrier, with destroyer escort.

64. The sinking of the *Glorious*, *Ardent* and *Acasta*

[PLAN 15

This proved to be the *Glorious*, which, after being detached at 0300 that morning, had proceeded on a course 250° at 17 knots. The wind was N.W., 2-3, and a north westerly swell was running; visibility was extreme. No reconnaissance aircraft were up, and none had been since parting from the *Ark Royal*, for the whole previous day and night had been spent piloting the R.A.F. Hurricanes on board.² It was shortly after 1600 that the Germans were sighted to the northward; the *Ardent* was ordered to investigate, while the *Glorious* turned to the southward, bringing the enemy on to her starboard quarter steering south-east, and orders were given to range the *Swordfish*; but it was too late, and none of them got away.

At 1631 the *Scharnhorst* opened fire at a range of 27,800 yards, soon followed by the *Gneisenau*; the *Ardent* made for the enemy at high speed, and both destroyers started laying a smoke screen, which was very effective and caused the guns of both battlecruisers to cease fire for some time. Shortly after the action commenced, however, the *Glorious* had received a hit in the forward upper hangar which started a fire; this was got under control, but it destroyed the Hurricanes, and prevented any torpedoes being got out. The fire curtains had to be lowered. A salvo hit the bridge about 1700, and a heavy shell struck her aft about 1715. The Commander was then apparently in charge of the ship. The *Glorious* was of course completely outranged and her 4.7-in. guns could do little against the enemy. One main wireless aerial was shot away at an early stage of the action.

The order to abandon ship was given about 1720, and some 20 minutes later, listing heavily to starboard, she sank. The *Ardent* after firing two four-tube salvoes at the enemy, had been sunk about 1728, leaving the *Acasta*, faced by overwhelming odds, to fight gallantly to the last. With her guns still firing she steered to the south-east, temporarily concealed by smoke. There seemed a chance of escape, but this was not Commander Glasford's idea. He passed a message to all positions 'you may think we are running away from the enemy; we are not, our chummy ship (*Ardent*) has sunk, the *Glorious*

¹ Admiral Marschall considered that these ships would have no further opportunity of oiling at sea, once the British heard of the sinkings. They were therefore to complete with fuel at Trondheim and then give protection to the German convoys between there and Bodo.

² One T.S.R. aircraft and one section of Gladiators were being kept at 10 minutes' notice.

is sinking, the least we can do is to make a show '—and altering course through the smoke screen towards the enemy, he fired a four-tube salvo, of which one torpedo hit the *Scharnhorst* abreast the after 11-in. turret. A final salvo hit the *Acasta* at 1808, and the order was given to abandon ship; her heroic Commander was last seen taking a cigarette from his case and lighting it, as he lent over the bridge waving encouragement to his men.¹ Then she sank. But her single torpedo had a big result; the *Scharnhorst* was severely damaged and her speed reduced; Admiral Marschall abandoned his cruise and with both battlecruisers steered for Trondheim, where they arrived at 1430, 9th June. To this alone the Earl of Cork's troop convoy to the northward owed its safety.

The sinking of the *Glorious* and the two destroyers was attended by heavy loss of life, the naval losses amounting to 1474,² and the R.A.F. to 41—a total of 1515. A large number of men got on to Carley floats, but it had not been possible to provide provisions and water in all of them, owing to fire damage. It was very cold (temperature 46°); there was a sea running, which capsized the *Acasta's* boats, and within a few hours men were collapsing from exhaustion. On one float, which started with 22 officers and men, the number was reduced to four by next morning. Poignancy is added to the story by the fact that survivors sighted a British cruiser some 5 miles to the north-west on the 9th and later in the day two aircraft from the *Ark Royal*, in the course of a search for the enemy, passed close over the rafts but did not see them; had they done so, many might even then have been saved.

It was not until 0030, 11th June—some 54 hours after the ships sank, that 38 (three officers, 35 ratings) from the *Glorious*, and one rating from the *Acasta* were picked up by the small Norwegian vessel *Borgund* and landed in the Faeroes. Another Norwegian fishing vessel, the *Svalbard II*, rescued five men from the *Glorious*, who, with two survivors from the *Ardent*, picked up by a German seaplane, were made prisoners-of-war. Among the hundreds lost were nearly all those airmen who had performed the supremely difficult task of flying their land machines on board the *Glorious*. And in addition was the loss of one of our few aircraft carriers, whose services in this Norwegian campaign had enhanced their value—a most serious blow.

65. British reactions, 9th June 1940

[PLANS 15, 16

The first news to reach the British that German ships were at sea came from the *Atlantis*, which met the *Valiant* about 0900, the 9th, just 24 hours after the *Orama* was sunk. Once again³ the German battlecruisers had traversed the North Sea undetected by British air reconnaissance.⁴

¹ The details of the *Acasta's* fight are taken from an account written by her sole survivor, Able Seaman C. Carter.

	Officers	Ratings	Total
<i>Glorious</i>	76	1086	1162
<i>Acasta</i>	8	152	160
<i>Ardent</i>	10	142	152
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	94	1380	1474
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>

² See Sec. 15 (*ante*).

³ The inadequacy of British air reconnaissance caused grave concern to the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, who on 15th June called the attention of the Admiralty to it, and made various suggestions for its improvement. (Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, 1541/15 June.) He also pressed for the reintroduction of a daily intelligence signal, giving disposition of enemy main units, which since 21st May 1940 had been discontinued.

The *Valiant* was on her way back to join Admiral Vivian's convoy. She broadcast the hospital ship's account of a battleship and two destroyers attacking a two-funnelled transport (the *Orama*), and increased speed towards the troopships, then some 400 miles to the northward, and about 100 miles from where the *Atlantis* had seen the enemy. The *Valiant's* signal brought one from Admiral Cunningham, in the *Devonshire* with the King of Norway on board. The *Devonshire* must have been 100 miles or so westward of the *Glorious*, when that ship sighted the enemy and turned away to the south-eastward. She, and she only, had received an enemy report the *Glorious* made to Admiral Wells. It was 'a barely readable signal'; for technical reasons it was 'probably corrupt and referred to some other matter'; and Admiral Cunningham decided not to break wireless silence, for 'to do so would have involved serious risk of revealing *Devonshire's* position at a time when air attack was likely, which in the circumstances was in the highest degree undesirable'. Next day, however, when German shadowing aircraft had sighted the *Devonshire*, and the *Valiant's* signal 'indicated the possible vital importance of this message', the Admiral made his 1031/9, which ran: '*Valiant's* 0901/9, following was read, reception very doubtful on 3700 kc/s, at 1720/8. Begins—Vice-Admiral (A) from *Glorious*: my 1615, two P.B. Time of origin, 1640—ends. *Glorious's* 1615 not received'. Not until the afternoon of the 9th when the Germans claimed in a wireless news bulletin to have had two squadrons of ships at sea, including the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, and to have sunk the *Glorious* and a destroyer, the *Orama*, the *Oil Pioneer*, and a 'U-boat chaser' (*Juniper*), was there serious anxiety about the carrier.

The Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, however, had taken steps to support the returning expedition as soon as the *Valiant's* signal reached him on the 9th. He ordered that ship to make the best of her way to Admiral Vivian's convoy, which in fact she was doing already, having begun to work up to full speed on hearing of the enemy from the *Atlantis*; and he made a signal to the *Glorious* to join the *Valiant*, if she had oil enough. The *Repulse*, *Newcastle*, *Sussex* and three destroyers, then at sea between Iceland and the Faeroes he ordered also to join Admiral Vivian. He raised steam in the *Rodney* and *Renown* at Scapa, and sailed with them and six destroyers in the afternoon to protect the convoys.

These ships—four capital ships, two cruisers and 13 destroyers, counting the *Valiant* and her screen—were all Sir Charles Forbes had now under his command (except for one or two more destroyers oiling or cleaning boilers) after the detachment of Home Fleet cruisers and destroyers to the Humber, Sheerness and Mediterranean (see Sec. 24). As always, there was an overall shortage of destroyers, and at this time many had been engaged in bringing away the Army from France, with heavy damage and loss; indeed, the want of destroyers had led Sir Charles to tell the Admiralty on the 3rd that 'in event of heavy ships being required to proceed to sea, battlecruisers only will be sailed unless occasion is vital'.

To go back to the convoys. Admiral Vivian also received the signals from the *Valiant* and *Devonshire*, and the Admiralty's reproduction of the German broadcast on 9th June. These signals explained wreckage reported by the *Ark Royal's* patrolling aircraft and bodies seen by the *Southampton* that day, for the route the troopships followed lay not far from the Germans' track of the day before; indeed, survivors of the *Glorious* said they saw the convoy and friendly aircraft pass them by. In the afternoon, German aircraft shadowed and attacked the *Valiant* on her way to join the troopships. 'I reported the attack', said Captain Rawlings, 'as I was leading aircraft straight to the convoy

and considered they would probably steer further to the westward'. When this report came, Admiral Wells recommended that the convoy should keep further westward, away from the enemy's air station at Trondheim, and that his aircraft should inform the *Valiant* of the new course and deal with the convoy shadower. Lord Cork agreed, so the convoy turned in the evening, anticipating an Admiralty order to do so. The aircraft duly informed the *Valiant* and drove off the shadowing enemy, and she and her destroyers joined about 2200 near 67° 30' N., 1° W. The same night, however, several aircraft tried to attack the *Ark Royal*; her fire and the *Valiant's* kept them at arm's length, whilst her fighters shot down one and damaged others. Next morning, the 10th, the *Newcastle*, *Sussex* and *Repulse* arrived, the first two departing to join the Harstad store convoy on the battlecruiser's approach, and at midday the *Ark Royal* left to join Sir Charles Forbes, then some 70 miles off to the eastward. The *Repulse* and *Valiant* parted company from the convoy on the 11th, and went to Scapa. On the 12th, the convoy came safe to the Clyde. The storeships also arrived safely. The *Newcastle* and *Sussex* took the Harstad convoy to Scapa, and the Tromsø ships came home later, escorted by a couple of trawlers.

Apart from the ships sunk by Admiral Marschall's squadron, only one other ship came to grief—the *Vandyck*, armed boarding vessel. She was a spare troopship in the second group, but instead of going back alone, like the *Orama*, she had orders to cruise on a station 130 miles to seaward, while the other ships loaded, and to join them at the distant rendezvous in time to go home on the 9th. By some mistake she seems to have gone to one of the inner rendezvous, from which she reported herself by signal some hours after the convoy had proceeded, though she was afterwards reported as having spoken a trawler more than 100 miles away within two hours of making her original signal. Aircraft and a destroyer sent to find her failed to do so, and the Naval Attaché at Stockholm informed the Admiralty on the 11th that she had been sunk off Andenes the day before by German aircraft.

66. Movements of the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet [PLANS 15, 16

The Commander-in-Chief, having left Scapa at 1250, 9th June, in the *Rodney*, wearing the Union at the main for the first time at sea,¹ with the *Renown* and destroyer screen, steered to the northward at best possible speed until the evening of the 10th to cover the returning troop convoy.

At 1625 on the 9th he received a message from the Admiralty (A.T. 1330/9) informing him that he was in command of all forces in the northern area of the North Sea, *i.e.* including those hitherto commanded by Lord Cork, who hauled down his flag that night. Aircraft of Coastal Command, reconnoitring Trondheim at 0846, reported four enemy cruisers there, subsequently modified to a battlecruiser, two cruisers and about seven destroyers; this was in fact Admiral Marschall's force. The *Hipper* and the four destroyers had reached Trondheim on the morning of the 9th, and the *Gneisenau* and damaged

¹ Sir Charles Forbes had been promoted to Admiral of the Fleet on 8th May, 1940. This was the first occasion in history—as was pointed out to Sir Charles Forbes by H.M. The King—that an Admiral of the Fleet had flown the Union at the main as Commander-in-Chief of a fleet in time of war. (Lord St. Vincent, on taking command of the Channel Fleet in 1806, was authorised to wear the Union at the main as a special mark of distinction, because he had formerly been First Lord of the Admiralty; but he was not promoted to Admiral of the Fleet till 15 years later.)

Scharnhorst a few hours later in the afternoon. Despite Admiral Marschall's important success in sinking the *Glorious*, the German Naval Staff was not pleased with his action in withdrawing his force to Trondheim, and ordered him to resume operations forthwith against the British convoys, about which numerous reports were coming in. Accordingly, he sent the *Gneisenau* and *Hipper* to sea on 10th June; they were reported—as 'a *Scheer* and a *Hipper*'—in 64° 35' N., 9° 45' E., steering 300°, at 1400 that day by the submarine *Clyde*. But it was clear to Admiral Marschall that by this time the convoys were beyond their reach, and they were recalled to Trondheim that night.¹

After receiving the aircraft report of the force in Trondheim, Admiral Forbes at 1000, 10th, ordered the *Ark Royal* to leave the troopships and join him, the Admiralty having asked him to arrange a torpedo attack by aircraft, should the Royal Air Force find the enemy in port; but on receipt of the *Clyde*'s report, the Admiralty cancelled the operation against Trondheim and ordered the Commander-in-Chief to concentrate on the ships reported. Sir Charles Forbes accordingly at 1600 stood to the eastward and south-eastward towards them, with aircraft scouting ahead; at the same time he asked Vice-Admiral Wells if he could send an air striking force as the 'only hope of getting the ships'. An extensive reconnaissance failed to find the enemy and at midnight, having no further report of them, he turned back to 320°, to provide cover for the slow convoy and storeships from Narvik, which were still at sea. By the morning of the 11th the last convoy was well to the westward, though the fleet kept meeting trawlers and merchantmen, chiefly Norwegian, 'all over the ocean'.

The same afternoon, the 11th June, the Royal Air Force machines attacked the ships at Trondheim, reporting there a capital ship and two cruisers, and claiming a hit with a 250 lb. bomb on each cruiser. The *Gneisenau* and *Hipper* had returned by that time from their short sortie, having realised that the convoys were beyond their reach, and there were consequently in Trondheim, when the aircraft attacked, two capital ships (*Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*), one cruiser (*Hipper*), and four destroyers. None of the ships was hit or damaged in the attack.

The Commander-in-Chief with the fleet was then somewhere beyond 67° N., and the Admiralty suggested that naval aircraft should attack; the fleet accordingly moved south that evening, in thick weather. Passing the last Tromsø store convoy next morning, the 12th, the Admiral turned eastward, having decided to attack with 15 Skuas, from 65° N., 4° 40' E., early next morning, provided he could reach the flying-off position undiscovered. German aircraft shadowed the fleet in the afternoon. 'It does not look hopeful for tomorrow, his reconnaissance is too efficient', signalled the Commander-in-Chief to Admiral Wells. However, 15 Skuas left the carrier in the appointed position

¹ The German Naval War Staff was dissatisfied with Admiral Marschall's whole conduct of the operation. In its view, his decision to attack the convoys was "operationally false"; it involved a risk of revealing the position of the battlecruisers before their main task of attacking Harstad had been carried out, and it could produce no relieving effect on the land situation at Narvik. The Naval Staff also considered that the torpedo hit on the *Scharnhorst* might have been avoided by better tactical conduct of the action, and that the ships should not have withdrawn to Trondheim immediately afterwards. That he did eventually intercept and sink the *Glorious*, the Staff ascribed to "an extraordinary stroke of luck".

This seems less than just to Admiral Marschall, as had he persisted in going to Harstad on the night of the 8th/9th, he would have found nothing there to attack: and whether by luck or skill, he did score an important success in sinking the *Glorious*. The net result so far as he was concerned was that he was relieved of his command as Commander-in-Chief, Afloat, and replaced by Vice-Admiral Lütjens, who perished a year later in the *Bismarck*.

in time to attack at 0200, the 13th. They believed that they hit the *Scharnhorst* with at least one bomb ; this was true, but the bomb failed to explode, a tragic turn of fate as eight of the aircraft were lost in the attack. Some Royal Air Force machines bombed the neighbouring airfield of Vaernes at the same time to distract attention from the Skuas, while others gave the naval machines fighter protection. The fleet returned to Scapa as soon as the surviving Skuas returned, the *Ark Royal* and her screen entering harbour on the 14th, the two capital ships (*Rodney* and *Renown*) with their screen on the 15th at 1700.

The campaign for Norway was at an end.

COMMENT AND REFLECTIONS

67. The Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet's remarks

The various reports on the campaign in Norway naturally teem with lessons, suggestions and recommendations.

Most of these are of a topical or technical nature, and have been either confirmed or rendered obsolete by the experiences of the later years of the war—for example, suggestions as to the best ways of dealing with air attack on surface craft, and remarks on the value and limitations of the handful of A.L.C.s and M.L.C.s in the Narvik operations, the forerunners of the vast fleets of landing craft which reached their climax on the Normandy beaches in 1944. Such lessons, though possibly of archæological interest, would serve no useful purpose now, and therefore no attempt is made to enumerate them.

Nevertheless, much of permanent value may be culled from this campaign. As already pointed out, it was the first large-scale operation in history involving the employment of all three arms—sea, air and land. The Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, in his general remarks on the operations, stressed the necessity of correctly balancing these components in any operation of war.

'There was little doubt in his mind that the general basis of the (German) plan was the conviction that our sea power in the north could be broken by means of air power and submarines. . . .

It had, the Commander-in-Chief considered, been proved again, *but was apt to be forgotten*,¹ that a preponderance in power of each form of fighting force was required, each in its own element, to control that element. For instance, naval forces were required to control sea communications; air forces or military forces could not do so, but could help the naval force, each in its own element. Air forces were required to control the air; naval and military forces could not do so, but could help. Military forces were required to control the land; the two other forces by themselves could not do so, but could help. . . .²

On our part, the scale of air attack that would be developed against our military forces on shore and our naval forces off the Norwegian coast was *grievously* under-estimated when the operations were undertaken. . . .³

It was this latter factor—the scale of air attack—that went a long way to ensuring the German success in Norway. After the air attack on the Home Fleet in the first afternoon of the campaign, it was speedily recognised—at least in the Fleet—that ships could not operate with a reasonable chance of success in proximity to shore bases operating air forces virtually unopposed in the air. On the other hand, as the campaign progressed, the counter to this new menace, which when properly developed would largely neutralize it, became apparent, viz., the presence of friendly fighters.

¹ Author's italics.

² In special circumstances there are, of course, exceptions to this rule, e.g. a powerful fort can control the sea within range of its guns, or a really strong air force can control the sea or land within a reasonable distance of its airfields, if—as happened in Norway—the other side has virtually no air force present.

³ Home Fleet Narrative, para. 269 (extract).

68. System of Command

From the British naval point of view, perhaps the most important aspect of the campaign was the system of high command, especially as regards the relations between the Admiralty and the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet.

The right and duty of the Admiralty to exercise general control of all naval forces has always been recognised ; but just how detailed this control should be, in order to produce the best results, is a difficult and delicate problem. The Admiralty keeps the Commanders-in-Chief informed of the general policy and strategy (including, naturally, enemy intelligence), and allocates the forces deemed necessary to implement them. In the 18th century an attempt was made to pass on the experience of the Senior Officers at the Admiralty by means of the ' Fighting Instructions '. More than that, in those days of slow and uncertain communications, could not be done.

A great change was brought about at the beginning of the 20th century by the invention of Wireless Telegraphy. This enables the Admiralty to exercise constant direct control over the doings of the Commanders-in-Chief afloat, and, if so desired, to communicate direct with subordinate Commanders. It is now recognised that the 18th century fighting instructions, though admirable in their inception, succeeded in paralysing the initiative of the Commanders afloat for nearly a century ; and there seems a possibility that too rigid distant control by wireless might well produce similar results. At some stage the Commander afloat must assume unfettered control ; the difficulty is to determine precisely when.

The importance of having a clearly defined working arrangement had been recognised both ashore and afloat before the war, and correspondence on the subject had taken place between the First Sea Lord and the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet ; but the question had not been definitely settled and there was some doubt as to precisely how things would work out in practice. The Norwegian campaign presented the first full scale opportunity for testing the arrangements.

In the event the Admiralty controlled the operations in considerable detail. It would almost appear that this on occasions introduced an element of uncertainty into the situation.¹

The importance of the Commander-in-Chief afloat not revealing his position by the use of wireless enters the problem nowadays and may be advanced as an argument in favour of the Admiralty making operational signals direct to various units of the fleet. But there are other methods of communication, for example, the despatch of the *Codrington* by Admiral Forbes on 10th April to a rendezvous with directions to the cruisers, or the aircraft sent by the German Admiral Lütjens to Trondheim, with orders to make an important signal three hours after leaving him.²

The whole matter of course bristles with difficulties, but it is of such importance as to merit the most serious consideration and discussion in time of peace, if it is to work smoothly in the early days of any war. The difficulties

¹ See Secs. 8, 11, 12, 14, 28.

² The Commander-in-Chief will almost always be in a position to request Admiralty to issue instructions to his forces, if from difficulty in communications or other causes, he is unable to control them himself. This was done by Admiral Sir John Tovey a couple of years later in the course of operations against the *Tirpitz* in support of a convoy to North Russia.

are not lessened by the fact that personalities are bound to enter into it. An understanding which might work well between one Admiralty Administration or C.N.S. and one Commander-in-Chief, might produce confusion or friction between others.

On the whole, the events of the Norwegian Campaign seem to indicate that as a general rule, subject to the ultimate responsibility and consequent duty of the Admiralty to take what measures they think fit in an emergency (as, for example, the sudden arrival of unexpected enemy intelligence) the aim should be for them normally to limit themselves (*a*) to giving the Commander-in-Chief directions as to broad policy and strategy on a high level, including early warning of projected operations; and (*b*) to keeping him well posted in intelligence, both enemy (especially, of course, new operational intelligence) and information of other friendly forces, etc., which may be operating within the area of his command.

It is interesting to note that the Germans also found difficulties in adjusting the relationship between the Naval High Command ashore, and the Commander-in-Chief afloat, as a result of which Admiral Marschall after his not unsuccessful handling of Operation Juno was relieved of his command because he exercised his judgment to modify the plan to meet a new situation that had arisen since he put to sea, and which could not have been known to the Naval Staff when the operation was planned. Apart from the fact now known, that on 8th June the attack on Harstad would have been too late and that Admiral Marschall's initiative led to the destruction of the *Glorious*, surely the exercise of his discretion under such circumstances should have been well within the competence of the Commander-in-Chief afloat.

The appointment of Lord Cork—an Admiral of the Fleet, senior to the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet—to a command within the operational area of the latter was an unusual feature in the Command set up of the Norwegian campaign, which, despite the careful definition of the geographical limits of Lord Cork's command, might well have introduced complications. Lord Cork had been in close contact with the First Lord of the Admiralty for several months, examining the question of Baltic strategy, and the latter and the First Sea Lord 'were both agreed . . . that Lord Cork should command the Naval forces in this amphibious adventure in the north'.¹ There were no doubt strong reasons for the appointment in this particular case, though Lord Cork's seniority was likely to produce a delicate situation alike in his relations with the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, and even more so with the Military Commander of the Narvik expedition, Major-General Mackesy.

The divergence between the instructions given to Lord Cork and those given to General Mackesy requires no comment; but the episode well illustrates the difficulty of gearing the normal administrative machinery to the necessities of war, after a comparatively long period of peace.

69. The importance of wireless silence

The importance of ships so far as possible keeping wireless silence in order to avoid giving away their positions has already been touched on in connection with the exercise of command afloat. But there is another and even more

¹ Churchill, *THE SECOND WORLD WAR*, Vol. I, p. 483.

important reason, applying equally to shore stations as well as ships, for limiting the use of wireless: the danger that the enemy may have succeeded in breaking the codes and cyphers in use.¹ This happened in the Norwegian campaign. As early as 12th April the Germans intercepted and decyphered a signal from Vice-Admiral Cunningham indicating Namsos and Mosjoen as suitable for landing (see Sec. 21 *ante*), and three days later they similarly learned that the *Chrobry* and *Batory* were earmarked for landings at Namsos and that General Carton de Wiart was the Commander in this area.

The problem of whether and when to break wireless silence must usually be a difficult one, and the decision must be made by the officer concerned after a most careful appreciation of the situation as known to him at the time.

Vice-Admiral Cunningham's decisions on 8th and 9th of June are of interest in this respect. At 1740, 8th June, the *Devonshire* intercepted a 'barely readable' signal (timed 1640) from the *Glorious* to the Vice-Admiral, Aircraft Carriers, which subsequent events proved probably an amplifying report identifying two pocket battleships. The *Devonshire* at the time was proceeding alone to the United Kingdom; she had on board the King of Norway and most of the Norwegian Cabinet, and was then some 300 miles to the westward of Harstad. Clearly it was no time to draw attention to herself and the Vice-Admiral decided to maintain wireless silence. Next forenoon, at 0938, the *Devonshire* intercepted the *Valiant's* report from the *Atlantis* of the attack on the *Orama*. The *Devonshire* was then to the eastward of the Faroes; wireless silence had already been broken to request air and destroyer escort, and the *Valiant's* signal gave an ominous significance to the *Glorious's* message intercepted the day before; Admiral Cunningham immediately passed it to the Commander-in-Chief, to whom it brought the first hint that there might be cause for anxiety about the carrier.

No hard and fast rule can be laid down, except that wireless should be used as sparingly as possible, having due regard for the efficient performance of the operations in hand.² A common doctrine, thoroughly permeating the fleet, will tend to reduce the necessity for many of such signals. A good example of this occurred a year after the Norwegian campaign during the chase of the *Bismarck*. Captain Vian, with a division of destroyers, was steering to the east-north-east under orders to join the Commander-in-Chief, when he intercepted a signal placing the *Bismarck* some 75 miles to the southward of him. He immediately altered course without orders to the south-east to intercept; making contact most opportunely just as the sun set, he then shadowed and harassed her throughout the night. '*I knew*³ you would wish me to steer to intercept the enemy . . .', he subsequently wrote to the Commander-in-Chief.⁴

¹ These, of course, were lessons of the War of 1914-18. Since then the advance of science, enabling more accurate bearings to be taken, and new technique have enhanced their importance, and will no doubt continue to do so.

² Several instances occurred during the war where security in this respect was overdone e.g. a decision in the *Cumberland* in October 1939 to maintain wireless silence, which resulted in information not reaching the Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic, that in his opinion might have led to the early destruction of the *Graf Spee*; and in connection with the *Cornwall's* encounter with Raider No. 33 (which she sank) in May 1941, the Admiralty remarked ' . . . rigid adherence to wireless silence resulted in essential reports not being made . . . '

³ Author's italics.

⁴ Incidentally, it is pertinent to remark that had the *Bismarck* kept wireless silence, she might well have escaped.

70. Tactical Loading of Expeditionary Forces

A lesson of importance which emerges from the campaign is the necessity for loading an expeditionary force tactically, even though it may not be anticipated that its landing will be opposed. Plan R.4 was abandoned by orders from the Admiralty at the very outset; but had the troops been kept embarked and had they been tactically stowed, it is easy to see in retrospect what a very important role they might have played. For example, the cruisers at Rosyth could have reached Stavanger before the Germans¹; or, alternatively, had they been sent to the north, and been able to land their troops immediately after Admiral Whitworth's action on 13th April, there seems little doubt that Narvik could have been occupied at once.

But it is doubtful whether the loading arrangements were sufficiently flexible for the troops to have landed for active operations, even if they had been kept embarked. The fact that on the splitting of convoy N.P.1, when the 146th Brigade was diverted to Namsos, its Brigadier was on board one of the ships which continued to Harstad, is an indication of the sort of contretemps which might have been experienced.

71. Risks and chances

The campaign well illustrates what might be termed the 'lost principle of war', viz., that nothing decisive can be achieved without taking risks.² This does not mean, of course, that risks should be blindly courted; but it does mean that having been recognised and carefully assessed, and every possible provision made to minimise them, they must be accepted for an adequate object.

Thus the very audacity of the German plan for the original landings—a great risk, recognised and accepted by Admiral Raeder—largely contributed to its triumphant conclusion; and in a lesser degree, the decision of the Admiralty to accept the risk to the *Warspite* in penetrating Ofot Fjord at the second Battle of Narvik produced the one resounding Allied success in the whole campaign.

The campaign is also interesting as emphasising the narrow chances³ on which important events so often turn. On the whole, the chances favoured the Germans; perhaps they deserved it. The sighting of the *Hipper* at the moment she chanced to be on a westerly course for no reason except to fill in time had the effect of causing the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, to steer away from the Norwegian coast in the afternoon before the invasion; similarly, the U-boat report of Captain Warburton-Lee's destroyers steering *away* from Narvik (also filling in time) must have misled Commodore Bonte. Had the U-boat sighted and reported them steering towards Narvik before they turned south-westerly, there can be little doubt the German destroyers would have been more on the alert and the result of the ensuing action would have been very different.

¹ See Sec. 8 *ante*.

² 'The boldest methods are the safest; nothing great can be achieved without risk.'—Nelson.

³ 'It seems to be a law inflexible and inexorable that he who will not risk cannot win.'—John Paul Jones.

'All naval expeditions . . . have always failed, because the Admirals . . . have learned—where I do not know—that war can be made without running risks.'—Napoleon.

³ 'Something must be left to chance: nothing is sure in a sea fight beyond all others.'—Nelson.

'There is no human affair which stands so constantly and so generally in close connection with chance, as war.'—Clausewitz.

Other examples which will occur to the reader are the escape of the *Hipper* from Trondheim on 10th April, when a fortuitous delay in sailing saved her from her diversionary course taking her straight into Sir Charles Forbes' battle fleet; the sinking of the *Rio de Janeiro*, which might have compromised the whole German plan of invasion, had the correct inference been drawn and acted upon; and the colour given to Admiral Raeder's planned diversion in the north by the chance encounter with the *Glowworm*, while she was seeking Admiral Whitworth's force the day before the invasion.

72. The Principles of War as applied in the Campaign

That the occupation of Norway was a great military success for Germany cannot be denied. But it must never be forgotten that it was a treacherous and unprovoked attack—ruthlessly carried out—on a small friendly nation against whom she had no shadow of complaint. There had been no diplomatic hint,¹ let alone *pour-parlers*, ultimatum, or declaration of war when the blow fell; and it was on this refusal to be bound by the hitherto accepted usage of civilised nations, or any moral principles whatever,² that their whole plan of invasion hinged. In the year 1940 the implications of 'total war' were not generally understood outside Germany; despite what had happened to Belgium in 1914, and quite recently to Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland, civilized nations did not expect even Germany suddenly to fall upon a neighbour for no better reason than that it suited her.

It is important to realise the immense initial advantage conferred on the Germans by this attitude when considering other factors that contributed to their success.

From the naval point of view, they accurately appreciated the risks from the first; serious losses were anticipated, and in fact occurred, but no capital ship was lost. There was, however, one very serious weakness in their plan, which directly led to the loss of Commodore Bonte's ten destroyers at Narvik. If the destroyers could not make the passage to Narvik and back at the required speed without re-fuelling, they should have used cruisers for this purpose and the destroyers to convey the troops to Bergen and Trondheim,³ rather than trust to the arrival of independently routed, unescorted oilers to get them home.

Turning to the Allied effort, the Higher Command had not the same freedom of action as the enemy, whose gangster methods, already referred to, had secured

¹ Unless the exhibition by the German Minister in Oslo—at a party to which Members of the Norwegian Government were invited shortly before the invasion started—of a film depicting the 'terror' bombing of Warsaw can be considered as such.

² Some German apologists are already (1950) attempting to depict the invasion as a 'race for Norway' between the Allies and themselves (which they won), with the implication that there was not much to choose between the two. This, of course, is a travesty of the facts. While the Allies were formally approaching the Norwegians by recognised diplomatic channels and genuinely seeking some solution of their legitimate grievance over the unhampered iron ore traffic, the Germans were conspiring with such traitors as Quisling to seize the whole country. The Allied precautionary measure, Plan R.4, was only to be put into execution after Germany had invaded Norway, or when there was clear evidence she was about to do so; and then it was to be carried out with every consideration for Norwegian susceptibilities. The German plan, on the other hand, relied on treachery and terror bombing from the outset for its fulfilment. Contrast this with the Admiralty instructions with regard to laying the minefields (admittedly a technical breach of neutrality) in which the sentence occurs '... should force have to be used we must refrain from replying to Norwegian fire until the situation becomes intolerable.' (A.T.1925/5.)

³ The Germans were aware that they would not meet a British submarine north of Trondheim, so the destroyers were not needed to screen the battlecruisers.

them the initiative, and the scope of whose operations came as an unpleasant surprise;¹ pre-war policy, moreover, had tended to retard rearmament, and there was a serious shortage both of materiel and trained personnel. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether the best use was made of such resources as did exist.²

In this connection, it is worth while to consider briefly the Principles of War (agreed between the three fighting Services)³ as applied to the operations in Norway, both as a test of their validity, and as possibly providing an explanation of some of the events that occurred.

In the early days the Allied *aim*⁴ did not seem to have been clearly thought out, much less maintained. The abandonment of Plan R.4 will occur to the reader; and later, was the main effort to be at Trondheim, or elsewhere in Central Norway? Or in the north at Narvik? This appearance of vacillation at the very top,⁵ percolating through, was likely to affect *morale* adversely sooner or later; the fact that the morale of all forces so finely stood the strain can be accounted for partly by the British character and partly because the final withdrawals were not delayed too long. The Germans, on the other hand, carefully defined and adhered to their aim. For the first phase, it was to capture the capital and to secure a foothold in the principal ports; as soon as this was accomplished, their next aim was to consolidate the position at Trondheim, and to this end all their efforts were directed, until the collapse of the Allied campaign in that region. Their morale, already high, was naturally enhanced by their steady advance. *Offensive action* was the keynote of their whole campaign. The Allies, too, took offensive action locally, and were eventually successful at Narvik; but the advisability of offensive action under such handicaps as obtained in Central Norway,—almost complete lack of air power and, in addition, feeble anti-aircraft protection against a powerful air force well within range—may be open to doubt.

The fourth principle, *security*, with its somewhat pointed reference to the 'adequate defence of vulnerable bases'⁶ could not be attained so long as the enemy held unfettered control of the air. Other instances where neglect of this principle brought its consequences will occur to the reader—notably the omission in the German plan to ensure oil for the Narvik destroyers and Commodore Bonte's inadequate arrangements, which cost him his life and enabled Captain Warburton-Lee, with a force only half his own, to inflict a signal defeat on him. This action, of course, also illustrated the value of *surprise*, as did Admiral Whitworth's (to a lesser degree) three days later;

¹ A report of the German landing at Narvik was at first not credited, and the Prime Minister (the Rt. Hon. Neville Chamberlain) expressed the opinion that this actually referred to *Larvik* (at the entrance to Oslo Fjord).

² Mr. Winston Churchill has made it plain that the *system* of higher direction in force at this time suffered from inherent weaknesses, which rendered the efficient conduct of the war impossible. (THE SECOND WORLD WAR, Vol. I, pp. 528-530, English Edn.) This subject is outside the scope of a Naval Staff History, but if the narrative of the campaign indicates that the principles of war, on which much thought had been expended by the Service Staffs in the inter-war years, were discarded at the first serious clash of arms, and that unfortunate results ensued, surely all other lessons pale into insignificance.

It is from this angle that the following points are raised, and in no spirit of criticism of Service Ministries or Staffs—still less individuals, all of whom were doing their best under circumstances of extraordinary stress and complexity.

³ Naval War Manual, 1947, pp. 6-8.

⁴ Apart from the overall aim of keeping the Norwegians in the fight and beating the Germans *somehow*, sometime.

⁵ This was of course known to only a few very Senior Officers, but its effects (constant changes of orders, etc.) would be bound to be noticed generally before long.

⁶ Naval War Manual, 1947, p. 7.

unfortunately there were no balanced forces readily available to exploit the advantage. But the outstanding example of surprise was the whole German campaign.

As to *concentration of force* the modest forces available at first to the Allies were immediately dispersed between Narvik and Central Norway; while the eventual employment of some 35,000 troops and considerable naval forces—with inadequate air support—to evict some 3000 Germans from Narvik may be held to have infringed the principle of *economy of effort*. *Per contra*, the successful initial German occupation of five of the principal Norwegian ports by no more than ~~7,700~~^{2,400} troops (suitably supported by sea and air) could scarcely have been effected more economically.

Lack of *flexibility* in the Allied arrangements was instanced by the difficulty of switching troops, already nearing Vest Fjord, from Harstad to Narvik, when Admiral Whitworth's victory on 13th April offered a fleeting chance of immediate success.

Regarding *cooperation*, there was ample good will; but the diverse instructions given to Lord Cork and General Mackesy show what a long path had to be travelled before the true cooperation reached in the latter stages of the war was achieved. As was only to be expected at this early period of the war, various weaknesses in the administrative arrangements revealed themselves as the campaign progressed.

73. Conclusion

Though it must be admitted that the Allied 'ramshackle campaign' in Norway was a failure from the military point of view, it provided sufficient breathing space for the Norwegians to steady themselves after the first shock, and enabled the King and Government, by transferring their activities to the United Kingdom and remaining 'in being', to defeat the German political aim.

The bright spot in an otherwise dismal story is the fine style in which the Allied morale, of all services and all nations—despite conflicting orders, lack of equipment, prolonged and almost unopposed air attack and constant reverses—stood the strain. The Royal Navy in particular can be proud of its share in the venture, and apart from its assistance in air defence and other activities inshore in support of the landings, the fact that it succeeded in transporting, maintaining and finally evacuating the other Services with a loss of only 13 troops killed and nine wounded¹ and 41 airmen² while afloat under its care, may justly be regarded as a source of pride and satisfaction.

¹ Embarked in the *Afridi* when bombed 3rd May 1940.

This does not include casualties in the *Chrobry*, which was in the nature of an inshore operation: 6 officers were killed on this occasion, but nearly all the troops were saved.

² Embarked in the *Glorious*, 8th June 1940.

APPENDIX A

*ALLIED WARSHIPS EMPLOYED IN CONNECTION WITH OPERATIONS IN
NORWAY, APRIL-JUNE 1940, WITH MAIN ARMAMENT AND COMMANDING
OFFICERS*

- I. HOME FLEET.
- II. MINELAYERS.
- III. H.M. SHIPS OTHER THAN HOME FLEET.
- IV. FRENCH SHIPS.

APPENDIX A

ALLIED WARSHIPS EMPLOYED IN CONNECTION WITH OPERATIONS IN NORWAY, APRIL-JUNE 1940

I. HOME FLEET

(From "Pink" List, 9th April 1940)

SECOND BATTLE SQUADRON

<i>Rodney</i> (9 16-in., 12 6-in., 6 4.7-in. H.A.) ..	Flag, Admiral Sir Charles Forbes, G.C.B., D.S.O., Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet. Captain F. H. G. Dalrymple-Hamilton.
<i>Warspite</i> (8 15-in., 8 6-in., 8 4-in. H.A.) ..	Captain V. A. C. Crutchley, V.C., D.S.C.
<i>Valiant</i> (8 15-in., 20 4.5-in.)	Captain H. B. Rawlings, O.B.E.
<i>Nelson</i> ¹ (9 16-in., 12 6-in., 6 4.7-in. H.A.)	Captain G. J. A. Miles.
<i>Barham</i> ² (8 15-in., 12 6-in., 8 4-in. H.A.) ..	Captain C. G. Cooke.

BATTLECRUISER SQUADRON

<i>Renown</i> (6 15-in., 20 4.5-in. H.A.) ..	Flag, Vice-Admiral W. J. Whitworth (V.A.C.B.C.S.). Captain C. E. B. Simeon.
<i>Repulse</i> (6 15-in., 12 4-in., 8 4-in. H.A.) ..	Captain E. J. Spooner, D.S.O.
<i>Hood</i> ³ (8 15-in., 12 5.5-in., 8 4-in. H.A.) ..	Captain I. G. Glennie.

AIRCRAFT CARRIER

<i>Furious</i> (12 4-in. H.A./L.A.)	Captain T. H. Troubridge.
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A.A. CRUISERS

<i>Cairo</i> ⁴ (8 4-in. H.A./L.A.)	Captain P. V. McLaughlin.
<i>Calcutta</i> ⁴ (8 4-in. H.A./L.A.)	Captain D. M. Lees.

FIRST CRUISER SQUADRON

<i>Devonshire</i> (8 8-in., 8 4-in. H.A.)	Flag, Vice-Admiral J. H. D. Cunningham, C.B., M.V.O. Captain J. M. Mansfield, D.S.C.
<i>Berwick</i> (8 8-in., 8 4-in. H.A.)	Captain I. M. Palmer, D.S.C.
<i>York</i> (6 8-in., 4 4-in. H.A.)	Captain R. H. Portal, D.S.C.
<i>Sussex</i> ⁵ (8 8-in., 8 4-in. H.A.)	Captain A. R. Hammick.
<i>Norfolk</i> ⁶ (8 8-in., 8 4-in. H.A.)	Captain A. J. L. Phillips.
<i>Suffolk</i> ⁷ (8 8-in., 8 4-in. H.A.)	Captain J. W. Durnford.

SECOND CRUISER SQUADRON

<i>Galatea</i> (6 6-in., 4 4-in. H.A.)	Flag, Vice-Admiral Sir G. F. Edward-Collins, K.C.V.O., C.B. Captain B. B. Schofield.
<i>Arethusa</i> (6 6-in., 4 4-in. H.A.)	Captain G. D. Graham.
<i>Penelope</i> (6 6-in., 8 4-in. H.A.)	Captain G. D. Yates.
<i>Aurora</i> (6 6-in., 8 4-in. H.A.)	Captain L. H. K. Hamilton, D.S.O.

¹ Refit Portsmouth till mid-June.

² Refit Liverpool till early July.

³ Refit Plymouth.

⁴ Detached from 20th C.S.

⁵ On passage from East Indies: then refit till 25th May.

⁶ Repairs Clyde till 6th July.

⁷ Refit and repairs, Govan, till 10th April.

APPENDIX A—continued

EIGHTEENTH CRUISER SQUADRON

<i>Manchester</i> (12 6-in., 8 4-in. H.A.)	..	Flag, Vice-Admiral G. Layton, C.B., D.S.O., Commanding 18th C.S. Captain H. A. Packer.
<i>Sheffield</i> (12 6-in., 8 4-in. H.A.)	..	Flag, Rear-Admiral M. L. Clarke, D.S.C., 2nd in Command, 18th C.S. (21/4-6/5). Captain C. A. A. Larcom.
<i>Southampton</i> (12 6-in., 8 4-in. H.A.)	..	Flag, Rear-Admiral M. L. Clarke, D.S.C. (6/5). Captain F. W. H. Jeans, C.V.O.
<i>Glasgow</i> (12 6-in., 8 4-in. H.A.)	..	Captain F. H. Pegram.
<i>Birmingham</i> (12 6-in., 8 4-in. H.A.)	..	Captain A. C. G. Madden.
<i>Edinburgh</i> ¹ (12 6-in., 12 4-in. H.A.)	..	Captain C. M. Blackman, D.S.O.
<i>Newcastle</i> ² (12 6-in., 8 4-in. H.A.)	..	Captain J. Figgins.

DESTROYER FLOTILLAS

<i>Woolwich</i> (Depot Ship)	Flag, Rear-Admiral R. H. C. Hallifax (R.A. (D)).
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SECOND DESTROYER FLOTILLA

<i>Hardy</i> (5 4.7-in., 8 21-in. tubes)	..	Captain (D)2 B. A. W. Warburton-Lee.
<i>Hotspur</i> (4 4.7-in., 8 21-in. tubes)	..	Com. H. F. H. Layman.
<i>Havock</i> (4 4.7-in., 8 21-in. tubes)	..	Lt.-Com. R. E. Courage.
<i>Hero</i> (4 4.7-in., 8 21-in. tubes)	..	Com. H. W. Biggs.
<i>Hereward</i> ³ (4 4.7-in., 8 21-in. tubes)	..	Lt.-Com. C. W. Greening.
<i>Hyperion</i> (4 4.7-in., 8 21-in. tubes)	..	Com. H. St. L. Nicholson.
<i>Hunter</i> (4 4.7-in., 8 21-in. tubes)	..	Lt.-Com. L. de Villiers.
<i>Hostile</i> (4 4.7-in., 8 21-in. tubes)	..	Com. J. P. Wright.
<i>Hasty</i> ⁴ (4 4.7-in., 8 21-in. tubes)	..	Lt.-Com. L. R. K. Tyrwhitt.

THIRD DESTROYER FLOTILLA

<i>Inglefield</i> (5 4.7-in., 10 21-in. tubes)	..	Captain (D)3 P. Todd.
<i>Isis</i> (4 4.7-in., 10 21-in. tubes)	..	Com. J. C. Clouston.
<i>Ilex</i> (4 4.7-in., 10 21-in. tubes)	..	Lt.-Com. P. L. Saumarez, D.S.C.
<i>Imperial</i> ⁵ (4 4.7-in., 10 21-in. tubes)	..	Lt.-Com. C. A. de W. Kitcat.
<i>Delight</i> (4 4.7-in., 10 21-in. tubes)	..	Com. M. Fogg-Elliott.
<i>Imogen</i> (4 4.7-in., 10 21-in. tubes)	..	Com. C. L. Firth, M.V.O.
<i>Diana</i> ⁶ (4 4.7-in., 10 21-in. tubes)	..	Lt.-Com. E. G. Le Geyt.

FOURTH DESTROYER FLOTILLA

<i>Afridi</i> (8 4.7-in., 4 21-in. tubes)	..	Captain (D)4 P. L. Vian, D.S.O.
<i>Gurkha</i> (8 4.7-in., 4 21-in. tubes)	..	Com. A. W. Buzzard.
<i>Sikh</i> (8 4.7-in., 4 21-in. tubes)	..	Com. J. A. Gifford.
<i>Mohawk</i> (8 4.7-in., 4 21-in. tubes)	..	Com. J. W. M. Eaton.
<i>Zulu</i> (8 4.7-in., 4 21-in. tubes)	..	Com. J. S. Crawford.
<i>Cossack</i> (8 4.7-in., 4 21-in. tubes)	..	Com. R. St. V. Sherbrooke.
<i>Maori</i> (8 4.7-in., 4 21-in. tubes)	..	Com. G. N. Brewer.
<i>Nubian</i> ⁷ (8 4.7-in., 4 21-in. tubes)	..	Com. R. W. Ravenhill.

¹ Refit, Tyne, till end of June.

² Defects, Tyne.

³ Repairs, Portsmouth, till 17th April.

⁴ Repairs, Dundee.

⁵ Repairs, Tyne, till 13th April.

⁶ Docked, Hull.

⁷ Repairs, Tyne, till 12th April.

APPENDIX A—continued

FIFTH DESTROYER FLOTILLA

<i>Kelly</i> ¹ (6 4.7-in., 10 21-in. tubes)	Captain (D)5 Lord Louis Mountbatten, G.C.V.O.
<i>Kashmir</i> (6 4.7-in., 10 21-in. tubes)	..	Com. H. A. King.
<i>Kelvin</i> (6 4.7-in., 10 21-in. tubes)	..	Lt.-Com. J. L. Machin.
<i>Kipling</i> ² (6 4.7-in., 10 21-in. tubes)	..	Com. A. St. Clair Ford.
<i>Kimberley</i> (6 4.7-in., 10 21-in. tubes)	..	Lt.-Com. R. G. K. Knowling.
<i>Kandahar</i> ³ (6 4.7-in., 10 21-in. tubes)	..	Com. W. G. A. Robson.
<i>Khartoum</i> ⁴ (6 4.7-in., 10 21-in. tubes)	..	Com. D. T. Dowler.
<i>Kingston</i> ⁴ (6 4.7-in., 10 21-in. tubes)	..	Lt.-Com. P. Somerville, D.S.O.

SIXTH DESTROYER FLOTILLA

<i>Somali</i> (8 4.7-in., 4 21-in. tubes)	Captain (D)6 R. S. G. Nicholson, D.S.O., D.S.C.
<i>Ashanti</i> (8 4.7-in., 4 21-in. tubes)	..	Com. W. G. Davis.
<i>Matabele</i> (8 4.7-in., 4 21-in. tubes)	..	Com. G. K. Whiting-Smith.
<i>Mashona</i> (8 4.7-in., 4 21-in. tubes)	..	Com. W. H. Selby.
<i>Bedouin</i> (8 4.7-in., 4 21-in. tubes)	..	Com. J. A. McCoy.
<i>Punjabi</i> (8 4.7-in., 4 21-in. tubes)	..	Com. J. T. Lean.
<i>Eskimo</i> (8 4.7-in., 4 21-in. tubes)	Com. St. J. A. Micklethwaite, D.S.O.
<i>Tartar</i> (8 4.7-in., 4 21-in. tubes)	Com. L. P. Skipwith.

SEVENTH DESTROYER FLOTILLA

<i>Jervis</i> ⁵ (6 4.7-in., 10 21-in. tubes)	Captain (D)7 P. J. Mack.
<i>Janus</i> (6 4.7-in., 10 21-in. tubes)	Com. J. A. W. Tothill.
<i>Javelin</i> (6 4.7-in., 10 21-in. tubes)	..	Com. A. F. Pugsley.
<i>Jersey</i> ⁶ (6 4.7-in., 10 21-in. tubes)	..	Lt. W. R. Patterson, O.B.E.
<i>Juno</i> (6 4.7-in., 10 21-in. tubes)	Lt.-Com. A. M. McKillop.
<i>Jupiter</i> (6 4.7-in., 10 21-in. tubes)	..	Com. D. B. Wyburd.
<i>Jackal</i> ⁷ (6 4.7-in., 10 21-in. tubes)	..	Com. T. M. Napier.
<i>Jaguar</i> ⁸ (6 4.7-in., 10 21-in. tubes)	..	Lt.-Com. J. F. W. Hine.

EIGHTH DESTROYER FLOTILLA

<i>Faulknor</i> (5 4.7-in., 8 21-in. tubes)	..	Captain (D)8 A. F. de Salis.
<i>Fearless</i> (4 4.7-in., 8 21-in. tubes)	..	Com. K. L. Harkness.
<i>Foxhound</i> (4 4.7-in., 8 21-in. tubes)	..	Lt.-Com. G. H. Peters.
<i>Fury</i> (4 4.7-in., 8 21-in. tubes)	Com. G. F. Burghard.
<i>Forester</i> (4 4.7-in., 8 21-in. tubes)	Lt.-Com. E. B. Tancock, D.S.C.
<i>Fortune</i> (4 4.7-in., 8 21-in. tubes)	..	Com. E. A. Gibbs, D.S.O.
<i>Fame</i> ⁹ (4 4.7-in., 8 21-in. tubes)	Lt.-Com. W. S. Clouston.
<i>Foresight</i> ¹⁰ (4 4.7-in., 8 21-in. tubes)	..	Lt.-Com. G. T. Lambert.
<i>Firedrake</i> ¹¹ (4 4.7-in., 8 21-in. tubes)	..	Lt.-Com. S. H. Norris, D.S.C.

¹ Repairs, Blackwall, till 27th April.² Repairs, Tyne, till 16th April.³ Refit and repairs, Hull, till 11th May.⁴ Repairs, Falmouth, till 15th May.⁵ Repairs, Tyne, till 3rd July.⁶ Repairs, Hull, till July.⁷ Repairs, Blyth.⁸ Repairs, Dundee.⁹ Repairs, Grimsby, till 10th April.¹⁰ Repairs, Grimsby, till 1st May.¹¹ Defects, Cardiff, till 1st May (?).

APPENDIX A—continued

FIRST DESTROYER FLOTILLA¹

<i>Codrington</i> (5 4.7-in., 8 21-in. tubes) ..	Captain (D)1 G. E. Creasy, M.V.O.
<i>Grenade</i> (4 4.7-in., 8 21-in. tubes) ..	Com. R. C. Boyle.
O.R.P. <i>Blyscawica</i> (7 4.7-in., 6 21-in. tubes)	Com. Stanislaus Nahorski.
O.R.P. <i>Grom</i> (7 4.7-in., 6 21-in. tubes) ..	Com. Alexander Hulewicz.
O.R.P. <i>Burza</i> (4 5.1-in., 6 21.7-in. tubes)	
<i>Greyhound</i> (4 4.7-in., 8 21-in. tubes) ..	Com. W. R. Marshall-A'Deane.
<i>Glowworm</i> (4 4.7-in., 8 21-in. tubes) ..	Lt.-Com. G. B. Roope.
<i>Griffin</i> (4 4.7-in., 8 21-in. tubes) ..	Lt.-Com. J. Lee-Barber.
<i>Gallant</i> ² (4 4.7-in., 8 21-in. tubes) ..	Lt.-Com. C. P. F. Brown.
<i>Grafton</i> ³ (4 4.7-in., 8 21-in. tubes) ..	Com. C. E. C. Robinson.

TWELFTH DESTROYER FLOTILLA⁴

<i>Electra</i> (4 4.7-in., 8 21-in. tubes) ..	Lt.-Com. S. A. Buss.
<i>Echo</i> ⁵ (4 4.7-in., 8 21-in. tubes) ..	Com. S. H. K. Spurgeon, D.S.O., R.A.N.
<i>Escort</i> ⁶ (4 4.7-in., 8 21-in. tubes)	Lt.-Com. J. Bostock.
<i>Escapade</i> (4 4.7-in., 8 21-in. tubes) ..	Com. H. R. Graham.
<i>Encounter</i> (4 4.7-in., 8 21-in. tubes)	Lt.-Com. E. V. St. J. Morgan.
<i>Eclipse</i> (4 4.7-in., 8 21-in. tubes) ..	Lt.-Com. I. T. Clark.

MISCELLANEOUS

<i>Protector</i> (Netlayer) ..	Captain W. Y. La R. Beverley.
<i>Vindictive</i> (Repair Ship) ..	Captain A. R. Halfhide, C.B.E.

SUBMARINE COMMAND

Vice-Admiral Sir Max K. Horton, K.C.B., D.S.O. (V.A. S/M), H.Q., London.

SECOND SUBMARINE FLOTILLA

Depot Ship, <i>Forth</i> (Rosyth) ..	Captain G. C. P. Menzies, Capt. (S)2.
<i>Thistle</i> (6 21-in. tubes, bow, 4 external) ..	Com. W. F. Haselfoot.
<i>Triad</i> (6 21-in. tubes, bow, 4 external) ..	Lt.-Com. E. R. J. Oddie.
<i>Trident</i> (6 21-in. tubes, bow, 4 external) ..	Com. A. J. L. Seale.
<i>Triton</i> (6 21-in. tubes, bow, 4 external) ..	Lt.-Com. E. F. Pizey.
<i>Truant</i> (6 21-in. tubes, bow, 4 external) ..	Lt.-Com. C. H. Hutchinson.
<i>Seal</i> ⁷ (6 21-in. tubes, bow, minelayer) ..	Lt.-Com. R. P. Lonsdale.
<i>Porpoise</i> ⁷ (6 21-in. tubes, bow, minelayer)	Com. P. Q. Roberts.
O.R.P. <i>Orsel</i> (12 21.7-in. tubes) ..	Lt.-Com. J. Grudzinski.
<i>Tribune</i> ⁸ (6 21-in. tubes, bow, 4 external)	Lt.-Com. H. J. Caldwell.
<i>Triumph</i> ⁹ (6 21-in. tubes, bow, 2 external)	Lt.-Com. J. S. Stevens.
O.R.P. <i>Wilkh</i> ¹⁰ (6 21.7-in. tubes) ..	Lt.-Com. B. Krawczyk.

¹ Nore Command (Harwich) temporarily attached to Home Fleet.

² Refit, Southampton.

³ Refit, Hull, till 15th April.

⁴ Rosyth Command, temporarily attached to Home Fleet.

⁵ Refit, Leith.

⁶ Repairs, Rosyth.

⁷ Temporarily attached.

⁸ Repairs, Greenock.

⁹ Repairs, Chatham, till end September.

¹⁰ Refit, Dundee, till 5th May.

APPENDIX A—continued

THIRD SUBMARINE FLOTILLA

Depot Ship, <i>Cyclops</i> (Harwich)	Captain P. Ruck-Keene, Capt. (S)3.
<i>Sealion</i> (6 21-in. tubes, bow)	Lt.-Com. B. Bryant.
<i>Seawolf</i> (6 21-in. tubes, bow)	Lt.-Com. J. W. Studholme.
<i>Shark</i> (6 21-in. tubes, bow)	Lieut. P. M. Buckley.
<i>Snapper</i> (6 21-in. tubes, bow)	Lieut. W. D. A. King.
<i>Sterlet</i> (6 21-in. tubes, bow)	Lieut. G. H. S. Haward.
<i>Sunfish</i> (6 21-in. tubes, bow)	Lt.-Com. J. E. Slaughter.
<i>Salmon</i> ¹ (6 21-in. tubes, bow)	Com. E. O. B. Bickford, D.S.O.

SIXTH SUBMARINE FLOTILLA

Depot Ship, <i>Titania</i> ²	Captain J. S. Bethell, Capt. (S)6.
<i>Unity</i> (4 21-in. tubes, bow, 2 external)	Lieut. J. F. B. Brown.
<i>Spearfish</i> (6 21-in. tubes, bow)	Lt.-Com. J. H. Forbes.
<i>Swordfish</i> (6 21-in. tubes, bow)	Lieut. P. J. Cowell.
<i>Clyde</i> ³ (6 21-in. tubes, bow)	Lt.-Com. R. L. S. Gaisford.
<i>Severn</i> ³ (6 21-in. tubes, bow)	Lt.-Com. B. W. Taylor.
<i>Sturgeon</i> ⁴ (6 21-in. tubes, bow)	Lieut. G. D. A. Gregory, D.S.O.
<i>Narwhal</i> (6 21-in. tubes, bow, minelayer)	Lieut. C. S. Green.
<i>Ursula</i> ⁵ (6 21-in. tubes, bow, 2 external)	Com. G. C. Phillips, D.S.O.

TENTH SUBMARINE FLOTILLA

16th French Submarine Division

Depot Ship <i>Jules Verne</i> (Harwich)
<i>Amazone</i> (6 21.7-in., 2 15.7-in. tubes)
<i>Antiope</i> (6 21.7-in., 2 15.7-in. tubes)
<i>La Sibylle</i> (6 21.7-in., 2 15.7-in. tubes)

II. MINELAYERS

<i>Teviot Bank</i>	Com. R. D. King-Harman (ret.).
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TWENTIETH DESTROYER FLOTILLA

<i>Esk</i> (2 4.7-in. guns, 60 mines)	Captain (D)20 J. G. Bickford, D.S.C. Lt.-Com. R. J. H. Couch.
<i>Impulsive</i> (2 4.7-in. guns, 60 mines)	Lt.-Com. W. S. Thomas.
<i>Ivanhoe</i> (2 4.7-in. guns, 60 mines)	Com. P. H. Hadow.
<i>Icarus</i> (2 4.7-in. guns, 60 mines)	Lt.-Com. C. D. Maud.
<i>Intrepid</i> ⁶ (2 4.7-in. guns, 60 mines)	Com. R. C. Gordon.
<i>Express</i> ⁷ (2 4.7-in. guns, 60 mines)	

III. H.M. SHIPS OTHER THAN HOME FLEET

BATTLESHIP

<i>Resolution</i> (8 15-in., 12 6-in., 8 4-in. H.A.).	Captain O. Bevir.	3rd B.S. (America and W.I.).
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¹ Refit, Chatham, till 10th May.

² Tyne, refit till early June. Com. (S) ashore at Blyth.

³ Temporarily attached.

⁴ Refit, Tyne, till 20th April.

⁵ Docked, Blyth.

⁶ Repairs, Middlesbrough.

⁷ Repairs, Hartlepool.

APPENDIX A—continued

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

<i>Ark Royal</i> (16 4.5-in.)	Flag, Vice-Admiral L. V. Wells, C.B., D.S.O.	} Mediterranean.
<i>Glorious</i> (16 4.7-in. H.A./L.A.)	Captain C. S. Holland. Captain G. D'Oyly-Hughes, D.S.O., D.S.C.	

CRUISERS

<i>Enterprise</i> (7 6-in., 3 4-in. H.A.)	Captain J. C. Annesley, D.S.O.	} America and W.I. Command.
<i>Efingham</i> (9 6-in., 8 4-in. H.A.)	Captain J. M. Howson.	

A.A. CRUISERS

<i>Coventry</i> (8 4-in. H.A./L.A.)	Flag, Rear-Admiral J. G. P. Vivian. Captain R. E. J. Onslow, M.V.O., D.S.C. <i>D. GILMOUR</i>	} 20th C.S.
<i>Curlew</i> (8 4-in. H.A./L.A.)	Captain B. C. B. Brooke.	
<i>Curacoa</i> (8 4-in. H.A./L.A.)	Captain E. A. Aylmer, D.S.C.	
<i>Carlisle</i> (8 4-in. H.A./L.A.)	Captain G. M. B. Langley, O.B.E.	

DESTROYERS

<i>Acasta</i> (4 4.7-in., 8 21-in. tubes)	Com. C. E. Glasfurd.	} 18 D.F. Western Approaches. 16th D.F. Portsmouth.
<i>Ardent</i> (4 4.7-in., 8 21-in. tubes)	Lt.-Com. J. F. Barker.	
<i>Arrow</i> (4 4.7-in., 8 21-in. tubes)	Com. H. W. Williams.	
<i>Basilisk</i> (4 4.7-in., 8 21-in. tubes)	Com. M. Richmond, O.B.E.	} 19th D.F., Dover.
<i>Brazen</i> (4 4.7-in., 8 21-in. tubes)	Lt.-Com. Sir Michael Culme-Seymour, Bt.	
<i>Havelock</i> (3 4.7-in., 8 21-in. tubes)	Captain (D.9) E. B. K. Stevens, D.S.C.	} 9th D.F., Western Approaches.
<i>Hesperus</i> (3 4.7-in., 8 21-in. tubes)	Lt.-Com. D. G. F. W. MacIntyre.	
<i>Highlander</i> (3 4.7-in., 8 21-in. tubes)	Com. W. A. Dallmeyer.	} 11th D.F., Western Approaches. 15th D.F., Western Apps. 18th D.F. Western Apps.
<i>VANOC</i> (4 4-in., 6 21-in. tubes)	COMMANDEUR J. E. BROOME Lt.-Com. J. G. W. Deneys.	
<i>Walker</i> (4 4-in., 6 21-in. tubes)	Lt.-Com. A. A. Tait.	
<i>Whirlwind</i> (4 4-in., 6 21-in. tubes)	Lt.-Com. J. M. Rogers.	
<i>Wolverine</i> (4 4-in., 6 21-in. tubes)	Com. R. H. Craske.	
<i>Wren</i> (4 4.7-in., 6 21-in. tubes)	Com. H. T. Armstrong.	

SLOOPS

<i>Auckland</i> (8 4-in. H.A.)	Com. J. G. Hewitt.	} Rosyth.
<i>Bittern</i> (6 4-in. H.A./L.A.)	Lieut. T. Johnston.	
<i>Black Swan</i> (6 4-in. H.A.)	Captain A. L. Poland, D.S.C.	
<i>Flamingo</i> (6 4-in. H.A.)	Com. J. H. Huntley.	
<i>Fleetwood</i> (4 4-in. H.A./L.A.)	Com. A. N. Grey.	
<i>Pelican</i> (8 4-in. H.A.)	Com. L. A. K. Boswell, D.S.O.	
<i>Stork</i> (6 4-in. H.A./L.A.)	Com. A. C. Behague.	

IV. FRENCH WARSHIPS

CRUISERS

<i>Emile Bertin</i> (9 6-in., 4 3.5-in. H.A./L.A.)	Flag, Rear-Admiral Derrien.
<i>Moncalm</i> (9 6-in., 8 3.5-in. H.A./L.A.)	

DESTROYERS

<i>Bison</i> (5 5.4-in., 6 21.7 in. tubes)	..
<i>Milan</i> (5 5.4-in., 7 21.7-in. tubes)	..
<i>Maillé Brézé</i> (5 5.4-in., 7 21.7-in. tubes)	..
<i>Foudroyant</i> (4 5.1-in., 6 21.7-in. tubes)	..
<i>L'Indomptable</i> (5 5.4-in., 9 21.7-in. tubes)	..
<i>Le Malin</i> (5 5.4-in., 9 21.7-in. tubes)	..
<i>Le Triomphant</i> (5 5.4-in., 9 21.7-in. best)	..

APPENDIX A (1)

A/S TRAWLERS EMPLOYED ON NORWEGIAN COAST

Name	Remarks
21ST STRIKING FORCE <i>Danemon</i> <i>Lady Elsa</i> <i>Man of War</i> <i>Wellard</i>	Arrived Namsos area 16th April. Ordered by C.-in-C., H.F., to proceed to Skjel Fjord on 20th April after a heavy air attack in which the <i>Rutlandshire</i> was sunk. The surviving trawlers remained in the Narvik area.
23RD A/S GROUP <i>Indian Star</i> <i>Melbourne</i> <i>Berkshire</i> <i>Rutlandshire</i> ¹	
22ND A/S GROUP <i>Warwickshire</i> ¹ <i>Hammond</i> ¹ <i>Larwood</i> ¹ <i>Bradman</i> ¹ <i>Jardine</i> ¹	Arrived Aandalsnes area 21st April.
12TH A/S GROUP <i>Stella Capella</i> <i>Cape Argona</i> <i>Cape Cheluyshin</i> ¹ <i>Blackfly</i> ²	Escorted petrol carrier to Namsos, arriving 23rd April. Then to Skjel Fjord and to Molde, 27th April. Remained in Molde area till evacuation 30th April/1st May.
11TH A/S STRIKING FORCE <i>Cape Sivetoko</i> ¹ <i>Argyleshire</i> <i>Northern Pride</i> ³ <i>Wisteria</i> ⁴	Arrived Molde-Aandalsnes area 27th April and left after final evacuation 30th April/1 May.
15TH A/S STRIKING FORCE <i>Cape Pessaro</i> ¹ <i>St. Goran</i> ¹ <i>St. Kenan</i> <i>St. Lomas</i>	Arrived Namsos area 27th April. Left Namsos after final evacuation of 2nd/3rd May for Narvik area.
16TH A/S STRIKING FORCE <i>Aston Villa</i> ¹ <i>Gaul</i> ¹ <i>Angle</i> <i>Arab</i>	

APPENDIX A (2)

NAVAL COMMANDS IN NORWAY

I. NARVIK AREA

Flag Officer, Narvik, and C.-in-C., Northern Expeditionary Force.	Admiral of the Fleet, the Earl of Cork and Orrery, G.C.B., G.C.V.O.
Chief of Staff	Captain L. E. H. Maund, R.N.
Flag Officer, Harstad	Rear-Admiral A. L. St. G. Lyster, C.V.O., D.S.O.
O.I.C., M.N.B.D.O., Harstad	Lt.-Colonel H. R. Lambert, D.S.C., R.M.
C.O. F.A.A. NARVIK AREA	CAPTAIN R. S. ARMOUR, R.N.

II. CENTRAL AREA

N.O.I.C., Molde (Aandalsnes area)	Captain M. M. Denny, R.N.
S.O.R.M., Aandalsnes	Lt.-Colonel H. W. Simpson, R.M.
S.O.R.M., Aalesund	Major H. Lumley, R.M.

¹ Sunk or driven ashore.

² Damaged in collision; remained Skjel Fjord.

³ Attached from 12th A/S Striking Force.

⁴ Attached from 19th A/S Striking Force.

APPENDIX B

*GERMAN WARSHIPS MENTIONED IN NARRATIVE, WITH MAIN
ARMAMENT, ETC.*

APPENDIX B

GERMAN WARSHIPS MENTIONED IN NARRATIVE: NORWAY, APRIL-JUNE 1940

NAME AND MAIN ARMAMENT	REMARKS
BATTLECRUISERS	
<i>Gneisenau</i> (9 11-in., 12 5.9-in. H.A./L.A., 14 4.1-in. H.A.).	Flag, Admiral Lütjens (C.-in.-C). Damaged by <i>Renown</i> , 9th April.
<i>Scharnhorst</i> (9 11-in., 12 5.9-in. H.A./L.A., 14 4.1-in. H.A.).	Captain Hoffman. Damaged by <i>Acasta</i> (torpedo), 8th June.
ARMoured SHIPS¹	
<i>Lützow</i> (6 11-in., 8 5.9-in., 6 4.1-in. H.A.)	Captain Thiele. Damaged Oslo coastal batteries, 9th April; and by <i>Spearfish</i> (torpedo), 11th April.
<i>Admiral Sheer</i> (6 11-in., 8 5.9-in., 6 4.1-in. H.A.).	Refitting during Norwegian operations.
CRUISERS	
<i>Blücher</i> (8 8-in., 12 4.1-in. H.A.)	Flag, Rear-Admiral Kummetz. Sunk, Oslo coast defences, 9th April.
<i>Admiral Hipper</i> (8 8-in., 12 4.1-in. H.A.)	Captain Heye. Rammed and damaged by <i>Glowworm</i> , 8th April.
<i>Leipzig</i> (9 5.9-in., 6 3.5-in. H.A.)	Under repair (Kiel) during Norwegian operations.
<i>Köln</i> (9 5.9-in., 6 3.5-in. H.A.)
<i>Königsberg</i> (9 5.9-in., 6 3.5-in. H.A.) Captain Ruhfus. Sunk. Bombed by F.A.A., Bergen, 10th April.
<i>Karlsruhe</i> (9 5.9-in., 6 3.5-in. H.A.) Captain Rieve. Sunk. Torpedoed by <i>Truant</i> , 9th April.
<i>Emden</i> (8 5.9-in., 3 3.5-in. H.A.)
<i>Nürnberg</i> (9 5.9-in., 8 3.5-in. H.A.) Under repair (Kiel) till 10th May 1940.
OLD BATTLESHIP (1905)	
<i>Schleswig Holstein</i> (4 11-in., 10 5.9-in.)
GUNNERY TRAINING SHIPS	
<i>Bremse</i>	Damaged, Bergen coastal batteries, 9th April.
<i>Brummer</i>	Sunk. Torpedoed by submarine, 15th April.
DESTROYERS	
<i>Wilhelm Heidkamp</i> (5 5-in. H.A./L.A., 8 21-in. tubes).	Broad pendant, Commodore Bonte, S.O., Narvik. Torpedoed and sunk, 10th April.
<i>Georg Thiele</i> (5 5-in. H.A./L.A., 8 21-in. tubes).	Damaged, 10th April; destroyed 13th April, Narvik.
<i>Hans Ludemann</i> (5 5-in. H.A./L.A., 8 21-in. tubes).	Damaged, 10th April; destroyed, 13th April, Narvik.
<i>Anton Schmidt</i> (5 5-in. H.A./L.A., 8 21-in. tubes).	Torpedoed and sunk, 10th April, Narvik.
<i>Hermann Kühne</i> (5 5-in. H.A./L.A., 8 21-in. tubes).	Damaged, 10th April; destroyed, 13th April, Narvik.
<i>Dieher von Roeder</i> (5 5-in. H.A./L.A., 8 21-in. tubes).	Damaged, 10th April; destroyed, 13th April, Narvik.

¹ 'Pocket battleships'.

APPENDIX B—continued

NAME AND MAIN ARMAMENT

REMARKS

DESTROYERS—contd.

<i>Wolfgang Zenker</i> (5 5-in. H.A./L.A., 8 21-in. tubes).	Destroyed, Narvik, 13th April.
<i>Erich Giese</i> (5 5-in. H.A./L.A., 8 21-in. tubes)	Destroyed, Narvik, 13th April.
<i>Erich Koellner</i> (5 5-in. H.A./L.A., 8 21-in. tubes.)	Destroyed, Narvik, 13th April.
<i>Bernd von Arnim</i> (5 5-in. H.A./L.A., 8 21-in. tubes).	Damaged, 10th April; destroyed, 13th April, Narvik.
<i>Friedrich Eckholdt</i> (5 5-in. H.A./L.A., 8 21-in. tubes).	
<i>Theodor Riedel</i> (5 5-in. H.A./L.A., 8 21-in. tubes).	
<i>Bruno Heinemann</i> (5 5-in. H.A./L.A., 8 21-in. tubes).	
<i>Paul Jacobi</i> (5 5-in. H.A./L.A., 8 21-in. tubes).	

TORPEDO BOATS

<i>Kondor</i> (3 4.1-in. H.A./L.A., 6 21-in. tubes)	
<i>Möwe</i> (3 4.1-in. H.A./L.A., 6 21-in. tubes)	
<i>Falke</i> (3 4.1-in. H.A./L.A., 6 21-in. tubes)	
<i>Wolf</i> (3 4.1-in. H.A./L.A., 6 21-in. tubes)	
<i>Seeadler</i> (3 4.1-in. H.A./L.A., 6 21-in. tubes)	
<i>Greif</i> (3 4.1-in. H.A./L.A., 6 21-in. tubes)	
<i>Albatros</i> (3 4.1-in. H.A./L.A., 6 21-in. tubes)	Wrecked, Oslo, 9th April.
<i>Luchs</i> (3 5-in., 6 21-in. tubes)	
<i>Leopard</i> (3 5-in., 6 21-in. tubes)	

APPENDIX C (1)

DISPOSITION OF THE HOME FLEET, NOON, 9TH APRIL

I. OFF THE COAST OF NORWAY

- (a) Detached under Vice-Admiral Whitworth: *Renown*—near 67° N., 10° E.
Repulse, Penelope, Bedouin, Punjabi, Eskimo, Kimberley—about to join the flag in 67° N., 10° E.
Esk, Icarus, Ivanhoe, Greyhound—patrolling the Vest Fjord minefield.
Hardy, Havock, Hotspur, Hunter, Hostile (joined p.m.)—going up Vest Fjord to Narvik.
- (b) With C.-in-C., Home Fleet—near 60° N., 3° E.: *Rodney, Valiant, Galatea, Arctusa, Devonshire, Berwick, York, Emile Bertin, Codrington, Griffin, Jupiter, Electra, Escapade, Brazen, Tariu, Maille Breze.*
- (c) Detached under Vice-Admiral Layton—making towards Bergen: *Manchester, Southampton, Glasgow, Sheffield, Afridi, Gvykha, Sikh, Mohawk, Somali, Matabele, Mashona.*
- (d) On passage to join Vice-Admiral Layton from United Kingdom: *Aurora.*
- (e) Going to fetch Convoy H.N.25 from Bergen rendezvous: *Tartar, Blyshawica, Grom, Burza.*

II. OTHER SHIPS AT SEA

- (a) On passage to join Admiral Forbes: *Warspite, Furious, Ashanti, Maori, Fortune.*
- (b) On passage to base short of fuel, disabled, etc.: *Birmingham, Fearless, Hyperion, Hero, Zulu, Cossack, Kashmir, Kelvin, Impulsive, Delight.*
 (Note.—The *Delight* had been screening the *Furious* from the Clyde; the others were in the North Sea.)
- (c) Escorting Convoy O.N.25: *Javelin, Janus, Juno, Eclipse, Grenade.*

III. IN HARBOUR—SULLUM VOE OR SCAPA

Cairo, Calcutta, Inglefield, Isis, Ilex, Imogen, Escort, Encounter, Faulknor, Foxhound, Forester, Brestois, Boulonnais, Foudroyant, Le Chevalier Paul.

Total ..	{	5 capital ships. 13 cruisers. 1 aircraft carrier. 2 anti-aircraft ships. 62 destroyers.
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APPENDIX C (2)

DISPOSITIONS DURING THE RETREAT FROM CENTRAL NORWAY 30TH APRIL-3RD MAY

I. THE CONVOYS

(Note.—The figures against a ship's name show the approximate number of passengers she brought away; numbers under 20 not shown.)

(a) From Aandalsnes, etc., 30th April-1st May—Vice-Admiral Edward-Collins: *Galatea* (660), *Arethusa* (520), *Sheffield* (590), *Southampton* (200), *Wanderer*, *Walker* (70), *Westcott* (50), *Sikh* (120), *Tartar*, *Somali*, *Mashona*, *Ulster Prince* (50), *Ulster Monarch*.

(b) From Aandalsnes, etc., 1st-2nd May—Vice-Admiral Layton: *Manchester* (860), *Birmingham* (390), *Calcutta* (720), *Inglefield*, *Delight*, *Mashona*, *Somali* (250), *Auckland* (240).

The *Diana* took General Ruge and 30 Norwegian staff officers from Molde to Tromsø.

(c) From Namsos, 2nd-3rd May—Vice-Admiral Cunningham: *Devonshire*, *York* (1170), *Montcalm*, *Carlisle*, *Afridi* (40), *Nubian*, *Maori*, *Kelly*, *Hasty*, *Imperial*, *Grenade*, *Griffin*, *Bison*, *El d'Jezair* (1300), *El Kantara* (1100), *El Mansour* (1750).

II. OTHER SHIPS OFF THE COAST OF NORWAY

(a) With Lord Cork about Narvik: *Resolution*, *Effingham* (flag), *Aurora*, *Enterprise*, and about a dozen destroyers.

(b) Taking the King of Norway, etc., from Molde to Tromsø: *Glasgow*, *Jackal*, *Javelin*.

(c) The Carrier Squadron—Vice-Admiral Wells: *Valiant*, *Berwick*, *Ark Royal* (flag), *Glorious*, and a destroyer screen (varied between three and ten).

III. AT SCAPA WITH C.-IN-C., HOME FLEET

Rodney (flag), *Repulse*, *Curlew*, and half a dozen destroyers.

Note.—There were some 30 destroyers besides those mentioned above. A few had special duties (e.g., three were screening the *Warspite* on her way to the Mediterranean), the rest were engaged with convoys, chiefly between the Narvik command and British ports.

APPENDIX C (3)

DISPOSITIONS, 8TH JUNE

I. ON PASSAGE FROM NORTHERN NORWAY

(a) With first group of troopships near Faeroe Islands: *Valiant, Tartar, Mashona, Bedouin, Ashanti.*

(b) Proceeding independently :—

(i) *Devonshire* (Flag, Vice-Admiral Cunningham).

(ii) *Glorious, Ardent, Acasta.*

(c) On passage to assembly rendezvous for second group of troopships :—

(i) *Southampton* (Flag, Admiral of the Fleet Lord Cork), *Coventry* (Flag, Rear-Admiral Vivian), *Havelock, Fame, Firedrake, Beagle, Echo, Delight.*

(ii) *Ark Royal* (Flag, Vice-Admiral Wells), *Diana, Acheron, Highlander.*

Page 156, Appendix C. (3) I. (d) (iii). After "VETERAN, VANOC - to join Vice-Admiral Cunningham" INSERT "after ferry duties. Actually, owing to shortage of fuel, these destroyers did not join him".

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II. OTHER SHIPS AT SEA

(a) On passage from Scapa to meet first group of troopships: *Atherstone, Wolverine, Witherington, Antelope, Viscount.*

(b) Returning to Scapa from coast of Iceland: *Renown* (Flag, Vice-Admiral Whitworth), *Zulu, Kelvin.*

(c) Off the coast of Iceland: *Repulse, Newcastle, Sussex, Maori, Forester, Foxhound.*

III. AT SCAPA

Rodney (Flag, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Charles Forbes, C.-in-C., Home Fleet), *Inglefield, Amazon, Electra, Escort, Escapade, Fearless, Whirlwind.*

Note.—Some of these destroyers may have been at sea or at Sullom Voe.

APPENDIX C (4)

DISPOSITIONS OF ALLIED SUBMARINES DURING BRITISH MINELAYING AND GERMAN INVASION OF NORWAY, 8TH-9TH APRIL

I. 8TH APRIL

Kattegat :
Sealion
Sunfish
Triton

Skagerrak :—
Trident
Orzel (Polish).

Entering Skagerrak :—
Truant

Outside Skagerrak :—
Seal 57° N., 6° E.

West Coast, Denmark :—
Spearfish
Snapper
Unity

East of Dogger Bank :—
Amazone (French)
Antiope (French)

On passage out :—
Severn
Tarpon
Clyde
Thistle
Shark
Seawolf

On passage home :—
Swordfish

Under sailing orders :—
Ursula
Triad

II. 9TH APRIL

Kattegat :—
Sealion
Sunfish
Triton

Skagerrak :—
Trident
Orzel
Truant
Spearfish

South-west Coast, Norway :—
Seal
Clyde
Thistle

Outside Skagerrak :—
Severn .. 57° N., 7° E.
Tarpon .. 57° N., 5° E.
Ursula .. 57° N., 4° E.

West Coast, Denmark :—
Snapper
Unity

East of Dogger Bank :—
Amazone .. 55° N., 4° E. } Both
Antiope .. 53° N., 3° E. } days

Heligoland Bight :—
Shark
Seawolf

On passage out :—
Triad
Sterlet

Under sailing orders :—
La Sybille (French)

Notes.—(1) These dispositions are for 0600 each day, according to the daily position signal made by Vice-Admiral, Submarines. The number of submarines in the Kattegat, Skagerrak or off the Norwegian coast rose from 10 on 9th April to 14 on the 12th. The strength decreased from the 14th, however, and by the 18th there was only half that number in those waters.

(2) The object of the patrol is stated in a signal made by Vice-Admiral, Submarines, dated 1931/4 April: 'To attack and then report enemy transports and warships; when transports escorted by warships are encountered it is more important to attack the transports.'

(3) The first result of these measures was the sinking of a German troopship near Kristiansand by the *Orzel* at midday, 8th April, and of a laden tanker in the mouth of Oslo Fjord by the *Trident* early that afternoon. On the 9th the *Truant* sank the cruiser *Karlsruhe* off Kristiansand, and in the night, 10th/11th, the *Spearfish* damaged the *Lutzow* near the Skaw.

(4) Four submarines were lost during the Norwegian operations: the *Thistle*, *Tarpon* and *Sterlet* in April, and the *Seal* early in May.

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 - (ii) *Glorious, Ardent, Acasta*.
- (c) On passage to assembly rendezvous for second group of troopships:—
- (i) *Southampton* (Flag, Admiral of the Fleet Lord Cork), *Coventry* (Flag, Rear-Admiral Vivian), *Havelock, Fame, Firedrake, Beagle, Echo, Delight*.
 - (ii) *Ark Royal* (Flag, Vice-Admiral Wells), *Diana, Acheron, Highlander*.
- (d) Others:—
- (i) *Arrow, Walker and Stork*—with Harstad store convoy.
 - (ii) *Campbell*—to join Tromsø store convoy.
 - (iii) *Veteran, Vanoc*—to join Vice-Admiral Cunningham. WENT FERRY BOTIES. ACTUALLY DUE TO SHORTAGE OF FUEL, THESE DESTROYERS DID NOT REPLY.

II. OTHER SHIPS AT SEA

- (a) On passage from Scapa to meet first group of troopships: *Atherstone, Wolverine, Witherington, Antelope, Viscount*.
- (b) Returning to Scapa from coast of Iceland: *Renown* (Flag, Vice-Admiral Whitworth), *Zulu, Kelvin*.
- (c) Off the coast of Iceland: *Repulse, Newcastle, Sussex, Maori, Forester, Foxhound*.

III. AT SCAPA

Rodney (Flag, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Charles Forbes, C.-in-C., Home Fleet), *Inglefield, Amazon, Electra, Escort, Escapade, Fearless, Whirlwind*.

Note.—Some of these destroyers may have been at sea or at Sullom Voe.

APPENDIX C (4)

DISPOSITIONS OF ALLIED SUBMARINES DURING BRITISH MINELAYING
AND GERMAN INVASION OF NORWAY, 8TH-9TH APRIL

I. 8TH APRIL

Kattegat :
Sealion
Sunfish
Triton

Skagerrak :—
Trident
Orzel (Polish).

II. 9TH APRIL

Kattegat :—
Sealion
Sunfish
Triton

Skagerrak :—
Trident
Orzel
Truant
Spearfish

Entering Skagerrak :—

West Coast, Denmark :—
Spearfish
Snapper
Unity

East of Dogger Bank :—
Amazone (French)
Antiope (French)

On passage out :—
Severn
Tarpon
Clyde
Thistle
Shark
Seawolf

On passage home :—
Swordfish

Under sailing orders :—
Ursula
Triad

West Coast, Denmark :—
Snapper
Unity

East of Dogger Bank :—
Amazone .. 55° N., 4° E. } Both
Antiope .. 53° N., 3° E. } days

Heligoland Bight :—
Shark
Seawolf

On passage out :—
Triad
Sterlet

Under sailing orders :—
La Sybille (French)

Notes.—(1) These dispositions are for 0600 each day, according to the daily position signal made by Vice-Admiral, Submarines. The number of submarines in the Kattegat, Skagerrak or off the Norwegian coast rose from 10 on 9th April to 14 on the 12th. The strength decreased from the 14th, however, and by the 18th there was only half that number in those waters.

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(4) Four submarines were lost during the Norwegian operations : the *Thistle*, *Tarpon* and *Sterlet* in April, and the *Seal* early in May.

APPENDIX D

SIMILARITY OF GERMAN SILHOUETTES

The similarity of the silhouettes of the German ships of various classes frequently caused confusion and uncertainty to their opponents. The reports of submarines and aircraft on 8th April (see B.S., Sec. 8 *ante*), and Admiral Whitworth's engagement on 9th April (see B.S., Sec. 10 *ante*) are examples of this; and it is almost certain that on 24th May 1941 the *Hood* at first mistook the *Prinz Eugen* for the *Bismarck*.

Vice-Admiral Whitworth in his report of the action of 9th April 1940 against the *Gneisenau* and *Scharnhorst* remarked: 'Both were known to be either of the *Scharnhorst* or *Hipper* class, but throughout the action observation of the details of the enemy was so difficult that even direct comparison with the silhouette cards failed to establish the identity.'

Evidence from control personnel after the action and fragments of an 11-in. shell found on board the *Renown* seemed to confirm that the leading ship was a battle cruiser and the second ship a cruiser of the *Hipper* class, and they were so referred to throughout in the original reports. Could it have been established that *both* German battle cruisers were in the Lofoten Islands area at this stage of the operations, it would have been of great value to the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, and the Admiralty.

The Commander-in-Chief subsequently remarked that this difficulty in identification must always be borne in mind when enemy reports were received.

The similarity of the German silhouettes was not a deliberate policy adopted for purposes of deception, but arose from the fact that all their later ships were designed under the same Chief Constructor, who applied so far as possible the same arrangement and features to all classes, which resulted in their remarkably similar appearance.

It is worth noting that if—all other things being equal—such similarity in appearance can be produced, it is almost certain to cause confusion and might well entail serious consequences for the enemy, while it is difficult to see that it could have any disadvantage for friends.

APPENDIX E

SUMMARY OF AIR ATTACKS ON H.M.S. SUFFOLK—17TH APRIL 1940

ATTACK	TIME	DISTANCE OF NEAREST SPLASH (<i>in yards</i>)	TYPE OF ATTACK
1	0825	1000	H.L.B.
2	0831	70	H.L.B.
3	0842	100	H.L.B.
4	0901	40	H.L.B.
5	0903	25	H.L.B.
6	0914	80	H.L.B.
7	0919	40	H.L.B.
8	0922	75	H.L.B.
9	1030	20	D.B.
10	1037	HIT	D.B.
11	1046	150	D.B.
12	1048	120	D.B. ¹
13	1100	70	D.B.
14	1120	120	H.L.B.
15	1134	120	H.L.B. ²
16	1141	100	D.B.
17	1149	150	H.L.B.
18	1207	120	H.L.B.
19	1208	20	H.L.B.
20	1226	130	H.L.B.

¹ This attack was reported as being an aerial torpedo, but no track was seen coming towards the ship. The aircraft came very low—to about 150 feet.

² This was definitely an incendiary bomb, being silver in colour and entering the water with a 'sizzle.'

APPENDIX E—*continued*

ATTACK	TIME	DISTANCE OF NEAREST SPLASH (in yards)	TYPE OF ATTACK
21	1231	160	H.L.B.
22	1236	80	D.B.
At 1305—Steering motor out of action			
23	1315	20	H.L.B.
24	1323	40	D.B.
25	1325	5	D.B. ¹
At 1328—Steering motor in action again			
26	1332	60	D.B.
27	1333	140	H.L.B.
28	1345	75	H.L.B.
29	1347	30	D.B. ²
30	1430	5	H.L.B.
31	1445	10	H.L.B.
32	1503	20	D.B.
33	1512	10	H.L.B.
Total number of bomb splashes seen		88	
Total number of attacks		33	
High level bombing attacks		21	
Dive bombing attacks		12	

¹ The machine dived at a 70° angle of sight and sprayed the hangar with machine gun fire. It flew astern of the ship from starboard to port after dropping the bomb and turned E.S.E. emitting smoke and losing height. The machine was not seen to come down.

² After this dive bombing attack, the machine appeared to be on fire, lost height, dropped her load of bombs, and later came down in the sea about four miles away on the starboard quarter.

APPENDIX F

H.M.S. *FURIOUS*

STATISTICS OF OPERATIONS IN NORWAY DURING THE PERIOD
11TH APRIL 1940 TO THE 24TH APRIL 1940

1. Distance flown by aircraft	23,870 miles.			
2. Bombs dropped—250 lb. S.A.P.	116 in number.			
20 lb. H.E.	293 in number.			
Total weight	15½ tons.			
3. Torpedoes dropped	18			
4. Aircraft totally lost	9			
5. Aircraft hit by enemy	17			
6. Aircraft damaged beyond facilities for repair on board ..	Nil			
7. Photographs taken	295			
8. Casualties—				
	<i>Killed.</i> <i>Wounded.</i> <i>Missing.</i> <i>Injured.</i>			
Officers	2	3	1	1
Air Gunners	1	2	1	1

APPENDIX G

SOME EXTRACTS OF GENERAL AUCHINLECK'S DISPATCH, DATED 19TH JUNE 1940

(M.017624/40)

In the Narvik as in the other expeditions to Norway, the German mastery in the air gained the day for them, the taking of the port after a six weeks' campaign notwithstanding. Indeed, the delay before the attack was largely the effect of the German strength in the air. The following extracts of General Auchinleck's dispatch deal with this subject:—

Paragraph 38.—' On 13th May the Germans had a powerful air force in southern Norway and several excellent air bases from which to operate it. We, on the other hand, had not a single aerodrome or landing ground fit for use. The enemy thus had complete mastery in the air, except on the somewhat rare occasions when the Fleet Air Arm were able to intervene with carrier-borne aircraft. The vigour and daring of the pilots of the Fleet Air Arm, when they were able to engage the enemy, earned the admiration of the whole force; but even their strenuous efforts could not compensate for the absence of land-based aircraft'

Paragraph 40, when it was decided to send Royal Air Force machines to work from Bardufoss.—' The need for some support in the air for both the sea and land forces was urgent, particularly for H.M. ships, which were suffering heavily from the daily and almost continuous attacks made on them in the narrow waters round Narvik by the thoroughly efficient enemy bomber aircraft. Nevertheless, Group-Captain Moore, rightly, in my opinion, resisted all pressure to induce him to call for the aircraft to be sent before he was quite satisfied that the landing grounds could be said to be reasonably ready to receive them.'

Paragraphs 114-116.—' Surprise landings from aircraft had far-reaching effects, owing to the ability they conferred on the enemy to outflank positions or take them in the rear. The action on the Hemnes Peninsula, south of Mo, provides an outstanding example of these tactics. The sequence of this action was, first, bombing and low-flying attacks on our troops holding the position. These attacks were followed almost immediately by landings from seaplanes in two places on each flank of the peninsula. Once these landings had been secured, they were promptly reinforced by small coastal steamers; and further reinforcements were brought up to the outflanking detachments by seaplanes on succeeding days'

The outstanding example of the supply by air is the maintenance of the German detachments in the Narvik area His troops, to the number of 3000 or 4000, have been successfully supplied by air for many weeks'

As regards the control of sea communications, the enemy's supremacy in the air made the use inshore of naval vessels of the type co-operating with this force highly dangerous and uneconomical. Though it might have been possible to use high-speed coastal motor-boats, armed with small guns, to prevent movement of enemy craft in these waters, the use of trawlers, owing to their extreme vulnerability to air attack, was not considered practicable. On the other hand, the inshore waterways were used at will by the Germans, who constantly employed local boats and steamers to ferry their troops about, thus entailing more dispersion of the defending forces on land. In an attempt to send considerable reinforcements and wheeled vehicles to Bodo, the Polish steamer *Chrobry* was sunk before she reached port. The unloading of large supply ships, which, owing to the limited facilities available, would have taken many hours, had to be ruled out as impracticable; and reinforcements to Bodo could therefore be sent only by destroyer or by small local craft. Thus, the provision of adequate reinforcements in guns and vehicles was made extremely difficult.'

As for anti-aircraft artillery, General Auchinleck states that he had only half the strength he asked for; yet he only asked for two-thirds of the War Office calculation of what would be required (Appendix E to the dispatch).

The General has also remarks about water transport.

Paragraph 17.—' The force was maintained through the base area which had been established from the outset at Harstad, the forward delivery to units and formations in contact being made by locally procured water transport to Fjord Head, where approximately 10 days' reserve supplies, etc., were held. Inland water transport was thus the main agency for forward maintenance. Yet, although a study of the map would have shown that this was so, no provision had been made to send with the force at the outset the necessary personnel to organise and operate inland water transport in the way that railway units are sent to operate railways in the theatre where the railway is the main transport agency.'

APPENDIX G—*continued*

Paragraph 48.—'. . . the weak link in the administrative system was the locally procured inland water transport which the navy had endeavoured to organise. It was weak because the craft were owner-driven diesel-engined fishing craft of 10 to 50 tons, and also because of the lack of adequate control or organisation. In consequence, though willing workers, the personnel could not be relied upon, whilst the distances to be covered were great. All immediately procurable craft ("puffers") and seven small coastal steamers, two of which were used as hospital carriers, were located at Harstad and in the vicinity of the forward field supply depots.'

Paragraph 50.—'Great difficulties were experienced in the handling of heavy equipment and stores at places other than Harstad, as there was no means of putting them ashore except by motor landing craft. These were few in number, and were also required for tactical operations. In consequence, the establishment of anti-aircraft guns in position and the creation and stocking of aerodromes at Bardufoss and Skaanland were seriously delayed'

APPENDIX H

NAVAL LOSSES AND DAMAGE (ALLIED AND GERMAN)

Note.—Total losses are shown in *ITALIC CAPITALS*. For damage to A/S Trawlers, see App. A (1)

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ALLIED		GERMAN	
SHIP	REMARKS	SHIP	REMARKS
CAPITAL SHIPS	2 DAMAGED		3 DAMAGED
H.M.S. <i>Renown</i>	Slight damage, gunfire, German battle cruisers, 9th April.	<i>Gneisenau</i>	Damage, gunfire, <i>Renown</i> , 9th April.
H.M.S. <i>Rodney</i>	Slight damage, bomb, 9th April.	<i>Lützow</i>	Severe damage, torpedo, <i>Spearfish</i> , 11th April.
		<i>Scharnhorst</i>	Severe damage, torpedo, <i>Acasta</i> , 8th June.
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS	1 SUNK, 1 DAMAGED		
H.M.S. <i>Furious</i>	Damage to turbines, near miss, bombs, 18th April.		
H.M.S. <i>GLORIOUS</i>	Sunk, gunfire, German battle cruisers, 8th June.		
CRUISERS	2 SUNK, 8 DAMAGED		4 SUNK, 2 DAMAGED
H.M.S. <i>Aurora</i> (6-in.)	Damaged, bomb, Ofot Fjord, 7th May.	<i>BLÜCHER</i> <i>Blücher</i> (8-in.)	Sunk, coast defences, Oslo Fjord, 9th April.
H.M.S. <i>Cairo</i> (A.A.)	Damage, bombs, Narvik, 28th May.	<i>Bremse</i> (Training)	Damage, coast defences, Bergen, 9th April.
H.M.S. <i>Curacoa</i> (A.A.)	Severe damage, bomb, 24th April.	<i>BRUMMER</i> (Training)	Sunk, torpedo, <i>Sterlet</i> , 15th April.
H.M.S. <i>CURLEW</i> (A.A.)	Sunk, bombs, Skjel Fjord, 26th May.	<i>Hipper</i> (8-in.)	Rammed by <i>Glowworm</i> , 8th April.
H.M.S. <i>EFFINGHAM</i> (6-in.)	Grounded, total loss, 17th May.	<i>KARLSRUHE</i> (6-in.)	Sunk, torpedo, <i>Truant</i> , 9th April.
French <i>Emile Bertin</i>	Damage, bombs off Namsos, 19th April.		

APPENDIX H—continued

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H.M.S. <i>Enterprise</i> (6-in.)	Damage, near misses, bombs, Narvik area.	<i>KÖNIGSBERG</i> (6-in.)	Damage, coast defences, Bergen, 9th April.
H.M.S. <i>Glasgow</i> (6-in.)	Slight damage, near miss, bombs, 9th April.		Sunk F.A.A. dive bombing, 10th April.
H.M.S. <i>Penelope</i> (6-in.)	Damaged, grounding, 11th April.		
H.M.S. <i>Southampton</i> (6-in.)	Slight damage, near miss, bombs, 9th April; ditto, 26th May, Narvik area.		
H.M.S. <i>Suffolk</i> (8-in.)	Severe damage, bombs, 17th April.		
COAST DEFENCE VESSELS			
H. Nor. M.S. <i>EIDSVOLD</i>	} Sunk, gunfire and torpedoes, Narvik, 9th April.		
H. Nor. M.S. <i>NORGE</i> ..			
DESTROYERS	9 SUNK, 12 DAMAGED		10 SUNK
H.M.S. <i>ACASTA</i>	} Sunk, gunfire, German battle cruisers, 8th June.	<i>ANTON SCHMITT</i> ..	} Destroyed, 1st and 2nd Battles of Narvik.
H.M.S. <i>ARDENT</i>		<i>BERND VON ARNIM</i>	
H.M.S. <i>AFRIDI</i>	Sunk, bombs, evacuation from 3rd May.	<i>DIETHER VON ROEDER</i>	
H.M.S. <i>Arrow</i>	Damaged, rammed, German trawler, 26th April.	<i>ERICH GIESE</i> ..	
French <i>BISON</i>	Sunk, bombs, evacuation from Namsos, 3rd May.	<i>ERICH KOELLNER</i> ..	
O.R.P. <i>Blyskawica</i>	Damaged, gunfire, Narvik area, 2nd May.	<i>GEORG THIELE</i> ..	
H.M.S. <i>Cossack</i>	Damaged, gunfire, 2nd Battle of Narvik.	<i>HANS LUDEMANN</i> ..	
H.M.S. <i>Eclipse</i>	Damaged, bombs, 11th April.	<i>HERMANN KUNNE</i>	
H.M.S. <i>Eskimo</i>	Damaged, torpedo, 2nd Battle of Narvik.	<i>WILHELM HEIDKAMP</i>	
		<i>WOLFGANG ZENKER</i>	

APPENDIX H—continued

ALLIED		GERMAN	
SHIP	REMARKS	SHIP	REMARKS
DESTROYERS—continued			
H.M.S. <i>Fame</i>	Damaged, gunfire, Narvik area, 23rd May.		
H.M.S. <i>Firedrake</i>	Damaged, gunfire, Narvik area, 23rd May.		
H.M.S. <i>GLOWWORM</i>	Sunk, gunfire and ramming, <i>Hipper</i> , 8th April.		
O.R.P. <i>GROM</i>	Sunk, bombs, Ofot Fjord, 4th May.		
H.M.S. <i>GURKHA</i>	Sunk, bombs, off Bergen, 9th April.		
H.M.S. <i>HARDY</i>	Damaged, gunfire, and beached; total loss: 1st Battle of Narvik.		
H.M.S. <i>Hesperus</i>	Slight damage, near misses, Narvik area.		
H.M.S. <i>Hotspur</i>	Damaged, gunfire, 1st Battle of Narvik.		
H.M.S. <i>HUNTER</i>	Sunk, gunfire, 1st Battle of Narvik, 10th April.		
H.M.S. <i>Kashmir</i>	Severe damage, collision, 9th April.		
H.M.S. <i>Kelly</i>	Severe damage, torpedo, M.T.B., 9th May.		
H.M.S. <i>Kelvin</i>	Severe damage, collision, 9th April.		
H.M.S. <i>Matabele</i>	Slight damage, grounding, 17th May.		
French <i>Milan</i>	Damaged, bomb, 23rd May, Narvik area.		
H.M.S. <i>Punjabi</i>	Damaged, gunfire, 2nd Battle of Narvik.		

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APPENDIX H—continued

H.M.S. <i>Somali</i>	Damaged, near miss, bomb, off Bodo, 15th May.		
H.M.S. <i>Vansittart</i>	Damaged, bomb, off Narvik, 10th May.		
H.M.S. <i>Wandever</i>	Damage, grounded, Alfarnes, 30th April.		
H.M.S. <i>Walker</i>	Damaged, near miss, bomb, 27th May, Narvik area.		
SUBMARINES		4 SUNK, 2 DAMAGED	
H.M.S. <i>Seal</i>	Damaged, mine or depth charge, Kattegat; captured by Germans, 5th May.	<i>U.22</i>	Lost in North Sea, possibly by French <i>Orphée</i> , 21st April.
H.M.S. <i>STERLET</i>	Sunk by A/S Craft, Skagerrak, 18th April.	<i>U.49</i>	Sunk by <i>Brazen</i> and <i>Fearless</i> , Vaags Fjord.
H.M.S. <i>TARPON</i>	Sunk by A/S Craft off Denmark, 14th April.	<i>U.46</i>	Sunk, <i>Warspite's</i> aircraft, Herjangs Fjord.
H.M.S. <i>THISTLE</i>	Sunk by <i>U.4</i> off Stavanger, 10th April.		
H.M.S. <i>Truant</i>	Damaged, explosion, possibly magnetic torpedo, 25th April.		
H.M.S. <i>UNITY</i>	Sunk, rammed by s.s. <i>Allejari</i> .		
SLOOPS			
H.M.S. <i>Black Swan</i>	Damaged, bomb, 28th April.		
H.M.S. <i>BITTERN</i>	Severe damage, bomb; sunk, 30th April.		
H.M.S. <i>Pelican</i>	Severe damage, bomb, 22nd April.		

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