Presentations by Antonios Kaldas
Why is it that we seem incapable of splitting our phenomenally conscious experience at any point ... more Why is it that we seem incapable of splitting our phenomenally conscious experience at any point in time into smaller experiences? Tim Bayne’s 2010 book “The Unity of Consciousness” is widely acknowledged as a major step forward in this inquiry. However, there are some troubling problems involved in his mereological conception of phenomenal unity, particularly to do with his use of the relation of subsumption to describe phenomenally unified experience. I tease out some of these problems and offer some possible solutions.
Presented at the Annual Conference of the Australasian Association of Philosophy at Macquarie University, July 2015.
Theses by Antonios Kaldas
Is attention both necessary and sufficient for consciousness? Call this central question of this ... more Is attention both necessary and sufficient for consciousness? Call this central question of this treatise, “Q.” We commonly have the experience of consciously paying attention to something, but is it possible to be conscious of something you are not attending to, or to attend to something of which you are not conscious? Where might we find examples of these?
This treatise is a quest to find an answer to Q in two parts. Part I reviews the foundations upon which the discourse on Q is built. Different inputs to Q produce different answers. After consideration of the many ways “attention” and “consciousness” have been defined, I settle upon phenomenal consciousness and Executive Attention (defined as a suite of strategies for structuring cognition for further processing implemented by the executive of working memory) as the most interesting inputs to Q, and the ones on which Part II focuses.
Attention without consciousness seems relatively easy to establish empirically, but consciousness without attention is much harder. The putative candidates all seem to have major problems, but I build a strong abductive case for the hitherto ignored case of foveal phenomenal overflow. We consciously see far more detail in our foveal fields than we can Executively Attend, although there is a serious obstacle to our ever confirming that empirically—identifying conscious content relies on Executive Attentional report. Triangulating the capacity limitations of attention, consciousness, and working memory strengthens this case for consciousness without attention, and suggests that cognition must work something like my “Witches’ Hat Model,” on which content can become conscious outside of Executive Attention or working memory. I conclude with some reflections on the implications of my arguments for the discourse on Q, and for other discourses such as the ontologies of attention and consciousness, theories of consciousness, some other cognitive concepts, and ethical considerations in humans, animals, and machines. A conclusive answer to Q continues to elude us. It may perhaps be an ultimately insoluble conundrum. But it is the very essence of humanity to seek an answer, and in so doing, to improve our understanding of our own nature:
“The proper study of mankind is man.”
When eating a grape while listening to a symphony, you have a single phenomenally unified experie... more When eating a grape while listening to a symphony, you have a single phenomenally unified experience containing both component experiences, rather than many disjoint ones. Tim Bayne's account of the unity of consciousness has two features that seem to be in tension with each other. On the one hand, he insists that component experiences are real token phenomenal experiences in their own right (mereology) and that phenomenal unity is grounded in mereological relations. On the other hand, he insists that the whole experience is metaphysically prior to the components and that component experiences cannot exist independently of the whole (holism). After briefly surveying previous objections to Bayne’s mereological conception, I elaborate on this tension by comparing Bayne’s holism with the “No Experiential Parts” view, and consider a number of interpretations of Bayne that might resolve the tension. Perhaps it is just a matter of different descriptions? Perhaps there is a special kind of decomposition? Or perhaps the mutual influence of component states upon each other’s characters can support Bayne’s account? Ultimately, none of them seem satisfactory, and the tension remains.
Books by Antonios Kaldas
Statements from the Soul: The Moral Case for the Uluru Statement from the Heart, 2023
Chapter in a book supporting the Indigenous Voice to Parliament
Justice, Mercy, and Well-Being: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, 2020
There is a growing body of empirical evidence that our judgments generally, including our moral j... more There is a growing body of empirical evidence that our judgments generally, including our moral judgments, are heavily influenced by factors beyond our conscious, voluntary control. How does this evidence sit in a Christian worldview?
Papers by Antonios Kaldas
Christian prspectives on science and tchnology, 2024
Christian Perspectives on Science and Technology, Dec 31, 2022
Christian Perspectives on Science and Technology, New Series, 2023
At a time when mental health is generally deteriorating, editors Eudoxia Delli and Vasileios Ther... more At a time when mental health is generally deteriorating, editors Eudoxia Delli and Vasileios Thermos have opportunely produced a volume that closely examines the intersection of Orthodox Christian theology and contemporary psychoanalysis. This volume provides access for English-speaking readers to a vibrant conversation on this topic, as it currently occurs in the Greek context. This review essay considers the insights this volume provides, and the application of these insights to the life of the church. The volume is a valuable contribution that argues persuasively from a variety of perspectives that the church and psychoanalysis can and ought to enjoy a fruitful and beneficial partnership. The art of looking within is as important today as ever, but more so in our age of widespread mental health issues.
History and Philosophy of The Life Sciences, Nov 15, 2022
The term attention has been used to mean so many different things that some have despaired of it ... more The term attention has been used to mean so many different things that some have despaired of it being useful at all. This paper is devoted to bringing a modicum of order to the chaos through the time-honored device of categorization. The chief purpose of this paper is to introduce a comprehensive descriptive taxonomy of the nuanced ways the term attention may be employed. It is presented in table form, followed by elucidations and illustrations of each of its items. But first, I offer reasons why a taxonomy of attention is needed and explore some of its possible benefits. After presenting the taxonomy, I sketch by way of example how it might be applied to two interesting questions: is the umbrella term attention still useful?; and, what is it that ties the subdefinitions of attention together yet distinguishes them from other kinds of cognition?
Theoretical thesis.Bibliography: pages 399-436.1. Q: Is attention both necessary and sufficient f... more Theoretical thesis.Bibliography: pages 399-436.1. Q: Is attention both necessary and sufficient for consciousness? -- PART I. (RE-) LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS: 2. Phenomenal consciousness -- 3. The many faces of attention -- 4. Relationships -- 5. Working memory -- PART II. ADDRESSING Q: 6. Pulling attention and consciousness apart -- 7. Phenomenal overflow -- 8. Triangulating capacity limitations -- 9. Answer(s) to Q -- Appendices -- BibliographyIs attention both necessary and sufficient for consciousness? Call this central question of this treatise, "Q." We commonly have the experience of consciously paying attention to something, but is it possible to be conscious of something you are not attending to, or to attend to something of which you are not conscious? Where might we find examples of these? This treatise is a quest to find an answer to Q in two parts. Part I reviews the foundations upon which the discourse on Q is built. Different inputs to Q produce different answers. After consideration of the many ways "attention" and "consciousness" have been defined, I settle upon phenomenal consciousness and Executive Attention (defined as a suite of strategies for structuring cognition for further processing implemented by the executive of working memory) as the most interesting inputs to Q, and the ones on which Part II focuses. Attention without consciousness seems relatively easy to establish empirically, but consciousness without attention is much harder. The putative candidates all seem to have major problems, but I build a strong abductive case for the hitherto ignored case of foveal phenomenal overflow. We consciously see far more detail in our foveal fields than we can Executively Attend, although there is a serious obstacle to our ever confirming that empirically - identifying conscious content relies on Executive Attentional report. Triangulating the capacity limitations of attention, consciousness, and working memory strengthens this case for consciousness without attention, and suggests that cognition must work something like my "Witches' Hat Model," on which con tent can become conscious outside of Executive Attention or working memory. I conclude with some reflections on the implications of my arguments for the discourse on Q, and for other discourses such as the ontologies of attention and consciousness, theories of consciousness, some other cognitive concepts, and ethical considerations in humans, animals, and machines. A conclusive answer to Q continue s to elude us. It may perhaps be an ultimately insoluble conundrum. But it is the very essence of humanity to seek an answer, and in so doing, to improve our understanding of our own nature : "The proper study of mankind is man."1 online resource (436 pages
Christianity, Two Become One: An Orthodox Christian Guide to Engagement and Marriage, Dec 15, 2017
History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, 2022
The term attention has been used to mean so many different things that some have despaired of it ... more The term attention has been used to mean so many different things that some have despaired of it being useful at all. This paper is devoted to bringing a modicum of order to the chaos through the time-honored device of categorization. The chief purpose of this paper is to introduce a comprehensive descriptive taxonomy of the nuanced ways the term attention may be employed. It is presented in table form, followed by elucidations and illustrations of each of its items. But first, I offer reasons why a taxonomy of attention is needed and explore some of its possible benefits. After presenting the taxonomy, I sketch by way of example how it might be applied to two interesting questions: is the umbrella term attention still useful?; and, what is it that ties the subdefinitions of attention together yet distinguishes them from other kinds of cognition?
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Presentations by Antonios Kaldas
Presented at the Annual Conference of the Australasian Association of Philosophy at Macquarie University, July 2015.
Theses by Antonios Kaldas
This treatise is a quest to find an answer to Q in two parts. Part I reviews the foundations upon which the discourse on Q is built. Different inputs to Q produce different answers. After consideration of the many ways “attention” and “consciousness” have been defined, I settle upon phenomenal consciousness and Executive Attention (defined as a suite of strategies for structuring cognition for further processing implemented by the executive of working memory) as the most interesting inputs to Q, and the ones on which Part II focuses.
Attention without consciousness seems relatively easy to establish empirically, but consciousness without attention is much harder. The putative candidates all seem to have major problems, but I build a strong abductive case for the hitherto ignored case of foveal phenomenal overflow. We consciously see far more detail in our foveal fields than we can Executively Attend, although there is a serious obstacle to our ever confirming that empirically—identifying conscious content relies on Executive Attentional report. Triangulating the capacity limitations of attention, consciousness, and working memory strengthens this case for consciousness without attention, and suggests that cognition must work something like my “Witches’ Hat Model,” on which content can become conscious outside of Executive Attention or working memory. I conclude with some reflections on the implications of my arguments for the discourse on Q, and for other discourses such as the ontologies of attention and consciousness, theories of consciousness, some other cognitive concepts, and ethical considerations in humans, animals, and machines. A conclusive answer to Q continues to elude us. It may perhaps be an ultimately insoluble conundrum. But it is the very essence of humanity to seek an answer, and in so doing, to improve our understanding of our own nature:
“The proper study of mankind is man.”
Books by Antonios Kaldas
Papers by Antonios Kaldas
Presented at the Annual Conference of the Australasian Association of Philosophy at Macquarie University, July 2015.
This treatise is a quest to find an answer to Q in two parts. Part I reviews the foundations upon which the discourse on Q is built. Different inputs to Q produce different answers. After consideration of the many ways “attention” and “consciousness” have been defined, I settle upon phenomenal consciousness and Executive Attention (defined as a suite of strategies for structuring cognition for further processing implemented by the executive of working memory) as the most interesting inputs to Q, and the ones on which Part II focuses.
Attention without consciousness seems relatively easy to establish empirically, but consciousness without attention is much harder. The putative candidates all seem to have major problems, but I build a strong abductive case for the hitherto ignored case of foveal phenomenal overflow. We consciously see far more detail in our foveal fields than we can Executively Attend, although there is a serious obstacle to our ever confirming that empirically—identifying conscious content relies on Executive Attentional report. Triangulating the capacity limitations of attention, consciousness, and working memory strengthens this case for consciousness without attention, and suggests that cognition must work something like my “Witches’ Hat Model,” on which content can become conscious outside of Executive Attention or working memory. I conclude with some reflections on the implications of my arguments for the discourse on Q, and for other discourses such as the ontologies of attention and consciousness, theories of consciousness, some other cognitive concepts, and ethical considerations in humans, animals, and machines. A conclusive answer to Q continues to elude us. It may perhaps be an ultimately insoluble conundrum. But it is the very essence of humanity to seek an answer, and in so doing, to improve our understanding of our own nature:
“The proper study of mankind is man.”