

**Ex-Combatant Views of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission  
and the Special Court in Sierra Leone**

*A study by **PRIDE**  
In partnership with the International Center for Transitional Justice  
Freetown, 12 Sept. 2002*

*The Post-conflict Reintegration Initiative for Development and Empowerment (PRIDE)  
47 Percival Street  
Freetown, Sierra Leone  
pridesalone@yahoo.com*

## **Table of Contents**

Introduction	2
Chapter 1: Overview of Research	4
Chapter 2: Ex-combatants and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission	11
Chapter 3: Ex-combatants and the Special Court	16
Chapter 4: Information Sharing	18
Chapter 5: Impact of Sensitization	24
Annex 1: About PRIDE/Acknowledgements	31
Annex 2: Methodology	36
Annex 3: Demographic Breakdown of Survey Sample	40
Annex 4: Data	42
Annex 5: Pre-Session Questionnaire	53
Annex 6: Post Session Questionnaire	56
Annex 7: Notes on Focus Group Discussions	58

## **Ex-Combatants and the Accountability Institutions in Sierra Leone**

### *A Study of Ex-Combatant Knowledge and Opinion About the TRC and the Special Court*

#### *Introduction: Context and Motive for Study*

Ex-combatants and the accountability institutions are vital to one another. Ex-combatants need the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the Special Court (SC) to help them make sense of the war and reintegrate and reconcile with their communities. The TRC cannot fulfil its stated aims<sup>1</sup> without the meaningful participation of ex-combatants—they are essential witnesses to what happened in this war and the greatest challenge to reconciliation. Moreover, both institutions, in particular the Special Court, risk creating unrest among ex-combatants—and thereby in the country—if ex-combatants misunderstand their goals and methods of working.

Anyone wanting to shape the relationship between ex-combatants and the accountability institutions in a way that promotes reconciliation, justice, and peace in Sierra Leone must understand what ex-combatants know of, fear about, and expect from the TRC and the Special Court. This report provides information that we hope will help develop such an understanding and encourage and guide future research efforts in this area.

#### *The Report*

The report presents the study's main findings and offers recommendations to key actors. It is divided into five chapters: (1) Overview of Research (with key recommendations); (2) Ex-combatants and the TRC; (3) Ex-combatants and the Special Court; (4) Information Sharing; (5) Impact of Sensitization. The report also contains the following annexes: (1) About PRIDE and Acknowledgements; (2) Methodology; (3) Demographic Breakdown; (4) The Data; (5) Pre-session Questionnaire; (6) Post-session Questionnaire; and (7) Notes of Focus Group Discussions.

#### *Outline of Data and Methodology<sup>2</sup>*

The report is based on two data sets. The first comprises the results of 176 pairs of questionnaires completed by ex-combatants in Bo, Freetown, Kailahun, and Makeni. The pre-session questionnaire consists of 22 questions completed immediately before a sensitization session on the TRC and the Special Court. The post-session questionnaire consists of 16 questions completed immediately after a session that included an explanation of how the TRC will share information given to it in confidence with the Special Court.<sup>3</sup> The questionnaires were designed to capture ex-combatants' knowledge of and views about the TRC and Special Court and determine how these were affected by (1) sensitization about the two institutions and (2) whether ex-combatants believe the TRC will share confidential information with the Special Court.

---

<sup>1</sup> The stated aims of the TRC are “to address impunity....to promote healing and reconciliation....to prevent a repetition of the violations and abuses suffered.” Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act, 2000, Part III, s. 6 (1).

<sup>2</sup> For a fuller explanation of the methodology, please see Annex 2.

<sup>3</sup> For a breakdown of the demographic characteristics of the ex-combatants who completed the questionnaires and a complete list of the questions asked, please see Annexes 3 and 6.

The second data set comprises the views of eight focus group sessions.<sup>4</sup> Two focus groups were held in Bo, Freetown, Kailahun, and Makeni between one and two weeks after the initial sensitization sessions. Participants were chosen from the ex-combatants who had participated in the sensitization sessions, so that the discussion could proceed from a basic understanding of the two institutions. One group in each location was composed of 8–10 senior commanders, the other 8–10 junior-ranking ex-combatants. All the research was carried out by PRIDE staff and volunteers during May and June of 2002.<sup>5</sup> In terms of the questionnaire data set, it should be emphasized that the results do not pretend to carry the accuracy of an opinion poll. For a breakdown of the demographic characteristics of the sample, see Annex 3.

### *About PRIDE*

The **Post-conflict Reintegration Initiative for Development and Empowerment** (PRIDE) is an indigenous Sierra Leonean non-governmental organization working to advance a lasting peace through reintegration and development, by ameliorating the socio-economic conditions of ex-combatants and war-affected parties still suffering the effects of the decade-long war. PRIDE began in April 2001 with the basic aim of joining hands with other interventionists to complement government efforts to find solutions for post-conflict problems in Sierra Leone. Since then it has forged programs and relationships with ex-combatants, which have allowed intimate understanding of the challenges transitional justice faces through their perspective. PRIDE therefore offers a unique bridge of understanding and communication between the policy-makers and the perpetrators of the Sierra Leonean conflict.

### *Note on Obtaining Further Information*

Those interested in obtaining any result from the questionnaires not cited in the main report, including how a result broke down with respect to one or more of the demographic characteristics used, please contact PRIDE by e-mail at [pridesalone@yahoo.com](mailto:pridesalone@yahoo.com) or bring the request to its office at 47 Percival Street, Freetown. Please refer to the Annexes for details on the questionnaires and the demographic characteristics of the sample.

PRIDE worked in partnership with the International Center for Transitional Justice<sup>6</sup> on this study. However, both organizations would like to be clear that PRIDE carried out the full research and authored the report. All policy statements in the Report are from PRIDE. ICTJ facilitated an international consultant to assist the project in Freetown and provided advice and counsel in shaping the project and in the final editing and presentation of the report.

---

<sup>4</sup> For details of the questions used, please see Annex 7.

<sup>5</sup> The initial intention of the study was to conduct only sensitisation/questionnaire sessions, surveying a larger number of ex-combatants and covering more locations. The particular focus was to be on understanding how different models of confidential information sharing between the TRC and the Special Court might affect ex-combatant support for the institutions and their willingness to participate in the TRC. However, on analysing the questionnaire data, PRIDE decided that richer information could be obtained by complementing the survey questionnaires with focus group discussions with ex-combatants on a range of key issues about ex-combatants' understanding and opinions of the TRC and the Special Court.

<sup>6</sup> The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) is located at 20 Exchange Place, Floor 33, New York City, NY 10005. <http://www.ictj.org>

## Chapter 1: Overview of Research

### *Introduction*

PRIDE, in partnership with the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), has completed a two-month survey assessing ex-combatants' awareness of and views on the Special Court (SC) and Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Through the survey and subsequent focus groups, we investigated ex-combatants' views about the possible relationship between these two accountability institutions, namely models of information sharing, and how these models would impact their decision to provide testimony to the TRC. We also ran surveys before and after our workshops on the two institutions to evaluate the effect of sensitization efforts on ex-combatants' attitudes. This research follows six months of PRIDE's efforts to educate and hear from ex-combatants about the accountability institutions that are now coming into operation.

PRIDE's objective is to advance a just and sustainable peace, and we believe that understanding the views of ex-combatants is an essential component of any effort to move Sierra Leone towards that goal. The concerns of ex-combatants have not fully been considered in the policy debates over accountability. Therefore, PRIDE believes that research on the views of ex-combatants is vital to this process.

### *Status of Sensitization (see also Chapter 5)*

The survey and focus groups suggest that most ex-combatants have heard of the TRC and Special Court, but do not feel that they understand the two institutions. They show surprisingly high support for both institutions, and a complex attitude towards the relationship between them, particularly after sensitization.

The vast majority of ex-combatants have now heard of the TRC and the Special Court, but most said that they do not understand the institutions.

	<b>Heard of It (Absolute%)<sup>7</sup></b>	<b>Feel That Understand It (Relative%)</b>	<b>Support It (Before Information Session) (Absolute%)</b>	<b>Support It (After Information Session) (Relative%)</b>
TRC	72%	54%	79%	89%
Special Court	73%	41%	59%	79%

<sup>7</sup> A bit less than 30% of the ex-combatants questioned said they had not heard of the TRC or the Special Court. The pre-sensitization questionnaire (Annex 5) exempted those who had not heard of the institutions from answering more specific questions about them. The post-session questionnaire (Annex 6) however required them to answer every question. We have run statistical analysis of all the data, including the blanks (absolute %) and excluding them (relative %). Unless noted otherwise, the percentages referred to throughout this report are relative ones. The data can be viewed in Annex 4.

<sup>8</sup> 53% of all participants said that they support the TRC, but 79% of those who had heard of the TRC supported it. This statistic applies only to those ex-combatants who initially answered that they had heard of the TRC- see footnote 1.

<sup>9</sup> 39% of all participants supported the Special Court, but 59% of those who had heard of the Special Court supported it.

Awareness of the accountability institutions also varied significantly according to the location of the session, as can be seen from the chart below.

<u>Location</u>	<u>Heard of TRC (%)</u>	<u>Understand TRC (before) (%)</u>	<u>Heard of SC (%)</u>	<u>Understand SC (before) (%)</u>
Freetown	83	47	86	56
Makeni	93	45	93	48
Bo	79	38	75	43
Kailahun	37	18	43	16
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>39</b>

### *Impact of Sensitization*

Ex-combatants' primary source of information about the TRC and Special Court is the radio. Of those who have heard of these institutions, 67% learned about the TRC and 72% heard about the Special Court from radio. Workshops, on the other hand, accounted for 5% or less of those who knew of the two bodies. The discrepancy between the large amount who have heard of the institutions and the low number who feel that they understand them suggests that radio is the most effective medium for raising awareness, but that it must be complemented by more extensive and interactive contact. From its experiences prior to this research, PRIDE has found consistently that the most effective way to generate understanding and support for the TRC and Special Court is through an exchange of ideas in which feedback is encouraged, rather than through sensitization, in which the information flows in only one direction.

The survey suggests that the more accurate information the ex-combatants receive, the more likely they are to support and cooperate with both the TRC and the Special Court, although this was more true of ex-RUF than CDF.

- After the workshops, the number of ex-combatants supporting the TRC rose from 53% to 85%, an increase of 32%.<sup>10</sup>
- Before the workshops, 41% of ex-combatants expressed a willingness to speak to the TRC, and afterward 60% said they were willing to do so.<sup>11</sup>
- For the Special Court, support rose from 59% to 79% after the workshop.

Based on these findings, PRIDE encourages both accountability institutions and civil society to focus their attention on educating ex-combatants about the operation of these institutions. At this point, lengthier programs are needed to produce understanding as well as awareness, and even basic radio education is needed, especially in the East (Kailahun).

### *Ex-combatants and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (see also Chapter 2)*

As noted above, ex-combatants are willing and eager to participate in the TRC because they believe the TRC will facilitate reintegration into their former communities. However,

<sup>10</sup> Before the session, 94 out of 176 reported that they supported the TRC; after the session this rose to 149.

<sup>11</sup> These numbers rose from 73 to 106 out of 176.

certain factors could undermine their willingness to participate, including concerns about whether information will be shared with the Special Court and about witness protection. (It is not clear from the data whether the ex-combatants who are willing to give statements to the TRC would necessarily speak about abuses they themselves have committed or whether they would be addressing only events they witnessed – this distinction did not form part of the question posed.)

The majority of former fighters from across all factions expressed a willingness to give statements to the TRC— 64% of all positive responses.<sup>12</sup> In fact, a majority of ex-combatants from both the RUF and CDF said they support the TRC.

- After the session, 79% of respondents thought the TRC would be an important element of reintegration.
- An overwhelming majority, 88% ultimately said that the TRC would bring reconciliation to the country.

While we understand policy and financial reasons for focusing on victims' testimonies, PRIDE believes that this research strongly indicates the importance of the TRC paying attention to perpetrators, as well. Perpetrators are willing to participate and, in fact, are relying on the TRC to promote effective reconciliation and reintegration. All four focus groups confirmed these findings that most ex-combatants believe their participation with the TRC will be essential for meaningful and safe returns to their communities. PRIDE is concerned that, given these expectations, a failure by the TRC to reach out adequately to ex-combatants would hinder reintegration and reconciliation efforts by creating disappointment and neglecting an opportunity for ex-combatants to ask for forgiveness. Such opportunities could substantially assist victim-perpetrator reconciliation and prevent relapse into further violence.

### *Ex-combatants and the Special Court (see also Chapter 3)*

In general, support for the Special Court was initially considerably less (59%) than that for the TRC (79%), but showed similar prospects for increasing after sensitization (79%). However, the survey suggests a factional split between CDF and RUF ex-combatants on this point. CDF support for the Court dropped from 89% to 75% after the workshop. Based on our focus groups, we believe that this is because many CDF initially assume that the Court does not apply to them. It should be noted that CDF support for the Special Court after the sessions remains very high, even though some withdrew their support upon hearing that it could apply to all factions.

Other points of interest that emerged from the survey regarding the Special Court were:

- The number of ex-combatants who were willing to “testify against former comrades or commanders” to the Special Court increased from 37% to 46% after the workshop.
- The majority (53%) of ex-combatants initially think that the Special Court will try “all” perpetrators.

---

<sup>12</sup> The positive responses have been calculated by subtracting blanks (see Annex 4).

*The Question of Information Sharing (see also Chapter 4)*

PRIDE devoted a significant portion of the study to testing ex-combatant reactions to various ways that the TRC and Special Court might share information. Our objective was to identify how information sharing would affect ex-combatants' support for and willingness to participate with the two accountability institutions. Our hypothesis was that the former fighters would be much less willing to testify before the TRC if they felt that the information might be given to the Special Court, which could then call them as defendants or witnesses. The results, however, proved that, while some negative correlation exists, other factors may be more important in determining participation.

We feel that the survey results are inconclusive on this point—our margin of error on the statistics well outweighs any differences in support resulting from different models. (For a further explanation on this, please see Chapter 4.) However, in the focus groups, ex-combatants exhibited a preference for the TRC and Special Court to share no information, although this opinion varied by faction and rank.<sup>13</sup> Most of those interviewed were also supportive of a model in which the TRC shares limited information with the Special Court, only under specific conditions, e.g. where the evidence is necessary to prove the innocence of someone indicted by the Special Court (the exculpatory model).

Although the ex-combatants prefer a more restrictive relationship between the TRC and Special Court, a solid majority still said they would be willing to give testimony to the TRC even if its information was shared freely with the Special Court. Note that 64% of the overall survey respondents were willing to participate in the TRC process, regardless of which information-sharing model they thought would apply. Of those who thought that the TRC would share information freely with the Special Court, 69% said they would give a statement to the TRC (many of these assumed that a statement would be given in public).

Reviewing the survey (again, survey data is inconclusive on information sharing) and focus groups together, our research indicates that ex-combatants *prefer* that information not be shared, but most are nevertheless willing to testify under any model. Other information they learned, most notably the limited number of people the Special Court will try, seemed to have a big impact on this outcome. Some still fear that the Court might call them as witnesses against their commanders based on statements to the TRC, but after the session only 19% of persons in our sample thought the Special Court will try them. Even if information is shared between the two institutions, a majority of ex-combatants will continue to cooperate with both institutions according to the survey, but we believe this depends on whether:

- (1) The Special Court sets an upper limit on the number of people it will pursue, and that number is seen as both reliable and reasonable; and,
- (2) The Special Court and TRC cooperate to develop a reliable system for protecting those who testify before both institutions.

---

<sup>13</sup> Exceptions include rank-and-file ex-RUF in the Makeni focus group, who were eager to participate with both institutions under any conditions because they felt betrayed by their commanders, and CDF commanders in the Freetown focus group, who advocated a free flow of information between the two institutions because they “have nothing to hide” and want many people to be held accountable by the Special Court.



Perhaps the most important aspect of the relationship between the TRC and Special Court is the need for a clear answer that organizations like ours can communicate to the public. While we support, as a matter of policy, the TRC's decision to announce that it will share no information, we note that the Special Court Ratification Act 2002 seems to grant the Court power to order disclosure of information by the Commission.<sup>14</sup> We therefore urge the two accountability institutions to come to an agreement that is seen as definitive on this contentious issue. Until that time, we must continue to tell ex-combatants that the relationship is undetermined, and that undermines the understanding of and support for both institutions.

### *Other Findings of Interest*

The survey produced a number of additional findings, which indicate key perceptions, misconceptions, and concerns of the ex-combatants.

- **On contrition.** Only 15% of the ex-combatants thought they had done anything wrong—and the workshop did not change this perception (14% afterwards). During the sessions with PRIDE, the RUF tended to regularly express regret, while the CDF tend to think they were justified in their actions. The fact that this split did not appear in the survey results warrants further investigation. If ex-combatants approach reconciliation without feeling remorse, this will severely strain any efforts at reconciliation and reintegration and, under those conditions, we would recommend that the TRC include tough recommendations against the ex-combatants. On the other hand, the fact remains that many ex-combatants were themselves victimized during the conflict.
- **On the TRC naming perpetrators.** Ex-combatants are evenly split on the question of whether the TRC's final report should include the names of perpetrators that have been identified by their research: 44% were in favor of naming names, while 45% were against.
- **On reparations.** More than 70% of ex-combatants believe that war victims should receive reparations, although only 3% believe that ex-combatants should be responsible for paying for those expenses (an additional 7% thought ex-combatants should contribute in some part).
- **On forcible recruitment.** A full 72% of ex-RUF maintained that they were forced to join their factions, whereas only 9% of the CDF surveyed said the same.
- **On the influence of economic pressures on the willingness to give a statement.** In several focus groups, ex-combatants explained that their ability to testify against their commanders is limited by their continuing lack of economic independence. Several participants urged the TRC to recommend job-creation programs that would liberate ex-

---

<sup>14</sup> The Special Court implementing legislation passed in March reads at Section 21(2); “Notwithstanding any other law, every natural person, corporation, or other body created by or under Sierra Leone law shall comply with any direction specified in an order of the Special Court.” On the face of it, this seems to include the TRC. PRIDE publicly objected to this aspect of the law in an open letter to then–Attorney General Solomon Berewa the day after the bill was published gazette on March 15, 2002. We complained that this Section threatened the independence, or at least the perceived independence, of the TRC in the eyes of ex-combatants and others. Nevertheless, the law was passed.

combatants to speak out against their leaders in their communities and before the Special Court.

- **On the amnesty.** Many ex-combatants displayed confusion about to whom the amnesty contained in the Lomé Peace Accord of 1999 applies, and a significant percentage (37%) thought that it applies before the Special Court.<sup>15</sup>

---

<sup>15</sup> Art. IX of the Lomé Peace Accord states that “the Government of Sierra Leone shall also grant absolute and free pardon and reprieve to all combatants and collaborators in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives, up to the time of the signing of the present Agreement.”

## *Summary Recommendations*

### **To the TRC**

- Do not focus solely on victim participation, but give greater consideration to the role perpetrator testimony can play in both establishing the historical record of events and promoting reconciliation.

### **To the Special Court**

- Offer a public statement about the number of people (rather than cases) the Court intends to prosecute and, if possible, give a definitive upper limit. The number can be large enough to allow for significant expansion of the Court's prosecution plan in future years, so long as ex-combatants have the comfort of a limit.

### **To the TRC and Special Court**

- Come to an authoritative agreement about the relationship between the two accountability institutions. In particular, offer the public a clear statement about whether information will be shared. PRIDE would recommend some form of a conditional sharing model that will allow for efficiency gains and necessary protections of justice without significant reduction of willingness to testify.
- Develop a clear and credible witness protection program.

### **To Civil Society**

- Lobby the TRC and Special Court to come to a conclusion about information sharing, and in the meantime do not sensitize as if the issue has been resolved.
- During education sessions with any groups, collect ideas and opinions in addition to delivering information to the people. The success of these institutions will depend in part on how well they are shaped by the perceptions of those for whom they were put in place.

### **To the TRC, the Special Court, and Civil Society**

- Increase education and consultation with ex-combatants throughout the country, with particular attention paid to Kailahun and other regions that have not received adequate information thus far.

## **Chapter 2: Ex-combatants and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission**

### *Introduction*

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established in accordance with Article XXXI of the Lomé Peace Agreement. Its main function will be to create an impartial historical record of violations and abuses of human rights and humanitarian law from the outset of the conflict through the signing of Lomé. The TRC is also charged with addressing impunity, responding to the needs of victims, promoting healing and reconciliation, and preventing a repetition of violations and abuses suffered during the war.

### *The Importance of the TRC to Ex-combatants vis-à-vis Reintegration*

For the TRC to carry out its function successfully, the Commission should pay attention to all factions that were parties to the conflict. The serious involvement of the ex-combatants in the accountability institutions is a prerequisite for the advancement of all the stated aims of the TRC. Their unique knowledge of the conflict—how it was fought, why people joined, who was in charge—is vital to an accurate historical record. As those who committed the atrocities, they need a forum in which to confess, and the permanent record of these deeds can contribute at least in part to addressing impunity. Furthermore, we have found that many ex-combatants are nervous about returning to their communities because they fear being rejected by their own people. They are putting a great deal of hope in the TRC to act as an effective and essential mechanism for promoting reintegration. Ex-combatants are also vital to promoting healing and reconciliation from the victims' point of view, e.g., how can a victim reconcile with an individual perpetrator if there is no perpetrator participation in the process? Furthermore, many ex-combatants perceive themselves to be victims and many genuinely *are* victims—having been forced to join under fear of violence, and subjected to the influence of forcibly administered drugs and to violence themselves.

The challenge of reintegrating more than 50,000 (DDR gives total ex-combatant population at 73,000) ex-combatants cannot be overemphasized. As mentioned, ex-combatants are reluctant to return to their communities for fear of non-acceptance and possible threats to their security from persons pursuing vendettas. Instead, they remain in the locations where they disarmed. The Eastern region of Kailahun, a former Revolutionary United Front (RUF) stronghold, is of particular concern. With the present unstable situation in Liberia, the need to engage these former fighters to participate in some form of reconciliation and reintegration processes grows urgent. The possibility is very real that fighting in Liberia will spill over into civil conflict in Sierra Leone, and policymakers must be vigilant to prevent a repetition of circumstances that could lead to further violence.<sup>16</sup> The war in Sierra Leone started in 1991 as a spillover from Liberia. It is possible that once the Special Court Prosecutor issues indictments, many ex-combatants will cross over into Liberia. The present lack of stability poses the danger of future unrest. One commander who took part in the survey in Kailahun said: "Foday Sankoh, a single individual, started a war that caused so much mayhem. Imagine what harm fifty disgruntled ex-combatants could do with support from anybody."

---

<sup>16</sup> Tensions on the border remain high. During PRIDE's recent visits to the region, we have heard complaints of frequent cross-border raids and we know from the ex-combatants in our programs that they are being offered as much as US\$500 to join various sides of the Liberia conflict.

The TRC could create vital opportunities for ex-combatants to return to their communities and thus would reduce the dangerous concentrations of ex-combatants in a few volatile areas. The mere hope of being reintegrated into their communities through TRC testimonials is enough to counter the belief that these former fighters have nowhere to go except back to war.

### *Ex-combatant Support for the TRC*

The TRC is a welcome institution among ex-combatants once they understand its design and purpose. This is evident from the survey data, which shows 53% supporting the TRC before the sensitization and 85% afterward.<sup>17</sup> Correspondingly, 52% percent of the ex-combatants thought the TRC would bring reconciliation before the session. This figure rose to 84% after the session. The survey showed no significant difference in opinion based on faction or rank.

The reasons ex-combatants gave for supporting the TRC range from the general to the personal:

- “[The TRC] will bring and promote peace.”
- “[The TRC] helps victims and perpetrators come together and reconcile.”
- “[The TRC] will help correct mistakes made by previous governments.”

More personal explanations for supporting the TRC included:

- “I hope to be free from people when I say the truth.”
- “[The TRC] will give us a chance to explain why we fought.”
- “The truth will help families and victims to forgive us.”
- “It will let our families accept us in good faith.”

Those ex-combatants who did not support the TRC after the session (8%) gave the following reasons:

- “It will bring up the past.”
- “It is not necessary.”
- “It will give information to the Special Court for prosecutions.”

### *Self-perceptions of Ex-combatants*

Although the proportion of ex-combatants who think that they have done something wrong is comparatively small (especially among CDF), there was an increase in those wanting to ask for forgiveness after the session. CDF in particular believe their cause was just as they claimed to defend their community and democracy.

From the survey, before the session 17% of all ex-combatants thought they had done something wrong, and 15% thought this afterward (no significant difference between the

---

<sup>17</sup> Admittedly, this figure may have been increased by the fact that one-fourth of ex-combatants were under the impression that the TRC would not share any information with the Special Court (the firewall model), but the remaining three quarters showed large support for the TRC in spite of the risk of some information sharing (see Annex 4).

factions).<sup>18</sup> Of those who felt they had done something wrong, 89% wanted to ask for forgiveness before the session, and 96% afterward. Also before the session, 15% felt they should be punished and, after the sessions, 24% felt they should receive punishment.<sup>19</sup> Of the RUF, 27% felt, before the session, that they should be punished, and 25% afterward. Of the CDF, those who felt they had done something wrong all wanted to ask for forgiveness both before and after the session.

It should be noted that many ex-combatants, and especially RUF, consider themselves to be victims. (This includes, particularly, females: 81% of female ex-combatants questioned said that they have been forcibly conscripted). Up to 72% claim to have been forcibly conscripted. Many of these individuals are quite young, alienated from their families and communities, and have spent years in the bush living a life punctuated by drugs, grotesque violence, and attacks on civilians. These individuals are far more familiar with a life of violence and impunity than one of schooling or job training. The barrel of a gun has replaced books, hoes, or hammers for the 10 formative years that should have been dedicated to education or economic productivity. Now, after the war, they live a suspended existence, congregating with other ex-combatants, who suffer a similar transition to civilian life without income or educational prospects. Up to 70% of ex-combatants were children or teenagers (some of which were 8 years or younger) at the start of the war.

The line between victim and perpetrator is even more blurred in the case of female ex-combatants. More than 80% say they were forcibly conscripted. The vast majority still live with their “husbands.” Over the years they have been subjected to all kinds of sexual abuse. On the other hand, there can be no doubt that they have participated in atrocities.

A challenge for the TRC will be how to deal with victim-perpetrators. Another question is whether such persons should be eligible for reparations.

### *Ex-Combatants’ Concerns and Desires*

Ex-combatants are supportive of the TRC and have expressed the genuine willingness to participate. During the focus group sessions they expressed certain concerns and desires they want to be addressed to enhance maximum participation.

- Witness Protection

*“What if I confess, and the victims did not forgive me, and later seeks my hurt. Will the commission protect me, and how guaranteed is the witness protection?”—Ex-CDF rank-and-file from Bo*

As much as ex-combatants have expressed their willingness to participate in the TRC process, they want a witness protection program to be fully in place. And if, after confessing, someone seeks to harm them, they want the right to prosecute such an individual.

---

<sup>18</sup> This percentage is calculated as the percentage of those who answered the question (not counting blanks).

<sup>19</sup> Admittedly, this is a question to which ex-combatants may have been venturing an answer according to what they thought we wanted them to say.

- Amnesty

*“What if after confessing to atrocities committed and the amnesty is challenged, will the victim have the right to prosecute me?”—  
Ex-RUF Senior Commander in Kailahun*

Ex-combatants who may participate in the TRC maintain the assumption that the amnesty clause from the Lomé peace agreement remains in place. However, they have heard rumors that the amnesty might be challenged. When discussing that possibility, ex-combatants say that they would feel like they got lured into a trap, and their sense of having been betrayed will be severe.

- The Relationship Between the TRC and the Special Court

*“If the Special Court will have access to any information I will give at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, count my testimony out. Even if the total number of indictees is reduced to five.”—Ex-RUF rank-and-file.*

Some ex-combatants believe the TRC is an investigative arm of the Special Court, and fear that, if the Special Court has access to TRC statements, they might be called as defendants or at least as witnesses against their commanders. This subject is covered in depth in Chapter 4.

- Reconciliation

*“We did pretty bad things which we are sorry for and want to say so. All we want now is peace and reconciliation which will bring development for all.”—Ex-RUF rank-and-file from Freetown*

After 10 years of fighting, ex-combatants expressed the desire for a sustainable peace. As much as they want jobs, most importantly they want to engage in skills training and income-generating activities that will not only enable them to be self-sufficient but will also give them the opportunity to contribute to the development of their communities.

- Sensitization of Local Community and Victims

Ex-combatants expressed the desire for the commission to sensitize destroyed communities so that victims may be tolerant of them. This they believe will start to create the atmosphere for reconciliation.

- Victim compensation

Before the information session, 71% of those surveyed wanted the international community or the government to compensate victims (only a tiny percentage of ex-combatants thought they should contribute to reparations), and afterward, 77% were in favor of it. In the focus groups ex-combatants continued their support for compensation. They believe justice in the form of compensation will “soften the aggrieved heart for forgiveness.”

## *Recommendations*

The Executive Secretary has said during the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's first press briefing that the Commission in Sierra Leone will be a victim-led institution. Although PRIDE agrees with this approach, based on extensive and close experiences with the ex-combatants, PRIDE proposes that ex-combatants—who have been both the perpetrators and victims of this war—should not be neglected in the TRC process for the following reasons:

1. First, the current nascent peace in Sierra Leone, coupled with continuing unrest in Liberia, creates a tenuous moment in this country's history. Ex-combatants must not be ignored in the process of reconciliation if the peace is to be sustained. Rather, we must use every tool at our disposal to get them back to their original communities rather than having them remain concentrated in volatile areas such as Kailahun.
2. Second, and most important, the Sierra Leone civil war differs from those dealt with by past TRCs in that 70% of the ex-combatants feel that they were forcefully conscripted and themselves victimized. For example, one ex-RUF combatant told a common narrative of being abducted at age 11, exposed to drugs, and trained to kill. In this conflict, the line between victim and perpetrator is vague, if not non-existent. To focus accurately on the victims of the Sierra Leone conflict, the TRC must consider that some of the perpetrators were also victims.
3. Third, some ex-combatants expressed a great need to ask for forgiveness. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission could provide a forum for addressing this desire. True reintegration of ex-combatants cannot proceed without this element of reconciliation.
4. Finally, PRIDE believes in the importance to reconciliation of allowing both victims and perpetrators to tell their story so that everyone can get a clear picture of the past. This will facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation. With everything that the victims of this war have suffered, we cannot place the burden solely on them to forgive and move forward. Ex-combatants must be called on to initiate and even lead the painful process of confession and reconciliation.



### **Chapter 3: Ex-combatants and the Special Court**

#### *Introduction*

The Special Court was established pursuant to an agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations signed in Freetown on January 16, 2002. The contours of the Special Court were further laid out in the Special Court (Ratification) Act 2002. The Special Court is a “hybrid” court of mixed composition (seven international judges and four Sierra Leonean judges) that will apply both international criminal law provisions (including crimes against humanity, violations of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, and other violations of international humanitarian law) and certain violations of Sierra Leonean domestic law. The Court is established to try those bearing “the greatest responsibility” for such violations from November 30, 1996 until the present day.

#### *Ex-combatant Perceptions Regarding the Special Court*

In general, ex-combatants were less supportive of the Special Court than of the TRC. But support for and understanding of the Special Court was also greatly increased by sensitization: before the sessions 59% of ex-combatants said they support the TRC, whereas this number grew to 79% post-sensitization. (Factional and regional differences are highlighted in Chapter 5.) For example, RUF support for the Special Court grew from 46% to 85% post-sensitization, whereas CDF support decreased from 89% to 75%. This probably relates to perceptions that the Court will mainly or exclusively focus on RUF (these perceptions emerged from the focus groups).

The confidence of ex-combatants in the Court’s ability to deliver justice also increased substantially from before sensitization (65%) to afterward (76%). Again, RUF showed a large overall increase in this respect (56% to 77%), whereas CDF’s confidence decreased (from 92% to 79%).

Ex-combatants showed large variation in their understanding of which factions the Special Court is intended to try (RUF, CDF, AFRC, ECOMOG, Government, UN, any combination of the above or all). The majority of persons surveyed either thought that the total number of persons tried would be fewer than 50 (24%) or that all perpetrators would be tried (29%). The number of ex-combatants who thought they themselves may be tried increased slightly from 14% before to 20% after sensitization: among the RUF this rose from 12% to 15%, whereas among the CDF it rose from 14% to 31%.

After sensitization, a relatively large percentage of ex-combatants indicated they were willing to testify before the Court (46%). (Again, this percentage rose among the RUF from 27% to 55%; it declined among the CDF from 58% to 32%.) Some of this increase may have been due to an increased confidence that the Special Court will be able to provide effective witness protection: pre-sensitization 39% believed that it could, whereas post-sensitization 57% expressed confidence that it will do so. Interestingly, this increase of confidence in witness protection was largest among female ex-combatants (from 13% before to 63% after). This increase may also have been due to an increased understanding of the numbers that will actually be tried.

Finally, it is worth noting that more than a third of ex-combatants (34% RUF, 36% CDF) surveyed believed that the amnesty provided in the Lomé Accord is also applicable before the Special Court. In general (and perhaps this is not surprising), ex-combatants showed a fair amount of confusion about the time period the amnesty covers, with up to 49% stating that they simply do not know what it is.

### *The Special Court and Sensitization*

The responses from ex-combatants expressing their willingness to cooperate with both institutions are cause for hope, but PRIDE believes that these positions may change considerably once the Special Court starts its indictment procedures. Based on the focus groups and our months of education and consultation sessions, we think that two factors will determine whether ex-combatants continue to cooperate with and support these two institutions:

1. The number of people prosecuted; and
2. The availability and credibility of witness protection.

Considering the possibility that some ex-combatants may have formulated their answers according to what they thought we wanted to hear and the fact that the number of indictees may exceed 25, there will probably be less willingness to cooperate with the Special Court than this report indicates. Also, while it is true that many ex-combatants want their commanders brought to justice, many also doubt that they will be guaranteed witness protection.

A corollary to the rank-and-file's witness protection concern is a continuing economic dependence on their former commanders. The rank-and-file in Bo particularly made it clear in the focus groups that if there are more job-creation programs directed toward ex-combatants, then it will be likely that they will not give in to their commanders' efforts to convince them to resist or obstruct the work of both accountability institutions. Many still lack economic independence from commanders and have deeply ingrained fears of disobeying or betraying them.

We therefore strongly advocate for:

- The Special Court to set an absolute limit on the number it will prosecute so as to allay the fears of ex-combatants that the figure will expand slowly to cover all of them; and
- The TRC and Special Court to develop a comprehensive witness protection program.

## Chapter 4: Information Sharing

### *Introduction*

Part of the TRC’s reconciliation mandate will be to take statements in a public forum, but the vast majority of statements will be taken either in private or in confidence. The confidentiality covers testimony from vulnerable groups—namely child victims and survivors of sexual crimes—and may also apply to particularly sensitive testimony. The question many ex-combatants and legal experts have asked is whether the TRC and the Special Court will share such non-public information, and the answer will have implications for the participation and support from former fighters.<sup>20</sup>

The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) has classified the possible relationship between the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the Special Court (SC) into different models (PRIDE has further broken down “conditional sharing” into exculpatory and inculpatory models):

- **Firewall:** The TRC will share no nonpublic information with the Special Court;
- **Free flow:** The Special Court can obtain any confidential information from the TRC upon request;
- **Conditional Sharing of Inculpatory Evidence:** The TRC would share only information that is essential for proving the guilt of an accused before the Special Court; and
- **Conditional Sharing of Exculpatory Evidence:** The TRC would share only information that is essential for proving the innocence of an accused before the Special Court.

### *Status of the Information Sharing Debate*

Currently, the law indicates that the Special Court will have the authority to demand any information from the TRC, as in the free flow information-sharing model, but the Court could voluntarily agree not to exercise that authority. This power comes from the Special Court Implementing Legislation ratified by Parliament in March of this year, which in Section 21(2) gives the Special Court the power to demand documents from institutions such as the TRC.<sup>21</sup> PRIDE publicly and vehemently objected to this aspect of the legislation in a letter to the Attorney General that we also delivered to every member of Parliament before their vote on the bill.<sup>22</sup> Although this power accorded to the Special Court may breach the letter and spirit of the

---

<sup>20</sup> PRIDE recognizes that there is a contradiction between the concerns and interests of most ex-combatants with regarding these testimonies. Most want to speak before the TRC as part of a reconciliation process, which may require them to perform a public confessional in their communities. Any such public session would yield information that anyone or any institution could access, including the Special Court. The probative value of such statements in courts is a separate question. But the TRC will gather most of its information through one-on-one statement taking, and most of this information will not be available to the public.

<sup>21</sup> Subsequently, the Interim Executive Secretary of the TRC, Ms. Yasmin Jusu-Sheriff, has announced that the TRC will not share any confidential information. While we agree with her decision as a matter of policy, the Special Court implementing legislation seems to contradict this. We therefore consider that the matter is not yet settled.

<sup>22</sup> The letter read, in part, “We are gravely concerned about the implications of this Section as it outrightly provides primacy to the Special Court at the expense of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Allowing the Court to demand evidence from the TRC will nullify the latter’s independence and hamper its efficacy. Including this provision in the implementing legislation will dampen the success of the TRC, which we consider the more vital institution for promoting peace and reconciliation in Sierra Leone. Both institutions are necessary and should

TRC Act's Section 7(3), which assures confidentiality for certain information, a subsequent and conflicting act of Parliament must prevail. Despite our efforts and the efforts of other civil society groups, the law passed without amendment, and the Special Court now has powers to order the disclosure of information from any natural or legal person in Sierra Leone.

In recent weeks, the Interim Secretariat of the TRC has announced it will not share any information with the Special Court. PRIDE is supportive of more restrictive information-sharing models but questions the extent to which this matter can be unilaterally decided by either institution. We strongly encourage the two institutions to forge an agreement on this question that is authoritative and unequivocal. While we generally support more restrictive models,<sup>23</sup> we think the most important factor at this point is to have clarity. Sensitization on these subjects is already difficult, but the challenge is aggravated by the uncertainty we have to share with the ex-combatants.

### *Impact of Different Models*

During our preliminary sensitization sessions at Brookfields Hotel in Freetown back in October 2001, ex-combatants made it clear that their willingness to participate in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission would depend in part on the relationship between the Special Court and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission; specifically, how information will be shared between the two institutions.<sup>24</sup> Some feared that giving a statement to the TRC would lead to their being tried by the Court, and others feared that they would be called as witnesses to testify against their commanders if the TRC shared information.

One of the purposes of this study was to test the impact of the fear expressed by ex-combatants and to measure the chilling effect of the possibility of information sharing by the TRC with the Special Court on ex-combatants' willingness to cooperate with the TRC. In order to study the ex-combatants' preferences, each survey group was given a questionnaire and then presented with a different model of information sharing. After the "education and consultation" sessions, they were then asked to fill out the same questionnaire for a second time. We compared the responses of the different groups to see if the models had any effect on support. However, we were faced with inconclusive results. To investigate the matter further, we decided to conduct focus group discussions might provide us with a better understanding of ex-combatants' views on this issue. We therefore organized a series of focus groups, each composed of 10 ex-combatants, to gain more insight into their specific concerns regarding information sharing.

The responses on the questionnaires indicated that the potential use of different information-sharing models did not necessarily affect ex-combatants' willingness to cooperate with the TRC, judging by changes in percentage of respondents. In general, support for the institutions and willingness to testify rose after the sessions, independent of the information-


---

reinforce one another, but Section 21(2) would turn a potentially symbiotic relationship into one more parasitic." Letter to Then Attorney General Solomon Berewa, dated March 16, 2002.

<sup>23</sup> PRIDE believes that much money can be saved by the two institutions cooperating on many issues, including sharing of nonpublic, information which is not confidential. We do not believe that the sharing of such data would in any way change perceptions of the two institutions.

<sup>24</sup> As this survey indicates, the fear that TRC testimony will be used by the Court is only one fear of the ex-combatants. It appears that the most definitive factors are an understanding that the Court will only try those who bear the greatest responsibility and a confidence, or lack of confidence, in witness protection guarantees by both institutions.

sharing model ex-combatants believed would be in place. Thus their belief of which model of information sharing will apply did not appear to be a significant factor in determining support.



However, the results did not help us to understand the complexities of how ex-combatants actually viewed the models themselves.<sup>25</sup> For instance, we were very surprised by the survey results for the free flow model. Although we expected a significant decrease in willingness to testify if information could be shared with the Court, the percentage of ex-combatants that expressed desire to participate actually rose (though negligibly) from 64% to 69% under this model. After months of education and sensitization sessions in which ex-combatants expressed their fears of being called before the Court either as a defendant or as a witness, these results gave us some doubts about the accuracy and reliability of the statistical data resulting from the survey.

We therefore felt the need to explore this result in further detail through the use of focus groups. With the focus groups, we were able to isolate the ex-combatant's willingness to cooperate with the TRC based on the information-sharing relationship, and we found significant variation with each proposed model.

---

<sup>25</sup> In other words, the gains from the ex-combatants learning about the limited number of people to be tried may have simply outweighed any losses due to a particular information-sharing model. When PRIDE first started sensitizing, many ex-combatants thought they may be indicted, and so their response to models of information sharing, were based on fear, thus skewing the results. However, now the opposite may to some extent have occurred: now many ex-combatants may presume that they will not be indicted and they may therefore react with more nonchalance to the question of which information sharing model should be used. However, if there were to be an increase in the numbers indicted, more clear-cut variations could probably be observed.

### **Firewall Model**

As mentioned, the survey results were inconclusive regarding ex-combatants' willingness to testify if there was to be a firewall. Within the focus groups, however, this model seemed to be favored over others, because ex-combatants think it will protect them from being indicted by the Special Court based on what they say to the TRC. Most of the ex-combatants, especially the commanders, supported this model. However, while half of the 10 RUF commanders in Makeni supported this model, the majority of their rank-and-file did not. The stated rationale of the junior fighters was that they felt used by their commanders and wanted to see these "perpetrators" held accountable.

It is worth noting that the RUF leadership and rank-and-file believed that information would be shared regardless of what public position was taken by the institutions.

### **Free Flow Model**

The focus groups offer a more in-depth look at why the numbers in support of a free flow model rose slightly after sensitization. Almost all of the commanders in Makeni (RUF), Bo (CDF), and Kailahun (RUF) said they would refuse to testify to the TRC under this model because they consider it a ploy to indict a great deal of ex-combatants. Interestingly, however, a majority of commanders in Freetown expressed support for this model. These CDF leaders stated that they had done nothing wrong and have nothing to hide and would like to see more of those who committed abuses held accountable by the Special Court.

Unlike their commanders, the rank-and-file of the RUF in Makeni expressed a willingness to testify before the Special Court under this model because they think it will bring justice. Many of them consider themselves victims as well as perpetrators and would like to see their commanders held accountable for what they have done.





### **Inculpatory Model**

In the focus groups, Commanders in Makeni (RUF), Bo (CDF), and Kailahun (RUF) generally did not support this model, thinking it to be a move to satisfy victims. A small number of these commanders also thought that if exculpatory information sharing is practiced, inculpatory information sharing must be used as well, to ensure fairness, because the exculpatory model seems to favor ex-combatants. On the other hand, the rank-and-file in Makeni supported this model and would give testimony to the TRC. Based on comments made in Makeni focus groups, PRIDE believes that these ex-combatants consider themselves victims and that they want their perpetrator commanders brought to justice.

It is interesting to observe that the CDF commanders in Freetown supported this model, while the rank-and-file did not. In the focus group sessions, the CDF commanders continued to insist that they had done nothing wrong and that they fought for democracy and for the Sierra Leone people. On the other hand, the rank-and-file rejected this model, explaining that they thought no one should be sent to jail for crimes committed during the war because they think peace has been achieved, and indictments may hinder the peace process.

## Exculpatory Model

In the focus groups, this model evoked responses opposite of those evoked by the inculpatory model. RUF commanders in Makeni and Kailahun, and CDF commanders in Bo, were willing to testify to the TRC under this model. Their rank-and-file also thought that this model should be applied. Many commanders in Makeni, Bo, and Kailahun, as well as the Freetown CDF rank-and-file, consider this model to be an alternative to the firewall model in that it could help to protect innocent defendants. However, a small number, including all the Freetown CDF commanders, expressed the concern that this model could prove too lenient on perpetrators. Still, others just did not see it as a possibility, given that the desire for punishment of the perpetrators is so strong among the public. Nonetheless, apart from the firewall model, this model was the most preferred in the focus groups.<sup>26</sup>



## Recommendations

In general, ex-combatants do not support information sharing between the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court because they want the benefits of the TRC in promoting their reintegration without any of the negative consequences they perceive coming

<sup>26</sup> To give some insight into the answers given in the focus groups, notes of the discussions in Makeni and Bo are included in Annex 7.

from the Special Court. They want to confess to the TRC because they think it will enable them to return to their communities, but they do not want to become defendants or even witnesses at the Special Court based on those confessions. Although most of them favor the firewall model because of it seems to protect them from having to appear before the Court, most think the exculpatory model would be a reasonable compromise because that would help to prove the innocence of ex-combatants.



## **Chapter 5: Impact of Sensitization**

### *Status of the Ex-Combatants' Sensitization Before Meeting With PRIDE*

The current state of ex-combatants' sensitization throughout Sierra Leone indicates that much work remains to be done. While a majority report that they have heard of both the TRC and the Special Court, a closer analysis of the questionnaires that preceded PRIDE's sensitization sessions reveals low levels of understanding, support, and willingness to cooperate with the institutions. Furthermore, the basic level of understanding differs significantly according to geographic location.

Of the ex-combatants PRIDE has sensitized during the study, 72% of them had heard of the TRC prior to meeting with PRIDE, and a corresponding 73% had heard about the Special Court.<sup>27</sup> Of those who were aware of the institutions' existence, an optimistic 79% supported the TRC prior to sensitization, and 63% of them were willing to give statements. Curiously, only 54% of the population that had heard of the TRC reported understanding it. Such discrepancy between support and actual understanding of its processes reflects the general positive sentiment of ex-combatants towards the TRC.

Support for the Special Court is noticeably lower, with 59% of those who have heard of the Special Court supporting it and only 37% willing to testify prior to sensitization. Whereas support for the TRC significantly exceeded ex-combatants' perceived level of understanding, the same cannot be said for the Special Court. Ex-combatants are much more wary of the Special Court than the TRC. This chart shows the figures prior to sensitisation:

	<b>Heard of (Absolute %)<sup>28</sup></b>	<b>Feel they Understand (Relative %)</b>	<b>Support (Relative %)</b>	<b>Willing to Talk (to the institution) (Relative %)</b>
<b>TRC</b>	72%	54%	79%	63%
<b>Special Court</b>	73%	41%	59%	37%

### *Geographic Discrepancies in Knowledge About the Institutions*

Differences in sensitization also appeared throughout geographic regions. Large, urban, well-connected cities such as Freetown, Makeni, and Bo displayed a high proportion of knowledge about the institutions (averaging 85%) of ex-combatants who have heard about the TRC and Special Court. On the other hand, a disturbingly low 40% of those surveyed in

---

<sup>27</sup> Slightly less than 30% of the ex-combatants questioned reported not having heard about either the TRC or the Special Court. The pre-sensitization questionnaire we drafted exempted those who had not heard of the institutions from answering more specific questions about the institutions; however, they were expected to answer all questions after the session. We have run statistical analyses of all data, both including and excluding the blanks in answers, and we cite those which best illustrate the trends we have observed. We will call the statistics that include the pre-session blanks "absolute" and the statistics that ignore them "relative." Unless noted, the default percentage used in this report is the relative percentage. All statistics are available for viewing in Annex 4.

<sup>28</sup> Id.


Kailahun, the former RUF stronghold and one of the most distant and devastated towns in the country, reported even hearing of the TRC and Special Court.

	Freetown	Makeni	Bo	Kailahun
<b>Heard of TRC</b>	94%	89%	90%	37%
<b>Heard of Special Court</b>	86%	93%	75%	43%

Although a majority of the ex-combatants we spoke with have heard about the TRC and the Special Court, the responses about understanding, support, and willingness to testify indicate that the population is at best not clear, or at worst seriously misinformed, about both institutions. Furthermore, the location where most ex-combatants currently are not yet reintegrated, Kailahun, is the least informed about even the existence of the institutions. This disturbing lack of awareness among key concentrations of ex-combatants must be addressed.

*Sources of Information About the TRC and Special Court for Ex-combatants*

The level of sensitization of ex-combatants seems linked to the medium of communication from which they received their information. Sources such as radio, the DDR project, sensitization workshops, rumor, newspaper, television, and commanders were some of the media mentioned. By far the most frequently cited source of information is been the radio, with 67% of ex-combatants hearing about the TRC and 72% learning of the Special Court through radio broadcasts.



The overwhelming dependence on radio may provide a clue as to why distant, rural, underdeveloped locations such as Kailahun are so under-informed about the TRC and Special Court. Even today, reception of Sierra Leonean broadcasts in Kailahun District is virtually nonexistent. The reliance on radio and scarcity of sensitization may also explain why many of the ex-combatants have heard of these institutions but not understood them. PRIDE has found that this audience needs *at least* a half-day of interactive education workshops to understand these institutions.

Unfortunately, the second most popular source of information about both institutions is rumor, with 17% hearing about the TRC and 15% learning of the Special Court through hearsay. Although word-of-mouth is a commonly practiced method of transmitting information in Sierra Leone, it is also precarious to assume that accuracy of information will be maintained through this method.

### *What Media Is Most Effective*

Effective sensitization can best be accomplished through a joint effort between radio stations and NGOs. Radio broadcasts of Sierra Leone should focus on a two-pronged strategy of sensitization. First, radio access to the remote regions of Kailahun District ought to be made a priority in the next couple of months, before the TRC and Special Court are in full swing.





Although many respondents reported hearing about the TRC and Special Court via the radio, their responses about understanding the institutions were significantly lower. This divergence of responses may provide an indication as to the quality and effectiveness of current radio broadcasts. Therefore, Sierra Leonean stations should focus on providing accurate, detailed, systematic, and repeated presentations about both institutions.

However, no amount of radio coverage will take the place of face-to-face contact and the exchange of ideas that occurs when groups hold sessions in the provinces. Sensitization teams are effective mechanisms of providing information and building a relationship of trust and a feeling of interconnectedness across the country. Providing an ear to the ex-combatants, as opposed to just expecting them to provide theirs, promotes their participation in the discursive process and encourages their reintegration into society.


Visual communication is also effective; however, this should be limited to drawings, because the majority of ex-combatants are illiterate. Providing the provincial villages with peace-promoting posters and banners provides a constant presence of a positive message.

### *Impact of Sensitization on Ex-combatants' Perceptions of the TRC and Special Court*

In general, positive responses towards the TRC and Special Court rise dramatically after PRIDE's education and consultation sessions. A direct and proportional relationship emerges from the respondents who, after sensitization, reported understanding and ultimately supporting both institutions. Respondents who initially left blanks (this proportion corresponds to the number of respondents who said they had not heard of either institution before sensitization) ultimately expressed support. Indeed, even a hefty proportion of respondents who were initially negative converted to support of both institutions by the end of sensitization.







Similarly, ex-combatants expressed a significant increase in willingness to testify for the TRC. This increase was not as one-sided, however. An equal on average 20% increase in ex-combatants *not* willing to testify to the TRC indicates that some people feel uncomfortable with the process. But on the whole, an increase of supporters willing to testify indicates strong support for the TRC.





There was a significant increase in the perception that the TRC will help reintegration into the community. Positive responses soared from 57% of those who had known about the TRC initially to 79% of respondents after sensitization. Even the percentage of respondents who had felt they did something wrong but felt the TRC would help reintegration increased slightly, from 70% to 76%.

The overwhelming support for the TRC spanned across geographic regions. The most dramatic increase in understanding and support was recorded in Kailahun. Post-sensitization, Kailahun displayed that 82% of respondents understood the TRC, and 88% supported it.

Different sentiments emerged from questions about the Special Court. The most telling variations appeared between factions. Whereas support and belief in the Special Court’s role for bringing justice to Sierra Leone increased on an absolute scale, while RUF support for the Special Court increased almost two-fold after sensitization, and the CDF ex-combatants’ relative support actually decreased.



Whereas about half of the ex-combatants expressed willingness to testify against comrades or commanders in the Special Court, an equal number of ex-combatants ultimately responded in the negative. Significant differences in attitude toward testifying also emerged across factions. Whereas RUF ex-combatants almost doubled their willingness to testify, the CDF’s *aversion* to testifying doubled after sensitization. Focus group discussions support this finding and indicate that ex-CDF combatants perceive that the Special Court is not going to target them. They consider their actions legitimate and beyond reproach because they were defending their country and communities. After this misconception is corrected during sensitization sessions, the CDF emerges more cautious, and the RUF emerges comforted.



Support of the Special Court also varied across geographical regions. Whereas in Freetown, Bo, and Makeni, approximately 70% of the total number of ex-combatants ultimately expressed support for the Special Court, Kailahun respondents jumped from a low 16% before sensitization to a stellar 90%. Although much of this jump can be attributed to the corrected misconception that the Special Court is directed solely at the RUF, expressions of concern from focus groups lead us to believe that many of the respondents were not being honest in their response. Specific intimations made by former RUF commanders that Special Court indictments will provoke their fleeing to Liberia or Guinea through the porous borders of Kailahun District lead us to doubt the sincerity of this support. We thus will need to design additional methods for testing this result.

*Strategies of Sensitization: Effective Messages*

It is very clear from the statistics in this report, but also from our general experience of working with ex-combatants, that support for the institutions depends greatly on ex-combatants hearing about and properly understanding them; hence, the need for effective sensitization. PRIDE has accumulated significant experience in this regard since the end of the war, and has found that there are at least two prerequisites for effective sensitization: (1) the importance of the kind of contact that wins the trust of ex-combatants either through repetitive or prolonged contact; and (2) the importance of interactive sessions in which ex-combatants are able to demonstrate their understanding of the institutions, as well as voice their concerns, provided that trust exists.

The primary responsibility of sensitization is to correct the misconceptions ex-combatants may have about the institutions. For example, a common misconception is that the TRC is the investigating arm of the Special Court. This discourages ex-combatants from participating or supporting the TRC. Although PRIDE staff and volunteers support both the TRC and Special Court, we believe our job is primarily to give the ex-combatants accurate information and allow them to reach their own conclusions about the institutions. Inevitably, some of our reasons for believing the accountability institutions are vital in general and beneficial to ex-combatants

specifically comes across in the sessions, but we frame our messages to exchange information more than to “pitch” them.

We asked ex-combatants for a list of messages they would recommend for describing the two institutions. These are some of the responses:

For the TRC:

- The TRC is a commission, not a court.
- The Truth and Reconciliation Commission is trying to create a forum where victims and perpetrators would talk things over.
- The TRC is for peace and reconciliation, and will help you return to local community.
- No money will be given at the TRC after confession.
- When you go to participate in the TRC, you should accept your wrongdoing and not develop a grudge after the confession.
- Be honest, accept fault, and apologize.
- Discussing the operation mechanism of the TRC.

For the Special Court:

- The international community is involved, so there will be no party bias.
- Discuss the criteria of the crimes—widespread and systematic.
- The Special Court is not for everybody—but for a chosen few of the most responsible.
- You should not let your former commander influence you.
- The Special Court is for every faction.
- The Special Court would let the public know who the bad people are.
- Those bearing greatest responsibility for the war should be held accountable and punished.
- There is no death penalty in proceedings before the Special Court.
- You will not be put in jail by the Government of Sierra Leone.
- You should be ready for anything as long as it promotes peace.
- The Special Court is to consolidate the peace and for justice for those who suffered.

Sensitization should proceed about both institutions together, because the relationship between them is of great interest and concern to ex-combatants.

## **Annex 1: About PRIDE / Acknowledgements**

The **Post-conflict Reintegration Initiative for Development and Empowerment (PRIDE)** is an indigenous Sierra Leonean nongovernmental organization working to advance a lasting peace through reintegration and development by ameliorating the socioeconomic conditions of ex-combatants and war-affected parties still suffering the effects of the decade-long war. In filling some of the gaps left by the official disarmament and reintegration processes, PRIDE's programs encourage and assist ex-combatants in their efforts to become productive, responsible, and caring members of society. We focus our efforts on these former fighters, because we believe that failing to understand their perspectives and needs is one of the greatest threats to long-term peace and development in Sierra Leone.

### *Mission*

To promote meaningful, sustainable peace and development by complementing and, where necessary, taking a different approach from the official Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Resettlement (RRR) processes in order to forge a realistic way forward for Sierra Leone.

### *Beneficiaries*

PRIDE promotes peace and development for all Sierra Leoneans by working with ex-combatants, because we believe that failing to engage this group in a continuing, comprehensive process of reintegration creates one of the greatest threats of renewed violence and instability in our nation. Our beneficiaries include the abducted women known as "camp followers" and others who were forced to live and suffer under the control of armed forces. Where we can incorporate other war-affected parties in our programs, we do so, but we concentrate our energy and expertise on promoting peace through reintegration of ex-combatants.

### *History of PRIDE*

PRIDE began in April 2001 when a group of five young people from Freetown committed themselves to the project of promoting peace and development through the reintegration of ex-combatants. Although none of them fought in the war, they all had worked enough with ex-combatants to realize the importance of developing programs that reach beyond the general scope of DDR. The founders have various backgrounds, including academic research, university campus leadership, mass media, small business management, and environmental studies. PRIDE was formed with the basic aim of joining hands with other interventionists to complement government efforts to find solutions for post-conflict problems in Sierra Leone. The founders shared three basic beliefs:

1. Ex-combatants must be reintegrated into mainstream society in order for peace and economic development to proceed.
2. Formal and vocational education is the key to creating necessary options and alternatives for ex-combatants before meaningful and sustainable reintegration can take place.
3. Human rights education is the key to changing their understanding of their actions, the consequences, and why they must never be a part of such atrocities in the future.



The founders were able to solicit free temporary office space and computers to start the program and agreed to accept no salaries during the first year of their work with PRIDE. Since then, the organization has a voluntary staff of six and has acquired, through donations, an office space and computer facilities by which we can host meetings and conduct training.

### *Staff and Volunteers*

The administrative structure consists of an executive committee of four senior staff and a board of directors. Our board includes two lawyers, a doctor, and other individuals with professional experience working with various organizations.

The organization has been entirely self-financed thus far through in-kind donations and incidental costs absorbed by the volunteer leaders. Presently, we have two interns from the Fourah Bay College Human Rights Clinic, an intern from Oberlin College in the U.S., and a core of 25 volunteers, some of which are ex-combatants. PRIDE has benefited from the expertise of many people, including Corinne Dufka of Human Rights Watch; Heidi Lechman of International Rescue Committee; Valeria Bove from the University of Rome; Thomas Pravda, who was with the Campaign For Good Governance; Marieke Wierda of International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ); Priscilla Hayner of the ICTJ; and Thomas Perriello of Yale Law School Human Rights Clinic, who is also a Fellow at the Fourah Bay College.

We have also received leadership training in strategic planning, budgeting, fundraising, and documentation from a visiting Yale Law School Fellow.

### *Program Areas*

#### **Human Rights Education**

Imagine trying to teach principles of human rights to those who have been both gross violators of human rights abuses and, often, victims as well. PRIDE has forged strategies for communicating these principles to ex-combatants. We continuously train an executive committee that represents ex-combatant neighborhoods and factions and supervise this committee in training these communities. We also are developing a module on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Special Court.

We continue to run weekly training for our executive committee. We have also conducted training sessions for ex-combatants on the accountability mechanisms (TRC and Special Court) and have conducted a survey on the opinion of ex-combatants on both institutions.

We have developed a regular schedule of meetings among our executive and leadership team of ex-combatants representing various neighborhoods. This is proof that one of our greatest assets is the relationship of confidence and mutual understanding that has emerged between PRIDE and the ex-combatants with whom we have worked.

We have also made recent promising efforts to establish relationships with local and international organizations. Specifically, our education program for both the TRC and Special

Court was developed in conjunction with Human Rights Watch and a professor from the University of Sierra Leone's law faculty.

The organization has also taken part in a weekly radio program entitled "The Way Forward," and even allowed air time for some of the beneficiaries to present firsthand information on their situation.

### **Income-Generating Skills Training and Formal Education**

When asked what they need, ex-combatants invariably answer: education and jobs. Each day, we witness young people being recruited into mercenary forces because they have no economic options or resources. PRIDE is designing several programs that integrate formal education (reading, writing, mathematics) and vocational training (woodworking, soap-making) as an alternative.

The hope of a job can be a potent incentive to remain committed to peace and reintegration. The revolutionary ideas were appealing to the ex-combatants because they were idle, unemployed, and disgruntled with society. The economic and social injustices marginalized this group, the majority of whom were in their prime.

### **Creating Jobs**

PRIDE intends to develop sustainable local businesses that can employ ex-combatants and other war-affected individuals in the years ahead. To start, we are developing two pilot projects—fishing and catering—that will create a track record of success and show our beneficiaries what could lie ahead. We are also developing environmental protection and beautification projects that could advance sustainable development while creating job opportunities.

### **Research and Advocacy**

Most of our efforts consist of education and direct services to ex-combatants, but we are increasingly committed to research and advocacy on reintegration policies. No serious research exists to tell us whether the reintegration of ex-combatants is working and what needs and difficulties they are facing. We believe that this lack of information is a grave risk to the peace process, because these former fighters are so volatile and could easily be recruited to join a new war. Because we have access to many of these people through our programs and relationships, we feel confident in our abilities to research the opinions and suggestions of ex-combatants.

We also will evaluate public policy relating to DDR and RRR, and recommend policy reforms based on our research and experiences. Our objective is not to advocate on behalf of ex-combatants, but rather to advocate for sustainable peace and development on policies relating to ex-combatants and the reintegration process.

### **Sexual and Gender-Based Violence**

We are also about to undertake an education campaign on Sexual and Gender-Based Violence to ex-combatants. During the conflict there was a high incidence of sexual assault and

rape. A recent Physician For Human Rights report confirms that this has not been reduced in peacetime. There is an urgent need to educate these ex-combatants on sexual and gender issues if they are to be effectively reintegrated into mainstream society.

### *Recent Successes*

Our human rights education program for ex-combatants has already begun to produce some success stories. After a recent altercation between ex-combatants and UNAMSIL soldiers and SSD outside of the DDR office, one of our beneficiaries, Amos Lahai, was struck with several blows. He described the events to us as follows, “Without the human rights education from PRIDE, I would definitely have reacted physically and the situation would have gotten worse.”

### *Acknowledgements*

First of all, we thank God Almighty for giving us the initiative and for making PRIDE what it is today. We didn’t know where to start or how to go about it, save for His Divine Guidance.

We extend our deepest appreciation to *Tom Perriello* for invoking the spirit of confidence and hard work in us. He was the one person who believed in us. With his invaluable *pro bono* time he has always been willing to establish contacts for us for an “international flavor” and assist financially while coping with our shenanigans. He deserves a Purple Heart and combat pay.

To *Corrine Dufka* we say thanks for initiating this work by drawing our attention to the TRC and Special Court and the views of ex-combatants regarding these accountability institutions.

May God continue to bless *Abdulai Sesay* and *Aminu Omar* of Savers Business Company for being around to support PRIDE in countless ways. They have been very generous to us, for which we thank them a great deal.

To the *UNAMSIL Human Rights Section* and *Rodolfo Mattarollo* we say a big thank you for, among other things, providing flights to different parts of the country. Similarly, we recognize the tremendous help given to us by the *Pakistani Battalion in Kailahun*, especially *Cornel Ahmed* and *Major Babar*.

We would like to acknowledge that *Tom Pravda* was exceptional. Being the survey consultant was just a matter of formality—he was truly a brother! When this survey project seemed to be impossible, he was always there with his sense of humor to “ease tension.” He rekindled our energy by always reminding us of how important and necessary this work is.

PRIDE will always need the input of *Valeria Bove* in many things to come. What is more important in getting us through than her legal knowledge, especially when interpreting the TRC and SC Acts? That was the very least she gave us.

The unflinching support given by *Aneta Binienda, Lech Wierzynski, Dr. Comfort Ero, Jennifer Hazen, International Crisis Group, Owen Alterman, Sophie Rodella, Kofi Woods, International Human Rights Law Group and the Special Court Working Group* will forever be in the good books of PRIDE.

Many thanks and much appreciation to our volunteers, without whose work this report would have been nearly impossible. They equally believe in our work. When others required that we pay substantial amounts of money, they helped us for almost nothing.

Finally, our deepest gratitude goes to our families: *Mrs. Mazel Quee, Mr. and Mrs. JP Amara, Mamie (and late son Alpha Sesay), Ta Amie, Peter Amara, Joshua, Jesse, Benjie, Dr. and Mrs. Fofana*, and friends, *Morie Alpha, Philip Amara, Alpha Sesay*, who always provided us with the love and support we needed.

#### *ICTJ Acknowledgements*

ICTJ wishes to thank *Tom Perriello* and *Aneta Binienda* for their support in conceptualizing and preparing this report.

## **Annex 2: Methodology**

### *Sensitization/Questionnaire Sessions*

The study's first data set is the results of 176 pairs of questionnaires completed by ex-combatants in Bo, Freetown, Kailahun, and Makeni. A team of one PRIDE staff member and four volunteers travelled to each location and held a session for between 36 and 49 ex-combatants. Participants were chosen with the assistance of local commanders as a representative group of ex-combatants currently residing at the location. A venue offering at least four private rooms was chosen; e.g., a school, so that explanations of different information-sharing models could be given to groups isolated from one another.

At the sessions, PRIDE first explained to ex-combatants the nature of the organization—notably its independence from the TRC, the Special Court, and the government—and the purpose of the study. Then the first set of questionnaires was administered.

The goals and working methods of the TRC and the Special Court were then explained to the ex-combatants, and the team fielded questions on the institutions. The team then divided the ex-combatants into four randomly selected, equal groups. Each group was taken to a separate, isolated room and told that the TRC would share information given to it in confidence with the Special Court in one of the following ways:

1. No Sharing (e.g., a Firewall between the TRC and the SC)
2. Free flow of Information from the TRC to the SC
3. Inculpatory Evidence Sharing only
4. Exculpatory Evidence Sharing only

The second set of questionnaires was then administered in order to measure the impact of the different models on the willingness of ex-combatants to participate in the TRC process. It should be noted that administering the questionnaires during this time may have had some impact on the total increase of support for the TRC and on ex-combatants expressing willingness to give a statement to the TRC (e.g., pushing the percentages in those categories up), but the focus groups provide further insight into ex-combatants' views on these matters.

The four groups were brought back together and PRIDE explained the possibility of the TRC being required to share confidential information with the Special Court<sup>29</sup> and why the groups of ex-combatants had been told about different models of information sharing. PRIDE emphasized the necessity of having “misled” the ex-combatants about information sharing in order to capture how different models affected their support for the institutions and their willingness to participate in the TRC. Finally, PRIDE fielded questions about itself and the study and took great care to ensure that all participants understood what had and had not yet been determined about how the TRC would actually share confidential information with the Special Court. All participants received a certificate of participation.

---

<sup>29</sup> This is pursuant to Section 21 (2) of the Special Court Ratification Act 2002.

### *Administering the Questionnaires*

All participating ex-combatants completed the two questionnaires anonymously, identifying themselves by a participant number given to them by PRIDE at the start of the session. Self-selecting literate ex-combatants filled out questionnaires in English. A PRIDE staff member/volunteer supervised the process to ensure that all appropriate questions were filled out and that participants did not share answers. Self-selecting illiterate ex-combatants were interviewed by a PRIDE staff member/volunteer in privacy, using Krio translations of the questionnaires.

### *Training of PRIDE Staff and Volunteers*

All PRIDE staff and several of the volunteers already had extensive prior experience of sensitizing ex-combatants about the TRC and Special Court, because PRIDE had been running “education and consultation sessions” on the subject for more than four months prior to the survey. In addition, some PRIDE volunteers are themselves ex-combatants. However, all PRIDE volunteers and staff members underwent a week of specific training that covered the following areas:

1. Knowledge and understanding of the TRC and the Special Court, including models of information sharing between the two
2. Techniques for explaining the TRC and Special Court to ex-combatants
3. Explanations of PRIDE and of the nature of this study
4. Methods for gaining the ex-combatants’ trust
5. Research methods for conducting questionnaire interviews in a nonleading manner

After the training, all PRIDE staff and volunteers practiced sensitizing ex-combatants about the TRC and Special Court and administering the questionnaires to both literate and illiterate ex-combatants in practice sessions held with groups of up to 12 ex-combatants in Freetown.

### *Focus Groups*

A team of one PRIDE staff member and two volunteers returned to Bo, Freetown, Kailahun, and Makeni between one and two weeks after the initial session to hold focus groups. Participants were selected from those ex-combatants who had participated in the initial sensitization/questionnaire session. In each location, one group of 8–10 senior commanders was chosen and another of 8–10 junior-ranking ex-combatants. The two groups were separated so that discussants felt more free to express honest and wide-ranging opinions. They were asked an identical set of questions (see Annex 7). The focus groups were held on separate, consecutive days in order to avoid any unnecessary time constraint on the discussion.

### *Training*

PRIDE staff and participating volunteers trained for two days using a National Democratic Institute (NDI) manual on “The Design and Implementation of Focus Group Projects,” drawing on NDI’s experience of running focus groups in Sub-Saharan Africa. After the training, PRIDE held a practice focus group with ex-combatants in Freetown.

## *Concerns about the Methodology*

### **Blanks**

As can be seen from the pre-session questionnaire (Annex 5), there was an instruction to leave certain sections of the questionnaire blank under certain conditions. There were also some blanks in the post-session questionnaire that indicated that some of the ex-combatants still did not understand what they were being asked. In the data, we have subtracted the number of blanks in order to derive percentages from positive responses given.

### **Motivation in Answering**

There may have been a tendency among some of the ex-combatants to respond according to what they presumed we wanted them to say. For example, in responding on post-session questionnaires that the TRC or the Special Court bring justice, they may be telling us what they think will satisfy us. One former RUF said that he thought persons may be expressing support for the Special Court in the hope that the Special Court may consider this in mitigation or divert attention away from investigating them. Alternatively, there may have been fear that not expressing support for the SC would somehow indicate a guilty conscience. PRIDE is aware of such motivations that may have influenced the outcome of this survey, and the data must be read in the light of this reservation.

### *PRIDE Strategies of Sensitization—General*

PRIDE does not sensitize ex-combatants. Instead, PRIDE “educates and consults” the ex-combatants about both institutions, soliciting their concerns, objections and suggestions of ways to enhance the success of both institutions. We have developed several techniques of education and consultation that we believe make our message most effective.

1. **First**, we provide ex-combatants with a **safe environment** in which they can feel comfortable and express themselves freely. We conduct our best sessions in Focus Groups. These private meetings among groups of ex-combatants of the same rank allow the ex-combatants to express their true concerns and opinions about the TRC and Special Court. Such frank discussions allow us to take into consideration the various issues that will affect/hinder ex-combatants from participating/supporting both institutions.
2. **Second**, we **engage** them at every stage of our session. We do not lecture. We take an active and receptive approach by discussing the institutions, asking questions and consulting the ex-combatants, and being open to their ideas and concerns.
3. **Third**, we focus on **building credibility** with our audience. When our audience asks us questions to which we do not know the answers, such as how many people will be tried by the Special Court, we honestly say we do not know. If the information is such that we should know it, we indicate we will look for the answer, and we attempt to be prepared for the question for the next session. We take great care to be non-judgmental of our audience in our commentary, questions, and overall attitude.
4. **Fourth**, we approach our sessions with a sense of **professionalism**. In this spirit, we do not pay our listeners for attending the sessions. We feel that any sort of payment immediately makes the relationship more like a sale than a discussion of mutual respect. While we meet initial resistance, eventually our stance on this demonstrates to ex-

combatants our conviction that we are there to speak the truth and that this information is important enough to them that their main benefit is to hear it. Nonetheless, we do provide our listeners with food during the long one- or two-day sessions to maintain the participation and interest on the topic at hand.

5. **Fifth**, and most important, we **build trust** with the ex-combatants. Some of our volunteers are ex-combatants themselves. Such speakers form powerful bridges of trust between the ex-combatant audience and PRIDE. Furthermore, we take great care to avoid naming specific persons or factions in our examples so as to avoid any feelings of discomfort or suspicion.



**Annex 3: Demographic Breakdown of Survey Sample**

<b>Location</b>	<b>No.</b>	<b>% of Total</b>
<b>Bo</b>	47	27%
<b>Freetown</b>	36	20%
<b>Kailahun</b>	49	28%
<b>Makeni</b>	44	25%
<b>ALL</b>	<b>176</b>	<b>100%</b>

<b>Sex</b>	<b>Bo</b>	<b>Freetown</b>	<b>Kailahun</b>	<b>Makeni</b>	<b>ALL</b>
<b>Male</b>	42 (90%)	34 (94%)	35 (71%)	39 (89%)	<b>155 (88%)</b>
<b>Female</b>	5 (10%)	2 (6%)	14 (29%)	5 (11%)	<b>21 (12%)</b>
					<b>176 (100%)</b>

<b>Faction</b>	<b>No.</b>	<b>% of Total</b>
<b>RUF</b>	106	61%
<b>CDF</b>	56	32%
<b>AFRC</b>	5	3%
<b>CDF/AFRC</b>	3	2%
<b>RUF/AFRC</b>	2	1%
<b>RUF/CDF</b>	1	1%
<b>OTHER</b>	3	2%
<b>ALL</b>	<b>176</b>	<b>100%</b>

<b>District of Origin</b>	<b>No.</b>	<b>% of Total</b>
<b>Bo</b>	32	18%
<b>Bombali</b>	12	7%
<b>Bonthe</b>	8	5%
<b>Kailahun</b>	47	27%
<b>Kambia</b>	2	1%
<b>Kenema</b>	11	6%
<b>Koinadugu</b>	3	2%
<b>Kono</b>	11	6%
<b>Moyamba</b>	16	9%
<b>Port Loko</b>	2	1%
<b>Pujehun</b>	20	11%
<b>Tonkolili</b>	5	3%
<b>Western Area</b>	5	3%
<b>No Response</b>	2	1%
<b>ALL</b>	<b>176</b>	<b>100%</b>

<b>Method of Joining</b>	<b>of RUF</b>	<b>of CDF</b>	<b>of Females</b>	<b>ALL</b>
<b>Forced</b>	76 (72%)	5 (9%)	17 (81%)	86 (49%)
<b>Voluntary</b>	25 (24%)	47 (84%)	2 (10%)	81 (46%)
<b>No Response</b>	5 (5%)	4 (7%)	2 (10%)	9 (5%)
				<b>176 (100%)</b>

<b>Time Since Joining Faction</b>	<b>No.</b>	<b>% of Total</b>
<b>Less than 2yrs</b>	2	1%
<b>2yrs &lt; 4yrs</b>	9	5%
<b>4yrs &lt; 6yrs</b>	42	24%
<b>6yrs &lt; 8yrs</b>	35	20%
<b>8yrs &lt; 10yrs</b>	22	13%
<b>More than 10yrs</b>	48	27%
<b>No Response</b>	18	10%
	<b>176</b>	<b>100%</b>

## ANNEX 4: DATA

### NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS

<b>MAKENI</b>	44	25%
<b>BO</b>	47	27%
<b>KAILAHUN</b>	49	28%
<b>FREETOWN</b>	36	20%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>176</b>	<b>100%</b>

### 1. SEX

			<u>MAKENI</u>		<u>BO</u>		<u>KAIL F/TOWN</u>		
<b>MALE</b>	155	88%	39	89%	47	90%	35	34	94%
<b>FEMALE</b>	21	12%	5	11%	5	10%	14	2	6%
	<b>176</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>100%</b>

### 2. FACTION

<b>RUF</b>	106	61%
<b>CDF</b>	56	32%
<b>AFRC</b>	5	3%
<b>RUF/AFR</b>	2	1%
<b>RUF/CDF</b>	1	1%
<b>CDF/AFR</b>	3	2%
<b>OTHER/MIXED</b>	2	1%
	<b>175</b>	<b>100%</b>

### 3. FROM

<b>BO</b>	32	18%
<b>BOMBALI</b>	12	7%
<b>BONTHE</b>	8	5%
<b>KAILAHUN</b>	47	27%
<b>KAMBIA</b>	2	1%
<b>KENEMA</b>	11	6%
<b>KOINADUGU</b>	3	2%
<b>KONO</b>	11	6%
<b>MOYAMBA</b>	16	9%
<b>PORT LOKO</b>	2	1%
<b>PUJEHUN</b>	20	11%
<b>TONKOLILI</b>	5	3%
<b>WESTERN AREA</b>	5	3%
	<b>174</b>	<b>100%</b>

### 4. RANK

FOR DIFFERENTIATION ON RANK SEE ANNEX 7 (FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION NOTES)

### 5. FORCED? OF ALL OF RUF OF CDF OF FEMALES

<b>FORCED</b>	86	51%	76	75%	5	10%	17
<b>VOLUNTARY</b>	81	49%	25	25%	47	90%	2
	<b>167</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>101</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>19</b>

### 6. TIME IN FACTION

<b>&lt;2YEARS</b>	2	2	1%
<b>&lt;4YEARS</b>	11	9	6%
<b>&lt;6YEARS</b>	53	42	27%
<b>&lt;8YEARS</b>	88	35	22%
<b>&lt;10YEARS</b>	110	22	14%
<b>10+YEARS</b>	158	48	30%
		<b>158</b>	<b>100%</b>

**7. HEARD OF TRC?**

	<b>FULL</b>		<b>MAKENI</b>		<b>KAIL</b>		<b>BO</b>		<b>F/TOWN</b>	
<b>YES</b>	126	72%	41	93%	18	37%	37	30	83%	
<b>NO</b>	50	28%	3	7%	31	63%	10	6	17%	
	<b>176</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>100%</b>	

**OF FEMALES**

<b>YES</b>	4	19%
<b>NO</b>	17	81%
	<b>21</b>	<b>100%</b>

**7. IF "YES", BY WHAT MEDIUM?**

<b>MEDIUM</b>	<b>ONLYSOURCE</b>		<b>ONE OF SEVERAL SOURCES</b>	
RADIO	66	67%	15	
RUMOUR	17	17%	9	
COMMANDERS	1	1%	9	
DDR	11	11%	8	
TV	1	1%	2	
NEWSPAPER	2	2%	9	
WORKSHOP			2	
UNAMSIL HRIGHTS OFFICE			1	

NOTE: POSITIVE RESPONSES ARE CALCULATED BY SUBTRACTING BLANKS

**8. FEEL UNDERSTAND TRC?**

<b>FULL</b>	<b>BEFORE</b>		<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>		<b>AFTER</b>	
<b>YES</b>	64	36%	<b>54%</b>		152	<b>90%</b>
<b>NO</b>	44	25%	<b>37%</b>		14	<b>8%</b>
<b>DK</b>	10	6%	<b>8%</b>		2	<b>1%</b>
<b>BLANK</b>	58	33%	<b>100%</b>		8	<b>100%</b>
	<b>176</b>	<b>100%</b>			<b>176</b>	<b>100%</b>

**MAKENI - BEFORE**

	<b>BEFORE</b>		<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>		<b>AFTER</b>	
<b>YES</b>	20	45%	<b>51%</b>		37	<b>93%</b>
<b>NO</b>	14	32%	<b>36%</b>		3	<b>8%</b>
<b>DK</b>	5	11%	<b>13%</b>		0	<b>0%</b>
<b>BLANK</b>	5	11%	<b>100%</b>		4	<b>100%</b>
	<b>44</b>	<b>100%</b>			<b>44</b>	<b>100%</b>

**KAIL - BEFORE**

	<b>BEFORE</b>		<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>		<b>AFTER</b>	
<b>YES</b>	9	18%	<b>53%</b>		40	<b>89%</b>
<b>NO</b>	7	14%	<b>41%</b>		5	<b>11%</b>
<b>DK</b>	1	2%	<b>6%</b>		0	<b>0%</b>
<b>BLANK</b>	32	65%	<b>100%</b>		4	<b>100%</b>
	<b>49</b>	<b>100%</b>			<b>49</b>	<b>100%</b>

**BO - BEFORE**

	<b>BEFORE</b>		<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>		<b>AFTER</b>	
<b>YES</b>	18	38%	<b>56%</b>		42	<b>89%</b>
<b>NO</b>	12	26%	<b>38%</b>		3	<b>6%</b>
<b>DK</b>	2	4%	<b>6%</b>		2	<b>4%</b>
<b>BLANK</b>	15	32%	<b>100%</b>		0	<b>100%</b>
	<b>47</b>	<b>100%</b>			<b>47</b>	<b>100%</b>

<b><u>F/TOWN - BEFORE</u></b>	<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>			<b>AFTER</b>		
YES	17	47%	<b>57%</b>	33	92%	<b>92%</b>
NO	11	31%	<b>37%</b>	3	8%	<b>8%</b>
DK	2	6%	<b>7%</b>	0	0%	<b>0%</b>
BLANK	6	17%	<b>100%</b>	0	0%	<b>100%</b>
	<b>36</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>36</b>	<b>100%</b>	

<b><u>9. SUPPORT TRC?</u></b>	<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>			<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>			
<b><u>FULL</u></b>	<b>BEFORE</b>				<b>AFTER</b>		
YES	94	53%	<b>79%</b>	149	85%	<b>89%</b>	
NO	17	10%	<b>14%</b>	14	8%	<b>8%</b>	
DK	8	5%	<b>7%</b>	5	3%	<b>3%</b>	
BLANK	57	32%	<b>100%</b>	8	5%	<b>100%</b>	
	<b>176</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>176</b>	<b>100%</b>		

<b><u>OF RUF</u></b>	<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>			<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>			
	<b>BEFORE</b>				<b>AFTER</b>		
YES	50	47%	<b>74%</b>	87	82%	<b>89%</b>	
NO	13	12%	<b>19%</b>	7	7%	<b>7%</b>	
DK	5	5%	<b>7%</b>	4	4%	<b>4%</b>	
BLANK	38	36%	<b>100%</b>	8	8%	<b>100%</b>	
	<b>106</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>106</b>	<b>100%</b>		

<b><u>MAKENI - BEFORE</u></b>	<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>			<b>MA -AFTER</b>		
34	77%	<b>83%</b>	38	86%	<b>95%</b>	
6	14%	<b>15%</b>	1	2%	<b>3%</b>	
1	2%	<b>2%</b>	1	2%	<b>3%</b>	
3	7%	<b>100%</b>	4	9%	<b>100%</b>	
<b>44</b>	<b>100%</b>			<b>100%</b>		

<b><u>KAIL - BEFORE</u></b>	<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>			<b>KAIL -AFTER</b>		
13	27%	<b>76%</b>	43	88%	<b>96%</b>	
2	4%	<b>12%</b>	0	0%	<b>0%</b>	
2	4%	<b>12%</b>	2	4%	<b>4%</b>	
32	65%	<b>100%</b>	4	8%	<b>100%</b>	
<b>49</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>49</b>	<b>100%</b>		

<b><u>BO - BEFORE</u></b>	<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>			<b>BO -AFTER</b>		
25	53%	<b>78%</b>	39	83%	<b>83%</b>	
3	6%	<b>9%</b>	6	13%	<b>13%</b>	
4	9%	<b>13%</b>	2	4%	<b>4%</b>	
15	32%	<b>100%</b>	0	0%	<b>100%</b>	
<b>47</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>47</b>	<b>100%</b>		

<b><u>F/TOWN - BEFORE</u></b>	<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>			<b>F/TOWN -AFTER</b>		
22	61%	<b>76%</b>	29	81%	<b>81%</b>	
6	17%	<b>21%</b>	7	19%	<b>19%</b>	
1	3%	<b>3%</b>	0	0%	<b>0%</b>	
7	19%	<b>100%</b>	0	0%	<b>100%</b>	
<b>36</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>36</b>	<b>100%</b>		

**10. TRC BRING RECONCILIATION?**

<b><u>FULL</u></b>	<b>BEFORE</b>		<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>		<b>AFTER</b>		<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>	
YES	92	52%	77%		147	84%	88%	
NO	13	7%	11%		12	7%	7%	
DK	14	8%	12%		9	5%	5%	
BLANK	57	32%	100%		8	5%	100%	
	<b>176</b>	<b>100%</b>			<b>176</b>	<b>100%</b>		

<b><u>OF RUF</u></b>	<b>BEFORE</b>		<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>		<b>AFTER</b>		<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>	
YES	52	49%	76%		85	80%	87%	
NO	8	8%	12%		8	8%	8%	
DK	8	8%	12%		5	5%	5%	
BLANK	38	36%	100%		8	8%	100%	
	<b>106</b>	<b>100%</b>			<b>106</b>	<b>100%</b>		

**11. WILLING TO GIVE STATEMENT TO TRC?**

<b><u>FULL</u></b>	<b>BEFORE</b>		<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>		<b>AFTER</b>		<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>	
YES	73	41%	63%		106	60%	64%	
NO	25	14%	22%		48	27%	29%	
DK	18	10%	16%		11	6%	7%	
BLANK	60	34%	100%		11	6%	100%	
	<b>176</b>	<b>100%</b>			<b>176</b>	<b>100%</b>		

<b><u>FIREWALL</u></b>	<b>BEFORE</b>		<b>AFTER</b>			
YES	16	39%	70%	28	68%	72%
NO	1	2%	4%	9	22%	23%
DK	6	15%	26%	2	5%	5%
BLANK	18	44%	100%	2	5%	100%
	<b>41</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>41</b>	<b>100%</b>	

<b><u>EXCULPATORY</u></b>	<b>BEFORE</b>		<b>AFTER</b>			
YES	19	50%	70%	24	63%	63%
NO	6	16%	22%	11	29%	29%
DK	2	5%	7%	3	8%	8%
BLANK	11	29%	100%	0	0%	100%
	<b>38</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>38</b>	<b>100%</b>	

<b><u>INCULPATORY</u></b>	<b>BEFORE</b>		<b>AFTER</b>			
YES	7	20%	35%	18	51%	53%
NO	7	20%	35%	14	40%	41%
DK	6	17%	30%	2	6%	6%
BLANK	15	43%	100%	1	3%	100%
	<b>35</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>35</b>	<b>100%</b>	

<b><u>FREEFLOW</u></b>	<b>BEFORE</b>		<b>AFTER</b>			
YES	16	40%	64%	25	63%	69%
NO	7	18%	28%	9	23%	25%
DK	2	5%	8%	2	5%	6%
BLANK	15	38%	100%	4	10%	100%
	<b>40</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>40</b>	<b>100%</b>	

**12. HOW WILL TRC AFFECT REINTEGRATION TO COMMUNITY?**

<b><u>FULL</u></b>	<b>BEFORE</b>			<b>AFTER</b>		
		<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>			<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>	
HELP	67	38%	<b>57%</b>	130	74%	<b>79%</b>
HURT	7	4%	<b>6%</b>	6	3%	<b>4%</b>
NO EFFECT	11	6%	<b>9%</b>	10	6%	<b>6%</b>
DK	33	19%	<b>28%</b>	19	11%	<b>12%</b>
BLANK	58	33%	<b>100%</b>	11	6%	<b>100%</b>
	<b>176</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>176</b>	<b>100%</b>	

<b><u>OF RUF</u></b>	<b>BEFORE</b>			<b>AFTER</b>		
		<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>			<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>	
HELP	37	35%	<b>54%</b>	78	74%	<b>82%</b>
HURT	5	5%	<b>7%</b>	5	5%	<b>5%</b>
NO EFFECT	7	7%	<b>10%</b>	5	5%	<b>5%</b>
DK	19	18%	<b>28%</b>	7	7%	<b>7%</b>
BLANK	38	36%	<b>100%</b>	11	10%	<b>100%</b>
	<b>106</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>106</b>	<b>100%</b>	

**13. OF THOSE WHO THINK HAVE DONE WRONG- WILL TRC HELP OR HURT?**

	<b>BEFORE</b>			<b>AFTER</b>		
		<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>			<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>	
HELP	16	59%	<b>70%</b>	19	76%	<b>76%</b>
HURT	0	0%	<b>0%</b>	1	4%	<b>4%</b>
NO EFFECT	2	7%	<b>9%</b>	1	4%	<b>4%</b>
DK	5	19%	<b>22%</b>	4	16%	<b>16%</b>
BLANK	4	15%	<b>100%</b>	0	0%	<b>100%</b>
	<b>27</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>25</b>	<b>100%</b>	

<b><u>MAKENI - BEFORE</u></b>	<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>			<b><u>MA -AFTER</u></b>			
	22	50%	<b>55%</b>	33	75%	<b>85%</b>	
	5	11%	<b>13%</b>	2	5%	<b>5%</b>	
	4	9%	<b>10%</b>	2	5%	<b>5%</b>	
	9	20%	<b>23%</b>	2	5%	<b>5%</b>	
	4	9%	<b>100%</b>	5	11%	<b>100%</b>	
	<b>44</b>	<b>100%</b>			<b>100%</b>		

<b><u>KAIL - BEFORE</u></b>	<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>			<b><u>KAIL -AFTER</u></b>			
	12	24%	<b>67%</b>	40	82%	<b>93%</b>	
	0	0%	<b>0%</b>	0	0%	<b>0%</b>	
	0	0%	<b>0%</b>	0	0%	<b>0%</b>	
	6	12%	<b>33%</b>	3	6%	<b>7%</b>	
	31	63%	<b>100%</b>	6	12%	<b>100%</b>	
	<b>49</b>	<b>100%</b>			<b>100%</b>		

<b><u>BO - BEFORE</u></b>	<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>			<b><u>BO -AFTER</u></b>			
	18	38%	<b>60%</b>	36	77%	<b>77%</b>	
	1	2%	<b>3%</b>	2	4%	<b>4%</b>	
	2	4%	<b>7%</b>	2	4%	<b>4%</b>	
	9	19%	<b>30%</b>	7	15%	<b>15%</b>	
	17	36%	<b>100%</b>	0	0%	<b>100%</b>	
	<b>47</b>	<b>100%</b>			<b>100%</b>		

<u>F/TOWN - BEFORE</u>	<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>			<u>F/TOWN - AFTER</u>		
15	42%	<b>50%</b>		21	58%	<b>58%</b>
1	3%	<b>3%</b>		2	6%	<b>6%</b>
5	14%	<b>17%</b>		6	17%	<b>17%</b>
9	25%	<b>30%</b>		7	19%	<b>19%</b>
6	17%	<b>100%</b>		0	0%	<b>100%</b>
<b>36</b>	<b>100%</b>				<b>100%</b>	

<u>OF FEMALES - BEFORE</u>	<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>			<u>FEMALES - AFTER</u>		
1	5%	<b>25%</b>		17	81%	<b>89%</b>
0	0%	<b>0%</b>		1	5%	<b>5%</b>
1	5%	<b>25%</b>		0	0%	<b>0%</b>
2	10%	<b>50%</b>		1	5%	<b>5%</b>
17	81%	<b>100%</b>		2	10%	<b>100%</b>
<b>21</b>	<b>100%</b>				<b>100%</b>	

**14. DO YOU WANT TRC TO NAME NAMES?**

<u>FULL</u>	<u>BEFORE</u>		<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>		<u>AFTER</u>		<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>	
YES	53	30%	<b>44%</b>		72	41%	<b>44%</b>	
NO	41	23%	<b>34%</b>		75	43%	<b>46%</b>	
DK	26	15%	<b>22%</b>		16	9%	<b>10%</b>	
BLANK	56	32%	<b>100%</b>		13	7%	<b>100%</b>	
	<b>176</b>	<b>100%</b>			<b>176</b>	<b>100%</b>		

<u>OF RUF</u>	<u>BEFORE</u>		<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>		<u>AFTER</u>		<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>	
YES	30	28%	<b>44%</b>		48	45%	<b>49%</b>	
NO	21	20%	<b>31%</b>		41	39%	<b>42%</b>	
DK	17	16%	<b>25%</b>		8	8%	<b>8%</b>	
BLANK	38	36%	<b>100%</b>		9	8%	<b>100%</b>	
	<b>106</b>	<b>100%</b>			<b>106</b>	<b>100%</b>		

**15. HEARD OF SC?**

	<u>FULL</u>		<u>MAKENI</u>		<u>KAIL</u>		<u>BO</u>	<u>F/TOWN</u>	
YES	126	73%	41	93%	21	43%	33	31	86%
NO	47	27%	3	7%	28	57%	11	5	14%
	<b>173</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>100%</b>

**OF FEMALES**

YES	9	43%
NO	12	57%
	<b>21</b>	<b>100%</b>

**16. IF "YES", BY WHAT MEDIUM?**

	<u>MEDIUM ONLYSOURCE</u>		<u>ONE OF SEVERAL SOURCES</u>
RADIO	71	72%	17
RUMOUR	15	15%	9
COMMANDERS	3	3%	6
DDR	7	7%	7
TV	0	0%	6
NEWSPAPER	3	3%	13
WORKSHOP			4
UNAMSIL HRIGHTS OFFICE			1



**17. UNDERSTAND SC?**

<b>FULL</b>	<b>BEFORE</b>		<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>		<b>AFTER</b>		
YES	48	27%	<b>41%</b>		140	80%	<b>84%</b>
NO	60	34%	<b>51%</b>		21	12%	<b>13%</b>
DK	9	5%	<b>8%</b>		6	3%	<b>4%</b>
BLANK	59	34%	<b>100%</b>		9	5%	<b>100%</b>
	<b>176</b>	<b>100%</b>			<b>176</b>	<b>100%</b>	

**18. SUPPORT SC?**

<b>FULL</b>	<b>BEFORE</b>		<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>		<b>AFTER</b>		<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>
YES	69	39%	<b>59%</b>		132	75%	<b>79%</b>
NO	39	22%	<b>33%</b>		30	17%	<b>18%</b>
DK	9	5%	<b>8%</b>		6	3%	<b>4%</b>
BLANK	59	34%	<b>100%</b>		8	5%	<b>100%</b>
	<b>176</b>	<b>100%</b>			<b>176</b>	<b>100%</b>	

<b>OF RUF</b>	<b>BEFORE</b>		<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>		<b>AFTER</b>		<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>
YES	32	30%	<b>46%</b>		83	78%	<b>85%</b>
NO	31	29%	<b>44%</b>		13	12%	<b>13%</b>
DK	7	7%	<b>10%</b>		2	2%	<b>2%</b>
BLANK	36	34%	<b>100%</b>		8	8%	<b>100%</b>
	<b>106</b>	<b>100%</b>			<b>106</b>	<b>100%</b>	

<b>OF CDF</b>	<b>BEFORE</b>		<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>		<b>AFTER</b>		<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>
YES	33	59%	<b>89%</b>		42	75%	<b>75%</b>
NO	3	5%	<b>8%</b>		12	21%	<b>21%</b>
DK	1	2%	<b>3%</b>		2	4%	<b>4%</b>
BLANK	19	34%	<b>100%</b>		0	0%	<b>100%</b>
	<b>56</b>	<b>100%</b>			<b>56</b>	<b>100%</b>	

	<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>		<b>MA -AFTER</b>				
<b>MAKENI - BEFORE</b>	21	48%	<b>51%</b>		31	70%	<b>78%</b>
	18	41%	<b>44%</b>		7	16%	<b>18%</b>
	2	5%	<b>5%</b>		2	5%	<b>5%</b>
	3	7%	<b>100%</b>		4	9%	<b>100%</b>
	<b>44</b>	<b>100%</b>			<b>44</b>	<b>100%</b>	

	<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>		<b>KAIL -AFTER</b>				
<b>KAIL - BEFORE</b>	8	16%	<b>44%</b>		44	90%	<b>98%</b>
	6	12%	<b>33%</b>		1	2%	<b>2%</b>
	4	8%	<b>22%</b>		0	0%	<b>0%</b>
	31	63%	<b>100%</b>		4	8%	<b>100%</b>
	<b>49</b>	<b>100%</b>			<b>49</b>	<b>100%</b>	

	<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>		<b>BO -AFTER</b>				
<b>BO - BEFORE</b>	20	43%	<b>69%</b>		32	68%	<b>68%</b>
	6	13%	<b>21%</b>		11	23%	<b>23%</b>
	3	6%	<b>10%</b>		4	9%	<b>9%</b>
	18	38%	<b>100%</b>		0	0%	<b>100%</b>
	<b>47</b>	<b>100%</b>			<b>47</b>	<b>100%</b>	

<i>F/TOWN - BEFORE</i>	<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>			<i>BF/TOWN -AFTER</i>		
20	56%	<b>69%</b>		25	69%	<b>69%</b>
9	25%	<b>31%</b>		11	31%	<b>31%</b>
0	0%	<b>0%</b>		0	0%	<b>0%</b>
7	19%	<b>100%</b>		0	0%	<b>100%</b>
<b>36</b>	<b>100%</b>			<b>36</b>	<b>100%</b>	

<b>19. SC BRING JUSTICE?</b>	<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>			<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>		
<i>FULL</i>	<b>BEFORE</b>	<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>		<b>AFTER</b>	<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>	
YES	77	44%	<b>65%</b>	126	72%	<b>76%</b>
NO	26	15%	<b>22%</b>	15	9%	<b>9%</b>
DK	15	9%	<b>13%</b>	25	14%	<b>15%</b>
BLANK	58	33%	<b>100%</b>	10	6%	<b>100%</b>
	<b>176</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>176</b>	<b>100%</b>	

<i>OF RUF</i>	<b>BEFORE</b>	<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>		<b>AFTER</b>	<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>	
YES	40	38%	<b>56%</b>	74	70%	<b>77%</b>
NO	22	21%	<b>31%</b>	8	8%	<b>8%</b>
DK	9	8%	<b>13%</b>	14	13%	<b>15%</b>
BLANK	35	33%	<b>100%</b>	10	9%	<b>100%</b>
	<b>106</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>106</b>	<b>100%</b>	

<i>OF CDF</i>	<b>BEFORE</b>	<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>		<b>AFTER</b>	<b>OF POSITIVE RESPONSES</b>	
YES	34	61%	<b>92%</b>	44	79%	<b>79%</b>
NO	1	2%	<b>3%</b>	4	7%	<b>7%</b>
DK	2	4%	<b>5%</b>	8	14%	<b>14%</b>
BLANK	19	34%	<b>100%</b>	0	0%	<b>100%</b>
	<b>56</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>56</b>	<b>100%</b>	

**20. HOW MANY YOU THINK WILL BE TRIED BY SC?**

	<b>OF POSITIVE FULL RESPONSES</b>			<b>OF POSITIVE RUF RESPONSES</b>			<b>CDF</b>	
<50	28	16%	<b>24%</b>	17	16%	<b>25%</b>	10	<b>26%</b>
50<100	5	3%	<b>4%</b>	4	4%	<b>6%</b>	1	<b>3%</b>
100<1000	1	1%	<b>1%</b>	1	1%	<b>1%</b>	0	<b>0%</b>
1000+	8	5%	<b>7%</b>	2	2%	<b>3%</b>	4	<b>11%</b>
ALL	34	19%	<b>29%</b>	23	22%	<b>33%</b>	8	<b>21%</b>
DK	40	23%	<b>34%</b>	22	21%	<b>32%</b>	15	<b>39%</b>
BLANK	60	34%	<b>100%</b>	37	35%	<b>100%</b>	18	<b>100%</b>
	<b>176</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>106</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>56</b>	

**21. DO YOU THINK YOU WILL BE TRIED BY THE SC?**

<b>BEFORE</b>	<b>FULL</b>		<b>RUF</b>		<b>CDF</b>			
YES	16	9%	<b>14%</b>	8	8%	<b>12%</b>	5	<b>14%</b>
NO	70	40%	<b>60%</b>	39	37%	<b>57%</b>	27	<b>73%</b>
DK	30	17%	<b>26%</b>	22	21%	<b>32%</b>	5	<b>14%</b>
BLANK	60	34%	<b>100%</b>	37	35%	<b>100%</b>	19	<b>100%</b>
	<b>176</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>106</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>56</b>	
<b>AFTER</b>	<b>FULL</b>		<b>RUF</b>		<b>CDF</b>			
YES	33	19%	<b>20%</b>	14	13%	<b>15%</b>	17	<b>31%</b>
NO	108	61%	<b>65%</b>	66	62%	<b>69%</b>	32	<b>58%</b>
DK	24	14%	<b>15%</b>	16	15%	<b>17%</b>	6	<b>11%</b>
BLANK	11	6%	<b>100%</b>	10	9%	<b>100%</b>	1	<b>100%</b>
	<b>176</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>106</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>56</b>	

**22. AGREE TO GIVE EVIDENCE AGAINST YOUR COMRADES OR COMMANDERS?**

<b>BEFORE</b>	<b>FULL</b>			<b>RUF</b>			<b>CDF</b>	
YES	43	24%	<b>37%</b>	19	18%	<b>27%</b>	21	<b>58%</b>
NO	48	27%	<b>42%</b>	33	31%	<b>46%</b>	13	<b>36%</b>
DK	24	14%	<b>21%</b>	19	18%	<b>27%</b>	2	<b>6%</b>
BLANK	61	35%	<b>100%</b>	35	33%	<b>100%</b>	20	<b>100%</b>
	<b>176</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>106</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>56</b>	

<b>AFTER</b>	<b>FULL</b>			<b>RUF</b>			<b>CDF</b>	
YES	75	43%	<b>46%</b>	52	49%	<b>55%</b>	18	<b>32%</b>
NO	71	40%	<b>44%</b>	31	29%	<b>33%</b>	33	<b>59%</b>
DK	17	10%	<b>10%</b>	11	10%	<b>12%</b>	5	<b>9%</b>
BLANK	13	7%	<b>100%</b>	12	11%	<b>100%</b>	0	<b>100%</b>
	<b>176</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>106</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>18</b>	

**23. THINK SC ABLE TO PROVIDE WITNESS PROTECTION?**

<b>BEFORE</b>	<b>FULL</b>			<b>RUF</b>			<b>CDF</b>	
YES	46	26%	<b>39%</b>	21	20%	<b>30%</b>	20	<b>54%</b>
NO	30	17%	<b>26%</b>	19	18%	<b>27%</b>	10	<b>27%</b>
DK	41	23%	<b>35%</b>	30	28%	<b>43%</b>	7	<b>19%</b>
BLANK	59	34%	<b>100%</b>	36	34%	<b>100%</b>	19	<b>100%</b>
	<b>176</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>106</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>56</b>	

<b>AFTER</b>	<b>FULL</b>			<b>RUF</b>			<b>CDF</b>	
YES	93	53%	<b>57%</b>	51	48%	<b>54%</b>	35	<b>63%</b>
NO	31	18%	<b>19%</b>	20	19%	<b>21%</b>	9	<b>16%</b>
DK	40	23%	<b>24%</b>	23	22%	<b>24%</b>	12	<b>21%</b>
BLANK	12	7%	<b>100%</b>	12	11%	<b>100%</b>	0	<b>100%</b>
	<b>176</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>106</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>56</b>	

**OF FEMALES**

	<b>BEFORE</b>			<b>AFTER</b>		
YES	1	5%	<b>13%</b>	12	57%	<b>63%</b>
NO	4	19%	<b>50%</b>	5	24%	<b>26%</b>
DK	3	14%	<b>38%</b>	2	10%	<b>11%</b>
BLANK	13	62%	<b>100%</b>	2	10%	<b>100%</b>
	<b>21</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>21</b>	<b>100%</b>	

**24. HOW WILL THE TRC AND SC WORK TOGETHER?**

	<b>FULL</b>			<b>RUF</b>			<b>CDF</b>	
<b>FIREWALL</b>	29	16%	<b>19%</b>	13	12%	<b>15%</b>	14	<b>29%</b>
<b>TRC INVESTIG</b>								
<b>AND GIVE INFO</b>	52	30%	<b>34%</b>	24	23%	<b>27%</b>	20	<b>42%</b>
DK	70	40%	<b>46%</b>	52	49%	<b>58%</b>	14	<b>29%</b>
BLANK	25	14%	<b>100%</b>	17	16%	<b>100%</b>	8	<b>100%</b>
	<b>176</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>106</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>56</b>	

**25. TRC AND SC WORK IN THE INTERESTS OF THE GOVERNMENT?**

<b>BEFORE</b>	<b>FULL</b>			<b>RUF</b>			<b>CDF</b>	
YES	71	40%	<b>46%</b>	34	32%	<b>37%</b>	31	<b>65%</b>
NO	32	18%	<b>21%</b>	21	20%	<b>23%</b>	10	<b>21%</b>
DK	51	29%	<b>33%</b>	37	35%	<b>40%</b>	7	<b>15%</b>
BLANK	22	13%	<b>100%</b>	14	13%	<b>100%</b>	8	<b>100%</b>
	<b>176</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>106</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>56</b>	

	AFTER	FULL		RUF		CDF		
YES	95	54%	<b>58%</b>	54	51%	<b>57%</b>	31	<b>56%</b>
NO	42	24%	<b>26%</b>	23	22%	<b>24%</b>	17	<b>31%</b>
DK	27	15%	<b>16%</b>	18	17%	<b>19%</b>	7	<b>13%</b>
BLANK	11	6%	<b>100%</b>	10	10%	<b>100%</b>	1	<b>100%</b>
	<b>175</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>105</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>56</b>	

NOTE, ONE RUF (KA:35) RESPONSE:

**"WILL WORK IN INTEREST OF UN"**

**26. DO YOU WANT REPARATIONS FOR VICTIMS?**

	BEFORE	FULL		RUF		CDF		
YES	125	71%	<b>79%</b>	72	68%	<b>79%</b>	43	<b>80%</b>
NO	15	9%	<b>9%</b>	6	6%	<b>7%</b>	6	<b>11%</b>
DK	19	11%	<b>12%</b>	13	12%	<b>14%</b>	5	<b>9%</b>
BLANK	17	10%	<b>100%</b>	15	14%	<b>100%</b>	2	<b>100%</b>
	<b>176</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>106</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>56</b>	

	AFTER	FULL		RUF		CDF		
YES	135	77%	<b>81%</b>	78	74%	<b>81%</b>	45	<b>80%</b>
NO	17	10%	<b>10%</b>	9	8%	<b>9%</b>	6	<b>11%</b>
DK	14	8%	<b>8%</b>	9	8%	<b>9%</b>	5	<b>9%</b>
BLANK	10	6%	<b>100%</b>	10	9%	<b>100%</b>	0	<b>100%</b>
	<b>176</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>106</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>56</b>	

**27. IF "YES", WHO SHOULD PAY?**

	BEFORE	FULL		RUF		CDF	
GOV'T	27	23%		11	16%		14
INTER.COMMUN	41	35%		23	34%		14
EX-COS	4	3%		2	3%		2
G,I	28	24%		23	34%		3
G,X	1	1%		1	1%		0
G,I,X	7	6%		5	7%		2
DK	10	8%		2	3%		4
	<b>118</b>	<b>100%</b>			<b>100%</b>		

**28. AMNESTY**

**A. COVERS WHICH FACTION?**

	FULL		RUF		CDF	
RUF	12	7%	8	8%	2	4%
CDF	14	8%	4	4%	8	14%
AFRC	2	1%	0	0%	1	2%
ECOMOG	2	1%	1	1%	1	2%
R&C	10	6%	4	4%	5	9%
R&A	6	3%	2	2%	2	4%
R&E	1	1%	1	1%	0	0%
C&A	2	1%	0	0%	1	2%
C&E	12	7%	3	3%	9	16%
A&E	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
R&C&A	18	10%	14	13%	2	4%
R&C&E	1	1%	1	1%	0	0%
R&A&E	2	1%	2	2%	0	0%
C&A&E	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
R&C&A&E	26	15%	21	20%	3	5%
DK	50	28%	30	28%	19	34%
BLANK	18	10%	15	14%	3	5%
	<b>176</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>106</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>100%</b>

**B. WHICH RANK(S)?**

	FULL			RUF			CDF		
OFFICERS	21	12%	13%	12	11%	13%	7	13%	
OTHER RANKS	8	5%	5%	3	3%	3%	4	7%	
CHILD SOLDIERS	24	14%	15%	12	11%	13%	9	17%	
ALL	46	26%	29%	31	30%	35%	11	20%	
ALL BUT OFFICERS	12	7%	8%	3	3%	3%	6	11%	
DK	45	26%	29%	28	27%	31%	17	31%	
BLANK	19	11%	100%	16	15%	100%	2	100%	
	<b>175</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>105</b>	<b>100%</b>		56		

**C. WHICH COURT(S)?**

	FULL			RUF			CDF		
SPECIAL COURT	56	32%	37%	29	28%	34%	19	36%	
SLEAN COURT	14	8%	9%	7	7%	8%	7	13%	
BOTH	9	5%	6%	3	3%	3%	5	9%	
DK	73	42%	48%	47	45%	55%	22	42%	
BLANK	23	13%	100%	19	18%	100%	3	100%	
	<b>175</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>105</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>56</b>		

**D. WHAT DATES?**

	FULL			RUF			CDF		
1991-11/96	10	6%	7%	7	7%	8%	2	4%	
1991-7/99	19	11%	12%	10	9%	11%	7	14%	
1991-PRESENT	24	14%	16%	10	9%	11%	12	24%	
11/96-7/99	15	9%	10%	10	9%	11%	4	8%	
11/96-PRESENT	10	6%	7%	5	5%	6%	3	6%	
DK	75	43%	49%	47	44%	53%	22	44%	
BLANK	22	13%	100%	17	16%	100%	5	100%	
	<b>175</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>106</b>	<b>100%</b>		55		

**29. DO YOU THINK YOU'VE DONE ANYTHING WRONG?**

BEFORE	FULL			RUF			CDF		
YES	27	15%	17%	15	14%	16%	9	17%	
NO	118	67%	75%	69	65%	75%	39	75%	
DK	13	7%	8%	8	8%	9%	4	8%	
BLANK	18	10%	100%	14	13%	100%	4	100%	
	<b>176</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>106</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>56</b>		

AFTER	FULL			RUF			CDF		
YES	25	14%	15%	16	15%	17%	5	9%	
NO	129	73%	78%	74	70%	77%	46	84%	
DK	11	6%	7%	6	6%	6%	4	7%	
BLANK	11	6%	100%	10	9%	100%	1	100%	
	<b>176</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>106</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>56</b>		

**30. IF "YES"**

BEFORE	FULL	% OF YES	RUF	% OF YES	CDF
Want ask forgiveness	24	89%	13	87%	9
Feel Sh. B punished	4	15%	4	27%	0

AFTER	FULL	% OF YES	RUF	% OF YES	CDF
Want ask forgiveness	24	96%	16	100%	5
Feel Sh. B punished	6	24%	4	25%	1

**Annex 5: Pre-Session Questionnaire**

**DEAR SIR OR MADAM, THANK YOU FOR YOUR KIND PARTICIPATION.**

**PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS BY WRITING AN “X” IN ONE OF THE ANSWER BOXES PROVIDED;  
OR WHERE THERE IS A LINE TO WRITE ON, PLEASE WRITE A SHORT, APPROPRIATE ANSWER.  
THANK YOU,**

**PRIDE EXECUTIVE.**

**Identification**

**Session Location:** \_\_\_\_\_ **Participant “Super Number”:**\_\_\_\_\_.

**Characteristics**

1. Are you Male  Female
2. Which faction are you from? (you may list more than one) \_\_\_\_\_.
3. Which district do you hail from? \_\_\_\_\_.
4. What was/is your rank? \_\_\_\_\_.
5. Did you join your faction voluntarily or were you forced to join? \_\_\_\_\_.
6. When did you join, please give month and year? \_\_\_\_\_.

**Section 1**

7. Have you heard about the TRC? Yes  No   
If “Yes”, where from: Radio  Rumours  Commanders  DDR  TV   
Newspapers  ; Other \_\_\_\_\_.

**IF “NO”, DO NOT ANSWER ANY MORE QUESTIONS FROM “SECTION 1”  
MOVE ON TO “SECTION 2”.**

8. Do you feel you understand the TRC? Yes  No  Don't Know

9. Do you support the TRC? Yes  No  Don't Know   
If you do, why do you? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
If you don't, why don't you? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

10. Do you think the TRC will bring reconciliation to the people of Sierra Leone?  
Yes  No  Don't Know

11. Would you be willing to testify before the TRC? Yes  No  Don't Know

12. How do you think the TRC will affect your ability to reintegrate into your  
community? It will: Help  Hurt  Have no effect  I Don't know

13. Do you think the TRC should list witnesses' and victims' names in its final report?

Yes  No  Don't Know

### Section 2

14. Have you heard about the Special Court (SC)? Yes  No   
If "Yes", where from: Radio  Rumours  Commanders  DDR  TV   
Newspapers  Other \_\_\_\_\_.

**IF "NO", DO NOT ANSWER ANY MORE QUESTIONS FROM "SECTION 2"  
MOVE ON TO "SECTION 3".**

15. Do you feel you understand the SC? Yes  No  Don't Know

16. Do you support the SC? Yes  No  Don't Know

If you do, why do you? \_\_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_  
If you don't, why don't you? \_\_\_\_\_.

17. Do you think the SC will bring justice to the people of Sierra Leone?

Yes  No  Don't Know

18. Who do you think will be tried by the SC? You may tick as many of the following as you want: RUF  CDF  AFRC  ECOMOG

Government  British  UN  Don't know  Other \_\_\_\_\_.

19. How many people do you think the SC will indict? Fewer than 50  51-100   
101-1000  More than 1000  All fighters  Don't know

20. Do you think you will be indicted by the SC? Yes  No  Don't Know

21. Would you be willing to testify against your comrades or your commanders before the SC? Yes  No  Don't Know

22. Do you think the SC could guarantee you protection if you were a witness?

Yes  No  Don't Know

23. How many people do you personally think the SC SHOULD indict?

Fewer than 50  51-100  101-1000  More than 1000

All fighters  Don't know

### Section 3

24. What do you think will be the relationship between the TRC and the SC?

They will be totally independent from each other

The TRC will be the investigating arm of the SC  Don't know

25. Do you think the TRC and SC will be independent from the Government?

Yes  No  Don't Know

24. Do you think there should be compensation for victims? Yes  No   
Don't Know

**If "YES",** who do you think should pay for it: (tick as many as you want)

GoSL  International Community  Ex-Combatants  Don't know

25. Which faction(s) do you think The Amnesty protects? (Tick as many of the following as want) RUF  ;CDF  ;AFRC  ;ECOMOG  ; Don't Know

Who does it protect? Rank& File  ;Child Soldiers  ;Everyone  ;Don't Know

From which Court(s)? SC  Sierra Leonean Court  Don't Know

For crimes committed between which dates?: '91-11/96  '91-7/99

'91-present  11/96-7/99  11/96-present  Don't know

26. Do you think you've done anything wrong? Yes  No  Don't Know

**If "YES",** Do you want to ask for forgiveness? Yes  No  Don't Know

Do you think you should be punished for it? Yes  No  Don't Know



**Annex 6: Post-Session Questionnaire**

**DEAR SIR OR MADAM, THANK YOU FOR YOUR KIND PARTICIPATION.**

**PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS BY WRITING AN “X” IN ONE OF THE ANSWER BOXES PROVIDED;  
OR WHERE THERE IS A LINE TO WRITE ON, PLEASE WRITE A SHORT, APPROPRIATE ANSWER.  
THANK YOU,**

**PRIDE EXECUTIVE.**

**Identification**

**Session Location:**

**Participant “Super Number”:**\_\_\_\_\_.

**Section 1**

8. Do you feel you understand the TRC? Yes  No  Don't Know

9. Do you support the TRC? Yes  No  Don't Know

If you do, why do you? \_\_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_.

If you don't, why don't you? \_\_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_.

10. Do you think the TRC will bring reconciliation to the people of Sierra Leone?  
Yes  No  Don't Know

11. Would you be willing to testify before the TRC? Yes  No  Don't Know

12. How do you think the TRC will affect your ability to reintegrate into your  
community? It will: Help  Hurt  Have no effect  I Don't know

13. Do you think the TRC should list witnesses' and victims' names in its final report?  
Yes  No  Don't Know

**Section 2**

15. Do you feel you understand the SC? Yes  No  Don't Know

16. Do you support the SC? Yes  No  Don't Know

If you do, why do you? \_\_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_.

If you don't, why don't you? \_\_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_.

17. Do you think the SC will bring justice to the people of Sierra Leone?

Yes  No  Don't Know

20. Do you think you will be indicted by the SC? Yes  No  Don't Know

21. Would you be willing to testify against your comrades or your commanders before the SC? Yes  No  Don't Know

22. Do you think the SC could guarantee you protection if you were a witness?  
Yes  No  Don't Know

23. How many people do you personally think the SC SHOULD indict?  
Fewer than 50  51-100  101-1000  More than 1000   
All fighters  Don't know

### **Section 3**

25. Do you think the TRC and SC will be independent from the Government?  
Yes  No  Don't Know

24. Do you think there should be compensation for victims? Yes  No   
Don't Know

**If "YES", who do you think should pay for it: (tick as many as you want)**

GoSL  International Community  Ex-Combatants  Don't know

26. Do you think you've done anything wrong? Yes  No  Don't Know

**If "YES", Do you want to ask for forgiveness? Yes  No  Don't Know**

Do you think you should be punished for it? Yes  No  Don't Know

## **Annex 7: Notes on Focus Group Discussions**

Whereas the focus groups in Bo and Freetown were comprised mainly of CDF, the ones in Kailahun and Makeni were comprised mainly of RUF. The main purpose of these notes is to show (1) the complex attitude of ex-combatants regarding information sharing and (2) rank differentiation.

### **Makeni Focus Group: 10 Commanders**

#### **1: What is your biggest concern about the TRC?**

- The fact that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court will be operating almost simultaneously will discourage fellow ex-combatants from participating. Even if they truly independent from each other we will not participate. (4)<sup>30</sup>
- The Truth and Reconciliation Commission should take into account that most ex-combatants were victims as well as perpetrators. (2)
- If someone lies about my involvement in atrocities, and I don't have witnesses to exonerate me, I may be obstructed in finding a job and may be fined or sentenced. Will the TRC grant me compensation if it later establishes that I was right? (2)
- I don't think that the TRC is going to be truly independent, because the government of Sierra Leone's involvement in its operations. (2)

#### **2: What is your biggest concern about the Special Court?**

- I know that the RUF would be targeted more than any other faction because of their long involvement in the conflict. The Court should either prosecute every fighter or nobody. (5)
- The Special Court is too early; it might hinder the peace. If I know I will be indicted I will flee with my trade to the war next door. (3)
- I hate the Special Court and I am against it.

#### **3: What is the most important thing for ex-combatants to know about the TRC?**

- That the Truth and Reconciliation Commission is trying to create a forum where victims and perpetrators would talk things over.
- That they should not fear the Truth and Reconciliation Commission because even if they face the Commission and are later indicted, they will not be jailed by the government of Sierra Leone.
- That the Truth and Reconciliation Commission is looking for the truth.
- I don't trust either institution (the TRC or the SC) as long as they will be working simultaneously.

#### **4: What is the most important thing for ex-combatants to be told about the SC?**

- That the Special Court cannot invoke the death penalty and those convicted will not be jailed by the government of Sierra Leone.
- The Special Court is for every faction.
- Ex-combatants should be ready for anything as long as it is for peace.

---

<sup>30</sup> Four members of this group took this view.

(Most were reluctant to respond to this question as they were apprehensive of the Special Court.)

**5: In your personal opinion, what can the TRC do to most effectively contribute towards the peace and reconciliation in Sierra Leone?**

- The Truth and Reconciliation Commission should try to work without the government's involvement.
- It should try to educate ex-combatants about its activities.
- It should provide enough security for those willing to testify.
- It should treat ex-combatants with care, as some of them are victims as well as perpetrators.
- Education on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission should go to chiefdom level so that even the layman will be ready for it.
- The Special Court should be truly independent from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

***Information sharing***

- **On the firewall model**

*About half of the commanders in this Focus Groups said that even under a firewall model, where there would be no information sharing between the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court, they would still refuse testify in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, because of the lack of trust that the government of Sierra Leone would not involve the proceedings of the Special Court. General lack of support for the Special Court, and the fact the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court will be operating almost simultaneously, seemed to be contributing factors to this reluctance.*

**6: Does the firewall model affect how you personally feel about the TRC?**

- We think the TRC would succeed if really it were so. (6)
- We think the TRC will not have that maximum cooperation from ex-combatants because of the timing of both institutions. (4)

**7: Does the information-sharing model affect whether you would be willing to give a statement to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission?**

- We will not do so voluntarily; no matter which system is adopted we still don't believe there would be no information sharing, for the mere fact that both institutions would be operating almost the same time. (4)
- We will voluntarily give testimonies to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and cooperate with it if there were really no information sharing. (5)
- I am still skeptical because of the timing of both institutions. (1)

**8: Does the fact that the Special Court will try only 25–30 people encourage you to change their mind about giving a statement to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission?**

- Our feelings are still unchanged.

- **On the inculpatory model**

*The majority of ex-combatants in the focus group thought that this model is partial and biased towards them. They thought that this is a move to satisfy the victims, which really is not the essence of the TRC. To know the truth about the war, the TRC needs to know the ex-combatants' story. They therefore did not support nor would they voluntarily testify to the TRC. One even said he would avoid the TRC altogether.*

- **On the exculpatory model**

*Some of the ex-combatants in this focus group said they would prefer this model but still feel skeptical because of the timing of the institutions. Others still consider it partial and in fact they do not believe that such a model could be implemented. However, if it could be implemented, they would prefer this model over the other models, apart from the firewall.*

- **On the free flow model**

*In general the ex-combatants did not respond well to the suggestion of a free flow model and said they will not cooperate with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. They expressed a preference for a firewall model while not minding an exculpatory model.*

### **Makeni Focus Group: 10 Rank-and-file**

*Most junior ranks in Makeni were very enthusiastic about both institutions and pledged to give their support. There were only one or two who expressed skepticism in their responses. These were later alleged to have been attached to very senior commanders during the conflict.*

#### **1: What is your biggest concern about the TRC?**

- We support the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and pledged cooperate with it. (7)
- Some are afraid that they might be subject to protracted visitation by the Commission's officials.
- We want to be guaranteed witness protection. (7)
- We think the Truth and Reconciliation Commission should come first, before the Special Court, because by so doing it will have more people to indict.
- What will be the fate of those who confess to or testify about grave crimes after the Special Court has completed its indictment process? (PRIDE informed the ex-combatants that by the time the Truth and Reconciliation Commission would have completed its operations, the Special Court would not even have indicted half of those it may seek to indict.)

#### **2: What is your biggest concern about the Special Court?**

- The number of those to be tried is too small. We suggest that the number be increased to at least 50. This is the biggest concern about the Special Court. (The ex-combatants agreed to this minimum number after PRIDE explained to them the reasons for setting the number at 25–30.)
- What if those indicted flee before being arrested to the conflict in Liberia until the end of the Special Court's mandate?

#### **3: What is the most important thing for ex-combatants to know about the TRC?**

- The Truth and Reconciliation Commission is not a court and will not prosecute anyone, including particularly junior ex-combatants.
- This is the best thing for Sierra Leone and the peace process.
- The Truth and Reconciliation Commission will let people know that not all ex-combatants were bad people, but that many were forced to do some of what they did.

**4: What is the most important thing for ex-combatants to be told about the SC?**

- The Special Court will let people know who exactly who is responsible for the atrocities of the war.
- Those bearing greatest responsibility for the war should be held accountable and punished.

**5: In your opinion, what can the TRC do to most effectively contribute towards the peace and reconciliation in Sierra Leone?**

- The TRC should conduct interviews with junior ex-combatants to know what really happened and to establish who are the real perpetrators.
- The TRC should approach these ex-combatants in cordial and encouraging manner to get the real story.
- The TRC should sensitize victims all over the country to know what their work is about and to accept the outcome.

***Information sharing***

**6: Does the model of information sharing adopted by the TRC and the SC affect how you feel about the TRC?**

- We think the TRC should share information with the Special Court in order to get those most responsible. (majority)
- We think the TRC would be “up to something” if they did not share information.

*This group all supported a free flow model of information sharing and promised to give statements to the TRC under this model. They want those responsible to be brought to justice (and do not think that they themselves will be indicted by the Special Court).*

**Bo Focus Group: 10 Commanders**

**1: What is your biggest concern about the TRC?**

- The TRC should not work in collaboration with the Special Court.
- The TRC should provide protection for ex-combatants willing to give testimonies.

**2: What is your biggest concern about the Special Court?**

- A majority of ex-combatants do not view the Special Court as essential. They say the Special Court would only incite another rebellion as most people would flee to Liberia and await their time to stage another rebellion like Foday Sankoh did.
- There should be specific number of those to be indicted. The Special Court should be certain about the number to be indicted.

**3: What is the most important thing for ex-combatants to know about the TRC?**

- The TRC is a perfect avenue to reconcile with victims.

**4: What is the most important thing for ex-combatants to be told about the SC?**

- The Special Court is not essential especially it is going to target all the factions involved in the conflict. (The ex-combatants in this focus group consider themselves above the Special Court because they fought to protect their homeland. Whatever they did was for the general good of all. That was the price people should pay for peace.)

**5: In your opinion, what can the TRC do to most effectively contribute towards the peace and reconciliation in Sierra Leone?**

- The TRC should sensitize and educate the public well about its operation.
- The TRC should train ex-combatants to be involved in the education and sensitization of the ex-combatants.
- The TRC should provide protection for those willing to give testimonies.
- The TRC should be independent of the Special Court and the Government of Sierra Leone.

***Information sharing***

- **On the firewall model**

*The persons in this focus group do not want the Special Court because they do not think it is essential; however, if there is going to be strictly independent from each other, they would support the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.*

**6: Does the model of information-sharing adopted affect how you feel about the Truth and Reconciliation Commission?**

- The entire focus group said it would support and give testimonies to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission if this model is adopted.

**7: Does the information-sharing model affect whether you, personally, would be willing to give a statement to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission?**

- We would support and give testimonies to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission because of this model.

**8: Does the fact that the Special Court will try only 25–30 people encourage you to change your mind about giving a statement to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission?**

- We do not care about the number because it might rise if there is strong evidence given to the TRC in order for someone to be indicted, as long as there is no definite number of those to be indicted.
- We would support the TRC only if this model is used.

- **On the inculpatory model**

Persons in this group do not support this model and would not give testimonies to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. However, there was one person who supported this model because he thinks that the defence and prosecutor should have equal rights. A majority think this model is designed to target ex-combatants more over the victims.

- **On the exculpatory model**

The majority of persons in this group, bar one, supported this model as an alternative to the firewall and said they would be willing to give a statement to the TRC if this model were to be adopted. The single person who voiced a different opinion wants all to have equal rights for both the defendants and the complainants.

- **On the free flow model**

Under this model, the members of this focus group said that they would not give testimony to the TRC. They see this as a ploy to indict more ex-combatants people in the Special Court. They see the TRC as an investigative arm of the Special Court in such a scenario.

### **Bo Focus Group: 10 Rank-and-file**

#### **1: What is your biggest concern about the TRC?**

- Some of the ex-combatants will need protection from victims when giving their testimonies. (3)
- The TRC will be the investigative arm of the Special Court, which would hinder the success of the TRC. (4)
- The TRC will be important for ex-combatants who want to tell their story and ask for forgiveness from their victims.

#### **2: What is your biggest concern about the Special Court?**

- Some of my comrades will be induced to support their commanders if they are indicted in the Special Court. (3)
- The Special Court will not be able to get those indicted to actually face the court.
- Some “junior boys” are still idle and their commanders still wield considerable influence over them. Therefore, if any of these commanders were indicted, their boys would not like it and would cause disruption. This might lead to further problems in the country.

#### **3: What is the most important thing for ex-combatants to know about the TRC?**

- They should be told the exact relationship between the TRC and the Special Court.
- They should be told that it is good to participate with the TRC because it is creating an avenue of reconciliation between ex-combatants and victims.

#### **4: What is the most important thing for ex-combatants to be told about the SC?**

- The Special Court would be targeting only those responsible and not the junior rank and file. These juniors should not let their former commander influence them.
- The Special Court exists to consolidate the peace and to bring justice to those who have suffered.

#### **5: In your opinion, what can the TRC do to most effectively contribute towards the peace and reconciliation in Sierra Leone?**



- The TRC should advocate for more jobs for the ex-combatants to get them involved meaningfully. If ex-combatants were gainfully employed, they would be less vulnerable to their commanders.
- The TRC should recommend that certain areas and people be compensated for the war.

### ***Information sharing***

- **On the firewall model**

*Some of the persons in this group supported this model, arguing that both institutions should develop independently and should each do their own investigations.*

- **On the inculpatory model**

*They do not support this model lest one of them is indicted in the SC.*

- **On the exculpatory model**

*Almost all of the support this model and would give testimonies in the TRC.*

- **On the free flow model**

*They do not support this model.*

*The ex-combatants in this group wanted a firewall and would prefer exculpatory model as an alternative. The majority of them say they would still give testimony under another model but are afraid that their comrades who are still under the yoke of their commanders would be induced to obstruct the TRC and the SC. In general, they want the TRC to advocate for more jobs for them, in order to make them self-reliant. Then the TRC and the SC could work to identify those responsible without fear of other ranks backing their commanders even if these are indicted.*

### **Kailahun Focus Group: Commanders**

#### **1: What is your biggest concern about the TRC?**

- What if the amnesty is challenged after confession?
- Will the TRC lead me to the SC?
- How will I live in my community after the confession?
- How guaranteed is witness protection?

*Therefore, greatest concerns are amnesty and witness protection.*

#### **2: What is the biggest concern about the Special Court?**

- If indictments begin, then there may be a bulk of ex-cos who flee to Liberia, and given that there is conflict/war there, this may incite new conflict in SL. The refuge in Liberia may incite new war in SL.
- Would like to see tighter security on the borders.

- How will the prosecutor get information that will prevent him from being biased?

**3: What is the most important thing for ex-combatants to be told about the TRC?**

- TRC is for peace and only for peace.
- When you go to participate in the TRC, you should accept your wrongdoing and not develop a grudge after the confession.

**4: What is the most important thing for ex-combatants to be told about the SC?**

- SC is for a chosen few, have no fear.

**5: In your personal opinion, what can the TRC do to most effectively contribute to peace and reconciliation in SL?**

- Victim compensation will help forgiveness.
- Witness protection.
- Ensure that blanket amnesty is not challenged.
- TRC should not encourage false testimony.

***Information sharing***

- **On the firewall model**

**6: Does the information sharing model affect how they, personally, feel about the TRC?**

*All of the Kailahun commanders were more supportive of the TRC if there was a firewall model. They will be more willing to participate in the TRC with a firewall.*

**7: Would information sharing model affect whether they would give info to the TRC?**

- Yes, they are more willing to talk knowing that the info won't be used against them or to make them witnesses.
- **On the exculpatory model**  
Supported as well because it is going to prove innocence.
- **On the inculpatory model**  
Were against this model because may be giving information against themselves.

**8: What if you knew that only 30 people were to be indicted by the SC? Will this affect your attitude in speaking to the TRC?**

- This does not change our mind on being against this sort of model. The same fear remains.
- **On the free flow model**
  - Most are against this model.
  - With this model the TRC will not be successful- nobody will talk about this.
  - Fear of sending one self and colleagues to SC.
  - The small amount of people tried in SC will not affect their attitude towards this model.

**9: Which model do you prefer? (in order of preference)**

- 1) Firewall
- 2) Exculpatory
- 3) Inculpatory
- 4) Freeflow

**10: If there is to be a free flow model, what is your biggest concern of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission?**

- Support declines, because the TRC is then seen as an investigating arm of the SC.

**11: What is the biggest concern about the SC if there is a free flow?**

- There is a fear that the SC will be biased.

**12: If there is free flow, what is the most important thing for ex-combatants to be told about TRC**

- We should advise about the free-flow and then warn against it.
- TRC will not send anyone to jail, but should beware of the SC.

**13: What is the most important thing for ex-combatants to be told about SC?**

- Have no fear, it is for the big guys.

**Kailahun Focus Groups: Rank-and-File**

**1: What is your biggest concern about the TRC?**

- Witness protection.
- Amnesty Challenge.
- Concerns about fine money for false testimony- where is it going? OK if it goes to war victims.

**2: What is the biggest concern about the Special Court?**

- Concern about the temporal jurisdiction. Fear of the jurisdiction going back to 1991 instead of staying with 1996. Fear that the number of indictments will increase.
- Timing problems. If indictments begin, then a bulk of ex-combatants may flee to Liberia, and given that there is conflict/war there, this may incite new conflict in SL. The refuge in Liberia may incite new war in SL.

**3: What is the most important thing for ex-combatants to be told about the TRC?**

- TRC is for peace and only for peace.
- Be honest, accept fault, apologize.

**4: What is the most important thing for ex-combatants to be told about the SC?**

- SC is for a chosen few, those who bear the greatest responsibility, therefore have no fear.
- We should support the number of 30 as an upper limit of those indicted.

**5: In your personal opinion, what can the TRC do to most effectively contribute to peace and reconciliation in SL?**

- Sensitize the local community for effective integration.
- Support victims in terms of compensation.
- Include ex-combatants in the TRC as staff.

***Information sharing***

- **On the firewall model**

**6: Does the information sharing model affect how you, personally, feel about the TRC?**

*All of the rank and file were more supportive of the TRC if there was a firewall model. They will be more willing to participate in the TRC with a firewall.*

- The TRC is for peace and reconciliation- this model works with it.

**7: Would information sharing model affect whether they would give info to the TRC?**

- Yes, they are more willing to talk knowing that the information will not be used against them or to make them witnesses.

- **On the exculpatory model**

- Supported as well because it is going to prove innocence.

- **On the inculpatory model**

- Were against this model because may be giving information against themselves.
- None will testify.

**8: What if you knew that only 30 people are to be indicted by the SC? Will this affect your attitude in speaking to the TRC?**

- This does not change our mind on being against this sort of model. The same fear remains.
- **On the free flow model**
  - Most against this model.
  - With this model the TRC will not be successful- nobody will talk about this.
  - Fear of being called as a material witness.
  - The small amount of people tried in SC will not affect their attitude towards this model.

**9: Which model do you prefer? (in order of preference)**

- 1) Firewall
- 1) Exculpatory
- 2) Inculpatory
- 3) Free flow

**10: If there is going to be a free flow model, what is your biggest concern regarding the Truth and Reconciliation Commission?**

- Support declines and they will go in exile if there is free flow.

**11: What is the biggest concern about the SC if there is a free flow of information?**

- The SC will cause the TRC not to be successful.

**12. If there is free flow, what is the most important thing for ex-combatants to be told about Truth and Reconciliation Commission?**

- Don't participate.

**13. If there is free flow, what is the most important thing for ex-combatants to be told about SC?**

- Make sure the indictments won't exceed 30.

**Freetown Focus Group: Commanders**

**1: What is your biggest concern about the TRC?**

- Relationship between TRC and SC in terms of information sharing.
- Witness protection.
- Will the victim forgive me?
- What are the human rights abuses the TRC is looking into?

**2: What is the biggest concern about the Special Court?**

- Some people who may have a grudge will think the SC is a witch-hunt.
- The time for the temporal jurisdiction is too short, worst crimes took place before 1996.
- Where will the penitentiary be located?

**3: What is the most important thing for ex-combatants to be told about the TRC?**

- TRC is a commission, not a court.
- Focus on the operation mechanism of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
- TRC will strike a compromise between them and the victims.

**4: What is the most important thing for ex-combatants to be told about the SC?**

- International community is involved, so there will be no bias.
- Tell them the criteria of the crimes- widespread and systematic.
- Not for everybody- a chosen few.

**5: In your personal opinion, what can the TRC do to most effectively contribute to peace and reconciliation in SL?**

- Sensitize the local community for effective integration.
- TRC can not be successful without the cooperation of the ex-combatants.
- TRC should visit amputee camps and pay more attention to them.
- Local chiefs should talk to community to accept ex-combatants back.
- Ask everyone to forgive.

***Information sharing***

- **On the firewall model**

**6: Does the information-sharing model affect how they, personally, feel about the TRC?**  
*Seven are against it, four are for it, and 1 was in-between. They recommend that 25-30 is too small a number to indict. They say they will testify.*

**7: Would information sharing model affect whether they would give info to the TRC?**

- Will testify. They perceive themselves as innocent and say they were protecting their communities.
- **On the exculpatory model**
- All are against it.
- **On the inculpatory model**
- Nine are for this, two against.

**8: What if you knew that only 30 people are going to be indicted before the SC? Will this affect your attitude in speaking to the TRC?**

- They will still give information.
- **On the free flow model**
- All for it.

**9: Which model do you prefer? (in order of preference)**

- 1) Free flow
- 2) Inculpatory
- 3) Exculpatory
- 4) Firewall

**10: If there would be a free flow model, what is your biggest concern of the TRC?**

- This would work in interest of everybody.

**11: What is the biggest concern about the SC if there is a free flow of information sharing?**

- The temporal jurisdiction should be from March 23, 1991.
- At least 50 people should be indicted.

**12. If there is free flow of information, what is the most important thing for ex-combatants to be told about Truth and Reconciliation Commission?**

- Should support it as a path to reconciliation.

**13: If there is free flow, what is the most important thing for ex-combatants to be told about SC?**

- Support SC.

### **Freetown Focus Group: Rank and File**

**1: What is your biggest concern about the TRC?**

- Witness protection

**2: What is the biggest concern about the Special Court?**

- Individual and command responsibility
- Number is too small

**3: What is the most important thing for ex-combatants to be told about the TRC?**

- TRC is for peace and reconciliation, and will help you return to local community.
- No money will be given by the TRC after confession.

**4: What is the most important thing for ex-combatants to be told about the SC?**

- SC is for commanders.

**5: In your personal opinion, what can the TRC do to most effectively contribute to peace and reconciliation in SL?**

- Bring rehabilitation and forgiveness.
- Houses: the TRC should build them.
- Victim compensation.
- Extend the DDR scholarship.

***Information Sharing***

- **On the firewall model**

**6: Does the information-sharing model affect how you, personally, feel about the TRC?**

- All support this model.

**7: Would information sharing model affect whether you would give information to the TRC?**

- Yes, we do not want what we say to the TRC to be used in the SC, against commanders.
- **On the exculpatory model**
- All support this model too.
- **On the inculpatory model**
- There is no support for this model

**8: What if you knew that only 30 people are in SC? Will this affect your attitude in speaking to the TRC?**

- They do not want to send anyone to jail
- **On the free flow model**
- No support.
- No number, even small in the SC will encourage participation in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

**9: Which model do you prefer? (in order of preference)**

- 1) Firewall
- 2) Exculpatory

- 3) Inculpatory
- 4) Free flow

**10: If there were to be a free flow model, what is your biggest concern regarding the Truth and Reconciliation Commission?**

- TRC risks inducing corruption. A lot of false information will be given.
- The Truth and Reconciliation Commission is not for peace because of false information.

**11: What is the biggest concern about the SC if there is a free flow of information?**

- The Special Court should get its own information.

**12: If there is free flow, what is the most important thing for ex-com to be told about the Truth and Reconciliation Commission?**

- Don't support the TRC. Support a firewall approach.

**13: If there is free flow, what is the most important thing for ex-combatants to be told about SC?**

- The SC is only for a few.