

CHAPTER 1

AIMS, STRUCTURE AND METHODS

INTRODUCTION

This thesis is a study of FRETILIN, the political party which led the independence struggle in Timor-Leste. The primary aim of my research has been to discover how FRETILIN's theory and practice of 'popular education' in the period from 1973 until 1978, and, in particular, in the Resistance Bases known as the *Bases de Apoio*, contributed to the capacity of FRETILIN and its supporters to sustain that struggle over two and a half decades of brutal military invasion and occupation by the Indonesian Military. My secondary aim has been, through undertaking this research, to contribute to a process of 're-conscientisation', by helping the participants in my research to rediscover the relevance of popular education now in independent Timor-Leste.

While Portuguese colonialism had come in different social and political forms and with different ideologies (Gunn 1999), it had completely negated the *education of the people* or mass education, keeping the majority of the indigenous Timorese illiterate and excluded from politics until early 1974. When the April 1974 Carnation Revolution in Portugal overthrew the fascist regime which had ruled there since 1926, and political parties became legal in Timor, FRETILIN was the only political party able to read this persistent social dimension of colonialism, and initiate change. Two leaders, António Carvarinho 'Mau Lear'¹ and Roque Rodrigues² were central figures in the first FRETILIN Education Committee. In early 1975, Roque Rodrigues explained FRETILIN's education policy to an Australian journalist, Bill Nicol, saying that "colonialism used many guns, one of which was illiteracy." Nicol quoted Rodrigues directly:

A struggle against illiteracy means also a struggle against mindlessness.³ The colonial state used the education system to polarize the people's creativity and suffocate the Timorese culture. A struggle against the colonial education is to promote an education that is to serve the mass of the Timorese people and to stimulate the indigenous culture (Nicol 2002, p.162)

1 António Carvarinho 'Mau Lear' was a member of the Casa dos Timores group of Timorese university student activists based in Lisbon in 1974. See Chapter 3.

2 Roque Rodrigues, a psychologist and a Portuguese Army official was dismissed because of his alliance with FRETILIN and later became a member of the Central Committee of FRETILIN. He is now adviser to the President of the Republic and lives in Dili.

3 This may be Nicol's translation of '*obscurantismo*', the term usually used to describe the state of a lack of political consciousness

He told Nicol, further, that FRETILIN teachers and FRETILIN schools were vital, to spread a popular ideology and to revolutionise the education system, creating a new mentality, *a new citizen*, anti-colonial, anti-fascist, popular and democratic (Nicol 2002, p.163). FRETILIN's *army of the pens*,⁴ the *Pedagogy of the Maubere Revolution*, had begun.

PREVIOUS STUDIES ON FRETILIN AND POPULAR EDUCATION

Among the many studies of Timor-Leste, the most significant and relevant to this study are two written in the 1970s, Jill Jolliffe's *East Timor: Nationalism and Colonialism* published in 1978 (Jolliffe 1978), and Helen Hill's *Stirings of Nationalism in East Timor: FRETILIN 1974-1978*, based on a Masters thesis from that time, published in English in 2002 (Hill 2002). Both books give some account of the history examined in this thesis, including of Nicolau Lobato's clandestine group in Dili, the Casa dos Timores students in Lisbon, the student organisation UNETIM, and FRETILIN's 'base work' and literacy campaign prior to the invasion. Both Jolliffe and Hill were post-graduate students in Australia at the time, and both visited in 1974-1975 to collect first-hand stories of FRETILIN. Hill's book remains the only book written specifically about FRETILIN. Another contemporary account was from Bill Nicol, an independent Australian journalist who visited Portuguese Timor in 1974-1975 to cover the political events of that time, and later wrote *Timor: The Stillborn Nation*, first published in 1978 (Nicol 1978), and republished in 2002 under a new title, *Timor: A Nation Reborn* (Nicol 2002). Despite many problems with his analysis, his clear stories about the leaders and programs in 1974-1975 became a useful source for this study.

Although useful, these three publications do not include any account of the FRETILIN alternative government that operated in the Resistance Bases after the Indonesian invasion on December 7th, 1975, but some material on this was discovered in books by Andrew McMillan (1992), John Taylor (1999), António Barbedo Magalhães (2007) and José Mattoso (2007). Another major source is the report of the Timor-Leste Commission for Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR 2006). The original FRETILIN leaders and a younger generation of FRETILIN members,

⁴ The phrase 'army of the pens' is inspired by a speech by the Chinese Leader Mao Tse-tung in Yenan province in 1942. See Chapter 4, below.

have also made significant contributions in autobiographies, political analysis and academic writing, including Abílio Araújo (1977), Jose Ramos Horta (1987), Constâncio Pinto (Pinto and Jardine 1996), Filomena de Almeida (1997), Xanana Gusmão (2000), and Laura Abrantes and Filomena Sequeira (2008). Of particular note is the work by Estêvão Cabral, a younger member of UNETIM and FRETILIN who joined the guerrilla fighters and was captured, and eventually managed to obtain higher degrees in Great Britain. His doctoral thesis, *FRETILIN and the Struggle for Independence in East Timor 1974-2002* (Cabral 2002) provides a solid structural analysis of FRETILIN and its armed wing, FALINTIL.

Still, the focus of these works is not education, nor specifically the popular education of Timor-Leste and of FRETILIN. The only book specifically about education in Timor-Leste was written for UNESCO by Susan Nicolai, published under the title *Learning Independence: Education in Emergency and Transition in Timor-Leste* (Nicolai 2004). Though her focus was on education during the emergency situation after 1999, she nevertheless used the term ‘popular education’ to describe FRETILIN’s alternative education program between 1974 and 1999. A Masters thesis by an Australian solidarity activist, Deborah Durnan, on *Popular Education and Peacebuilding in Timor-Leste* (Durnan 2005) also gave some account of FRETILIN’s early popular education work, though its main focus is on the work of the popular education network, *Dai Popular*, in the period after 1999, a topic covered in this thesis in Chapter 13. More recently, a Master’s thesis on education by a Timorese, João Pereira, briefly acknowledges the education program of FRETILIN from 1974-1975 (Pereira 2010, p.34). Finally, while this thesis was in progress, a number of papers were presented by myself and others to the adult and popular education stream of two Timor-Leste Studies Association Conferences, which I helped to organize in 2009 and 2011 (Leach et al 2010). This work has contributed to a growing awareness of the role of popular education in our country. The numerous other publications about Timor-Leste to which I have referred are not listed here, but are mentioned in the introductions to the chapters in which they are discussed.

Finally, to establish a proper understanding about the main popular educators whose ideas had influenced the popular education work of FRETILIN, as I discovered in my study of early

clandestine groups of 1973-1974, I consulted some of the original writings of Paulo Freire, Amílcar Cabral, Julius Nyerere, Mao Tse-Tung, Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels and V.I. Lenin. Those original works, and some secondary sources analyzing their ideas and work, are also referenced in the relevant chapters, particularly in Chapter 4.

THE ORGANIZATION OF THIS STUDY

This study covers four distinct periods of recent Timorese history. The first is the period from the early 1970s to the Carnation Revolution in Portugal on 25 April 1974, during which time two active clandestine groups of young Timorese intellectuals opposed to Portuguese colonialism formed, one in Timor and the other in Portugal. The second period, the period of decolonization, runs from May 1974 until August 1975, and its main features were the formation of political parties, the Portuguese-sponsored decolonization, the continuing instability of Portuguese politics in Lisbon, and the grass roots education campaign of FRETILIN. This period ended in August 1975, with the attempted coup d'état by FRETILIN's coalition partner, UDT, and FRETILIN's successful counter-coup. The third period, from September 1975 until December 1978, covers the Indonesian armed incursions followed by the full-scale invasion in December 1975, until the fall of the last of the Resistance Bases in December 1978. The fourth period, from 1979-2002, was the period of re-organization of the FRETILIN-led state, RDTL, into a nationalist movement, the work of the clandestine front, the UN-supervised referendum, the period of UN rule after Indonesian withdrawal, and the final realization of self-determination, in May 2002. In my analysis, I have also sometimes written of two separate eras, the first being the era of the first independent state, the Democratic Republic of Timor Leste, which I call RDTL 1, from December 1975 until May 2002; and the second, the era of RDTL II, from end of the occupation until today. This second era is characterized by the United Nations intervention, and a new political pluralism.

The thesis is divided into three main parts. Part One, consisting of four chapters, deals with the foundations of the thesis. Chapter 1, explains the aims, the overall thesis structure, the specific research questions, the research approach and methods, and the principle sources. Chapter 2

presents personal testimony of my experience of the popular education of FRETILIN, as a child in the Resistance Bases and immediately afterwards. Chapter 3 gives an account of the early Popular Education Groups, the Anti-Colonial Informal Discussion Group (AIDG) in Dili and the *Casa dos Timores* in Lisbon Portugal, from 1973 until September 1974. Chapter 4, the last in Part One, is about the leaders and theorists who inspired FRETILIN Popular Education. This chapter discusses three sources of inspiration for the early FRETILIN leaders: the Pedagogy of the Liberation Struggle of Amílcar Cabral, the Pedagogy of the Oppressed of Paulo Freire, and the mass line education work of Mao Tse-tung and the Communist Party of China. While it is acknowledged, in Chapter 3, that some of FRETILIN's early popular educators and leaders also drew their inspiration and learned from the social teaching of the Catholic Church, particularly from *Rerum Novarum*⁵ and from liberation theology, these are beyond the scope of this thesis.

Part Two explores the theme of *The Pedagogy of Maubere Liberation Struggle*. In the first three chapters, I deal with FRETILIN's ideas, structure and programs. Chapter 5 explains the FRETILIN structures, including its political education mechanisms. Chapter 6, concerning UNETIM and FRETILIN's base work, describes the mobilization of students to undertake grass roots work, and includes a detailed analysis of the literacy manual they used, inspired by the work of Paulo Freire. Chapter 7 deals with FRETILIN's women's organization, OPMT, and the contribution of women to the resistance. The next four chapters, Chapters 8 to 11 then explore the popular form of government which operated in the resistance bases, the relationship of the nascent state with its people, and the development and strengthening of popular democracy in warfare education, health care, and food production, and through international solidarity and diplomacy. Finally in this part, Chapter 12 covers the period after the fall of the Resistance Bases, tracing the re-organization of the state into a broad clandestine movement.

Part Three consists of Chapter 13, which presents three case studies of popular education ideas and practices in the period after the Indonesian occupation and the final chapter, which summarises the conclusions from this study, and identifies areas for future work.

5 *Rerum Novarum* (Latin for 'Of New Things') is an encyclical issued by Pope Leo XIII on May 15, 1891. It was an open letter, sent to all Catholic bishops in the world, that addressed the condition of the working classes. The encyclical is entitled: "Rights and Duties of Capital and Labour". Wilhelm Emmanuel von Ketteler and Cardinal Henry Edward Manning were influential in its composition.

METHODOLOGY

Hypotheses and Research Questions

The basic hypotheses of this research were, first, that popular education had been a driving force in the persistence of the Timorese Resistance and the bravery of its supporters, in the way in which the people came to understand the justice of their cause and their right to freedom and independence; and secondly, that the original leaders of FRETILIN, the students from the *Casa dos Timores* group in Lisbon and from Nicolau Lobato's informal group in Dili, were the key leaders and educators behind this popular education campaign. The first and primary task was to identify who was part of these early popular education groups and the theories influencing them; and to describe and analyse the FRETILIN popular education actions which became a source of FRETILIN's persistence, both in the Resistance Bases, the *Bases de Apoio*, and in the international arena. While the principal focus is the early years of popular education and the armed struggle from 1973 up until 1978, the second and secondary research objective was to understand the relevance of the popular education theories and practices for FRETILIN to the current political reality.

Specifically, the research questions included:

1. What were the early popular education groups? Who were the leaders and other activists who were part of the groups?
2. What ideas and theories influenced them?
3. What activities did FRETILIN undertake
 - a. prior to the Indonesian invasion;
 - b. in the Resistance Bases after the invasion;
 - c. after the collapse of the Bases; and
 - d. in international work?
4. What is the relevance of the theory and practice of popular education of that period to the current political reality?

Political Objectives of the Research

My experience as an activist in the independence movement, and, prior to that, as a child growing up in the Resistance Bases behind FALINTIL lines, had led me to believe in popular education, as a means for mobilisation for self-defence, a ‘non-antagonistic’ aspect of the Timorese Resistance. So, my research was intended to bring about a new awareness of the importance of popular education in an independent Timor-Leste in the new political conjuncture, as a means for the active prevention of social injustices, especially new forms of colonization, both internal and external. In particular, I wanted to capture both the imagination and memories of FRETILIN members, to help them and others reflect on the relevance of FRETILIN’s popular education ideas and programs to the current political conjuncture. So, beyond collecting stories, and understanding theories and practices of popular education at the theoretical level, this study had practical objectives as well, namely:

- to promote popular education as a non-violent movement within FRETILIN in the conjuncture of political pluralism and social and popular democracy;
- to promote popular education as a method for community economic self-sufficiency beyond FRETILIN;
- to raise awareness of the importance of the history of resistance as means to educate the next generation of FRETILIN activists and to link them with the older generation of FRETILIN;
- to support *formação política*⁶ for young political activists and FRETILIN cadres; and
- to provide reference for future studies on popular education and history of Timor-Leste.

The methods chosen reflected these practical objectives, as well as meeting the requirements of academic research.

6 In 1976, FRETILIN formed a political education and leadership training centre known as Centro Formação Política (CEFORPOL) in the Bases de Apoio. Formação refers to a process of exposure of political cadres to political theories and of involvement in the political program of FRETILIN.

Methods of Data Collection and Analysis

To develop a methodology, my first task was to explore the relevance of oral history to this project and its commonality with the practices of popular education.⁷ This showed me that oral history was a viable contributing method for this study. My other methods included archival research, group discussions, and public seminars. The action-oriented discussions formed part of the action-research aspect of this study, and the notes from these sessions contributed substantially to this research.

Oral History

Staughton Lynd argued that oral history was history itself, “in the form of an articulating consciousness” (cited in Grele 1998, p.42). In the context of this study, oral history aims to ‘re-conscientize’ the Timorese people, recovering and re-articulating the consciousness which they developed between 1974 and 1978, through the original ‘conscientisation’ work of FRETILIN.⁸ Oral history is therefore an important tool of popular education research, because, as Oxford historian Paul Thompson wrote:

. . . oral history certainly can be a means for transforming both the content and the purpose of history. It can be used to change the focus of history itself, and open up new areas of inquiry; it can break down barriers between teachers and students, between generations, between educational institutions and the world outside; and in the writing of history—whether in books, or museums, or radio and film—it can give back to the people who made and experienced history, through their own words, a central place (Thompson 1998, p.22).

A similar claim is made by Robertson (2006, p.3). who sees oral history not just as a process of documenting information provided by participants through interviews, but also about documenting and recognising the important roles played by ordinary people in history. The Australian oral historian Janis Wilton, from the University of New England, expressed this to me as “giving back the history to the people” (Pers.com, 20/04/2008). Moreover, “through oral

7 I consulted with Dr Janis Wilton, an experienced oral historian (Wilton 2004), and the studies she recommended on oral history methods.

8 The term ‘conscientisation’, derived from Paulo Freire, was used by FRETILIN to describe its ‘base work’ and literacy campaign. See Chapter 6

history the community can, and should, be given the confidence to write their own history” and “for the historian who wishes to work and write as a socialist, the task must be not simply to celebrate the working class as it is, but to raise its consciousness. A history is required which leads to action: ‘not to confirm, but to change the world’” (Thompson 1998, pp. 22, 24).

The objective of this research was not just to look at the popular education practices of FRETILIN prior to the invasion, but also at popular education ideas and practices during the Indonesian occupation. During this study, I have interviewed, and held informal discussions and conversations with seventy-five informants. They included leaders, activists and ordinary members of FRETILIN, and soldiers and lower commanders who fought in the front line against Indonesian occupying forces but were also actively involved in popular education prior to occupation and in the Resistance Bases between 1974 and 1978. In some cases, the stories were recorded and in other cases detailed notes were taken. At the conclusion of this study, the stories and pictures collected will be given back to each of the participants and their families. Appendix 1 lists all the interviewees and informants, including their *nom de guerres* or aliases where they had one, and the positions they held or organisations they belonged to. While almost all were from Timor-Leste, a small number were activists in the solidarity movement in Australia and Portugal. Approval to conduct the interviews was sought and obtained from the University of New England Human Research Ethics Committee.

Archival Research

In the course of the research, documents were discovered in five archival collections in Portugal, as follows:

1. The Torre do Tombo (Files of the King), based in the Universidade Classica Lisboa, which holds the files of the Portuguese Security Police (PIDE-DGS);
2. The archives of CDPM-CIDAC (*Centro da Defesa do Direito do Povo Maubere-Centro Informação e Desenvolvimento Amilcra Cabral*), a solidarity organisation in Lisbon;
3. The Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Relations of Portugal;
4. The Library of *Sociedade Geográfica de Lisboa* (SGL); and
5. The Library of *Espaço por Timor*.

I visited each of these during the period of the study, to collect and copy original documents of and about FRETILIN. The first visit to Portugal occurred in June 2008, to make preliminary contacts and gain a basic understanding about the information available in the respective collections. The second visit was for three weeks in March 2009, during which I collected and copied original documents of FRETILIN available particularly in Centre for Information and Development of Amílcar Cabral (CIDAC) based in Lisbon.

In Australia, I visited three archives: the private collection of Kevin Sherlock⁹ in Darwin; the National Library of Australia in Canberra, which held papers of Australian solidarity activist Denis Freney,¹⁰ and of the journalist Jill Jolliffe; and the archives of the Australia East Timor Association (AETA) in Melbourne.

The *Biblioteka Maubere*

In keeping with the philosophy of participatory action-research, one of the aims of this thesis has been to improve contemporary political education, as it is practised within FRETILIN and the wider independence movement. My hypothesis was that the recovery of the stories of the popular education and the pedagogy of the Maubere revolution from the rural villages and districts would help to ‘re-conscientise’ the militants of FRETILIN, but for this to happen, the products of the research had to become more widely available. For this reason, I established, in 2009, the *Biblioteka Maubere* (Maubere Library), a centre for political and historical study and self-education which I and my comrades have built in my compound in the suburb of Bebonuk in Dili. Over the last few years, I have deposited in this library copies of all the documents collected for this research and the records of interviews, along with many of the books and other publications which appear in the bibliography.

9 Kevin Philip Sherlock born on March 08, 1934 in Adelaide, South Australia. He studied only up to second year of secondary school, and is a working class Australian. On July 25 1974, he visited Portuguese Timor as a tourist and started his collection of material relating to Timor-Leste. Today Kevin’s archive is one of the best on Timor in Australia. Kevin was awarded a medal for his work by the President of Republic of Timor-Leste in 2009.

10 Denis Freney was a journalist for *Tribune* and a member of Communist Party of Australia (CPA). His role in the solidarity movement is discussed in Chapter 11.

Praxis Discussions

I envisaged my research as a continuation of the popular education work of FRETILIN and the independence movement it built. In the tradition of popular education, this was a shared project, in which many other people are active participants, not only as informants, but also as respondents to the material which was being uncovered by the research. To facilitate this process, I used ‘praxis discussions’, dialogues in which the material from the research was the subject of group reflection and discussion, out of which it was possible to discover or reconstruct the real meaning, in the contemporary situation. This was part of the process of ‘systematisation’, as it has been practiced over many years within the international popular education tradition (Kane 2001:20; Torres Carillo 2010). During the period of the research, therefore, I organised and/or took part in a variety of group discussions and seminars, as a way to bring back collective memories and actions.

Thus, as a member of the group CP-FORPOLA (Centre for Planning Political Formation and Alternative Leadership)¹¹ on 30 December 2008, I organised with other FRETILIN youth a public event, to reflect on the ideas and actions of President Nicolau Lobato, who had died in battle on that day thirty years earlier. During this event, there were contributions from former friends of Nicolau and from the leadership of the party, about the history and his contribution to the liberation struggle. The following year, 30 December 2009, the Central Committee of FRETILIN (CCF) organised its own first-ever reflection on the contribution of Nicolau Lobato to the Resistance, and I was invited to contribute a speech about the ideas and practices of Lobato’s popular education work. Then, in December 31, 2010, the Timor-Leste state held the first-ever state-sponsored reflection on Nicolau Lobato’s life, and it has now become an official yearly event.

Aside from organising Nicolao Lobato’s successful reflection, I worked with CP-FORPOLA youth members to organise in cooperation with FRETILIN community leadership structures, two further types of activities, namely community level discussions and regular discussions at

¹¹ CP-FORPOLA established in Dili in mid-2004, is youth-initiated and served as political formation for FRETILIN young activists.

the National University (UNTL). Two grass-roots political formation activities were organised in 2009, with speakers coming from former CEFORPOL¹² members, and current middle-level cadres of the party. The themes discussed were:

- the role of OPMT in the Resistance;
- political education: understanding the works of CEFORPOL (Centre for Political Formation) in 1976-77;
- leadership; and
- Maubere as a social concept.

Detailed notes were kept during each of these two meetings.

Second, my position as a lecturer at the National University of Timor-Leste (UNTL) has meant that this research project has been able to involve my fellow lecturers and students. Between June and August 2009, Natalino de Jesus Gusmão, another UNTL lecturer, organised three seminars on Timorese Nationalism, to which he invited older FRETILIN leaders, including Francisco Xavier do Amaral, Marí Alkatiri and José Ramos Horta (see Chapter 3). I was also able to take notes during this seminar series to use in this study, and the material presented in the leaders' speeches helped to validate and corroborate my findings from other sources.

The third example is the progressive development of collective discussion on UNETIM-OPJT (União Nacional dos Estudantes Timores - Organização Popular da Juventude Timor).¹³ This began at one of the CP-FORPOLA meetings already mentioned, at which a member of the FRETILIN-initiated student organisation, UNETIM from the 1970s, Domingos Beremau, was identified. Since then, we have worked together to bring other former UNETIM members into discussions. The first meeting took place in October 2009 and was followed by a mini-conference on Popular Education, organised in cooperation with the Faculty of Education and Faculty of Social and Political Sciences of the National University (UNTL) on 25-26 November 2010. The keynote speaker was Dr. Estêvão Cabral, author of the thesis on FRETILIN referred to above

12 CEFORPOL was the FRETILIN political education structure in the Resistance Bases. See Chapter 5.

13 União Nacional dos Estudantes Timores (UNETIM) was the first Timorese students' union established in the Escola Técnica and Liceu Dr. Francisco Machado in Dili October 1974. It was under the guidance of the Casa dos Timores students from Lisbon. Organização Popular da Juventude Timor (OPJT) was the first FRETILIN youth organization established in June 12, 1975. UNETIM and OPJT are discussed in Chapters 5.

(Cabral 2002), and himself a former member of UNETIM. The outcome of this conference was then summarised in a paper to the 2011 Timor-Studies Association Conference (Fernandes 2011) by another CP-FORPOLA member, Zélia Fernandes, who has been an informant for this study.

As a learner and participant in the historical process of popular education in Timor-Leste, I will necessarily interpret the oral history and other material on the basis of my own relationship with the social reality of the popular education process and with other participants. In order to counter my own subjectivity and bias aside from the reflections on Nicolau Lobato and UNETIM, I also organised a seminar on the topic of RENAL (Rehabilitacao Nacional)¹⁴, which was perhaps the most sensitive area of my research. Three key speakers were two surviving political assistants, each of whom was responsible for a different RENAL in Ponta Leste¹⁵, and a former prisoner of one of the RENALs. I also presented work-in-progress papers on my research at conferences of the Timor Studies Association in Dili in 2009 and 2011.

Thematic Analysis

Minichiello et al (2008), citing Tylor and Bogdan (1984), identify three stages of data analysis: firstly, coding the data, discovering themes and developing propositions; secondly, refining one's themes and propositions; and thirdly, reporting the findings. However, in terms of the analysis of oral history interviews, Grele (1998, p.44) recommends:

to analyse an oral interview properly as a *conversational narrative*, we must combine an analysis of the social and psychological relationships between the participants, and their appropriateness to the occasion, with our historical analysis.

In other words, while oral history is a conversation between the interviewer and the informants, this conversation has a purpose. To analyse the stories collected, as outlined above the goal of this study - the re-conscientisation of the people, particularly of the militants of FRETILIN - needed to be clear. The interviews/conversations became particularly interesting, once the participants understood that I was attempting to systematise with them, both the pedagogy of

14 RENAL (Rehabilitacao Nacional) were the Re-Education Centres established in the Resistance Bases, as part of a system of 'popular justice.'

15 The Resistance divided the country into sectors, as described in Chapter 8.

FRETILIN-FALINTIL in the Maubere Liberation Struggle (the past) and the Pedagogy of the People's Liberation Struggle in Progress (the contemporary situation). The aim of the latter is to contribute to the on-going transformation in the country. The necessity of having these two themes and objectives is to avoid what Grele called the "deleterious effects" of oral history research, which occur when there is a lack of clarity in undertaking oral history in analysing it, and more importantly, in its purpose. This, he said, resulted in a situation of endless activity without goal or meaning, "a movement without aim" (Grele 1998, p.38). These ideas originally arose through my study of Amílcar Cabral's theory (see Chapter 4), which Chilcote (1999, p.75) described as "the Pedagogy of Liberation Struggle".

The Challenges of Data Collection

There were multiple challenges in undertaking this research. Language in Timor-Leste always is a complex issue. Portuguese was the only official language until 1975, but I grew up speaking my mother tongue, Naueti, and also learned and spoke Tetum in the Resistance Bases. After the Indonesian invasion, all school students had to learn Indonesian, and I learned English from the 1980s. Since many of the original documents and publications of FRETILIN, and some of the secondary sources were in Portuguese, I spent a lot of time translating, and checking my translations with Portuguese language professionals, including Evangelina Ximenes¹⁶, Carina Bossu and Manuela Taboada, two Brazilians, whom I met at the University of New England. Most of the interviews were conducted in Tetum and translations were also needed. Some of the testimonies recorded by others, e.g. Abrantes and Sequeira (2008) also required translation, as did the audio recordings of the Archive and Museum of the Resistance (AMR 2005). For my own purposes, and for the future use of the Maubere people, perhaps it would have been better for this thesis to have been written in Tetum, the most commonly spoken and read language of Timor-Leste today, but then it would not have been examinable as a thesis for an Australian university. Fortunately, my studies in the Philippines and in Ireland have given me sufficient English to be able to write in this language, with the assistance of my supervisors and other colleagues. At times, however, my English may seem strange to someone for whom it is their

16 Evangelina Ximenes is a Portuguese Linguistics student at the National University of Timor-Lorosaé (UNTL).

normal means of academic communication. In particular, my account of the stories which people have told me has been translated as closely as possible to the way people expressed things to me in their own languages.

Since other researchers in the future will want to continue investigating the same subject, the validity and credibility of this research was a fundamental concern for me. As an educator and an historian, my personal satisfaction relies on the authenticity of the stories, and the more authentic the stories are, the happier I am.

My personal ambition as a researcher was to interview as many as possible, especially people from the villages, but the challenges were great. There is little communication infrastructure to make arrangements in advance and it is difficult to find people and conduct a good interview at short notice. The geographical settings and rough terrain between one Resistance base and another made travel difficult, especially at certain periods of the year. Rough roads, landslides and floods during the rainy season meant that my only interview time for the interior areas of the country was between July and November. However, I have made four visits to the Central North Sector (Lequidoe, Remexio and Aileu), one visit to the Central South Sector (Same), one visit to the North Border Sector (Ermera and Maliana); and three visits to Baucau, Lospalos and Viqueque. I was helped, however, by the fact that many former FRETILIN members are based in Dili, and I could easily go to see them and discuss matters that I was not clear about. Everyone whom I have met has been cooperative.



Map 1. Timor-Leste, showing the 13 districts.

Another challenge was the perception of the interviewees. There have been so many research projects carried out by both national and international researchers, that there is now a perception, which is fair and true, that researchers treat people as objects for their projects, and to make money. Consequently, researchers now do not find it easy to interview people upon arrival in a village. I used to have to spend time establishing rapport by finding common stories and sharing personal feelings of being a FRETILIN member, before an interview could be done. Sometimes, this involved sharing some cigarettes and drinks.

The distinct characteristic of an oral history research method is its emancipatory approach, whereby the people become the subjects and owners of their history. This is obviously relevant to a study of popular education, because popular education also aims to help people become subjects of their own history.¹⁷ But it is not enough just to write history. The real issue is how

¹⁷ This is discussed in the section on Paulo Freire, in Chapter 4.

to make history and to use history to re-energise the people. Freire's praxis method of action research, reflection-action and action-reflection, which is itself a feature of popular education, was used in this research.

Research and the politics of post-conflict peacebuilding

Few Timorese have had the opportunity to undertake doctoral study since the war ended in 1999. One reason is that for most of us involved in the Resistance, our education was severely interrupted and affected by the occupation; it therefore takes a long time to complete the preliminary study necessary to undertake such academic work. There is also the issue of resources. Higher education institutions in Timor-Leste are only now becoming functional for postgraduate research, and incomes for most people are still very low, making it difficult to undertake full-time study without a scholarship. As one of the first people of my generation to be given the opportunity to undertake doctoral research largely in my own country, I have obligations to include some things in this thesis which may appear inappropriate or irrelevant to an outsider who does not have a detailed knowledge of the recent history of Timor-Leste. In this section, I will attempt to explain some of these features.

The thesis includes a considerable amount of detail about the lives of very many individuals who were involved in the liberation struggle, both those who have participated in the project as interviewees and informants, but also a significant number of leaders and others who died in the course of the struggle. It is important to recognise the significance of producing such a detailed record. For twenty-four years FRETILIN waged a war which was almost totally hidden from view, with our country cut off from the outside world and the population lived under conditions of extreme repression. This imposed conditions of secrecy on activists, militants and fighters, such that the majority of people who survived know only a very small fragment of the total story. Moreover, between 150000 and 200000 people died in this struggle. Until very recently, the vast majority of the people have had an oral rather than a literate culture, so it is vital to write down now as many of the stories as possible from the survivors, in as much detail as is possible, even where the detail may not seem directly relevant to the thesis argument. I have

included sufficient detail in this thesis in terms of peoples' names, dates and places of birth, personal networks and events in their lives to allow other researchers to follow up the leads I have uncovered. For many people whose stories are told in this thesis, this is the first time such a detailed record has been documented.

However, this work is not only academic research, it is also part of nation-building and the post-war peacebuilding. A brutal military occupation destroys all the normal means of open communication which is taken for granted as part of a 'civil society', tearing apart the social fabric which under more normal circumstances binds people together. As will become clear in the thesis, the principal objective of the Indonesian invasion and military occupation was literally to annihilate FRETILIN, as a pre-condition for the integration of the territory of Timor-Leste into the Republic of Indonesia. These conditions forced many thousands of individual FRETILIN members and supporters to remain isolated, with their true life stories known by very few people in their clandestine networks, often not even including their whole extended family. Post-conflict peacebuilding literature teaches us that to share these stories, and to help others to do the same, is an important part of the healing process. As we listen to the stories of individuals and record them, we are bearing witness to the suffering and the bravery that could not be spoken about at the time. Telling the stories is one way to try to re-create our society which the war almost totally destroyed. My aim is also to help explain why so many people died, and what they were fighting for, which I have called 're-conscientisation'. If the suffering and anger that the war engendered is not properly understood by current and future generations, this can become a cause of ongoing internal violence, as witnessed in the post-conflict histories of many previously-colonised peoples and societies.

For this reason, wherever possible, not only have I included as much detail about individual people as possible, I have also taken relevant sections which I have written, along with photos and recordings, back to the people in the villages from whom I originally obtained them. Copies of this thesis will also be made and distributed, and significant parts translated into Tetum, so people can see that their stories were recorded in this form, even though they may not be able to read the whole work.

The large number of original documents retrieved from archives in Portugal and Australia and referred to in this thesis are another aspect of the process of post-war recovery, especially since copies have now been brought back to Timor-Leste where they can be more easily accessed by others. As part of the attempt by the Suharto dictatorship to suppress all evidence of the national liberation struggle, such documents if they did exist in Timor during the occupation were destroyed, if not by the authorities then by the movement itself for its own protection. Many of these documents are in Portuguese, since that was the language of the Resistance especially in the 1970s and 1980s (Cabral and Martin Jones 2008), so part of my task has been to translate as much as possible for non-Portuguese readers. Other documents are in Tetum and Indonesian, especially from the later period, and again, this has required a significant effort of translation. Depending my own resources and those of my comrades, friends and colleagues for this, the translations may not always be as good as they could be, but now that the documents have returned to Timor-Leste and are collected in an accessible place, better translations can be done as part of the work of future Timorese scholars and researchers.

The privilege of undertaking this research and documenting my findings brings with it a duty to use it to assist individuals and the FRETILIN party to recover and heal from the violence of our recent past. Reclaiming our history and giving it back to the people helps us to restore our national identity and regain a sense of personal and national dignity; helping to make better sense of lingering disputes and re-establish trust and dialogue between conflicted parties. My hope is that this thesis is a small step along the arduous road towards national liberation.

A GLOSSARY OF SOME KEY TERMS

Before beginning the study proper, I will finish this introduction by explaining briefly some of the ‘specialist’ terms and concepts which are used throughout the thesis.

- **Popular Education** is a term used to describe FRETILIN’s mass education, which incorporated a literacy campaign, political education, cooperative and agriculture projects, health education, arts and literature aiming to build awareness, which FRETILIN called *consciencialização*, of the people’s oppression under colonialism

and the right to self-determination. *Consciencialização* is a term Paulo Freire used in his book, *The Pedagogy of the Oppressed*.

- **Maubere** is a social concept which FRETILIN used to refer to the ordinary people, the dispossessed, the working and farming classes of Timorese society during the colonial era.
- **Base work** refers to popular education activities, as described above, that started from the grass-roots level, the popular education movement.
- **Bases de Apoio** are the Resistance Bases established after the invasion. Some publications, including CAVR (2006) for example, have used *liberated zones* in writing about the period from 1976-1978. This term was used by Amílcar Cabral in Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde. PAIGC and Amílcar Cabral were based in Guinea Conakry, a different country, from where they made guerrilla incursions into the colonised Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde; and when some parts of the country were re-captured by PAIGC, those areas were called the liberated zones. FRETILIN used both Bases de Apoio (literally, Bases of Support) and Resistance Bases to refer to an area that remained under the control of FRETILIN/RDTL after the Indonesian invasion, from 1976 up until December 1978. These areas were also called *Zonas controladas*, or controlled zones, which means they were still defended and were under FRETILIN-FALINTIL's authority and governance. A FRETILIN-CRRN official document, dated January 2, 1985, used the concept of *Bases Populares* to describe the same period 1976-1978 (FRETILIN-CRRN 2/01/1985) while Konis Santana in another message used Bases de Apoio to refer to the same period (Mattoso 2005, p.48). This study will use both Resistance Bases and the Portuguese Bases de Apoio. According to Júlio Rihi, a FALINTIL Company commander in Ponta Leste, there were only two main Bases de Apoio, the *Base de Apoio Kablaki* which consisted of Central North Sector, North Frontier Sector, South Coast Sector, and South Frontier Sector, and *Base de Apoio Matebian*, which consisted of Ponta-Leste and Centre East Sector. Both of the sectors functioned as administrative, political and military Resistance Bases.

- **Formação Política** refers to political education. targeting, first, the key cadres of FRETILIN including the members of the Central Committee, regional committees and leaders of mass organizations like Organização Popular Juventude de Timor (OPJT), Organização Popular Trabalhadores de Timor (OPTT) and Organização Popular da Mulher Timor (OPMT). In the Bases de Apoio FRETILIN built political schools known as Centros da Formação Política (CEFORPOL) to educate new political cadres, both civilian and military. This occurred until the end of the Bases de Apoio in December 1978.
- **Popular Socialism** is the term I use to describe FRETILIN's political project. FRETILIN never indicated the political ideology of the Party until the Laline Meeting in 1977, when it finally declared Marxist-Leninism as its ideology. But, as Gusmão recalled in his autobiography, before this he had discussed with Sahe that they were Maoists, and they regarded the Communist Parties of the Soviet Union and of Western Europe as social-imperialists (Gusmão 2000, p.66). There seemed to be a tension within the leadership and the intellectuals of the party over these questions, but one thing that all seemed to have agreed on in the historic Soibada meeting in May 1976 was the symbolic idea of a *Revolução de Maubere*, a Maubere Revolution. This indicates that they were very aware of Timor's own local possibilities, constraints and culture. They were attempting to build a form of socialism from the grass-roots level. At the same time, as will be shown, they applied a degree of democratic centralism in their organisation. FRETILIN consistently used the term 'popular', and it still has observer status in the Socialist International, indicating that FRETILIN was attempting to build its own form of socialism. I have therefore used this term, 'popular socialism', to describe the FRETILIN political project, particularly as it transpired in the Bases de Apoio.¹⁸

18 I have used this term in three articles published in Tetum: 'Mauberism-Socialismo Popular' (2006), 'The Ideas of Nicolau Lobato' (2009) and 'OPMT-Socialismo Popular' (2011).

A note on names

Most members of the Resistance adopted a *nom de guerre*, e.g. Vicente Reis was known as Sahe, António Cavarinho was Mau Lear etc. In the text, I have included these names, as they are the ones by which people are often best known, putting them in single parenthesis e.g. Vicente Reis ‘Sahe’.

CHAPTER 2

SOME PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS: LEARNING IN THE BASES DE APOIO, AND BEYOND

Introduction

What is popular education? In 2008, when I interviewed Alarico Fernandes, a founding leader of FRETILIN, he defined it for me simply and clearly. “Popular education”, he said, “was teaching the people how to understand revolutionary theories, so they could struggle for their liberation” (Alarico Fernandes, Interview 28/10/2008). From the very beginning, FRETILIN’s popular education program went beyond simply understanding revolutionary theories, to become an essential part of the practice of the liberation struggle.

As described in more detail in the next chapter, a group of Timorese university students in Portugal, who later came to be known as the *Casa dos Timores* group, had begun to study revolutionary and nationalist theories in the early 1970s. Soon after the Carnation Revolution in April 1974, they left their studies. Returning to Timor, prior to the Indonesian invasion, they initiated informal political education classes and a literacy campaign, and began setting up farmers’ cooperatives in remote areas. Similarly, the first FRETILIN Prime Minister, Nicolau dos Reis Lobato, left his job soon after ASDT-FRETILIN formed in 1974, to work full-time as a party leader and activist, organizing among farmers. As these first leaders began putting the revolutionary and nationalist theories they had learned into practice, they developed something that was unique and specifically Timorese. This was FRETILIN popular education, which I will also call the ‘Pedagogy of the Maubere Revolution.’¹⁹

One of the ways that I know this is because I am a ‘product’ of FRETILIN’s popular education. I lived in the mountains after the Indonesian invasion, in the FRETILIN Resistance Bases. Before I begin the more formal account of my research, therefore, I need to tell a little of my own story. My ancestors originated from the Makasae-speaking clan of Afaloicai on Mount Matebian, and a Naueti-speaking community on Burabo’o Mountain, in the sub-district of Uato-Carbau, in

19 The ‘pedagogy of the revolution’ is a term used in relation to Paulo Freire and Che Guevara (McLaren 2000). Similarly, the biographer of Amílcar Cabral, the leader of the independence movement in Guinea Bissau, wrote of the ‘pedagogy of national liberation’ (Chilicote 1999). See Chapter 4.

the district of Viqueque. My father, Agostino da Silva of Burabuhæ, married my mother Maria Bendita, who was from the Afaloicai clan, a mix of Naueti- and Makasæ-speaking people living in Baguia, on the southern side of Mount Matebian. I was born in Burabuhæ on April 30, 1968. I have two brothers, one older, Anacleto Bendito da Silva, and one younger, David Bendito da Silva; and two younger sisters, Aguida Bendita da Silva and Maria Bendita da Silva. In our early childhood years, Anacleto and I had to travel about three kilometres every day to go to a Portuguese elementary school at Uato-Carbau. This was in 1974, before the Indonesian invasion. I was six years old.

After the Indonesians invaded our country in December 1975, we lived for three years in one of the FRETILIN-controlled Bases de Apoio in the mountains²⁰, which are described in later chapters. It was there that I learned about politics, through images, art and words, as I also witnessed and experienced being bombed, surviving, and feeling the pain of loneliness, and anger against the military repression. I learned from many different people and situations. In the Bases de Apoio in Uato-Lari in early 1978, I attended political education classes, at the age of ten. This provided the foundation for my ongoing involvement in the Maubere Revolution, the national liberation struggle of the people of Timor-Leste.

My father, Agostinho da Silva, had begun my political education by taking me to FRETILIN gatherings in Uato-Carbau in late 1975, before the invasion. Agostinho himself had never attended school as a child, probably because the distance made it too hard for him. But later in life, his brother, Lucas Baptista, who had studied in Ossú, and his brother-in-law, Horaácio Guterres, taught him proper reading and writing at home, until he managed to do it quite well.

After the fall of the Bases de Apoio at the end of 1978, we went back to live in Uato-Carbau. From my memories of those times, I have written some short anecdotes to show something of what it was like in those days, through the eyes of a young child. These stories will help the reader to understand why I chose to do this research.

20 The origin of this concept, which is similar to ‘liberated zones,’ was described in the glossary in Chapter I.

Story 1: Jornal A Voz de Timor

When I was interviewing António de Jesus Pinto for this thesis, he told me that it had been somewhere around February 1975 that Agostinho da Silva (my father), together with his brother Ricardino Madeira and a nephew Agapito, travelled from our village to Dili by *carreira*.²¹ (António Pinto, Interview 01/03/2010). Agostinho returned with a copy of a newspaper, *A Voz de Timor*.²² On the front page was a cartoon of Xavier do Amaral, representing FRETILIN, and Francisco Lopes da Cruz representing UDT. They were pulling on either end of a rope, perfectly balanced to show they had equal power. At the time, I was seven years old, and this was the first political cartoon I had ever seen. More than three decades later, I remembered it, when I found a copy of the same newspaper in Kevin Sherlock's Archive in Darwin, Australia. A copy is now kept in Dili, in the *Biblioteka Maubere*.²³

Story 2: Maubere and Buibere

As kids, Anacleto and I used to go to the farm of an elderly couple living in Burabuhae, in Uani-Uma village to get fruit, including papaya, pineapples and mangoes. They were a kind, happy, funny and generous family. It just happened that the husband's name was Maubere and the wife's name was Builoi. After the founding of FRETILIN, instead people called her *Buibere*, because Maubere and Buibere were the FRETILIN words for the ordinary people of the remote areas. When FRETILIN had one of its early political gatherings in the coastal town of Lesurubi in Uato-Carbau, some time after the UDT coup d'état in August 1975,²⁴ we travelled there from up in the mountains to participate. I saw the old man, Maubere. He was in the front line, singing with a huge smile on his face, revealing his broken teeth: 'Foho Ramelau, and Bere O Maubere'. He was the happiest man there that day, because his name was in the song. Buibere died soon after the collapse of Matebian *Base de Apoio* in November 1978. But Maubere survived until early 1989. Their relatives remain strong supporters of FRETILIN in Uani-Uma village in Uato-Carbau today.

21 *Carreira* is a typical Portuguese car owned by Chinese merchants to carry local products and passengers between Dili and the remotest areas in Timor-Leste.

22 *Jornal A Voz de Timor* is a newspaper which was published in Dili by the Portuguese Government.

23 As explained in Chapter 1.

24 The UDT coup d'état, an attempt by a conservative political group to seize power in August 1975, is explained in Chapter 8.

Story 3: *Convívios in Burabuhæ and Uato-Carbau*

When the Indonesian army invaded Dili on December 7, 1975, Burabuhæ, our parents home village, became a base for FRETILIN popular education. Later, it became the centre for the Zona²⁵ Mada of Uato-Carbau. For several months, FRETILIN militants used to gather there for *esclarecimentos*, and for social gatherings called *convívios*. *Esclarecimentos* (literally clarifications - one of FRETILIN's methods of political education) were public events in which the FRETILIN leadership conducted dialogue with the people. In *convívios*, people would do traditional dances –such as *Tebe Olorinda* - and sing FRETILIN popular songs. *Convívios* were designed for pleasure and were part of the political education of the people.²⁶ On one occasion, we travelled from Burabuhæ to old Uato-Carbau town, because three FRETILIN leaders, Ma'Hunu²⁷, Abel Larisina²⁸ and Xanana Gusmão²⁹, had come to visit. There was a big gathering organised by FRETILIN's party organization in the town. There was a drama performance, and the people danced *tebe-tebe* a native Timorese dance, singing revolutionary songs.

The most impressive performance for me as a kid was drama, a kind of popular theatre. All the actors were my neighbours.³⁰ The way I remember the plot, a family had a sick baby, but no access to medicine or to a doctor, and the baby was about to die. The mother was a man dressed in women's clothes. The father Matias, went to look for a doctor and found Doctor Kai-Mau.³¹ Dr. Kai-Mau arrives, with his medicines, to find out that Mateus had suffered from a terrible malaria because of mosquito bites. Dr. Kai-Mau was the joker of this pantomime. He mixed up his words: *Moreu* (original word *morrer* in Portuguese means to die) and *Umu* (in Makasæ means dead). Instead of saying: *Não morreu* (not dying), he said: “nao umu-reu”(not plus Makasæ word, dying). The crowd erupted in laughter. But this was a serious lesson too. It was reminding people that if there was no modern doctor, they could use their traditional healers.³²

25 Zona is equivalent to a sub-district.

26 *Esclarecimentos* and *convívios* are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.

27 José António da Costa, also known as Ma'Huno, is still today, as he was then, a member of the Central Committee of FRETILIN (CCF).

28 Abel Ximenes Larisina is an original member of the CCF, from Baguia.

29 José Alexandre Gusmão, better known as Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão, was at that time the FRETILIN Vice-Secretary for the Ponta-Leste Sector.

30 The actors were Ernesto de Carvalho as Dr. Kai-Mau, Matias, and Matias da Silva (Mau-Kalma) as the mother, Francisco Fernandes (Gaelihu) as son, Cecília as sister, Mateus Kai-Mau as messenger. And the director was Braz Rangel. This was confirmed with Dr. Kai-Mau in an interview in March 2009.

31 Kai-Mau, Maubere, and Buibere are native Timorese names.

32 The organisation of health care in the Bases de Apoio, including the use of traditional healers, is discussed in Chapter 10.

Story 4: The execution of Aquiles

Aquiles Freitas from Quelicai was a Timorese sergeant in the Portuguese army who ran a school in Atabae in Maliana district, which provided the children with basic military training.³³ He had joined FRETILIN in the counter-attack against the UDT coup d'état in August 1975, and fought against the Indonesian soldiers who crossed the border from West Timor in October (Jolliffe 2009). However, after the historic Soibada meeting in May- June 1976, at which the FRETILIN leaders decided to establish Resistance Bases with the population in the mountains, he was accused of being a traitor and was eventually arrested and executed. This story is well known among the people who survived that time.

According to a cousin of mine, Bernardo da Silva, Aquiles Freitas 'Magiali' and David Lebre 'Loisiba', a FALINTIL Commander, had a meeting with other FALINTIL Commanders and local FRETILIN leaders in our house in Burabuhae, during which a big fight broke out. 'Loisiba' was angry and he hit the table with his pistol, breaking a piece off (Bernardo da Silva, Pers. Com. 19/03/2009). This was not long before Aquiles was arrested. My father's cousin, Adelino de Carvalho,³⁴ who was Zone Secretary of Uato-Lari, was also regarded as a reactionary and was arrested and sent to CASCOL³⁵ for political education, according to Gusmão (2000, p.46). Soon after, a warrant was issued for my father, Agostinho, and a section of FALINTIL, led by Jacinto Busafuik,³⁶ was sent by José Henrique 'Ko-Susu' to let him know that he was going to be arrested. However, he was given the option to surrender to the Indonesian forces, which he eventually did, in early 1977.

My mother, Maria Bendita, had died soon after giving birth to my baby sister, also called Maria Bendita, sometime in 1976. So, after my father left, we children had to survive on our own in the Bases de Apoio. In early 1978, the baby Maria Bendita died also, in Matebian.

33 See Smith (1975) for footage of this school. It is discussed in Chapter 9.

34 Adelino de Carvalho was killed in a combat with Indonesian forces in Uato-Lari 1990.

35 Cascol is the name of the Headquarters of the Commissariat of Sector Centro-Leste, led by 'Sahe'. It was a CEFORPOL (Centre for Political Formation) – see Chapter 5.

36 Jacinto Busafuik is a cousin of my father who is also a relative of Adelino de Carvalho.

LEARNING IN THE BASE DE APOIO IN UATO-LARI

Elementary Schooling

The interim RDTL government established by FRETILIN set up schooling in the Bases de Apoio in Uato-Lari between 1977 and 1978. Children from the second up to fourth grade studied in a separate school. Alzira, my cousin, had gone to CEFORPOL Ravina³⁷ and became a teacher in the second grade. Her students included my brother, Anacleto Bendito da Silva. I instead attended first grade school in the village called *Aldeia 20 de Maio*. Regina Braz, who had taught me for a year in kindergarten in 1974/1975, was one of our teachers. Almost the only thing I can remember now is that we learned the Tetum alphabet and how to construct words like: *ka, ke, ki, ko, ku*.³⁸ Educational materials, such as black boards, books and pencils were scarce. Each student had a board made of wood, and we used charcoal from the fireplace, or red stones picked up from the river, to write with. We had to wash the board everyday after the class so it could be used the next day. We also used stones, beans and *paulitos* (little sticks) for counting. The schooling went on for more than a year in Atanlele, before we were forced to move further up the mountain, Matebian, around July to August 1978, as the Indonesian army was launching its final encirclement operation known as the 'circle of destruction'.

Political Education

As students, we travelled for flag-raising ceremonies from one village to another. We were called FALINTIL youth. Our first Battalion Commander was Agostinho Nahareu. Later, he was replaced by Mau-Meta, and Agostinho assumed a new responsibility as the drummer leader. It was a lot of fun. We had our own weapons, made out of wood, complete with bullets tied around our hips. We trained by marching and singing the national anthems, including *Patria-Patria*, *Foho Ramelau* and other revolutionary songs. We were fed well in the villages we visited. People welcomed us and would butcher a buffalo for our meal. Everyone was proud to go on these Saturday marches. In our own village, we had political education classes every Saturday night for about a month. Saturday night was a night for *convívios*, and for us it was also the time

37 A Centro do Formação Política (CEFOPOL) was a FRETILIN Political Education Centre. These are described in Chapter V. CEFOPOL Ravina was the name of the centre in Uato-Lari, established by Xanana.

38 These were the first schools in which Tetum was the language of instruction. See also the Tetum literacy campaign, as described in Chapter VI.

for basic military training, when we learned how to set up an ambush and how to break into the enemy lines.

Unlike normal schooling, the political education classes were a time of much laughter and joking. People of all generations and both sexes, many of whom had never been to school, found themselves sitting in the large room, taking part in the dialogue³⁹ with confidence and freedom. I can still remember today some of the themes, including antagonistic and non-antagonistic resistance; the Fascist state and proletarian state, and ‘marriage systems’ (monogamy, polygamy, polyandry and bigamy). Our political educator was Francisco Borulaku Soares, a member of DK (Delegado Komissariadu)⁴⁰ from CEFORPOL (Centro de Formação Política).⁴¹ People were free to ask questions. I can remember some of those dialogues, as follows:

Dialogue 1:

Educator: Comrade Franscisca, can you explain to us what the proletariat is?

Francisca: Comrade Borulaku! If the comrade asks me to answer, ‘Ave Maria, *manu koibasa-gua*’, I probably can answer you. But if you ask me to explain, *kroletaria* (which actually in the Naueti local dialect means a hole below) or *kro-ho-oli* (a hole above), which hole shall I explain?

Participants: Ha ha ha...

Francisca: (she went on saying...) A proletarian or popular state (she used the Portuguese terms *estado proletariado*, *estado popular*) is a state that is led by the people. There are no servants, and no one will look after the horses of the Liurais (traditional Timorese chieftans or kings). They will hold the reins of their own horses, and control their own destiny.

Francesca is quoting from a line in *Foho Ramelau*, the FRETILIN independence anthem sung in the mountains, which calls on the people to take control of their destiny, using the metaphor of taking the reins of your own horse. The symbol of the modern FRETILIN party is a clenched hand, holding a rope.

39 Dialogue is a process of popular education, based on the work of Paulo Freire. It uses ‘generative themes’ to stimulate discussion and debate. See Chapter 4.

40 Delegado Komissariadu are FRETILIN political cadres responsible for mass political education and were based in Commissariat of FRETILIN/RDTL I.

41 These names for the different parts of the FRETILIN organisational structure in the Bases do Apoio are described in Chapter V.

Dialogue 2:

Borulaku: Comrade, Teresa! What is polyandry?

Teresa: Comrade Borulaku, that is very easy. Polyandry is a woman who has many husbands, that is called 'bigamy' right?.

Participants: Ha ha ha hai...!

Comrade Teresa died in early 1980s. But Francisca is still alive, and I interviewed her for this study.

Dialogue 3:

Participant: Comrade Borulaku! The Indonesians are coming to fight us with bombs, cannons, mortars, tanks, airplanes and warships every day. We have only small arms and knives and spades. How can we fight them?

Borulaku: Do not worry, what they have are ours. One day we will beat them.

Though I did not understand until years later, Borulaku was referring to the military equipment of the occupying forces, and the FRETILIN philosophy decided at Soibada, which was to rely on its own capacity to fight and win, and then capture the weapons of the enemy.⁴²

Meeting Vicente Reis 'Sahe'

We had been training throughout the months from one village to the other, raising flags every Saturday. Now came the biggest moment for us, to meet Minister Vicente Reis 'Sahe', who was a very famous FRETILIN leader, one of the original members of the Casa dos Timores student group in Lisbon.⁴³ This was sometime in early 1978. The local leaders of the RDTL Government had organised a big gathering in Kulu-Ohi Lebada'e, near Sana in Uato-Lari. All the students went there, carrying their wooden weapons, to take part in the march-past and flag-raising ceremony. We had travelled for miles to get to this place, and there were many people. We formed a long line to welcome Vicente 'Sahe' Reis, who was our Minister of Defence at that time. He arrived with a huge number of soldiers, and I could not figure out which one was the Minister, because they all looked alike in their uniforms. My brother, Anacleto, who liked

42 See Chapter 9.

43 Vicente 'Sahe' Reis and the Casa dos Timores will be further discussed in Chapter 3.

performances like poetry readings, singing and dancing, was lucky and managed to make his way to the front. That night he read a poem for Vicente Reis. He had been trained by our teacher, Braz from Uato-Carbau, to do it. Braz is still alive today, and I have interviewed him for this study.

Communal Farms⁴⁴

The head of the village was Lino da Silva, a relative and a close friend of my second adopted father, Lucas Baptista. The village organised communal farms. Once, I went to join my adopted father Lucas to work in the communal farms. There was plenty of maize harvested and a lot of pumpkin. The results of the harvest were stored in the *armazem*⁴⁵ (storehouse) in the village. I also went with my cousin Alzira Abu-Rubi, the school teacher, to work on the OPMT farm in Atan-Lele. Because we had no parents, sometimes we benefited from the social assistance services of the Aldeia 20 de Maio and Zone 1975 of Bautae. Not long after, Lucas Baptista suffered a sudden attack from an unknown disease, which caused his leg to become swollen, and he died within a week. In that same period, we received news that my baby sister, Maria Bendita, had fallen down a crevice in a rock and died, in Matebian.

Surviving the Bombings on Mount Matebian in 1978

Story 1: The Last Farm

Our grandmother had a cousin by the name of Gidae, a word in the Makasae language which means chief. He came from the Abu-Afaloicai clan of Ossoleru, on Mount Matebian Mane. We called him *Avo* (Grandpa) Gidae. When we evacuated our village, and moved to the top of Matebian, it was Avo Gidae who looked after us. We lived somewhere between myth and reality. The encirclement and the bombing were intensifying. For some time, we stayed in Avo Gidae's house. Once when the plane came, Avo Gidae told us: "Boys, you can go up to the house, or go and hide in the nearby trees and stay quiet. Nina and your Grandma, come stay in the house with me." We somehow did not trust him, so we went and hid under trees. Avo Gidae obviously believed in the magic power of his traditional house, his *uma-faala*⁴⁶ (in the Makasae

44 The communal system of food production is described in Chapter 10.

45 Armilcar Cabral developed *armazem* in the liberated zones in Guinea Bissau in 1960-early 1970s. See Chapter 4 and Chapter 10

46 Uma-Fa'ala is a traditional community house and it is also the spiritual house for the Makasae speaking clans of Timor-Leste.

dialect). When the land attack was intensifying, he moved us to his farm, located about one kilometre away from his house. He told us:

This farm is yours. Take whatever is on it for your food, but do not touch things that belong to other people. And love each other in the family. You will be all right.

We followed his words this time. We dug holes under the rocks to make caves in which to hide. We took potatoes, cabbages and other kinds of crops from the farm for our food. We lived near a spring, so we did not have to walk a long distance for water. But we stayed there for only a month or so, occupying three different caves. All our grandparents and young girls stayed in one cave. Our aunts stayed in another cave. And we, the boys, had our own cave. One day, the plane saw from the air a white stone in the middle of our three caves, which we were not aware of. The plane fired its guns at the stone, breaking it into pieces. And everyone was terrified. One piece of the stone flew just above the ground, hitting my cousin, Lino, in the knees, and he screamed as if his leg had been cut in half. Another cousin, Manuel Pinto, who was a bit older, grabbed Lino's leg, but found it was only a small wound. We were all caught between laughter and relief. Within days, we moved out from the farm, and it was our last farm in the Base de Apoio.

Story 2: The Last Pig

At this point our Aunt Evangelina da Silva had a pig. She had been defending the pig, hoping that it would reproduce. But there was no future for the poor pig. The pig was noisy when she got hungry, and our neighbours were unfriendly with us, for fear that the enemy might locate our position. At least four, sometimes six planes came bombing daily, in October and November 1978, the last months before Matebian fell. Usually, the bombing would last until around 6pm. One day, it was getting dark. Assuming that there were no more planes coming, Evangelina ordered my cousins to kill the pig and they did so, preparing a nice meal. As we were about to eat the food, the plane surprisingly returned to bomb us around 7pm or so, and they dropped the bombs very close to our hiding place. We rushed to hide in another cave, which was a small distance from ours. When the planes were gone, one whole family, thought to be nine people from the village of Loi-Ulu in Uato-Carbau, had been incinerated, trapped underground. We still heard some people calling, but it was just impossible to rescue them.

At home, we found nothing left of the pig. It was either stolen or eaten by dogs. The following day, Xanana Gusmão, who was Vice-Secretary of our Region, came to visit the site and people beseeched him: “Comrade, we are all being killed everyday!” Xanana told the people: “These people, they do not die for nothing, they die for our independence!” And he left.

Story 3: A Bamboo Pot of Drinking Water

After that bombing, we moved again to a new place, our last in the mountain. This time we were scattered. Our grandmother, Maria Lourdes, who was in her seventies, my sister Aguida Bendita da Silva (‘Nina’) who was 3 years old and myself, we stayed alone in a cave. Our cousins would bring us food which they obtained from the *Seccae* of Zona 1975,⁴⁷ food like maize powder and dry sweet potatoes, that could last for days. Nina would always cry when there was no water and the responsibility fell on me. Our two other brothers, my elder brother Anacleto and our youngest brother David stayed with other relatives. Albertina Madeira, our maid, and Maria Pinto, our cousin, were our faithful guardians. I took the responsibility to look for water for Nina. We had to travel for twenty four hours, from one evening until the next, to bring back around two or three litres of water in a bamboo pot. During the day, we travelled slowly, hiding from the planes. At night we could keep travelling, but we needed to be aware of the sounds of the artillery and mortars, because through their sounds we could identify where they might land.

I can remember one trip, probably our longest and last to look for water. We used to go to a place called Uai-Bitai, miles away from our hiding cave. We had to travel through narrow gorges, heading down to the valley. Many other water resources had been captured by the Indonesian forces. So many people were hit, either by bullets, bombs, mortars and artillery. Everyone at some point had to scramble along the ground, to get to the water source. This time, I went to get water with some seven or so other friends, travelling from Matebian Mane, to the Uai-Bitai valley, which was between the two mountains, Matebian Mane and Matebian Feto.⁴⁸ The FALINTIL forces were fighting the Indonesian forces around the area. As we were coming close to the spring, a man was shot dead and fell into the water. We all turned back and ran, as the red bullets were flying, like stars. But we all survived.

47 The *Seccae* was the Economic Department of the Zone.

48 *Mane* means male and *Feto* means female. This was how the two mountain peaks were known

Story 4: The Potato and the Wounded FALINTIL Fighter

It was already more than 24 hours since we had left. We had nearly run out of food, and we still had no water to bring home. Around midnight, we moved to a cave at the foot of Matebian Mane and by luck we found a group of FALINTIL fighters who were cooking potatoes behind a big rock for some wounded comrades. One of them came to talk to us, and he ordered us to help with cooking the potatoes for the wounded comrades. The way we cooked the potatoes, is to put them in the hot charcoal of the fire, and leave them for a while until they were cooked and one could just remove the black skins, ready for eating. What happened was that we cooked the potatoes and the results were divided. Some went to the wounded FALINTIL members inside the cave and some went to our group. Realizing that cooking was taking so long, one of the FALINTIL fighters came out to check. “Comrades, why are the potatoes not cooked yet?”, he said. I cannot remember our exact responses, but we had some potatoes that night and managed to get water the following day.

Story 5: Hail Mary

Another time, Maria Pinto, Albertina and I had gone again to Uai-Bitai. Poor Albertina lost her way, so we could not find her. The following day, she managed to get back home and safe. On our return, after collecting the water, a plane attacked us. It was around midday, and we were out in the open, in between the rocks and the trees. There was no way that we could escape death. Aside from Maria Pinto, there was one other woman. We put the water somewhere, and these women pulled down a little tree called ‘Kai-Llala’ to camouflage ourselves. Maria asked me to lay down and they put their legs on the top of me. And Maria said: “Tino-Kay”, as I was called. “If we die, please, go and inform grandmother and aunties that we are dead, ok.!” As I lay underneath, terrified and crying, I could hear them praying, “Hail Mary”.

Story 6: The Death of Marcelino Mauloho

In the Labalou mountain, the FALINTIL elite forces known as KC (for *Komandu Choque*, literally Shock Brigade), had wiped out an Indonesian battalion, PASMAR XI (Marine Forces XI) and such a victory was big news. Other news came to us through Tomás Betu-Laili, a member of KC and a cousin, telling us that Commander Lai-Cana of Quelicai and Commander

Mau-Loho were great fighters defending the area of Ira-isi, only miles way from our cave. Both Mau-Loho and Lai-Kana were heroes, we were proud of them. But then the news became bad. Mau-Loho had been killed and Lai-kana was wounded in that fighting. We were so terrified; the enemy was advancing to our position. Tomás Betu-Laili also told us that Tomás da Cruz,⁴⁹ who had deserted from FALINTIL, and who had been leading the Indonesian forces, had been shot in the battle. But air bombings were intensifying. Some days later we also got news that fierce fighting was going on nearby. I was with Mana⁵⁰ Maria on our way from the spring at Uai-Bitae. We had collected the water but had not been able to return home. Late that night, we came across people setting up a camp, who were collecting water for the FALINTIL fighters on the battle front. I was in the front, so my water was to be taken away. I was in between ‘a rock and a hard place’, either to keep it for my young sister or to contribute to FALINTIL. I resisted, saying that the water was for my young sister and my old grand mother. Maria was whispering at me from behind: “ Tino-Kai, please give it to FALINTIL. I will repay you.”

Story 7: The Unexploded Bomb

There were two families hiding in each side of the same stone cave. The Francisco Xavier family of Ala-Oli, and my grandmother, Nina and myself. This time we were visited by our other cousins: Feliciano, António and Lino Pinto. They brought us some food and water. As a member of the second line of FALINTIL, known as Arma Branca (the White Army), Feliciano and another friend, Jerónimo, had just narrowly missed being killed or captured, after the enemy attacked their camp in Beremeta, Matebian Mane. Around midday, the plane came, dropping its bombs. One bomb hit our cave, without exploding, then bounced away, and still did not explode. But five people had suffered from its radiation, their faces and skin burned black. Presumably, they were left to die on the mountain. That same day, Cristina Kai-Malidere, Anacleto’s teacher, was running up and down, crying out that Delfin, her brother, had been killed by a mortar explosion and his body was cut into pieces, while they were having a meeting of the Central Committee of FRETILIN. Delfin Quintao was a member of Delegadu Komissariadu (DK) working in the Commissariat of the CCF (Central Committee of FRETILIN).

49 Tomás da Cruz was a platoon commander of FALINTIL who was arrested together with Commander Aquilis but managed to escape.

50 *Mana* is a Tetum term of respect for an older woman, like *Senhora* in Portuguese.

Two days later, the CCF announced that those who wanted to go on fighting could join the guerrilla army, and those who wanted to leave the mountains and go down to the Indonesian-occupied territories could do so, with the hope that one day we would meet again in an independent Timor-Leste. As we were coming down from the mountains, there were two FALINTIL fighters with us, José Lesu-Lalebau and Silvino Liame. The fighters were dispersed among the population, but there were spies from the lowlands who identified them. Jose was killed, his body left to lie in the gutter. Silvino was dragged away, pulled along the ground by a rope, and I could see the back of his t-shirt, caked in blood.

SETTLEMENT CAMPS IN UATO-CARBAU

After the collapse of our Base de Apoio on Mount Matebian on 22 November 1978, many people surrendered to the Indonesians, and many others went to join the guerrillas. At that time, I witnessed people dying of famine, some FRETILIN members surrendering, disappearing, or being assassinated, others escaping from their villages to Baucau, Dili or other districts, and others going back to the jungle. I also witnessed sexual violence being committed by Indonesian forces against the local people. In this section, I will tell some short stories from that time.

Story 1: Jeremias alias Kildiri

Avâ Kildiri had a typical story. He came from a sub-clan of Burabuhæ called Malele. Many years earlier, he had travelled to Luca in Viqueque, where he had married a woman called Buisoru. Because Buisoru's family was unknown to the clan, this marriage was not permitted, but Kildiri insisted, and he paid the price of not being accepted back into his clan. My grandfather, who was the chief of the overall Buraboo clan, under which the Boraboo community existed, allowed Kildiri to settle on our own land. Buisoru became sick and died around 1976, but Kildiri survived the bombings on Matebian. On returning to the village, he was badly treated by his relatives. He became very sick, and was kept where the pigs were fed. Hearing of this, my father said to me, "Tino-Kai, go to the Akadiru-ulu family and see if the old man, Kildiri, is there." I went, and was shocked to see Kildiri living like a pig, eating the same food as the pigs. I returned home and told father the story, and soon Kildiri was living with us, looking after our farm. I worked with him in the farm. Around the same time, I remember that three

distant relatives, who were all FALINTIL members, namely Delfin Uaimasi, Guilhermino and Manuel Kai-malidere, were reported to have been executed by Indonesian forces. There were eight other men who were their comrades, who came to get travel documents from my father, who by then was the head of the village, so they could escape to Dili, Baucau and Viqueque.

Story 2: My Banana 'Rebellion'

In 1979, my father had married again for the second time, to a woman whose father, Fernando Pinto, had been one of the rebel leaders in the 1959 Revolt⁵¹. He set up rules for us children to obey. One was that lunch time was at midday, straight after school finished. The school was just 200 metres away from our home; so, by lunch time, all the children had to be home. When there were bananas to eat, my father would divide them, to make sure that all the kids would get their share.

One day, it happened that I went with other kids for a football game, forgetting that we needed to come home for lunch at noon. By the time I got home, I was hungry and tired. There was a small banana on my meal plate. I knew about this bunch of bananas, because I had worked in the farm, and I was determined to claim my share. I said to everyone in the kitchen, "Why does this banana look like a monkey's penis?" They told me uneasily that I should talk to Dad, because he was the one who had distributed the bananas. In the evening time, when everyone was at the table, including Father, I raised my hand. "Ponto de ordem!", I said. (i.e. Point of order, as we had learned in the mountains). When he gave me permission to speak, I said: 'Father, this banana looks like monkey's penis. I worked hard on the farm and it is unfair to have this kind of banana'. I threw the banana away. He said, "Well, that banana should have gone to someone else, just like you got. It is the same. So you should eat whatever you get, that is just." And I said, "But I worked in the farm to look after the bananas, so they would bear fruit." And he then started to say something like, "The rule is that the lunch time is midday. If people are not there at lunch time, it means they are not hungry." I was so angry. "Excuse me father," I said. "When we were in the mountain, you did not feed us! We worked our fingers to the bone, and we struggled for our lives."

51 See Gunter (2007, p. 36) for an account of Pinto's role in the revolt.

This was a sharp blow to father's self-respect. He got up and left the lunch, and everyone was upset because of what I had said. Father no longer had his lunch, he was so furious and went around the house, as was his habit when he got angry. My cousin Feliciano then told me: "Tino-Kai, get up and go away from here! You are in grave trouble!" I escaped from home, and went to stay with Alzira, my cousin, for some weeks, until father sent a messenger to bring me home.

Soon after that incident, father started taking me with him, to clandestine meetings he had with his friends. We usually left home around 7pm and would return at midnight. Then, in 1984, my father and his friends, including Gaspar Alacho, Chiquito Bahatata, and Liurai Afonso of Loi-Ulu, were all arrested. The last three were all taken away by Indonesian Battalion 511 and disappeared. Still today, no one knows where they were taken and what happened.

Story 3: Rapes

Early one morning, a village woman arrived on our doorstep, with her husband, Feliciano Koni-Ulu. She had been raped, just one hour before, by some soldiers from Battalion 732, which came from Ambon. Father was angry, and called on me to come with him. We ended up going to the military headquarters with the lady, who was still wet from the rape, and showed the Commander. Some soldiers had already left, but those remaining were lined up in the football field and the lady was asked to indicate who had raped her. She was of course unable to point them out. The lady was given a *batik* cloth, and we left.



Photo. My father Agostinho da Silva, around 1980

Story 4: The Son of FRETILIN

By the time we arrived in Uato Carbau in 1979, after the surrender, my father was the Chief of the village of Uani-Uma, respected for his ability to work tirelessly and maintain close contact with his people. But we children were like strangers to the youth in the town who had arrived earlier, who now wore the uniform of the Indonesian Boy Scouts. My sister, Nina, my Grandma, and I all lived with my father who was now re-married, while my brothers Anacleto and David lived with some other relatives. Anacleto hated my father for the fact that he had left us in the mountains. But Anacleto kept things to himself. He was more interested in reading poems, performing drama and singing songs. I enjoyed farming, fighting in the street, looking for shrimps in the river, hunting birds, and sport. I had a football team composed of old friends: Matias Braz, Aristides Xavier, Fernando and Avelino of the Kefy family and Marcelino Liame. Their family were all FRETILIN members. We played well and always scored every time we played. Our opponents at the school called us the Sons of FRETILIN. People who were called FRETILIN were the enemies of the Indonesian forces, and we could have been killed. We fought these early arrivals, and not just on the football field. We challenged them physically in the class rooms and on the street, fighting. The anger went on for a long time.

A short time later, my grandmother died, and Nina and I were left alone. Life was so terribly hard. The advantage of living with my father's new family was to go around with him as he worked. One day, Francisco Borulaku and Abílio Sorubai, both FRETILIN members, surrendered. Very early in the morning, Father told me:

Tino-Kai, get up and take your volley ball with you and go to the field in front of the Koramil⁵², pretending to play, and see if your cousin Borulaku is there.

Borulaku, as I wrote above, had been my political educator in the Bases de Apoio, and I was excited to see him again. When I got there, two men were cleaning up the front yard, and they smiled at me. But a few minutes later, two *HANSIPs*,⁵³ Acai-Boru of Afaloicai and Jaime of Bahatata, arrived. Each of them proceeded to kick Borulaku in the face with their boots. Each

52 Koramil was the sub-district level Indonesian military headquarters. At the district level, it was called Kodim

53 HANSIP was an Indonesian paramilitary force, consisting of Timorese.

time he was kicked, he fell to the ground, then got up again, with tears running down his face. Then another group of about seven people from Irabin village came with shorts sticks, also wanting to beat Borulaku. But an army commander, who was said to come from Sumatra, spoke to them, and they headed back home. I was so shocked and straight away, I ran to my father to tell him that people were going to kill Borulaku. The following day, he was taken by helicopter to Baucau but then released and returned a few months later to Uato-Carbau on the International Red Cross plane, which was distributing maize.

Another story I remember about a FRETILIN member involves Bernardo Quintão 'Romit'. He was a Kilobravo, a FALINTIL military officer, working in the COMSEC (Sector Command) around Matebian. One day, around noon, just as I had arrived from school, Carlos Nunu-Soko of Uato-Liloli arrived, all sweating, saying that Romit was just nearby, wanting to surrender. Romit was eventually brought to a platoon of Indonesian forces known as ARMED, who were from Sumatra. But he had to leave Uato-Carbau for Viqueque because it was not secure there. There were other FRETILIN cadres who were constantly harassed in the town, to whom Father gave a *Surat Jalan* (Travel Letter), allowing them to move to Baucau, Dili, Viqueque and elsewhere.

The Massacre

Sometime around February 1984, for reasons which are still unclear, some FALINTIL fighters launched a series of attacks against the villages of Uaitame in Uato-Lari, and Bahatata⁵⁴ and Uani-Uma in Uato-Carbau. In Uani-Uma, our village, FALINTIL did not kill any civilians, but they burned down three or four houses. An hour later, the Indonesian forces and the militia, known as HANSIP, came from Uato-Carbau and the fighting that night resulted in three HANSIPs being killed. The following morning, the Indonesian Special Forces (RPKD)⁵⁵ arrived. During this period, about forty people were arrested in the Uato-Carbau town alone. My father's brother, Recardino Madeira, who was also my adoptive father, was soon after executed on the orders of RPKD. About 16 people were taken away by Battalion 511, including five of my relatives, on April 11, 1984. Their whereabouts still remain unknown.

54 Bahatata is the village of Ildha Maria da Conceicao, a FALINTIL fighter and a leader of OPMT. Her husband was Commander Kili Uaegae, whose death remains a mystery until today. Ildha, now a member of FRETILIN CCF, was the Vice Minister of Education in 2006-07.

55 RPKD stands for Resimen Pasukan Komando Angkatan Darat, later known as KOPASSUS.

After these events, an Indonesian army unit moved into the village, staying only 200 metres from our house. When an Indonesian soldier, whose name was M. Latief, attempted to abuse a woman who was staying with us in our house, my father grabbed an air gun and began to attack the soldier. “You, who say FRETILIN has so many wives, and are communist, you are the communist!”, he shouted. As a result, he was detained, at first in the police station and later, in the military headquarters in Viqueque, for about six months. From then on, he was kept under a form of house arrest, until he died, on February 7, 1995. Soldiers visited us almost every day.

ESCAPE TO DILI

Seeing those horrible disappearances, the execution of my uncle Recardino Madeira, and the detention of my father, in this same month, April 1984, I managed to escape in a PT. Gunung Kijang⁵⁶ car. I have lived in Dili since then. When I arrived in Dili, I had already started the first year of secondary school, but I had not done my exams, so I had no certificate to allow me to continue my studies. I sent a letter asking for assistance back to my village. At my relatives’ request, Samuel Alves, a former FALINTIL Commander who had been my teacher and Yangsen Bawiling, a Christian teacher from Sulawesi who had married a local girl, wrote down the grades I had received, and this allowed me to pursue my studies at the most elite school in Dili, Sao Paulo VI. But it was a blessing in disguise, because I was a classmate of Xanana’s son, Eugénio Paulo Gusmão (Neto), and was reminded of FRETILIN in the Bases de Apoio.

In Dili, I had to engage in many different types of activities, just to survive. These included buying and selling bread rolls early in the morning; card playing during mourning ceremonies; ⁵⁷ working in construction in Kailoki at night from 7pm to 11pm for Rp.1500 (15cents) per night; selling fuel in the market; and cultivating vegetables on the outskirts of the city, travelling on foot every weekend from Dili to Hera to do the farming, and opening a kiosk to sell the produce in my suburb, Becora.

In 1987 and 1988, I joined the student demonstrations, becoming involved in the underground, the

56 Pt. Gunung Kijang was a private Indonesian road construction company. Francisco Xavier, a relative of in the village who was a religious teacher in the church helped me to obtain a seat in the car, and I managed to leave for Dili.

57 It is a tradition for Dili people to play cards, gambling when someone died, as a way to stay on guard in the house of the family of the dead. It is considered to be normal as a way for people to gather and associate. I always carried several packs of cards, so I could join the gathering and make some money.

Clandestine Resistance⁵⁸. I was arrested twice by the Indonesian military, once in Viqueque in 1988, and the second time in Dili, on 16 February 1991. In 1992, I went to study in the Catholic Seminary in the Philippines. I returned to Dili in December 1994, after having represented my student organisation, HPP-MAI/LENAT, in the first Asia Pacific Conference on East Timor (APCET I).

CONCLUSION: My Fathers' Last Word

I returned from the Philippines in December 1994, and the following February, I travelled to Uato-Carbau, to see my father. Upon my arrival, we talked about various things, including life in Manila, and in Uato-Carbau, and the politics of Timor. Dad said to me, "I know you work with Mau Hudo,⁵⁹ but be aware you have so many enemies".⁶⁰ Five days later, a terrible diarrhoea overtook my father, and he died on 7 February, 1995.

With only US\$65 in pocket, I began studying Politics at the university in Dili, (UNTIM) in July 1995. In June 1998, I was appointed the leader of the ETSSC (East Timor Students Solidarity Council), for the referendum campaign, which ended with an overwhelming popular vote for independence, in August 1999. People should know that FRETILIN began the resistance, with a *war of weapons*, for self-defence; and we ended the war of resistance, with the *army of the pens*. Three weeks after the vote, on September 21, 1999, as the troops were withdrawing, Indonesian Battalion 745 from Lospalos found my brother in Fatuahi with two foreign journalists and a driver. The Indonesians took my brother, Anacleto Bendito da Silva, away. It was said that he had been executed; but, until today, his remains have not been found.⁶¹ Mau Hudo, who originally came from the same village as my mother, and whose house was just next to ours in Bebonuk, also disappeared soon after the referendum in 1999.

This is my story, which may help the reader to understand who I am and why I have undertaken this research.

58 The story of the clandestine resistance is told in Chapter 12.

59 José da Costa 'Mau Hudo Ran Kadalak' or known as 'Mau Hudo' was a student of Liceu Dr. Francisco Machado. As described in later chapters, he was a member of UNETIM and was the top student of legendary FRETILIN leader Vicente Reis 'Sahe'. His mother and mine (Maria Bendita), came from the same town Baguia and are relatives. Orlando Baptista, my cousin was a vendor and his nearest neighbor in Bebonuk. Over the years in Dili from around 1994 to 1998, Mau Hudo, Paulino and Orlando were my close friends.

60 Only later I discovered through Andre Pinto member of HPP-MAI that Mau Hudo had met my father in Becusse, in Dili, when I was away in Manila.

61 While translating for a British Journalist of the Nation Jon Swain, Anacleto Bendito da Silva was arrested by Indonesian forces Battalion 745, mainly composed of Timorese, in Dili on 21 September 1999 and disappeared (See Swain 13/09/2009).

CHAPTER 3

EARLY POPULAR EDUCATORS AND THEIR INTELLECTUAL FORMATION

INTRODUCTION

The origins of FRETILIN's popular education program lay in the experience of a small number of leaders who received some education under the Portuguese colonial system. In 1940, the fascist Salazar regime in Portugal had signed a Concordat with the Vatican, delegating responsibility for all education in the Portuguese colonies to the Church (Lenox 2000, p.28; Hill 2002, p.18), and it was not until 1960 that the Portuguese Government established the first public senior high school in Timor, the *Liceu Dr. Francisco Machado*. It offered general courses up to the equivalent of seven years of secondary studies. In 1969, Salesian priests opened a private agricultural school in Fatumaca, near Baucau (Magalhaes 2004), and in 1973-4, the Government established another high school, the *Escola Tecnica*, which offered professional courses in Administration and Commerce, and in Electrical, Mechanical and Civil Engineering. At the elementary level,⁶² overall, there were 94,000 students and 1,336 teachers across the country in 1973-74 (Magalhães 2004). According to Hill, the Government, the church and the military became the three main pillars of education in the expansion of the system from 1967-1973. By school year 1972/1973, the military ran 93 schools compared to 50 run by the church, and 298 by the Government (Hill 2002, p.39).

This chapter analyses the intellectual formation, ideas and programs of two groups which, arising from this colonial education context, began to build a popular education movement to oppose Portuguese colonialism and fascism. These groups are known as the Anti-Colonial Informal Discussion Group (AIDG) of Nicolau Lobato in Dili, and the Casa dos Timores university students in Lisbon. The first part of this chapter discusses the former, focusing on the personal educational background and political inclinations of key members, prior to the establishment of the *Associação Social Democrática Timorese* (ASDT), the forerunner organisation to FRETILIN. The second part of the chapter deals with the Casa dos Timores students, many of

62 Elementary schooling consisted of kindergarten, plus four years of primary education.

whom returned to Timor-Leste in 1974, to play a central role in FRETILIN's popular education initiatives. I discuss also the background of the key members, their early political activism in Portugal, and the work which some of them began when they returned to Timor-Leste in September 11, 1974.

THE ANTI-COLONIAL DISCUSSION GROUP (AIDG)

Previous studies by Jolliffe (1978) and Hill (2002) indicate that, in the early 1970s, an active underground group was already writing regularly in the Catholic Journal *Seara*, and meeting regularly “in conditions of utter clandestinity” in Dili (Jolliffe 1978, p.56). In his autobiography, the resistance leader Xanana Gusmão wrote that, when he was still in the high school in the mid-1960s, there was a group of friends who would meet at ‘social gatherings’ but then everyone married and started to stay home, or were too busy. Justino Mota was an exception, a friend of Xanana who always had time to go out for “chatting and grumbling,” and another group of young people soon formed. Xanana describes this group as

. . . deeply engrossed in society gossip (such as) the Chinese and their smiling diplomacy and red envelopes; bosses, their integrity and professional abilities or otherwise; governors and their policies, taxes and prices; the ‘terrorism’ in the African provinces; day to day life in the civil service—these were all topics that reflected a dissatisfied character (Gusmão 2000, p.15).

Borja da Costa, a friend whom he met when they both served in the Portuguese Army, was also one of this group. His friendship with da Costa and Mota and, later, his close relationship with Nicolau Lobato, would seem to indicate that Xanana was connected with the clandestine group, though his own writings do not reveal this.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the group began to promote their ideas through the local media. The writers were Nicolao Lobato, José Ramos Horta, Xavier do Amaral (writing as ‘Ramos Paz’), Domingos de Oliveira, Manuel Carrascalão, Francisco Borja da Costa, Inácio Moura and Marí Alkatiri (Jolliffe 1978, p.56; Cabral 2002, p.189). Another member of the

AIDG was Rui Fernandes, who was a school teacher at the *Liceu* (Cabral 2002, p.174).⁶³ Most of this group became the founding members of ASDT in May 1974 in Dili, soon after the Carnation Revolution in Portugal (Jolliffe 1978, p.63-64). However, Manuel Carrascalão and Domingos Oliveira later became leading members of União Democrática de Timor (UDT), which advocated a federation under Portugal.

Leading Figures of AIDG

This section considers six members of AIDG, namely Nicolau dos Reis Lobato, Justino Mota, Mari Alkatiri and José Ramos Horta, who formed the core group which established ASDT; and two poets, Borja da Costa and Inácio Moura, whose writings had a deep influence on FRETILIN's popular education work. I will also discuss the educational background of Francisco Xavier do Amaral, because his writings in *Seara* influenced the thinking of the group. Even though some of these stories have appeared in other studies, e.g. Hill (2000), Jolliffe (1978), Cabral (2002) and CAVR (2006), this study aims to provide a new perspective, demonstrating that they were not just political leaders, but also popular educators.

1). Nicolau dos Reis Lobato: The leader

Nicolau dos Reis Lobato was born in Soibada, Laclubar, on 24 May 1946. He completed a course in humanities, equivalent to high school, at the Jesuit-run Minor Seminary, *Nossa Senhora de Fátima*, in Dare, then left the seminary, in 1965, and continued with a two-year general course at the *Liceu* in Dili, the equivalent to today's Bachelor of Arts. Nicolau wanted to study law in Portugal but was unable to do so because of his responsibilities as the eldest son in a family of 13 children (*Diário* 30/12/2009). Bishop Jaime Garcia Goulart and Father Martinho da Costa Lopes had some indirect influence on Nicolau Lobato.

According to Jolliffe, Nicolau served as a regular Portuguese soldier from 1966-1968, during which time he came in contact with a Mozambican soldier, Sergeant Timane, through whom he began to learn secretly about political developments in Africa. After two years of military service, Nicolau went to work in the Department of Agriculture, and later worked in the Department

⁶³ Rui Fernandes, who was born in Maliana, taught history in the *Liceu*. He was a founding member of ASDT and became a member of the CCF, remaining a member until his death, in Dili in 2008.

of Finance, where he studied economics in his spare time (Jolliffe 1978, p.56). Nicolau met a Cape Verdian agriculturalist, named Marcelino, in the Department of Agriculture, through whom he learned about Amílcar Cabral and the PAIGC⁶⁴ (*Diário* 30/12/2009). Ramos Horta described Nicolau as intellectually inclined, very ambitious, with an enormous appetite for reading (Horta 1987, p.63). He was one of the regular contributors to the journal, *Seara*. Soon after the April 1974 Carnation Revolution in Portugal, Nicolau left his job to dedicate all his time to the formation of ASDT/FRETILIN. When the pro-Portuguese party, UDT, launched a coup in Dili in August 1975, Nicolau and other members of the FRETILIN Central Committee (CCF) initiated the formation of FRETILIN's armed wing, FALINTIL, and, under his leadership, FALINTIL launched a counter-coup, defeating the UDT forces within two weeks, to become the de-facto ruling authority.

He became the first Prime Minister of Timor-Leste when FRETILIN declared independence on 28 November 1975, and later became the President of Republic, replacing Xavier do Amaral (see below) in 1977. He was killed in a battle against the Indonesian forces in Mindelo, near Maubissi and Same, on 31 December 1979. He married Isabel Barreto, who was executed by the Indonesian forces in Dili on the day of the invasion, December 7, 1975. The marriage left them a son, José Maria Barreto Lobato Gonçalves, who is a current member of the Central Committee of FRETILIN (*Diário* 30/12/2009).

As will be seen in subsequent chapters, Nicolau Lobato played a key role in developing FRETILIN's strategy, including its mobilisation of the peasantry to support the independence struggle, and the establishment of the Resistance Bases after the invasion.

2). Justino Mota

Justino Mota, is regarded as one of the very critically-minded ASDT founding members. Justino's political consciousness was likely born out of his family's historical background. His parents were descendants of East Timorese of African and European origin, and this seemed to have provided him with some comparative stories and knowledge. Like Marí Alkatiri and

64 Amílcar Cabral and the PAIGC are discussed in Chapter 4

José Ramos Horta, Mota acquired his highest education from the *Liceu* in Dili, and he also had experienced working as civil servant prior to the Carnation Revolution (Cabral 2002, p.191). Justino Mota acquired his informal formation from his mother who was an active religious teacher and devoted Catholic. I have not found any article or poem written in his name, in surviving copies of *Seara*, and have discovered little about his overseas experience. Mota, Lobato, Horta and Alkatiri formed the core group in establishing ASDT in May 20, 1974, and Mota went on to become a leading member of the Central Committee of FRETILIN. According to Cabral (2002, p.191), Indonesian forces arrested him and his wife in the early days of the invasion in Dili, and “he spent three years and she eighteen months in prison, without trial.” Together with his wife and children, Mota went into exile in Portugal in 1982, where he died of tuberculosis, which he had contracted while in prison in Dili. Mota had three children, of whom one died also, in the early 1990s.

3). Marí Alkatiri

Marí Bin Ahmad Alkatiri comes from a prominent Timorese Muslim family, part of the small Muslim community in Dili, whose forefathers had come from Southern Yemen, some 200 years before his birth, providing him with strong educational, moral and intellectual roots. Like many Timorese, Alkatiri studied the General High School Course at the *Liceu* in Dili, where he met Nicolau Lobato, providing him both with friendship and the inspiration to dream of an independent Timor (Fieldnotes, Alkatiri Public Seminar,⁶⁵ 30/12/2009). On the advice of Nicolau, Alkatiri travelled to Angola to study, where he learned about the political ideas of the independence movement there, the MPLA (*Movimento Popular para a Libertação de Angola*).⁶⁶ On his return, *Seara* provided him with a training ground to put forward his anti-colonial ideas and visions for Timor-Leste. Among his writings was an article entitled ‘Yes Sir’ published in *Seara* 8 August 1973. In this article, he criticized those Timorese who cultivated a mentality of inferiority, and were always ready to obey their patrons (*Seara*, 8/8/72). In a seminar in 2009 at the national university, Alkatiri recalled that the AIDG had sent him to Indonesia to lobby for support for an independent Timor-Leste, but he had found no support there (Fieldnotes, Alkatiri

65 As described in Chapter 1, this public seminar was one of a series which formed part of the ‘praxis-discussion’ at the national university, UNTL, stimulated by this research.

66 English: Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola

Seminar, 25/08/2009). A key member of the Central Committee of FRETILIN, he was sent out of the country on 5 December 1975, to lead a diplomatic mission for the newly proclaimed Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (RDTL), along with José Ramos Horta and Rogério Tiago Lobato. In exile for the next two and a half decades of the Timorese Resistance, Alkatiri sustained his spirit of resistance, organising diplomatic support and international solidarity through the external wing of FRETILIN, returning home after the popular consultation of 1999, described in Chapter 12. Alkatiri became the first Prime Minister of RDTL II in 2002, but was forced to resign by the opposition in June 2006. He remains the Secretary-General of FRETILIN. His work in the External Diplomatic Front to build international solidarity and support for the independence struggle, which will be described later, identifies him also as a leading popular educator within FRETILIN.

4). José Ramos Horta

José Ramos Horta, who, at the time of writing, is the President of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (RDTL), had learned in very interesting ways. First, his father and grandfather were both members of an anarcho-syndicalist anti-fascist group in Portugal. So, he was already politically conscious as a child. Second, like Nicolau Lobato, Ramos Horta had spent his student years in a primary school in Soibada, Baucau, and later in the *Liceu* in Dili. After graduating, he worked as a journalist on a government newspaper, *A Voz de Timor*, where his writings were sometimes critical. According to Abel Larisina Ximenes, a former member of the CCF, in those times, the newspaper recruited journalists on the basis of their knowledge and intellectual ability (Abel Larisima Ximenes, Pers. Com. 25/11/2010). Because of his outspoken stance against Portuguese colonialism, Horta was deported to Mozambique at the age of 18. After returning from Mozambique, Horta wrote an article ‘The Myth and the Reality’ which, “brought him to the attention of the police, and he was on the verge of once more being sent into exile when the April revolution occurred” (Dunn 2003, p.53). He also worked as a filmmaker in the Centre for Information and Tourism in Dili during which time he became friends with Inácio Moura (PIDE/DGS⁶⁷: Doc. No. 4/73-2a. Div.Inf). Horta participated in regular

67 PIDE/DGS or simply PIDE, was the title of the Portuguese secret police. The acronym stands for *Polícia Internacional para a Defesa do Estado/ Direcção Geral de Segurança* (English: International State Security Police/Director General of Security)

discussions with prominent people in Dili, including the Indonesian diplomat, Tomodok. Horta wrote another article, entitled, *Maubere*, published in March 1973. PIDE then intervened leading to the closure of *Seara* (Jolliffe 1978, p. 56; Horta, Public Lecture 07/2009; CAVR 2006, p.27). Horta was the founding member of ASDT responsible for External Relations. When ASDT transformed into FRETILIN, Horta became a member of the Central Committee of FRETILIN and remained in his post as the head of External Relations, allowing him to make diplomatic visits to Australia, Indonesia and Portugal. It was Horta who defended the short-lived coalition of UDT and FRETILIN in January 1975. Two days before Indonesia's full scale invasion of Dili, December 7, 1975, Horta was among the three CCF members sent out as a diplomatic mission for the newly proclaimed RDTL. He later became the external Representative of the National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM), in 1987; and in 1996, he and Bishop Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. He was elected President of the Republic in 2007. As will be seen in later chapters, Horta also played a significant role in FRETILIN's early popular education work.

5). Francisco Borja da Costa

Borja da Costa was born on 14 October 1946 to a Liurai family in Fatu-Berliu, in the district of Same. Like many other early Timorese leaders, when Borja da Costa finished his elementary school in Soibada, he went on to study to be a Catechist in the Catholic seminary in Dare, called the *Colégio de S. Francisco Xavier*. Between 1963 and 1967, he completed the seven year program at the *Liceu*, then served in the regular Portuguese army from 1968 until 1971. He wrote regularly in *Seara* (Da Costa 2009, p.5). He was one of the first leaders killed by the invading Indonesian army on 7 December 1975 (Cabral 2002, p.195). As will be seen in later chapters, Da Costa's poems and songs played an integral part in the popular education work of FRETILIN. In particular, he wrote *Foho Ramelau*, which became a symbol for mass political education and was sung across the country in 1974-1975. It continued to provide inspiration in the Bases de Apoio and is now the anthem of FRETILIN.

Mount Ramelau

Eh! Mount Ramelau, Mount Ramelau, eh!
What is higher than your peak?
What is greater than your majesty eh!
Why, Timor, is your head forever bowed?
Why, Timor, are your children enslaved?
Why, Timor, do your children continue to bow?
Why, Timor, do your children remain enslaved?
Awake, the foot of the mountain is white!
Awake, A new sun has risen!
Open your eyes, a new day is over your village
Open your eyes, a new day is over our land
Awake, take the reins of your own horse
Awake, take the reins of your own destiny, eh!
Awake, govern our own land eh!

Foho Ramelau

Eh! Foho Ramelau, Foho Ramelau eh!
Sa be aas liu o tutun,
Sa be bein liu o lolon eh!
Tan sa timoroan hakru'uk bebeik?
Tan sa timoroan ata uai-uain?
Tan sa timor ulun sudur uai-uain?
Tan sa timoroan ata uai-uain?
Hader, rai hun mutin ona la!
Hader, loro foun sa'e ona la!
Loke matan, loro foun to'o iha o knua
Loke matan, loro foun iha ita rain
Hader, kaer rasik kuda talin eh!
Hader, ukun rasik ita rain eh!

The song uses ordinary words that are familiar to the common people. Ramelau is the highest mountain in Timor-Leste with approximately 3000 meters high. The original words for Awake, 'take reins of your own *kuda* (horse)' is *hader, kaer rasik kuda tali eh! Hader! Ukun rasik ita rai eh!*



Today, the FRETILIN logo continues this image, showing a hand holding a rope, of the kind used to lead a horse.

6). Inácio Moura

Inácio da Moura, like Borja da Costa, was a poet, whose works reflected and inspired the emergence of anti-colonial consciousness among the Timorese. He worked with Tourism Department of the Portuguese Administration in Dili. Long before the 1974 Carnation Revolution, Moura had begun to refer to the Timorese as the Maubere People and had written many poems including the words, ‘the Maubere people’ and ‘the land of Maubere’. Moura wrote a poem entitled ‘*Peregrinos da sorte- The pilgrims of luck*’ which appeared in Seara on the same page as Mari Alkatiri’s short story ‘*Sim, Senhor!*’ (Seara 8/8/1972). The poem was republished in Seara on September 23, 1973 and attracted the attention of the political police, PIDE-DGS.⁶⁸ In 1973, a PIDE/DGS officer, Lourenço Soares, reported that Julieta Fatal and Inácio de Moura had published a book entitled ‘*Vamos Cantar Uma Ilha*’ and some of its poems were already out in the press, causing resentment in Dili (PIDE-DGS 1973). In the collection, “*Vamos Cantar Uma Ilha*”, Inácio Moura used the term ‘*Mau Bere*’ repeatedly in his poems such as; “*Era uma vez uma terra, a terra de Mau Bere,*” ‘*Carícias de Mau Bere,*’ ‘*Quadros soltas para Mau Bere*’, ‘*Tédio de Mau Bere*’; ‘*Os meus Poemas*’, ‘*Cantiga de Amigo para o entardecer de Mau Bere*’. As discussed below, Maubere became a key symbol of the revolutionary independence struggle of the Timorese, the *Revolução Maubere*, in 1975.

7). Francisco Xavier do Amaral: ‘The Teacher’

As the son of a Liurai in Turiscai, Xavier do Amaral had learned from his family about the lives of his people, and the interactions they had with the colonial administrators. Xavier acquired a very high-level religious education. After studying for the Catholic priesthood in Dare Seminary, he finished his theological training in Macau. While in Macau, according to Hill (2002, p.61), Xavier followed closely the happenings back home, and was also very much influenced by a rebellion by Timorese political dissidents in 1959, the subsequent massacre committed by the Portuguese authorities, and the deportation of the remaining leaders to Angola. He then returned to Timor, and, according to Hill (2002, p.62), “in 1966, together with a group of friends, he founded a private school ... [which] taught the primary course and the first two *ciclos*, the two year secondary courses ... for young people who were excluded from the Portuguese educational

68 I found a copy of the poem in the PIDE-DGS archive in Torre do Tombo, the University of Lisbon.

system.” This led to him becoming known as ‘The Teacher’ Antoninho Santana, *nom de guerre* Nino Konis Santana,⁶⁹ Lino da Silva and José Sarmiento, all of whom later became FRETILIN members, went to this school (Mattoso 2005, p.42; Lino da Silva,⁷⁰ Interview 18/03/2010; José Sarmiento⁷¹, Interview 10/10/2009).

Xavier do Amaral then joined the Customs Department where he became a senior officer. He was one of the contributors to *Seara*, which published his articles under the pen name of *Paz Ramos*, to avoid the watchful eye of the Portuguese secret police, PIDE-DGS (Hill 2002 p.53; Cabral 2002, p.191). In a recent public lecture at the National University of Timor-Lorosae, Xavier do Amaral recalled that he wrote an article on Marxism, which was published by Pe. Martinho da Costa Lopes in *Seara* (Fieldnotes, Francisco Xavier do Amaral Public Lecture 12/06/2009), a copy of which I located in Portugal, in the archives of the Geographical Society of Lisbon (SGL) (Sociedade Geográfica de Lisbon).

Xavier do Amaral assumed the leadership of ASDT/FRETILIN when it was formed in 1974, and when FRETILIN proclaimed Independence on November 28, 1975, he became the first President of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. Due to internal strategic differences, the Supreme Command of the Resistance at that time, made up of members of the CCF and senior FALINTIL commanders, dismissed him from his post as the President of the Republic in 1977 and he was arrested and detained until the collapse of the Resistance Bases in 1978. The Indonesian regime placed him under house arrest, in Bali and later in Jakarta, until 1999. He re-established ASDT in 2000 and won seats in the 2001 Constituent Assembly elections, and he was elected Vice President of the Assembly. He is recognized as the first President of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. His role in leading FRETILIN and the Republic in its early years, and in educating key younger FRETILIN leaders, identifies Xavier do Amaral as one of the early FRETILIN popular educators.

69 Nino Konis Santana was a member of the student union, UNETIM. After the invasion, he became a guerrilla fighter, eventually becoming the FALINTIL commander. He died from an illness in Ermera in March 1998 (Mattoso 2005). See Chapter 6, on UNETIM.

70 Lino da Silva was chief of Aldeia 20 de Maio in Uato-Lari. He came from my hometown, Uato-Carbau in Viqueque.

71 José Sarmiento from Lequidoe was a FALINTIL Commander in 1975. See Chapter 9.

Schools and Early Intellectual Formation

The AIDG was the first network of Timorese ‘popular educators’, whose early attempts to raise the consciousness of Timorese as an oppressed people and to build an educational political movement for the liberation struggle created the foundation for the work described in this thesis. In this section, I will examine further how the members of the group came to acquire this level of awareness and education, through their formal schooling, through the journal *Seara*, and through their experiences in other countries.

The Jesuit School

The Vatican and the Salazar regime signed a Concordat and Missionary Agreement in 1940, under which Catholic Missions in Portuguese colonies were to receive income from the state and to be responsible for educating the indigenous people and for implementing government policy (Lennox 2000, p.28). That year, Dom Jaime Garcia Goulart, a Portuguese priest, became the Bishop of the Diocese of Dili, and held this post until 1967 (Lennox 2000, p.48-51), during which period, the Catholic Church built the Dare Seminary to train Timorese men for the priesthood (Carey 1999, p.78). The seminary is located in the hills above Dili, several kilometers from the capital. Father Martinho da Costa, a brilliant young Timorese student of Dom Jaime, headed the Dare seminary from 1951 until 1954, where he “set the routine for the future leaders of East Timor” (Lennox 2000, pp. 48, 51). This included Francisco Xavier do Amaral and several early FRETILIN leaders who studied there.

Bishop Joaquim Ribeiro, who replaced Dom Jaime Garcia Goulart in 1967, felt “there was enough ‘Jesuit propaganda’ in there (i.e. Dare Seminary)”.

The Jesuits had a history of conflict with Portuguese authorities, going back centuries. They were expelled from Portugal for long stretches of time, and even when they were allowed in the country, their independence made them an object of suspicion by the Portuguese Catholic hierarchy (Kohen 1999, p.61).

According to Hill, there was a radical priest, Father Rocha, who was a disciple of the Columbian Marxist priest, Camilo Torres. Bishop Ribeiro expelled Father Rocha from Timor in October

1974 (Hill 2002, p.77). This brief account suggests that ‘liberation theology’ may have been familiar to the young Timorese who studied in Dare during this early period.

Political Articles in Seara

The Church also established a Catholic Newspaper, or Journal, called *Seara*, with its first edition published in Dili 1948 (SGL: *Seara Timor*, 1 Serie, 1948-1953). *Seara* enabled young Timorese to develop their intellectual capacity and begin their involvement in activist education. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, it became a focus of growing unrest in Portuguese Timor, as it was then known. This publication

stood outside of the normal censorship laws and its columns soon filled with contributions about issues of Timorese life: traditional marriage law, traditional housing customs and attendant problems, scientific humanism v. Christianity, the morality of violence, the principles of education (Jolliffe 1978, p.56).

In Portugal in 2009, I obtained copies of some of the original *Seara* publications, which have been collected and housed in the archives of the *Sociedade Geográfica de Lisboa* (SGL). In the edition of May 29, 1971, the editorial was entitled ‘The contradictions of Marxism.’ This was followed in later issues by a series of articles on the relationship between Marxism and Christianity written by B. Langlois (*Seara* 26/8/1972, *Seara* 9/9/1972). As the numbers of critical articles increased, PIDE/DGS shut down *Seara*, in March 1973 (Lennox 2002, p.86; Jolliffe 1978, p.56) and it was never republished again during the remaining one and a half years of Portuguese colonialism. Because of the limited number of copies of *Seara* and the use of pseudonyms in the *Seara* poems and articles, it is hard to identify all the real authors. However, these writings provide strong evidence of an ‘informal’ but significant presence by the Anti-colonial Discussion Group, prior to the Carnation Revolution.

Comparative Studies

Among Nicolau’s group, José Ramos Horta and Marí Alkatiri were the first to be exposed to overseas experiences, particularly that of the Portuguese-speaking colonies in Africa. These countries were also known to the Timorese people in the districts, because some of the Timorese

involved in the 1959 uprising in Uato-Lari and Uato-Carbau were deported there (Hill 2002, p.50).

In 1970, PIDE interrogated José Ramos Horta, after he allegedly shouted at some Portuguese at a party in Dili, that if they were not careful, they would also face war in Timor-Leste as they were in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. The regime then exiled Horta to Mozambique, where he ‘worked as a journalist, and witnessed FRELIMO in action’ (Jolliffe 1978, p.56-57; see also Hill 2002, p.79). Even though he did not succeed in making contact with FRELIMO, Horta claimed he learnt his politics in Mozambique, after “witnessing the repressiveness of the system and contradictions of Portuguese Government” (Hill 2002, p.64). Horta saw that Mozambican beaches were divided into black and white areas, there was discrimination on buses, and it was black people who worked as waiters in restaurants (Hill 2002, p.65). After returning from Mozambique, Horta wrote an article in *A Voz de Timor*, published on 27 July 1973, entitled *Tópico*. Bill Nicol (2002) incorporated a translation in his book, *Timor: a Nation Reborn*. One section reads:

Today, the facts are very clear in Africa, Latin America where countries are supposed to be independent but in fact are economically and politically dominated by powerful nations which help them to maintain their dependence. This is what is called neo-colonialism, a miserable way of colonizing underdeveloped countries (Ramos Horta, cited Nicol 2002, p. 124-125).

According to Nicol, “the African experience of revolutionary socialism as preached by FRELIMO and other guerrilla movements had a great deal of influence on Horta,” who then made his own analysis about Portuguese colonialism, which he “began to put into practice” in Timor-Leste (Nicol 2002, p.125).

Marí Alkatiri’s experience in Angola was unlike Horta’s. There, he met secretly with a representative of the MPLA (Jolliffe 1978, p.57). On his return, between December 1972 and January 1973, Alkatiri debated Horta in the pages of *Seara*, after Horta criticized the people

for not working harder to make something of their country. Alkatiri argued the sociological aspect of colonialism, by pointing out that the problem was not that the Timorese had no will to work, the malaise of Timor was more complex - it was structural; the agriculture system was retarded by the colonial system. Horta then responded that “our problems will not be solved with Utopias or sophisms” (cited Jolliffe 1978, p.56). This was a crucial debate, which still remains relevant today.

THE CASA DOS TIMORES IN LISBON

Jill Jolliffe (1978), Arnold S. Kohen (1999) and Estêvão Cabral (2002) have all written briefly in their studies of this period about the Casa dos Timores students. However, there has not previously been any detailed study of this group, who played a crucial role, as this thesis will show, in the development of FRETILIN’s popular education strategy and programs. The aim of the final section of this chapter is to explain the origins and the intellectual and political formation of this Lisbon-based student group’s key members, and to describe their political ideas and activities between 1972-1974.

Scholarships to Portugal

From around 1948, the Portuguese government had established a series of cultural centres for African students studying in Portugal, known as *Casa dos Estudantes do Império*. These included the *Casa de Mozambique*, *Casa de Angola*, *Casa de Macau*, and *Casa de Guiné-Bissau e São Tomé e Príncipe* (Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, Interview 09/06/2008; Justino Yap, Interview 12/6/2008). In 1952, the African students in Portugal began to publish a regular student newspaper, known as the *Boletim Estudante do Império*, covering a wide range of issues including organizational matters, and literary writing. None of these early publications mentioned Timor, partly because there were very few Timorese students in Portugal until the 1970s. Contributors to the *Boletim Estudante do Império* included Agostinho Neto, who later became the leader of the MPLA, which led Angola to independence; and Amílcar Cabral, who formed the PAIGC. Both of these leaders had an influence on FRETILIN, as we will see in later chapters.

As explained above, the Portuguese Government built only two secondary public schools in Timor, namely the *Liceu Dr. Francisco Machado*, formally established in 1960, and the *Escola Técnica* established in the early 1973 (Magalhães 2004). To proceed to university, Timorese students therefore had to go to Portugal, but, until the early 1970s, very few had done so. Among them were Ana Pessoa, António Carvarinho ‘Mau Lear’⁷² and Aires de Almeida. Ana Pessoa followed her Portuguese father and was not on a scholarship. Mau Lear went on a scholarship to study law in the *Universidade Clássica de Lisboa* in 1970. On his own funding, Aires Almeida, who had served in the Portuguese army, went to study engineering in the *Instituto Industrial de Lisboa*. From 1971, a larger number of students went on limited scholarships to Portugal. They were Madalena Corbafo Araújo (medical studies), Pedro Sequeira (*Instituto Superior de Agronomia*), who eventually became a professor in that same institute, and Maria do Céu Pereira and Abílio Araújo (Abílio Araújo, Interview 09/09/2009). *Seara* confirmed in its edition of 21 October 1972 that the Governor of Portuguese-Timor, Colonel Fernando Alves Aldeia, had increased the value of the scholarship to each recipient for ten months from 15,000 to 20,000 escudos. For the remainder of the time, each received 1.800 per month, because the universities were on holiday. The number of scholarships increased to thirty seven in the academic year 1972/1973. Some scholarships came from *Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian*, a private foundation created in 1956 by a Portugal-based petrol magnate of Armenian origin.

The students took courses such as agriculture, engineering, philosophy and law. Among the 26 students accepted in academic year 1972/1973 were Isabel Maria R. Antunes, Justino Marato Yap, Vicente M. dos Reis and Tomás Amaral. Table 1, below, lists the thirteen scholarship students identified in *Seara* (21/10/1972)

72 Mau Lear was Cavarinho’s *nom de guerre*.

Table 1. New Scholarship Recipients, Academic Year 1972/1973

No.	Names	Course	Universities
1.	Maria Manuela de J. Babo	Magistério Primário	
2	Maria Madalena dos Santos	Magistério Primário	
3	Inácio Dias Fonseca	Regente Agrícola	
4	Venâncio Gomes da Silva	Regente Agrícola	
5	Oscar Sanchos	Práticas Agrícolas	
6	Fernando Teles do Nascimento	Práticas Agrícolas	
7	Isabel Maria R. Antunes	Filologia Germanico	
8	Justino Marato Yap	Engenharia	Universidade Técnica de Lisboa.
9	Vicente M. dos Reis	Engenharia	Universidade Técnica de Lisboa.
10	Tomás Amaral	Engenharia	
12	Alvaro Ramalhino da Cruz	Direito	
13	Tereza Chaves	Direito	

Some other Timorese students were studying in Portugal, either with their own funds or on scholarships. They included Leão Amaral, Hamis Bassarewan, Hélio Pina, Rosa Bonaparte, Estanislau da Silva, César Lebre, Manecas Cruz, Noémia Cruz, Filomena de Almeida, José Luis Guterres, Francisco Borja da Costa,⁷³ Felicidade Lopes Lay, and Vitor Gandara.

While studying in Portugal, the Timorese students had the opportunity to become acquainted with the anti-colonial movements in Latin America, Asia and Africa. Meanwhile, the Portuguese people who had been to Timor had established for themselves the *Casa de Timor*, a space where they could meet each other regularly because of their attachment to Timor (Estanislau da Silva and Filomena de Almeida, Interview 18/07/2008). The Portuguese Government formally inaugurated the establishment of *Casa de Timor* based in *Rua Antero de Figueiredo 2*, in Lisbon on January 26, 1974, and a group of Timorese were elected to become its organizers. The General Assembly was headed by a Colonel Filipe José Freire Themudo Barata, the Vice President was Rev. Pe. Jorge de Barros Duarte and secretaries were Maria Rosa Joaquim and Manuel do Rosário dos Mártires. The head of the Executive body was Dr. Caetano de Carvalho.

⁷³ As described above, Francisco Borja da Costa was a poet and a member of the Dili-based Anti-Colonial Informal Discussion Group. He went to Lisbon to train as a journalist with *Diário de Notícias*, prior to the Carnation Revolution. He seems to have played a crucial linking role between the Casa dos Timores students and the AIDG in Dili.

There were others mentioned in the list of the organizers such as Maria Gabriela and Manuel Tilman Simão de Araújo Barreto. Colonel Alves Aldeia, a former Governor in Portuguese-Timor, and *Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian* appear to have been the main drivers in establishing the cultural and information centre for the Timorese students, public employees and friends of Timorese in Portugal (PIDE/DGS, Caixa.a.7847).

However, there was one student group which refused to associate with the Casa de Timor. They referred to the Casa de Timor as a place of the rich, *mestiços* and the *bufos*, a Portuguese word for police spies. These students were Abílio Araújo, Vicente M. Reis, Hamis Bassarewan, António Carvarinho and Justino Yap who lived together in the same rented house in Lisbon (Justino Yap, Interview 12/6/2008; Abílio Araújo, Interview 09/09/2009). The students regularly visited the house of Aires de Almeida,⁷⁴ who was already on the PIDE ‘watchlist’ (Estanislau da Silva and Filomena de Almeida, Interview 08/07/2008). At some point, the PIDE called Carvarinho and Abílio Araújo for interrogation. They were charged with committing subversion against the state, which led to their dispersion before the Carnation Revolution in 25 April 1974 (Abílio Araújo, Interview 09/09/2009).

When the young progressive soldiers of the Armed Forces Movement overthrew the Caetano Regime in Portugal, this clandestine student group took over the Casa de Timor, as the Africans did to other *Casas*, and renamed it as *Casa dos Timores*. Abílio Araújo became the President of the students, and António Carvarinho assumed the position of Director.

Abílio Araújo by then was a member of the Movement for the Re-Organisation of the Portuguese Proletariat, *Movimento Re-Organização do Partido do Proletariado* (MRPP), a Maoist Communist Party founded in Portugal as an alternative to the Soviet-aligned Communist Party, *Partido Comunista Português* (PCP). The members of the MRPP at that time, according to

74 Aires De Almeida was born into a Timorese-Indian family in Dili, and finished his study in the Liceu in 1960s. He then did his military service, during which he became an adult educator for the illiterate Timorese members of the army. He was put on the watch list of PIDE, and moved to study in Portugal in 1970s, where he rented a house in Lisbon where key members of the Casa dos Timores such as Vicente Reis, Abilio Araujo, Justino Iap, Antonio Carvarinho, and Rosa Muki often visited him. Aires later moved to Australia in late 1978, where he continued to be involved in the Timorese struggle. Since independence, he has been living in Dili, promoting alternative technology (Interview, Estanislau Da Silva and Filomena de Almeida: 07/2008).

Araújo, included Durão Barroso⁷⁵, Jaime Gama⁷⁶, Ana Gomes⁷⁷ and Carlos Gaspar. Carlos Gaspar and Abilio Araujo worked together producing a booklet for public distribution, and many copies were sent to Timor. Within the MRRP, there was a branch named *Movimento Popular Anti-Colonial* (MPAC)⁷⁸. The Casa dos Timores students were linked clandestinely to MPAC, in order to build relationships with anti-colonial movements in Africa and to advocate for the independence of the colonies. Inside MPAC, another network, called RPAC, (*Resistência Popular Anti-Colonial*) was being built within the Portuguese army. According to Abílio Araújo, it was through the MRRP that the Casa dos Timores students learned about Amílcar Cabral of the PAIGC and the anti-colonial movements in Africa. Through PAIGC, they also learned about Paulo Freire's literacy methods (AAbílio Araújo, Interview 09/09/2009).⁷⁹

According to Kohen (1999, pp.71-72), and confirmed by myself in a discussion with Bishop Belo, as a young priest studying in Portugal at this time, Belo was also in contact with the Casa dos Timores students, which included people he had studied with in the seminary at Dare. Kohen writes that, as a theology student in Évora, Belo and a friend went by train to Lisbon to participate in one of the Casa dos Timores meetings. Belo later told Kohen that he and his friend had hoped to go back to Timor to found a socialist party that ultimately would spread democracy in Indonesia (Kohen 1999, p.71-72). Interestingly, when ASDT was formed in Dili in May 1974, Maria do Céu Pereira, a member of Casa dos Timores, was on the list of Organizing Committee members⁸⁰ (Magalhães 2007, p.233), indicating that the Casa dos Timores already had some links with ASDT, prior to the transformation of ASDT to FRETILIN in September 1974.⁸¹

75 Durão Barroso is the current President of the European Union.

76 Jaime Gama was the former Foreign Minister of Portugal in 1980s.

77 Ana Gomes is a senior member of the Socialist Party of Portugal

78 According to Mário de Andrade (1979, xxvii), Amílcar Cabral participated in a consultative meeting in Paris for the development of the struggle against Portuguese colonialism and had also involved in the creation of a movement known as MAC (Anti-Colonialist Movement) in Lisbon in 1957.

79 The ideas and works of Amílcar Cabral, Paulo Freire and Mao Tse-tung, and their influence on the Timorese struggle, are discussed in Chapter 4.

80 Others member of the Organizing Commission of ASDT were Francisco Xavier do Amaral, Nicolau Lobato, Aleixo Corte Real, Octávio Jordão de Araujo, Afonso de Araújo, Rui Fernandes, Floriano Chaves and Sebastião Montalvão. The founding members included also Ramos Horta, Mari Alkatiri and Justino Mota (Magalhães 2007.p.233).

81 The formation of ASDT and its transformation to FRETILIN is described in more detail in Chapter 5

Key Figures

Kohen (1999, p.71) estimates there were around 40 Timorese students in Lisbon. It seems that most became involved in the Casa dos Timores, but not all were supportive of FRETILIN. The early clandestine members of Casa dos Timores were António Carvarinho, Abílio Araújo, Vicente Reis, Justinho Morato Yap, Hamis Bassarewan, and Venâncio Seran da Silva. Other identified members included Francisco Borja da Costa, Hélio Pina 'Maucruma', César Lebre 'Maulaca,' Silvério Pereira, Celestino Encarnação, Marina Alkatiri, Olímpio Branco, Álvaro Ramalinho da Cruz, Dulce Cruz, Rosa Bonaparte, Maria do Ceu Pereira, Amelia Sequeira, Filomena de Almeida, Inácio Dias da Fonseca, and Tomás Amaral, Manuel Tilman, Aires de Almeida and Vicente da Silva Guterres (Justino Yap, Interview 12/06/2008; Estanislau da Silva and Filomena de Almeida, Interview 08/07/2008).

In October 1974, the Casa dos Timorese students divided politically into two groups. The divergence was over whether to support FRETILIN conditionally or unconditionally. The 'conditional' faction argued that, instead of relying absolutely on those that were in Timor-Leste, they needed to know what they were supporting. Members of this group included Aires Almeida and Vicente Guterres. The other group thought that people inside the country, in Timor-Leste, had more knowledge and were in a better position to decide the direction of the country and they should support them without demanding any conditions. Some of the members of the group included Justino Yap and Estanislau da Silva. The latter established a new platform to be called the *Comité de Acção da FRETILIN* (CAF) (FRETILIN Action Committee). CAF then started organising for a visit by Nicolau Lobato to Lisbon the next year. (Justino Yap, Interview 12/006/2009; Estanislau da Silva and Filomena de Almeida, Interview 08/07/2008). After the invasion, the CAF members joined Marí Alkatiri and the External Delegation and headed for Mozambique, as the Portuguese Government had already cancelled their scholarships. The group by then included Ana Pessoa, Marina Alkatiri, Estanislau da Silva, Filomena de Almeida, José Luis Guterres, Zito de Oliveira and others.

The following brief account of seven key members of the Casa dos Timores group is provided to assist in understanding their political affiliations and ideas.

Antonio Carvarinho *nom de guerre* ‘**Mau Lear**’, who was of mixed Timorese and African descent, has been briefly mentioned above. He was among the group of five students who returned to Dili on 11 September 1974, on the day ASDT was transformed into FRETILIN. He was described by observers at that time as one of the most radical left wing students from Lisbon. Carvarinho was married to Maria do Céu Pereira, *nom de guerre* ‘Bi-Lear’. On their return, *Sinar Harapan*, an Indonesian newspaper published a picture of Mau Lear and Bi-Lear identifying them as Maoist students from Portugal (Cabral 2002, p.194; Hill 2002, p.66). As described in Chapters 6 and 7, he became a member of FRETILIN CCF, and was on its Education and Culture Commission, and played a major role in the development of the student organization, UNETIM. He was a Minister in the first government, established in November 1975.⁸² After the invasion, at the re-structuring meeting of the Central Committee of FRETILIN (CCF) in Soibada on May 1976, Carvarinho was named National Political Commissar responsible for the Department of Ideology and Political Orientation. He was originally based in *Sector Centro Norte* in Aikurus, Remexio in 1976, then moved to *Sector Ponta Leste*.⁸³ When Xavier do Amaral was detained in 1977, Carvarinho succeeded Nicolau Lobato as the Prime Minister of RDTL. Both Mau Lear and Bi-Lear⁸⁴ were killed sometime after the death of Vicente Reis, also in Betano, in early 1979 (Tobias Mendonça, Interview 19/09/2009).

Abílio Araújo’s parents came from Ainaro, but he was born in Aileu, where his father worked as a catechist. He went to the Jesuit School in Dili, and then studied and graduated from the *Liceu* (Luis Araújo, Interview 20/09/2009). Araújo undertook Portuguese military service, but refused to go to war in Angola. In 1969, he was appointed a sub-district administrator of Hatu-Udo, Ainaro, at the age of nineteen. He taught music in the *Liceu*, before taking a scholarship to study economics in Portugal in 1971. Araújo was very ideological, as well as being a talented musician. In Lisbon, he used his free time to teach music at the *Fundação Calouse Gulbenkian*, to earn cash to rent a house. Borja da Costa and Araújo wrote the FRETILIN songs described in

82 See Chapter 5.

83 According to Tobias Mendonça, Mau Lear disagreed with the way Alarico Fernandes, another CCF member, treated the prisoners in the National Rehabilitation Centre known as RENAL, in Remexio, and on the advice of Sahe he then moved to Ponta Leste in 1977.

84 Some details of Bi-Lear’s last days are in the recollections of Dulce Vitor, a member of FRETILIN’s women’s organization, OPMT, in Baucau, in an audio recording in the Archive and Museum of the Resistance in Dili (AMR 2005).

later chapters, including *Kdadalak Suli Mutu* and *Foho Ramelau*, which became an important part of the popular education work. Araújo is also the author of the FALINTIL song, *FALINTIL Fighter*, which he wrote on a flight from Islamabad to Peking 1976. Araújo recalled:

I was in the plane together with Rogério Lobato and Olímpio Branco, from Islamabad to Peking and I was unable to sleep. I was thinking of FALINTIL fighters in the mountains of Timor. So I ended up with writing the song (Abílio Araújo, Interview 09/09/2009).

In September 1974, he and his partner, Guilhermina dos Santos, a Portuguese comrade, returned for a short time to Timor, where they both became members of the first Central Committee. Araújo and dos Santos returned to Portugal and worked as FRETILIN representatives to Europe (Abilio Araujo, Interview 09/09/2009).

Araújo became the President of FRETILIN, between 1987 and 1989. In 1992 he initiated talks with the Suharto regime, which became known as the ‘London Reconciliation Meeting.’ In 1993, he was removed from his position of leader of FRETILIN’s External Delegation (Cabral 2002, p.370-73). He resigned from FRETILIN, but remains an active political figure in Timor-Leste today.

Vicente M. Reis, whose *nom de guerre* was ‘**Sahe**’, also known as Bieky Sahe, is from Bucoli. ‘Sahe’ was suited for work behind the scenes and was a popular educator. Prof. Barbedo Magalhães⁸⁵ described him as ‘someone who could learn without a teacher’ (Barbedo Magalhães, Interview 09/06/2008). Sahe returned to Timor on 11 September 1974, where he became a teacher in the *Escola Técnica*. Sahe, Hata, and ‘Mau Seran’ were the key figures behind the formation of *União Nacional dos Estudantes de Timor* (UNETIM)⁸⁶ in October 1974 (Jolliffe 1978, p. 106). Sahe was responsible for initiating the FRETILIN ‘base work’ or ‘grass-roots’ campaign known as Pilot Project No.2 Bucoli, described in Chapter 6. He was

85 Prof. Barbedo Magalhaes was a leader of the Socialist Student Group in Oporto University, and later served as an army officer in Timor, where he sat on the Education Commission. He became an active supporter of FRETILIN after the 1975 invasion. Barbedo’s wife Judith Magalhães was a pedagogy teacher in the Liceu in the 1970s. Along with the Casa dos Timores students, Judith was one of the people who introduced the UNETIM students to Paulo Freire’s idea of *concientização* in 1974.

86 See Chapter 6.

regularly targeted by the police after his return, and stayed most of the time in Bucoli. His brother, Mário Reis, recalled that Sahe often had underground meetings with Nicolau, Mau Lear and Mari in Hera on appointed nights and would return to Bucoli soon after the meetings (cited in Gonçalves 2004). When FRETILIN proclaimed Unilateral Independence, he became the State Secretary for Infrastructure and Works in the first RDTL government. In 1976, behind the army lines, Sahe was responsible for preparing FRETILIN-FALINTIL political cadres, and established the Centre for Political Formation (CEFORPOL) in CasCol Naroman, Bagueia and Uato-Lari⁸⁷. He was Political Commissar for *Sector Centro-Leste*, and succeeded Carvarinho to become National Political Commissar in 1977. One night in February 1979, Sahe was betrayed to the Indonesians. He was shot in the leg, and disappeared. Tobias Mendonça, a former *Vice-Chefe da Zona* in Remexio, was with Sahe that night. In his interview with me, he said:

I wonder why a good man like Sahe died. For Sahe, (one who is) a traitor today, will be revolutionary tomorrow. The revolutionaries today could be the reactionaries of tomorrow (Tobias Mendonça, Interview 03/09/2009).

Madalena da Silva Fernandes, a former member of CEFORPOL, described Sahe as the first leader of national unity (Madalena da Silva Fernandes, Interview 05/2/2009).

Hamis Bassarewan *nom de guerre* ‘**Hata**’, whose ancestors, like Mari Alkatiri’s, had originated from Yemen, completed his secondary schooling at the *Liceu*, then won a scholarship to study Mathematics in the *Universidade Técnica de Lisboa*. Alfredo Borges Ferreira, a classmate, described him as an excellent student in mathematics (Alfredo Ferreira, Interview 12/09/2010). Like Abilio Araujo and Antonio Cavarinho, Bassarewan joined the MRPP. Luisa Teotónio Pereira remembers him making contact with the *Centro de Informação e Documentação Anti-Colonial* (CIDAC)⁸⁸ in Lisbon, to get films about the anti-colonial movements in Africa (Luisa Teotónio Pereira, Personal Com, 3/03/2009). Bassarewan became a member of the CCF and was appointed Minister of Education of RDTL I in 1975. Jafar Alkatiri, a former member of CCF, in an interview on Timor-Leste Television, claimed that he saw Hata and Juvinal Inácio

87 See Chapter 5.

88 See Centre for Anti-Colonial Information and Documentation, in Chapter 11.

‘Serakey’ being held in the Indonesian military headquarters in Dili in early 1979, after the fall of the Resistance Bases. Bassarewan told Hélio Pina, another member of Casa dos Timores who remained in the mountains:

If you cannot resist, do not surrender. Even if you come to the city, you will be killed

Bassarewan is said to have been executed by the Indonesian military (Jafar Alkatiri, TVTL Interview 07/12/2010).

Justino Marato Yap is a Timorese from Same, on the south cost of Timor Leste. He studied at the *Liceu* and was a friend of Sahe. Yap won a scholarship in the Academic year 1972/1973 to study Civil Engineering in the Universidade Técnica de Lisboa. Sahe is said to have used Yap’s ticket to return to Timor in 1974. Staying behind, Yap, along with José Luis Guterres ‘Lugo’⁸⁹ and Estanislau da Silva, established the *Comité de Acção da FRETILIN* (CAF), to support FRETILIN. During the resistance years, Yap worked behind the scenes and was in close contact with FRETILIN networks. He has been working with the Department of Environment of the Portuguese Government in Lisbon (Justino Yap, Interview 12/06/2008). Yap married a Portuguese woman and remained in Portugal, where he still lives.

Rosa Bonaparte known as ‘**Muki**’, was born in Manatuto and studied in the Canossian Girls’ School in Ossu, before going on scholarship to study in Lisbon. She left with a friend, Noémia Cruz, the sister of Dulce Cruz, before the Carnation Revolution, with the intention of studying commerce. While completing an introductory course, she joined the MRPP, becoming a member of Casa dos Timores student group after the revolution (Estanislau da Silva and Filomena de Almeida, Interview 07/08/2008). Rosa Muki is known for her courage and determination. She was among the few women to become a member of the FRETILIN Central Committee and later assumed the responsibility of first Secretary General of the FRETILIN women’s organization, *Organização Popular Mulher Timor* (OPMT).⁹⁰ She wrote a number of articles for the *Jornal do*

89 Jose Luis Guterres ‘Lugo’ later went with Mari Alkatiri’s group to Maputo, Mozambique, and became a member of the External Delegation of FRETILIN (DEF). (Interviews, Yap: 14/06/2008; Da Silva and De Almeida, 8/07/2008). Guterres left FRETILIN in 2006, and, at the time of writing, is a Vice Prime Minister in the government led by Xanana Gusmão.

90 The Organization of Popular Women Timor. See Chapter 7.

Povo Maubere and one other article by her, originally published in a Trotskyist newspaper,⁹¹ was reproduced in 1977 in the Australian solidarity movement bulletin, *East Timor News* (Timorese women 1977). Muki was executed together with Borja da Costa, on December 7, 1975, the first day of the Indonesian full-scale invasion, because she refused to surrender to the Indonesian forces. Her body was dumped into the sea.

Estanislau da Silva was born in Manatuto but his parents came from the island of Atauro. His father was the Administrator of Manatuto before the Carnation Revolution. He left for Portugal in 1973 to study agriculture, and became involved with the group around Vicente Reis 'Sahe'. When Sahe, Mau Lear and the others returned in September 1974, he remained in Portugal and, together with others, established CAF (see above) to support FRETILIN. He went from Portugal to Mozambique with the External Delegation after the invasion, then travelled to Australia to work as an operator of FRETILIN's underground radio in Darwin in 1976. As described in Chapter 11, this led to his arrest by the Australian Commonwealth police, and he was tried and deported back to Maputo, Mozambique. He eventually returned to Australia to become the Australian leader of FRETILIN. He returned to Timor-Leste in 1999, and became a Minister in the First Constitutional Government and the Prime Minister for a brief period, in May-June 2007. Estanislau da Silva is married to Filomena de Almeida (Estanislau da Silva and Filomena de Almeida, Interview 08/07/2008).

Filomena de Almeida, also a member of Casa dos Timores, was active in the external front work. Initially based in Mozambique, she participated in the FRETILIN delegation to several African countries, and in a youth delegation to Cuba. She moved to Australia and continued to work for FRETILIN, including writing a history of FALINTIL (De Almeida 1997). She is the wife of Estanislau da Silva and a sister of Aires de Almeida (see above). De Almeida returned to Timor-Leste after independence, and remains an active FRETILIN member, working with the Department of Propaganda and Information (DEPIM). (Estanislau da Silva and Filomena de Almeida, Interview 08/07/2008).

91 Conversation with Dr. Helen Hill from the University of Victoria, Melbourne, Australia, November 2008.

As will be seen in subsequent chapters, these members of the original Casa dos Timorese student group played central roles in the development of FRETILIN's program of popular education, prior to the invasion, in the Resistance Bases, in the internal clandestine front after the fall of the bases, and in the solidarity and diplomatic work of the external front.

Developing Political Framework and Action

The General Assembly of the Casa dos Timores on June 30, 1974 passed a motion, divided into a Declaration of Principles and a set of demands, that became a key reference for the Resistance in the following years. Among the twenty points of the Principles are: First, the colonialist carried out systematic oppression of the Timores through violent means. Second, colonial education was marginalizing the people and was aimed to facilitate the exploitation of the Timorese people. Third, agriculture was an export-oriented mono-culture system, which was detrimental to the subsistence agricultural culture of the people, designed only to favour the landlords. Fourth, there were serious problems faced in the health sector including malnutrition, deficient sanitation systems and low life expectancy. Fifth, the system of governance was corrupt and undemocratic, and there was only pseudo-participation by the Timorese people. Sixth, the Timorese were absent from the formal economy and the banking system favoured the rich. Seventh, the colonial troops waged corrupt psycho-social actions against the people in the form of prostitution and other forms of sexual violence against Timorese women (*Declaração dos Princípios*, 30/6/1974, CDPM-CIDAC TL3225).

In order to systematically overcome those problems imposed on the Timorese by the Portuguese fascist Government, the General Assembly resolution set out twelve actions, which I have translated in full from the Portuguese text of the original document, retrieved from the CDPM-CIDAC Archives in Lisbon:

1. Destroy all and any form - even if residual – of colonialist practices;
2. Unmask the most recent forms of colonialism, that is, neo-colonialism;
3. Dismantle any foreign action aiming to progressively colonise our country;
4. Fight against all anti-democratic forces and vile forms of action that lead to the exploitation of the Timorese people and any form of exploitation of man by man;

5. Fight against all groups that oppose the programs for the real liberation of the people of Timor;
6. Denounce all groups that have programs which are only appearing to promote the well-being of the people of Timor;
7. Build the base for popular and revolutionary actions;
8. Set up an infrastructure aiming at the effective and genuine well-being of the Timorese people;
9. Strengthen and solidify the pillars of a genuine popular participation so that the people can freely and consciously choose their future;
10. Support all parties that defend and fight for a real liberation of the people of Timor.

(Declaração dos Princípios, 30/6/1974, CDPM-CIDAC TL3225).

The following section and later chapters will demonstrate that the Casa dos Timores students attempted to educate the students back in Timor and the FRETILIN cadres, using the results of the structural analysis of Portuguese colonialism they produced in this statement. However, as will also be shown, the Casa dos Timores students were aware of the realities of Timor-Leste, and they incorporated the cultural aspects of the struggle into their education programs.

Political Actions

On July 13, 1974, the Casa dos Timores held another General Assembly, passing a further resolution, to re-affirm their solidarity with the national liberation movements all around the world, particularly with the MPLA in Angola, FRELIMO in Mozambique, PAIGC in Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde, and GMLSTP⁹² in *São Tomé and Príncipe* (T13225 CDPM-CIDAC). This was a crucial political move.⁹³ The second political action was to send a delegation to Timor to participate in the political change in the colony. The Portuguese Government had already committed some funds for students who had achieved good marks at the University to return home for a holiday. Using those funds obtained by some of the members, Casa dos

⁹² *Guinea Movement* for the Liberation of *São Tomé and Príncipe*.

⁹³ This question of solidarity will be further dealt with in Chapter 11.

Timores held a meeting and officially elected Abílio Araújo, Vicente Reis ‘Sahe’, and António Carvarinho to return for political work in Timor-Leste. Returning along with these Casa dos Timores students was Venâncio Seran da Silva, who had already completed his studies. Abílio Araújo paid for his wife Guilhermina dos Santos to go along with them. Sahe used the ticket of Justino Yap to return together with Bassarewan and Da Silva (Estanislau da Silva and Filomena De Almeida, Interview 08/07/2008; Justino Yap, Interview 12/06/2008). Rosa ‘Muki’ Bonaparte also returned. According to Bishop Belo’s biographer, several members of the student group stopped for a week in London on their way home, where they stayed with an academic couple who provided them with access to their personal library of books on Indonesia, and the students made use of their time reading as much as they could (Kohen 1999, p.42). The students arrived in Aitarak Laran, Dili, by plane, on September 11, 1974, at 1 pm. Abílio Araújo recalled the trip:

We came with one only concept from Portugal. We need to form one united front, but not with UDT because UDT was pro-status quo, not anti-colonial. I thought we needed to build a front with APODETI because they were anti-colonial. It was me who proposed the concept FULIN which came from ‘Batar Fulin-fruits of corn seeds.’ It means that it was not us who started the war. Our ancestors already fought against colonial rule. If they were the seeds, we were the fruit. We are the historical outcome of our ancestors’ struggle. We are the fruit that could bear new seeds and [plant] new generations of corn to resist against colonial powers (Interview Abílio Araújo, 09/09/2009).

However, on September 11, Araújo went to meet his brother, Afonso Redentor (composer of the National Anthem, *Pátria, Pátria*), where he was told that it was an important day for Timor, because ASDT was already transformed into FRETILIN. The group then immediately went to a meeting with Francisco Xavier do Amaral in his residence. They arrived at the same time as a meeting of FRETILIN leaders. The group were admitted to present the Tetum concept FULIN (seeds), to develop into a political movement named FULINTIDI (Frente Unido de Libertação Nacional de Timor Dili).⁹⁴ Nicolau Lobato told them that it was an interesting concept, but they

94 For an account of this meeting, see also Cabral (2002, p.193).

were too late. The FRETILIN pamphlets were already printed, and an announcement was about to be broadcast on Radio Haksolok⁹⁵. According to Araújo, the students told Nicolau on that day that they disagreed with the fact that it was only ASDT that was transformed into a front, but they were ready to support FRETILIN; and the FULINTIDI program then became the program of FRETILIN (Abílio Araújo, Interview 09/09/2009).

Vicente Reis ‘Sahe’ and Hamis Bassarewan ‘Hata’ both became teachers in the *Escola Técnica*. Roque Rodrigues, a former Portuguese officer who was expelled because of his association with FRETILIN, was a philosophy teacher at the *Liceu*. These three began to inspire students, leading to the formation of *União Nacional dos Estudantes Timores* (UNETIM) as described in Chapter 6 (Francisco Calsona and Domingos Caetano, Interview 20/10/2009). At the leadership level, FRETILIN decided to initiate ‘base work’, and three sites were selected and assigned leaders. Nicolau Lobato was to be responsible for cooperative work in Bazartete. ‘Sahe’ became responsible for Bucoli and Abílio Araújo was to develop pilot program No.1 in Aisirimou, Aileu (Abílio Araújo, Interview 09/09/2009). A literacy manual which the Casa dos Timores had developed, *Rai Timor, Rai Ita nian* (Timor is Our Land), and the songs which Borja da Costa and Abílio Araújo’s had written were to become instrumental when the UNETIM students began their literacy campaign in January 1975. The Casa dos Timorese students had also brought with them from Portugal books and writings about Mao Tse-tung and other Marxist publications. These were to become useful in the following years of resistance.

95 Radio Haksolok was a FRETILIN Radio Program, funded by the Portuguese Government as part of the de-colonization campaign

This study has managed to identify a total of twenty students who arrived back from Portugal between 1974-75 (See Table 2, below).

Table 2. Casa dos Timores members who returned to Timor 1974-75⁹⁶

No	Name	Nom de guerre	Position	Whereabouts
01	Abílio Araújo	None	Member of External Delegation	Lives in Portugal
02	Guilhermina dos Santos	None	Member External Delegation	Lives in Portugal
03	Vicente Maria Reis	Bieky Sahe	Minister of Infrastructure and Work	Died in combat 1979
04	António Carvarinho	Mau Lear	Prime Minister Justica/Vice Presidenti	Died in combat 1979
05	Hamis Bassarewan	Hata	Minister of Education	Disappeared
06	Venâncio Seran da Silva	Mau-Seran	Member of CCF	Disappeared
07	Rosa Bonaparte	Muki	Member of CCF/General Secretary of OPMT	Executed in 1975
08	Inácio Dias da Fonseca	Solan	Secretary of Region Viqueque/ Member of CCF	Tutuala
09	César Lebre	Mau Laca	Member of CCF/Comisar for Costa Sul	Died in combat 1979
10	Hélio Pina	Maucruma	Member of CCF/Comisar for Fronteira Norte	Died in combat 1979
11	Manecas Cruz	Sekar		Killed
12	Dulce Cruz	Wewe	Political Assistant	Killed
13	Maria do Céu Pereira	Bi-Lear	Political Assistant	Killed
14	Felicidade Lopes Lay		Member of OPMT	Died
15	Vitor Gandara			Killed
16	Fernando Teles Nascimento	Txai ¹	Member of CCF	Killed 1980
17	Óscar Faria ²			Killed in Dec.1975
18	Francisco Benevides			Died in Dili, 2010
19	Francisco Borja da Costa		Member of CCF	Killed in Dec.1975
20	João Soares		Studied Agriculture in Portugal ³	Unknown

96 Compiled from various sources, including Justino Yap, Interview 12/06/2008; Da Silva Interview 26-28/12/2010.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has introduced the two groups of political leaders who built the independence movement in Timor-Leste, and became the country's first popular educators. In the first part of the chapter, the existence, in the early 1970s has been confirmed of, not an organized, but an informal, Anti-Colonial Discussion Group (AIDG), whose key figures were Nicolau do Reis Lobato, Justino Mota, Mari Alkatiri and José Ramos Horta. The members of this group belonged to distinguished families which had links either with the Catholic Church or the colonial administration. Both their family connections and their access to formal schooling in the Catholic schools and the *Liceu Dr. Francisco Viera Machado* were fundamental to their learning. They all grew up with a good education and had strong characters as leaders of their own time. All of them gained experience as professionals in the Portuguese army, and/or served in the public administration. All had previously witnessed the 1959 rebellion and deportation of those involved to Africa. The Catholic journal, *Seara*, played a crucial role, not only providing information and knowledge about world politics and events, but also becoming a training ground of these young leaders to gain experience in critical writing and activism. They were also exposed to some of the great political ideas of that time, such as nationalism, colonialism and anti-colonialism, African Socialism, Marxism and the liberation theology of Latin America.

The second part of this chapter discussed the Timorese university students in Portugal in 1970s, a group which by 1974 included over thirty people. It has shown that the first of these students to make contact with the anti-fascist political forces in Portugal was António Carvarinho, later known as 'Mau Lear.' Joining with later arrivals, including Abílio Araújo, Vicente Reis, Justino Yap and Hamis Bassarewan, Mau Lear and his group formed a clandestine group in Lisbon, linked mainly with the Maoist *Movimento Reorganização de Partido de Proletariado* (MRPP), which had links with the Armed Forces of Portugal and with the anti-colonial movements in Africa. Soon after the Carnation Revolution on April 25, 1974, the clandestine group mobilized other sympathetic Timorese students and occupied the *Casa de Timor*, renaming this cultural centre the *Casa dos Timores*. They set up a student structure and held regular General Assemblies

as a tool to develop political analysis of colonialism and anti-colonialism, imperialism and anti-imperialism and to specifically analyse Portuguese colonialism in Timor. This series of discussions in the *Casa dos Timores* resulted in a political framework that was fundamental to their later direct involvement in the Timorese Resistance. At least twenty students returned in late 1974 and early 1975, of whom only two members, Abílio Araújo and Guilhermina dos Santos, went back to Portugal. Of the remaining eighteen, there was only one survivor, Francisco Benevides, when the Indonesian forces withdrew from Timor-Leste in 1999. The rest had all been martyrs for the independence of the homeland and the liberation of the Timorese people.

The AIDG of Nicolau Lobato and the *Casa dos Timores* students formed the embryo of the FRETILIN leadership, becoming the spiritual fathers and mothers of the Timorese resistance against the Indonesian occupation. They drew their main inspiration from two diverse sources: the social teachings of the Catholic Church and the popular anti-colonial education work of the MRRP. The next chapter will consider in more detail three of the main theoretical sources of their revolutionary ideas and practice, namely Amílcar Cabral, Mao Tse-tung, and Paulo Freire.

CHAPTER 4

LEADING THEORIES OF POPULAR EDUCATION

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the origin of popular education and the work of three of its leading theorists who had an influence on FRETILIN, namely Amílcar Cabral, Paulo Freire and Mao Tse-tung. I will begin this chapter with a short review of the definition of popular education, before considering how the ideas of these three theorists became part of the FRETILIN's revolutionary education theory and practice, and their connection to contemporary popular education in Timor-Leste. The second section discusses Amílcar Cabral's theories of class suicide and culture, and how the African Party for Independence of Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC) implemented these ideas in the liberated zones in Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde. The third section introduces Paulo Freire's concept of *conscientização* (literally, 'making conscious') and his use of generative themes, which was taken up by FRETILIN in its literacy work. The last section discusses the 'mass line' theory and 'base work' which was developed by Mao Tse-tung in the Chinese liberation struggle in the 1930s and 1940s. This chapter provides a basis for understanding some of the ideas and concepts underlying the programs and actions of FRETILIN which are described in the next few chapters of this study. In the final chapters of the thesis, I will return to consider the relevance of such theories in the current situation of the independent Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste.

DEFINING POPULAR EDUCATION

Contemporary educators such as Kane (2001), Hammond (1998), Streck (2001) and Nassif (1994/2000) are all in agreement that popular education, as it is known today, originated in Latin America. Ricardo Nassif, a Professor of Education Sciences at La Plata National University in Argentina and also a UNESCO consultant, is widely known through his books including *Pedagogía General* and *Pedagogía de Nuestro Tiempo*. Danilo Streck is a Professor at the Graduate School of Education, University of the Vale do Rio dos Sinos in Brazil. Both Nassif (1994/2000) and Streck (2008) argue that the Latin American concept of popular education can be traced back to the ideas and practices of the Cuban educator and national hero José

Martí, whose nineteenth century writings had a major influence on the national independence movements of Latin America. According to Streck, José Martí identified four pillars of popular education. First, popular education values the plurality of knowledge; second, interpersonal relationships are the milieu for teaching and learning and the basis for social transformation; third, knowledge of reality arises from an emancipatory perspective, as a political act; and finally, education is the self-transformative process of society. Importantly, Martí's concept of popular education included this premise:

Popular education does not mean exclusively education of the poor class; but that all classes of the nation, which constitute the same people, be well educated. What reason to educate the poor and not the rich? All are equal (Streck 2008).

However, the class struggle within an independent Cuba, particularly under the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista in 1950s, changed the context, turning education for the people into the education of the oppressed people (Holst 2009). In his study of popular education in Latin America, the Scottish popular education writer Liam Kane has pointed out that the term 'popular' in Portuguese and Spanish refers to "people, being the working class, the unemployed, 'peasants', the 'poor' and sometimes means the lower middle class: it excludes and stands in contradiction to the well-off middle class and the rich" (Kane 2001, p.9). This class analysis, then, is now at the heart of popular education, the task of which, essentially, is to pursue an educational practice which will best serve the interests of the 'popular classes,' in Latin America. Likewise, after systematically studying the popular education movement in El Salvador, Hammond (1978, p.4) defines popular education as "education of, by and for the people, organised by people in their own community, outside the control of the official education system." In summary then, it can be seen, first, that the term 'popular education' originates from the anti-colonial national independence movements of Latin America; second, that popular education concerns the people who make up the oppressed class of a society; and third, that it is democratically organised by the people outside of the official education system. Popular education is therefore a people-centred education theory and practice, the aim of which is class abolition.

POPULAR EDUCATION IN TIMOR-LESTE

The previous chapter introduced the Anti-Colonial Informal Discussion Group (AIDG) in Dili and the *Casa dos Timores* student group in Lisbon as the first clandestine popular education groups to take up the cause of independence. The *Casa dos Timores* students, in particular, had encountered popular education in Portugal's own anti-fascist movements, and in the national liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies. They returned from Portugal following the Carnation Revolution with the dream of "creat(ing) bases that are truly popular and revolutionary" (*Declaração de Princípios*, 30/06/1974, CPDM-CIDAC TL3225). The party they helped to form, FRETILIN, then developed a grass-roots mobilisation campaign known as *trabalho de base*, literally, base work. Both Jolliffe (1978) and Hill (2002) documented the fact that the AIDG, the *Casa dos Timores*, the National Union of Students of Timor (UNETIM) and FRETILIN's base work utilised the methods of Paulo Freire in the literacy campaign they mounted in 1975 as a process of *consciencialização*. Jolliffe added that the sources of FRETILIN's ideas included African nationalists like Amílcar Cabral, Samora Machel and Frantz Fanon; but also, secondarily, drew on the experience of the Chinese and Indo-Chinese liberation movements (Jolliffe 1978, p.153). Professor George Aditjondro, a leading Indonesian activist against Suharto's dictatorship, agreed with Jolliffe and Hill, arguing that FRETILIN's base work was inspired by the praxis of Paulo Freire and the work of Amílcar Cabral in the liberated zones in Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde (Aditjondro 1999, p.xxx).

As base work suggests, FRETILIN did not use the term *popular education* to describe their early interventions for popular mobilisation. The *trabalho de base* was then transformed into the work of the Bases de Apoios from June 1976-1978, after the invasion, as will be described in subsequent chapters. The concept *popular*, though, was introduced in describing the FRETILIN-sponsored mass organizations which will be described in later chapters, namely the youth organisation Organização Popular da Juventude de Timor (OPJT), the workers' organisation Organização Popular dos Trabalhadores de Timor (OPTT), and the women's organisation Organização Popular das Mulheres de Timor (OPMT), and even the state was referred to as *estado ditadoro popular* ie 'a people's dictatorship' (Mattoso 2005, p.63). In later

chapters, it will be seen that the conscientisation campaign approach continued until 1999, and was particularly identified with the ‘awareness’ campaign in 1998-99 of the East Timor Student Solidarity Council based at the Universitas Timor (UNTIM) in Dili. Susan Nicolai, an American adult educator who had worked briefly in Timor in early 2000, used the term *popular education* in her brief description of FRETILIN education campaigns, prior to the invasion and in the Resistance Bases (Nicolai 2004, p.30).⁹⁷

For the purpose of this study, I interviewed Alarico Fernandes, a founding member of FRETILIN and former Minister of Information and Internal Security, about his understanding of popular education. His response was straight forward:

Popular education means getting people to understand the revolutionary theories in order to struggle for liberation (Alarico Fernandes, Interview 28/10/2008).

This suggests that the concept of popular education was used and discussed in the Resistance Bases.

The popular education movement was revived publicly in Timor-Leste immediately after the withdrawal of the Indonesian forces. As Elda Guterres da Silva, a founding member of GFFTL (Young Women’s Group of Timor-Lorosaé) recalled in a recent informal conversation, the Student Solidarity Council/GFFTL had made three fundamental decisions: To reactivate the students’ movement in all districts; to start a literacy campaign targeting women to be led by GFFTL; and to begin a media campaign by establishing a student radio, Ramkabia (Ramelau Kablaki Matebian) and student journal. The literacy campaign utilised an Action-Reflection Method, before the intervention of Oxfam a year later (Elda Guterres da Silva, Pers. Com. 27/07/2011), signalling a new beginning of the popular education movement in Timor-Leste. In her examination of popular education and peacebuilding in Timor-Leste, Durnan (2005) describes how a number of NGOs and activists were funded by Oxfam between 2001-2003 to visit Brazil and Cuba to examine those countries experiences with popular education, leading to the establishment of the Dai Popular network in 2003. The NGOs who visited Cuba included

⁹⁷ See also Durnan (2005) and Boughton (2010), for recent analysis of popular education in Timor Leste’s independence struggle.

the Sahe Institute, Fokupers, La’o Hamutuk, Hak Foundation, Haburas Foundation, Narroman Community Centre, and the Men’s Association Against Violence. The study tour was hosted by the Martin Luther King Centre (CMLK), which is recognized as a main centre of Cuba’s popular education theory and practice (Durnan 2005, p.119). Because of the differences which arose within the group which visited Cuba, Dai Popular has not been active as a network since 2006, but its member organizations have continued to promote popular education in Timor-Leste.⁹⁸ In this thesis, I will return to the contemporary relevance of popular education within FRETILIN and the social movements in the final chapters.

AMÍLCAR CABRAL: THE PEDAGOGY OF THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE

As was explained in the previous chapter, the theories and practice of the national liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies of Africa were an important intellectual and political influence on the founding members of FRETILIN. In this section, I look in more detail at some of the writings of Amílcar Cabral, the leader of the *Partido Africano para a Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde* (PAIGC) in Guinea Bissau. Cabral’s writings are important, because they show how those national liberation movements theorised the role of education in their struggles, in the period immediately prior to FRETILIN’s formation. Moreover, while I cannot pursue this in detail in this thesis, the ideas of the African movements were not developed in isolation from Latin American popular education, due to the work of the Cuban revolutionary leader and educational thinker, Che Guevara and the Cuban educators he inspired who went to the aid of the African liberation movements in the 1960s and 1970s (Turner Marti 2008; Holst 2009). Looking forward to the final section of this chapter, there is also an important historical and intellectual link with the pedagogical theory of Paulo Freire, whose writings regularly acknowledged his debt to both the Cuban and African revolutionary leadership, including Guevara and Cabral (Freire 1978; McLaren 2000).

Amílcar Lopes Cabral was born in Cape Verde, and studied agronomy in Lisbon. Being committed to class emancipation and the liberation struggle for his homeland, he abandoned his

98 There was an Adult and Popular Education stream in the Timor-Leste Studies Conferences in Dili in 2009 and 2011, which the author helped to organise. The 2009 papers were published in Leach et al (2010).

job as an agronomist in Lisbon, and returned to Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde to form PAIGC in 1956. This was an act of what he described as “class suicide” (see below), to be with the people or the oppressed to wage a revolution against Portuguese colonialism. He remained the leader of the Party he founded until he was tragically shot dead by Kani Inocência, a corrupted PAIGC comrade, in Conakry, 20 February 1973 (Chilcote 1999). Cabral’s importance to this thesis arises because he combined the roles of political leader and popular educator within the liberation struggle in Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde, and his ideas and his work helped inspire FRETILIN. Ronald H. Chilcote, for example, used the term ‘Pedagogy of the National Liberation Struggle’ to describe the ideas and revolutionary practices of Cabral towards the liberation of the Guinean and Cape Verdians from the tyranny of Portuguese colonialism (Chilcote 1999, p.75). My brief examination of Cabral’s ideas relies on the work of Chilcote (1999), Chabal (2003) and Tomas (2007), and a collection of Cabral’s own writings (PAIGC 1973). Chilcote identified four main aspects to Cabral’s thinking: theory about colonialism and imperialism; theory about revolutionary nationalism and national liberation; theory about class and class struggle; and theory about the state and development (Chilcote (1999). This section discusses two aspects of Cabral’s theory, his concept of ‘class suicide’, and his ideas on the role of indigenous culture in the national liberation struggle. As will be seen in subsequent chapters, both were important for FRETILIN’s own pedagogy of liberation during the years of the Resistance to the Indonesian occupation.

Class Suicide

Amílcar Cabral’s understanding of Marx’s dialectical analysis of the history of humanity is revealed in ‘Weapon of Theory’, a speech delivered to the first Tricontinental Conference of the Peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America in Havana 1966 (Cabral 1966). He stated the classic Marxist historical framework, recalling the stages of the history of humanity from primitive communal stage, through capitalism and class struggle, to socialism and communism. However, Cabral was not a blind follower of Marxism, rather recognizing that:

National liberation and social revolution are not exportable commodities; they are, and increasingly so every day, the outcome of local and national elaboration, more or

less influenced by external factors (be they favorable or unfavorable) but *essentially determined and formed by the historical reality of each people*, and carried to success by the overcoming or correct solution of the internal contradictions between the various categories characterizing this reality (Cabral 1966; my emphasis).

His careful study of the social context of his people revealed that the industrial working class, the proletariat, was too weak to provide the ‘base’ for the liberation struggle in his country. The majority of Guinean and Cape Verdeans were peasants, but “the peasantry was not a revolutionary force in Guinea.” In saying this, he differentiated physical force from political force. The peasantry was indeed a great force in Guinea as it was almost the whole population, and it created the nation’s wealth. However, there was no history of peasant revolt, therefore it was difficult to find support for the idea of national liberation (Chabal 2003, p.175).

Cabral, on the other hand, discovered that some members of the *petite bourgeoisie* mostly people working in the colonial state apparatus, were revolutionaries (Chilcote 1999, p.174), obviously including Cabral himself. This segment of society benefited from colonialism, but was never fully integrated into the colonial system. In Cabral’s account, this class was trapped in the cultural contradictions between the colonial culture and the colonized culture, but had no clear interests in carrying out a revolution (Chilcote 1999, p.174-6). Acknowledging this weakness, Amílcar Cabral writes:

However, the degree of revolutionary consciousness of the sector of the *petite bourgeoisie* called to fulfill its historical function, it can not free itself from one objective reality: the *petite bourgeoisie*, as a service class (that is to say a class not directly involved in the process of production), does not possess the economic base to guarantee the taking over of power. In fact history has shown that whatever the role—sometimes important—played by the individuals coming from the *petite bourgeoisie* in the process of a revolution this class has never possessed political control. And it could never possess it since political control (the state) is based on the economic capacity of the ruling class, and in the conditions of colonial and neocolonial society this capacity is retained by two entities: imperialist capital and the native working class (cited in Chabal 2003, p.174).

The petty bourgeoisie was a new class created by foreign domination and indispensable to the operation of colonial exploitation. However, the petty bourgeoisie could never integrate itself into the foreign minority in Guinea and remained prisoner of the cultural and social contradictions imposed on it by the colonial reality, which defined it as a marginal or marginalized class. It is therefore on the petite bourgeoisie, which the PAIGC revolution should partly rely (Chilcote 1999, p.80). Amílcar Cabral delivered another speech in Havana stating that “the alternative - to betray the revolution or to commit suicide as a class - constitutes the dilemma of the petty bourgeoisie in the general framework of the national liberation struggle ...” (Chabal 2003, p.179). Cabral concluded, in order to carry out their historical function for national liberation, the petite bourgeoisie needs to undergo a process of *déclassé* or class suicide, in order to organize and build an alliance with the indigenous farmers to fight against colonialism and imperialism (Chilcote 1999, p.80).

Culture as a Weapon for Revolution

Aside from the theory of class suicide, Cabral found a new way to make revolution in a peasant society. In Cabral’s view, the people’s culture was a source of power, a culture which in itself was an act of resistance against the colonial culture, allowing him to rely on the whole colonized people in the country for the national revolution. Cabral delivered two important speeches on culture in the early 1970s. In *National Liberation and Culture*, a speech delivered at Syracuse University, New York on February 20, 1970, Cabral stated that:

A people who free themselves from foreign domination will be free culturally only if, without complexes and without underestimating the importance of positive accretions from oppressor and other cultures, they return to the upward paths of their own culture, which is nourished by the living reality of its environment, and which negates both harmful influences and any kind of subjection to foreign culture. Thus, it may be seen that if imperialist domination has the vital need to practice cultural oppression, national liberation is necessarily an act of culture (PAIGC 1973, p.43).

Cabral sees culture as “an essential element of a people’s history. It is perhaps, the product of the history just as a flower is the product of a plant. Like history or rather it is history—culture has a material basis at the level of the forces of production and the mode of production” (PAIGC 1973, p.43). Every society, anywhere, has culture and history. However, the colonial and imperialist forces imposed cultural domination on the indigenous people, and maintained their domination through organized repression. For example, the apartheid regime in South Africa was a form of organized repression. It created a minority white dictatorship over the indigenous peoples. Yet, Cabral discovered that in a society where there is a strong indigenous cultural life, foreign domination cannot be sure of its perpetuation. Depending on the relationships between various internal and external factors, cultural resistance could exist in the forms of political, economic and armed resistance, to contest the foreign domination, colonialism and imperialism. The national liberation movement is therefore “an organized political expression of the culture of the people, who are undertaking the struggle” (PAIGC 1973, p.43).

Amílcar Cabral further reasserted his position in *Identity and Dignity in the Context of National Liberation Struggle*, a speech delivered at Lincoln University, Pennsylvania on 15 October 1972. He argued that the imperialist domination requires cultural oppression and attempts either directly or indirectly to do away with the most important elements of the culture of the subject people. On the other hand, people could and should keep their culture alive, despite the organized repression of their cultural life, as a basis for their liberation movement. They can still resist culturally even when their politico-military resistance is destroyed, and new forms of resistance, political, economic and armed, will eventually return (PAIGC 1973, pp.57-69).

Cultural Actions in the Liberated Zones

Amílcar Cabral turned his ideas into concrete actions in the liberated zones in Guinea Bissau. Eight years after its formation, PAIGC held its first Congress in Cassaca, a liberated zone in Guinea Bissau, in February 1964, to lay down the foundation for state construction of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. António Tomás describes this period as building “a state inside the colony” (Chabal 2003, p.193; Tomás 2007, p.193). Chabal (2003) provided extensive data about political and economic reconstruction in the liberated areas.

Firstly, PAIGC developed revolutionary democracy by setting up Village Committees which consisted of five directly-elected villagers, two of whom had to be women. Each committee was to be responsible for agricultural production; security and local defense; health, education and other social services; providing supplies and deliveries to the armed forces and accommodation for troops visiting the village; the census, civil registry and accounting (Chabal 2003, p. 107). These Village Committees provided basic administrative infrastructure for the management of the liberated zones, increased agricultural production and built schools and hospitals (Chabal 2003, p.108-109).

Secondly, PAIGC established agriculture cooperatives and people's storehouses (Chabal 2003, p.112). Since the economy is a central aspect of human life, it could be a weapon in the struggle for liberation. PAIGC therefore had to develop and implement policies that would systematically destroy, sabotage and in anyway possible, dismantle the colonial economic system (Chabal 2003, p.110). Among the policies of PAIGC was to increase and diversify food cultivation (Chabal 2003, p.111), and the agriculture products were to be stored in people's storehouses to replace Portuguese commercial networks and to compete with private shops in the Portuguese held-zones. The first people's storehouses were established in 1964, and by 1968, there were some 15 in the country. The stores were also centres for a barter system, replacing the monetary system of the Portuguese. These people's storehouses also provided economic justice by keeping low the prices of goods sold for money. Rice was also always available for everyone (Chabal 2003, p.112-113).

Thirdly, PAIGC developed social services such as basic education and health care. Cabral urged the education system to go beyond literacy and numeracy, and teach students about the liberation struggle. One subject called 'militant formation' was taught throughout the four years of elementary schooling. During the first two years students learned political formation and in second two years they studied sociological and political notions such as the social and ethnic structures of Guinea, the objectives of the national liberation struggle, and the contribution of the Guinean liberation struggle to world peace. The PAIGC schools also taught history which avoided the colonial European ethnocentric tradition. Instead history lessons were about the

history of Guinea and Cape Verde, located within the new African historiography which had emerged in the 1950s and 1960s (Chabal 2003, p.116-117).

PAIGC established only one Party School, known as *Centro de Instrução Político-Militar* (CIPM), in 1971. CIPM provided military and political training to some 200-300 members of the armed forces for several months. They were composed of university students returned from overseas together with illiterate members of the armed forces, specifically to raise political consciousness. Aside from strict military training, they studied colonial domination, the nature of the enemy, the situation in Africa, international affairs, the PAIGC program, the strengths and the weaknesses of the Party, the question of national unity, the problems of regionalism and tribalism and relations of the armed forces with the population (Chabal 2003, p.117). Cabral strongly believed that the quality of Party members would determine its success in attaining its objectives. Cabral also urged women to combat the restrictions imposed by Muslim teachings on them, and the PAIGC promoted women's participation in all levels of its structure (Chabal 2003, p.117).

The health-care system was another problem in the liberated zones. Between 1968 and 1971, PAIGC built some 117 health posts (Tomás 2007, p.209), and some mobile medical centers, known as mobile health brigades. The health brigades each had one female and one male nurse and each was responsible for a number of villages. They operated on the principles of developing hygiene and health prevention and treated the most serious cases. By 1971, PAIGC had built three safe and well-equipped modern hospitals, staffed with surgeons and other specialists, across the border in Senegal. There was only one medical doctor in 1966, but by 1972 PAIGC had 18 and 20 medical assistants. There were 9 foreign doctors in 1966, and the number increased to 23 in 1972. Some of the doctors were from Cuba, and others from Europe (Chabal 2003, p.199-120).

Fourthly, PAIGC established a people's judicial system in the liberated zones, which was perceived as popular and progressive. PAIGC found that the concentration of military and political power in the hands of some guerrilla commanders of *Forças Armadas de Revolução*

Popular (FARP) had led to gross abuses and arbitrary justice which the Portuguese legal code was no longer suitable to address (Tomas 2007, p.193). The PAIGC then took a decisive step by drafting a new legal code which recognized the pre-colonial justice system. This was followed by the establishment of village people's courts for minor offences such as theft, minor violence, land disputes and family matters. These 'Popular Courts' had three judges selected from Village Committee members, and a school teacher who acted as court clerk. The villagers could replace the judges, if they were found no longer suitable for the job (Chabal 2003, pp.120-121). In a speech entitled *Connecting the Struggles: An Informal Talk with the Black Americans* in the United States of America in October 1972, Cabral mentioned to his audience:

We now have Popular Tribunals - People's Courts - in our country ... Through the struggles we created our courts and the peasants participate by electing the courts themselves (PAIGC 1973, p.84).

The PAIGC claimed that crimes diminished markedly after the introduction of people's courts, and most disputes were settled without recourse to the higher regional courts. Those cases requiring jail sentences were to be brought to zone courts. The higher court, the *Tribunal de Guerra*, dealt with serious crimes including espionage and murder which could result in the death penalty. This system brought back the capacity of people to control their own lives that had been taken away by colonial rule. Corporal punishment was strictly forbidden. The courts instead adopted reconciliation, rehabilitation and retributive justice, rather than punishment against the Party members and members of armed forces. This way of thinking fundamentally came across partly because Amílcar Cabral remained convinced that human nature is essentially good and always seeks better things and he therefore opposed life imprisonment and the death penalty (Chabal 2003, pp.120-123).

The revolution against Portuguese colonialism was always about building an alternative to cultural imperialism described by Cabral as tribal, military-aristocratic, feudal and capitalistic. The resistance of the colonized people could be political, economic and military, but it was always cultural. Assuming the farmers were not revolutionaries, Cabral appealed to the petty bourgeoisie to commit class suicide by forming an alliance with them in order to educate

themselves about a culture alternative to that of the colonial fascist state of António Salazar. The PAIGC tested his theories on the ground, in the liberated areas in Guinea Bissau. It constructed an alternative culture along themes such as: revolutionary democracy; organizing agriculture cooperatives; integrating the liberation struggle into education; preventive health care through health brigade programs; and the establishment of Popular Tribunals. They proved to be successful, leading to the independence of Guinea Bissau.

George Aditjondro argued some years ago that the theory and praxis of Cabral and the PAIGC became a primary source of inspiration for FRETILIN. His evidence included the establishment of the women's wing of the party, OPMT, which he argued was inspired by Carmen Pereira's work in the liberated zones in Guinea Bissau. Aditjondro also believed that activities such as agricultural cooperatives, and organizing the youth, were influenced by Amílcar Cabral and Paulo Freire (Aditjondro 1999, p.xxxi). My own research has confirmed these claims. Two members of the *Casa do Timores* said their group's thinking was influenced by Amílcar Cabral and the PAIGC, and also by the works of Eduardo Mondlane and Samora Machel of Mozambique, and Agostinho Neto of Angola (Interviews, Justino Yap, 14/06/2008; Abílio Araújo, 09/09/2009). Further evidence of Cabral's influence can be seen in the organization of the Resistance Bases, analysed in later chapters.

PAULO FREIRE: EDUCATION FOR LIBERATION

The *Casa dos Timores* students returned from Portugal in 1975 with a literacy Manual: *Rai Timur, Rai Ita nian* which was used to teach literacy in village pilot programs in the Districts of Aileu and Baucau. A Portuguese military officer, Major Mota, a member of the Decolonization Committee, who visited one of the FRETILIN's pilot projects in Bucoli, in Baucau in 1975 said he had witnessed Paulo Freire's literacy methods being used (Jolliffe 1978, p.117). As explained in later chapters, the *Casa dos Timores* students learned about Freirian pedagogy, both in Portugal and also from a Portuguese teacher in Dili, Judith Magalhães.

Paulo Freire was born in Recife, Brazil, on 19 September 1921 (Freire and Macedo, 1987, p.12). During the early decades of his life, Brazilian political culture remained paternalistic,

under the Populist Leader President Getulio Vargas. The incorporation of industrialists, the military, the bureaucracy and the bankers into a ruling elite created a state which maintained their dominance over sixteen million illiterate peasants. However, Freire was a committed adult educator, who had worked for fifteen years with the people to address social poverty and alienation. During this time, he used different methods, and formed a profound conviction that working with illiterate people to help them take their own actions to change their situation as oppressed people was the only way to bring about change (Freire 2001, p.80). Freire struggled to develop a philosophy of education by making practical interventions. His work helped to initiate an education revolution in Brazil.

Educational Philosophy

Freire developed a critical philosophical analysis regarding the existence and the history of humanity. His basic premise was that *humanization* – becoming more fully human - is the central vocation of humanity. However, injustice, exploitation, oppression and the violence of the oppressors had in fact produced de-humanization. Because it is a distortion of the historical vocation of human beings to become fully human, this dehumanization would eventually lead to the struggle of the oppressed, the alienated, for the freedom and justice necessary to regain their humanity (Freire 1970, pp.45-46).

In this existing class struggle, where the oppressed is opposed to the oppressor, education can be either domesticating, maintaining the status quo of oppression, or liberating, that is, aiming to resolve the contradiction between oppressor and the oppressed (Freire 1970, p. 52-53). Freire believed that the role of education is to develop the critical consciousness of the oppressed about their contradictory reality, their division and their oppression and the violence they suffer (Freire 1970, p.37), in order to regain their humanity. However, Freire does not advocate the total destruction of the oppressors. He rather sees that the oppressed should not become the new oppressors of their former oppressors, but rather the restorers of the humanity to both the oppressed and the oppressor (Freire 1970, pp.37-46). In Brazil, Freire saw the peasants' movements fight for land reform based on their desire to own their own land, just like their oppressors. Unconsciously, he believed, they would also become sub-oppressors or oppressors

themselves, and so would not become free either. This analysis led Freire to a new layer of analysis about future society, in which he described freedom as a situation where no classes existed, what Marx called a classless society, communism, the abolition of classes and the end of class struggle.

Literacy and Critical Consciousness

Paulo Freire had studied for his PhD in education, and he knew perfectly well that the policy of obscurantism and the banking system of conventional education had allowed massive cultural poverty to exist in Brazil. He was convinced that promoting mass education, working directly with the people, was one way to make change in Brazil. In 1964 President Goulart's Labour Party in government supported Freire's mass education campaign, establishing 24,000 cultural circles "designed to assist two million illiterate workers" (McLaren 2000, p.144). The cultural circle which Freire introduced was a new institution, a form of popular culture which made education an active arena for reflection and action, known as *Praxis*. The revolution started to transform the day-to-day paternalistic learning culture of the school banking system. Pupils and students became 'participants' and lecturers and teachers became 'coordinators' who engaged in 'dialogue' instead of teaching.

In the cultural circle, the topics discussed and words learned to read and write were not fixed in advance. Rather, Freire used generative themes, identified through a long process of dialogue and community research. These generative themes reflected the real situation of the Brazilian people and encouraged discussion about and discoveries by participants of their own social situation, as part of the development of their critical consciousness. This involved identifying the issues or themes, and analyzing their causes and effects, lead to the participants developing concrete actions to address them (Freire 2001, p.81). For example, the Portuguese word *Tijolo* (brick) is an example of a generative theme. The generative word *tijolo* something workers know from their daily lives, is presented as a picture of men at work on a construction site. The word is simply written: *tijolo*, then broken into syllables which are used to generate :

ta-te-ti-to-tu.

ja-je-ji-jo-ju

la-le-li-lo-lu

The five vowels *a-e-i-o-u* are used to form new phonemic families. As well as learning to read and write the word *tijolo*, this process allows questions to be raised, so that participants may understand their own reality as workers, of being in the position of the oppressed. Questions might include: Who makes *tijolo*? How much are they paid? How many *tijolo* are produced? Who owns the *tijolo*? This in turn produces continuous dialogue which could lead to actions such as a labour protest.

From Freire, the early FRETILIN leaders learned that literacy teaching involved conscientisation, ‘reading the world’, not just the word. As a recent analysis of Freire’s writings put it:

...the challenge was not just to teach literacy skills, but to give voice to the people, so they could transition from a culture of silence, oppression and colonialism, to one of pride and of active political participation in which they would become masters of their own destiny (Schugurensky 2011, p. 22)

Chapter 6 will demonstrate the importance of Freire’s ideas in the development of FRETILIN’s popular education theory and practice in the *Casa dos Timores* students’ literacy manual and campaign, twenty five years before the ‘re-discovery’ of his ideas in the post-occupation popular education movement.

MAO TSE-TUNG: The Theory of the Mass Line

In September 2001, I travelled to the town of Lospalos, in the eastern-most district of Timor-Leste, to participate in a youth meeting. While I was there, I ended up having a discussion with Renato de Oliveira, a FRETILIN middle-ranking leader in the Ponta-Leste Sector during the Resistance. The old man challenged a friend and me with an unexpected question. He stated, loudly and confidently:

The revolution has started, and we cannot stop, we are in the middle of the river. Now I want to ask you both. When we started to fight the Indonesian occupying forces and colonialism and imperialism in 1974, they were all outside. Today they are here with us. What is your strategy?

He continued, saying that the original Marxist class analysis of contradiction between bourgeoisie and proletariat was not applicable to the struggle in Timor, because there was an absence of industry and working class people. However, the Maoist idea of a peasant movement was relevant, because the Timorese population were primarily employed in subsistence agriculture (Renato de Oliverira, Personal Com, 09/2001). Sadly De Oliveira died of a heart attack within a week of our meeting, but for me, this was evidence that the ideas of Maoism had been important within the Resistance Bases, and, as seen in the previous chapter, several of the Casa dos Timores group were members or associates of the Maoist Communist Party of Portugal, the MRRP.

Several adult education writers over the last three decades have acknowledged the importance of Mao's ideas to the development of revolutionary popular adult education in China and elsewhere (Youngman 1985; Hayford 1987; Foley 1993; Boughton 2003; Boshier & Huang 2009, 2010). Born into a peasant family, Mao had once lamented that "in China, culture had always been the exclusive preserve of the landlords, and the peasants have no access to it ... Ninety percent of the people had no education" (Hayford 1987, p.148). Mao worked as a librarian in 1918 during which time he became a Marxist. He went on to become a labour organiser, and was among the twelve people who were present at the formation of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1921.

Based on his study of Marx and Lenin, Mao was a supporter of the Marxist 'mass line' concept, the idea that, since only a mass can make a revolution, it is mass revolutionary practice that creates revolutionary theory. Unlike the classic Marxists, however, Mao believed this mass revolutionary practice would not occur in China in a proletarian revolution, but through an uprising of the peasantry. This orientation to the peasantry led him to split from mainstream Chinese communists, and to build a new culture within the CCP. Mao built a new educational doctrine on a complex combination of his personal experience of teaching, on Marxism, on his research on the formation of classes in the countryside, and on the rich cultural heritage of China (Qingjun 1994, pp.93-106).

Mao Tse-tung and his comrades initially became literacy teachers, working as volunteers in the Chinese Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) literacy campaign in 1923. Although this work with the Christian group did not last long, it introduced Mao and his friends to the work of literacy educators, including the founder of the Mass Education Movement (MEM) Tao Xingzhi, whose famous "each one, teach one" method, was expressed in the slogan:

Let the husband teach his wife, the son teach his father, the secretary teach his boss, and those who know more, teach those who know less

While this experience was influential, this literacy movement was not political enough for the CCP, who soon introduced Marxist concepts into the YMCA primer. (Hayford 1987, pp.161-163).

According to Hayford (1987, p.164), Mao developed a new form of literacy education, where "political mobilisation and general communication were more important than general literacy", and large numbers of villagers, including women, became politically active, though they were still unable to read very many characters. In order to gain the farmers' support, Mao turned to traditional folksongs and local opera as a vehicle for revolutionary ideas (Qingjun 1994, p. 28). In Shaanxi (North West) Province of China in 1934, when the Soviet-trained CCP leadership's conventional warfare strategy was defeated by Kuomintang forces led by Chiang Kaishek, Mao led the soldiers and party cadres in the Long March which reached Yen-an in 1935. Here Mao launched "a new phase of the revolution, in which the war with Japan overshadowed the class struggle. He welcomed students and intellectuals to join a United Front, a multi-class coalition, to attack the problems of the village and defend the nation" (Hayford, 1987, p.164).

In December 1936, the CCP moved its headquarters from Yen-an in Shaanxi Province, the base of the Red Army. Literacy and political education were all important in the Red Army, for several reasons:

One was functional: the ability to obey written orders. The second was political: the Leninist Model of an Army that was ideologically as well as militarily equipped. As part of this effort, a learn-to-read movement was adopted from the Soviet Red Army and quickly became an integral part of troops' political education (Peterson 1994, p.99).

In 1941, the Communist Party fought both the Nationalist and the Japanese imperial forces. Mao Tse-tung launched a series of popular education movements, one aim of which was to establish cooperatives to promote land reform and self-reliant communities to address food shortages and organise political and cultural education. The intellectuals who claimed to be left wing were required to demonstrate their solidarity with the masses by joining them in practice (McDougall and Louie 1997, p.192). This campaign centred in Yen-an, began in July 1941, and was called 'To the Village'. As part of this movement, according to Selden (1995, p.181), the CCP transformed local politics through the 'praxis method' of learning adopted by the Yen-an Party School, which sent its student cadres to the countryside to assist with the grain harvest. These programs allowed intellectuals to experience first-hand the hardships and problems of rural life; to bridge the gap between the town and country; to overcome barriers separating mental and manual labor; and to bring new skills to villages that were cut off from the outside world. In a speech to the party intellectuals, K'ai Feng, the head of the propaganda department of the Central Committee of the CCP, argued that the purpose of 'To the Village' was for "intellectuals [to] truly serve the workers, peasants and soldiers, [to] reflect their livelihood and work" (Selden 1995, p.182; see also Youngman 1986, pp. 216-217). The campaign was then extended to involve artists, writers and regional and district officials. A group of writers associated with the Lu Xun academy supported the movement by composing songs and poems, and collecting folksongs (McDougall and Louie 1997, p.192).

'To the Village', not only brought the urgent revolutionary message of development and social transformation to the countryside, but through it, intellectuals shared in and learned from the experience of the people (Selden 1995, p.182). There was resistance to the movement by some local leaders and cadres who were used to seeing themselves as in charge, and felt threatened by the program (Selden 1995, p.182). Nevertheless, it brought a vision of revolution and society which challenged many deep-rooted village values and Youngman regarded it as putting into practice in China the principles of a "consistent socialist pedagogy" (Youngman 1986, p. 217).

On May 2, 1942, Mao Tse-tung delivered a speech at the Yen-an Forum of Literature and Art, in which he stated:

In our struggle for the liberation of the Chinese people there are various fronts, among which there are the fronts of the pen and of the gun, the cultural and the military fronts, and they play a complementary role in defeating the enemy (Mao Tse-Tung 1975, p. 69)

Subsequent chapters will show how the cultural front, which I have called the ‘army of the pens’, became a key aspect of the work of FRETILIN.

CONCLUSION

José Martí’s original vision of popular education was of an education of the whole people, the whole nation. However, the social and political context of Latin America, particularly of Cuba in the 1950s and of Brazil in the 1960s, changed the meaning of popular education to the education of the oppressed people or classes. The class spirit is highlighted in Paulo Freire’s concept of *conscientisation*, a process of empowering the oppressed to understand their own social and political reality, as oppressed subjects in a world of unjust external and internal structures, including colonialism, imperialism, feudalism and corporatism. The class spirit of popular education is also seen in the works and thinking of Amílcar Cabral in the independence struggle of the PAIGC from Portuguese colonialism and imperialism in Africa. In China, class struggle was a dominant idea in the popular educational programs of Mao Tse-tung, within a broader alliance to resist Japanese imperialism with the nationalists and intellectuals.

Later chapters will show how FRETILIN popular education adopted and adapted this class-conscious character inherited from Paulo Freire, Amílcar Cabral and Mao Tse-tung. The FRETILIN campaign for independence started with the initiation of what it called ‘Base Work’ in rural areas, to bring about critical awareness and to form the new consciousness of the Maubere People, a mentality of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, and for freedom and independence. Popular education introduces a new understanding about education, as not merely developing knowledge, but building people’s critical consciousness of their structural and cultural location as people who have been marginalised and oppressed, in order to transform their own reality. It becomes then a tool both for learning and personal empowerment, as well as for popular mobilization for radical political change in society.

In order to conscientise the people and promote change, popular education movements engage in acts of culture with the oppressed people to bring hope that a better future is possible and can be made by them. They apply many methods, including media campaigns, group discussions and cultural circles, popular literacy campaigns, grass-roots work, popular mobilization, popular arts and building alternative programs, even alternative states. The role of popular education is neither to replace nor to complement armed struggle. Rather, it supplies the essential ethical elements to all the equally important and irreplaceable aspects of the popular struggle.

CHAPTER 5

THE ORIGIN, IDEAS AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF FRETILIN

INTRODUCTION

While its early leaders drew on the work of the revolutionary leaders and educators, Amílcar Cabral, Paulo Freire and Mao Tse-tung, in the specific context of Timor-Leste, FRETILIN was also articulating its own political project, which Mattoso has called the Revolution of the Maubere (Mattoso 2005, p.63). From the perspective of popular education, this study argues that FRETILIN developed a distinct Pedagogy of the Maubere Revolution, to achieve two related but distinct objectives: the liberation of the country and the liberation of the people.⁹⁹ As part of constructing an understanding of the Pedagogy of Maubere Revolution, this chapter explains the political context of FRETILIN, including its political ideas, the structure of the Party and its efforts to develop a popular or people's movement through the formation of mass organizations, campaigns and programs. The formation of popular mass movements will be discussed in more detail in the next two chapters.

In the first part of this chapter, I discuss the formation of political parties in Timor-Leste during the decolonization period 1974-5. In the second part, I analyse the concept of *Maubere* as a political and popular education symbol for mass mobilisation. In the third and final part, I discuss FRETILIN's political structures, including training for political cadres in the Resistance Bases. The evidence presented is drawn from my own interviews with FRETILIN leaders and activists of the period, including Abílio Araújo, Alarico Fernandes, Domingos Sibikinu, Afonso Pinto, Madalena Fernandes, Júlio Fátima, António Pinto, Lorença Guterres, Adelino de Jesus and Ali Alkatiri. Their accounts are supplemented with documentary material from the time, retrieved from various archival collections. I have drawn further on the work of other researchers, including Jolliffe (1978), Barros-Duarte (1988), Turner (1992), Hill (2001), CAVR (2006), Cabral (2002), Nicol (2002), Nicolai (2004), Mattoso (2005), Magalhães (2007); and on the writings of some key FRETILIN members, including, Horta (1987), De Almeida (1997) and Gusmão (2000).

99 In Portuguese: *Libertação da Pátria e Libertação do Povo*

THE FORMATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES

The Carnation Revolution and Political Parties in Timor

Progressive Portuguese army officers in the *Movimento das Forças Armadas* (MFA) initiated a peaceful revolution in Portugal on April 25, 1974, since known as the Carnation Revolution. This brought an end to the Fascist Regime *Estado Novo* of António de Olivera Salazar, which had dominated Portuguese politics for nearly 50 years. The revolution immediately focused attention on the question of self-determination for the Timorese people, after more than 400 dark years under Portuguese colonial rule.

Between May and June 1975, five political parties formed in what was still then called Portuguese Timor: the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT - União Democrática Timorense) which wanted Timor to be part of a federation under Portugal; the Social Democratic Association of Timor (ASDT - Associação Social Democrática de Timor) which called for immediate independence; the Popular Timorese Democratic Association (APODETI - Associação Popular Democrática Timorense) which wanted integration into Indonesia, and two smaller parties, KOTA (Klibur Oan Timor Aswain) and the Workers Party (Partido Trabalhista). The members of UDT were largely the national petty bourgeoisie and lower-middle ranking Portuguese administrators. The young Timorese intellectuals of the Anti-Colonial Informal Discussion Group described in Chapter 3, were the key group behind the formation of ASDT on May 20, 1974, and its call for independence (Jolliffe 1978).

ASDT to FRETILIN: The Maubere Revolution

The ASDT leaders and the Casa dos Timores believed the new MFA Government included some neo-colonial tendencies which were ambivalent on self-determination for the Timorese. They therefore imagined a long struggle for independence ahead of them, in which national unity and popular mobilization would be the fundamental basis of resistance. Between September 1974 and June 1975, they took four steps which would prove decisive for the independence campaign, by broadening popular resistance against both Portuguese colonialism and the threatened neo-colonialism of Indonesia.

Firstly, on 11 September 1974, ASDT was transformed into FRETILIN (Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente). On that same day, some of the *Casa dos Timores* students arrived from Lisbon, planning to establish their own political party on the left of the political spectrum, called FULINTIDI (Frente Unida de Libertação Nacional de Timor-Dili) (Cabral, 2002. p.193). However, when their proposal was rejected by the ASDT/FRETILIN leadership, they decided to join FRETILIN instead (Abílio Araújo, Interview 09/09/2009). Along with the change of name, FRETILIN also adopted a new Political Manifesto calling for immediate independence. The Manifesto proclaimed that FRETILIN was the only legitimate representative of the Maubere People, as it was the only party which stood for complete independence from colonial rule (CAVR, 2006, p. 26; FRETILIN, 1974). Some months later, on January 25, 1975, the President of FRETILIN, Francisco Xavier do Amaral, delivered a speech in which he explained the transformation of ASDT into FRETILIN:

The Revolutionary Front of East Timor appeared. It was a popular explosion. It was the beginning of the revolution of Maubere. It was necessary to take a more radical line so that it would be possible to destroy all the colonialist structures and introduce a new form of life [which was] truly democratic. Of the people, with the people and for the people for a better East Timor ... It was the start of the great revolutionary march (Quoted by Nicol 2002, p.168).

Second, the returning students from Lisbon formed the National Union of High School Students (UNETIM) in October 1975, which began to challenge the education system inherited from the Portuguese colonial government. The role of UNETIM is discussed in detail in Chapter 6.

Third, FRETILIN adopted a program of mass mobilization and political education in communities, which was known by the term Base Work. This included the promotion of cooperatives for agriculture production, and a mass adult literacy campaign using Paulo Freire's ideas and methods of education for conscientisation, which required the UNETIM students to travel frequently to the countryside to work with Timorese villagers.

Fourth, FRETILIN formed three other mass popular organizations, namely the Popular

Organisation of Timorese Workers (OPTT - Organização Popular de Trabalhadores Timor); the Popular Organisation of Timorese Youth (OPJT - Organização Popular de Juventude Timor) and the Popular Organisation of Timorese Women (OPMT - Organização Popular da Mulher Timor). These are discussed in the next chapters.

UDT Coup d'état August 11, 1975

In his three volume history of Timor-Leste, Professor Barbedo Magalhaes of the University of Oporto in Portugal, himself a Portuguese military officer stationed in Timor during that time, aptly referred to the events leading up to the UDT coup d'état of August 11th as a convergence of “the international interest and local actors.” According to Magalhães (2007, p.119-120):

The United States of America was against such anti-colonial revolutions because they believed that communists were penetrating the nationalist movement

In fact, it was Indonesia which was planning to implement the anti-communist strategy in Timor-Leste. As Nicolai wrote:

As FRETILIN gained strength, the world became increasingly fearful of its leftist rhetoric, and Indonesia supported UDT in launching a coup in August 1975 (Nicolai 2004, p.36; see also Magalhães 2007, p.258-259).

Many authors have covered these events, and the details will not be pursued here. It is sufficient to note that, after a series of overseas trips to Europe, Hong Kong, Australia and Indonesia, including meetings with Indonesian Lieutenant General Ali Murtopo¹⁰⁰, the UDT leadership initiated a coup d'état on August 11, 1975, seizing power from the Portuguese authorities, but in fact directed primarily at FRETILIN and its growing support base (Magalhães, 2007, p.259). Four days later, on 15 August 1975, FRETILIN called for a popular armed uprising against UDT, established its first military base, the *Centro de Insurreiçao do Comando Territorial Independente de Timor* and formed its own army, *Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional*

¹⁰⁰ União Democrática Timorense (UDT) leaders, including such as João Carrascalão, Francisco Lopes da Cruz and César Mounzinho had visited Jakarta prior to the coup, and met with General Ali Mortopo, who was the key mastermind of the Indonesian invasion in 1975. UDT initially wanted Timor-Leste to remain part of the Portuguese Republic as a federal state, but later supported integration with Indonesia.

(FALINTIL)¹⁰¹ on 20 August 1975 (De Almeida 1997, p.7). The Portuguese authorities evacuated to the island of Ataúro off the coast of Dili, and two weeks of violent conflict between UDT and FRETILIN followed, resulting in FRETILIN securing total control. FRETILIN then called on the Portuguese authorities to return and to continue the decolonization process in East Timor, but this was ignored. As Indonesia increased its illegal armed incursions into Timor, in preparation for a full-scale invasion, FRETILIN became the country's de-facto governing authority (Jolliffe 1978 & 2009; Cabral 2002; CAVR 2006; Dunn 2003).

POLITICAL IDEAS AND STRUCURE

Its Political Manifesto of 1974 states only that FRETILIN is a broad front of all nationalist forces, and it did not explicitly align itself with any particular ideology until the decision taken in June 1977, to declare itself a Marxist-Leninist party. This section discusses the original political platform of FRETILIN, and its use of the term 'Maubere' as a symbol of anti-colonial resistance and a call for unity in class struggle. It also discusses the political structure of FRETILIN from 1974-1978.¹⁰²

The Maubere Revolution as a Political Slogan

Mau Bere is the name of a mountain in Soibada, in the District of Manatuto. In September 1972, Inacio Moura published a poem in the journal, *Seara*, entitled 'The Pilgrims of Luck', in which he used the words 'the Mau Bere People' and 'the land of Mau Bere', to refer to the Timorese and their country (Seara 8/8/1972). The next year, Julieta Fatal and Inácio Moura published a collection of poems, entitled *Let Us Sing An Island* (Portuguese: *Vamos Cantar Uma Ilha*), and Moura used the word 'Mau Bere' in seven of his poems. According to reports of the Portuguese secret police, PIDE, copies of the poetry collection were distributed in the streets of Dili (PIDE-DGS 1973). In that same year, José Ramos Horta wrote an article entitled 'Mau Bere' also published in *Seara*, and more recently, he testified to the Commission of Truth and Reconciliation that he had proposed the concept of Maubere as a political symbol for FRETILIN:

101 FALINTIL is the military wing of FRETILIN. Initially, it consisted mainly of former 'first' and 'second line' Timorese soldiers in the Portuguese Army, who sympathised with FRETILIN's call for independence.

102 The ideas and structure of Partido Marxista Leninista-FRETILIN (PML-F) of the 1980s will be discussed in Chapter 12.

I wrote an article in a journal in Timor, not in 1975 or in 1974, but in 1973 ... When we began ASDT, in a meeting of ASDT/ FRETILIN, I explained that all political parties needed an image. That if we wanted to convince the electorate we could not do this with complicated philosophy ... So I said it would be good if we could identify FRETILIN with Maubere like a slogan, a symbol of FRETILIN's identity. It is clear that 90% of Timorese are barefoot, no papers, but they all called themselves Maubere ... It is important [to understand] that there was no other philosophy to this term, it was a party identity (CAVR 2006, Ch.3, p. 27).

Abílio Araújo, a leading member of FRETILIN at that time, told Barros Duarte that Maubere was a common Timorese name, similar to João or Maria in Portuguese. He also said that the Portuguese used 'Maubere' to refer to any native Timorese who was illiterate, had bad health and was poor (Barros Duarte 1988, p.17-18).

There are clearly different interpretations of the concept Maubere or Mau Bere. Inácio Moura used Mau Bere to refer to the land of Timor and to the people in general. According to Barros Duarte, Abílio Araújo, on the other hand, did not see every Timorese as Maubere.

'Maubere' [refers to] ... the people who resisted colonialism, culturally, they were the real vanguard of the popular culture, because of that they suffered ... (Barros Duarte 1988, p.18).

Duarte himself goes further, claiming that Maubere means Timorese who are deprived and disadvantaged. Like the Portuguese 'Povo Zé ninguém', or 'povo Zé', it signifies the working people, the people with nothing (Barros Duarte, 1988, p.18).

What is clear, however, is that FRETILIN used the concept 'Maubere' as a symbol of its commitment to the liberation from colonialism of the majority of people, the 'popular classes'.. In May 20, 1975, during the first anniversary of ASDT, FRETILIN published a special edition of its magazine, *Nacroma (Light)*, in which appeared a banner inscribed with the words: *Revolução de Maubere* (Nacroma 20/05/1975).



Photo *Jornal Nacroma*, May 20, 1975

FRETILIN cadres promoted this concept through literacy classes and party meetings. In speeches, for example, instead of singling out ‘Senhores’ or ‘Your Excellencies’, a leader would start with ‘Camaradas Mauberes e Biberes¹⁰³’ to signal that everyone is equal. The UNETIM members who taught literacy classes in the villages, also used the term. One UNETIM member recalled:

People were asked: “Who built the road?” People said: “Maubere!” “Who use the road?” They said: “The colonials!” The facilitator would say: “Now Maubere must build the road and Maubere will use the road” (Francisco Borulaco, Pers. Com. 27/08/2009).

This brief discussion shows that ‘Maubere’ is an important social concept, identifying those Timorese to whom FRETILIN was appealing. It became a vital symbol for the political movement, as in the National Council for Maubere Resistance (CNRM) established in 1987. However, according to FRETILIN’s current Secretary-General and founding member Mari Alkatiri, it remained undeveloped as the basis of a political ideology. During a public lecture at the National University of Timor-Leste in August 2009, Alkatiri reaffirmed the class interpretation of the concept of Maubere:

If FRETILIN was to liberate the people, it therefore should liberate the lowest segment of the society. Maubere is a socio-cultural concept to re-affirm the Timorese nationalism.

¹⁰³ Maubere refers to male Timorese, and Bibere (Buibere) to Timorese women, but Maubere as social concept refers to both genders.

Maubere has an ideological character, but it is not an ideology. There was the concept of 'proletariat', but Timor did not have a proletariat, so FRETILIN used Maubere (Fieldnotes, Alkatiri Seminar, UNTL, 21/08/2009).

FRETILIN stood for the liberation of the Maubere people, in opposition to colonialism, imperialism and the neo-colonial forces of Indonesia.

The Structure of FRETILIN 1974-1978

FRETILIN consisted of the Central Committee (CCF) within which there were several commissions, including a Political Commission, an Education and Culture Commission, a Commission on External Relations and regional committees formed since late 1975. FRETILIN further developed its structure in the *support bases* and constantly substituted its members that are killed in the battle.

Central Committee

FRETILIN's most important structure was the Central Committee (CCF), which according to Hill had 50 members in May 1975 (Hill 2002, p.131). After the Indonesian invasion this increased to 68, excluding the External Delegation (De Almeida 1997, p.16). The early members of the Central Committee comprised three different groups, which other writers have said represented different political tendencies, ranging from popular nationalism to a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology.

The first political block, was the Anti-Colonial Discussion Group around Nicolau Lobato, included Nicolau Lobato, Justino Mota, Mari Alkatiri, José Ramos Horta, and Francisco Borja da Costa. With the exception of Borja da Costa, who was in Portugal during the Carnation Revolution, they were founding members of ASDT. Ideologically, they were not a uniform group. Ramos Horta (1987, p. 35) recalled that Nicolau Lobato, Justino Mota and Mari Alkatiri combined nationalism and Marxism (Ramos Horta 1987, p.35). Borja da Costa was considered a left nationalist poet, and during his time in Portugal, he was associated with the Communist/Maoist views of the *Casa dos Timores*. Horta identified as a social democrat and was a friend of Alarico Fernandes. However, they were all familiar with the ideas of Amílcar Cabral (Ramos Horta 1987, p.35).

The second group consisted of the remaining key founding members of ASDT, who, according to a report of Lemos Pires, the Portuguese Governor in Timor at the time, included Francisco Xavier do Amaral, Maria do Céu Pereira, Aleixo Corte Real, Octávio Jordão de Araújo, Afonso de Araújo, Rui Fernandes, Floriano Chaves, and Sebastião Mantalvão (Magalhães 2007, p.233). Their ideological position is very unclear. But it is worth noting that Maria do Céu Pereira, who was a member of the Communist/Maoist *Casa dos Timores* tendency in Lisbon, appeared alongside with Xavier do Amaral, who was described by Hill as a “populist” (Hill 2002, p. 62).

The third political block is the Lisbon-educated *Casa dos Timores* group of students. Helen Hill, who met the FRETILIN leadership early in 1975, recalled that the members of the *Casa dos Timores* group were Abílio Araújo, Francisco Borja da Costa, António Duarte Carvarinho and Vicente dos Reis (Hill 2002, pp.65-67). Here again, Francisco Borja da Costa was also among the list of the radical students from Lisbon, whom Horta wrote were instrumental in FRETILIN’s ‘grass-roots’ mobilisation and education campaign, known as ‘Base Work’ (Ramos Horta 1987, p.38). Estêvão Cabral (2002, p.193) listed the group of students returning from Portugal to include Hamis Bassarewan, Rosa Bonaparte (Muki), César Lebre (Mau-Laka), Hélio Pina (Mau-Kruma), Bieky Sahe, Guilhermina dos Santos and João Soares. In a recent interview, Estanislau da Silva, himself a former member of the *Casa dos Timores* group, explained that ‘Bieky Sahe’ was actually the complete *nom de guerre* name of Vicente dos Reis (Estanislau da Silva and Filomena de Almeida, Interview 08/07/2008). The identity and the role of João Soares, who was mentioned by Horta (1987, p. 38) as part of this group, was questioned in Chapter 3, where it was also shown that the *Casa dos Timores* group had links with the Maoist political part, the MRRP, in Portugal. All told, my research has identified about 20 other members of the *Casa dos Timores* who returned from Portugal in 1974-1975, some of whom appeared later as leading members of FRETILIN in the Resistance bases. These included Dulce Cruz ‘Wewe’, Manecas Cruz ‘Secar’, and Fernando do Nascimento ‘Taxai. Table 3, on the following pages, lists all the names of the sixty five members of the CCF that I have been able to identify.

This brief discussion suggests that efforts to classify the 1974-78 FRETILIN leadership into clear and discrete political tendencies is not all that useful. Rather, what matters most is that all the CCF members united around a common program, which was implemented in the months prior to the invasion, and in the years following it. That program called on the leaders and militants of the party to engage directly with the 'popular classes', identified as the Maubere people, the 'Povo Maubere', so as to mobilise them as active agents in the independence struggle, a struggle to free their homeland and to free themselves.

Table 3. Members of the CCF, 1974-1978¹⁰⁴

No	Name		Position FRETILIN
01	Francisco Xavier do Amaral		President
02	Nicolau do Reis Lobato		Vice-President
03	Justino Mota		Member of CCF/Died in Lisbon 1992
04	Marí Alkatiri		Member of External Delegation
05	Maria do Céu Pereira	Bilear	Member of CCF/Killed in 1979
06	Borja da Costa		Member
07	Alarico Fernandes		Member
08	Aleixo Corte Real		Member
09	Octavio J. de Araújo		Member
10	Jose Ramos Horta		Member of External Delegation
11	Abílio Araújo		Member of External Delegation
12	Rogério Tiago Lobato		Member of External Delegation
13	Guilhermina dos Santos		Member of External Delegation
14	Roque Rodrigues	Mao Benko	Member of External Delegation
15	António Carvarinho	Mau Lear	Member/National Political Commissar
16	Vicente Reis	Sahe	National Political Commissar
17	Rosa Bonaparte	Muki	OPMT; Killed December 1975
18	Venâncio da Silva Seran	Mauseran	Member of CCF/Captured in Dili 1975
19	Gunxi Bonaparte		Member; Killed in December 1975
20	Fernando do Carmo		Member/Killed in December 1975
21	Guido Valadares		Member
22	Jhafar Alkatiri		Captured in Dili December 1975
23	Alexandrina Guterres	Bihare ⁴	Member /Centre East Sector
24	Dulce da Cruz	Wewe	Member
25	Antunes ⁵	Feralafaek	Member
26	Hamis Bassarewan	Hata	Member
27	Guilherme dos Santos	Lere	Member
28	Eduardo dos Anjos	Kakuuk	Member
29	Natalino Leitão	Samotxo	Member
30	Manecas Cruz	Secar	Member
31	Domingos Ribeiro	Bere Manu Koko	Member/Commander
32	Valente Soares	Mau Luli	Member/ComSec
33	Eduardo dos Anjos	Kakuk	Member
34	Maria José	Soimali	Leader of OPMT
35	Artur do Nascimento		Member
36	Sebastião Sarmiento		Member/Commander
37	Guido Soares		Member/Commander
38	José Maria	Mausiri	OPJT
39	João Branco ⁶		ComSec/ Ponta-Leste

¹⁰⁴ Sources, apart from my own investigations and interviews, include Gusmão (2000, p.37, 47), Jolliffe (1978, p.269-270), Sibikini (2011), De Jesus (2011) and Alkatiri (2011). This data has been cross checked with middle ranking early FRETILIN leaders such as Adelino de Jesus, Domingos Sibikinu and Ali Alkatiri on different occasions

40	Abel Ximenes	Larisina	Member
41	Aníbal Araújo ⁷		Member
42	Oscar Araujo	Manukey	Member
43	Inácio Dias Fonseca		Member
44	José Alexandre Xanana Gusmão		Member
45	Juvinal Inácio	Sera Key	Member/Ponta-Leste
46	Pedro Sanches ⁸		COMSEC Ponta-Leste
47	José António da Costa	Ma'Huno	Member
48	Fernando Teles do Nascimento	Txai	Member
49	João Bosco		ComSec / Centro North Sector
50	Sebastião Mantalvão	Lais	Member
51	Augusto Pinheiro	Botemau	Member
52	Afonso Redentor Araújo		Member
53	César Lebre	Maulaca	Commissar/South Border Sector
54	Paulo Rodrigues		Member
55	Feliciano Fátima		Member
56	To Barbosa		Member
57	António Pádua		Member
58	Joaquim do Nascimento ⁹	Gari Buhana	Member
59	Hélio Pina	Maucruma	Commissar/ Border North Sector
60	Rui Fernandes		Member
61	Floriano Chaves		Member
62	António Carvalho	Fera lafaek	Member
63	Ali Alkatiri		Member
64	Filomeno Paixão		Member/ComSec
65	José da Silva		Commander

Regional Committees and Sub-Committees

Prior to the invasion, FRETILIN began to establish Regional Committees in the twelve districts outside of Dili, the capital, as well as Sub-Committees at the sub-district level, though it is not known how many actually functioned. The Regional Committee consisted of a Secretary, two Vice-Secretaries, and a representative from each of the Popular Organisation of Women of Timor, the Popular Organisation of Workers of Timor, and the Popular Organisation of Youth of Timor, plus a Delegate of Activists¹⁰⁵ and a Commander of Militias (JPM 15/11/1975).

¹⁰⁵ This would have been someone from UNETIM or another young cadre who had attended the political school for Base Work.

The formation of the regional committees and sub-committees was in itself an act of political education for the members of the Party. In Manatuto, according to the *Jornal do Povo Maubere* (04/12/1975), FRETILIN Political Commissar, Comrade Sahe, started political training in Manatuto, Laleia and Vemasse. The participants, who were FRETILIN cadres and literacy teachers (see Chapter 6), discussed the FRETILIN program and political structures. Members of the youth organisation (OPJT) also took part, instructing teachers on how to further facilitate the literacy campaign at the grass root level. In Laleia, the participants included the Vice-Secretaries of the Regional Sub-Committee, João Baptista Ximenes, Felisberto de Brito Viegas and Francisco Barros Gusmão (JPM 4/12/1975; Jolliffe MS.4969). The same newspaper reported that on 24 November 1975 that meetings were held in Dili, Baucau, Aileu and Bobonaro for the Secretaries and Vice-Secretaries of FRETILIN:

These important meetings were to discuss the political military situation ... and general strategies of the actual phase of resistance in our country Timor-Leste (JPM 4/12/1975)

FRETILIN President Francisco Xavier do Amaral led the meetings in Ermera, Dili and Liquica, while the Vice-President, Nicolau Lobato led the meetings in Aileu (JPM 4/12/1975).

The use of the concepts ‘discussions’, ‘general strategies’, ‘resistance’ and ‘our country Timor-Leste’, suggest that FRETILIN was consciously orienting its members towards the process of nation building or state formation. Education and organizational capacity was therefore a key for popular mobilization. Using these regional conferences, the members of the Central Committee educated their members about organizational matters of the Party, articulating the reasons of the struggle. There was also a process of leadership formation, evidenced by the fact that they were bringing young people from OPJT to speak to the people about why literacy campaigning was important, thereby encouraging young cadres in public speaking to build up their leadership capacity and confidence.

The Regional Committees were established through democratic processes, and were expanded to include representatives of the women’s organisation, OPMT, and the youth organisation, OPJT. They also included representatives of FALINTIL. In the district of Same, for example,

FRETILIN held a direct election for its local structure on 17 November 1975. The Party meeting elected a Temporary Coordinating Committee with the following members: António Cepeda, Regional Committee Secretary; Vítor da Costa, Regional Committee Vice-Secretary; Adriano Corte-Real Regional Committee Vice-Secretary; António Lisboa, OPJT Representative; Lúcia Cepeda, OPMT Representative; Pedro Corte Real, Activist Delegate; Amaro Bosco de Sousa, a FALINTIL Commander; João Amaral, a FALINTIL Commander; and Paulino das Neves, representing the soldiers of FALINTIL. The Committee planned to hold its first meeting on 18 November 1975 (JPM, 22/11/1975). In Suai, FRETILIN cadres unanimously elected José de Araújo as leader of the Regional Committee on 9 November 1975 (JPM, 22/11/1975). The incorporation of military members into the FRETILIN political structures allowed the military to participate in political activities, and to learn the political and organizational skills that would become crucial in the liberation struggle in subsequent years.

In November, it was reported that ‘an advanced democratic process and mass mobilization’ had been achieved in Baucau and Lospalos. FRETILIN had organised weekend meetings which were like popular schools, where people came to learn about politics and perform popular dances, and to become familiar with the methods of work of a disciplined organisation. The people, the armed forces, and other mass organizations adopted democratic methods in meetings in order to exchange information and to hold ‘criticism and self-criticism’ sessions about the activities of the day. In Lospalos, FRETILIN cadres also held weekend meetings, organising *convívios* to exchange information about the revolutionary process in the country (JPM, 08/11/1975).

Meanwhile, in the border areas of Maliana and Suai, FRETILIN was facing increasing pressure from Indonesian military incursions, and a people’s war against the invasion had already begun. The Regional Secretary in Bobonaro, Leonel de Jesus Carvalhos, reported that FRETILIN members in Cailaco, Lebos, Bobonaro and other zones were under attack by the Indonesian forces; but they had excellent morale and women were providing logistical support to those who were fighting in the battle front. From Atsabe, the FRETILIN leader, Comrade Mussa, informed the leadership that a food cooperative had been established and was facilitating exchanges of crops; one ton of dry potatoes had been given to the FALINTIL support base.

Meanwhile, the Secretary of the Suai Regional Committee, José de Araújo and his members were maintaining their vigilance to defend against the likely Indonesian invasion in that region. People contributed food voluntarily and were on high alert, watching the border (JPM 22/11/1975).

DOPI AND THE LEADERSHIP TRAINING SCHOOLS

Within the Central Committee of FRETILIN there was a Department of Ideological Orientation and Politics known as DOPI composed of Commissars and top leaders of FRETILIN including Nicolau Lobato, Sahe, Mau Lear, Sera Key, and Hamis. According to Xanana Gusmão, Sahe was in charge of political education (Gusmão 2000, p.47-48). Under DOPI's leadership, FRETILIN organized political and leadership training schools for both civilians cadres and military officers. This systematic political education was more apparent in the Central East Sector where Commissar Vicente Reis Sahe was based. The intensive attacks of the Indonesian forces against FRETILIN bases in other sectors meant that political education courses there were only short.

CEFORPOL: CASCOL Naroman

Soon after the historic Soibada meeting, on July 28 1976, Nicolau Lobato delivered a speech which was directly transmitted to Darwin via Radio Maubere¹⁰⁶ the National Radio of the Democratic Republic of East Timor. In this speech, he referred explicitly to the progress of FRETILIN's political education:

I find our resistance is the necessary proof of our determination to achieve nationhood. Against all odds, we are keeping the struggle going from Batugade to Tutuala ... Our resistance is becoming our political school. We taught the people the theoretical principles of our revolution and now the practice is being learnt in the battlefield ... Despite our inferiority in arms and numbers, we are fighting and winning. But our struggle is not only military but political (Lobato 1976)

¹⁰⁶ In 1976, it was broadcasting three times a week and was monitored in Darwin by the Australian solidarity organization, CIET See Chapter 11.

FRETILIN established a Centre for Political Formation (CEFORPOL), which was a political and leadership training school with its headquarters based in the Cascol¹⁰⁷ Naroman near Venilale, in Baucau where Vicente Reis, Sahe, was based. There were two levels of participants of CEFORPOL Cascol Naroman. First line participants were Commissars, Sectoral Commanders, Regional Secretaries and Regional military officers and political assistants of the Sectors. From the Central Eastern Sector (areas of Baucau and some parts of Manatuto), for example, three political assistants were selected to participate in CEFORPOL Cascol. In all there were more than 80 political cadres in Cascol including Fernando Sousa of Uato-Carbau (Domingos Sibikinu, Interview 7/2/2010).

They discussed political ideas such as Marxism, Leninism and Maoism. Xanana managed to get hold of a copy of the “Thoughts of Chairman Mao” at the end of 1976 (Gusmão 2000, p.47). Domingos Sibikini, an alumnus of CEFORPOL Cascol Naroman, recalled that the political philosophy taught to the FRETILIN militants included nationalism. Other ideas they learned included the political ideas of the Communist Party of Albania, Mao Tse-tung, Samora Machel and Amílcar Cabral and the lessons of the Vietnamese guerrilla war against the French (Sibikinu, interview 20/3/2011). Sibikinu also recalled being taught that a nationalist had to undergo “ideological suicide” and learn a spirit of self-sacrifice (Sibikinu, interview 23/02/2010). It is possible the term might have been *class suicide* which derived from Amílcar Cabral, been discussed in Chapter 3. After learning in the Cascol Naroman School, the cadres went to their own regions and formed mini CEFORPOLs.

The Mini CEFORPOL in Baguia

Prior to the invasion, UNETIM activist José da Costa, newly graduated from the *Liceu* in Dili as a teacher of Portuguese, had worked with Sahe in the No.2 Pilot Project of Base Work in Bucoli, in the District of Baucau. Da Costa, who became known as the legendary FRETILIN leader ‘Mau Hudo Ran Kdadalak’, continued Sahe’s works in later years. According to Daniel Gutteres, it was through the efforts of Mau Hudo and Abel Larisina, a member of the CCF, that

107 There has not been much written about *Cascol*, but it is certainly the name of Sahe’s Popular Education Centre in the Centre East Sector. There was a CEFORPOL for cadres of all levels including military officers and the staff of the Ministry of Work and Social Services.

FRETILIN established a 'mini' CEFORPOL in Baguia in October 1976. The participants were party cadres who came from Baguia, Venilale, Laga and Quelicai, and they included Augusto 'Uaidera', Abel Mauriba and Daniel Guterres himself, from Afaloicai Village. Guterres further recalled that, to take account of geographical and logistical constraints, the training in Baguia had to move from one location to another. The second group of CEFORPOL began their turn in Samalari village, still in Baguia on February 1977. This time the number of facilitators increased to include Mau Hudo and Virgilio Faculto 'Sibi-Sama', a former member of the Executive Committee of UNETIM, who replaced Abel Larisina who was attending a CCF meeting. Other new political facilitators were Alcino Aparício from Haeconi-Baguaia who spoke on agriculture and food production and Paulino Lemorai from Baguia, a FALINTIL commander who spoke on self-defence and military strategy. The participants included Paulino Ilibui, Mateus Roy (Alawa-Leten), Alexandre Magno, Joana Laluresi, Mateus Sinarai, and Daniel Laculubu (Daniel Guterres, Interview 08/07/2009).¹⁰⁸

The subjects which Guterres remembered learning in the mini CEFORPOL in Baguia were the history of humanity, which included the historical materialism of Karl Marx and the evolutionary theory of Darwinism; agriculture and food production; and the role of the self-defence forces. CEFORPOL also offered an introduction to other revolutionary theorists such as Mao Tse-tung and Lenin. Guterres remembered one of his theory lessons, which said there were two ways of resistance: antagonistic, by weapons and non-antagonistic, by persuasion. But, in reality, according to Guterres, a non-violent struggle can transform into a war and a war can transform into a non-antagonistic resolution of the problem (Daniel Guterres, Interview 08/07/2009).

The Mini CEFORPOL in Ravina Uato-Lari

In his autobiography, Xanana Gusmão wrote that he met Sahe and other members of the Central Committee in Cascol (Centre East Sector Commissariat) in Venilale in December 1976, where Sahe said to him:

I knew very well you weren't prepared and that you had never worked with the masses.

I wanted to encourage you and affirm that you had performed well considering all the

108 Other people who took part have not been identified.

difficulties. Theory comes from practice and if you continue working as you are you will more dynamically assimilate the theory (Gusmão 2000, p.45).

According to Gusmão, when Sahe some time earlier had given him a book called *Historical Materialism* to read, he had told him he had “heard enough ‘-isms’” (Gusmão 2000, p.42). However, though his autobiography does not recount this, Xanana worked with the Zone Secretary Adelino de Carvalho and Abílio Menezes, a FALINTIL Commander to establish a CEFORPOL in Kusi-Leki, Gulusu, in an area of Uato-Lari close to Hedemumu, the ‘Retaguarda’ Company Headquarters. There, in 1976, they built a political school, complete with dormitories, kitchen and dining room. There were two groups of students, with each course lasting for three to four months. Students were recruited mainly from the youth of Uato-Lari and Uato-Carbau. The name of students the first group that I have identified are as follows. From Uato-Carbau came António Castro, Francisco da Silva Fernandes, Cosme da Silva, and Gastão Sousa. Approximately twenty people came from Uato-Lari, among them João Baptista (Liloi), Afonso Pinto (Uato-Lari), Kilimaukasa (Afaloicai), Bilalu Casa ‘Crista Menezes’ (Matahoe), Bidolimau (Matahoe), Lourença (Matahoe), Sinoringa (Matahoe), Domingas (Matahoe-Bidolimau’s sister), and Domingas. The second group of students which started their course in around February 1977 were Joana Trindade (Babulo), Amélia Ribeiro (Nunumalau), Madalena Fernandes da Silva (Kaikasa-bu’u), Fátima Menezes (Uato-Lari), Hilda Menezes (Uato-Lari), Joao Menezes Daraloi (Cmdt. Zona), João Soares (Babulo-Joana mean nia pai), Júlio Pires Selok (Afaloicai), Alípio Mascarenhas (Vessoru), Alberto Mariana (Ossokaiwa-Afaliocai), Napoleão Almeida Lekidemau (Baidela-Vessoru), Jacinta Fernandes (Uni-uma/Uato-Carbau), Alzira Fernandes (Uani-Uma-Uato-Carbau), Hilda Maria da Conceição (Bahatata-Uato-Carbau), Isaura Uato-bitá (Uato-Carbau), Delfin Quintão (Uni-uma/Uatocarbau), Pedro Kailau (Uato-Carbau), Francisco Borulaco (Uni-uma/Uato-Carbau), Marcelino Mauloho (Irabin-Leten/UC), Brígida Martins (Ossu), Tomás Boilo, Balbina Sequeira, Julieta Guterres (Ossu-Uato-Lari), Bendita Bubulaco (Uato-Lari), Fátima Clotilde (Nahareka), Eusébia Joana Fernandes (Vessoru), Feliciano Pinto (Makadiki), and Cândida of Ossu. (Madalena Fernandes, Interview 5/2/2010; Afonso Pinto interview, 09/092008; Júlio Fátima, Interview 08/04/2010; Lourença Guterres, Interview 18/03/10 /2010).

The school had three instructors. Xanana Gusmão was responsible for political- ideological education. The Regional Commander for Viqueque, Lino Olokasa, tutored on military matters with Américo Sabika, a senior FALINTIL Commander who had been in the Portuguese army tutored on military matters. These two also taught how a fascist state operates, sustaining its political regime through the military and police. Xanana was the political educator providing classes on the history of humanity and also explained the Constitution of the newly proclaimed RDTL. Afonso Pinto, a member of CEFORPOL, recalled that in the ‘history of humanity’ class, they learned that the history of humanity would change dialectically from primitive communism to feudalism and slavery, then to capitalism and towards a ‘meta-final’, that is communism; and that communism would be the destiny of all societies around the world. CEFORPOL did not teach these political theories simply out of books, but they also developed a contextual analysis of Timorese society. Afonso recalled that feudalism could be seen as existing in Timor, at that time. In those days when a dead body of local Liurai¹⁰⁹ or Dom (ruler) was buried, his mattress was the human body of his human slave. Deep down in the grave, the slaves were supposed to lie down deep down in the grave, before the king’s dead body was interred. They also discussed, according to Pinto, that there were slave revolts of slaves in Europe, but that took a long time before it happened. Europe was now in the epoch of capitalism, but it would eventually fall too because of crisis and the proletariat protest unrest and that the world would enter a new phase, that is socialism. When everyone, the whole world already had become socialist, then the the whole world would enter into modern communism, as the last phase , the *meta-final*, of the history of humanity (Afonso Pinto, Interview 09/09/2008). From this description it is obvious that a version of Marxist historical materialism was the dominant theory taught in the FRETILIN school which Xanana had helped to establish.

Further evidence of the influence of historical materialism came from Lumia, a man from Venilale, who has re-written from memory his notes of a Party school, a CEFORPOL in the Central North sector. On the cover of the note book, it says: *História da Humanidade*. The book begins:

Man appeared in the world for millions of years. The primitive people were animals just

109 A Liurai was a local Timorese ruler in the Portuguese-Timor ‘monarchy’, equivalent to a king. The ‘Dom’ was a Portuguese state official, above the Liurai, equivalent to a sub-district administrator.

like other animals at that stage, but more developed than the rest. Man did not dominate nature, on the contrary, subjected to the conditions of nature. Work is then the basis of social life. Man could not exist without working in order to transform nature in the betterment of life (Lumia 1976).¹¹⁰

The notebook also has quotations like: “War is peace. War is a continuation of politics by other means ... otherwise, a war still continues until our objectives are completely obtained. Politics is a war without bloodshed, it is a war of politics” (Lumia 1976).

***Esclarecimentos* and Grass Roots Political Education**

FRETILIN meetings were designed to be educative, so people could learn how to analyse situations, and make collective decisions. There were two processes of decision-making. One process required that every single decision had to come through a long process of collective discussions, to allow everyone to express their opinions before the decision is made. Less sensitive or significant decisions could still be made by a party organisation, but they had to be presented back to the people and subject to discussion. In those meetings, the political activists or the responsible Party organisation would explain the decisions to the people, and allow them to give their opinion and present counter proposals. The aim of this process, which was called *esclarecimento*, literally clearing up, or clarifying, was to make people aware of the reasons for a decision, so that they would be fully involved in its implementation. But once the decision was made, everyone had to carry it out (Madalena Fernandes, Interview 13/03/2010). As Madalena recalled:

We conducted *esclarecimento*, to present our proposal to the people, and they made counter proposals. This creates debates/ponto de ordem/criticism and self-criticism, and this will terminate with *convívios*. So *esclarecimento* is a process of conscientisation to make everyone involved in decision-making ... but not all decisions made were participatory (Madalena Fernandes, Interview 13/03/2010).

At the village level, often the head of the village was the most active participant, and families would often play important roles in grass roots mobilization. But not all decisions were as

110 The notebook is written in Portuguese, which I transcribed and translated.

democratic as this. The second type of decision was called '*decisão orientada*'. These were mostly related to a security situation.

There was a short time when FRETILIN schools operated in the Central North Sector, but in the other regions, it appears that political education took place mostly through small Party meetings and the *esclarecimentos* sessions at regular outdoor political meetings. Adelino de Jesus, a political assistant from the Central South Sector recalled one of the longest meetings in their Sector with António Carvarinho 'Mau Lear', on the occasion of the first anniversary of the Unilateral Proclamation of Independence, on November 28, 1976 (António de Jesus, Interview 26/03/2011).

Political education also took place at the grass-roots level in different forms, mainly as extensions of CEFORPOL to the villages, using *esclarecimentos* and *convívios*. After graduating from a CEFORPOL or a short political education course, the participants became political activists, 'DKs' (Delegados Komisariadu) and political activists. The DKs, in cooperation with the Democratic Revolutionary Council (DRC) and the head of the village, organised short political courses during evenings. I was 10 years old when I participated in one of these political classes in Aldeia 20 de Maio, Zone 1975 Bautae, Uato-Lari. Participants were a mixture of older youth and children of my age.

António de Jesus Pinto, who was the administrator in Aldeia Lorico, Zone 1975 Bautae, also recalled one of these political classes. The political activists were Madalena da Silva Fernandes and Joana, who was the wife of Commander Rubileki. They came for *esclarecimento* to encourage people to continue the struggle and provided one night of political education. Pinto recalled: "they explained about the Manufahi war [a famous uprising against the Portuguese in Timorese history], colonialism, imperialism, fascism ... but it was [only for a] very short time (Afonso Pinto, Interview 02/03/2010).

CONCLUSION

Even though the Timorese People's right to self-determination is enshrined in a United Nations' General Assembly resolution, the Portuguese Government, both the regime of the Estado Novo of Salazar and the MFA transitional Government, had no intention of facilitating a peaceful transition to self-determination and independence. At the same time, the United States of America and the wider European world viewed an independent Timor-Leste as not being economically viable, and also, potentially, open to 'communist subversion'. In this view, it was in the interests of these anti-communist powers, including Australia, for Timor-Leste to be incorporated into Indonesia. This was the context in which the Indonesian Intelligence Coordinating Agency (BAKIN), headed by General Ali Murtopo, orchestrated the UDT coup d'état. When that failed, Suharto's troops launched their full-scale invasion in December 1975, and occupied the country for more than two decades.

FRETILIN leaders, including those of the Casa dos Timores in Lisbon, had meanwhile also developed their own analysis about the growing complexity of the self-determination issue, and the fragility of the Portuguese Transitional Government after the Carnation Revolution. They knew that independence and freedom were not a gift to be given, but something for which the Timorese people would have to fight and die. They were clear about the need to resist the new wave of neo-colonialism and the benign neglect of the Portuguese Government, but they desperately worked to develop a correct strategy, in order to mount a struggle which could eventually lead to victory.

Viewed from the perspective of popular education theory, the FRETILIN leaders needed a new *Pedagogy of the Maubere Revolution*. The findings presented so far indicate that the *Pedagogy of Maubere Revolution* was defined by two main characteristics. Firstly, it required a broad and genuine popular movement, one that would involve the people in resisting the neo-colonial forces. This was where Base Work and *conscientisation* became imperative. People had to understand how they had been colonized and exploited, and that it was possible and necessary to resist by all means possible. The FRETILIN leaders also had to address the fact that previous Timorese struggles against the colonizers had been localized and divided, and had proved

unable to resist Portuguese colonialism nationally. Therefore, they needed a revolutionary idea and a political platform that would serve as symbol for national unity around which to mount the struggle. History provided them with the concept of *Maubere*, and on May 20, 1975, they proclaimed the Maubere Revolution (*Revolução de Mau Bere*). The concept of ‘Maubere’ was used to counter the anti-communist attacks against FRETILIN, and it also served to engender a sense of pride among the people. The Maubere People were full of the fighting spirit and dreams, and had the intellectual capacity to make their dreams come true. Among the grass-roots, there was also a need for structures and organisations, as a means of mobilization and education. As will be seen in the following chapters, the FRETILIN strategy began by mobilizing high school students through UNETIM, then, with the students, FRETILIN launched its Base Work programs, and finally established new mass popular organizations, namely OPTT, OPJT and OPMT.

Secondly, FRETILIN could not afford to rely solely on the majority of the population to lead the Maubere revolution. FRETILIN itself required a strong political structure, with cadres that were revolutionary, intellectually capable and strongly committed to the revolution. Aside from having sixty-five or more members on its Central Committee, it also created regional structure in the thirteen districts making up Timor-Leste. Using political meetings called *esclarecimentos*, which allowed interactive dialogue and social analysis, FRETILIN began to provide the regional committee members with a political orientation. This included creating a FRETILIN military arm, and incorporating it into the Regional and Sub-Regional Committees. Finally, following the invasion, FRETILIN’s Department of Propaganda and Information (DOPI), under the leadership first of Commissar António Carvarinho ‘Mau Lear’ and later Vicente Reis ‘Sahe’, established cadre training schools known as CEFORPOLs, with headquarters in Cascol Naroman. The CEFORPOLs continued this process of political education and leadership training in the Resistance Bases. The participants in these schools were young FRETILIN cadres recruited from the local area in Baucau and Viqueque and from the Party structures, military commanders and members of the popular mass organizations such as OPJT and OPMT. Using FRETILIN manuals and RDTL Constitution, the schools taught political ideology, military

strategy, agriculture and food production, and an introduction to the nature of the state and the newly proclaimed RDTL.

The following chapters detail how FRETILIN developed its Pedagogy of the Maubere Revolution which enabled the people to learn what was needed to achieve final victory.

CHAPTER 6

THE ROLE OF UNETIM IN FRETILIN'S BASE WORK

INTRODUCTION

In Chapter 3 I described the formation of the early anti-colonial groups, one of which was the Casa dos Timores group in Lisbon, whose members passed a ten point resolution prior to arriving in Dili on September 11, 1974. Two of the ten points indicate their intention to undertake mass work to enable popular participation in the decolonisation process:

"We state that we will:

- Create bases that are truly popular and revolutionary
- Establish the foundations and fight for a genuine public participation so that the people freely and consciously choose their future" (Casa dos Timores, 1974, CPDM-CIDAC TL3225).

In Chapter 5, I described further how upon arrival in Dili these university students joined FRETILIN, which had also resolved that mass mobilisation was a critical part of its strategic intervention to convince the majority of the people who lived in areas to support the ideas of national independence and national liberation.

This chapter addresses in more detail FRETILIN's strategy for mass mobilization, *trabalho de base* (base work), which it implemented from October 1974 to November 1975, prior to the Indonesian invasion. In particular, it considers the formation of the students' movement UNETIM (the National Union of Timor Students) led by members of the Casa dos Timores and the national literacy campaign it initiated as a method of popular mobilization.

THE FORMATION OF UNETIM

Although UNETIM was an independent organization, it supported FRETILIN'S ideas of national independence and worked with FRETILIN especially in the literacy campaign (Hill 2002, p.116). Nicol (2002) points out that UNETIM included UDT supporters:

but the virtues of a nationalist movement - meaning FRETILIN's demands for the independence of East Timor - were supported and discussed with the villagers . . . the students lobbied on FRETILIN's behalf (Nicol 2002, p.164-165).

More recent studies by Estêvão Cabral (2002) and Boughton (2010b), confirm that UNETIM comprised predominately high school student supporters of FRETILIN.



Photo. Calsona (Bere Mata Ruak), with Beremau (Middle) former members of the Executive Committee of UNETIM with Vaz¹¹¹ (right) Dili, 20/10/2009.

Three of the newly arrived Casa dos Timorese university students, namely Vicente Reis ‘Sahe’, António Carvarinho ‘Mau Lear’ and Hamis Bassarewan ‘Hata’ became teachers towards the end of 1974 in the two main secondary schools in Dili, the *Liceu Dr. Francisco Machado*, and the *Escola Técnica* (Technical School), allowing them to get close to the students (Francisco Calsona and Domingos Caetano, Interview 20/10/2009). The *Liceu* offered general courses and the *Escola Técnica* offered vocational courses, including mechanics.

The popular revolutionary education hence began. Calsona and Caetano, both leading members of UNETIM, recalled that Sahe, Hata and Mau Lear organized alternative classes in the evenings, outside of the formal schooling system, to discuss the nationalist movements in Portuguese Africa, the African Party for the Liberation of Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC) in Guinea Bissau, Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) in Mozambique,

111 Santiago Vaz is currently a researcher in the Peace and Conflict Studies Centre, UNTL. As a former young combatant and member of Brigada Negra, a group of youth trained to carry on armed struggle, I have taken him with me for several interviews including trips to Namuleco village, in Lequidoe, Aileu as part of the ‘re-conciliacao’ project.

and Popular Movement for Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in Angola. They also taught about the work of Paulo Freire in Brazil. Hata had brought films from Lisbon which were used for discussion with the students. (Francisco Calsona and Domingos Caetano, Interview 20/10/2009; Luisa Teotónio Pers. Com.10/03/2009). They also studied Samora Machel's popular health projects operating in the countryside of Mozambique, through which he mobilized the masses for the independence of Mozambique. During these alternative classes, Sahe and Mau Lear also facilitated discussions on the *Cinco Doutrinas do Mundo* (Five Doctrines of the World), containing some political writings of Hegel, Marx, Lenin, Stalin and Mao Tse-tung. Roque Rodrigues, a Timorese military officer involved with FRETILIN who had been expelled from the army, was another political education facilitator of the evening classes. It was during these evening classes that they discussed the idea of forming the high school student's movement UNETIM. (Francisco Calsona and Domingos Caetano, Interview 20/10/2009).

Whilst the exact date of the formation of UNETIM remains unknown, Calsona and Caetano claimed that around October 1974 UNETIM established an Executive Committee whose members included Domingos Lobato, Virgílio Faculto 'Sibisama', António Pinheiro 'Botemau', José Maria 'Mausiri', George dos Santos 'Mauhui', and Francisco Calsona (Francisco Calsona and Domingos Caetano, Interview 20/10/2009; Domingos Caetano, Interview 03/03/2009). Gregório Lobo, a student at the *Escola Técnica*, said that UNETIM was based in *Escola Técnica*, not in the *Liceu* and that the students at his school were very critical of the students from the *Liceu*, which was commonly regarded as the school of the rich bourgeoisie, and (Gregório Lobo Pinto Interview 04/03/2011). However Domingos Caetano and Francisco Calsona, students at the *Liceu*, claim that it was a base of UNETIM (Francisco Calsona and Domingos Caetano, Interview 20/10/2009; Domingos Caetano, Interview 03/03/2009). This indicates, at least, that UNETIM had members at both the *Liceu* and the *Escola Técnica*. In fact, UNETIM extended into other schools and colleges. Mattoso (2005, p. 46) says that Antonino 'Konis' Santana, a FALINTIL commander, was a member of the UNETIM Executive Committee, and was responsible for UNETIM's expansion to the teacher's training college in Dili, the *Escola de Professores Canto Resende*. According to Hill (2002, p. 115), UNETIM also established branches in Baucau,

while Júlio Fátima, ‘Rihi’, reported that UNETIM had members at the Catholic High School in Balide, Dili, the *Externato São José* (Júlio Fátima, Interview 08/04/2010). Calsona and Caetano claimed that by December 1974 over 200 UNETIM members had been sent to remote areas to study culture and to determine the interest of people in learning (Francisco Calsona and Domingos Caetano, Interview 20/10/2009; see also Nicol 2002, p.164). Furthermore, according to Julmira Sirana, about 100 students took part in the Pilot No. I in Aisirimou, in the District of Aileu. She identified five other women members of UNETIM, including Maria Julmira, Margarida, Tereza, Aluia Alkatiri and Maria José Boavida, alias Soimali. On January 2, 1975, the Portuguese Government formally recognized UNETIM (Francisco Calsona and Domingos Caetano, Interview 20/10/2009; Julmira Sirana, Interview 20/10/2009).

FRETILIN’s Education Reform Agenda

As noted in the previous chapter, the FRETILIN Political Manual and Program (1974) criticized the curriculum of the Portuguese colonial education system arguing that by teaching Portuguese history and geography it aimed to make Timorese Portuguese, failing to respect the Timorese people who had their own history and geography (FRETILIN 1974, pp.17, 30). Consequently in January 20 1975, Colonel Mário Lemos Pires, who had served under General António Spínola in Guinea Bissau, and is credited with bringing the radical decolonisation program of the Armed Forces Movement (MFA) to Timor (*Age* 16/03/1975) and was the Portuguese Governor in transition, began to progressively transform the education system in Timor by ordering the establishment of the Coordinating Group for the Reformulation of Teaching in Timor (*Grupo Coordenador para a Reformulação do Ensino em Timor - GCRET*) (Magalhães 2004). António Pinto Barbedo de Magalhães, known as Barbedo Magalhães, who was a Portuguese military officer, stationed in Timor, was given responsibility for this work by the Governor. In his account written in 2004, *Descolonização do ensino em Timor*, Magalhães (2004) recalled that in addition to himself as Chairman, GCRET comprised seven people, and included representatives from the FRETILIN, UDT and APODETI, the three main political parties, namely Prof. Dulce Cruz (FRETILIN and a primary school teacher), António Duarte Carvarinho (FRETILIN), Manuel António Caldeira Baptista (UDT), and João Martins (APODETI); a man called Alferes Mil;

Roque Rodrigues (see above); and Magalhães' wife, Dr. Judith Barbedo de Magalhães, who was a mathematic teacher at *Liceu*, Dulce Cruz and António Duarte Carvarinho 'Mau Lear', had been members of Casa dos Timores, and Roque Rodrigues was a facilitator of the UNETIM evening classes. Both Mau Lear and Rodrigues were members of the Central Committee of FRETILIN.

GCRET held discussions with teachers from both the *Liceu* and *Escola Técnica* on February 1, 1975 followed by a separate discussion with teachers and students from *Escola Técnica* on February 03, 1975. They discussed 36 basic questions, including how to write the history and geography curriculum of Timor (Magalhães 2004). GCRET also discussed Timorese history with the members of the National Union of Primary Teachers of Timor (*União Nacional dos Agentes do Ensino Primário de Timor* - UNAEPTIM) which had been created by FRETILIN and was involved in developing a new school curriculum. GCRET also introduced the work of Paulo Freire, described as a Catholic Professor from Brazil (Magalhães 2004). Francisco Calsona, a former teacher at the *Liceu* says that Barbedo Magalhães and Professor Judith Magalhães, a Professor of Pedagogy at the *Liceu*, taught the UNETIM students the methods of Paulo Freire (Francisco Calsona and Domingos Caetano, Interview 20/10/2009).

According to Hill:

In the field of decolonization of education, for example, while FRETILIN leaders played a role in getting official policy changed so the state education would reflect the needs of Timorese children, they also pursued initiatives of their own (Hill 2002, p.101)

These other FRETILIN activities included the literacy campaign beginning in January 1975.

UNETIM Objectives

In its founding Manifesto, UMETIM describes itself as a Union:

which will ensure the unity of all Timorese students in their actions within the broad sphere of action involving the people in Timor in their fight for freedom and progress (quoted in Hill 2002, p. 115).

This statement by UNETIM is consistent with the resolution of the Casa dos Timorese at the beginning of this chapter.

The seven objectives developed by UNETIM soon after its formation are:

1. [To destroy] the apparatus of fascist and paternalistic teaching;
2. To promote the general and democratic reform of the educational system in collaboration with progressive teaching staff;
3. To combat 'deification' of the teaching staff and the subsequent segregation of students from teachers which can only exist in a paternalistic education system;
4. To fight for respect of students' most profound and immediate demands; student participation in the decision making process and in the administration of the learning institutions;
5. ... To fight for the consolidation of the democratic liberties already obtained in the teaching institutions in particular, and in the political life of the country in general ...
6. To support unconditionally all progressive movements in their fight for freedom of oppressed and exploited peoples ... and
7. To establish contacts conducive to a close fraternal cooperation between students of Timor and student and youth organizations of the world (Jolliffe 1975, p.8).

The students began with the demands for transformation of the colonial education system. But, they also knew that transformation had to involve radical political change. The program of UNETIM included promoting a literacy campaign; developing media (leaflets, student's Radio, newspaper publication); investigating history and culture; establishing discussion groups, women's groups, sports and popular arts such as theatre, dance and concerts; and obtaining scholarships for Timorese students to study abroad (Hill 2002, p.116). Calsona and Caetano recalled UNETIM as a radical student group, working with international support. It began to organize demonstrations calling for the transformation of the colonial education system, which led to the arrest of Sahe and Hata (Francisco Calsona and Domingos Caetano, Interview 20/10/2009).

In Portugal, there remained members of Casa dos Timores including those who had formed a new organization known as the Action Committee of FRETILIN (CAF) that was linked with UNETIM (Estanislau da Silva and Filomena de Almeida, Interview 08/07/2008). A relationship developed with the National Union of Students in Australia. Jill Jolliffe, a post-graduate student at the Australian National University in Canberra, and a member of NUS who visited Timor in March 1975, as part of an Australian trade union and student delegation. While there, she participated in a meeting with the UNETIM students and witnessed them in action. She was impressed with their courageous work, and upon returning to Australia she attempted to mobilize support for UNETIM through NUS (Jolliffe 1975, p.23). In a report published by the ANU Students Association, Jolliffe stated that both Timorese and Australian students would stand to benefit greatly by a speaking tour of Timorese students from UNETIM to Australia to present their case personally. (Jolliffe 1975, p.23). However, Indonesia invaded and such an exchange program never took place.

‘GRASS-ROOTS’ WORK (*TRABALHO DE BASE*)

In Chapter 4, I outlined how one aspect of the theory of the ‘mass-line’, developed by Mao Tse-tung and the Communist Party of China was the “To the Village” movement. Several key members of the Casa dos Timores were members of the Portuguese Maoist Party (MRPP) which promoted a similar program in Portugal following the Carnation Revolution, mobilizing students to go into the countryside to teach literacy. Once back in Dili, the MRPP members of the Casa dos Timores joined FRETILIN, and promoted a similar program, called *Trabalho de Base* (Base Work). This grass-roots work drew UNETIM closer to FRETILIN.

Towards the end of 1974, FRETILIN initiated a return to Base Work. This began with pilot projects in the villages of three FRETILIN leaders. Abílio Araújo took responsibility for Pilot No.1 in Aisirimou in Aileu district. Vicente Reis ‘Sahe’ was responsible for Pilot No.2 in Bucoli in the district of Baucau and Nicolau Lobato for Pilot No.3 in Bazartete, in Liquica district (Abílio Araújo, Interview 09/09/2009).

Pilot No. 1 Aisirimou, Aileu: Political Education and Literacy

Abílio Araújo and his partner Guilhermina dos Santos ‘Bimali’ lived for a short time in Aisirimu before Guilhermina left for Portugal in late December 1974. Abílio followed her in early January 1975. Bimali worked with Maria Isabel Barreto, the wife of the chefe of Suco Aisirimu. Luís Araújo,¹¹² a FRETILIN political delegate in Aisirimu, confirmed that the local FRETILIN leaders in Aileu were the Secretary of FRETILIN, Adão, and the Vice-Secretary Ramaldo Mendonca and that they held regular FRETILIN meetings (Luís Araújo, Interview 20/09/2009). The effectiveness of the FRETILIN local cadres was evident when 40,000 people from villages in Aileu were mobilized for a visit by Colonel Lemos Pires in November 1974. Soon after, on January 01, 1975, Mau Lear, the Secretary of the FRETILIN Education and Culture Committee, commenced the literacy campaign in the village of Namuleco in Lequidoe, Aileu (Richardson 1975). By April 1975, UNETIM had sent some members to assist with the literacy campaign and to work in the fields (UNETIM 17/05/1975). In Aisirimu, there were nearly a hundred UNETIM students living in the same house that was divided into two, half for women and half for men. According to Julmira Sirana, the students “socialized the idea of independence through meetings, direct involvement in agriculture work and in resolving conflict in the communities” (Julmira Sirana, Interview 20/10/2009). They were guided by a strict disciplinary code. Sirana recalled:

We always say “Discipline is the guardian of our political line” (Julmira Sirana, Interview 20/10/2009).

They used the word ‘Comrade’ (Kamarada) to promote the spirit of cooperation and they drank and ate together. The FRETILIN Village Committee was responsible for providing logistical support for UNETIM, OPJT and OPMT members working in Aisirimu (Abílio Araújo, Interview 09/09/2009).

112 Luís Araújo (known as Luís Gonzaga) was born in Maubisse 13 October 1938 and was married to Carlota Araújo. He remembered taking Abílio Araújo and his sister Aliança de Araújo to school in Soibada when they were children. When UDT initiated the coup d’état in August 1975, Araújo joined FALINTIL. He did not participate in the literacy classes because he was coordinating logistical support (Luís Araújo, Interview 20/09/2009)

Pilot No. 2 Bucoli, Baucau: Political Education and Literacy

Upon learning of the political developments in the Portuguese Timor, Denis Freney, a journalist from *Tribune*, the Communist Party of Australia newspaper, travelled to Dili on October 1974, from where he travelled with Vicente Reis ‘Sahe’ to Bucoli. In his biography, Freney (1991) described Sahe as a Maoist, like the other Lisbon based Timorese students, and claimed it was Sahe who convinced the FRETILIN leadership to organize the campaign for independence in the villages. Freney recalled his conversation with Sahe:

After lunch, Sahe took me around the village, whose largest building was a church that would have graced with pride any Australian town ten times Bucoli’s size. He said wistfully that it had been built by the volunteer work of the whole village, where the traditions of communal labour were still strong. If such collective could be transformed and harnessed to more productive goals in the future, the living standards of the villagers could rise greatly ... (Freney 1991, p.347-348).

Forty years later, Mateus Gonçalves, an activist from the Sahe Liberation Institute, a popular education organization in Dili, interviewed the elder brother of Sahe, Marito Reis, in Dili 26 July 2004, intending to write Sahe’s biography. When I interviewed Gonçalves, he said that, according to Marito Reis, Sahe and a few UNETIM members travelled with FRETILIN President Francisco Xavier do Amaral to Atsabe, in Ermera to campaign for FRETILIN in late 1974. Upon arrival, they found Portuguese soldiers present at the meeting with the village people. Sahe said: “the weapons of the people cannot be used against the people.” This caused tension among the Portuguese soldiers present, forcing Sahe to leave the meeting early. He took refuge in his home village Naroman, Bucoli, where he started the Pilot No 2.

Marito Reis also told Gonçalves that Sahe organized literacy classes for older people, directing the facilitators to travel early in the evening to their houses, or to organize classes beneath banyan trees. They taught literacy to farmers at three in the afternoon (Gonçalves 2004). This was quite radical because mass education had not been part of the Timorese history before. Instead only those people who belonged to the ruling feudal families, including Sahe himself, were admitted to Portuguese schools, leaving the majority of the population marginalized and submissive to

the Portuguese colonial rule and its local feudal class. In Bucoli, Sahe demonstrated that he was different and wanted to change society for the better.

Along with literacy, there were other activities happening in Bucoli. First, Sahe and other FRETILIN cadres organized a program of political education. The members of the pilot project learned basic political literacy by using a *Cartilha Política* (a compilation of political ideas of great thinkers) which gave an overview of socialism. One of the core ideas was that they had to pass through revolution in order to be able to become independent including the possibility of undergoing guerrilla warfare. The films on the PAIGC in Guinea Bissau were also shown in Bucoli (Goncalves 2004). They also organized *convívios*, which have been described previously, with popular dances in the evenings. Sahe also formed a security system known as the Peoples' Security Organization (Organização Popular da Segurança - OPS) and trained local people in basic security awareness. During the day, the FRETILIN cadres worked with the people on their farms and at night they stayed on guard at the beach, vigilant in preventing possible infiltration by other political parties and outside forces. The members of OPS also learned martial arts from Cabo Martinho and Guilherme of Bidau. There was a plan to send OPS to Mozambique to learn guerrilla techniques but this was interrupted by the Indonesian occupation (Goncalves 2004). Bill Nicol (2002) gave a negative account of OPS:

The People's Security Organization, otherwise known as the FRETILIN Army, was actively encouraging the growth of anti-Indonesian sentiment and was helping it to overflow into violence (Nicol 2002, p. 172).

However, Marito Reis told Gonçalves that when the UDT forces attacked Bucoli, Sahe prohibited the FRETILIN cadres from defending the village and Bucoli was burnt to the ground (Gonçalves 2004).

Because of increasing rumors about Sahe and FRETILIN activities, Major Mota of the MFA and a member of the Decolonization Committee visited Bucoli and discovered that Sahe and FRETILIN cadres were working alongside the peasants and holding political discussions at

night. According to Helen Hill, Mota told Jolliffe that they were using the method of Paulo Freire, and

one does not have to be a communist to say that if we are to educate these people and increase literacy, the most capable people must work near the people (Quoted in Hill 2002, p.133).

Marito Reis also recalled that it was from Bucoli that Sahe maintained contacts with the members of the CCF including Nicolau Lobato, Mari Alkatiri and Antonio Carvarinho and regularly travelled to attend their meetings in Hera until the Indonesian invasion (Gonçalves 2004).

Pilot No.3 Bazartete, Liquiçá: Agriculture Cooperatives

FRETILIN piloted a number of agricultural co-operatives during this period at Bazartete, Aileu and Bucoli (Jolliffe 1978, pp.8, 103). Both Nicolau Lobato and Vicente Reis Sahe belonged to the leading family in their own villages and used their family authority to negotiate the use of land for the agricultural cooperatives. In Bazartete, according to Jolliffe, land tenure remained with the “constituent families.” The target land was the fertile areas, so as to maximise production (Jolliffe 1978, p.103-104). The cooperatives included local customary families and collective work was emphasized as necessary to intensify production. The results of production were to be divided equally between the family and the state, through the village consumer cooperative. It is unlikely that the farmers were sure what would happen to that 50 per cent of the production and understandably people were suspicious of the cooperative project. According to Nicolau Lobato speaking in 1974 about his own home village of Bazartete:

The people are still suspicious of the idea ... they have been drawn into similar collective projects by either the Portuguese or the Japanese only to find themselves dispossessed. We have started off with a small number so that we can work out the problems that arise easily, and when it has shown itself to be successful then others will follow quickly. It demands the creation of a great deal of trust among the members and that all decisions taken by the co-operative be taken democratically (Quoted in Jolliffe 1978, p.103).

When I visited the village of Nicolau in Leorema, Bazartete I was unable to find anyone able to provide testimony, most likely because many of the former cooperative members had been killed during the war.

Base Work in Oecusse

Several UNETIM cadres were sent by Sahe to Oecusse, including Martinho Mausesta of Maliana (deceased), Lúcio Correia and Domingos Caetano Beremau, the UNETIM leader for the Base Project in Oecusse. When they arrived, a Catholic priest, Father Norberto Barada gave them some money, 300 escudos, and ten sacks of rice. They began to build water pipes using materials provided by Jaime Oliveira¹¹³, who was the Portuguese administrator of Oecusse and a FRETILIN sympathizer in the area of Kio-Koler of Naimeco village. The UNETIM members ran literacy classes, including political literacy, in which they taught *Foho Ramelau* for about two months, in Bihala village in Bobocassa sub-district. Among those involved were João Teki (Bihala), Jorge Teme, Sebastião Almeida, Manuel Mota (Oesono) and José António Ote (Domingos Caetano, Interview 20/10/2009). According to Jolliffe (1978, p. 273), FRETILIN claimed that Oecusse was under FRETILIN control, while the Portuguese Government counter-claimed that “Oecusse was loyal to the Portuguese flag.” On December 13, 1975, one week following the Indonesian invasion of Dili, the Indonesian Governor of Kupang in West Timor, El Tari, presided over an Official Ceremony for the ‘integration’ of Oecusse. Jaime Oliveira, and José Valente, a Portuguese military Commander then declared their loyalty, and this was followed with an official ceremony in Oecusse on 19 December 1975 (Jolliffe 1978, p.273). Oecusse then became part of Indonesia and, due to its geographical location, remained out of contact with the rest of Timor. All the UNETIM members were arrested and jailed in Dili, but were released in 1977 (Francisco Calsona and Domingos Caetano, Interview 20/10/2009). Nevertheless, Oecusse maintained an armed resistance and FRETILIN cadres there, some of them known to me personally, continued their involvement in the clandestine movement throughout the occupation.

113 His daughter Ivete de Oliveira wrote a thesis on OPMT in 1998.

LITERACY AND POLITICS

The need to address the problem of illiteracy was highlighted in FRETILIN's Manual and Political Program, adopted in September 1974. To this end, it used the Literacy Manual: *Rai Timur, Rai Ita nian* (The Land of Timor, is Our Land) developed by the Casa dos Timores students in Lisbon. Equipped with the the Literacy Manual, and using the *conscientisation* method of Paulo Freire, the Casa dos Timores FRETILIN members who had trained the UNETIM members were the key architects of the Literacy Campaign.

FRETILIN's Manual and Political Program

Both the Manual and Political Program of FRETILIN were written in Portuguese and Tetum. The manual contains fourteen questions, beginning with "What is FRETILIN? What is a front? What is revolutionary?" There were two questions about education and literacy. The eleventh question asks: "What is an education which works for the people? (FRETILIN 1974, p.17). Due to its crucial role in determining the school curriculum in the Resistance Bases from 1976 to 1978, I will quote the two relevant points:

- 1) Colonialists teach only their geography and history. So the Timorese know only their mountains, roads, rivers, but do not know mountains, roads and rivers in our nation. And Timorese also understand only the origin of the people of Portugal, their way of life, the kings that ruled in Portugal, wars that they made. But about our nation, the wars our antecedents made, how they made them, we do not know.
- 2) When the Timorese have forgotten their nation and their origin, the Portuguese colonial schools only teach people to love Portugal.

But an education for the betterment of the people is not like that. We search to know our history and our geography. Later, when we love our nation, then we search for ways to make progress for our nation and for our people. (FRETILIN 1974, p.17. Translated from Tetum by the author)

The twelfth question asks: "Why does FRETILIN want people to have a clearer understanding and for everyone to be able to read and write?" (FRETILIN 1974, p.17)

It answers:

- 1) In order for people to be truly liberated, they should have a voice and not be manipulated;
- 2) Politics is not only for doctors (conventional intellectuals), people should know what their rights are;
- 3) For people to express their ideas through letters, music, poems;
- 4) We lost a lot of stories because our elders did not know how to write;
- 5) To obtain our independence.

(FRETILIN 1974, p. 19-20).

The answer finishes with this call by FRETILIN:

Everyone should know how to read and write and FRETILIN is obliged to teach everyone regardless of their sex and age to liberate ourselves from more than 400 years of obscurantism. FRETILIN will let people know what FRETILIN thinks so that people could also express their opinion about how to run Timor-Leste, only then we could have DEMOCRACY (FRETILIN 1974 p. 19-20).

FRETILIN's policy on Education and Culture consists of seven areas of intervention, with three relevant to this section, as follows:

Fight against illiteracy and obscurantism and ignorance through rigorous literacy campaigns for all people of all ages; . . . protection and development of people's culture. Develop Tetum and other local languages, develop literature and arts of diverse ethnic groups. Cultural exchange with other peoples across the globe to enrich our culture and as a contribution for progress and the enrichment of universal culture (FRETILIN 1974, p. 30-31).

Obscurantism, according to FRETILIN, had become the political culture of Portuguese colonialism, which kept the majority of the Timorese illiterate, while educating the elite to serve Portuguese colonialism. Obscurantism was the target of the literacy campaign as it appears in FRETILIN policy which indicates also that FRETILIN strongly emphasised the "protection and development of people's culture" including the development of Tetum and other local languages. Therefore in 1975 Tetum became the language of instruction in the literacy classes throughout the country.

UNETIM's Literacy Survey

Domingos Caetano 'Beremau' recalled that before conducting literacy classes, UNETIM sent students to do research about Timorese village culture. He himself had been assigned to Lequidoe, Aileu as described above under Pilot No. 1 (Domingos Caetano 21/10/2009). Nicol (2002) reports that UNETIM organised about 200 students divided into groups of 15 to go into the rural areas to conduct research. Hélio Sinatra, an 18 year-old student, led a group to Ermera during a school break. They broke into small groups and each member went to interview people, asking them: "Have you been to school? Do you want to learn reading and writing? Why do you think it is important? Do you know about the revolution in Portugal? Do you know why people join demonstrations in Dili? Are you a member of any political party?" (Nicol 2002, p. 164). After the students had talked to people in their homes, they were invited to join discussion sessions where everyone listened to them talk and asked them questions. Hélio Sinatra and his friends, according to Nicol (2002), found that people were very interested in the literacy campaign, that most of the villagers were UDT or FRETILIN, and not members of APODETI, and that the discussions were political. The students explained the meaning of the revolution in Portugal, the demonstrations in Dili, the nationalist movement and their right to independence. They spoke to the people so that they would, in Sinatra's words, "repudiate any other form of domination, imperialist or fascist, in the form of another power" (Nicol 2002, p.165).

Literacy Method and Curriculum: *Rai Timor, Rai Ita Nian*

The students found common ground with FRETILIN, and lobbied the people on the behalf of FRETILIN. UNETIM members were trained in Dili how to use the Literacy Manual before they were sent to the rural areas to live with and teach the people (*A Voz de Timor*, 17/05/1975). Hill (2002, p.109) and Jolliffe (1975, p.4)¹¹⁴ have both noted that the FRETILIN Literacy Manual, *Rai Timur, Rai Ita Nian*, was based on Paulo Freire's method and was an anti-colonial text.


114 This is a referenc to the report which Jolliffe wrote for the National Union of Students, on her return from Timor in 1975: Report from East Timor, Published by ANU Students Association, Canberra. (NLA, MS.4969.addition 11/09/91-Jill Jolliffe Collection).

Bruce Stannard, a journalist for *The Australian* newspaper visited Namuleco village in March 1975, where he witnessed the Literacy Manual being used. He wrote:

the textbooks feature drawings, which portray greedy Portuguese clutching money bags and encouraging the island's feudal kings to exploit the people (Stannard 1975).

Rai Timor, Rai Ita Nian is divided into three parts: learning to read and write by art illustration and words, learning history, and learning songs. The first part of the Manual is to teach people how to read and write, using ordinary words for common concrete things.

Using Paulo Freire's method of 'generative themes' discussed in Chapter 3, the Casa dos Timores students including 'Mau Lear' and 'Sahe' had prepared a well-designed literacy manual in Tetum, which is today the national language of Timor-Leste but which had been ignored by the Portuguese colonial education system throughout the centuries of their rule. The title itself, *Rai Timor, Rai Ita Nian*, sent a thunder-like political message to the villagers. For more than four hundred years, Timor had become a foreign country; we the people were alienated from our land. For the first time, this title spoke loudly that Timor is our country, not the land of the Portuguese colonial power. Like the FRETILIN Political Manual discussed above, the Literacy Manual emphasised learning to read and write about material things that people encountered in everyday life. The following analysis of the Manual, the first done since a copy was discovered in the papers of Jill Jolliffe deposited in the National Library of Australia, conveys its pedagogical and political message.¹¹⁵



115 A copy was provided for the author by Anya Dettman, NLA librarian.

RAI TIMUR, RAI ITA NIAN

A U I


The Land of Timor is Our Land

LUHU-basket	HUDI-banana	KUDA-horse
HARE-rice	LALAR-fly	LAFATIK-
NIKI-vat	BIBI-goat	DIHI-
NEHEK-ant	KOHE-bag	KARETA-car
LORONG-sun	LAHO-rat	BOKA-
BIBI-goat	KABAS-	BATAR-corn
DIMANG-	TUDIK-	FETO-woman
FOHO-mountain	FEHUK-potato	FAHI-pig
AHI-fire	KOHE-bag	KNUK-cage
KANEDOK	AISUAK-	LILING-candle
AIDILA-papaya	LIS-onion	MOTA-river
UMA-house	MANU-chicken	SANA-cooking pot
KATANA	PATEKA-water melon	NATAR-rice field
FORERAI-peanut	AITARAK-thorn	SUSUK-mosquito
HAS-mango	TALAS-taro	AIATA-
BITI- sleeping mat	KAWA-	KOYABAS-guava
SURIK-	RAMA-arrow	IKAN-fish
BERO-small boat		

Casa dos Timores (1974, p. 1).

In the first part there is a total of fifty words each accompanied by a drawing. The words are divided into animals, plants, kitchen materials, fruits and household equipment. Some of these words appear again as part of the reading for the history lesson.

The second part of the Manual briefly presents Timorese history on a thematic basis. Each phrase is short but meaningful with a picture to illustrate its meaning because it aims at political conscientisation.



TIMOR OAN SEI HAMUTUK
 HODI UKUN RASIK
 ITA NIA RAIN

Ita kee lurong
 BA EMA SELUK
 Hodi kosar beng
 Hodi mata beng
 Ita kee lurong
 Hada uma fatuk ba ema seluk

Kolonialismu nain sira
 Maka liu husu lurong
 Ho sira nia kareta.
 Husi lurong,
 Sira main naun ita nia sasan
 Ita laiha kareta,
 Ita laiha uma fatuk
 Ita kabun hamalaha
 Casa dos Timores (1974, p. 22).

Kolonialismu sira
 La to halo ita isin kole
 Halo balu mate tang;
 Mai husu ita nia osan
 Atu selu impostu
 Tanba nee nia moris kiak nafating
 Casa dos Timores (1974, p. 24).

Kolonialismu nain sira
 Fo aimoruk ba ita
 Atu halo moris
 Hodi servisu nafating ba sira.
 Ita timur oan mak mate hotu karik,
 Se maka fo hang ba sira?

TIMORESE WILL BE UNITED
 TO RULE
 OUR OWN LAND

We dig the road
 for other people
 with sweat
 with tears,
 We dig the road
 We build stone houses for others.

The colonialists
 Who pass the road
 With their cars
 by road
 they come to steal our wealth.
 we have no cars
 We do not have stone house.
 We are hungry.

The colonialists
 not only exhausted our bodies
 made some die,
 asked for our money
 to pay tax.
 That's why we remain poor.

The colonialists
 give medicine to us
 to keep us alive
 so we keep working for them.
 If we Timorese all die,
 who would feed them?

Rai hamalaha
Hare ho batar laiha
Tangba kolonialismu nain sira
Haruka ita kuda deit kafe no nu,
Hodi fang ba sira.

Rai hamala
Ita nia maung aling sira
No ita nia aman sira
Ho ita nia kaben sira,
Balu tama tropas
Balu ba kee lurong
Balu ba servisu
Iha kolonialismu nain sira nia plantasang

Kolonialismu naing sira
Bandu ita la bele koaliala ita nia liang
Ita nia rain dok husi sira nia rain
Sira mai husi tasi balu
Sira dehan ba ita katak ita iha hung ida deit,
Maibe la los ida.
Ita nia amang sira la hanesan sira
Ita oing seluk.
Ita rai seluk, Ita liang seluk.

Tangba nee iha sira nia eskola,
Sira hanorin ba ita buat seluk deit.
Ita la bele bidu
Ita la bele hananu ita nia dahur
(Ita la bele) sama hare no tebe

Hori uluk Timor oan ukun rasik rai timur
Maibe kolonialismu naing sira,
Hateke ho laran moras
Ita nia aikameli, aiteka no aiseria
Aisira nee iha foling as.
Tanba nee sira haruka sira nia ema,

Mai bosok ita nia amang sira
Ita nia aman sira hatene katak sira bosok,
Maibe kolonialismu naing sira mao
ho kilat hatauk ita,

Ita nia amang sira la fo ulun.
Nune barak foti liman hasoru sira.

Barak mate, barak dadur, barak fila ba atan,

Too ohin ita mo satang nafating.
Casa dos Timores (1974, p. 14)

We are hungry,
no paddy, no corn,
because the colonialists
tell us to plant only coffee and coconuts
to sell to them.

We are hungry.
Our brothers and sisters,
our fathers,
our husbands,
some become soldiers,
some dig roads,
some work
at the plantation of the colonialists.

The colonialists
forbid us to speak our language.
Our nation is far from theirs.
They come from overseas.
They told us we have only one origin,
but it is not true.
Our fathers are not like them,
we are different.
We are a nation, we have a different language.

That is why in their school,
they teach us other things.
We can not dance.
We can not sing our *dahu*,
we can not and also *tebe*.

Before, Timorese ruled their own nation.
But the colonialists
stare jealously at our sandalwood,
our sandalwood, hardwood and aiseria trees.
These trees are expensive.
They sent their men

to lie to our fathers.
Our fathers know they lied,
but the colonialists come with guns to
threaten.

Our fathers did not give up.
That's why many rose up and fought against
them.
Many died, many were imprisoned, many
returned to slavery.
Until today we remain slaves.

The Manual ends with the words of *Foho Ramelau*, the most famous song composed by the poet Francisco Borja da Costa and Abílio Araújo, who were members of Casa dos Timores. *The Australian's* journalist, Stannard (1975) wrote:

The Portuguese were fond of claiming that Timor's Ramelau was the highest mountain in Portugal. Now FRETILIN uses the mountain in their Unity Song as a symbol of the new state they plan to call Timor-Leste.

He described how on his visit he saw a boy singing *Foho Ramelau* while riding a horse through the mountains. His colleague, Michael Richardson of *The Age*, who was also on this visit, provided a similar report, adding that the song was sung also at the FRETILIN Party meeting in Namuleco (Richardson 1975)



Photo. FRETILIN youth singing *Foho Ramelau* in Baucau 1975
Source: Kevin Sherlock Archive, Darwin

The Literacy Campaign begins

FRETILIN started its literacy campaign in remote areas by January 1 1975, a month before the GCRET was established to decolonise the education system. As mentioned above, two Australian journalists travelled by horseback for five hours with 'Mau Lear', the Secretary of the Education and Culture Committee of FRETILIN, and José Ramos Horta, the Secretary

of External Relations, to the remote Namuleco village, in the sub-district of Lequidoe, in the district of Aileu, around the second week of March 1975. Stannard's article about the trip and the FRETILIN literacy campaign in Namuleco village, published in *The Australian*, included this detail:

The 500 Mambai tribesmen at Namuleco are poor subsistence farmers who cultivate tapioca, bananas, peanuts and coffee for \$30 a year - the lowest per capita income in South East Asia. After nearly 500 years of Portuguese colonial rule they are only just beginning to learn to read and write their own language. They are also being taught about colonialism and the politics of independence (Stannard 1975)

The literacy campaign started in a very nice and profoundly dignified way. Long before the literacy campaign, the Portuguese army had built a school in Namuleco village. FRETILIN did not use that building, instead out of people's collective work "FRETILIN built its own grass-thatched and mud-slab classroom right in the heart of the community which was located about 2kms away" (Stannard 1975). The message to the people is that they had waited for more than four hundred years and that a school was indeed built but by the army of the colonialists. Now that the people had built their own school right in the heart of the village, they no longer needed to travel to the military school to learn Portuguese language, Portuguese geography and Portuguese history. According to Stannard (1975) when they arrived "the entire village turned out with drums and cymbals to whoop and yell" and shouted popular slogans like: "Viva FRETILIN ... dead or alive, independence!". 'Mau Lear' told the journalist that already some 60 people had learned to read and to write in Tetum (Stannard 1975).

To confirm this story, I travelled on October 19, 2009 to Namuleco village where I interviewed Correia Vilanova, Manuel Beremau, Beremau's wife Rosita Quintão, António Correia 'Amea' and Elias Vilanova alias Mau Metama. They confirmed that Abílio Araújo had visited before the school opened and that later Mau Lear worked with them to build the Rimori-Namuleco school. They said Rimori-Namuleco was not the only school built; there were other schools in Fahisoe and also in Manucasa village. In Namuleco village, one of the teachers was Bernardo

P. Silva Braz, a FRETILIN delegate, who had died during the war. The villagers told me that the subjects of the FRETILIN Rimori-Namuleco school included basic literacy, learning music and songs like *Foho Ramelau* and *Kole Le Le Mai* and sports. Communal food production was also introduced as part of the school activities (Correia Vilanova et al, Interview 19/10/2009). A student of Namuleco school, Correia Vilanova remembered the literacy Manual, *Rai Timur*, *Rai Ita Nian*, recalling:

Namuleco school was built when the Portuguese were still here and the teacher was Bernardo P. Silva Braz, a FRETILIN delegate who has passed away. He used a small book for learning. In it there were 'lohu, dihi, lafatik, nehek, - ABC and writing our names, reading syllables, writing. There were also drawings of Timorese animals. When Indonesians invaded, the school moved to Rai Susar-Mota Kumai and this time the school teacher was José Soares (Correia Vilonova, Interview 19/10/ 2009).



Photo: Namuleco village in Liquidoe, Aileu 35 years later, Photo taken by the author 19/10/2009.

In 1975, José Ramos Horta made a speech about the literacy campaign:

In the process of learning how to read and write the word 'car' he is discussing with the FRETILIN cadre political issues that are linked with the making of a car. Who makes the car? Where does it come from? From Japan, from Germany. Who works on this car? The working class (of Japan, Germany). Who gets the profit? The cars arrive in East Timor.

Who imported these cars? Who drives these cars? Where do the cars circulate? On the road. Who builds the road? Of course, the people build the roads—with little or no pay (quoted in Hill 2002, p.113)

A similar comment was made by Francisco Soares, *nom de guerre* Borulaco, when I spoke with him in 2009. Borulaco, a member of UNETIM who was assigned to the campaign in Becora, recalled:

And we asked them “... who owns the car?” People said, “Malae [Foreigners].” “Who build the road?” “Povo Maubere [Maubere People]”. “Who drives the car on the road?” People said, “Malae [Foreigners].” And we said, “Now Maubere build the road, for Maubere people” (Francisco Soares, Pers. Com. 15/09/2009).

Estêvão Cabral, who attended the *Exetrnato São José* High School, was 14 years old when he joined UNETIM. He went in April 1975 with two women members of UNETIM to the UDT stronghold in Maubisse, and with the support of a UDT young man who was in love with one of the UNETIM women, they successfully conducted literacy classes for three weeks in that area (Estêvão Cabral, Pers. Com. 07/11/2009). On May 10 1975, the Executive Committee of UNETIM issued a press release stating that the campaign had started in Quintal Boot in Dili on May 6, and classes were happening in more than ten groups. It said the classes were organized in the houses of the people, and that this was a school of the people. The press release, published in *A Voz de Timor*, stated:

UNETIM initiated the campaign. A campaign against what? A campaign against illiteracy! A campaign against obscurantism! A campaign against exploitation of man by man. A campaign of political conscientisation etc! Signed, for the Executive Body, Domingos Cassiano Lobato and Francisco Calsona, (*A Voz de Timor* 1975).

A few days later, on May 20 1975, FRETILIN declared the Revolution of the Maubere in its own magazine, *Nacroma* (*Nacroma* 20/5/1975). Helen Hill reported that next month, in June, FRETILIN announced the launching of the Revolutionary Brigades, each consisting of 1060 people. Students, teachers, nurses and members of the Central Committee of FRETILIN would be included in each brigade. The CCF members had left their jobs to participate in this

work. The objectives of the Revolutionary Brigade were to conduct literacy classes; to initiate cooperatives and the diversification of crops; and to teach people about elementary preventive medicine and first aid (Hill 2002, p.132-133).

The Campaign Continues. The Execution of UNETIM Members

On June 10, 1975, according to Calsona, UNETIM transformed itself into the Popular Organisation of Timorese Women (*Organização Popular da Mulher Timor* - OPMT), and the Popular Organization of Timorese Youth (*Organização Popular da Juventude Timor* - OPJT) (Francisco Caslona and Domingos Caetano 20/10/2009). Some former UNETIM members continued literacy classes including in Alas near the town of Same on the south coast of Timor-Leste. When UDT launched the military coup d'état against FRETILIN on 11th August 1975, it imprisoned UNETIM members. Eleven UNETIM members including the President of the Executive Committee, Domingos Lobato were murdered. His brother, FRETILIN Vice-President Nicolau Lobato, told Jill Jolliffe:

Already, in the cruel sequence of events since 11 August, he had lost a brother, sixteen year old Domingos, President of UNETIM, the National Union of Timorese students. Domingos' mutilated body was found on a beach off the hamlet of Bi Susu on the south coast, along with ten others (Jolliffe 1978, p.7).

In an interview in Bali, about that massacre, Rogério Tiago Lobato, the former commander of FALINTIL in 1975, said:

Yes, my brother was killed. He and 10 other friends wanted to use weapons too but, Nicolau Lobato did not permit them to do so and they were all killed (Rogério Lobato, Interview 19/12/2010).

However following the defeat of the coup, FRETILIN resumed the literacy classes and by October 1975, there were over fifty classes operating (ACFOA 1975, p.8).

In Ossú, in the District of Viqueque, a FRETILIN delegate, Mariano da Silva from Derulo village was reported as saying "that using the existing materials, the people of the area had built a school with a capacity of 250 students" (*Jornal do Povo Mau Bere* 22/11/1975). This was followed with an article in the fifth edition of *Jornal do Povo Mau Bere* published on

25 October 1975 entitled: “*Consciencialização.*” The article argued that class struggle was an historical reality. The colonialists never wanted to make people aware (including through literacy), because they wanted to continue to exploit the people (*Jornal do Povo Mau Bere* 25/10/1975). These were the last days of the first phase of the Maubere literacy campaign by FRETILIN, supported by UNETIM.

CONCLUSION

In order to achieve independence, the Casa dos Timores group, through UNETIM, were attempting to develop pedagogy for the liberation struggle, because they believed that without a correct pedagogical intervention, true independence was difficult, if not impossible. The Casa dos Timores then also prepared the practicalities of the intervention by designing the Tetum Literacy Manual *Rai Timor; Rai Ita Nian*. The Literacy Manual was a combination of classical European culture, reading and writing and the native Timorese culture of music, dance and arts, and story-telling about the history of Timor under colonial rule. However there was a need to increase the number of activists to implement the plan. The Casa dos Timores, as members of FRETILIN, built the National Union of Timorese Students (UNETIM) and mobilised its members to carry out the FRETILIN program of grass-roots work and in particular to take the literacy campaign to remote villages in Timor-Leste.

This chapter has demonstrated that education is not a neutral activity. Portuguese education was very much of the kind Freire (1970) calls “domesticating”, educating the Timorese to become submissive subjects of the empire. On the other hand, FRETILIN discovered that education was an arena for fighting what the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci called the “war of position” (Mayo 2005). The mobilisation of UNETIM and the decolonization of the education system became the basis for a new pedagogy, the pedagogy of the Maubere Revolution through which teachers and students became agents for the Maubere Revolution.

Finally, this chapter indicates also that the literacy campaign and the theory of *consciencialização* had influenced the transformation of the FRETILIN party into a mass popular movement which I argue in the following chapters laid down the foundation for the next twenty four years’ resistance against the Indonesian occupation.

CHAPTER 7

THE POPULAR ORGANISATION OF TIMORESE WOMEN (OPMT) AND WOMEN'S EMANCIPATION

INTRODUCTION

According to Estêvão Cabral (2002, p.244), behind FALANTIL lines, FRETILIN developed mass organizations in the Resistance Bases to oppose the Indonesian occupation. These were the Popular Organisation of Timorese Women (OPMT), the Popular Organization of Timorese Youth (OPJT), and the Popular Organization of Timorese Workers (OPTT). This chapter examines the OPMT and the education its members experienced, as learners and educators, to sustain the Resistance movement in the hope that, by sharing their experiences, the chapter will contribute to the revival of the popular education movement in Timor-Leste for a new social, political and economic order, including for women,

One of my primary concerns is to recover some of the stories of OPMT members who worked at the village level during 1975-1978 and so the OPMT story is told mainly through the eyes of twelve of its members at that time. Among other sources, I have also drawn on my interviews with nine FRETILIN men, some archived audio interviews in Tetum and Portuguese, and one pioneering academic paper by a young Timorese, Ivete D.S. Oliveira (1998), which deals with the structure of the OPMT in the Resistance Bases in Remexio in the Central North Sector.

OPMT'S FORMATION, IDEAS AND PROGRAM OF ACTION

Origin and Ideas

Although women were not represented in the Anti-colonial Informal Discussion Group, several notable women were crucial in the early days of the Independence movement including Julieta Fatal, a veterinarian and poet, whose writings contributed to the formation of anti-colonial ideas in the early 1970s and Maria do Céu Pereira, 'Bilear', a founding member of ASDT (Magalhães 2007, p.233) who was one of the Casa dos Timores students and was married to António Carvarinho 'Mau Lear' (Abílio Araújo, Interview 09/09/2009). Both were killed in early 1979 (Tobias Mendonça, Interview 18/09/2009).

When ASDT transformed into FRETILIN, the number of women in the leadership of FRETILIN grew to include Maria do Céu Pereira, Guilhermina dos Santos, Rosa Bonaparte ‘Muki’ and Dulce da Cruz ‘Wewe’, the wife of Vicente Reis ‘Sahe’. All had belonged to the Casa dos Timores. Rosa ‘Muki’, as she was known, participated in the negotiations with the Portuguese Decolonisation Commission in Dili in May 1975, and along with other Casa dos Timores women, was part of the group who organised alternative political education classes leading to the establishment of UNETIM in October 1974 (Domingos Caetano, Interview 20/10/2009). ‘Wewe,’ who had graduated as a teacher, was appointed as the FRETILIN member of GCRET to look at the transformation of the school system as part of the decolonisation process (as discussed in the previous chapter) (Magalhães 2004; Aditjondro, 1999a).

Jolliffe (1975) observed that in 1975 there was little participation by women in politics including in the leadership of FRETILIN, but found many more women in the student’s organization, UNETIM (Jolliffe 1975, p.10). Alves and Abrantes (2005, p.13) identified some twenty-five women who had become members of UNETIM in 1975. Many were high school students trained in how to use the literacy manual, who joined the revolutionary brigades and went to teach literacy classes in rural areas around Dili, Liquica, Ainaro and Aileu. Zulmira Sirana and Maria Maia dos Reis have confirmed that they were among the UNETIM women assigned to Pilot Project I in Aisirimu in Aileu district (Julmira Sirana, Interview 20/10/2009; Maria Maia dos Reis Personal Communication, 08/30/2011).

In order to address the humanitarian crisis arising from the August 1975 UDT coup d’etat, the FRETILIN Central Committee (CCF) formally established OPMT, with its first Secretary General Rosa Muki Bonaparte and two vice secretaries, Filomena Aniceto ‘Lybe’¹¹⁶, and Aicha Bassarewan,¹¹⁷ on 28 August 1975, the day of the FRETILIN victory in Dili. UNETIM women, including Maria Maia dos Reis and Isabel Barreto Lobato, formed the initial core group of OPMT. Within a month, Rosa Muki had produced an OPMT Manifesto, published

116 Filomena Aniceto ‘Lybe’ was originally from Bucoli. She survived the war and still lives in Dili.

117 Aicha Bassarewan is the younger sister of Hamis Bassarewan ‘Hata’, a member of the Casa dos Timores. Both belonged to the minority Muslim community in Dili. Aicha was captured soon after Indonesia invaded Dili. During the Indonesian occupation, while working as a public employee in the district of Dili, she continued underground work. In 2002, Aicha was named Vice-Minister of Finance and is now a member of the Central Committee of FRETILIN, a Member of Parliament and remains a key leader in OPMT.

in the FRETILIN newspaper, *Jornal do Povo Mau Bere* on September 27 1975, entitled: “The Popular Organisation of Timorese Women: Analysis of the Situation of Timorese Women” (*Organização Popular da Mulher Timor: Texto de Análise da Situação da Mulher Timor*) The only document which provides an understanding of the theoretical basis for the women’s liberation struggle in Timor-Leste at that time, it identifies the causes of women’s oppression as “both cultural and structural”. It addressed the issue of culture by explaining that the traditional practice of dowry (*barlaque*) was no longer about the alliance of families to form a *fetsa-umane*,¹¹⁸ and instead had become a social philosophy and practice depriving women of their dignity. In fact it remains today a practice of exchanging women for wealth and limits them to domestic work. The OPMT Manifesto also described how in some regions in Timor-Leste the traditional authorities, the landlords (*latifundiários*), and the lords (*régulos*) practiced polygamy and forced women into hard labour. These practices, it argued, alienated women from actively participating in the work of the liberation struggle.

The structural cause of women’s oppression was the fascist colonial system itself. The Portuguese fascist state had created a labour force which separated women from their husbands, leaving them with many children and without the means to raise them. This forced women to be involved in prostitution. The OPMT Manifesto also states that colonialism is a form of direct imperialism by the international capitalist system. In Timor-Leste, because of the extended hand (*lacaíos*) of international capitalism, women had become cheap labour under the Portuguese fascist regime. The Manifesto concludes that Timorese women therefore suffered from a double oppression: that from within Timorese society and from the fascist imperialist state (Bonaparte 1975, p.8). From that time on, OPMT had two main objectives: to directly involve women in the struggle against colonialism; and to eliminate all forms of violence against women. This Manifesto was presented by Rosa Muki to the CCF on September 28, 1975, on the occasion of the one month anniversary of OMPT’s founding (Alves & Abrantes 2005, p.14).

118 Fetosaa-Umamane: literally *fetsa* means wife-receiver which is the extended family of the husband, and *umamane* means wife-provider which is the extended family of a wife. *Fetsa-umane* is a form of social alliance between families.

The OPMT Program in 1975: Restoration and Childcare

The urgent humanitarian work that OPMT began in September 1975 was to restore the country to normality following the civil war (Alves et al 2005, p.14). OPMT assumed responsibility for establishing childcare centres for war orphans and to feed all those who had been displaced by the war. Creches were established in Dili, Maubisse, and Turiscai, and were functioning by the first week of September (Jolliffe 1978, p.162; see also Alves & Abrantes 2005, p.15).

The Dili creche, called Mau Bere was under the responsibility of Isabel Barreto Lobato, Genoveva, Aicha Bassarewan and Alui Alkatiri. Other members such as Rosa Muki, Soimali, and Zulmira Sirana were responsible for building another creche called Mau Koli based in Maubisse, Ainaro. where they met a local Portuguese woman named Milena and other married Timorese women including Bilelok Carapina, Isabel Lindao, and Margarida Bonaparte who supported them in their activities in the Creche Mau Koli. Rosa Muki however, returned early to Dili as she was required as a member of CCF to participate in the preparation of the Unilateral Proclamation of Independence (Julmira Sirana, Interview 20/10/ 2009) and according to Aditjondro (1999, p.2) “was the one to unfurl the brand new flag of the Democratic Republic of East Timor”. The Secretary of the Regional Committee, Luís de Mendonça Araújo, reported in the FRETILIN newspaper *Jornal do Povo Mau Bere* on 22 November 1975 that the Creche Mau Koli, under the direction of comrade Sakunar, had around 100 children, mostly orphans. Sirana and Soimali next went further to Turiscai, in the Same district to establish Creche Bere Leki as requested by the comrades in that locality. While in Turiscai, they received a further request for a creche from FRETILIN in the town of Same, and Sirana left for Same. However, this program was interrupted by the landing of Indonesian forces in Same on December 7, 1975 (Julmira Sirana, Interview 20/10/2009).

The objectives of the childcare centres were to provide nutrition and moral and logistical support for war orphans; to promote and teach the literacy program; to provide sewing activities and political education for women (Julmira Sirana, Interview 20/10/2009; Jolliffe 1978, p.162). For example, in Maubisse, they used a sewing machine, which belonged to the local administration, to train women to sew and taught literacy during the day. At night they conducted political

education for women (Julmira Sirana, Interview 20/10/2009). According to Jolliffe (1978, p.196) there were ninety-four children in September 1975 in Creche Mau-Koli and OPMT and OPJT worked hand-in-hand with the local people and the International Red Cross.

The hard work of women and the difficulties that OPMT faced on the eve of the Indonesian invasion is acknowledged in a poem written by Inacio Moura and published in the *Jornal do Povo Maubere* on the 4th October 1975:

Camarada Bi-Bere

By Inácio Moura

Camarada Bi-Bere
Sao para ti
Estes versos
Cheirando as rosas bravas
Bravíssimas
E ainda
As acácias rubras
Da cor da nossa bandeira.

Quero que os guardes
Religiosamente
Bem dentro de ti
No mais profundo
Da tua carne
Para depois os regares
Com lágrimas de sangue
Ou de saudade
Nas campas dos camaradas
Já mortos

Que souberam ganhar
A grande batalha
Da nossa independência.

Muito te devemos camarada
Bi-Bere
Por tudo quanto sofreste
A honra do Povo Maubere
E a Pátria de Timor-Leste

Comrade Bi-Bere

Comrade Bi-Bere
For you are
These verses,
Smelling the wild roses
Very wild ones
And also
The red acacias
Of the colour of our flag

I want you to keep them
Religiously
Well inside you
In the deepest part
Of your flesh
So that you can water them
With your tears of blood
Or of nostalgia
On our comrades' graves
The deceased ones

Who fought to win
The great battle
Of our independence

We owe you so much comrade Bi-Bere
For all of your sufferings
In honour of the Maubere People
and our nation Timor-Leste

Indonesian forces murdered Rosa Muki along with other OPMT leaders including Isabel Barreto Lobato, wife of Prime Minister Nicolau Lobato, on the first day of the full-scale invasion of Timor-Leste on December 7 1975.¹¹⁹

They [Indonesian soldiers] were dragging women on to the barges. One woman wouldn't go. She was Muki, Secretary of the Popular Organization of Timorese Women. . . . Small intense, very Timorese, the Portuguese called her "the petite revolutionary" and "Rosa Luxemburg" for her contribution to the talks. When she resisted the Indonesians she was shot on the wharf and her body thrown into the harbour (Jolliffe 1978, p.5).

Maria Jose Boavida 'Soimali', replaced Rosa Muki as the leader of OPMT, until she herself was killed in 1979 by the Indonesian forces after the collapse of the Resistance Bases (Maria José da Costa, Pers.com. 05/05/2011).

Women in the *Bases de Apoio* 1976-1978

During the period of the *Bases de Apoio* FRETILIN administered the newly proclaimed Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (RDTL) by dividing the country under its control into six administrative sectors (Mattoso, 2005, p.63; Cabral 2002, p.243).¹²⁰ OPMT continued its Base Work over the three years across the different sectors under FRETILIN control. In this section I provide some detail of OPMT in three of the Sectors: *Fronteira Norte*, which consisted of Liquica and Ermera districts; *Centro-Norte*, which consisted of part of Manatuto (Laclo and Laclubar), Aileu and Dili/Metinaro; and *Centro-Leste*, which included Baucau, Viqueque and part of Manatuto.

***Fronteira Norte* (North Sector): Adult Schools and Military Training**

Fronteira Norte was under the command of Commissar Hélio Pina 'Maucruma', a member of Casa dos Timores, and a Vice-Minister in the first RDTL government, but the leader of OPMT in *Fronteira Norte* is unknown. FRETILIN had already organised in Bazartete in Liquica,

119 Muki's brother, Bernardino Bonaparte, who was Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs in the first Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (RDTL) Government, was also murdered at the same time (CIET: Box.no.6, MS9535/3/11; Horta 1996, p.5)

120 The sectors were: 1) Ponta-Leste (Far East); 2) Centro-Leste (Central East); 3) Centro-Norte (Central North); 4) Centro-Sul (Central South); 5) *Fronteira-Sul* (Border South); 6) *Fronteira Norte* (Border North). See Chapter 12.

prior to the Indonesian invasion, adult schools which taught both adults and children reading, writing, political education, revolutionary songs and military training and these continued until 1978. The adult school in Bazartete was not only for reading and writing but importantly it was also a place where women learned self-defence which proved vital to the Resistance and led to some OPMT members joining the armed struggle.

Abrantes and Sequeira (2008) interviewed Madalena Bi Dau Soares¹²¹ ‘Domin’ but later known as ‘Kassian’, married to Mau-Kasso, commander of a FALINTIL platoon. ‘Kassian’ was an organiser for OPMT in her village, Mota-ulun, had attended FRETILIN’s adult school in Borlete, Bazartete. She and a platoon of women had taken part in military training which FRETILIN had begun to organise in anticipation of the Indonesian invasion. The idea was that women had to learn how to fight with weapons because if all the men were killed, women would have to carry on the struggle for independence. Elsa Sanak was among the women who already carried an automatic rifle known as a ‘Z3’, prior to the full scale invasion (Abrantes and Sequeira 2008, p. 45-46). In 1978, when the Resistance Bases were destroyed, ‘Kassian’, along with another OPMT comrade Margarida Gonçalves, ‘Leno Timor,’ joined the guerilla war.

When Xanana Gusmão sent commander José Henrique ‘Ko-susu’¹²² accompanied by two other women Domingas, ‘Bilou Mali’, and Binegra, also known as Rosa to rebuild the FRETILIN networks in 1979, he found three other OPMT women Fátima Pinto, ‘Dihi Morik’, Maria Imaculada ‘Bi-lehar’ and Inês Kaisiba ‘Beatriz Duarte’. They also encountered ‘Kassian’ (Abrantes and Sequeira 2008, pp.51, 45, 54, 57). In 1990, ‘Kassian’ and ‘Leno Timor’ were still fighting with the armed resistance around Bazartete, until Leno Timor was wounded in combat and captured by Indonesian forces. ‘Kassian’ managed to live among the population without being captured (Abrantes and Sequeira 2008, p.51). In 1998, when the East Timor Students Solidarity Council (ETSSC) organised a public dialogue¹²³ in the area, she was among the speakers (Abrantes and Sequeira 2008, p.51).

121 Madalena Bi Dau Soares was born in in Bazartete, Liquica. In her family, there were three sisters and three brothers.

122 Comander Ko-Susu, whose real name is José Henrique, was born in Loilari, Afaloicai Uato-Lari. He assisted Xanana to re-establish the FALINTIL forces after the destruction of the Resistance Bases. Ko-Susu, according to Domingos Pinto Gabriel, died of diarrhoea from eating raw cassava, somewhere in Same, in the mid 1980s (Domingos Pinto Gabriel, Interview 20/03/ 2011; Abrantes and Sequeira, 2008, p.51)

123 The public dialogues organised by the ETSSC in 1998-99, in the lead-up to the referendum of August 1999, are described in Chapter 17.

Centro Norte (Central North Sector): Women Have Many Tasks

The *Centro Norte* was one of the most populated and most difficult regions due to the dry and hilly terrain. The landscape was strategic in terms of armed resistance, but it was difficult to grow food and difficult to access drinking water. Some 20,000 people from Dili, Aileu and Manatuto were concentrated in the *Centro Norte* sector, which was divided into two resistance sub-bases: Zone A Remexio and Zone B Lequidoe. According to Juliana Mendonça do Rego¹²⁴ (Interview 10/10/2009), the OPMT leaders in the *Centro Norte* sector were ‘Bilear’, ‘Namdiri’, and ‘Leli’.¹²⁵ ‘Bilear’ and ‘Leli’ coordinated OPMT in the *Commissariat Light Star (Commissariado Fitun Naroman)*, based in Ai-Kurus which was also the headquarters for OPMT (Luís Gonzaga, Interview 19/09/2009; Juliana Mendonça do Rego, Interview 19/09/2009). Tereza da Costa ‘Bui-Iku’, a member of OPMT who worked there, explained that they were organised into sections and were actively involved in various programs. These included food preparation; food production through the agriculture co-operatives with the support of OPJT; food storage in the *Armazem*:¹²⁶; security as members of OPS;¹²⁷ craft production using palm trees; salt production in Lacló; the gathering of wild food; and the sewing of FALINTIL uniforms (Tereza da Costa, Interview 17/10/2009).

In the *Centro Norte*, OPMT women played several very crucial roles as illustrated by the following examples. A nurse named Fátima Mendonça, headed the RENAL Health School in Remexio¹²⁸ with up to 122 military and 84 civilians in training as paramedics; among them were ten women. The women members of the health brigade trained other women in the villages on how to become health workers (Inácio Costa, Interview 09/10/2010).

The FRETILIN Ministry of Education and Culture built popular education centres in the camps, and the few educated OPMT women became teachers. According to Juliana Mendonça do

124 Juliana Mendonça do Rego, now 51 years old, was born in Faturasa, Remexio. She was a young member of OPMT in Faka-Faturasa, during the years of the Resistance Bases. Do Rego is married to Luís Gonzaga, a former FALINTIL company commander

125 The real identities of Namdiri and Leli are yet to be discovered. According to Bui-Iku, Leli was originally from Ermera (Tereza da Costa Interview 17/10/2009).

126 *Armazem* is a warehouse to store agriculture produce for re-distribution to the population and the fighters. The concept was developed by Amílcar Cabral (see Chapter 4) and elaborated in the Resistance Bases (see Chapter 13)

127 *Organização Popular da Segurança* (OPS), the FRETILIN civilian security organisation, is described in Chapter 12

128 The Health School will be further discussed in Chapter 13

Rego, she and her friends learned literacy using stones to form letters because there were no writing materials in their camp, which was named Rai Fuik, Bimaek. However, the classes lasted for only about three weeks, because they had to move constantly to escape the Indonesian bombardments. The school also provided guitar and violin lessons. They sang political songs such as *Foho Ramelau* and *Pátria, Pátria* (Homeland, Homeland). Kiha, and a comrade from Lacló was their music teacher. (Juliana Mendonca do Rego Interview 10/10/ 2009).

OPMT leaders also had a very important role in political education, visiting villages to undertake *esclarecimentos*. Juliana remembers learning the chant, “Down with colonialism, down with imperialism and down with traitors” (Juliana Mendonça do Rego, Interview 19/09/2009). Similarly Tereza da Costa recalled that political education involved learning how to act:

Every time we meet other comrades, regardless of their status and age, we must say: “*Salud*, revolutionary comrade”. Or if someone enters a farm without permission from others, or makes mistakes in official meetings, they would have to do ‘criticism and self-criticism’ in front of others, to make sure that they would not repeat the mistake next time.

However, she said she had no time to learn literacy, because she had so many other responsibilities (Tereza da Costa, Interview 7/10/2009).

There was a serious problem in the *Centro Norte* base with the shortage of food, which, according to Juliana Mendonça do Rego, caused many deaths. The local people in Remexio had enough food initially, but with the arrival of so many people from other places, the locals had to redistribute cassava and sweet potatoes to those who were in need. Bilear and Namdiri organised a communal farm in Aikurus which also covered an area called Faturasa camp in Kateri (Juliana Mendonça do Rego 19/09/2009; Tereza da Costa, Interview 7/10/2009). Domingas Baptista Mesquita do Rego, the leader of OPMT in Kateri, was based in camp Faka, where she and nine local OPMT members built a creche for abandoned children and orphans to provide food for malnourished children in Manumera, Lequidoe. Mesquita also led another group of women to farm rice in a far away village, in Laclubar in Manatuto. Juliana Mendonça do Rego spoke softly recalling the tragic death of her friends saying:

Our OPMT leader in Remexio was Domingas Baptista from the Aldeia Kateri-Faturasa. She formed an OPMT group who went to cultivate rice in Taroke-Bedas, Laclubar. Because the place is said to be sacred, they got fever and all suddenly died. They were nine people, all young single women. Domingas herself was an illiterate woman, but her words were sharp enough to make people listen to her. Some of her group who I remember are Jacinta Baptista (Januario Baptista's mother); Sebastiana da Costa; Maria Margarida; Maria Mendonça; Antonia; Tereza da Costa; and two other women who I cannot recall their names. Domingas also got sick and eventually died (Juliana Mendonça do Rego 19/09/2009)

According to Rosita Quintão who was from Namuleco village in Lequidoe, and was only 10 years old in 1976, her sister Deolinda da Costa Mouzinho was the OPMT organizer for Zone B, Lequidoe. She tells of witnessing the communal farm work and the harvests, which were stored in storehouse in Namuleco. The crops were not only to provide food for the children, but were also to assist FALINTIL (Rosita Quintão, Interview 19/10/2009). This critical support of FALANTIL was confirmed by Ana Rosa Tilman who was responsible for four villages namely Hai-Nukrai, Deomelal, Fatukmerlau and Tautelo, where she organised women to work in the communal farm to provide for FALINTIL (Abrantes and Sequeira 2008, p.2).

Women continued their traditional role as cooks in the headquarters of the Sectors. This is partly because most of the men were fighting. Anita dos Reis Fernandes was a kitchen coordinator in Prime Minister Nicolau Lobato's base in Holarua, at the feet of Mountain Kablaki. She recalled that when the CCF conducted a meeting they prepared meals for the participants. Sometimes the meetings went on for two days, and then they had to buy and kill buffaloes (Anita dos Reis Fernandes, Interview 20/04/2009). Bui-Iku also a member of the Kitchen of Comissariado Aikurus in *Centro Norte* was proud of the high respect shown to the women who continued their traditional role working in the kitchen in support of the formal meetings of the CCF, ministers, political delegates and members of the armed forces (Tereza da Costa, Interview 07/10/2009).

***Centro Leste* (Central East Sector): Leadership Education**

Centro Leste was comprised of Baucau and Viqueque district, and also an area within Manatuto district referred to as the Matebian Resistance Base which was the last Resistance Base to fall in 1978. In the area of Uaimori, between Venilale and Ossú, which was initially under the command of Commissar Vicente Reis Sahe there was a base known as *Posto Mar-Colina* which had eight areas, and the FALINTIL Commander was Marito Reis, the elder brother of Sahe. OPMT members were active in this region organising and participating in craft production, food production, logistical support, literacy classes, and political and military education.

Abrantes and Sequeira (2008) interviewed OPMT member Natália da Costa (*nom de guerre*, Tali) who was born in Waisemu-Bucoli, Baucau 24 December 1958 and married with seven children to Clementino da Silva who was a member of FALINTIL, and a body guard of OPMT leader Wewe. Da Costa who lived in the Bases de Apoio from 1975-1978, recalled how being literate was a valuable skill:

Literacy helped me a lot when in the military formation to disperse weapons, because numbers and letters were written on the weapon. We used weapons such as Mauzer and Z3. Comander Ernesto Gomes who trained us in *sobu kilat* and tactics to fight the enemy . . . we can't run straight, we must run zig-zag . . . (Quoted in Abrantes and Sequeira, 2008, p.2)

After having initial military training in Bucoli from comander Ernesto Gomes, who was a former member of second line of the Portuguese military, Da Costa served as a member of the logistical team for FALINTIL in *Posto Mar-Colina* company (Abrantes and Sequeira, 2008, p.2). The logistical team members were often armed and functioned as second line forces who could take up arms to fight if necessary. Tali continued her military training and political education under the supervision of Commander José Viegas, a military trainer and a political educator. He taught women both the theoretical and technical skills of war. As Tali puts it, they had political conscientisation classes. She recalled her teacher's words: "In the future, when all the men have died, you women must continue to resist). The theme of political education was nationalism - "Independence, dead or alive" (Abrantes and Sequeira 2008, p.2 - 3).

As well as learning in the *Centro Leste* schools, as in other Sectors women also worked in food production which involved both the cultivation of the land and its preparation for consumption. Some were required to provide logistical support for the men fighting in the battle front. Maria da Costa Feritas of Osticu-Bucoli, like Tali and Da Silva, was an organiser of the Women's Logistic Committee responsible for the communal farm which grew maize and prepared food for FALINTIL (Abrantes and Sequera 2008, p.27). Sometimes they encountered difficulties such as food shortages, and their job was to make sure they found wild food. Feritas recalled:

whenever they were out of food stock, in order to feed FALINTIL the OPMT members cooked whatever was possible to eat. OPMT members gathered wild food such as *akar* and *kombili* (Quoted in Abrantes and Sequeira 2008, p.2).

Akar and *kombili* were common foods found in the wild, which before the war the Timorese would only eat occasionally and usually fed to pigs and goats. *Akar* was a common tree which grows very tall, up to 30 meters high, and was mostly found in the coastal areas across Timor-Leste. The men cut down the tree and the women worked in groups to turn it into powder ready to cook. It is a long process involving hard work but it is sweet and healthy food. *Komibili* is a root vegetable, a type of potato which grows wild but could also be grown on farms. There are different types of *kombili* in Timor-Leste. The wild one usually has thorns and is difficult to dig. It requires careful work and time to prepare for consumption. However, once it is removed from the soil, it is easy to cook, just like sweet potatoes, and it is tasty too. *Kombili* was one of the most typical guerrilla foods.

My research suggests that, compared to the other Sectors, the political education for women in the Viqueque region of *Centro Leste*, was more in depth. As discussed in Chapter 5, in June 1976, the Department of Political and Ideological Orientation (DOPI) built a political and leadership school in Uato-Lari, called CEFERPOL Ravina, led by Xanana Gusmão and Lino Olo-Kasa. Seven women were among the thirty cadres recruited to participate in the initial political and leadership program who became the permanent educators at CEFORPOL. These seven women were: Lourença da Silva, Celestina da Silva Pinto 'Bisae', Etelvina Belo 'Bidolimau', Domingas (the wife of Bou-Lesa), Dominga of Matahoe, Bilou-Mali and Cristina (Celestina

Silva Pinto, Interview 18/03/2010). In addition to these original members, many women from other zones were recruited later to join CEFORPOL for three months of study and then returned to their camps. These included Jacinta Fernandes of Uani-Uma, Alzira Fernandes 'Abu-Rubi' of Uani-Uma, Juliana Kaikutu of Irabin, Amelia Menezes of Afaloicai, Sirorinha of Matahoe, Madalena da Silva Fernandes of Babulo and Hilda Maria da Conceição of Bahatata, Uato-Carbau (Júlio Fátima, Interview 08/0/2009, Afonso Pinto, Interview 23/10/2009; Madalena da Silva Fernandes, Interview 5/2/2010).

Some from this group became political educators known as DK (*Delegado Komisariadu*), responsible for mass political education and thereby making an exceptional contribution in the Resistance Bases, and later during the years of military occupation. I worked with many of them during the Resistance, particularly in 1990s. The most popular CEFORPOL woman, about whom I had heard often in the Resistance Bases, was 'Bidolimau', the sister of Biloumali and Bisae. She was beautiful, with great musical talent, carrying a guitar and a pistol too. Bidolimau graduated from the Canossian Sisters elementary school in Uadae-Ossú, Viqueque, and married Maukalo, a company commander from the same village, Matahoe, who is still a commander in the independent Timorese army, F-FDTL. Both continued resisting Indonesian forces after the Resistance Bases were destroyed in 1978. Bidolimau surrendered in 1991, but remained active in the Clandestine Front.¹²⁹ However, in 1998 Bidolimau, who was pregnant at the time, travelled to Ataúro and sadly was killed in a boat accident, together with Biloumali's daughter, Domingas. (Marcelino Pereira, Interview 18/03/2010; Zélia Fernandes, Pers.com., 26/12/2010; Celestina Silva Pinto, Interview 18/03/2010). Biloumali continued as a member of FALINTIL until 1999 when the war ended, and now lives in Dili. Bisae married Lourenço Guterres, a former FALINTIL commander and a teacher, and now lives in Uato-Lari. (Celestina da Silva Pinto, Interview 18/03/2010).

The Armed Struggle

As noted above, some OPMT women were also active members of the Armed Resistance. When the Australia Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA) arrived in Timor-Leste in 1975, before

129 The work of the clandestine front after the fall of the Resistance Bases is discussed in Chapter 12.

the invasion, it noted the existence of a military unit of 100 people commanded by a woman (ACFOA 11975, p.9). Jolliffe also reported what *The Australian* journalist Roger East saw, in November 1975: “Nearby Tapó there was a brigade of women recruited in Bobonaro to fight with FALINTIL” (Jolliffe 1978, p. 201). Nicolau Moniz, a member of OPJT in 1975 who later served as commander of a combat unit of FALINTIL, also reports that Maria Santana de Tapó was a fighter. Santana was married to Manuel Morais, a company commander in Bobonaro who died in a battle. Santana then took up the arms of her husband and became a FALINTIL fighter (Nicolau Moniz, Pers. Comm. 24/03/2010). It is believed that Maria Santana de Tapó was OPMT’s first martyr having been shot dead in combat (Maria A.Sarmento Pers. Comm. 16/07/2010). When I presented some of my research to the CCF on International Women’s Day 8 March 2011, Maria Maia dos Reis confirmed that Vice President Nicolau Lobato had received a letter from the FALINTIL Commander on the Bobonaro border, reporting Maria Santana de Tapó had fought and died in battle on the 3rd of November 1975, and that day was then proclaimed as Timor-Leste Women’s Day (Maria Maia dos Reis, Pers. Comm. 08/03/2011).

As indicated earlier, FALINTIL trained women in two Resistance Bases: Bazartete and around Uaimori. The former was the home village of Prime Minister Nicolau Lobato, and the latter the home of Sahe, the revolutionary educator. Other military training was also conducted in Aileiu and Bobonaro. The following women are believed to have been the longest serving in the Armed Resistance: Bidolimau, Hilda Maria da Conceição ‘Zebra’, Balbina of Iliomar, Bisoi, Bilou-Mali and Kassian. Bisoi from Ossú, rejoined the armed struggle in 1983, and remained in the guerrilla force until 1999 (Zélia Fernandes, Pers.com. 04/06/2011). The Makadique and Matahoi women who attended CEFORPOL and remained in the Armed Resistance until 1999 were Sinorina Alves ‘Bilesa’, and Domingas da Silva ‘Biloumali’. Another former member of UNETIM who joined OPMT, Maria de Fátima ‘Taumali’ or ‘Kihikmori’, also joined the Armed Resistance. She was arrested in Remexio and jailed alongside President Francisco Xavier do Amaral in 1977, but was released after Prime Minister Nicolau Lobato intervened. When the Resistance Bases were destroyed, Indonesian forces captured many people, including Taumali. However, by 1979 Taumali was involved in establishing a new Resistance Organising Base

known as ROB (*Resistência Organiza Baze*) in the occupied territories.¹³⁰ She also went on to expand OPMT. On 10 June 1980, Taumali was with an armed group under the command of Antonio Ramos of Laulara, which broke into the headquarters of Indonesian Battalion 747 in Becora and obtained 284 weapons. Taumali was betrayed and recaptured by the Indonesian forces and imprisoned on Ataúro Island. She was later sentenced to 13 years in prison, but was granted amnesty and released in 1988 (Abrantes and Sequera 2008, p. 74-76.) Even though women in FALANTIL were small in numbers, theirs was an exceptional contribution to the liberation of the homeland. It is a story that will be forever retold as part of our history.

The Clandestine Movement in the Concentration Camps

Despite the enormous personal risks and systematic repression by the occupying forces, OPMT played a critical role as part of the underground which formed in the occupied territories, continuing to support the Armed Resistance and educating the people about the struggle for independence. The repression had been severe from the beginning. Alarico Jorge Fernandes announced via Radio Maubere on 10 November 1976

Two escaped females from the concentration camp in the Same village reported that one sixteen year old girl named Josefa Artires was barbarously violated by the Indonesian soldiers and died some hours later due to the barbarity (CIET.Ms.9535).

The use of torture and violence by the Indonesian military against women was not uncommon.

For example:

A special intelligence unit operating on the top floor of the Tropical Hotel in Dili, regularly resorted to torture to obtain information about FRETILIN. The officer in charge of this 'interrogation unit' was Major Yusman, who reported to the senior Intelligence Officer in Timor-Leste, Colonel Sinaga, a man reportedly disliked and feared. One woman informant said she knew two women who had been tortured to obtain information about FRETILIN (Jolliffe 1978, p.303).

130 The founding members of ROB were David Dias Ximenes, Pedro Manek, Raimundo of Dare, Daniel da Costa 'Nahak', and Maria de Fátima Pinto 'Taumali. See also Chapter 12 on the Clandestine Front. Other FALANTIL commanders assigned to lead revolts in Ermera and Liquica were Pedro Lemos and Filomeno Paixão.

A well-known extraordinary story of bravery and courage demonstrating the terror of occupation is that of Maria Gorete Joaquim who was 17 years old when the invasion occurred and a member of UNETIM (Turner 1992). She remained in Dili and worked as a translator for the Indonesian soldiers, and also for the Clandestine Movement as a messenger (*Estafeta*) for FRETILIN. She was arrested by Military Intelligence and detained at Sang-Thai-Ho prison, a former Chinese shop in Dili, and later was moved to Baucau prison (Alves & Abrantes 2005, p.12). Maria José Fernandes ‘Mize’, daughter of Alarico Jorge Fernandes, told me that Maria Gorete was with them in Baucau:

She was a woman of self-respect and dignity. The Indonesian soldiers wanted to harrass her, she fought back. That same day, the army took her away and we never saw her again (Maria José Fernandes, Interview 28/10/2008).

In an interview recorded by Michelle Turner (1992), her informant Lourenço, a friend of Maria Gorete, said:

I talked with Maria Gorete Joaquim in Baucau, just before she was taken away to Lospalos, and then to somewhere else, perhaps she was murdered in Quelicai. We met accidentally. Later I realised that she was a very brave woman. Many people talked about all that she did, how she sacrificed her dignity, self-respect, to work for Indonesians in order to obtain information and pass it to the Resistance fighters. She did this very well for a long time, she bore a lot.

When we met, she did not talk much, but I remember what she said. She was very quiet, subdued, broken. I do not know how to explain it, it seemed she gave up her dignity as a human being. She said, she worked for the Indonesians as a translator and they treated her as an object for their human pleasure. Maria Gorete was everything for them—their interpreter, but also as object for sex. She was raped every hour anywhere and by whoever wanted her. She said she could not stand it anymore. They could not control her anymore. She did not want to work for them any longer, and said, “it is better you kill me” (Turner 1992, p.169).

OPMT members also attempted to use the social teachings of the Catholic Church to counter the anti-communist campaign waged against FRETILIN by the occupying forces and to help the population to understand the struggle for liberation. Rhetorically, Luciana da Costa stated:

The teachings of the Catholic Church is consecrated with the blood of Jesus Christ in order to be implemented by Catholics throughout the world. In fact, the doctrine of FRETILIN from 1975-1979 is consecrated in the body and blood of the those who died - the guerilla fighters - in order to live under the governance of FRETILIN in the world of Timor (Abrantes and Sequeira 2008, p.83).

Luciana believed that OPMT's role was to assist the people to resist "all forms of oppression such as paternalism, nepotism, ethno-centrism, racism, fascism, feudalism, divisionism, discrimination, defamation etc...." (Quoted in Abrantes and Sequeira 2008, p.82).

OPMT was not only resisting and doing practical work as part of the Clandestine Front, but its members were critical to the ideological work of the struggle, an essential part of FRETILIN's political education as outlined in the Manifesto presented by Rosa Muki.

The Women's Movement: the Struggle Continues

Although a minority in the early days of ASDT-FRETILIN, the number of politically active women multiplied towards the end of 1974 after the formation of UNETIM. FRETILIN formed OPMT, led by Rosa Muki and her two Vice-Secretaries Lybe and Aicha Bassarewan, in order to intensify the Base Work among women and children, to conscientise the masses. The women's movement for justice, dignity and equality was born as an integral component of the political movement for independence. The *Manifesto* made it clear:

the objective of the participation by women in the revolution is therefore not just for the emancipation of women but the victory of revolution... (Bonaparte 1975).

The "victory of revolution" refers to the victory of the socialist revolution. In the early years of 1900s, the German socialist Clara Zetkin had argued that women's liberation is only possible under socialism (Zetkin et al 2007, p.101). It is possible that Rosa Muki and her sisters in the

Casa dos Timores had learned such ideas originally with the MRRP in Lisbon, or perhaps from the PAIGC women's organisation, since Muki visited Guinea-Bissau's liberated zones during that country's independence struggle against Portuguese colonialism" (Adjitondro 1999). Whatever the source, OPMT had begun to implement its revolutionary social policy between September and December 1975 and continued during the period of the Resistance Bases. They took this experience and political training with them to the Armed Resistance, Clandestine Front and Diplomatic Front over the next two decades.

The OPMT lost too many of its women, including leaders such as Rosa Muki Bonaparte, but also grass roots women such as Domingas Batista and the eight women of Faturasa, Remexio who died due to their commitment to their belief in the social revolution. Some of the names I have identified are Jacinta Baptista, Sebastiana da Costa, Maria Margarida, Maria Mendonça, Antónia and Tereza da Costa. So many women were subjected to human rights abuses including sexual abuse, terror and executions. OPMT fought and suffered the long war of Independence on all fronts against the Indonesian military forces occupation. Their contribution is an extraordinary story, which is providing a strong platform today for the younger generation of OPMT to stand upon, as they seek to obtain the goals of their original Political Manifesto.

CHAPTER 8

THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF TIMOR-LESTE I: STATE AND PEOPLE

INTRODUCTION

On November 28, 1975, in front of about 2,000 people gathered outside the *Palácio do Governo*, FRETILIN proclaimed a new Republic, the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. This thesis refers to this new state as RDTL I (meaning the ‘first’ Republic, which existed until the current Republic was proclaimed on May 20, 2002). The complete text of the proclamation adopted by the Central Committee of FRETILIN (CCF) was read out by President Francisco Xavier do Amaral:

Expressing the highest aspirations of the people of Timor-Leste, and to safeguard the most legitimate interests of national sovereignty, the Central Committee of FRETILIN decrees by proclamation, unilaterally, the independence of Timor-Leste, from 00.00 hours today, declaring the state of the Democratic Republic of East Timor, anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist.

Long live the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste!

Long live the People of Timor-Leste, free and independent!

Long live FRETILIN! (Cited in Jolliffe 1978, p.212).

The crowd of FRETILIN supporters erupted into cheering, embracing, singing and weeping (Jolliffe 1978, p.214). The proclamation was inspirational and sent a very strong political message to the people in the countryside, that Timor-Leste was now a country of its own. With lyrics written by Francisco Borja da Costa, and composed by Afonso Redentor and Simão Barreto, the national anthem *Pátria, Pátria* (Homeland, Homeland), was sung for the first time on that day.



Photo: Jolliffe (1978, p. 213).

HOMELAND, HOMELAND

Homeland, homeland!
East Timor, our nation!
Glory to people and the heroes,
Of our liberation!

Vanquish colonialism,
Down with imperialism!
A country free,
A people free!
No, no, no to exploitation!

Advance united,
Firm and decisive,
In the struggle against imperialism,
The enemy of the people,
To the final victory,
By the revolutionary road!

Homeland, homeland,
Of our nation! (Translation in Jolliffe 1978, p.47)

Pátria, Pátria

Timor-Leste, nossa Nação
Gloria ao Povo e aos heróis
Da nossa libertação

Vencemos o colonialismo
Gritamos, abaixo o Imperialismo
Terra livre, Povo livre
Não, não, não, a exploração.

Avante unidos
Firmes e decididos
Na luta contra o imperialismo
O inimigo dos Povos
Até a vitória final
Pelo caminho da Revolução.

Pátria, Pátria!
Timor-Leste, nossa Nação
Gloria ao Povo e aos heróis
Da nossa Libertação.

On 29 November 1975, CCF also adopted the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, which consisted of six main parts: General Principles; Rights and Obligations of Citizens; The Organs of the State; The Division and Organization of Administration; The Judicial Power; and Final Disposition and Additions (RDTL 1976, p.11-41). Rogério Tiago Lobato, the Commander of FALINTIL, read the newly adopted Constitution aloud to the crowd (Jolliffe 1978, p. 217). This Constitution became the legal foundation for government in the Resistance Bases. President Amaral delivered a strong speech:

The right of a people to independence is inalienable. Talks between FRETILIN and Portugal have never taken place because from the time of the Rome talks Portugal has stood by while Indonesia intervened ... We had to fight alone against UDT in Dili and against Indonesia at the border. We must build on the grave of fascism and colonialism a new country free and democratic where there is no discrimination ... We direct our appeal for peace to Indonesia, but we will live by the slogan 'Independence or death.' (Jolliffe 1978, p. 218)

For the following 24 years, until 1999, 'Independence or death' was a popular slogan demonstrated by so many FALINTIL and FRETILIN members who, as they were about to be executed by the occupying forces, cried out: "Independence or death" and "Viva FRETILIN, Viva RDTL" as their final 'prayers'.

On December 1, 1975, FRETILIN also announced the formation of the first RDTL Cabinet, which consisted of eleven Ministers and seven Vice-Ministers (Jolliffe 1978, p. 219).

A week later, Indonesia launched a brutal full-scale invasion on December 7, 1975 against FRETILIN/RDTL. Using air and marine forces, Indonesia attacked the capital of the newly proclaimed Republic forcing people to retreat to the interior of Timor-Leste (Cabral 2002, p.240; Hitchens 2001, p.91). Their intention was to eliminate the FRETILIN leadership as quickly as possible. FRETILIN forces were however determined to resist and bitterly confronted and successfully isolated the Indonesian occupying forces in the main cities. In the mountains, FRETILIN ran an alternative Government for the next three years, until December 1978.

Although *Chega!*, the final report of the Truth, Reconciliation and Reception Commission (CAVR 2006) assumed that the FRETILIN structure was identical to the organisation of the Resistance Bases, from 1975-1978, this is not the case. This conflation of the two undermines and negates not simply the three-year existence of the independent FRETILIN-led state, the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (RDTL), but also, the reality of the Maubere Revolution itself. Throughout this period, FRETILIN was not only resisting an invading army, it was making a social, political and economic revolution, bringing about fundamental changes for a better society in Timor-Leste. It was building an alternative socialist state structure to replace the colonial state which had governed peoples' lives until that time. This thesis will correct CAVR's narrow and misleading analysis by differentiating between the structure of FRETILIN as a political party and a national liberation movement, and the new FRETILIN-led state structure, RDTL I.

This chapter and the following three will examine how FRETILIN systematically developed an alternative Government with programs based on the 1974 FRETILIN Political Manifesto and on the RDTL I Constitution adopted on November 29, 1975. I will show how, in this period, popular education in Timor-Leste moved beyond the initial conscientisation of the people by the leadership of FRETILIN and its mass organisations, and took the pedagogy of the Maubere revolution to a new level. In the Resistance Bases, the Timorese people learned about liberation and socialism by living, working and fighting within a FRETILIN-led popular socialist state. President Nicolau Lobato in a speech broadcast over Radio Maubere on 28 June 1976, made this point:

Our resistance is becoming our political school. We taught the people the theoretical principles of our revolution and now the practice is being learnt in the battle field (Lobato 28/6/1976).

The lessons learned from this experience, from this practice, were then taken into the next stage, sustaining FRETILIN and the Resistance until the Indonesian withdrawal in 1999. As Marx wrote in his famous third thesis on Feuerbach, revolutionary education, education in which people are changed as they change their circumstances "can be conceived and rationally understood only

as revolutionary practice.” (Marx 1886/2002). This chapter and subsequent ones will show how the FRETILIN-led RDTL provided a structure in which this practice was developed. The first section of the chapter addresses the Unilateral Proclamation of Independence (UPI) and the nature of the revolutionary state. The second section discusses the RDTL structure and its implementation in the Resistance Bases, including the democratic and participatory processes which provided people with an experience of a new kind of society.

The UPI and the Nature of the RDTL

Five main factors lay behind FRETILIN’s decision to declare the Unilateral Proclamation of Independence on November 28, 1975. First, a full-scale invasion by Indonesian military forces was imminent. Within a month of the UDT attempted coup d’état in September 1975, elements of the Indonesian elite forces had penetrated the coffee-farming community of Ermera in the midlands, and FALINTIL had to undertake a joint military operation to pursue them (José Sarmiento, Interview 13/04/2010). Fighting also intensified in the border area around Maliana, during which Indonesian forces killed five Australian-based journalists, Greg Shackleton, Brian Peters, Garry Cunningham, Tony Stewart and Malcolm Rennie on October 16 (Turner 1992, p.95; Jolliffe 2009). By November 27, the FALINTIL base in Atabae had been captured by the Indonesian military, forcing FALINTIL to retreat, sending a strong signal that a full-scale Indonesian invasion was underway (Jolliffe 1978, p. 217).

Second, Portugal was not responsive to FRETILIN’s call for talks. Essentially, the Portuguese Government refused to return to Timor-Leste to carry on the decolonization process, and was giving up the country to Indonesia with Australia’s support (Ramos Horta 1996, pp. 75, 97, 98).

Third, the decolonization process was speeding up in the Portuguese colonies in Africa, who were also strongly supporting FRETILIN. The MPLA proclaimed Angola’s independence on November 11, 1975 and a FRETILIN delegation, consisting of Mari Alkatiri and César Mau Laca, participated in the independence ceremony. Rosa Muki issued a solidarity statement: “The Proclamation of Independence of Angola is unforgettable for both the people of Angola and in the history of the struggling peoples across the world” (Bonaparte 15/11/1975).

Fourth, as Mari Alkatiri argued the UPI was a strategy to win wider international support:

We know that after independence we can get more aid and support from countries who are not our neighbours. We hope that their attitude will force neighbouring countries to take the same step. We would prefer them to be the first to recognise our independence (Cited in Jolliffe 1978, p.216).

Fifth, the UPI provided FALINTIL fighters with greater motivation – they were now fighting to defend their own country, not a Portuguese colony. Jolliffe, who was one of very few foreign observers in Timor at the time, recalled that

Soldiers at the front had been pressing for independence for some time. They wanted to fight as defenders of an independent country: if the East Timorese were to die fighting for their homeland, they should die as free and independent people (Jolliffe 1978, p.216).

RDTL1 was based on a model of a revolutionary socialist state primarily derived from the USSR and China. This can be seen by three features, the concept of a vanguard party to lead the state; the idea that the state was to represent the interests of a revolutionary class, namely, the peasantry; and the identification of the state with the struggle against colonialism and imperialism.

The Soviet Union provided the first model of a working class or proletarian state, led by a revolutionary vanguard party, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). According to Vladimir Lenin, in his 1902 pamphlet, “What Is to Be Done?” the role of the vanguard party was to educate and lead the working class, rather than relying on the working class to develop its class consciousness spontaneously. The vanguard party was a highly centralized body organized around a core of experienced professional revolutionaries. Lenin argued that only such a party could succeed in the conditions of illegality prevailing in Tsarist Russia at the time (Lenin, 1902, p.v). This model was implemented after the Russian revolution of 1917.

The RDTL proclaimed by FRETILIN can be seen as derived from the Soviet model, but also from another model, the Peoples' Republic of China. This is suggested, first, in Article 1 of the RDTL1 Constitution, which states:

The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste is a nation sovereign and united, anti-colonialist, anti-neocolonialist, and anti-imperialist, born out of the strong popular resistance generated by the struggle against Portuguese colonialism and imperialism, under the just leadership of *the sole legitimate vanguard* of the Maubere People, the Revolutionary Front for an Independent Timor-Leste - FRETILIN (RDTL 1976, p.33; my emphasis).

In Timor-Leste in 1975, the proletariat or industrial working class was not a significant segment of Timorese society. FRETILIN therefore also borrowed from the Chinese model, in which the peasantry had played the role of the revolutionary class, as discussed in Chapter 3. The evidence for this is seen in Article 6 of the RDTL I Constitution, which says:

Recognising that Timor-Leste is a peasant nation (*uma Pátria de camponeses*), agriculture is the basis of the RDTL economy. The attention of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste is to be applied especially to a policy of agrarian development, while also considering industry to be as a decisive factor of (future) development (RDTL 1976, p.34).

As Júlio de Fátima 'Rihi,' a former UNETIM member who attended the political education program in the CEFORPOL in Uato-Lari recalled, consistent with Article 6 of the RDTL Constitution, they were taught that the proletariat was not a significant class as Timor-Leste society in the 1970s, was substantially an agrarian society. The RDTL was therefore going to be a popular agrarian -based state as a transition towards socialism. This was explained as being based on the theory of Mao Tse-tung (Júlio de Fátima, Interview 08/04/ 2010)

The third revolutionary characteristic of the RDTL is seen in the use of concepts such as fascism, anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, evident in the text of the UPI and the RDTL Constitution, and also in the national anthem. As will be discussed in later chapters, political education classes in the Resistance Bases discussed the fascist state with reference to the Salazar

and the Suharto regimes. Mattoso (2005) wrote that RDTL was indeed a “people’s dictatorship” form of state. He drew particular attention to an important feature under RDTL, namely a collective decision-making body at the village level, known as the Democratic Revolutionary Council (CDR), which is discussed in the last section of this chapter.

THE STRUCURE AND EXPERIMENT OF DEMOCRACY

Although based on actually-existing ‘real socialist’ states (Sella 2002, p.96) the structure and system of democracy of the RDTL I went beyond democratic centralism towards popular and participatory democracy. The Political Manifesto of FRETILIN declared that one of the political objectives of the Maubere Revolution was to totally eradicate and transform the old colonialist structures and to implement a new one that would truly serve the people of Timor-Leste (FRETILIN 1974, p.25).

From this point on, FRETILIN experimented with an alternative model of government, one which aimed not just to liberate the country from the occupation, but also to liberate the people through the elaboration of a new form and type of state. Chapter 3, Article 33 of the Constitution describes the three important organs of the state. The first is the Popular Assembly, which is the supreme organ of the state and its legislative body. Its members consisted of

- the Central Committee of FRETILIN;
- the Ministers and Vice-Ministers of the Government of the RDTL;
- the Regional Administrators;
- representatives of the Military Units and
- two representatives from each sub-regional committee

The Constitution (Article 38) states that the President of the Republic would preside at the Popular Assembly, to be convened at least once in a year.

The second most important organ of the state is the Council of Ministers presided over by the Prime Minister (Article 40) with an executive mandate, to operate under the orientation of the Central Committee and the Executive Committee of FRETILIN. The third important organ is the Presidency of the Republic. The President serves as the Head of the State and the symbol of

National Unity. Among other mandates, the President of the Republic is to appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister and the President of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice (RDTL 1976, p.37-40).

Under Article 46 of the Constitution, the Republic's administration was to be organized into regions, sub-regions, villages and hamlets. The "historic Soibada meeting" (Gusmão 2000, p.42), of May-June 1976 which decided the hierarchy of "the political administration as aldeia, suco, zona, região, and sector" (CAVR 2006, Ch 5, p.4) was, in reality, a meeting of the RDTL Popular Assembly to legislate this administrative division in accordance with the Constitution. The CAVR report (2006, Ch 5, p.5) identifies the following six sectors:

Table 4. FRETILIN Regional Structure from May 1976

Sectors	Districts	Commissar
Ponta-Leste (Eastern End)	Lautém	Juvenal Inácio (Sera Key)
Centro-Leste (Central East)	Baucau and Viqueque	Vicente dos Reis (Sahe)
Centro Norte (Central North)	Manatuto, Aileu, and Dili	João Bosco Soares
Centro Sul (Central South)	Manufahi and Ainaro	Hamis Bassarewan (Hata)
Fronteira Norte (Northern Border)	Ermera, Liquiçã and some parts of Bobonaro	Hélio Pina (Mau Cruma)
Fronteira Sul (Southern Border)	Covalima and some parts of Bobonaro	César Correia (César Mau Laka)

The political commissar was the ultimate leader in each sector with responsibility for both political and military matters, and all political commissars were members of the FRETILIN Central Committee (CAVR 2006, Ch 5, p.5). However instead of limiting the structure from villages up to regions only, and treating the Sectors as separate, which CAVR (2006, Ch 5, p.5-6) did, it makes better sense to consider the Sectors as elements within the totality of the administrative structures of the RDTL I state. This is the underlying juridico-legal reality of the independent revolutionary state of Timor-Leste in this period, a form of 'dual-power'¹³¹ operating in opposition to the neo-colonial military fascist state of the occupying power, Indonesia.

131 This is the term used by Lenin to describe the Paris Commune of 1871, and the formation of the workers' soviets in Russia in 1917 (Lenin 1917)

Within the Sectors were four other levels of the administrative structure: Region, Zone, Suco and Village (CAVR 2006, Ch 5, pp.5-6). According to Daniel Guterres, a former member of CEFORPOL in Baguia, the above-mentioned structure which has five levels, and was still to include the Council of Ministers, was “too long”. Instead of eliminating and transforming the old structure, the new structure had included the ‘suco’ level inherited from the Portuguese colonial administration. (Daniel Guterres, Interview 08/07/2009). I will now compare the Portuguese administrative structure with the Soibada meeting formulated structure, which appeared as the only structure in the CAVR report, to substantiate my argument:

The Republic of Portugal	RDTL
Província Ultramarina	Sector
Conselho	Region
Posto	Zone
Sucos	Suco
Povoação	Village

This ‘new’ administrative structure then appears to be a ‘carbon copy’ of the Portuguese colonial administrative system. There was no change at all as the Political Manifesto had proposed. In fact, according to Guterres, people continued to hold on to their Portuguese-inherited suco and this made it difficult to mobilize them.

In August 1977, the CCF formulated a new structure, in which the suco was eliminated to make the political structure ‘shorter’ and ‘more popular’, something which CAVR appears to have missed in its findings. This also resulted in the breaking down of the Posto of the colonial government. In Ossú, for example, the RDTL administration was reduced to two zones: Posteira Oeste (Liaruka) and Posteira Leste (Boilo). The sub-district of Venilale had two zones, Liz Oeste and Liz Leste. The Commissariat (*Commissariado*) was to become the centre for both administration and politics. There was one Commissar and several secretaries in each *Commissariado*.

Building on the analysis provided by Cabral (2002, pp.243-246) and CAVR (2006, pp. 5-6), and from discussions with two former FRETILIN political cadres, Daniel Guterres and Adelino de Jesus, a former political assistant in Central South Sector, I conclude that the RDTL I structure from 1977-1978 was as follows:

RDTL I

State Structure (1977-1978)

POPULAR ASSEMBLY		FRETILIN
President	Prime Minister	CCF ¹³² (DOPI) ¹³³
Minister of Defence (FALINTIL)	Council of Ministers Sectors/Regions	ODM ¹³⁴
Sector Command (COMSEC)	Zones (Comité da Zona)	
Regional Command	Villages (CDR) ¹³⁵	

The Political Commissars worked at sector level with Assistant Commissars, each of whom was responsible for organizing specific areas such as health, agriculture, education, the women's organization and political propaganda. The secretariat of the administrators was called the *Commissariat*. The centre of each Sector was called the Political Commissariat of the Sector (CPS) and each of the Sectors was headed by one Political Commissar, one sector military commander, known as COMSEC and a few secretaries. All were members of CCF. Sectors were divided into smaller administrative units. The Political and Military Structure was created at all levels except that there was no military structure at the village level.¹³⁶ (CAVR, 2006, Ch, p. 5; Mattoso 2005, p.63; Cabral 2002, p.243; Gusmão 2000, p.42).

In 1981, Mau Hodu Ran Kdadalak recorded in the minutes of the Aitana Assembly a review of the names and positions of the civilian and military leadership which had operated in the

132 Central Committee of FRETILIN (CCF)

133 Department of Political and Ideological Orientation (DOPI)

134 Organização das Massas (ODM) consisting of OPMT; OPJT; OPS is better seen as part of FALINTIL.

135 Conselho Democrático Revolucionário (CDR).

136 The military structure will be discussed in Chapter 9 on FALINTIL.

Resistance Bases of each Sector, the majority of whom by then had been killed, captured or surrendered¹³⁷. From this record, I have constructed Table 5 below.

Table 5. RDTL Leadership by Sector, 1976-78.

No	Sector	Name	Positions
01	South Border	Cezar Lebre 'Mau Laca'	Commissar
02		Paulo Rodrigues	Secretary
03		Feliciano Fátima	CCF
04		To Barbosa	CCF
05		António Padua	CCF
06		Joaquim do Nascimento 'Gari Buhana'	CCF
07	North Border	Hélio Pina 'Mau Kruma'	Commissar
08		Filomeno Paixão	ComSec
09		António Carvalho 'Fera Lafaek'	
10		Ali Alkatiri	
11		Rui Fernandes	
12	Central North	Alarico Fernandes	Minister
13		João Bosco	Commissar
14		Mantalvão "Lais"	Secretary
15		Afonso Redentor	Secretary
16		António Pinheiro	Secretary
17	Central South	Nicolau dos Reis Lobato	President of RDTL
18		Domingos Roibeiro "Bere Manu Koko"	Chief of Staff
19		Sebastião Sarmiento	Shock Brigade
20		Guido Soares	Shock Brigade
21		Hamis Bassarewan 'Hata'	Minister of Education
22		Guilhermi dos Santos 'Lere'	Commissar
23		Valente Soares 'Mau Luli'	ComSec
24		Eduardo dos Anjos 'Kakuk'	CCF
25		Natalino Leitão 'Samoxo'	CCF
26		Manecas Cruz 'Secar'	CCF
27		José Maria 'Mausiri'	OPJT
28		Artur Nascimento	CCF
29		Maria José 'Soimali'	OPMT
30	Central East	António Carvarinho 'Mau Lear'	Prime Minister
31		Vicente Reis 'Bieky Sahe'	National Commissar

(Source: Ran Kdadalak 1981)

137 Possibly for security reasons, this list however does not include the Eastern Sector where the leaders were Juvinal Inácio 'Sera Key' (Commissar), José Manuel da Costa 'Ma'Huno' (Secretary), Juvinal Fonseca 'Solán' (Secretary), José Alexandre Gusmão 'Xanana' and Fernando do Nascimento 'Txai' (Secretary). There was also a group of leaders who, according to Mau Hodu, had "promoted Skylight and surrendered to the invader". (Operation Skylight was an Indonesian campaign designed to capture the "so-called communist-wing, to whom responsibility was attributed for the continuation of the war" (FRETILIN 1982, cited in Cabral 2002, p.266)).

On 10 February 1979, the External Delegation of FRETILIN/RDTL had created a new RDTL Cabinet, whose membership is listed in Table 6, below.

Table 6: RDTL Cabinet, February 1979

No	Name	Membership	Ministerial position
01		CCF	President of the Republic
02	António Carvarinho	CCF	Prime Minister
03			Ministry of State and Political Affairs
04	Abílio Araújo	CCF	Ministry of state for economic and Social Affairs
05	Rogério Tiago Lobato	CCF	Ministry for National Defense
06			Ministry of Information and National Security
07	Mari Alkatiri		Ministry for External Relation
08	Hamis Bassarewan	CCF	Ministry of Education and Culture
09	António Carvarinho	CCF	Ministry of Justice
10	Vicente Reis Sahe	CCF	Secretary of State for Labor, Health and Welfare
11	Juvenal Inácio	CCF	Secretary of State for Finance
12	Eduardo dos Anjos	CCF	Secretary of State for Transport and Communication
13	Hélio Pina	CCF	Secretary of State for Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery
14			Secretary of State for Public Works and Housing

Source: CIET Sydney, 10 February 1979 (CPDM-CIDAC TL6606)

José Ramos Horta is no longer listed as in the Ministry, because, at that time, he was under investigation, having been accused by some of his comrades of being a CIA agent. Nevertheless, he remained a member of the CCF and assumed a new post as Roving Ambassador, and Director of Information and Public Relations (Ramos-Horta 1996, p.157). Alarico Fernandes was not included because he had already been captured. Nicolau Lobato, the former Prime Minister and the President of the Republic had been killed on 31 December 1978, and former President Francisco Xavier do Amaral had been captured by the occupying forces. In the External Delegation, José Luís Guterres had become a member of CCF and coordinator for the Diplomatic Front of FRETILIN and Representative of RDTL to Mozambique. Roque Rodrigues became FRETILIN Representative to the People's Republic of Angola and Algeria. Guilhermina dos Santos remained a member of CCF (CIET 10/7/79 CPDM-CIDAC TL.6606). However by April 1979, all the members of the CCF inside the country who had been given Ministerial posts had either been killed in battle or executed after being captured. The only

surviving members of the CCF and Sector Secretariat structure who were still active in the guerrilla zones were Xanana Gusmão, Ma'Huno, and Fernando Txai.¹³⁸ All of them had been Secretaries in Matebian, the last Resistance Base.

The Supreme Organ of State: The Popular Assembly

The FRETILIN leadership conducted four popular assembly meetings during the period of the Resistance Bases in accordance with the RDTL Constitution. The first occurred in Barique in April 1976, the second in Soibada May-June 1976, and another in Laline in 1977, all are described by Gusmão (2000, pp.41, 42, 47). There was also a meeting, according Adelino de Jesus, held in October 1976, in Aidila Oan, in Fatuberliu, Central South Sector (Adelino de Jesus, Interview 26/03/2011).

The most fundamental thesis developed at the Soibada Popular Assembly in May-June 1976 was the re-affirmation of the Maubere Revolution as a people's war, a protracted war, a war of self-reliance (Mattoso 2007, p.63). Years later Gusmão called this decision "the true pillar of the liberation of the homeland" (Mattoso 2007, p.63; Gusmão 2000, p. 42). Soon after the Soibada meeting the Prime Minister, Nicolau Lobato delivered a speech transmitted via Radio Maubere on July 28, 1976.

Unity is the foundation of our revolution. We have to learn to indulge in criticism and self-criticism, in order to solve the problem that arises out of our contradictions. Open debate is another way to reconcile our differences. The Central Committee of FRETILIN is not authoritarian, and is open to any constructive criticism. The fighting goes on without vacillation. Victory is certain (Lobato 1976)

The last Popular Assembly held during this period was at Laline, May-June 1977, and it was at this meeting that the Party adopted Marxist-Leninism as its political ideology. The delegates of the meeting comprised the members of the CCF, the Ministers, and the commanders of the FALINTIL.

138 Txai was killed in 1983 in a battle in Atelare, Laga in Baucau.

The Political Commissariat

After each Popular Assembly, the Political Commissariat in each Sector made decisions . As well as having a Commissariat, there were Secretaries, Ministers, a Sector Commander and a Vice Commander, Political Assistants and representatives from each Zone - a Zone Secretary and Vice-Secretary, and two military officers. In Zona 1975 Bautae, these military officers were known *Quilo Bravo* (literally Brave Unit), whose task was as a liaison officer between civilian and military leaders and as political educators within the companies of the FALINTIL (Madalena da Silva Fernandes, Interview 05/02/2010).

The Zone Committee

According to Daniel Guterres, (Interview 08/07/2009), the Zone Committee consisted of two Bureaus: The Political Bureau and Zone Command, usually of one FALINTIL company. The Political Bureau consisted of the Information Section, Education Section, Popular Health and Hygiene Section, Economic Section (SECAE) and the Unit of *Esclarecimento*. Madalena da Silva Fernandes (Interview 05/02/2010) provides the structure of Zone called ‘1975 Bautae’ of Uato-Lari, for example as follows:

Zone Secretary: António Espírito Santo ‘Uato-Mau’

Vice Secretary I: Jeremias Guterres (Amzet)

Vice Secretary II: Bernardo Quintão ‘Romit’

Justice Section: Anselmo no Adelino Matahoi

Education Section: Braz Rangel/ Delfim Quintão

Health Section: Unidentified.

Economic Affairs Section: Luís Amaral ‘Siul’/Tomás da Silva

Security and Communication Section: José Barros

Secretariat Section: Gastão Sousa ‘Badulau’/Madalena F. da Silva/Miguel Amaral

Mass Organizations (ODMs): OPMT and OPJT

Unlike the Village Committee which is elected, the *Commissariado* appointed people to the Zone posts based on their political performance and loyalty to the Party, to the state and to the ideas of independence. Membership of the Zone Committee went beyond the Political Bureau

to include political activists, called *Delegadus Komisariadus* (DKs), and the heads of villages within each Zone. With the exception of military matters decision-making in the Resistance Bases was democratic, because most decisions at the Zone Committee meetings were decided collectively (Madalena da Silva Fernandes, Interview 5/2/2010).

The Democratic Revolutionary Council (CDR): The Village Committee

The village was the base of the RDTL I administration. The CDR members consisted of the Responsible Principal (RP - *Xefe Aldeia*¹³⁹) the head of the Village Committee; the Secretary of the Village; the Economic Section, SECAE; the Security Section; the Justice Section; and two representatives of OPMT and OPJT. These members were directly elected from popular meetings conducted specifically for this purpose. The elections were organised by members of the Zone Committee and the Commissariat Delegate (DK). People were asked to nominate candidates and they were elected by acclamation, and the person with the majority would become the village leader, RP, and the Vice-RP would be the head of the Economic Section SECAE. Leoneto do Rego, a Catholic priest who had been in the Resistance Bases until the end of 1978, said in an interview¹⁴⁰ in Portugal that:

People held meetings with and sometimes without political assistance to programme the way of life and solve all the problems of the camps, from latrines to housing the pigs and other animals...That is how things worked. They were conscious of what they were fighting for - independence (Padre Leoneto do Rego, Interview, 1979).

The RP convened *esclarecimento* to discuss the proposals of the Village Committee and the Zone Committee with the people and these normally encouraged counter-proposals, which then generated debates. There were also directives made by the Political Commissariat which usually related to the security situation; for example, moving the Resistance Base to another place. These decisions were expected to be implemented accordingly (Madalena da Silva Fernandes, Interview 05/02/2010).

139 *Xefe* is a Tetum version of the Portuguese *Chefe*, ie Chief.

140 The interview was originally published in a Portuguese magazine, then translated into English and re-printed in the newsletter of the Campaign for an Independent East Timor in Sydney.

At the village level, the RP also discussed the decisions all over again and a final decision would be taken in public meetings, where people spoke out freely. The aim was to *conscientize* people about decisions. Even decisions made by the Zone Committee would be put on the agenda and subject to popular discussion and this made people aware of and able to implement the final decisions. When they made mistakes, they were expected to make self-criticism, When they were criticized and proved to have committed a mistake, they apologized to the Assembly immediately.

The RPs were very active in day-to-day work. Since they were elected, they had the legitimacy to mobilize people to go to school, work on the collective farms and to be involved in other activities in the village. There was no idleness - everyone was doing something. The extended family was also a principal agent for mobilization (Madalena da Silva Fernandes, Interview 5/2/2010; Daniel Guterres, Interview 08/07/2009; Domingos Sibikinu 20/03/2011).

CONCLUSION

The Casa dos Timores had envisioned the destruction of the old colonial structure through a people's revolution. In the Bases de Apoio, FRETILIN formed a new state structure which experimented with a form of popular participatory democracy. Most decisions were made collectively at all levels, with the exception of security issues generally made by the leadership. The RDTL Constitution used the term Popular Assembly (*Assembleia Popular*) to describe the legislative organ of the RDTL. Its meetings were crucial for developing strategies for continuing the Maubere Revolution in the Resistance Bases and beyond.

This three year experience of a popular socialist state taught FRETILIN members and supporters, through direct practice and reflection on that practice, the real meaning of the Maubere revolution. The revolution became its own pedagogy, supported by FRETILIN, the Party which had undertaken to lead that revolution. These lessons from practice, described in more detail in the next three chapters, were crucial to sustaining the Resistance for another 20 years. Moreover, as the final section of the thesis will consider, these lessons are still relevant for FRETILIN and its allies in the new social movements, as they seek to achieve the liberation of the Maubere people in the contemporary era.

CHAPTER 9

FALINTIL, POLITICAL-MILITARY EDUCATION AND THE MAUBERE PEOPLE

INTRODUCTION

FALINTIL is the acronym for *Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste* (the Timor-Leste National Liberation Army), defined by the RDTL I Constitution, Article 3, as one of the “principal state organs” with a mandate “to defend the sovereignty of the nation and its territorial integrity” (RDTL 1976, p.33). Xanana Gusmão estimated the total size of FALINTIL at the time of the invasion as 20,000, consisting of about 2,500 Timorese regular forces inherited from the Portuguese army, about 7,000 second- line reservists, and 10,000 Timorese with some previous military training (Gusmão 2000, p.38; see also Tanter 1976). Indonesia was one of the biggest countries in the world with a strong military, well-supported by a super-power in its mission to invade a tiny country. And yet, FALINTIL was able to maintain an Armed Resistance for more than two decades, before victory was finally obtained through the ballot box on August 30, 1999. The purpose of this chapter is to examine how a small, relatively unprepared and greatly outnumbered army learned both technically and theoretically how to fight, and eventually win, what FALINTIL and FRETILIN described as “an arduous and protracted war” (Francisco Guterres Lu Olo¹⁴¹, Pers.com. 30/12/2009).

The first section of this chapter discusses the origin of FALINTIL as a national liberation army and its early battles against the combined Indonesian-UDT forces in the border area prior to the full scale Indonesian invasion on December 7, 1975. The second part discusses the articulation of war theories and resistance strategies, including internal army reforms in the Resistance Bases. The last part discusses the FALINTIL forces’ involvement in socio-political programs, and the Indonesian military operations which eventually led to the destruction of the Resistance Bases towards the end of 1978.

141 The current president of FRETILIN, Lu’olo is one of very few FALINTIL commanders to survive as a guerrilla fighter in the mountains for the whole period. He helped re-establish FRETILIN as a legal political party after the Indonesian withdrawal in 1999, and was elected Party President in 2001. Elected to the Constituent Assembly in 2001, he was the President of the National Parliament from May 2002 until 2006. He is currently a FRETILIN Member of Parliament.

EARLY FORMATION OF FALINTIL

The Popular Security Organisation (*Organização Popular da Segurança - OPS*)

Before the formation of FALINTIL on August 15, 1975, FRETILIN had a security system known as **the Popular Security Organisation (OPS)**. Nicol (2002, p.172) wrote of a clandestine security organization in existence in early 1975, described as the People's Security Organization, otherwise known as FRETILIN's army. Domingos Sibikinu, a FRETILIN activist in 1975, told me that OPS was part of the Security Section of the Party, but was neither clandestine nor armed. He said that OPS taught people to observe "revolutionary vigilance" - encouraging ordinary FRETILIN members to concern themselves with security and to be aware of the dangers of reactionary and counter-revolutionary forces. It was intended to be a mass organisation, like OPJT, OPTT and OPMT (Domingos Sibikinu, Interview 20/03/2011). Domingos Caetano 'Beremau' provided a different but similar story, saying that the student union, UNETIM, had its own Security Section led by Germano da Silva, a UNETIM member. The main responsibility of the UNETIM Security Section was to observe and gather information about the security situation, particularly around UNETIM (Domingos Caetano, Interview 03/03/2011).

The existence of a security organisation within UNETIM suggests that UNETIM leaders and their mentors, such as Vicente Reis 'Sahe', were conscious of the inevitability of an armed struggle for independence. This view is strengthened by the story told to Mateus Gonçalves by 'Sahe's' elder brother, Marito Reis, recounted in Chapter 6, when Sahe told a Party meeting in Atsabe that "The army of the people should not be used to kill the people," then went into hiding in Bucoli, where he began to form the OPS, and trained people on how to make bombs. He intended to send people to be trained in Mozambique, but the plan was interrupted by the Indonesian invasion (Marito Reis, interview with Gonçalves 26/7/04).

It would seem, then, that 'Sahe' was conscious of the fact that, while FRETILIN had the desire for independence, and the people to support it, no armed force existed to resist military intervention, and the threat from Indonesia would have been obvious. Educated Timorese like 'Sahe' had learned in school that the ex-Portuguese colony, Goa, was invaded by India, and integrated into mainland India in 1953. The Casa dos Timores students would also have known

that their only real military asset, to start with, was the few thousand Timorese in the Portuguese army. In other words, the speech which Sahe made at that Party meeting at Atsabe in Ermera was based on foresight.

The MAC Coup d'état and the Formation of FALINTIL

Indonesia was behind the formation of a pro-Indonesian Timorese political party, the Popular Democratic Association of Timor (APODETI), as part of a strategy to incorporate Timor-Leste into Indonesia (Jolliffe 1978; CAVR 2006). In August 1975, the Decolonization Committee of *Movimento das Forças Armadas* (MFA) of Portugal, under the leadership of Colonel Lemos Pires, organised a popular election for the village chiefs in Timor-Leste, as the first stage of administrative reform. FRETILIN won in the pilot villages in Lospalos, while APODETI's support was small. These elections also threatened the conservatism of the União Democrática de Timor (UDT), whose support had come from pro-Portuguese *liurais* and village chiefs. At this point, UDT became a second option for the Indonesians. With the support of General Ali Murtopo, UDT created the *Movimento Anti-Comunista* (MAC) and launched an armed coup d'état. This was ostensibly done in protest against the presence of two MFA Portuguese army officers, Majors Mota and Jónatas, who were alleged to be communists, with the aim of expelling them along with certain FRETILIN leaders, in particular, António Carvarinho, Vicente Reis, Roque Rodrigues and Carapina Bilelock, described as 'communists', 'Maoists' and 'extremists'. A few days later, the two Portuguese officers were evacuated by the Portuguese authorities (Horta 1981, p.4; Jolliffe 1978, p.115).

UDT had initiated a civil war, and the Portuguese Decolonization Committee completely failed to ensure a peaceful resolution of the conflict. In response, on 15 August 1975, FRETILIN called for a 'General Armed Uprising', (*Insurreição Geral Armada*) against the UDT coup. Timorese soldiers in the Portuguese Army in Aisirimu in Aileu joined FRETILIN, and took over the military training centre, which became the Centre of Instruction of the Independent Territorial Command of Timor (*Centro de Instrução do Comando Territorial Independente de Timor*) which functioned during the counter coup d'état on August 20, 1975, when, with all

other means exhausted, the new force, FALINTIL, launched its counter-attack against UDT (Cabral 2002, p.249; Magalhaes 2007, p.265).

FALINTIL quickly over-ran the UDT forces, as most of the Timorese in the Portuguese colonial army joined FRETILIN. Ponciano, a Laumana-Quilicai-born Timorese in the Portuguese Army, obtained a key to the arsenal in the Portuguese Army headquarters in Taibesi and weapons were distributed to FRETILIN supporters, and a volunteer brigade was formed (Maria Angelina S. Lopes,¹⁴² pers. com. 15/04/2010). In Remexio, according to Raul da Silva,¹⁴³ under the instruction of OPJT leaders Francisco Calsona (Bere Mata Ruak) and José Maria Paixao (Mausiri), the former Portuguese forces occupied the Administrator's Office, obtained weapons to fight the UDT and formed two companies of two hundred soldiers under the command of Ananias da Silva and Raul da Costa Araújo Silva (Raul da Costa Silva, Interview 09/09/2009).

About 3000 died in the coup and counter coup d'état which forced 1,115 refugees to flee to Darwin. Of these, four hundred were Timorese and the remainder were Portuguese and Chinese. Nine hundred of these refugees departed for Portugal (Ramos-Horta 1996, p.91; Timor-Leste 15/04/1977, p.3; Jolliffe 1978, p.140). The UDT forces then retreated into Indonesian West Timor, seeking Indonesian support, while FRETILIN claimed victory over the "reactionary forces" of UDT.

Early Battles on the Border

Even though FALINTIL was in control, having defeated the UDT forces during two weeks of chaotic fighting mainly in Dili, this was not sustained for long. FALINTIL was soon engaged against a company of Indonesian elite forces that had penetrated to Ermera, in the midlands, by early September 1975. After the Indonesian forces killed some FRETILIN members, including one ex-Portuguese military officer in Aifu, Ermera, FALINTIL undertook a successful joint operation to destroy their base (José Sarmiento Interview 13/0/2010).

142 Maria Angelina Sarmiento Lopes 'Lita' is a niece of Ponciano. She is now is a member of the National Electoral Commission of RDTL.

143 Raul da Costa Araujo da Silva was a Vice-Company Commander of FALINTIL in Remexio Zone A.

José Monteiro of Remexio, a reservist in the Portuguese Army, was recruited to a militia and sent to fight in the border area. Later, he became an instructor for militias in Aileu in 1975. Between 1976-1978, before the collapse of Resistance Bases, he was in charge of the re-education centre, RENAL (Reabilitação Nacional) in Remexio (José Monteiro, Interview 19/09/2009). Monteiro recalled that FALINTIL began to re-activate the second-line (reserve) ex-Portuguese forces and recruited civilians to form a new second-line force, known as the Popular Militias for National Liberation (*Milícia Popular da Libertação Nacional* - MIPLIN)¹⁴⁴ (José Monteiro, Interview 19/09/2009). The number who joined MIPLIN is not known, but they were given brief training and sent to the border to fight against the combined UDT-Indonesian forces, from September until November 1975. Felizberto da Carvalho from Becusse, a suburb in Dili, was recruited to have a short training in the Taibesi military headquarters and was then sent to fight the Indonesian forces in the border under a commander by the name Junior Sergeant Pinto. There, they met up with Commander Aquilis and Cabo Martinho and their troops. Cabo Martinho had been a member in the Portuguese Navy. After two weeks fighting, they could not withstand the heavy Indonesian offensive any longer. Felisberto and his friends were replaced by new MIPLIN forces and he returned to Dili. Later, he joined the Rearguard '*Retaguarda*' FALINTIL company¹⁴⁵ in Uato-Lari (Felisberto de Carvalho, Interview 21/07/2009). Virgílio Ular Duarte, a former Portuguese regular soldier, joined FALINTIL and was located in Atus in Bobanaro to fight the Indonesian forces before returning to Viqueque. He was appointed as a Zone Commander during the historic Soibada meeting in 1976 (Duarte interview, AMTR 1975). On October 16, 1975, Balibó, the border town in the district of Maliana, fell to the combined Indonesian and MAC forces. This was a strong indication of the impending Indonesian invasion (de Almedia 1997, p.9)

The experience of combating the UDT forces, then fighting the combined forces (the occupying Indonesian forces and followers of the anti-FRETILIN Parties UDT, APODETE, KOTA and Trabalhista) in the border areas provided valuable experience for FRETILIN/FALINTIL, and

144 According to Domingos Sibikini, FRETILIN-FALINTIL also organized a MIPLIN in 1983, made up of those Timorese in the occupied territories, who became members of the clandestine movement but belonged at the same time to the militias attached to the Indonesian army, including RATH (Sibikini 20/03/2011)

145 The *Retaguarda* Company is explained below.

these initial lessons guided them during the following years of the armed struggle. The fighting spirit was exceptionally high among the FALINTIL combatants and they learned quickly that they were fighting an enemy who was far superior in numbers, well equipped and backed by foreign powers. In other words, this was an anti-imperialist war; they were not simply resisting the UDT and APODETI forces and the Indonesians. They learned that, behind the armed forces, the people were militant and ready to fight for their freedom. Through cooperatives people were mobilizing logistical support for FRETILIN. Fighting in the border area prepared them for a long and sustained war. In fact, some members of the Central Committee of FRETILIN such as 'Sahe', Hélio Pina 'Maucruma', Juvinal Inácio 'Serakey', Jose da Costa 'Ma'Huno', Antunes 'Fera Lafaek' and Xanana Gusmão had participated in these early battles on the border (Gusmão 2000, p.37). Ma'Huno and Xanana Gusmão, the only two surviving original members, were able to re-organise the Resistance in 1980s after the collapse of the Resistance Bases.¹⁴⁶

The Formation of *Retaguarda* Company of Karau-fruik Hedemumo

While engaging the combined forces in the border, FRETILIN-FALINTIL was developing an alternative back-up force, the *Retaguarda* (the rear-guard). The rear-guard force was a concept developed by Che Guevarra during the Cuban Revolution in the late 1950s. Out of his experience in fighting against the Batista Regime in Cuba, Che Guevara produced a small manual, *Guerrilla Warfare (A Guerra de Guerrilla)*¹⁴⁷, published in Havana in 1960 and later popularised in French, Spanish and English (Tomás 2007, p.159). The Manual discussed the importance of "rear-guard zones" which could not be captured by the enemy, could replenish and provide political and military training for the fighters and, equally importantly, could develop social reforms in conjunction with the population (Tomas 2007, p.195). Some FRETILIN leaders, particularly Rogério Tiago Lobato, the commander of FALINTIL in 1975, had studied the military strategies of other revolutions, including Cuba. Rogério explained to me the concept of the *Retaguarda* company, when I talked to him in Bali on December 19, 2009.

146 See Chapter 12.

147 See also Che Guevara, (1963), *Guerrilla Warfare: A Method*.

Rogério Lobato travelled to the eastern part of Timor-Leste with about 40 cars full of soldiers and war materials and stayed for few days in Uato-Lari and Uato-Carbau. His father, Narciso Lobato, a catechist, had lived in Malurcumo in Uato-Lari, so as Rogério knew the terrain and the people, he chose Uato-Lari to develop the *Retaguarda* company of Hedemumo (Rogério Lobato Pers. Com., 19/12/2009; Abrantes and Sequera 2008, p.33)

Gregorio Lobo Pinto of Uato-Carbau, a student at the *Escola Técnica* and a member of UNETIM, volunteered to fight the UDT forces during the August 1975 counter coup d'état, before becoming the Platoon Commander of Uato-Carbau. After a series of discussions between Adelino de Carvalho and José Piedade (Zeca Piedade) from the regional FALINTIL Command, they began to set about the formation of *Commando Karau-fruik* (wild buffalo) in Hedemumo, Makadique. Every sub-district in Viqueque was to form one platoon of thirty people with a commander. João Menezes¹⁴⁸, whose *nom de guerre* was 'Daraloi', was the Company Commander (Gregório Lobo Pinto, Interview 04/03/2011).

Júlio Fátima 'Rihi,' originally from Babulo of Uato-Lari, a third year student at the *Externato São José* secondary school, was also a member of UNETIM. He recalled arriving in Uato Carbau with Rogério Tiago Lobato, along with 200 weapons from Dili. 'Rihi' was recruited, on September 20, 1975, to the *Commando Karau-fuik* of Hedemumo. The new recruits were quickly trained in technical skills e.g. to strip and reassemble weapons, in tactical skills and in more complex military strategies (Júlio Fátima, Interview 08/04/2009; Gregório Lobo Pinto, Interview 04/03/2011). Fátima recalled:

We learned the simplest things such as to strip, to clean and assemble weapons, [up] to complex military strategies ... [We learned that] the enemy used offensive strategy, and we used defensive strategy, because we were limited in war materials. We then knew that if the bases were destroyed, we had to continue [with] guerrilla war (Júlio Fátima, Interview 08/0/2009).

148 João de Menezes was a descendent of 'King' Dauloi Daraloi of Makadique, and was well respected by his people.

In August 1976, when the Indonesian forces entered Uato-Lari, the *Retaguarda* Company was tested in the Base Area. After about two weeks of intensive fighting, the *Retaguarda Karau-fuik* managed to push the occupying forces to retreat to Viqueque, along the south coast. The enemy was unable to re-enter the same area until the following year. My village, Burabohae, was about 20 miles away from Uato-Lari and I am familiar with the story. The defeat and retreat of the Indonesian forces was victorious news.

A month after the Soibada meeting in June 1976, Xanana Gusmão was nominated Vice-Secretary of Viqueque Region to support Inácio Dias Fonseca ‘Solan’ (Gusmão 2000, p.43). As reported in Chapter 5, around this time he started the political education centre, CEFORPOL Ravina, in Makadiqui, Uato-Lari in which military officers participated, including Júlio de Fátima ‘Rihi’ from *Karau-fuik* Company, consistent with Che Guevara’s idea that rear-guard zones should provide political education and military training for new forces (Afonso Pinto, Interview 23/10/2009; Júlio Fátima, Interview 08/04/2010).

DEFINING WAR STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE

“Making revolution is not just firing bullets” is the title of an article in FRETILIN’s newspaper *Timor-Leste*, on 11 October 1975. It notes that in a revolutionary war, there should be a link between theory and practice. Without practice, revolutionary theory is like a fertilizer kept inside a bottle, becoming useless. Military victory without political victory weakens the revolution. The reactionary UDT gained military control quickly, but it did not win political power and proved a failure. Political revolution implies the destruction of all oppressive social and political structures and the formation of new structures to bring about real liberation, the elimination of the oppression of men by men (sic) (*exploração do homem pelo homem*) (*Timor-Leste* 11/10/1975). This article articulates the key concepts of the armed struggle. The struggle against the Indonesian neo-colonial occupation was considered a revolutionary war which the article explains, is not an end in itself, but is a means to obtain political power, in order to transform Timorese society and truly liberate its people. Revolutionary war therefore requires that the armed forces believe, encourage and practise revolutionary values.

Timorese Resistance leaders also often used the expression *a guerra de movimento* - 'the war of movement' (Domingos Sibikinu Interview 20/03/2011), derived from the strategies of Amílcar Cabral of the PAIGC in 1960s in Guinea-Bissau when the PAIGC built an alternative state which Tomás (2007, p.193) describes as a "state within a colony". FRETILIN/FALINTIL adopted the PAIGC model of revolutionary war, for while FALINTIL fought the Indonesian forces, behind the lines, FRETILIN was building an alternative state in the areas under its control, the Bases de Apoio. This ensured that the people and the armed forces were struggling side by side, as evidenced by a slogan popular with FALINTIL derived from Mao Tse-tung: "The people are the water, and FALINTIL are the fish" (Adelino de Jesus, Interview 26/03/2011).

Early Resistance to the Full-Scale Indonesian Invasion

On December 7, 1975, 10,000 Indonesian troops invaded East Timor. *Operasi Komodo* was supported by a large naval taskforce of Russian-built destroyers, American-supplied landing craft, amphibious tanks, fighter planes and helicopters (Horta 1996, p.1). They confronted 2000 to 2500 regular Timorese troops of the Portuguese Army equipped with inferior weaponry.

In the early days of the invasion, FALINTIL volunteers were trained very quickly, if at all. When Indonesian forces reached Baucau on December 12, 1975, Libório de Jesus Freitas from Gariuai, Baucau, was among the new recruits. He learned how to shoot on the battlefield. He recalled:

At night after the battle, we would have evaluations and learn new lessons about the use of weapons and other techniques or tactics of war. The first military strategy was how to make an attack, and when to withdraw from an engagement (Libório de Jesus Freitas, Interview 15/05/2008).

From that time on, Freitas had learned from one military detachment to another, from conventional war strategies to guerrilla war strategies. Whenever the FALINTIL forces were in the villages, they also learned politics from the OPMT and OPJT members who had gone to CEFORPOL in Baguia, Baucau. Freitas recalled that "we learned how to be disciplined" (Libório Freitas, Interview 15/05/2008). Asked if he remembered any political ideas, he said:

We cannot call a young person 'child', but *kamarada* . . . This means we treat everyone equally (Libório de Jesus Freitas¹⁴⁹ 15/05/2008).

Equality was one of the basic principles of the liberation struggle. A new Timor had started, where women and men, young and old, were all to have the same rights and privileges. Slavery and exploitation were the ills of feudalism and colonialism.

With the exception of China, there was no sign of military support from outside Timor for FRETILIN-FALINTIL. In his article, *Timor-Leste: The Dragon's Newest Friend*, Loro Horta¹⁵⁰ revealed that FRETILIN leaders, including his father José Ramos Horta, Mari Alkatiri, Rogério Tiago Lobato and Roque Rodrigues had visited China between 1976 and 1978, and, at their request, "Beijing assembled equipment sufficient to arm a light infantry of 8,000 men, including medium anti-aircraft machine guns, light artillery, mortars and infantry anti-tank weapons." But the Indonesian blockade, assisted by the Australian navy, prevented it being delivered to Timor. It was sent to Mozambique for storage, eventually being used by FRELIMO in its war against the western-backed RENAMO forces (Loro Horta 2009, p.3). By April 1976, it was clear that FRETILIN-FALINTIL was not to get any outside military support. Around this time, Australian intelligence placed the number of Indonesian troops in East Timor at 32,000, with a further 10,000 in reserve in West Timor (McMillan 1992, p.74).

Developing Theories and Strategies of War

FALINTIL was regulated by law. Article 3 of the Constitution of the RDTL1, defined its 'competencies' thus:

The role of the armed forces of national liberation of East Timor - FALANTIL- as one of the major forces of the state power, is to take primary responsibility for defending the nation's sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the country; and as a genuinely popular force, to contribute to national reconstruction, in close collaboration with the working masses (RDTL, 1975)

149 Libório de Jesus Freitas born in Gariuai-Baucau 1953. He never went to school. The Indonesian parachutists landed in Baucau in 9 December 1975 and in 12 December 1975, Freitas was among the new recruits of FALINTIL to fight Indonesian forces in Kaibuilo, a place in between Venilale and Baucau.

150 Loro Horta is the son of José Ramos Horta and Ana Pessoa. He is a graduate of the People's Liberation Army Defence University (PLANDU) in Singapore.

To be a “genuinely popular force”, FALINTIL sought to work with and amongst the “working masses” (*vastas massas trabalhadoras*) in the reconstruction of the country, a task that was extremely difficult because of the superiority of the Indonesian forces that it was combating. In order to make FALINTIL into a genuinely popular army, a number of FALINTIL members who were active on the border and elsewhere chose to go to their regions of origin. The main reason was, probably, that they knew the areas better and realized they would have better support from the masses and the extensive members of their extended family (Cabral 2002, p.251).

Domingos Caetano, a former leading UNETIM member, recalled Nicolau Lobato prior to the Indonesian invasion, saying that “the Indonesian invasion, would be like waves in the seas, and they would have to stop at the beach, not beyond.” He understood this to mean that the power of the Indonesian military had its limitations, and FALINTIL was to exploit those limitations (Domingos Caetano, Interview 22/10/2009). A month after the invasion, the morale of the FALINTIL forces remained high, and FALINTIL was still in control of most of the country. The leaders by then had learned the limits of the Indonesian forces.

As mentioned in previous chapters, a one-month Popular Assembly in Soibada in May- June 1976 re-affirmed the Maubere Revolution, and defined the nature of the war, as “A People’s war, protracted and self-reliant” (Mattoso, 2007, p.63; my translation). With no support from overseas, the Republic had decided to rely on the people and its own means to resist the Indonesian occupying forces and as much possible to engulf the enemy in a protracted war as long as possible, so victory could be won in the political arena. There are two possible war theories influencing the military aspect of the *Maubere Revolution*. One, as Xanana Gusmão has mentioned more than once in his autobiography, the FRETILIN/RDTL1 leadership was familiar with the Mao Tse-Tung’s writings on war. During the DOPI (Department of Political and Ideological Orientation) meetings, according to Xanana, they discussed in groups ‘strategic questions’ and Mao’s theory of the peoples’ war. Xanana recalled, for example, that “the theory excited us in the planning of ideas and in strategic thinking, but it was a theory that required a heavy loss of life, and that Mao himself had said: “All war is specific to a time and place. All war is evolutionary, in the unfolding of war itself” (Gusmão 2000, p.49). Another

important feature of Mao's theory that FRETILIN/RDTL1 adopted was the idea of subsistence resistance, the theory of self-reliance as a military strategy to fight Indonesian forces. In the Bases de Apoio, I heard that the people were afraid because FRETILIN-FALINTIL had few weapons, and no planes, tanks and warships. The leaders including 'Sahe' would respond: "Comrades, those planes, tanks, warship and weapons that the Indonesian brought here, they are ours." The logic however is that FALINTIL had to kill the occupying forces and take their weapons in order to use them again – this was subsistence resistance and, eventually, it proved to be successful. Filomena de Almeida¹⁵¹, writing in her short history *FALINTIL: Origem e Revolução*, pointed this out

In contrast to the wars for independence in other zones of conflict, namely in some of the Portuguese ex-colonies (Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau), the survival of the guerrillas in Timor-Leste presents the singular case of never having received even one bullet from organizations or countries supporting the cause of the Maubere People (De Almeida 1997, p.11).

Another source of FRETILIN's war theory was Amílcar Cabral's military strategy against the Portuguese Army in the 1960s, as discussed in Chapter 4. Tomás (2008, p.xx) called it "winning the politics without losing the war". The fact that FALINTIL realised that it could not realistically hope to win against the superior Indonesian military equipment and personnel meant that FRETILIN planned to obtain its objectives through other means. FRETILIN's strategy was to keep the war going as long as possible, while they built a political movement to win the war by non-antagonistic non-violent means. They knew the risks of such a war. As Gusmão wrote:

We were aware that a hard and prolonged war was waiting for us, particularly from the concepts we had learnt (Gusmão 2000, p.490).

In other moments, Sahe had told the UNETIM students prior to the Indonesian occupation, that "the war starts from the city and will end in the city" (Domingos Caetano, Interview 22/10/2009). Indonesia invaded the capital city of Timor and forced RDTL I into a guerrilla

151 Filomena de Almeida was a member of the Casa dos Timores – see Chapter 3

war, but the solution finally would be a diplomatic one. But the Soibada meeting was not the only meeting to discuss the war strategy. On October 1976, the President presided over a debate, which included the war strategy. Adelino de Jesus (Interview 26/03/2011) recalled that it was in this meeting that two different proposals emerged. Francisco Xavier do Amaral proposed that taking into account the meagre supplies of food and limited military capacity to defend and manage the population in the Bases de Apoio, children, women and elderly people should be allowed to surrender, and only the strong should remain, including children aged fourteen and above, who could understand guerrilla warfare. Nicolau dos Reis Lobato, the Commander of FALINTIL, on the other hand defended the political project to re-organise the population into Resistance Bases and to involve them in the resistance.

The meeting lasted for two weeks and the outcome was that Francisco Xavier do Amaral was from then on regarded as a traitor (Adelino de Jesus Interview 26/03/2011). De Jesus, reflecting on the President's position, said that the idea of a guerrilla war was not yet relevant, because if many people were allowed to surrender, it would send a wrong message to the world and could have demoralised the whole Resistance. But this idea was re-considered when the Resistance Bases collapsed at the end of 1978 (Adelino de Jesus, Interview 26/03/2011; Eládio Faculto, Pers.com., 26/03/2011).

FALINTIL Structure in the Resistance Bases

An important political idea in the Resistance Bases was that the political takes precedence over the military (CAVR 2006, p.8; Adelino de Jesus, Interview 26/03/2011). This is to say that war is not the end in itself but a means to achieve a political objective, and that the military are subject to the legal control of the state. This was in line with the RDTL 1 Constitution, Article 40 which makes the President of the Republic the Commander in Chief of FALINTIL, and Article 42 which gives the President the power to dismiss any member of the military (RDTL 1976, p. 38). Under the President was the Minister of Defence who directs the FALINTIL Chief of Staff. The Minister of Defence in December 1975 was Rogério Tiago Lobato, but he was sent overseas to undertake a diplomatic mission and his two Vice-Ministers, Hermenigildo

Alves and Guido Soares, took over the role. The Chief of Staff was Guido Soares, with a deputy commander José da Silva¹⁵² (CAVR 2006, p.7).

In mid-1977, FALINTIL adopted a new military strategy and transformed its structure. Instead of basing companies in regions and zones, which sometimes meant there were three companies with up to three or four platoons in each to fight within one region, FALINTIL created Sector Commands, with a commander known as COMSEC. This new structure allowed the regional forces to support each other and to fight across the country, rather than in one region. The Intervention Force, which was a special force to deploy in large-scale combat and a ‘Shock Brigade’ were also formed. Guido Soares^{152a}, the former Vice-Minister, also took on the role of Commander of the Shock Brigade (Brigada Choque-Brichoq). The Minister of Defence was eliminated and the Vice-Ministers were transferred. Hermenegildo Alves became the Sector Commander (COMSEC) of the Central East Sector and Guido Soares became the COMSEC of the Central South Sector (CAVR 2006, p. 8). Nicolao Lobato, as well as being Prime Minister and later replacing Francisco Xavier do Amaral as the President of the Republic, was also the Commissar of the General Staff, responsible for overseeing logistics and providing political orientation for FALINTIL forces (CAVR 2006, p.8)

Rogério Tiago Lobato, the first FALINTIL commander, explained in the *Timor-Leste*, that the FALINTIL was divided into four groups: the regular forces; regional forces; guerrilla forces and self-defence forces. The regular forces were Timorese who had been in the Portuguese Army. They had the mission to fight all over the country in large-scale battles. The regional forces were stationed in regions and they were supposed to coordinate with the regular forces during attacks. The guerrilla forces were mainly composed of militias (MIPLIN) operating within regions, maintaining close contact with regular and regional forces. The self-defence forces were the remaining people who can fight with traditional weapons to eliminate the enemy (Timor-Leste 03/1979).

152 José da Silva, a former Portuguese Sergeant in Aileu and was executed in the Border North Sector due to internal conflict.

152a Guido Soares was a lieutenant in the Portuguese army who had trained in Portugal with Roque Rodrigues.

In the six sectors across the Resistance Bases, the Sector Command (COMSEC) was subordinated to a Political Commissariat, which was the centre for political administration, headed by a Commissar and some secretaries. They were all members of the Central Committee of FRETILIN (CAVR 2006, p.5). Each COMSEC trained its Sector Forces, Intervention forces (which became the Shock Brigade) and the Guerrilla Army. When FALINTIL organized the Sector Commands, it developed the OPS (*Organização Popular de Segurança*) and *Estafetas* (Couriers - see below) together known as the White Army (*Forças de Armas Brancas* - FAB) (Cabral 2002, p.251). They were unarmed civilians who were militarily trained and worked closely with the Sector Commands. FALINTIL also established a unit called *Observers*. These worked as an intelligence network, locating and penetrating enemy lines and linking with the clandestine networks in the occupied towns. They also served as links among FALINTIL members. The observers were supposed to report directly to the Commanders of the companies (Cabral 2002, p. 252). These units were in operation only until the end of the Resistance Bases in December 1978, as discussed briefly at the end of this chapter.

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE STATE

As defined in the Constitution, as well as their main role in the combat, FALINTIL forces were also involved in national reconstruction, which at this stage, involved the establishment of the Resistance Bases. During a CAVR hearing, Xanana Gusmão, as a former CCF member, recalled:

We had just begun the war and the people were with us [in the interior]. [We established] *bases de apoio*, with the idea they would function as a base to provide logistical and political support, which we could describe as revolution ... In May 1976 the FRETILIN Central Committee put the *bases de apoio* into effect. So six sectors were established ... with that the *base de Apoio* ... structure was formed. *Bases de apoio* were implemented as a mechanism to organize people so they could continue to fight in the war (Quoted in CAVR 2006, p.8).

Not only was there political education and discussion of war theories in CASCOL *Naroman* (Naroman, literally, means light) under the DOPI, but FALINTIL company commanders

themselves participated in CEFORPOL both as facilitators and students. Júlio Rihi, who was Vice-Commander of Rusa Fuik Company in Uato-Lari, participated in CEFORPOL, learning Maoist political ideas (Júlio Fátima, Interview 08/04/2011) In CEFORPOL Ravina of Uato-Lari, the company commanders took part in the political formation. Two FALINTIL commanders, Lino Olokasa and Américo Sabika were also facilitators on military issues in the CEFORPOL¹⁵³. In the Resistance Bases, FALINTIL soldiers did not only fight, but were also involved in food production and education. Some seventy two FALINTIL members attended the Popular Health School¹⁵⁴ in Remexio. They were to provide health services to the members of FALINTIL. Every two weeks between 1976 and 1977 they would rotate from the battlefield to the School .

Training Young FALINTIL

In a recent television interview, Marito Reis, currently the Secretary of State for Veterans, stated that the question of child soldiers had become an issue of human rights; but that it was necessary to consider the context of the struggle and to distinguish between recruiting a regular army in an independent state, and a liberation army where everyone had to fight for their independence and for their own survival (TVTL 14 March 2011). In *Timor-Leste* in 1977, Roque Rodrigues, who by then was the RDTL Ambassador to Mozambique, argued that the children of Timor were like children in Indo-China, forced to fight for the liberation of their country (*Timor-Leste* 15/05/1977). Thus it is not surprising that Aquilis Freitas 'Magli', a Sergeant in the Portuguese Army who was aware of the impending war, established the first FALINTIL school in Atabae for young children, soon after the coup d'état in 1975. A foreign journalist who visited it on October 30, 1975 wrote:

The six year old Juvenal dos Santos, the smallest child in the top picture taken at the FRETILIN fort of Atabae in Timor near the Indonesian border, is one of about 60 youngsters growing up amid the fighting here. In the lower picture, a second boy is shown stripping an automatic weapon while behind him other boys get in some rifle firing practice.

153 See Chapter 5.

154 See the Health Section in Chapter 10.

The journalist described Aquiles Freitas as a gentle commanding officer who was once a school teacher, who had adopted the boys and was doing his best to bring them up with his own eight children. Aquiles had originally built this school six years before the Indonesian invasion, and had enrolled children from his home village, Quelicai, to be educated together with his eight children. The school used the primary school curriculum and there were also music and horse-riding lessons. When the Indonesians orchestrated the UDT coup d'état, Aquiles sided with FRETILIN as many regular forces did, and the school began to teach children how to use machine guns and how to fight in the battle field. The school had 64 boys in 1975. The journal in which this story was published, *Living Today*, also reported that

not long ago, when most of the fort's troops were away on patrol, the children joined the 10 remaining soldiers to fight off a surprise guerrilla attack.

Aquiles told the journalist, "I am rich with the boys. I want no money." The boys were brought to Dili to participate in the Unilateral Proclamation of Independence ceremony (MS9535).¹⁵⁵

A similar military education for children and young people continued in the Resistance Bases. Timotia da Silva of Bucoli joined OMPT in Waimori between Manatuto and Baucau. She and many other young OMPT women undertook military training and later became teachers. People learned literacy and basic military training in the same school. The sub-district of Colina had eight areas and two children were recruited from each area, totalling 16 children attending military training. According to Timotia da Silva, the objective of the training was to develop expertise in the use of weapons. The children also learned politics and to become nationalists (Abrantes and Sequeira 2008, p. 90-91). In Remexio, FRETILIN established the Bereliu OPJT Centre. At the age of 14, Manuel Beremau became the leader of 62 OPJT members. For about three months, the children learned literacy, poetry, music, dancing, politics and sport, and they were responsible for flag-raising in official ceremonies (Correia Vilanova, Manuel Beremau and Rosita Quintão, Interview 19/10/2009). In Uato-Lari, children also undertook military training after school and on weekends. Each village had one company of up to 100 children

155 See also RDTL, a journal published the Ministry of External Relation and Information, Maputo, Mozambique. Historic video footage of the Atabae School and its children, taken by Australian journalist Tony Smith in 1975, has recently been made available on YouTube.

who took part in military training, using weapons made of wood. They had children's parades and flag raising ceremonies. They were organised into small groups to practise ambushing and attacking the enemy in an offensive strategy. Agostinho Fernandes was the band leader of the 20 de Maio children's Falintil Company. He proudly recalled: "We were called little FALINTIL (FALINTIL *Kiik*)." This training was discontinued when Indonesia began the war of encirclement against the Resistance Bases from mid 1978 onwards.

Literacy and Communication

One serious challenge was communication between the FALINTIL forces. FRETILIN used two-wave radios, most captured from the Indonesian forces and local communication systems including a postal service which operated behind the lines between the six sectors comprising couriers known as *estafetas*. Most of the messages were hand-written, though some manual typewriters were available (Cabral 2008, pp.156, 157). Marcelino Pereira of Matahoe told me that these messages had to be copied before they were delivered to their destinations in case things went wrong. Marcelino had learned to read and write from his cousin Lourenço Guterres before the war, while working in the Portuguese coffee company in Dili. He became a member of FALINTIL and later in Uato-Lari he commanded a Section of nine soldiers. In this role, he was responsible for re-writing messages and his writing eventually improved (Marcelino Pereira Interview, 03/2009). In the Central North Sector, messages were also written on eucalyptus leaves and put inside bamboo, then carried by *estafetas* to their destination.

Soon after the collapse of the Resistance Bases, FRETILIN-FALINTIL developed a new system of communication, using temporary sites and specific symbols to signal the presence of a message. The site was called the message box (*caixa de correio*). The *estafetas* would check the sites regularly. When a site was considered to be no longer secure, they would move to new sites with new symbols and so on (Afonso Lawarei¹⁵⁶ 15/03/2010; see also Abrantes and Sequeira 2008, p.39). Secrecy was the key to safeguarding the messages. Codes were developed for different couriers using the same message box. Only two people, the responsible leader and the courier, would share their specific code (Abrantes and Sequeira 2008, p.39). These systems

156 Afonso Lawarei was a member of MIPLIN and operated a guerrilla unit behind the lines in Uato-Lari.

of communication show some of the ways people developed their literacy in the Resistance Bases and afterwards.¹⁵⁷

FALINTIL and the End of the Bases de Apoio

In 1976, Jimmy Carter from Democratic Party was elected President of the United States of America. According to José Ramos-Horta, United States military aid to Indonesia doubled in 1977, and this included providing 16 OV-10 'Bronco' aircraft, 3 Lockheed C-130 transport aircraft, and 45 Cadillac-Cage V-150 Commando armoured cars (Horta 1996, p.91). From September 1977 until August 1978, Indonesian forces launched three successful operations targeting the Resistance Bases. First, Major Benny Murdani mobilized 30,000 troops in a sweep from the coast and the border which gained control over the western regions of the country. Second, the newly appointed Indonesian Minister of Defense and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces General Yusuf directly led another operation called Operation Skylight in May 1978, targeting the main FRETILIN leaders. This operation was supported by another 15,000 fresh troops who then captured the Central North Sector Resistance Base on June 1978 (McMillan 1992, p.77). In September 1978, Alarico Fernandes, the Minister of Information and Internal Security, surrendered and cooperated with the Indonesian forces, giving up Radio Maubere, FRETILIN's only link with the outside world (McMillan 1992, p. 77; see also CAVR 2006, p.75).¹⁵⁸ In the eastern area, people began to move to the top of Mount Matebian, in July up until August 1978. According to Verónica da Dores, Matebian was going to become a *base de ferro* which meant the people would be concentrated there with the armed forces providing a ring of steel around the mountain (Abrantes and Sequeira 2008, p.35). FRETILIN had prepared food supplies sufficient for a two year war on the mountain (Lamartinho de Oliveira¹⁵⁹ Pers. Com. 20/04/2010).

I can recall that at this time, at least for the first month or so, we had relative peace. People still travelled back to the low lands to gather food. On one occasion, I accompanied my auntie, Evangelina da Silva, back to gather food in Atanlele, in the lowlands of Uato-Lari and we had

157 See also Cabral & Martin-Jones (2008).

158 I have interviewed Alarico Fernandes in Pangkalpinang, Indonesia in October 2009, and he denied having surrendered to the Indonesian forces (Alarico Fernandes Interview 28 /10/2009).

159 Lamartinho de Oliveira was a logistics assistant in Matebian base.

an overnight stay. As we went down, I saw for the last time Luís Cavoso, an uncle of mine, who was then a member of the Intervention Forces, looking at me from the distance. I never saw him again, and later we learned he was executed in Uato-Ila, Uato-Lari in 1980, with dozens of FRETILIN mid-ranking cadres including Júlio Pires and Acácio Carvalho, who were also my father's relatives.

The Indonesian military countered the strategy of *base de ferro* with a third operation, known as the circle of annihilation (*cercos de aniquilamento*), leading to the complete destruction of the Bases de Apoio, and FRETILIN-FALINTIL's military defeat. During this operation, the Indonesian forces would encircle villages, and burn all the crops. Those that were captured were then relocated to the coastal areas and along the main road, where they could be more effectively controlled (McMillan 1992, pp.76, 77). The Indonesians encircled Mt Matebian around October 1978 and launched offensive attacks from land, sea and air.¹⁶⁰ The CAVR Report noted that the key to the Indonesian victory at Matebian was the bombing. Indonesian forces used OV-10 Bronco aircraft, F-5s and Sky Hawk A-4s, bombing at least three times a day, causing many deaths (CAVR 2006, p.76). Supporting them were Timorese collaborators, who sided with the Indonesian forces or were forced to fight against their own people. Xanana Gusmão wrote in his autobiography:

With a few assistants we went to set up our command near Uae-Bitae. We had lost the North, Sesegua and Nalidole. I visited all the frontlines engaged in combat. There was no room for the people. There were bombardments, explosions, deaths, blood, smoke, dust and interminable queues of people waiting for their turn to try to get a bit of water for the children from a few springs. There was no crying. Dead bodies were everywhere but strangely they were not rotten, they dried. The nights were warm and fog did not dissolve; it seemed that it was afraid to lift because of the interminable battering of artillery from the land and sea (Gusmão 2000, p. 56).

Gusmão wrote also "I regretted moving all those people to Matebian where it was impossible to cater for them. Matebian was literally full and problems arose everywhere between the recent

160 See my personal testimony in Chapter 2.

arrivals and the residents” (Gusmão 2000, p.55). In 2003, I interviewed Armando Soares, a FRETILIN member who secretly recorded as many as possible of the deaths on Matebian. By the time it fell to the Indonesian forces, he had recorded the names of more than 3000 people. This figure excludes those not directly known to him.¹⁶¹

On November 22, 1978, the CCF decided to allow the people to surrender and began a new stage of guerrilla warfare. The FALINTIL commanders provided new training to those who committed to join the guerrillas. They began to teach members the use of codes, for example: using numbers, instead of letters. Verónica da Dores recalled: “‘Hau sai’ (I am off) became ‘H14 51i.M3’” (where ‘M3’ is the code for Verónica) (Abrantes and Sequeira 2008, p.37). People also learned guerrilla tactics, including how to evade enemies by covering footprints or walking backwards (Abrantes and Sequeira 2008, p.37). Xanana Gusmão, assisted by Fernando Teles Nascimento ‘Txay’ (Member of the CCF), ‘Kilik Wai-Gae’ (FALINTIL Commander), ‘Mau Hudo’ (Political Assistant), ‘Xatxa’ and Konis Santana with one company of FALINTIL, broke through the enemy lines to the area of Baguia on November 22, 1978 (Gusmão 2000, pp.57, 58). Later, they made contact with David Alex ‘Dai-Tula’, a descendant of Bualale of Matebian and José Henrique Ko-Susu of Afaloicai,¹⁶² and together they re-organized FRETILIN-FALINTIL to launch the guerrilla struggle.

The defeat of FRETILIN-FALINTIL went deeper. Operation Skylight, which Xanana described as a ‘movement’, continued until it located the whereabouts of the President and Supreme Commander, Nicolau dos Reis Lobato, who was finally killed in a battle on 31 December 1978 (Sinar Harapan 01/1979). Vicente Reis ‘Sahe’ and António Carvarinho ‘Mau Lear’ are believed to have been betrayed and killed around February 1979 (Tobias Mendonça, Interview 18/09/2009; Gonçalves 26/07/2004). This ended this period of the military struggle.

161 Soares, who was a catechist, kept the records of people killed in Matebain during the two months bombardment, working under the direction of Father João Fagundo Martins, an Indian priest who went also to Matebian. I interviewed Armando Gusmão in Uato-Lari in 2003.

162 José Henrique ‘Ko-Susu’ successfully reorganised networks in midland on the orders of Xanana Gusmão and CCF. José died of diarrhoea in Same in the late 1980s (Interview Domingos Sibikinu 03/03/2011). José’s other cousin, Adelino de Carvalho, who earlier had been regarded as a reactionary in Uato-Lari because of his links with Commander Aquilis, continued fighting in the guerrilla war until he was killed in combat in Uato-Lari in August 1990.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has shown the role of FALINTIL in the liberation struggle in the period under study, focusing on the education and training which were organised by FRETILIN and RDTL1 to prepare for and conduct an armed struggle which was also an integral part of the social revolution. The first section has shown that Portuguese regular and second line forces formed the embryo of FALINTIL which totalled 20,000 Timorese with some previous military training. These forces, including those newly recruited civilians in the militia (*Milícia Popular da Libertação Nacional*), gained valuable experience during their fight against the combined anti-RTDL and Indonesian forces in the border region, prior to the full-scale invasion. Some of the members of the Central Committee of FRETILIN also went to war on the border, gaining first-hand experience which then helped them to define the theories of war and the military strategies which would be most effective in resisting the Indonesian forces. It was noted how the concept of 'rearguard forces' developed by Che Guevara was applied in this time, and also that several ex-UNETIM members were involved in building FALINTIL.

The chapter has also shown that FRETILIN-FALINTIL did not only fight the Indonesian forces at the level of narrow military techniques and strategies; they fought also at the level of ideas and theories of war. Ideology became a principle element of FALINTIL's struggle, as they learned from experience to make a correct analysis and conclusions. They learned they were not just fighting the Indonesian forces but also the imperialist political forces that were behind Suharto's fascist regime, which was progressively isolating FRETILIN-FALINTIL. There were promises of military support from a few socialist countries, especially China, but it never arrived in Timor-Leste. Realising they were in such an isolated situation, the CCF adopted the 'subsistence war' theory of Mao Tse-tung, a 'self-reliance' method to fight the invading forces. This meant that they could not fight without the support of the people. The Resistance Bases were therefore formed as both a political and a military strategy. Marxism was adopted as a political ideology - this was a war of socialists against the capitalist and imperialist forces, a war of self-determination for a socialist Republic. The members of FALINTIL/MIPLIN/OPS therefore not only learned technical and military strategies but they also learned politics and the

reasons behind the war they were launching against the occupying forces. Children and OPJT members also learned basic military training skills and politics in their schools and villages.

After the destruction of the Resistance Bases, FALINTIL was exposed to a new situation. Only a few thousand fighters survived, of whom many later surrendered to the Indonesian forces. The remaining FRETILIN CCF and FALINTIL leaders then developed new strategies: a new diplomatic war, taking into consideration the changed context, and an “arduous and protracted” guerrilla war, in which the victory of FRETILIN- FALINTIL would depend first and foremost on the support of the Timorese people. I will return briefly to this in the Chapter 12, where the re-organization of RDTL 1 as a clandestine movement is discussed.

CHAPTER 10

EDUCATION, HEALTH AND FOOD PRODUCTION IN THE RESISTANCE BASES

INTRODUCTION

The organization of adult literacy classes, popular schools, health care provision and food production in the Resistance Bases has been briefly mentioned in previous accounts of the period by Pinto (1996), Taylor (1999), Cabral (2002), CAVR (2002) and Cabral (2008). In this chapter, I present significant new evidence, based principally on interviews with two surviving members of the Education Ministry of RDTL-I, Manuel Coelho of Central North Region and Braz Rangel of the Viqueque Region of the Ponta-Leste; and with two surviving members of the Health Brigades, Bernardo Guterres,¹⁶³ and Inácio da Costa. The recollections of these four people have been supplemented with material from my interviews with fifteen other people with direct experience of this time.

The aim of the chapter is to analyze the way FRETILIN organized schooling, health care and food production and distribution in the Resistance Bases, not only to sustain the resistance to the Indonesian occupation, but also as part of the formation of the RDTL-I state. The chapter is presented in three parts. The first addresses literacy and schooling, through case studies from two main Resistance Bases; the second discusses the popular health system, focusing again on these two centres; and the third analyzes the systems of food production and distribution, in the context of the FRETILIN/RDTL-I vision of a socialist economy.

EDUCATION: COMBATING OBSCURANTISM, CREATING A NEW MAN

Defining Educational Philosophy

The term *obscurantism* is found in the FRETILIN Political Program (Point 11):

. . . therefore FRETILIN will initiate a rigorous literacy campaign, a teaching that is truly liberating, which in turn would liberate our people from 500 years of obscurantism (FRETILIN 1974, p.19).

¹⁶³ Bernardo Guterres born in Baguia, Baucau was a Christian Protestant pastor who worked alongside Manuel Gamma, an illiterate man known as Dr. Lequidoe, who built two Health Centres to produce medicines out of traditional plants and educated a number of people as part of the Health Brigade in Centro-Leste and Ponta-Leste.

It appears also in Article 12 of the Constitution of RDTL I:

The RDTL proposes to undertake a major campaign against illiteracy and obscurantism, and works to protect and develop [Timorese] culture as an important instrument of liberation (RDTL 1976, p.34).

It means the process of hiding or concealing (obscuring) knowledge, information, the ‘whole picture’, and it results in knowledge that is partial, incomplete and one-sided. It’s close allies are superstition, fatalism and ignorance, and what Paulo Freire termed naive or magical perception, and, like them, it contributes to the formation of false consciousness (Freire 1996, pp.111-112). The concept was often used by FRETILIN to characterise the Portuguese colonial education system, which FRETILIN leader Roque Rodrigues ‘Maubenko’ understood was used by the colonial state “to polarize the people’s creativitiy and to suffocate the Timorese culture”. There was no doubt for him, that “the struggle against illiteracy is a struggle against mindlessness” (quoted in Nicol 2002, p.162).

While combating obscurantism by promoting mass literacy, FRETILIN also, as the RDTL-I Constitution indicated, recognised the value and importance of indigenous, traditional popular knowledge. Like Amílcar Cabral who saw Guinean culture as potentially revolutionary (see Chapter 4), Timorese culture was, for the FRETILIN Government, “an important instrument of liberation”(RDTL 1976, p.34).

Rodrigues explained that the fundamental objective of FRETILIN’s education program was to revolutionize the education system inherited from the Portuguese. FRETILIN education aimed to transform the Maubere People not just to develop “a new man”, with a mentality which is anti-colonial, anti-fascist, truly popular and democratic, but “a new man who takes an active part in politics to take part in the society that he belongs to.” As well as literacy, therefore, the objective was to teach people about nationalism, and the national liberation struggle, with the aim of building a just and humane society. Thus, political education was to be basic to the literacy campaign and the new education system (Nicol 2002, p. 163).

A Network of Schools

Three months after the Indonesian invasion, Prime Minister, Nicolau Lobato told the media:

In the short period of three months since December, we have set up 90 schools with more than 9000 people learning to read and write through a genuine method which develops political awareness (Lobato 1976).

As explained in Chapter 6, FRETILIN's literacy campaign inspired by Freirian pedagogy was one of the most active components of its base work, which started on January 1, 1975. When the RDTL was proclaimed on 28 November 1975, a member of the Casa dos Timores who had been involved in training the UNETIM students to use the literacy manual, Hamis Bassarewan 'Hata', was appointed Minister of Education. The Vice-Minister was Afonso Redentor, a musician and the composer of RDTL National anthem, *Pátria, Pátria* (Homeland, Homeland). In each of the six RDTL Sectors, an Education Director was directly responsible to the Education Minister. Manuel Coelho¹⁶⁴, whose *nom de guerre* was 'AA', was the Education Director of the Central North Sector and Amélia Menezes of Nunumalau was the Education Director for Central East Sector (Manuel Coelho, Interview 11/06/2008). Braz Rangel 'Warik' was responsible for education in *Zone 1975 Batae* in Uato-Lari (Braz Rangel, Interview 18/03/2009). Coelho who worked very closely with Afonso Redentor, recalled that:

FRETILIN built 400 schools across the country between 1976-1978. In the Central North Sector alone there were 32 schools, excluding the RENAL Medical [Training] Centre in Remexio (Manuel Coelho, Interview 12/06/2008).

In Viqueque, which was one of the two regions of the Central East Sector, 35 schools were built covering three zones. Within the region, Atanlele School in Uato-Lari taught students up to grade four, making it one of the highest level FRETILIN schools in that region (Braz Rangel, Interview 18/03/2009).

164 Born in Lau-aba/Loi-Ulo, in Uato-Carbau, on 9 May 1953, Coelho had studied in the Liceu up to third year secondary school in 1974-75. Following his time as the Central North Sector Director of Education, he was captured by the Indonesian forces along with many others in Manehat, Soibada-Manatuto on 22 December 1978, and detained for 10 days in Maubisse before being taken to Dili. He worked with the Indonesian Telecommunication Department after his release, but was re-arrested January 25, 1984, and imprisoned in Becora until 16 of February 1986. In March 1996, he managed to travel to Portugal, where he lives today, and is a postgraduate history student.

Pedagogy and Teacher training

As discussed briefly in Chapter 6, FRETILIN cooperated with the Education Section of the Portuguese Decolonization Committee, which in turn initiated the Coordinating Group for the Reformulation of Teaching in Timor (GCRET). In cooperation with the Primary Teachers' Union (UNAEPTIM), GCRET provided initial teacher training to primary education teachers, and to some of the UNETIM students and teachers from two high schools in Dili, the *Liceu* and the *Escola Técnica*. They learned how to teach geography and Timorese history, utilizing the ideas of Paulo Freire's *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (Magalhães 2004). This form of teacher training continued in the Resistance Bases, where the teachers received orientations directly from members of the FRETILIN Central Committee, particularly from the members of the Department of Political and Ideological Orientation (DOPI) and the Department of Mass Mobilization (Rodrigues interview in *Timor-Leste*, 15/05/1977). Vicente Paulo, a teacher born in Tulu Takeu, Remexio on 19 July 1958 recalled that while he was teaching at the base schools in the Central North Sector, about a hundred teachers regularly attended teacher preparation provided by CCF member António Carvarinho 'Mau Lear'. The subjects they studied in teacher training included how to promote Tetum through writing and reading, and basic literacy teaching methods such as using vowels and consonants to form syllables and simple words. Dictation was still used in the school as well. The teachers were a mixture of civilians and regular FALINTIL forces. The members of FALINTIL did literacy teaching when they had their days off in the village (Vicente Paulo, Interview 19/10/2009).

FRETILIN continued to use Paulo Freire's methods, even though some were not skilled in them, according to Manuel Coelho. He observed that they took some time for people to understand and the war made it difficult to apply them. Resources were very scarce. Papers and pencils were scarce in the Resistance Bases. Celestino da Costa recalled that in Remexio, in order to help students to learn, the facilitators used a demonstration method. They formed letters of the alphabet using stones on the ground (Celestino da Costa, Interview 19/09/2009). When I was a student in the RDTL-I school in *Aldeia 20 de Maio* in Viqueque, we used white stones, charcoal and bamboo for writing because there were no writing materials available. In the Central North

Sector, students wrote on the pamphlets dropped from Indonesian planes (Vicente Paulo, Interview 19/10/2009; Celestino da Costa, Interview 19/09/2009).

Some educators supported the Freirian method of generative themes because they helped people to learn. In the end, the teachers combined conventional and Freirian methods (Manuel Coelho, Interview 11/06/2008). Francisco Calsona said that he was taught that, according to Freire, instead of holding students' hands, a teacher's task was to help them to use their own hands. He concluded that the methods they developed and used in the Resistance Bases, worked because a lot of people learned how to read and write in a short time, at the very least enough to know how to count and how to write their names (Francisco Calsona and Domingos Caetano, Interview 20/10/2009).

Tetum as an Intermediary Language

In its Political Manual and Manifesto, FRETILIN proposed to continue the use of the Portuguese language until Tetum was developed, because a lot of words were lacking in Tetum, preventing it from becoming an official language (FRETILIN 1974, pp.21, 31). However, in the Resistance Bases, the RDTL I Government not only used Tetum but also the local languages. So instead of Tetum supplementing Portuguese or Portuguese supplementing Tetum, it was often the local languages which supplemented Tetum in the Resistance Base schools. Braz Rangel 'Warik' explained how they used Tetum in the Region of Viqueque to teach basic literacy:

We first introduced vowels: 'a', 'e', 'i', 'o', 'u'; and then we formed syllables, like: Ka, Ke, Ki, Ko, Ku. From there we can form more words out of those vowels and letters, for example, *Kuda* [horse], and can introduce to students that in Portuguese, *Kuda* is called 'Ca-va-lo'. The word, we can give an example, *Ai* (Tetum for tree), *ema* (Tetum for human), *inimigu* (which is Tetum for enemy). Students understood it very quickly because we used things around their situation. We teach numbers and if students find it hard to say them in Portuguese, we could just use local languages, like *Makasae*¹⁶⁵, or *Naueti*, so they can actually begin counting (Braz Rangel, Interview 18/03/2011).

165 There are about 16 languages in Timor. Makasae and Naueti are two local languages, among many, in the eastern part of Timor-Leste.

Kuda is Tetum for horse, a very popular animal in Timor, part of everyday village life. As we have seen in Chapter 4, *kuda* is found in the revolutionary song, *Foho Ramelau* “Awake, hold the reins of your own horse. Awake! Take control of our own country!”. and is a key word in the FRETILIN literacy manual, *Rai Timor, Rai Ita Nian*.

Júlio dos Santos from Bobonaro, who was 9 years old when he attended a FRETILIN school in Aldeia Mapeh, in Zumalai, between Suai and Ainaro districts, recalled a similar approach there. He said they learned: *Ka, ke, ki, ko, ku*. Out of these syllables, they formed words such as *kara, kere, kiri, koro, kuru*. The students were also encouraged to find the meaning of these words in their own local languages such as *Bunak* and *Kemak*,¹⁶⁶. He remembered that this provoked the curiosity of students, who would research and discuss with each other, and school was very enjoyable for them (Júlio dos Santos, Interview 11/03/2011).

Thus the FRETILIN-RDTLI Education Department was systematic in developing the education pedagogy, using a version of Paulo Freire’s generative words and themes in the Resistance Bases. The continued influence of the *Casa dos Timores* literacy manual is clear, and as Celestino da Costa ‘Malik’¹⁶⁷ explained, the use of Tetum in the classes was “part of cultural struggle of the Timorese resistance” (Celestino da Costa, Interview 19/09/2009).

Curriculum: Praxis Learning

Manuel Coelho recalled that the role of the school was to make sure that people were able to understand what they were fighting for:

Why did we resist and want *ukun-rasik-an* [independence]? It was imperative that people participated in literacy classes and joined mass organizations in order to understand the objective of the struggle (Manuel Coelho, Interview 11/06/2008).

Coelho’s linking of the education with practice underlines another aspect of anti-colonial learning - the utilization of new knowledge to transform social reality. For example, the FRETILIN schools taught geography, not as the Portuguese had taught it, but as the “Geography of the new

166 Bunak and Kemak are spoken in Maliana and some part of Suai and Ainaro district.

167 Celestino da Costa ‘Malik’ is from Aldeia Bereliu, in Suco Faturasa, Remexio.

Timor-Leste”. Coelho and da Costa both remembered this as a very political subject because it helped to educate the people about the existence of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (RDTL), as a nation. The students learned that the RDTL includes two small islands, Atauro and Jaco, as well as the enclave of Oecusse. This was a big thing, because even the older people did not know where Oecusse was, due to its relative isolation from the rest of Timor-Leste (Manuel Coelho Interview 11/06/2008; Celestino da Costa, Interview 19/09/2009).

In their school, Juliana and Celestino remembered, they used FRETILIN’s Political Manual to discuss the right for self-determination of the *Maubere People*, explaining that the oppressed majority were peasants and small subsistence farmers, the major part of the “working masses” (Juliana Mendonça, Interview 19/09/2010; Celestino da Costa, Interview 19/09/2009). Politics was also taught through revolutionary songs, such as *Pátria-Pátria*, *Foho Ramelau* and many others. Before the arrest of Xavier do Amaral, many leaders visited Faturasa, a camp in Remexio, and the local students entertained the guests with presentations including revolutionary songs and popular dances (*tebe-tebe-dahur*) (Celestino da Costa, Interview 19/09/2009; Juliana Mendonça, 19/09/2010). As explained in Chapter 8, in addition to writing, reading, geography, mathematics, politics, sport and music, the schools also provided military training, and organized students to work in the communal farms. Those students capable were trained how to strip and re-assemble weapons with their eyes closed. Like other citizens, the students cultivated crops such as cassava, sweet potato and maize on communal farms. In this way, they learned the lesson of social solidarity through practice; the harvest produced from their work was used to feed the armed forces, to assist those whose crops had failed, and to provide for those in special need such as the elders and orphans. Still, there were a lot of problems. The policy of the schools was to encourage the students to bring their own food to school. Many people got sick from lack of food, and malnutrition was common in the Central North Sector.

Challenges in Learning and Evaluation

The educators conducted meetings at least twice a week to discuss issues related to the education, culture and national security, but there was not a systematic evaluation for students, because of the security situation. By this time, FRETILIN was attacking obscurantism as a major

cause of social injustice, supporting the continuation of colonialism; and had made a correct intervention to abolish it, by promoting an alternative mass education. FRETILIN/RDTL 1 was also promoting local languages to complement Portuguese, which was still used at the leadership level.¹⁶⁸ However, in the Resistance Bases FRETILIN/RDTL 1 was confronted with a lack of basic necessities to live, and to sustain the Resistance. Education then became not only a system for learning basic literacy and politics, but also a system of resource management and food production, which was integrated into the education system. This allowed children to do agricultural work in the fields while learning through experience the importance of sharing the surplus produced from their work.

THE POPULAR HEALTH SYSTEM

As discussed in the Chapter 6, FRETILIN formed Revolutionary Brigades in June 1975, which included members of UNETIM and members of the Central Committee. The role of the Brigades was to mobilize the community, to intensify the base work. Popular health campaign, to improve hygiene and sanitation, and to highlight the importance of local medicines, were an important component of this work (Julmira Sirana, Interview 20/10/2009; Hill, 2002, p.133).

Timor-Leste Committee of Red Cross: Emergency

Even though the International Red Cross Committee (ICRC) had been actively supporting the health system in Timor-Leste (ACFOA 10/1975), when Indonesia invaded Timor-Leste in 1975, there was only one Timorese Goan medical doctor, Guido Valadares, a former Portuguese soldier. He was appointed as Vice-Minister of Labour and Welfare in the RDTL Government (Ramos Horta 1996, p.194; see also Jolliffe 1978, p.220). However, FRETILIN and the RDTL Government made systematic attempts to address the crisis in the health sector brought on by the invasion. By March 1976, FRETILIN had built three medical centers and more than 100 young cadres were learning basic medicine so as to be able to serve the masses (Lobato 1976).

168 The use of language in the Resistance has recently been analysed in Cabral and Martin-Jones (2008)

On 10 June 1976, the RDTL Council of Ministers established the East Timor Red Cross (ETRC) and its Director was Coli Mali.¹⁶⁹ Alarico Fernandes, the Minister of Information and Internal Security said on *Radio Maubere*, on 23 June 1976 that there was “an urgent need to set up an organization to deal with the victims of the war and the families of those who had fallen in the struggle of the national liberation and that the East Timor Red Cross was already built”. In July 1977 the Australian Labor Party, then in opposition, made an appeal to the international community for humanitarian support through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), but since the Australian Government was very much working with Indonesia, there was no result. (*Timor-Leste* 1/08/1977). The ICRC attempted to return after the invasion, but did not succeed until the destruction of the Resistance Bases in December 1978.

Health Schools and Medicine Production

As Minister for Labour and Welfare, Vicente Reis ‘Sahe’ mobilized people to establish a popular health system. Bernardo Guterres, a paramedic who had worked with Sahe, recalled that Sahe visited elders who had knowledge about medicinal plants and that he turned the Central East Sector’s Administration Centre (CasCol Naroman,), into a School of Health with a Portuguese-trained Timorese nurse, Eduardo, as the health coordinator. This centre produced medicines and organized health education and established clinics in each of the other sectors under the Ministry of Labour and Welfare (Bernardo Guterres, Interview 05/05/2010).

Lequidoe Health Centre, Baguia

Baguia is a small and very remote sub-district, in the south-eastern corner of the District of Baucau where descendants of the Abu-Afaloicai clan live around the base of Mt Matebian, the main Resistance Base in the eastern area. Aiming to address the increasing health crisis caused by the Indonesian occupation and to provide health services to citizens, the RDTL Government built three health centres in Baguia alone. Manuel Pinto and local FRETILIN cadres developed a health centre in Samalari, which produced tablets and provided health services. Caetano

¹⁶⁹ I have not identified the real name of Mau-Coli. But he was possibly one of the nurses working with Sahe in CasCol.

Guterres ‘Mau Lory,’¹⁷⁰ a FALINTIL Commander, built a Health Centre in his home village Bibela, and here also, they produced tablets and provided health services. The third and perhaps most significant medical production centre was based in Kaisae-Hoo, also in Baguia, under an illiterate man, Manuel Gamma who built another branch of the centre in Uato-Lari in mid-1977 (Bernardo Guterres, Interview 20/05/2010). These three medical centers each undertook medical research and produced medicines, drawing on their own experiences, and on their determination to experiment and succeed. They were therefore centres for popular education and learning, making a unique contribution to the national liberation struggle against the Indonesian occupation, and beyond. To illustrate this, I will focus on the work of Manuel Gamma, about which I have been able to obtain detailed information.

Manuel Gamma ‘Lequidoe’ was born in Baguia. He had never attended school. In 1960, when the Portuguese Government were deporting dozens of Timorese who took part in the 1959 rebellion in Uato Lari and Uato Carbau, Manuel Gamma happened to be at the port in Laga, Baucau. The Portuguese authorities were calling out for one of the local rebel leaders from Laga, whose name was also Manuel Gamma. This man had not turned up, but the young Manuel raised his hand, whereupon he was taken and deported to Angola. On his arrival in Angola, the Portuguese authorities realized he was too young to be a rebel, and was illiterate. He was assigned as a servant to a couple, in which the husband was doing medical research and producing medicines. At first, he was assigned to looking after the children of the couple, but he was not good at that job, and the doctor then asked him to carry his doctor’s bag, which he did well, accompanying the doctor on his travels until he was sent back to Timor around the middle of 1967. Back in Timor, Gamma tried to implement what he had learned. He began to identify local medicinal plants, and produced tablets and injections for tropical diseases such as malaria. He then opened his own clinic, providing health services in Baguia until one day he was accused of causing the death of a woman. The case was taken to court, which found him innocent, and he was released (Grupu Saúde Lequidoe 2004; Bernardo Guterres, Interview 20/05/2010; Constâncio Pinto, Pers. Com. 25/05/2010).

170 During the colonial administration Mau Lory was responsible for the Portuguese military arsenal. He had a relationship with FRETILIN leader Rogério Tiago Lobato, and played a major role against the UDT coup in August 1975 (Gutterres 2002).

While in Angola, Manuel Gamma had not only acquired medical knowledge from the doctor, but he also learned about the health problems which existed in Angola during the War of Independence. When Indonesian forces invaded Timor in 1975, Manuel Gamma moved from Dili back to Baguia permanently. According to a document, *Farmacy Lekidoe*, produced by Grupu Saude Lequidoe, a health NGO in Baguia,¹⁷¹ Manuel Gamma realised that the health crisis brought on by the Indonesian invasion would continue. He went to Atelari to meet Abel Ximenes 'Larisina', a member of the CCF, and gained his support to establish a Health Centre. Further discussions were conducted, including with Francisco Gaspar, the Zone Secretary of Baguia in the RDTL-I Government. With the contributions of people from three other villages, Osso-Huna, Afaloicai and Hae-Coni, they built a clinic in Kaisaho'o, where Manuel Gamma began working with a team of volunteers to identify medicinal plants and to produce medicines. By 2 February 1976, the Centre had begun to produce medicines for common diseases, such as malaria, TB, and various skin diseases and to provide basic health services (Grupu Saúde Lequidoe 2004; Bernardo Guterres, Interview 7/05/2010).

Bernardo Guterres and Matias da Silva, who provided some of this information, worked as assistants to Manuel Gamma in Baguia and Uato-Lari, producing tablets and providing 'on-the-job' training in identifying medicinal plants, producing medicines and providing basic healthcare (Bernardo Guterres 05/20/2010; Matias da Silva, Interview 16/03/2010). News of their work reached the Minister responsible for Health, Vicente Reis 'Sahe' who organized a meeting in Cascol Naroman, to which he invited all the nurses, and people who had knowledge of herbal medicines, including both Manuel Gamma and Guterres. This meeting resolved to promote the use of herbal medicines, and to support the program in all the Resistance Bases, (Bernardo Guterres, Interview 05/05/2010).

In order to better manage the Medical Health School, the Health Brigade was organized in three small teams each with a coordinator, and a few assistants, with specific tasks, namely to

171 Grupu Saúde Liquidoe is an NGO built in Baguia, which aims to continue Gamma's work. Justino Guterres, who is a relative of Gamma, is one of the founding members.

provide health services to communities in the Resistance Bases, to identify medicinal plants and to produce tablets and serum for injections. In order to produce serum:

We used cooking pots to boil the herbal medicines, and the heated sputum would travel through bamboo pipes; there was a second pot, then it would be boiled again, and the sputum would travel again through bamboo pipes before it went to bottles that would be ready for injection (Bernardo Guterres, Interview 05/05/2010).

FALINTIL member Estêvão Cabral (2002, p. 248) described a similar process for the production of quinine tablets:

For example, in Ponta-Leste quinine was extracted from the bark of trees. The bark was first dried, then it was crushed and mixed with water. After it had been made into pulp in this way, it was inserted into a small tube, generally taken from small bamboo branches. Once it was dry, a small stick was inserted into the hole in the bamboo branch to press its content to come out. Once the contents were removed, they were exposed to the sun again to dry. The semi-dried bark pulp was then cut up into 'tablets', which differed in size from one another.

Around 1977, Manuel Gamma built another Health Centre in Manu-baha, *Zone 1975 Bautae..* and gathered together people who knew herbal medicines, and all the varieties were written down in a manual. Lino da Silva, who was Chief of the *Aldeia 20 de Maio* of Zone 1975-Bautae, himself assisted with the production of cough syrup, a diarrhea cure and a cholera medicine. Initially, people were afraid to use the medicines, and there was no laboratory to test them. Manuel Gamma said, "If you are afraid, please inject me first as a trial". Sometimes the patients experienced negative reactions, but once they were cured, it lasted a long time (Matias da Silva, Interview 10/03/2010; Lino da Silva, Interview 10/03/2010).

All the Health Centres were forced to close by the Indonesian Encirclement and Annihilation campaign against the FRETILIN/RDTL Government which destroyed the Resistance Bases in November 1978. Manuel Gamma survived to die in Uato-Lari in the mid-1990s.

RENAL Medical Center in Remexio

In the Central North Sector, the RDTL-I Vice-Minister Guido Valadares was the driving force behind the establishment of the National Rehabilitation (RENAL) Medical Centre (CMR), but he did not survive long, being killed while on patrol on September 30, 1976, when a landmine exploded (Marquita Soares Valadares, pers. com. 07/08/2010). Almost one year later, Alarico Fernandes reported on the Central North Region through Radio Maubere on 20 May 1977:

Counting on our own forces on all levels, we have used traditional medicines. Meanwhile the Department of Labour and Popular Health has put measures afoot to improve the traditional medicines to modern medicines in complete ... injections, food and so on (Fernandes, cited in ETNA 1976)

Inacio da Costa, who was trained as a nurse in the Central North Sector from 1976-1978, with the Health School and its Revolutionary Health Brigade, said there were 306 villages in the Sector, Central North Region, each with a population of between 800 and 1000 (Inácio da Costa, Interview 18/08/2009). The guiding principle of the health service was that health was for all, military and civilians, with no discrimination. The structure of Ministry of Health in the Central North (which included Lacló-Manatutu-Laclúbar, Same, Ainaro, Aileu and Dili in mid 1976) is outlined below, in Table 7.

Table 7. Ministry of Health Structure, Central North Sector

Name	Positions
Dr. Guido Valadares	Vice-Minister of Health
Dr. Joao Oligário	Health Coordinator
Dr. Fátima Mendonça	Health School of RENAL
Dr. Maubere (João Barudo)	Laboratory for medical production
Henrique Marques	Portuguese Trained Nurse
Antonio Mendonça do Rego	Member of Health Brigade
José Mendonca ‘Sadere’	Member of Brigade/trainer
Domingos da Costa	Member of Brigade/trainer
Tomás Pinto	Member of Brigade/trainer
Inacio da Costa	Member of Brigade/trainer
Henrique	Member of Brigade/trainer
Vicente	Member of Brigade/trainer

Source: Inácio da Costa (Interview 18/08/2009).

The RENAL Medical Centre's (CRM's) training combined theory and practice. The 84 civilian students, including ten women, were organized into groups or brigades. They studied for two weeks in the school, and then spent two weeks working in the communities where they taught paramedics, who were recruited from among OPMT and OPJT members, on how to provide health services.

The students who were FALINTIL soldiers, who numbered as many as 122 paramedics, were also divided into groups, and each group was required to study for two weeks in the RENAL Health Centre. They then returned to the battlefield to provide healthcare to their comrades. The number of students in the School totalled 206.

In order to better provide health services to the people, the Revolutionary Health Brigade built a health education centre and small medicine cabinets (*Bankada* - RAK) in each village. They trained two members of OPMT and OPJT from each of 300 villages or camps to provide health services to the people (Inácio da Costa, Interview 09/2009). In the Central North Region alone, the popular health system trained at least 600 village-based paramedics. CRM also provided medical services to prisoners in RENAL, but because of limited resources, priority was given to fighters in the battlefield.

The subjects taught in the RENAL Health Centre were not just about diseases, medicinal plants and medical production; the participants were also trained in the politics and ethics of the popular health service. According to da Costa, they were taught:

The health service is for all, for human beings that are in need. When people get sick we are there to help.

According to Inácio (Interview 18/09/2009), the most useful medicinal plants usually grow in wet areas, attached to stones on river banks. Everything was on an experimental and subsistence basis:

Every time a medicinal plant was taken, one should make sure that there were still others surviving or to continue to grow for future needs.

The Medical Centre produced tablets and syrups to treat fevers, diarrhea and other stomach sicknesses, TB, flesh wounds, respiratory diseases, and skin diseases, and they provided maternity care. There were no headache and hypertension problems identified by the Health Centre. Skin diseases were very common, and some had never previously occurred in Timor. Some came about as a result of the bombing. Da Costa recalled that the Indonesian planes dropped a chemical that killed plants, burnt trees, and poisoned water sources causing diseases and swelling of the body. One of the most difficult jobs of the paramedics was to assist FALINTIL in the battle line. When people were wounded, they were given a kind of medicine to stop the blood from flowing before they were treated. Many wounds were healed in this way (Inácio da Costa, Interview 18/09/2009).

However, there were some problems in the communities in the Central North Sector where a few people used 'magic' cures, and asked for payments. The CRM taught that these practices were obscurantist and wrong. If they were found out, they were punished accordingly (Inácio da Costa, Interview 09/2010).



Photo. Second from right is Inácio da Costa, Member of Revolutionary Health Brigade and three local youth

Doctor Maubere

The most popular member of the RENAL Health Centre was Dr. Maubere, whose real name was João Varudo. Arsénio Ramos Horta, in his memoir, referred to him as a traditional doctor from Lequidoe (Horta 1981, p.16). Joao Varudo is said to have come from Atsabe, but had lived in Dili prior to the Indonesian occupation. He never went to school, and spent much of his time in the streets of Dili, moving from one Chinese shop to the other to make friends and enjoy himself. When Indonesia invaded Dili, like many other people, Varudo moved to Remexio where, surprisingly, he demonstrated enormous ability in curing sick people, using his knowledge of medicinal plants. Under the direction of the Health Centre, he also gathered local people together, and those who might know medicinal plants, and with their help the Health School identified medicinal plants to produce tablets under his supervision. João Varudo eventually became known as Dr. Maubere. It was said that he could cure those who had been wounded without surgery (José Monteiro and Raul da Costa Silva, Interview 09/09/2009). According to Inácio da Costa (Interview 18/09/2009):

He poured medicines around the wounds, massaged and the bullet just came out. Some people suffered broken bones because of bullets, he gave medicines to drink, and the bones could join again. Many people were surprised to see this, and called him Dr. Maubere. They called him Dr. Maubere, because he was an illiterate.

José Monteiro¹⁷² and Raul da Costa Silva¹⁷³ were proud of Dr. Maubere and his achievements, agreeing that:

Modern doctors have the expertise to cure people, but Maubere was also a doctor of his own (José Monteiro and Raul da Costa Silva, Interview 09/09/2009)

Dr. Maubere was shot dead when the enemy attacked the camp, along with the head of RMC, Fátima Mendonça (Ana Maria), when Remexio fell to the Indonesians in late 1978 (Inácio da Costa, Interview 18/09/2009). Other sources told me, however, that Dr. Maubere and Fátima

172 Dr. Maubere, was married to Isabel, a sister of my interviewee, José Monteiro. Today, she lives in Atsabe..

173 Raul da Costa Araújo Silva, who was born in Remexio, served in the Portuguese regular army. He became the second commander of Zone A Remexio, in the Central North Region. The Company Commander was Ananias da Silva.

Mendonça were killed by their own comrades, perhaps to prevent them from revealing their secrets to the occupying forces. If so, this is a tragic end to an extraordinary story.

FOOD PRODUCTION: SELF-SUFFICIENCY

The Political Manifesto of FRETILIN adopted in September 1974 envisioned a campaign to increase food production, in order to combat hunger and become a country self-sufficient in food, building a new agrarian economy based on co-operatives (FRETILIN, 1974, p.28-29). Land reform and agricultural cooperatives were important components of the FRETILIN grass roots mobilisation work which took place from the end of 1974 until the full-scale invasion in December 1975. This commitment was reflected also in the RDTL I Constitution, under Article 6:

Recognising that Timor-Leste is a land which belongs to the peasantry, the basis of the RDTL economy is agriculture. The RDTL Government therefore focuses in particular on a policy of agricultural development, while also taking industry into account as an important sector (RDTL 1976, p. 34; my translation).

This section will show how the RDTL I Government mobilised the people to achieve economic self-sufficiency, which was an essential foundation for the popular struggle against the Indonesian occupation. This experience has an important popular education component and demonstrates the potential for economic development alternative to the industrial capitalist economy of today.

Cooperatives and People's Shops (Lojas Populares)

As mentioned in Chapter 6, Nicolau Lobato had started a pilot agricultural cooperative in his home village of Bazartete in 1974 (Jolliffe 1978, p.103). The cooperative campaign received some intellectual backing from José Gonçalves, a Timorese economist who had studied in Brussels, and was the Head of the Economic Services Department in the Portuguese Government in Dili. On June 7, 1975, Búcar Carmo, a journalist from the Government Journal *A Voz de Timor* interviewed Gonçalves who outlined the two key areas of FRETILIN economic policy. Firstly, the state would stimulate commercial and industrial cooperatives through an

appropriate legal framework. A cooperative, he explained, is owned by its members, and the benefits flow to them, facilitating credit and social and economic progress. Each member of the cooperative would make a contribution in money or work, to signify their participation. Thus, the formation of cooperatives is on a voluntary, individual basis. Secondly, as a consequence of the formation of the popular cooperatives, there would be an end to the small group of big capitalists, found mainly in the Chinese community, because there would no longer be a need for them. In order to survive, the business people in the cities might form their own cooperatives, to defend their interests (*A Voz de Timor* 07/06/1975). In November 1975, José Gonçalves became the Minister of Economics and Statistics in the RDTL I Government, and was one of the first people captured when the Indonesian forces landed in Dili, in December 1975. He remained active in the clandestine movement until his death in 1995.¹⁷⁴

During 1975, FRETILIN opened People's Shops (*Lojas Populares*) across the country as an alternative to the Chinese-owned shops. Local FRETILIN branches had opened a number of *Lojas Populares* prior to the Indonesian invasion, including in Maubisse on August 15, 1975. In Ossú, the FRETILIN Regional Sub-Committee reported that it had sent 3 tons of corn to the Central Committee food store. The people had also started opening up a road to link Ossú with Uato-Lari sub-district, known for its rice, copra and maize and a People's Shop was also to be built. João de Jesus, the Vice-Secretary of Liquiçá Sub-Committee declared they had sent 500 sacks of coffee to the Central Committee food store, while the local People's Shop had a stock of 200 sacks (*Journal do Povo Maubere* 22/11/1975). In Ermera, the situation had recovered and the Regional Committee had organized three collective maize farms and sent 40 tons of coffee to Central Committee. According to Commander José da Silva, five collective farms had been set up to plant sweet potatoes and maize in the District of Aileu (*Journal do Povo Maubere* 22/11/1975).

There is also evidence that RDTL1 initiated trade in coffee. According to Brian Manning, the RDTL I government established an account with the Commonwealth Bank in Darwin, under the names of Juvenal Inácio ('Sera Key'), who was appointed Minister of Finance in 1975,

174 I worked with him in Dili in 1990.

and José Ramos Horta, Minister of Foreign Affairs and External Information (Brian Manning Pers. Com., 13/12/2008). In his memoir of this period, Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA¹⁷⁵) official David Scott indicated that \$38,000 (Australian dollars) was raised through selling coffee. However, Indonesia invaded, and it was only José Ramos Horta who had access to the bank, while Juvenal Inácio was fighting in the bush. David Scott proposed to the External Delegation an additional signatory to the account, in order to withdraw the money to support the diplomatic mission of FRETILIN/RDTL I. Mari Alkatiri, the most senior FRETILIN/RDTL leader in the External Delegation, agreed, but Scott does not report if the money was actually withdrawn (Scott 2005, p.204).

Food Production in the Resistance Bases

One of the policies adopted by the Soibada Popular Assembly in May-June 1976 was to develop food production (Gusmão 2000, p.42). This was further reinforced in a speech by President Nicolau Lobato, broadcast over Radio Maubere on 28 June 1976, in which he stated:

Despite our inferiority in arms and numbers, we are fighting and winning. But our struggle is not only military and political. It is also economic. We need food to live. We have to produce that food, introduce new methods. When the enemy burns our crops, we have to start again and again without failure (Lobato 28/6/1976)

This agricultural production, according to Júlio de Fátima, a former UNETIM member who became a FALINTIL Commander in Uato-Lari, was crucial for the construction of a self-reliant socialist state. Socialism does not allow the accumulation of wealth in the hands of individuals, and does not tolerate private monopoly:

Mao Tse-tung taught the importance of both agriculture production and distribution of the production. When production increases and distribution fails, it creates injustice, inequality and gap between the rich and the poor (Júlio Fátima, Interview 08/04/2010).

After Soibada, RDTL I developed systematic methods to improve food production and distribution. Under the Minister of Economy, FRETILIN established a Commission for

¹⁷⁵ ACFOA (Australian Council for Overseas Aid) was an NGO, based in Melbourne. It changed its name to ACFID and is now based in Canberra.

Organizing and Controlling Economic Affairs (*Comissão Organizadora e Controladora dos Assuntos de Economia* - COCAE) which was based in the Commissariat, and a series of SECAEs (*Secção de Controla do Assuntos de Economia*), based in the zones and villages. In this way, food production was organized at all levels of the administration, but without eliminating family production, which means it did not abolish small-scale private ownership or attack the peasantry. What is striking is that the organization of economic affairs to sustain the population and to feed the FALINTIL fighters took the same form. The persons responsible for economic affairs (the SECAE) collected food from the population and re-distributed to those in need and also to FALINTIL soldiers in the frontline. There were communal farms and food stores in each village (Ramaldo da Costa et al, Interview 20/04/2009).

The food produced was stored in food stores at all three levels: villages, *Zonas* and *Comissariado* as in the program developed by Amílcar Cabral and PAIGC in the liberated zones in Guinea-Bissau in 1960s.¹⁷⁶ FRETILIN redistributed food from the stores to the people, on the basis of their needs, with priority given to FALANTIL fighters, orphans and elderly people. Villages also provided food for those villages where production had failed or where crops had been destroyed or captured by the enemy. There was also a system called *evacua*, which meant that people travelled beyond their communities to abandoned areas near the war zones to gather food. (Madalena da Silva Fernandes, Interview 5/02/2010; Julio Fatima, Interview 08/04/2010; Lino da Silva, Interview 10/03/2010). The food production took place at all levels. With the family farms, and the communal farms run by villages, zones, OPMT, OPJT, armed forces, and prisoners, everyone was involved in food production (Madalena da Silva Fernandes 05/02/2010; Lino da Silva, Interview 10/03/2010). António de Jesus Pinto, an administrative assistant in the Aldeia Lorico in Zona 1975, Uato-Lari, explained the system in this way:

Cooperative means people gather crops from families into the village storehouse, and when they need they can take back; crops including surplus of rice. Collective means working together in farms and the harvest will be stored in the Aldeia warehouse. When people need they can borrow it. Who can borrow them? Those that are disadvantaged people, including orphans and the elderly. The food can also be used to support armed forces. Aldeia 20

176 See Chapter 4.

de Maio was farming in Mahele. The harvest was very good (António de Jesus Pinto, Interview 2/3/2010).

Throughout those parts of the country under the RDTL I Government, there were political structures, communal food production and distribution systems, popular schools and a popular health system, developed in a coordinated and integrated way. In Zone 1975 Bau-Tae in Uato-Lari alone, there were more than twenty villages. Collective works were promoted and storehouses were built in each of these. From 1977 until mid-1978, food production in many places was very high, there were good harvests and the food stores at village and zone level were full. Lamartinho de Oliveira, who was a Zone logistical assistant in Baguia, recalled that the food was stored in three locations. The last one was in Matebian, which had 70 tons consisting mostly of rice, maize, and dried meat, estimated to be enough to maintain the Resistance for one year. Right up until the fall of Matebian, he said, there was still plenty of food (Lamartinho de Oliveira, Pers. Com. 25/03/ 2010).

People lived in Mapeh village in the area of Zumalai, near Same and Ainaro, for nearly two years. They had two harvests and there was plenty of food, because the land was fertile. They also raised so many chickens that they filled almost every tree in the village. People were very well organized and lived a life which was relatively peaceful for about two years. As many people have told me, “These were the good old days” (ETN 1979).

When the enemy began to intensify the attacks in 1978, firing artillery at them throughout the night, the village was abandoned. Júlio dos Santos recalled:

Once the attacks intensified, we had no more farming, all we did was run, run away from the enemy. Still, some people brought plenty of animals and seed with them, but it was no longer possible to live in the same way as it was. When we finally arrived in Kablaqui, it was so cold and many people died there (Júlio dos Santos, Interview 11/03/2011).

CONCLUSION

Chapter 3 described how the students from the *Casa dos Timores* had learned some of the ideas of Amílcar Cabral, Paulo Freire, Che Guevara and Mao Tse-Tung which combined pedagogy with national liberation and socialist revolution. The evidence presented in this chapter shows how FRETILIN used a mixture of these Maoist, Freirian and ‘Cabral-ist’ ideas to build a self-reliant ‘socialist-communist’ state in the Resistance Bases. Common to the writings of Mao Tse-tung and Amílcar Cabral was the idea that a culture should be revolutionary (Mao Tse-tung 1975, p.69). Through the popular organizations, which we have discussed in earlier chapters, FRETILIN began to promote a cultural revolution. In the Resistance Bases, while resisting the Indonesian forces militarily, the new nation developed its own cultural army, expanding the cultural revolution to involve all the social institutions and citizens of the fledgling Republic.

The first agents to promote the new revolutionary culture consisted of educators and students who were actively involved through their revolutionary schools. Under the Minister of Education Hamis Bassarewan ‘Hata’, FRETILIN/RDTL I built at least 400 schools in the Resistance Bases between mid 1976 and late 1978. These schools themselves were politically active. This was extraordinary considering the circumstances. Through these schools, children and adults were involved in basic literacy classes, military training, food production and political education.

The second cultural army, we have seen, consisted of the workers in the health sector, the revolutionary health brigades and their popular health schools. The RDTL Government built three medical production centers, two of which have been discussed in this chapter. The occupying forces killed the only trained doctor, the Vice-Minister of Labor and Social Welfare, Dr. Guido Valadares in late September 1976. Amazingly, two illiterates, Manuel Gamma ‘Lekidoe’ and Joao Varudo ‘Doctor Maubere’, became prominent figures, using their ‘natural intelligence’ and local knowledge to produce medicines, demonstrating that indigenous knowledge and herbal medicine are a powerful means of revolution in the health sector. My research has also revealed that a woman, Dr. Fátima Mendonça, ran a Medical School with 206 students attending which trained some 600 young paramedics from 306 villages in the Central North Sector between mid 1976 and mid 1978.

The third cultural army was the people themselves, the citizens of the newly proclaimed Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. By 1975, cooperatives had been established in Oecusse and Liquiçá, with a plan to spread out into other districts. There were also People's Shops established to replace the Chinese shops. In the Bases de Apoio, the new Government built on this experience to organise food production through communal farms and family-based production, and distribution through a system of community storehouses. Everyone, including the FALINTIL forces, became involved in food production at all levels. The armed forces worked on collective farms during their two weeks leave from fighting, while students and the popular organizations such OPMT and OPJT were also all involved. It appears that, despite the circumstances of war, in some sectors food production was relatively high during the year of 1977, compared to other years.

While more work needs to be done to recover this history, it is clear from the recollections recorded in this chapter and from the documentary evidence retrieved from the archives, that this experience had a profound effect on the people involved, who in total numbered over one hundred thousand. The remembering and re-telling of these stories is an important part of the re-conscientisation process in the rural areas, as FRETILIN seeks to continue the process of the liberation of the people.

CHAPTER 11

INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY AS POPULAR EDUCATION

INTRODUCTION

The previous chapters have shown how FRETILIN leaders and educators used popular education to mobilize the Timorese people to fight for their self-determination. They had also begun their own revolution, the Maubere Revolution, creating the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste as an alternative to the colonial Portuguese fascist state. This popular revolutionary state successfully resisted the Indonesian invasion and occupation militarily for three years. However, these successes could not be maintained, because Indonesia had the backing of the imperialist forces, and was able to block the United Nations from intervening to end immediately the Indonesian occupation. In order to combat these imperialist forces at the international level, FRETILIN appealed to the international solidarity of the working class and of other colonized peoples as its natural and strategic allies. Indeed, FRETILIN's early leaders in the Casa dos Timores for example, had anticipated this by forming alliances with anti-colonial movements in the African countries, as was shown in Chapter 3.

The aim of this chapter is to describe some aspects of the activities of the Democratic Republic to mobilize international solidarity before, during and beyond the period of the Resistance Bases. The first section discusses the militant international socialist tradition of solidarity which informed the FRETILIN/RDTL approach. This is important, because most recent accounts of international solidarity, including, for example, CAVR (2006) and Fernandes (2011), focus on a later period when support was framed by less radical definitions of solidarity. The second section presents the context particularly in Portugal and the work of the remaining members of the Casa dos Timores and CIDAC (Amílcar Cabral Centre for Development & Information)¹⁷⁷ in working with solidarity and progressive political forces to educate the Portuguese public. The third section deals with the solidarity campaign in Australia, the activities of the Communist Party of Australia (CPA) and two solidarity groups, Campaign for an Independent East Timor (CIET) and the Australian East Timor Association (AETA) and includes an account of the CPA-FRETILIN clandestine radio operation in Darwin.

177 Centro de Informação e Desenvolvimento Amílcar Cabral

MILITANT INTERNATIONALIST SOLIDARITY

The understanding of international solidarity among the founding members of FRETILIN derived from the traditions of international socialism. In 1848, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels had written in the *Communist Manifesto* that the interests of communists could not be separated from the interests of the international proletariat, and called for international working class solidarity, extending across the borders of nations. Communists were to work with the proletarian movements against the bourgeoisie everywhere (Marx and Engels 1848/1998, pp.17, 39). In the twentieth century, this concept of international solidarity was taken up by anti-colonial movements for national liberation, many of whose leaders had been educated in the traditions of communism and socialism. In the words of Samora Michel, FRELIMO's founder, international solidarity was "not an act of charity but an act of unity between allies fighting on different terrains toward the same objectives." (Quoted in Koopman, n.d.).

In the early days of the Carnation Revolution on June 30, 1974 in Lisbon, the Casa dos Timores appended the following to their initial Declaration of Principles:

In consideration for the spirit behind the drafting of the Declaration of Principles and to implement the point 4 of it, adopted at the General Assembly of 30 June 1974, the Timorese, meeting in the Casa dos Timores, support all Movements for National Liberation of the Oppressed People worldwide, namely MPLA, FRELIMO, PAIGC and MLSTP. (Adopted by acclamation on 13/7/74).

This position was further enshrined in the FRETILIN Political Manifesto on September 1974, which stated that:

FRETILIN is in solidarity with all people of the world struggling for progress (FRETILIN 1974, p.26).

One month after FRETILIN was formed, Denis Freney, a member of the National Executive of the Communist Party of Australia (CPA) and a journalist on the CPA newspaper, *Tribune*, made a brief visit to Timor, to make contact with FRETILIN's leaders. As described in more detail below, after returning to Sydney, Freney worked with the Southern African Liberation

Centre (SALC), a body already working in solidarity with the national liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies in Africa (Goldsworthy 1973), to establish a solidarity campaign in Australia.

During 1975, FRETILIN consolidated its relationship with the national liberation movements in Africa. Nicolau Lobato visited Angola and Mozambique in April/May 1975; and a second delegation, consisting of Mari Alkatiri, César Mau Laka and Roque Rodrigues, was sent to attend the Proclamation of Independence of Angola 11 November 1975 (Jolliffe 1978, pp215-217; Cabral 2002, pp.218-219). On these visits, FRETILIN built contacts with African leaders, who would remain loyal supporters of FRETILIN for the next twenty-four years, and beyond independence up until the present. The *Jornal do Povo Maubere* (JPM) reported that the second delegation had meetings with Jomo Kenyatta, President of Kenya, and with Julius Nyerere President of Tanzania (JPM 1/11/1975). When Angola proclaimed its independence, President Agostinho Neto made a militant solidarity appeal to the Angolan people “to struggle with the people of Timor-Leste and its glorious vanguard FRETILIN” (JPM 15/11/1975). Two weeks later, on 29 November 1975, on the eve of the Indonesian invasion, the President of the RDTL 1, Francisco Xavier do Amaral, made a strong appeal for solidarity:

To all the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist countries of the world, I appeal and urge in the name of militant internationalism for cooperation in all areas (Do Amaral 1975).

Eight months following the Indonesian invasion, Prime Minister Nicolau Lobato delivered a speech transmitted via Radio Maubere on July 28, 1976, which once again acknowledged the importance of militant international solidarity:

Our liberation is part of the general process of liberation of all oppressed people in the world. We benefited from the struggle in Africa, as others have benefited from ours. Unity is the foundation of our revolution (CIET. NLA MS.9535/3/9. Box 6).

In the Resistance Bases, FRETILIN leaders taught that the Portuguese and the Indonesian people should be regarded as brothers, all fighting a common enemy, whether it be the fascist regime of Portugal, the Suharto fascist regime of Indonesia and its neo-colonial ambitions,

or against other imperialist forces. This view of militant internationalist solidarity became a central feature of the pedagogy of the Maubere revolution.

SOLIDARITY WORK IN PORTUGAL

The Political Transition in Portugal

When the *Movimento das Forças Armadas* (MFA) and its supporters from the *Movimento dos Capitães* of COPCON (*Comando Operacional do Continente*) overthrew the fascist regime in Portugal on 25 April 1974, they formed a coalition government known as the Junta for National Salvation, with General Sebastião Spínola as President. The first civilian Prime Minister was Adelino da Palma Carlos, appointed by the Junta 16 May 1974. However, political instability ensued, with competition over control between the military and civilian politicians. In July, Prime Minister Palma Carlos was dismissed by the Junta, and in September, President Spínola was dismissed and replaced by the more moderate Costa Gomes. Spínola initiated a failed coup, leading to his exile. Political stability did not return to Portugal until after the country's first free elections, held in July 1976, which were won by a socialist coalition under the leadership of Mário Soares.

Soon after the dismissals, COPCON imprisoned 400 militants of the Maoist *Movimento Reorganizativo do Partido Proletariado* (MRPP), dealing a hard blow to the Casa dos Timores students, some of whose leading members, as we saw in Chapter 3, were affiliated with it. As the Portuguese leadership shifted further to the right, the UDT launched its coup d'état in Dili. In the period from 1976 until the Resistance Bases were destroyed, the Portuguese Government failed to take any significant action to support the new Timorese Government other than to support resolutions in the United Nations General Assembly (Cabral 2002). This was the context in which the Casa dos Timores members who had remained in Lisbon and the solidarity organisation CIDAC initiated FRETILIN/RDTL's solidarity work in Portugal.

The FRETILIN Action Committee (*Comité de Acção da FRETILIN* - CAF)

After some members of the Casa dos Timores returned to Timor-Leste, those remaining in Portugal, under the leadership of Justino Yap and Estanislau da Silva formed the FRETILIN

Action Committee (CAF), on November 30, 1974. CAF's objective was to provide unconditional support for FRETILIN and the liberation struggle (CDPM-CIDAC 1974/TL3221; Justino Yap Interview, 12/06/2008; Estanislau da Silva and Filomena de Almeida Interview, 08/07/2008).

CAF began by issuing a press release, pointing out that, while recognising the anti-colonial movements in Africa, the Portuguese Government was increasingly isolating the only legitimate representative of the people of Timor, FRETILIN by pressing for a coalition between UDT and FRETILIN; and suspending FRETILIN's radio program (CDPM-CIDAC TL3221). The following day, December 1, 1974, CAF held a press conference, releasing a statement filled with much emotion:

. . . Timor is not known, therefore it is not supported, alas, there is nothing changed. Timor is all the more used to long years of living with the ignorance and forgetfulness of its oppressors and of its oppressed friends (CDPM-CIDAC TL3221).

This feeling of abandonment, they said, arose from the news of political manoeuvres between António de Almeida Santos, the Portuguese Minister for Colonial Territories, the Indonesian President Suharto and Prime Minister Whitlam of Australia. The Casa dos Timores were clearly aware of the geopolitical constraints on FRETILIN's anti-colonial and self-determination struggle - as a left wing nationalist party, FRETILIN was seen as a source of instability. Their press release stated that countries such as Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand had always taken action against progressive movements, and FRETILIN was now a target (CDPM-CIDAC TL3221).

The Casa dos Timores had also established links overseas. In February 1975, a telegram arrived from CIET, the solidarity group in Sydney:

LT-FRETILIN representatives – Casa dos Timores - Lisbon Portugal. Australian Press warn Indonesian invasion East Timor 2 or 3 weeks. Urgent you organise protest Europe stop. Campaign Independent East Timor Sydney (CDPM-CIDAC 1975/ TL3224).

Two days later on February 27, 1975 a demonstration was organised in Rossio, Lisbon, and

a pamphlet distributed warning the Portuguese public of the imminent Indonesian invasion, appealing to those whom they described as “the natural allies of the people of the colonies” to call on the Portuguese government to take a public stand supporting the independence struggle of the Timorese people (CDPM-CIDAC, 1975/ TL3220).

The Casa dos Timores planned another demonstration to coincide with an Indonesian delegation composed of officials of Indonesian Armed Forces which was arriving in Lisbon on 4 March 1975 for meetings with the Portuguese Government, in order to negotiate decolonisation, and consequently to set up a Transitional Government for Timor (CDPM-CIDAC 1975/TL3224). The solidarity campaign intensified with the visit of the Vice-President of FRETILIN Nicolau dos Reis Lobato who stopped over in Lisbon on the way home from Mozambique. In a press statement, Nicolau said that decolonization was not a just process, if Portugal was giving up Timor to Indonesia:

Decolonized to become independent is logical, but decolonised in order to be left colonized by a new colonial power simply makes no sense, it is an absurdity (Lobato 19/05/1975).

The following day, May 20, Casa dos Timores organised another demonstration with participation of African friends from Angola, Mozambique, Guinea and São Tomé e Príncipe, to celebrate the first anniversary of ASDT-FRETILIN. The Portuguese solidarity groups released a communiqué entitled ‘Communiqué of the Portuguese people and the progressive forces’ which explained that FRETILIN and Timor-Leste were being geopolitically blockaded by ASEAN, describing Indonesia as “a faithful ally of imperialist forces . . . Australia [is] adopting a very ambiguous position, between its friendship with Indonesia and the call by the Australian people for the right to self-determination by the Timorese people”(CPDM-CIDAC 1975/TL3223). This ambiguity was to plague successive Australian Governments over the next thirty years.

In May 1975, CAF published the second edition of its bulletin describing the UDT and APODETI as agents of imperialism and claimed that “the imperialist forces were attempting to break the UDT and FRETILIN coalition using the classical method of ‘divide and rule’” (CAF 1975). Casa dos Timores at its General Assembly on July 29, 1975 called on the Portuguese

Government to withdraw its representatives in Timor namely Governor Colonel Lemos Pires, Lieutenant Colonel Maggioli, the Commander of Portuguese Police Forces, Pinades Lourenço Delegate of the General Prosecutor and one unnamed officer, a lawyer at the Dili prison (Casa dos Timores 29/07/1975).

A month later, following the shift right-wards of the Government in Lisbon, UDT launched its coup d'état aiming to eliminate left wing FRETILIN leaders (Freney 1991, p.350), and demanded the departure of Major Jónatas and Major Mota whom they regarded as pro-FRETILIN and pro-Independence. Within weeks however, FRETILIN defeated UDT, and CAF sent a message to congratulate the CCF and FALINTIL for their political and military victory over the reactionary UDT (JPM 11/10/1975, p.2). Early in October 1975, Abílio Araújo, who had returned to Portugal, contacted Mau Lear in Dili through Radio Marconi, telling him that the solidarity movement in Portugal supported FRETILIN (JPM 11/10/1975, p.2). However, while FRETILIN may still have had support of left wing political groupings in Portugal and in Europe, it was losing support within the Portuguese Government.

BAC-CIDA-C and the Information Campaign

Soon after the Carnation Revolution on 25 April 1974, CIDA-C (*Centro de Informação e Documentação Anti-Colonial*) established relations with African students in Portugal and was producing films on liberation struggles, and holding public lectures, debates and demonstrations supporting independence of these African territories, particularly Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde, and São Tomé e Príncipe. Luisa Teotónio Pereira, a founding member of CIDA-C, recalled that it made its first contact with FRETILIN in September 1974, through the Casa dos Timores students in Lisbon (Pereira 2004, p.30). CIDA-C organized a National Week of Solidarity with the people of colonies and the Republic of Guinea Bissau, in December 1974, and this was the first meeting which brought together representatives of FRELIMO, FRETILIN, MLSTP¹⁷⁸, MPLA and PAIGC (Pereira 2004, p.30). When the Casa dos Timores

178 The Committee for the Liberation of São Tomé and Príncipe (CLSTP) was founded in exile in Gabon in 1960, to oppose Portuguese colonial rule. In 1972, the CLSTP became the MLSTP (Movimento da Libertação São Tome e Príncipe).

students left to start their popular education movement in Timor, CIDA-C again contributed to the campaign. According to Pereira

A group of young students who departed for Dili, in the winter of 1974, enthusiastic about the literacy campaign in their birth place, took with them publications and a collection of films borrowed from CIDA-C. Almost all were brutally assassinated by the invading forces of the Republic of Indonesia... (Pereira, 2004, p.30).

CIDA-C developed an analysis of the coup d'état in Timor and presented a public statement, on 6 November 1975. CIDA-C argued that the Portuguese bourgeoisie in Timor, referring to high ranking officials in the Portuguese administration, local kings (*régulos*), coffee and coco plantation owners, had changed their strategy by abandoning their neo-colonial pretensions and with the Portuguese politicians had chosen to abandon Timor in favor of Indonesia. CIDA-C also said "that the 650,000 Timorese people, oppressed for centuries by colonial domination, abandoned in a precarious condition of under-development, are awakening now with arms to decide their destiny" (CIDAC 6/11/1975). The Communiqué concluded with "Fight against imperialism! Long live international solidarity! FRETILIN will win!" (CIDAC 6/11/1975).

After the full-scale Indonesian invasion, CIDA-C continued to receive information, mainly from CIET in Australia. CIDA-C made an appeal to the United Nations dated 7 September 1976 entitled: "The Question of Timor is Open: Solidarity with the Struggle of FRETILIN" to re-open debate on the question of Timor. Meanwhile in Colombo, Sri Lanka, the Non- Aligned Conference condemned the Indonesian aggression and called for the right of self-determination for the Timorese people while the Portuguese Government maintained its shameful silence. CIDA-C then called for all Portuguese progressive forces to launch a campaign of public speech, mobilization and solidarity with the Popular Resistance in Timor-Leste (CIDA-C 7/9/1976).

In 1977, CIDA-C launched a re-invigorated campaign. In honor of Amílcar Cabral, *Centro de CIDA-C* was transformed into *Centro de Informação e Documentação Amílcar Cabral* (CIDAC) on January 20, 1977, the anniversary of his death (Pereira 2004, p.32). From then onwards, CIDAC produced a series of publications on FRETILIN called *Timor-Leste: Boletim*

de Informação do CIDAC (referred to in this thesis as *Timor-Leste*). However, some of the Portuguese public doubted that the information provided in the publication was true. The public also doubted if a small backward people had the capacity to resist Indonesian occupation. Questions continued, and even the existence of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste was seen as a mystification (*Timor-Leste* 15/4/1977).

In early January 1977, James Dunn, a former Australian Consul in Dili, visited Portugal and in his report accused the Indonesians of committing grave human rights violations in Timor. Diplomat Dunn's strong statement against Indonesia provided the Portuguese public with a new level of understanding on the situation in Timor-Leste. Dunn's report was printed in the second and third editions of *Timor-Leste* (15/4/1977; 1/5/1977). CIDAC also continued its campaign to convince the Portuguese public of the existence of RDTL, with an article in the third edition of *Timor-Leste*, entitled "The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste is an Anti-Colonial and Anti-Imperialist State".

Soon after Roque Rodrigues, a CCF member and the Republic's Ambassador to Mozambique, visited Portugal, and CIDAC organized a public forum. Rodrigues re-affirmed that the RDTL was an anti-colonial, anti-neocolonial and anti-imperialist State (*Timor-Leste* 01/05/1977) and his article in the fourth edition entitled "Timor-Leste: O Cerco do Imperialism" presented further evidence of the organizational capacity of the Government in the mountains:

RDTL-FRETILIN is not only able to resist militarily against the occupation forces by controlling 80 percent of the national territory after 17 months of a guerrilla war, which has cost the lives of 14,000-15,000 soldiers and more than 200 million dollars, but is even able to organize its population in the Resistance Bases. FRETILIN has developed projects such as a food production, education and literacy programs, and basic health care. There was abundant food production in the first year of the project, 200 nurses have been trained to use traditional medicines and 50,000 adults have gone to schools. There is now a Timor-Leste Red-Cross in operation in the mountains (*Timor-Leste* 01/05/1977, my translation).

The commitment of CIDAC and its supporters to FRETILIN/RDTL appears to have been very strong. Even when the Bases de Apoio fell, their solidarity campaign continued. From 1979 to 1981, CIDAC intensified its campaign, responding it seems to FRETILIN's strategy to strengthen the diplomatic front of the liberation struggle. According to Luisa Teotónio, CIDAC organized two international events. One was a seminar on Timor-Leste in Lisbon 1979 and the second was a special session on *Tribunal Permanente dos Povos*, also in Lisbon in 1981. It was in this special session that the CPDM (*Comissão Para os Direitos do Povo Maubere*) was established, which then continued to campaign for the liberation of Timor-Leste over the next eighteen years (Pereira 2004, p.38). Thirty years after its founding, CIDAC was acknowledged by the President of Portugal, Jorge Sampaio, for its matchless support of the independence struggle (CIDAC 2004, p.13) which originated with the work of the *Casa dos Timores* in 1974-75, and was an expression of the revolutionary anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist analysis which CIDAC and the *Casa dos Timores* shared with their comrades in the national liberation movements in Portugal's African colonies.

The External Delegation: The Militant Diplomats

FRETILIN sent three of its senior members on a diplomatic mission two days before the invasion on December 7, 1975, Mari Alkatiri, José Ramos Horta and Rogério Tiago Lobato. Other members of the CCF who had returned to Portugal earlier were Abílio Araújo, Guilhermina dos Santos and Roque Rodrigues. Together with the remaining members of the Casa dos Timores in Lisbon, these people formed a team of the organic leaders of the Maubere People. In the face of the uncertain political support in Portugal, FRETILIN and FRELIMO made a agreement, and the External Delegation of FRETILIN, under the leadership of Mari Alkatiri, moved to Maputo in Mozambique.¹⁷⁹ According to Ana Pessoa and Pascoela Barreto, both members of CAF, about a dozen other members of CAF also moved to Mozambique at this time, including Marina Ribeiro (Marina Alkatiri, wife of Mari), Alice Casimiro, Madalena Boavida, Tereza Serra, Amélia Sequeira, Filomena de Almeida, Lola, Adelina Tilman, Zito de Oliveira, Afonso de Oliveira, Mário Alvez, Policarpo Pina, António Faculto, and José Soares (Amaral, 2007).

179 Cabral (2002) provides an account of the work of the External Delegation based in Maputo.

In Mozambique, some were able to continue their studies. This move ended CAF's work in Portugal, and the solidarity work in Portugal was taken over by CIDAC.

In 1978, Abílio Araújo, a member of the External Delegation of FRETILIN/RDTL who had remained in Lisbon, established the *Comité 28 de Novembro*, to which both FRETILIN and non-FRETILIN Timorese patriots living in Portugal belonged. Its main objective was "to support the heroic struggle of the Maubere People for independence and its revolutionary vanguard FRETILIN." Specifically, it supported Timorese refugees; provided training for FRETILIN cadres; and promoted Timorese culture. Various groups around Portugal co-operated with it, such as *Centro de Estudos Anti-Imperialistas* in Coimbra, and the theatre group of the *Comité de Apoio a Frente Polisario* of Western Sahara. It edited publications such as 'The Lorrikets Returned to Sing' (*Os Loricos Voltaram a Cantar*) and produced Timorese music (*Timor-Leste* 1978, p.10; José Kamarada Interview, 11/03/2009).

As the Indonesian forces intensified their operations, the *Comité 28 de Novembro* appealed:

to all socialist countries, all progressive and democratic forces worldwide to denounce such adventurist and demagogic politics of the Carter Government which on one hand was talking about human rights, and on the other hand sending million tons of war materials to execute the people of East Timor whose only crime is that they want freedom, in accordance with the basic principles and international rights of people to exercise their own sovereignty, their independence, their freedom and their peaceful co-existence with all peoples of the world (T13170-CDPM-CIDAC).

With the support of their African allies, the work of the External Delegation in this period, led the United Nations to adopt a number of resolutions calling upon the Indonesian Government to withdraw its forces. However, the United Nations was impotent to implement these decisions, and the Resistance Bases finally fell. For the next two decades, the External Delegation continued to represent FRETILIN/RDTL internationally. As well as being diplomats, they were militant educators of FRETILIN, attempting to make their cause known to the world, but particularly working to build and maintain the alliance with the African national liberation movements.

SOLIDARITY WORK IN AUSTRALIA

With the exception to the Communist Party of Australia (CPA) and some committed individuals, FRETILIN had difficulty in its first two years obtaining genuine solidarity support in Australia. Australia shares the Anglo-Saxon anti-communism of countries such as the United Kingdom, the United States of America, New Zealand and Canada; and in 1961-63, it had been involved in secret meetings in New York which had envisioned an incorporation of Portuguese Timor into Indonesia (Australian Commonwealth 2001, pp. 21-26). Australia's involvement in the US Alliance means, even today, that any political party that achieves Government in Australia cannot afford to ignore these historic ethnic and strategic alliances. While support might have been expected from Indigenous Australians, themselves the victims of colonialism, a long history of racist policies in Australia had left them isolated and with little political power.

The CPA had a history of campaigning against racism and colonialism in Australia, and a strong tradition of internationalism. However, despite some influence within the trade union and student movements at this time, the CPA was very much a minority force in Australian politics, and its influence continued to decline over the next fifteen years, until the majority of its remaining members voted to close the party down in 1991. This was the context in which FRETILIN began its political campaign in Australia.

On behalf of ASDT and later FRETILIN, José Ramos Horta made several visits to Australia between May 1974 and December 1975, to solicit support for the independence struggle from unions, aid agencies and individual members of the ALP and of the CPA. In October 1974, Denis Freney from the CPA National Executive visited Timor, as mentioned above. In his meetings with Nicolau Lobato, Mau Huno, José Ramos Horta, Vicente Reis 'Sahe' and Alarico Fernandes, he was told of the urgency of alerting Australia and the world to the danger of an Indonesian invasion. On his way home to Sydney, he visited Brian Manning, a CPA militant and Waterside Workers' union leader in Darwin,¹⁸⁰ briefing him about the independence struggle (Freney 1991, pp. 339- 348).

¹⁸⁰ Brian Manning had played a significant role in the Aboriginal Rights struggles in the Northern Territory, including the famous Gurindji people's walk-off in 1966 (Boughton 2001; Manning 2001).

CIET in Sydney

On his return to Sydney, Freney, with the backing of the CPA, established the Campaign for Independent East Timor (CIET) in November 1974, based in the offices of the Southern Africa Liberation Centre (SALC) in Sydney. In a letter dated November 1974, SALC warned its supporters of the “imminent danger of Indonesian invasion of East Timor and need for a mass campaign” in Australia. This was an appeal to all organizations concerned with the right of self-determination. The letter also stated that “we have already taken the initiative in forming a broad committee to act in solidarity with the people of East Timor” and added “if you can forward a financial donation, for immediate production of badges and stickers and further copies of this report, we would be grateful.” (CIET papers. Freney, D. NLA. MS 9535/3/9). This call resulted in two different groups visiting Timor. On January 23, 1975, CIET sent out a letter appealing for a delegation to visit Timor in response to a request from FRETILIN. In a press release by the Australian Union of Students (AUS) dated 23 February 1975 Ian MacDonald stated:

The Australian government should use every diplomatic action possible to persuade the Indonesian government not to enforce its will upon the people of Portuguese Timor ... the Australian Union of Students is committed to oppose unwanted interference in Portuguese Timor, and will organize action immediately (CIET papers. Freney, D. NLA. MS 9535/3/9).

Back in Dili, FRETILIN had established the OPTT and was preparing for a demonstration in March 1975. When this news reached the Australian unions they agreed to send a delegation consisting of Jim Roulston, Victorian Branch President of the Australian Metalworkers’ Union and Senior Vice President of the Victorian Branch of the Australian Labor Party; Keith Wilson, Secretary of the Newcastle Trades Hall Council; Jill Jolliffe representing the Australian Union of Students; John Birch, NSW Chairman of Community Aid Abroad; Tim Rowse, a lecturer at Flinders University, Adelaide; and Bill Williams, Aboriginal activist and field officer of the Aboriginal Legal Service, Adelaide (Press Release by Australia Delegation to East Timor, Sydney March 21, 1975).

Aside from this solidarity visit, the Australian Non Government Organizations launched an appeal for \$250,000 to avoid famine in Timor. Already nearly \$200,000 has been donated to

the Timor Relief Appeal and the first shipment of food, seeds and medical supplies had been delivered (CIET papers. Freney, D. NLA. MS 9535/3/9).

In May 1975, the Northern Territory Trades and Labour Council sent another delegation, consisting of Brian Manning, and a Timor-born ethnic Chinese waterside worker, Lai Con Liong, to Timor, to attend the ASDT first anniversary on 19 May 1975. In Dili, Manning met some members of FRETILIN and another link was then established. On his return, Manning's house became the contact point for FRETILIN leaders to send messages to the outside world (Brian Manning, Pers.com., 26/05/2011). This was the beginning of the clandestine radio operation with the CPA described below. Meanwhile, in October 1975, as FRETILIN forces were fighting the Indonesian military on the border, the Waterside Workers' union banned Indonesian ships in Melbourne and Darwin ports and there were moves to extend the bans to other ports by October 26, 1975 (CIET papers. Freney, D. NLA. MS 9535/3/9).

In response to FRETILIN's report describing the invasion on December 7, 1975 CIET put out a press release and pamphlet saying:

Can you stand by and watch the genocide in East Timor? ...Come to the December 17 rally and make it the first, big step for a continuing series of protests against this genocidal war: ---whatever party wins the December 13 elections, such a mobilization will be needed. Demands: all Indonesian forces out of East Timor now; recognize the RDTL and cut all military and economic ties with the Indonesian generals. Protest outside Indonesian consulate in Sydney (CIET papers. Freney, D. NLA. MS 9535/3/9).

The Australian East Timor Association (AETA)

A year after CIET had formed in Sydney, activists in Melbourne, including David Scott from Community Aid Abroad/ACFOA, established the Australian East Timor Association (AETA). AETA was formed in response to and in recognition of the establishment of the Democratic Republic of East Timor (AETA: L.54/43. Box 18). Several months later, on April 29, 1976, forty nine people participated in a General Meeting which elected AETA's first Executive Committee, namely Dr. Bill Roberts, Chairman; Mr. Jim Roulston, Vice Chairperson; Mr. Andrew Hewett,

Secretary and Mr. Bruce Ratcliff, treasurer; and the Committee Members were Wes Arnott, Ian Bell, Ann Brady, Jill Jolliffe, Natalie Savin, David Scott, and John Waddingham. The Assembly resolved to carry out a systematic campaign through public statements, leaflets, articles and books and the provision of speakers, and to work in cooperation with organizations with similar aims throughout Australia and interested countries. It was agreed to publish a bi-monthly newsletter¹⁸¹ to be circulated to all members (AETA: L.54/43. Box18).

However, conflicts soon arose between the two solidarity groups, which were ideologically very different. As described in the next section, information from FRETILIN inside Timor after the invasion was obtained via a clandestine radio operation, set up and controlled by the CPA and FRETILIN. The news received was first circulated through the CIET East Timor News Agency (ETNA) and the CPA newspaper Tribune, and was then further circulated to FRETILIN supporters all around the world. David Scott and Richard Tanter from AETA saw this as counterproductive, and in 1976, they wrote an eleven-page analysis, urging the FRETILIN leadership to change their strategy in Australia (Scott and Tanter 1976 in ACFOA archives; see also Scott 2005).

Their arguments were: “First, there was a large reservoir of public support for FRETILIN and the East Timorese people, but it has proved very difficult to convert that latent support into political action.” Second, part of the cause of this was “the direct link between FRETILIN and the Communist Party of Australia through Denis Freney and ETNA, [which] is often mentioned by conservative (and moderate A.L.P) politicians and journalists as a reason for not supporting FRETILIN.” Third, there was a “power politics dispute between the CPA and the Australian Labor Party”. The policy paper further recommended to the External Delegation of FRETILIN that the reports from East Timor should be sent directly to Chris Santos¹⁸² and released by him to the media. They argued for a fortnightly journal, to be edited by Chris Santos, as an official organ of FRETILIN (Tanter n.d.).

181 One of AETA's founding members, John Waddingham, recently created a digital archive of the newsletters of both AETA and CIET, at <http://chartperiodicals.wordpress.com/>

182 Chris Santos was a member of FRETILIN, a Portuguese national based in Sydney, who was working with Freney on the translations of the cables from East Timor.

The CPA did in fact have support from some elements of the ALP, including Federal Parliamentarian Ken Fry, who had spoken with FRETILIN leaders through the Darwin radio in April 1976, and while Fry was initially a minority, the ALP eventually, on July 8, 1977 passed a resolution condemning the Indonesian aggression against Timor-Leste, and calling for an immediate Indonesian withdrawal from the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. The resolution also recommended “the future Australian Labor Party Government to consider: first, suspension of military aid to Indonesia until all its forces are withdrawn from territory of Timor-Leste; second, recognition of a Timor-Leste Government, which should be confirmed through a genuine act of self-determination” (*Timor-Leste* 1/08/1977, p.5).

In 1978, David Scott reviewed AETA’s campaigning efforts:

Public meetings with MPs and unionists, a number of small rallies, a 24 hour vigil commemorating the deaths of the Australian journalists, a travelling photographic show, many film evenings and speaking engagements to political party branches, union branches and community groups (including prisons). It held rallies commemorating FRETILIN’s special occasions, public meetings with Chris Santos about the arrest of Xavier do Amaral; public meetings with trade unionists....More has happened in 1978 (ACFOA 106/39, Box.1).

Nevertheless, the Australian Government continued issuing licenses for national and international companies to explore for oil in the Timor Sea. A license was granted to a number of companies such as Pelsart Oil NL, Woodside Oil, Shell (Aus.) mid-Eastern Oil, British Petroleum, Getty Oil, Mid American Oil, Voyager Petroleum, Bridge Oil, and Union Texas Australia (*Timor-Leste* 1/06/1977). Bitter moments came in February 1978, when the Australian Government supported Indonesia and recognised Timor-Leste as an integral part of Indonesia (*Timor-Leste* 18/02/1978). It was the only country in the world to do so.

RADIO MAUBERE: RDTL I’s Official Broadcaster, 1976-1978

Maubere, as discussed in Chapter 5, was the term used by FRETILIN/RDTL to describe the “working masses” of Timor-Leste, the people who were the base of the resistance against

colonialism and the Indonesian occupation. Radio Maubere, the official national broadcaster of FRETILIN/RDTL had two major tasks: to conscientize the people and to maintain an information channel between the the Resistance Bases and the FRETILIN/RDTL supporters in the occupied territories and internationally.

Broadcasting from the Resistance Bases

ASDT had a Radio Program known as *Rádio Haksolok* (Radio of Joy) to campaign publicly for its political programs, and this continued after the transformation of ASDT to FRETILIN (Abílio Araújo, Interview 09/09/2009). But *Rádio Haksolok* was suspended by the new Portuguese Government on November 30, 1974 (CDPM-CIDAC TL3221). Twelve months later, predicting an invasion by Indonesia was increasingly likely, and realising radios would be necessary to maintain links with the outside world, Brian Manning organised through the Northern Territory Labour Council to send Warwick Neilley¹⁸³, a young Darwin-based CPA member and trade union organiser to Dili in November, carrying six Single Side Band (SSB) Radios for FRETILIN (Brian Manning, Pers. Com. 01/05/2011; Freney 1991, p.354).

RDTL's first Minister of Information and Internal Security had completed a radio technician course in Darwin prior to the Indonesian invasion (Boughton-Dent 2003, p.3). Francisco Broja da Costa, who had studied journalism in Portugal, and was the Secretary of FRETILIN's Department of Information, was executed by the Indonesians on December 07, 1975, the day of the invasion. Fernando Carmo, the Vice-Minister of Information and Internal Security Commander was ambushed and killed by Indonesian forces the same day, as he was on his way to rescue the Australian journalist Roger East, who had been operating the East Timor Information Service (CIET papers. Freney, D. NLA. MS 9535/3/9). Alarico Fernandes therefore took over responsibility for operating FRETILIN's radio, which was then re-named *Rádio Maubere*. From then on, it became the official radio broadcaster of FRETILIN/RDTL and the Resistance's only communication link with the outside world.

183 Neilley purchased the SSB Radios 'off the shelf' in Darwin. They were already set up with frequency crystals used in the VJY Darwin Radio network in use at that time for communications throughout the remote areas of the Northern Territory. He was also involved with the radio contact in the early stages. He became a CPA and Building Union organiser in Sydney in the 1980s, and more recently was a Ministerial adviser in the NSW ALP State Government (Brian Manning, Pers. Com. 01/05/2011).

Fernandes worked initially with Arsénio Horta, a younger brother of José Ramos Horta, who was a member of UDT, and had been detained when FRETILIN gained control of the territory. Both had spent time in Darwin, and both spoke good English and Portuguese as well as Tetum. Arsénio Horta recalled in his memoirs that in the early days, Alarico Fernandes had attempted desperately to contact Australian Red Cross seeking help, but obtained nothing. Until January 1976, Alarico Fernandes was only able to communicate with Darwin through the VJY network, using public and coded messages which were received by Tony Belo, a Timorese operator in Darwin working with Manning (Horta 1981, p.7; Manning 2003). Then, according to Horta, Fernandes released a FRETILIN prisoner, Alexandre Lemos, who was a radio technician, and Radio Maubere started broadcasting (Horta 1981, p.12).

Rádio Maubere broadcast in three languages, Portuguese, Tetum and English to conscientise the people, affirming to them that Timor-Leste was already an independent nation.

East Timor is a new country and it is the child of Timorese people and we run it. Many countries in the world already recognize us as an independent country and respect our sovereignty.

We will explain the FRETILIN program. One part of it is that everyone should be educated. Why this is so? The people must do things for their own benefit. We must teach the elementary things of hygiene. Our education must be complete so that we can look after our children properly. The new society must be healthy for the strength of the country in the future. We must have good food to develop our bodies.

Why do we want Portuguese as our official language? Because for five hundred years we did not have our language developed under colonialism. We will use Portuguese for the time being to develop and later we will use Tetum and we develop. For the time being Portuguese is needed because modern technology does not have words equivalent in Tetum. The Portuguese suppressed our customs and language use and left us behind. We must study this problem closely so that we can use Tetum in the future.

Stay tuned into the Voice of Maubere, the voice of the people. In five hundred years under Portuguese colonialism, in the history of humanity of Timorese people, this is not the first time we have had to fight for our freedom. Do not let these new rulers mislead us, they are the same as Portuguese colonialists.

The only way to be free is for you to become free yourself; no one else can do it. (What follows is in English on recording from East Timor...) (Transcript from April 7, 1976, Denis Freney:CIET.MS.9535/3/9)

These broadcasts were heard in Indonesian West Timor, according to a group of Timorese refugees who had demonstrated in Atambua to be allowed to go to Portugal, and then heard news of their demonstration on the radio (CIET Press Release November 12, 1976, NLA MS 9535/3/16). People living in Dili listened to Rádio Maubere and the Indonesian military had been powerless to stop it (Freney 1976). The memoirs of Arsénio Horta identified the following names of people who worked with Fernandes, in the Department of Information and Internal Security: Arsénio Horta, Alexandre Lemos, Leopoldo and Fernando Pedruco, Artur Nascimento, Augusto Vaz, and a Chinese-Timorese named Aseng (Horta 1981, pp.9, 20,34).

Rádio Maubere operated inside Timor-Leste until late 1978, when the radio and Fernandes were captured in the encirclement operation which led to the fall of the Resistance Bases. These events are still shrouded in mystery, but FRETILIN believed that after his capture, Fernandes collaborated with the Indonesians to use the radio to spread misinformation and create a trap for the other leaders (Cabral 2002, p.266).

‘Mount Macau’: The Official FRETILIN/RDTL Communion Line

In addition to public broadcasts, the FRETILIN/RDTL leaders also used the radios to send messages in and out of Timor-Leste, maintaining communications between the internal and the external fronts of the struggle. Initially, when Fernandes sent such messages via VJY Radio, they were passed on by phone from the Darwin VJY receiving station to Manning, who would

send them on to Freney and the CIET Office in Sydney for retransmission, including to United Nations Secretary General Kurt Waldheim and supporting governments around the world.

When the conservative Liberal Country Party Government of Malcolm Fraser ordered the VJY station to stop passing on the messages, Manning worked with Tony Belo, a young Timorese, to maintain contact with Alarico Fernandes via their own radio. Manning would pass on the messages to FRETILIN leaders overseas by phone. Under Australian law, these unauthorised international communications were illegal, and, on January 25th 1975, the police arrested Belo and the radio was confiscated, only a week before the United Nations Envoy Winspeare Guicciardi was due to arrive in Australia, en route to Timor. This effectively prevented the FRETILIN/RDTL leadership communicating directly with the Envoy to arrange his safe passage to meet them. On January 30, 1976 a CIET press statement pointed out:

Mr. Peacock and Mr. Fraser show great concern of the 'illegality' of the FRETILIN radio transmitter, but little concern for the illegality of Indonesia's invasion of East Timor, which is costing thousands of lives (Freney:CIET.MS.9535/3/9).

Guicciardi's mission was aborted and he had to return to New York (Brian Manning, Personal Communication 13/12/2008; Rob Wesley Smith, 1997, p.1; Freney 1991, p.358)..

In order to re-open communication lines, Manning and Freney then worked through the CPA to establish a more secure clandestine operation. This time, the radio link was established on the property of one of Manning's contacts outside of Darwin. To confuse Australian Federal Police, Belo spread the news that he was going to Macau and that the Radio was named *Mount Macau*, as if they were operating from Macau (Rob Wesley Smith 1997, p.1; Freney 1991, p.360; Manning 2003). The operation went successfully. Some months later, FRETILIN External Delegation leader Abilio Araújo visited Australia with Estanislau da Silva and met with the CPA. It was agreed da Silva would take over from Belo. Joe Palmada, the CPA's Head of Security, organised for Harry Hatfield, a metal worker comrade, to fit out a Toyota Coaster with a mobile radio, which would receive coded messages. These were sent for decoding to the External Delegation of FRETILIN and from there to solidarity organizations around the world.

Another CPA member, Neville Cunningham, was assigned to work as an operator with da Silva, but he left the operation after a while, and was replaced by Andrew Waterhouse (Freney 1991, p. 360-361; Manning 2003; Boughton-Dent 2003). This operation lasted several months until September 1976, when, ten days before Australian Prime Minister Fraser was to visit Jakarta, the police moved in again, arresting da Silva and Waterhouse and seizing their transmitter (*Timor-Leste* 15/11/1977, p.8). The CIET Press Release of November 22, 1976 (MS.9535/3/16) reads:

Mr. Estanislao da Silva, a member of FRETILIN and East Timorese, was discovered by Telecom and police officials in the vicinity of a radio transmitter, in bushland outside Darwin on September 27. He was charged with no offence but police took his passport and allowed him to return to Darwin, asking him only to get in touch with Immigration Officials in the next few days or so. Mr. da Silva wants urgently to leave Australia and return to Mozambique. He has therefore decided to sit in at the Immigration Office at Chifley Square until he receives a reply (CIET Press Release November 22, 1976. MS.9535/3/16-).

Not long after this, da Silva was re-arrested, extradited to Darwin where he was tried, found guilty and eventually deported. The radio remained in the hands of the police (Freney 1991, p.361),.

These events prompted another underground operation by the CPA, with the authorization of the External Delegation of FRETILIN, and financial support from Dutch support groups. This time the CPA brought in Chris Elenor, a radical young English self-described 'hippy' who had just arrived from London in 1976 and joined the CPA. Elenor was given a false identity, intense radio operation training, and a vehicle fitted out with a radio concealed in the reserve fuel tank to drive to remote locations outside Darwin, from where he operated the radio for six months (Elenor 2003; Freney 1991, p.361-362; Boughton-Dent 2003). Elenor recalled his first contact:

Amazing, through the crashing storm static, I could hear the tinny strains of *Foho Ramelau*. This was it. Somehow, from somewhere, they were still broadcasting: Viva FRETILIN, Viva Povo Maubere . . .

This *Kolibere*, this is *Kolibere* calling Alarico Fernandes and FRETILIN. This is *Kolibere* in Australia. Can you hear me, over . . .

Hello *Kolibere*, hello *Kolibere*, this is Alarico Fernandes, I am receiving you . . .

It had worked, for the first time, and I knew they wouldn't catch me, not this time. What a blast (Elenor 2003, pp 36-7).

Six months later, another CPA comrade, John Wishart arrived, and replaced Chris Elenor who, by then, had identified 25 usable transmitting sites. Other operators included Andrew Waterhouse, David Arkins, and Peter Bryson 'Cosmos' (Boughton 2003). The *Mount Macau* underground radio operation was successfully maintained without being captured by the police until the end of 1978, when it was closed down after the Indonesians captured both the radios and their operators inside Timor-Leste, and began using it to broadcast misinformation.



Photo. From left: John Wishart, Brian Manning, Chris Elenor and Dave Arkin in Dili for the FRETILIN Cadres Conference in 2000. Brian ran the "public" radio in Darwin, but was also the CPA contact point for the illegal operation. The other three were underground operators (Source: Rough Reds at <http://roughreds.com/index.html>)

CONCLUSION

In 1979, after the collapse of the Resistance Bases, FRETILIN/RDTL were forced to make a political compromise by calling for a referendum, a position that FRETILIN had previously rejected. The representatives of the External Delegation of FRETILIN such as Abílio Araújo, Roque Rodrigues and José Ramos Horta, made a statement to the Fourth Committee of the UN on October 23, 1979:

FRETILIN - the East Timor national liberation front ... calls for a referendum in East Timor, under U.N. supervision, in order to ascertain the real wishes of the people of the territory. We would go further to accept Indonesian full participation in the agreements leading toward that referendum. An international police force comprising of forces from various countries, including those of Indonesia, could be stationed in the territory during and until the conclusion of the referendum process (Araújo 1979, p.15).

This statement marked a new strategy of intensive international diplomacy. In Portugal, as was seen above, CIDAC continued its work. In Australia, the Fraser Government had banned official visits by FRETILIN's External Delegation in November 1975, and the ban was not lifted until the Hawke Labor Government came to power in 1983. The first demonstration at which FRETILIN and RDTL flags were displayed was held in Sydney in 1981. There was a big public demonstration in Melbourne when Roque Rodrigues and Abílio Araújo visited in 1983.

FRETILIN's efforts to maintain its external organisation within the Timorese refugee community in Australia are documented in the Report of CAVR:

The first official FRETILIN Committee was established in Sydney in 1986 with Harold Moucho as coordinator. By the late 1980s FRETILIN was well established in many parts of Australia, including Darwin, Sydney, Melbourne and Perth and had good contact with the Resistance in Timor-Leste. Agio Pereira was the first FRETILIN representative in Australia. Others were Alfredo Ferreira, Estanislau da Silva and Francisco Carlos. They had responsibilities for various parts of Australia and the region, and worked hard at building links with political parties, the Church, civil society and the media in support of Timor-Leste. The Party held an Extraordinary Conference in Sydney on 14-20 August 1998 (CAVR, Ch 7.1, para 365)

Abílio Araújo and Roque Rodrigues also attended the Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific (NFIP) Conference in Vanuatu in 1983, establishing links between the Resistance and the Pacific Islands people. The NFIP movement revived links between FRETILIN and the Aboriginal rights movement in Australia, which was an active participant in the NFIP, through organisations like Tranby College in Sydney and the Institute for Aboriginal Development in Alice Springs (Durnan and Beetson 2011).

By 1987, the National Council for Maubere Resistance (CNRM) became the new platform, and José Ramos Horta was appointed as its Official Representative. José Ramos Horta launched a new campaign under CNRM, telling solidarity groups in Australia in the late 1980s that FRETILIN no longer represented the movement inside Timor-Leste, and should not be supported. This created tensions within the Australian solidarity movement between those who remained in support of FRETILIN and those who supported CNRM (Deborah Durnan, Pers. com., 29/04/2011).

The solidarity movement changed dramatically after the massacre of 241 unarmed demonstrators at Santa Cruz by the Indonesian forces on November 12, 1991 (discussed in the next chapter). As many commentators have observed, the events at Santa Cruz, which were filmed clandestinely and shown internationally, brought a new dimension to international solidarity work with Timor-Leste. The Catholic Church, in particular, became much more active in this period. The following year, José Ramos Horta and Mari Alkatiri met with two Filipino socialists, Renato Constino and Jose Augusto Micalat to discuss the possibility of a regional conference on Timor-Leste (José Ramos Horta, Public Seminar 20/06/2009). Two years later, in 1994, in cooperation with CNRM, the solidarity groups in the Philippines organized the Asia-Pacific Coalition for East Timor (APCET), bringing together solidarity groups from across the world, and greatly increasing the visibility of the Timorese resistance in the Asia Pacific region (Mattoso 2005, p.221). Comprised more of non-government organizations, rather than as a mass movement, APCET organized series of conferences in Malaysia (1995), Thailand (1997), and Jakarta (1998). US public opinion also began to shift, with the new solidarity movement there focusing on the issue of economic and military cooperation with Indonesia (Kohen 1999, pp.173, 183).

However, some of these new solidarity groups were only supportive of the idea of independence, and not at all supportive of FRETILIN as a revolutionary political movement.

The contemporary international popular education movement recognizes the centrality of international solidarity to its theory and practice. For example, the Scottish popular educators who established the International Popular Education network (PEN) included the following in their definition:

Popular education seeks to connect the local and the global. In every context it proceeds from specific, localised forms of education and action, but *it deliberately sets out to foster international solidarity* by making these local struggles part of the wider international struggle for justice and peace (Crowther et al, 1999, p.4)

As early as 1974, the FRETILIN leadership was conscious of the importance of the international solidarity in the struggle against colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism, and had developed links to mobilize support from the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist movement in Africa, Australia and Portugal. The work of the Casa dos Timores and CIDAC in Portugal, and their links with African movements, the formation of CIET and AETA in Australia, and the establishment of a radio link to transmit information through Australia, are indicators of the value of such solidarity links. While this story of international solidarity has been told in many publications, this account demonstrates that the primary relationships in Australia and Portugal were established through FRETILIN/RDTL's connections with the wider militant internationalist movement against imperialism and colonialism. Moreover, this work was a deliberate and conscious part of the strategy of the Maubere revolution which established organizations that mobilized people and public opinion through protests, media campaigns, seminars and conferences, even holding people's tribunals in support of FRETILIN and the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste and the heroic struggle of the Maubere. However, with the exception of the newly independent African countries, which remain loyal supporters of FRETILIN, these campaigns were not powerful enough to influence political events in Portugal and Australia between 1974-1978.

CHAPTER 12

THE REORGANIZATION OF THE FRETILIN RDTL1 GOVERNMENT AS A CLANDESTINE FRONT

INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides an understanding of the dynamics of the Resistance movement from 1981 to 1999, including the formation of the clandestine movement and its methods of popular action. This account demonstrates how FRETILIN built upon the experiences and political education gained during the period of decolonization and RDTL I to sustain the Maubere liberation movement. The underlying argument is that popular education continued to play a vital role inside the occupied territories, through a different approach.

The chapter is divided into two main sections, the first of which concerns the first national reflection following the collapse of the Bases de Apoio and the actions taken following this historic conference, including the formation of the Clandestine Front. The second section discusses how from 1988 onwards FRETILIN students transformed *Universitas Timor-Timur* (UNTIM), the only university established by the Indonesian occupiers. There were many youth organizations involved, particularly after the massacre at the Santa Cruz cemetery. I will only discuss the Association of Anti-integration Youth and Students (HPP-MAI) and the Student Solidarity Council (SSC), the two organizations in which I was an active participant, and which were distinct in their philosophy and method of operation.

THE RE-ORGANIZATION OF THE RDTL

The occupying forces had annihilated most of the leading figures of the FRETILIN RDTL1 Government including the President of the Republic, Nicolau dos Reis Lobato, the Prime Minister António Carvarinho ‘Mau Lear’, the National Political Commissar. Vicente Reis ‘Sahe’, and had forced many other members of the Central Committee of FRETILIN either to cooperate or to surrender at the end of 1978 and early 1979. Only three members of the Central Committee of FRETILIN survived: José Alexandre Gusmão, ‘Kay Rala Xanana’, José Manuel da Costa ‘Ma’Huno Bulerek Karataianu’ and Fernando Teles do Nascimento, ‘Txai’

(Gusmão 1999, p. 63; Ran Kadalak 1981, p.32). When Txai, a former member of the Casa dos Timores died in combat in 1980, only Xanana and Ma'Huno remained to lead the struggle (Aurélio Freitas Ribeiro, Pers. Com. 15/03/2011). Other surviving FALANTIL commanders who worked with the leadership to reorganise the Resistance included Reinaldo Coreia 'Kilik Wae Gae' and 'Bere Malae Laka' (Gusmão 2000, p. 63; Gama 1995, p.101).

As a result of the collapse of the Bases de Apoio, most people surrendered, and were forced to live in strictly controlled settlements or 'strategic camps' throughout the Indonesian occupied country, where many thousands died from a severe famine (CAVR 2006, Chapter 7 pp. 49ff).

The Aitana Conference: Critical Reflection and The Declaration of PML-FRETILIN

Despite suffering an extremely serious set back, FRETILIN militants were still hopeful of continuing the "arduous and protracted war" as planned. Xanana Gusmão along with Ma'Huno had taken the initiative to consult the people and to re-organise the Resistance. They learned that despite the loss of direction and uncertainty about the future of the struggle, the dreams and fighting spirit of the Maubere people remained strong, encouraging FRETILIN leaders to continue the struggle. Xanana Gusmão with his troops met some warriors in Venilale, for example, who told him: "Son, carry on the fight! Don't ever surrender! You are the only hope!" (Gusmão 2000, p.65). However, it took over two long years for Xanana Gusmão and Ma'Huno, with the support of the middle-ranking Commanders, to organise a national meeting on 1-8 March 1981, at Mount Aitana in the sub-district of Lacluta. This was their first opportunity for collective evaluation and reflection about the conduct of the revolution and the war against the Indonesian occupying forces. The theme of the conference was the "re-organization of the nation" (CAVR 2006, Chapter 5, p.27; Gusmão 2000, p.68). FRETILIN leaders had studied and applied different theories about politics and war from late 1975 until 1980. Now in order to facilitate a more methodical study of the processes of the Resistance, prior to the conference, Xanana Gusmão had prepared two reports: 'Homeland and Revolution'; and 'The Themes of War' (Gusmão 2000, p.67; see also Ran Kadalak 1981, p.47). The *Thoughts of Chairman Mao* was his only property in the forest at this time (Gusmão 2000, p.47). Mao's ideas had influenced the FRETILIN leaders' thinking, particularly in the conduct of war (Cabral 2002,

p.281-282), and it appears that this influence prevailed. At this historic meeting, FRETILIN members determined to identify and correct the mistakes they had committed and to develop new ideas and strategies. José da Costa 'Mau Hudo Ran Kadalak', who was the Secretary of the Conference, wrote:

In truth, it was a real school of democracy where everyone learned mutually from the experiences of others, where we all learnt to respect the opinions of others and helped each other mutually to correct mistakes and limitations of each other, in the spirit to serve better. In summary it was a true school of democratic centralism (Ran Kadalak 1981, p.51. Translated by author).

The Aitana Conference achieved a clarity at the ideological level of the struggle by renaming the Party the Partido Marxista Leninista-FRETILIN (PML-F), thus retaining the vanguard spirit, in accordance with the decision of the previous conference at Laline in 1977 when the CCF had adopted a Marxist ideology. The Aitana Conference also elected nine members of FRETILIN to assume leadership of the CCF, namely José da Costa 'Mau Hodo Ran Kadalak', 'Bere Malae Laka', Reinaldo Coreia 'Kilik Wae Gae', Dinis Carvalho 'Nelo Kadomi Timor', 'Sakin Nere Ulas Timor Lemorai', 'Holy Natxa', Tito da Costa 'Lere Anan Timor', 'Hari Nere' and Paulino Gama 'Mauk Moruk Teki Timor Ran Nakali Lemorai' (Cabral 2002, p.270; see also Gusmão 2000, p.64). It was also agreed that External Delegation members Abílio Araújo, Marí Alkatiri, Roque Rodrigues, José Luis Guterres, Guilhermina Araújo, Jose Ramos Horta and Rogerio Lobato were to remain members of the CCF, with Abílio Araújo as FRETILIN Secretary General and Xanana Gusmão as the National Political Commissar, President of PML-FRETILIN and Commander-in-Chief of FALINTIL (Cabral 2002, p.274; CAVR 2002, Chapter 5, p.27). The Aitana Conference also established a new political platform called the Revolutionary Council of National Resistance (*Conselho Revolucionário da Resistência Nacional - CRRN*) to form a United Front with other pro-independence forces (Cabral 2002, p.269; Ran Kadalak 1981, pp.38, 49; Gusmão, 2000, p.73; Ran Kadalak, 1981, p.49).

It was also decided to reorganise FALINTIL into small mobile 'hit and run' units and that FRETILIN members would establish clandestine organizations in the strategic camps inside

the occupied territories to support the armed struggle (Cabral, 2002; Gusmão 2000, p.68). This means that although the Government was forced into a new political movement known as CRRN, they were nevertheless on the march again to carry on the war against the neo-colonial military forces of the fascist regime of Indonesia.

New Military and Popular Actions

The Bases de Apoio had been a political school for FRETILIN militants and the citizens of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, and they were committed to use their knowledge acquired in there to continue to resist and to win back their independence. According to the current Secretary General of FRETILIN Marí Alkatiri, the whole country was from this time on transformed into a Resistance Base (Marí Alkatiri, Seminar 05/06/2011). This was the truth. People established small networks, which operated as political and educational circles to plan for military and popular actions. For example, even before Aitana, in 1979, João Branco organised a military operation in Lospalos with his network linked with Domingos Caetano, in Dili. However, the network was soon discovered and João and his twenty-five people were ambushed by the Indonesian military (Domingos Caetano, Interview 21/10/2009). Another example was a new network, known as the Resistance Organizing Base (*Resistência Organiza Base* - ROB) set up by David Dias Ximenes, a Commander of the Indonesian Battalion 744 in Dili and FALINTIL Commander Pedro Fátima Manek Soares. It included Raimundo, Maria de Fatima Pinto, 'Taumali', Augusto Amaral 'Laloir', Domingos Caetano 'Beremau', 'Daniel da Costa 'Nahak', Marcelina Barreto 'Marusta', Beatriz Duarte Alberto 'Kaisiba', Maria Imaculada de Araújo 'Bilehar', José Soares, Madalena Kasian, Filomeno Paixão,¹⁸⁴ José Correia, Luis Boxboard, António Ramos, and Filipe dos Santos Aranhado.¹⁸⁵ David Dias Ximenes was a Commander of the Indonesian Battalion 744 in Dili. On the night of June 10, 1980 ROB launched an assault on Battalion 744 headquarters. José Correia and Luís Bobonaro, two Timorese soldiers who worked within the Battalion, supported a platoon of ROB members to successfully capture 284 weapons, and burn enemy houses in Marabia, Fatunaba and Dare.

184 A CRRN document dated 20 March 1984 however stated that Meno Paixão, and Abel Larissina had collaborated with the occupying forces (CPDM-CIDAC TL3908).

185 According to Aurélio Cristóvão Guterres he had three cousins namely Edmundo Reis, Segismundo Reis and António dos Reis, who were members of Cabo Martinho Martial Art group in Taibesse and also disappeared in 1981 (Aurélio Cristóvão Guterres, Personal Com,20/07/2008).

This action became known as the Marabia uprising (Abrantes and Sequeira, 2008, p.51, 77-78; see also Mattoso 2005, p.87-88; Domingos Caetano, Interview 21/10/2009).

However, UDT had also organized two political movements, the National Movement for the Liberation of Timor-Dili and *Manu Cocoroek* (Cock Singing), led by Francisco Lopes da Cruz. Their aim was to eliminate FRETILIN leaders in the occupied territories, as well as to fight the Indonesian occupation. The new FRETILIN networks and military actions were partly a response to this pressure by UDT, but also to indicate to the Timorese people and the outside world that FRETILIN continued to resist (Domingos Caetano, Interview 21/10/2009). In 1981, in response to continuous attacks, the Indonesian military mobilized 60,000 civilians to sweep across the territory to flush out those remaining members of FRETILIN/RDTL still resisting in the mountains. This was known as Operation Security or Fence-of-Legs (Kammen, 2009, p.73, Cabral 2002, p.288). However, this operation did not succeed in exterminating FRETILIN's guerrilla forces. By March 23, 1983 FRETILIN had secured a dialogue and ceasefire with Colonel Purwanto, Indonesian ABRI commander in Timor-Leste (Cabral 2002, p. 292-293). This was an extraordinary achievement, because it challenged the Indonesian claim that FRETILIN had been reduced to a small dying guerrilla group. FRETILIN demonstrated it had survived and gained a tactical victory. Two months later, on May 29, 1983, FRETILIN/CRRN held another dialogue with Mário Viegas Carrascalão, the Indonesian appointed Governor of Timor-Leste (Kammen 2009, p.73).

However in August 1983, the Popular Militia for National Liberation (MIPLIN) which had been established in the occupied territories with members including Timorese serving in the Indonesian militias known as RATIH (*Rakyat Terlatih* - trained people), attacked the Indonesian forces. As part of this plan in Viqueque, Commanders 'Falur Rate Laek' and Virgílio 'Ular', members of MIPLIN who had served as Indonesian militia, travelled to the forest with 200 weapons, providing new military strength for FALINTIL (Aitahan Matak 2009). In Same, António Assunção 'Mauleno Rusa Fuik', a commander of a MIPLIN section, and his friends attacked an Indonesian military camp before they left to join FALANTIL (Abrantes and Sequeira 2008, p.20). The cease fire had lasted only five months. Xanana Gusmão in a radio message

in February 1985, said that the military insurgency was a violent response to the attempt by Jakarta to promote a dialogue and promise amnesties as a means to convince the Resistance to surrender after eight years of war. Xanana also wrote that FRETILIN was ready for dialogue if it was on the basis of equality (Gusmão 1985, p.34). The collapse of the Bases de Apoio signalled a new approach in our struggle for national liberation.

The Atauro Island Prison

The Indonesian military continued to develop new strategies to isolate the guerrilla fighters. For instance, it decided to deport to Atauro Island those people who had family members participating in the guerrilla units, hoping to isolate the guerillas from the rest of the population, making it easier for them to wipe out the remaining Resistance forces. They established concentration camps on Atauro Island, off the coast from Dili, to accommodate approximately seven thousand FRETILIN members and their families. However, the outcome was clear; these people were never going to become Indonesian citizens. Instead, their solidarity was strengthened, and later it was the ex-Atauro prisoners who were behind the formation of many of the clandestine political organizations in 1980s and 1990s (Eduardo Fernandes, Interview 17/06/2011). For example, Afonso Soares, 'Uairela', a member of MIPLIN working inside RATIH, was arrested in 1981, and was sent to Atauro Island. This allowed him to meet with FRETILIN members from other places and to rebuild their political consciousness, which later led to him establishing new clandestine solidarity operations (Afonso Soares, Interview 13/06/2011; Zélia Fernandes, Interview, 13/06//2011). Eduardo Fernandes, 'Lorico' was born and lived on Atauro Island, where he met with imprisoned FRETILIN leaders including Domingos Castro (originally from Venilale), Alfonso Rangel, Marito Reis, Filomena Oliveira, and Mateus Guterres. From them, Fernandes learned about the Bases de Apoio, and he eventually became active himself. In 1996, he became Zone Secretary for Atauro Island in the CNRM (Eduardo Fernandes, Interview 17/07/2011). Manuel Pinto from Matahoi of Uato-Lari and Diago from Manatuto were young boys who were sent to Atauro. Later in 1988, they studied with me in Dili, and we set up one of the informal FRETILIN networks at our high school later that year. We became part of the Association of Anti-integration Youth and Students (HPP-MAI) which I discuss in detail below.

CNRM-FRETILIN and the Clandestine Youth Movement

At the time of the invasion, the Catholic Church under Bishop Joaquim Ribeiro was anti-FRETILIN (Kohen 1999, p.84). In 1977, an indigenous Timorese, Father Martinho da Costa Lopes, became Apostolic Administrator of Dili Diocese and an outspoken defender of the people against abuse by the Indonesian forces (Budiardjo and Liong 1984, p.117). In September 1982, the new Bishop met Xanana Gusmão in Mehara, Lospalos. He suggested FRETILIN embrace religion, Timorese culture and social organization as an ideological solution to the differences between FRETILIN and UDT (Mattoso 2005, p.108; CAVR 2006, Chapter 5, p.31).

Two years later, in Hodi Laran in 1984, Xanana Gusmão proposed that FRETILIN abandon its radical ideology, and that both the CRRN and the FRETILIN External Delegation (*Delegação da FRETILIN em Serviço no Exterior* - DFSE) should operate as temporary organs until new elections could be held in a free Timor-Leste. Subsequently, Abílio Araújo was appointed the President of FRETILIN; Marí Alkatiri Vice-President; Roque Rodrigues National Political Commissar; Xanana Gusmão the Commander-in-Chief of FALINTIL; and José Ramos Horta became the Secretary for the External Delegation (Mattoso 2005, p.121). These decisions caused a split within the CCF, and two members of the PML-F Central Committee, namely Kilik Wae Gae and Mauk Moruk, along with three leading FALINTIL Commanders, Ologário Aswain, Trix Okan and Mau Selou, formed an opposition group.¹⁸⁶ Soon after, Kilik Wae Gae was killed in a battle, and Mauk Moruk was forced to surrender to the Indonesian forces (Mattoso 2005, p.120-121; CAVR 2006, Chapter 5, pp.33-34; Gama 1995, p.103). This re-organisation aimed to promote the ‘politics of national unity’ to include UDT as part of the CRRN. However UDT continued to refuse to join because of the use of the term ‘revolutionary’ which they associated with Marxist-Leninism (CAVR 2006, Chapter 5, p.34). FRETILIN, with support from Bishop Lopes and Mgr. Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, who replaced Mgr. Lopes as Bishop in May 1983, then began a new dialogue with UDT leaders aiming for unity (Mattoso 2005, p. 127). The National Convergence (CNT) was reached in Portugal in March 1986, signaling

¹⁸⁶ Some of the opposition group of PML-FRETILIN then went on to form a new group, Popular Council for the Defence of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (CPD-RDTL) in 1999, and called themselves FRETILIN Movimento, which has continued to operate up to the present time (Aitahan Matak, Interview 07/2009).

closer cooperation between the two political parties especially on the Diplomatic Front. (Cabral 2002, pp. 294-296; CAVR 2006, Chapter 5, p.34).

In December 1988, the *Conselho Nacional de Resistência Maubere* (CNRM) was formed to replace CRRN in order to further promote national unity (Matosso 2005, p.127; CAVR 2006, Chapter 5, pp.35-36). According to CAVR, the CNRM structure consisted of ten members, as follows:

...three FALINTIL commanders, five from the clandestine resistance front and two FRETILIN members. The FALINTIL Commander-in-Chief Xanana Gusmão became the highest leader of the CNRM with the title *Responsável Principal*. The power of this post was extensive, encompassing full authority over all matters connected with the struggle in Timor-Leste, including the international diplomatic struggle (CAVR, 2002, Chapter 5, pp.35-36).

Constancio Pinto (1996), a young FRETILIN member, and his friends, who were in contact with Mau Hudo, Taur Matan Ruak and David Daitula, formed a clandestine network known as 007 in 1985. By 1987, they were part of Órgão Oito (Organ Eight), which was a CRRN umbrella organization of clandestine networks with a collective leadership which largely operated in Dili (Pinto 1996, p.97-98, Aitahan Matak 2009). Several other clandestine organizations emerged including the Organization of Youth and Students Timor-Leste (OJETIL); the National Resistance of Students of Timor-Leste (*Resistência Nacional dos Estudantes de Timor-Leste* - RENETIL) in 1988; the Association of Anti-integration Youth and Students (*Himpunan Pemuda, Pelajar, Mahasiswa Anti-Integrasi* - HPP-MAI) in April 1989; the *Frente Estudantil Clandestina para a Libertação de Timor-Leste* (FECLITIL); FITUN (1990); Sagrada Familia (1989), and the Socialist Association of Timor (AST) in 1990/1991 which was based in Indonesia (Mattoso 2005, p.149). The emergence of these clandestine youth organizations indicates the growing consciousness of the new generation of FRETILIN activists as well as non-FRETILIN nationalists opposing Indonesian rule and supporting an independent Timor-Leste.

TRANSFORMING UNTIM INTO A RESISTANCE BASE

My involvement in FRETILIN and its clandestine activities was not accidental, as already indicated in Chapter 2, and this is highlighted again in this section. Several authors have mentioned the role played by the East Timor Students Solidarity Council (ETSSC), of which I was General Coordinator, in the 1998-1999 campaign for a popular referendum on independence, including Kohen (1999), Gunn (1999), Fukuda (2000), Martinkus (2001), Leadbeater (2006) and Cristalis (2009). Australian journalist John Martinkus, who was one of the few foreigners who spent a lot of time with students, wrote:

It was the Dili-based students of the Solidarity Council who were driving the change (Martinkus 2001, p.53).

The Origin of UNTIM and The Students' Solidarity Movement

As well as weapons, the Indonesians used education to indoctrinate young Timorese. Budiardjo and Liong (1984, p.110) wrote that, in the school year 1982-1983, there were 5,622 children studying in 28 junior high schools, and 1,047 children in five senior high schools. Two years later in 1986, the Indonesian Governor Mário Viegas Carrascalão established the Universitas Timor-Timur (UNTIM) as part of the Indonesian 'development' campaign against FRETILIN and the independence movement. UNTIM offered courses in politics, agriculture and teaching and targeted middle-level administrators, agricultural extension workers and secondary school teachers. By 1998/99 it had nearly 4,000 students, with 73 permanent teaching staff in the three faculties of Agriculture, Social and Political Sciences and Education and Teacher Training (CAVR 2006, Chapter 5, p.43).

In 1987, the number of Indonesian children studying in high schools in Timor-Leste was increasing rapidly, while at the same time, the newly-graduated Timorese secondary school students, including myself, were not being accepted into the high schools. Consequently we, for the first time, went to the street in protest against the Provincial Government. We marched to the *Palácio do Governo* and on to the *Liceu*, where the Education Department of the Province was based. The angry mass broke doors and windows with stones, and the Indonesian police detained about a dozen students. In response, Governor Carrascalão urged all the high schools,

both private and public, to accommodate all students wanting to continue studying, and it happened accordingly. However, through this popular action a new consciousness that Timor-Leste remained an occupied country was built, with anti-Indonesian sentiment taking new roots. The secondary and high schools became a new breeding ground for resistance against the Indonesian military occupation.

Informal Discussion Groups and HPP-MAI's Penetration of UNTIM

Sekolah Menengah Kejuruan Tingkat Atas (SMKTA) was a vocational college which consisted of 1600 students studying in four smaller schools, a Technical School, a Women's School, a Social Welfare School and an Economics School. I studied accountancy in the Economics School from 1987 and in the school year 1988-1989, I was elected President of the SMKTA Students Union known as the Organization of Students Intra-School (OSIS). It was during this year in Dili that SMKTA OSIS hosted for the first time an all high school Students Union Assembly named *Musyawah* OSIS. This Students Union Assembly was a result of discussions with Fousto da Silva 'Liurai Taci', who later I learned was a member of OJETIL. Behind OSIS, towards the middle of 1988, I was in a group of SMKTA students who came together in our students' boarding house in Bekusi, and organized our first discussion about FRETILIN and the struggle for independence.¹⁸⁷ Those who participated included Manuel Pinto and Diogo from Manatuto, both of whom had been imprisoned on Atauro Island. Jacinto de Oliveira, an orphan living in an orphanage in *Panti Asuhan Seraja* which became our base for gathering after school, was a member of our group; others were Romão da Silva from Bucoli, and Júlio dos Santos from Bobonaro. Júlio later introduced me to Rui Fernandes, a founding member of ASDT-FRETILIN, and a member of the CCF.¹⁸⁸ Júlio dos Santos recalled our informal meetings around the end of 1988, which was our second year in high school. Prior to that, he said, he had already attended several clandestine meeting along with Vitorino of Maliana, in the house of Gregório Saldanha in Haas-Laran, Dili, (Júlio dos Santos, Interview 11/03/2011). Gregório Saldanha

187 In early 1988 we established HPPU (Himpunana Pemuda Pelajar Uato-Carbau) or Union of Students and Youth of Uato-Carbau in Dili. Around July 1988, I lead some 62 students from Uato-Carbau returning from holiday to Dili, and I was arrested and detained for a day in the military headquarter in Viqueque. The leading members of HPPU, who were suspected of being FRETILIN youth, included Afonso Sousa (nephew of Vicente Reis Sahe), Lamartinho de Oliveira (a cousin of Mau Hudo who was a logistic assistant in Matebian Resistance Base in 1978), Mariano Quintão and myself.

188 Rui Fernandes died in 2007.

was the leader of OJETIL (*Organização da Juventude e dos Estudante de Timor-Leste*). Ricardo Belo from Baucau was another friend in our group. Monica Graziela, Aiti from Manatuto, Wirisimu from Iliomar and Joana Lopes from Dili joined in subsequent years. Joana smuggled into Timor-Leste a copy of an Indonesian intelligence (BAKIN)¹⁸⁹ report, about the decolonisation process in Portuguese-Timor. It detailed a series of meetings that had occurred between Almeida Santos, the Foreign Minister of the Portuguese MFA Government and the Indonesian dictator, Suharto. That book provided me with significant information on the international dimension of Timor-Leste politics. Through Evangelina Guterres, a school friend and a cousin from Baguia, I met Mirandolindo Aparício Guterres ‘Riba-lafaek’¹⁹⁰ and Augusto Gamma ‘Teki’¹⁹¹. I gave the document to Mirandolindo Aparício Guterres, and never saw it again. It turned out that Sotero da Costa ‘Hae’¹⁹², who I had met previously, was a friend of Mirandolindo and Augusto Teki, Vasco da Gamma ‘Criado’¹⁹³ and Constâncio Pinto. One day, Mirandolindo and I had a meeting in a small bar in Becora, and began discussing politics. We concluded that our resistance would only make progress if we were to penetrate the university, UNTIM. About a month later I had a meeting again with Mirandolindo, in his house, and he said that they had created the organization, HPP-MAI to penetrate the UNTIM campus in Kaikoli.

The structure of HPP-MAI was similar to that of the Democratic Resistance Councils (*Conselho Democrático Revolucionário* or CDRs), which FRETILIN had established in the Bases de Apoio, which included a Secretary General, a Vice-Secretary, a President of the Commission, and several sections. In HPP-MAI, there was a section for Education and Propaganda (*Serviço de Informação, Agitação e Propaganda Política Interna*), a Security section (*Organização*

189 BAKIN was the Coordinating Agency for Indonesian Intelligence.

190 Mirandolindo Aparício Guterres, nom de guerre Riba Lafaek/Foti Mak Riba. We called him Lito. He was also a founding member of HPP-MAI. He studied first at Fatumaca, the Catholic school in Baucau and later in Externato de São José, Balide. Like Criado, Lito also came from Baguia. He still lives in Dili.

191 Augusto Gamma, was a former seminarian who studied agriculture in UNTIM. He was a founding member of HPP-MAI. In the aftermath of November 1991 Santa Cruz massacre, Indonesian intelligence arrested Teki. I met him on 13 or 14 of November 1991; he passed me a coded message: “Please, tell Lito to take the letters in the Dioceses Dili”. The message was passed to Lita within 20 minutes, and I learned he had been arrested the night before and was going to be detained again. The last time I saw Teki in February 1992, was with his hands tied behind his back, in the Police headquarters in Dili, waving his hand to me from behind. Months later, when I was in Manila, I had a letter from Sotero, saying that Teki had been taken to Barique and had possibly been executed.

192 Sotero da Costa, nom de guerre ‘Hae’ is a cousin of Vicenti Reis Sahe, from Bucoli.

193 Vasco da Gamma ‘Criado’ is a distant relative from Baguia. He was one of the founding members of HPP-MAI and was also arrested following the November 12 Massacre, and from then on, was continuously imprisoned, on about seven occasions. He studied agriculture in UNTIM and defended his Final Thesis for his undergraduate degree from inside the Prison Comarca Becora, Dili. He still lives in Dili today.

Popular Segurança OPS), an Economics Section (SECAE), and an International Communication section (HPP-MAI 1989). In 1990, with the support of East Timor Agriculture Development (ETADEP), HPP-MAI started an agricultural project to support the organization, but it was never successful. As Júlio dos Santos recalled in his interview, after graduating from High School:

Working with our own informal group of SMKTA students, we attempted to establish a coconut cooperative in Mercado Comoro, but it did not succeed, so we decided to find temporary jobs to generate income, planning to rejoin the cooperative later (Júlio dos Santos, Interview 11/03/2011).

But the following year, 1991, the November 12th massacre occurred at Santa Cruz. As a result, most of the youth organisations were destroyed, as the leaders were either arrested, escaped to the mountains to join the guerrillas, or went into hiding. The Indonesian police detained leaders including Teki Ran Nakali Lemorai and Criado. Teki was executed, around 1994. Constâncio Pinto, the representative of the *Comissão Directiva da FRETILIN*, went into hiding, and eventually he left the country. Hae also went into hiding. Riba Lafaek joined the Organization of International Spiritual and Cultural Advancement (OISCA) in Japan with the sponsorship of Hosanna Foundation of the Protestant Church in 1992. I obtained a scholarship to study in a Catholic Seminary in Manila, in the Philippines. However, ‘Riba Lafaek’ and I remained in contact, to keep HPP-MAI activities going. Inside the seminary in Manila, we established a new structure. Estanislau Salsinha organised lobbying of Filipino politicians, Nelson Berek was responsible for liaison with the Filipino media, while Henrique da Costa undertook to develop a radio link, hoping to channel information directly between Philippines and Timor-Leste or inside Indonesia. Roberto Soares¹⁹⁴ was our link with the CNRM networks in the Philippines.

The CNRM, in cooperation with Filipino socialist groups, organized the first conference of the Asia Pacific Coalition for East Timor (APCET), held at the University of the Philippines in Manila from May 30-June 1994. On behalf of HPP-MAI¹⁹⁵ we sent a letter to APCET, entitled:

194 Roberto Cabral is now the RDTL Ambassador to Singapore.

195 When the HPP-MAI network was destroyed after November 12 Massacre, some of its members established a new organization called Liga Estudantil Nacionalista de Timor (LENAT), but it did not last long.

Matebian, the Mountain of the Dead. We began to work with the International Initiative for Dialogue (IID), which then became the Secretariat of APCET. It was at that conference that I began to understand the internal conflicts within the FRETILIN leadership, as a result of an intervention by Paulino Gama 'Mauk-Moruk', who made a controversial speech on the first day, accusing José Ramos Horta of being an opportunist and not representing the Timorese people. The next night, May 31 1994, was very distressing for me, but it was also a decisive moment for my political activism as a FRETILIN youth. The conflicting orientations of the two leaders had exposed me to a new layer of our struggle. For the three months following the APCET conference, I spent a lot of time studying, which helped me gain greater ideological clarity about our national liberation. I examined the experience of the 1986 EDSA Revolution, which overthrew the Marcos dictatorship in the Philippines, and I studied different political ideologies and the liberation theology of Gustavo Guterres. One day, I found a small red book, the *Communist Manifesto*, in the Canossian Father's library. The Manifesto reminded me of the political education classes I had attended back in Uato-Lari in 1978, which I described in Chapter 2. When I completed my studies, I was ready to return to Timor-Leste, for a more militant struggle.

Rebuilding the Students' Movement: GERIPOTA-OSKTL-DSMPPTL

When I returned to Timor-Leste in December 1994, I contacted Evangelina Aparício Guterres, who briefed me about the old HPP-MAI network. I brought back a T-Shirt from APCET for Bishop Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, who eventually became my adviser, throughout the year of 1998-1999. I learned that a month before my return, OPJLATIL (*Organização Popular da Juventude Loriku Aswain de Timor-Leste*) had been formed, on 12 November 1994 (Matosso 2005, p.236; see also Nicholson 2001, p.26).

In July 1995, I enrolled in the Faculty of Social and Political Science, and we began to rebuild the students' movement inside UNTIM. I also joined Mirandolindo, who had returned from Japan in early 1995, and we spent time working in the farms in Lisadila in Loes, Metinaro, and planting trees in Hera, until one day, we could not operate anymore because Indonesian intelligence had detected our work. After that, we avoided contact until 1999. During 1996,

Estanislau Salsinha and Roberto Cabral, who had taken over my clandestine work in Manila, visited Timor-Leste and our link with APCET in Manila was strengthened.

Our interventions were multi-level. While keeping the diplomatic relationships and international solidarity links open, we penetrated the University in Dili, and universities in Indonesia. At the same time, we involved high school and university students in promoting farmers' groups outside of the Dili.

The clandestine student and youth organizations had returned, but now there were conflicting orientations and leaderships, divided among Mau Hodu, Konis Santana, David Dias Ximenes 'Manu Dati', António Aitahan Matak and Avelino Coelho of *Associação Socialista de Timor* (AST) (Mattoso 2005, p.273). Through Nelson Belo, who had been a courier for Commander David Daitula and Konis Santana in the 1990s, our network established a link with Konis Santana, who by then was the Vice Secretary of Executive Committee of FRETILIN, and was urging us to reorganize the students' movement.

A group of classmates, under the leadership of Mateus Belo 'Bitumau' from Bucoli, had built a network called *Guerilla Politika Militar* (GERIPOTA). Bitumau had established links with FALINTIL Commander L7 and the Hudi-Laran faction of PML-FRETILIN, which included Mouk Moruk, a member of the Central Committee. I was made an advisor to the newly established network. Many of the members were couriers who had undertaken basic military training in the bush. However, in March 1997, they undertook a poorly-organized demonstration at the Mahkota Hotel in Dili, which led to the arrest of Bitumau and other friends.

Roberto Cabral arrived from the Philippines the following month, April 1997, and we formalized a new clandestine group the East Timor Youth Solidarity Organisation (*Organizasaun Klosan Solidariedade Timor-Lorosae* - OSKTL) with the aim "to encourage non-violent resistance against Indonesian occupation" (UNTL Library Project 2002). This organization was to be linked with APCET in Manila. After long discussions, it was decided that solidarity was the group's political philosophy, and that this would be a socialist political movement, to re-unite

the youth resistance. OKSTL started discussing ideas and issues among its members, such as solidarity, culture, ecology, economy, the emancipation of women, health, and the political resistance against the Indonesian occupation. It also started a grass roots agricultural project in Hera, with UNTIM students from the Agriculture Department and some high schools students from Hera.

Through Abel Guterres, a CNRM representative in Australia, OSKTL developed solidarity links with a group based at Melbourne University, called University Students for East Timor (USET). We also built a strong link with solidarity groups in Japan, through Shigehito Takahashi, a Japanese colleague who was living in a Catholic convent in Timor, and was a true friend of OSKTL. Underground discussions had intensified by the time Suharto, the Indonesian dictator, resigned, on May 20, 1998. That night I was watching television with a few other friends, including Laura Abrantes, Filomena Reis and Estanislau Martins. When the new President, Habibie, announced that Indonesia would have a democratic election the following year, we all spontaneously shouted: “Referendum for East Timor! Viva RDTL!”

Formation of DSMPPTL and Referendum Campaign

Two weeks after Suharto’s resignation, on June 8, 1998 the UNTIM students established the East Timor Students Solidarity Council (ETSSC) (*Dewan Solidaritas Mahasiswa Pemuda dan Pelajar Timor Timur - DSMPPTL*) I was elected *in absentia* to lead the movement, whose only political objective was to call for a referendum. My immediate task was to formulate a political document, including a revolutionary idea that could guide us throughout the campaign. In the first DSMPPTL core group discussion, the group split into two, over differences of strategy. José Aparício led a minority group, and I was with the rest of the group. So, instead of relying on the core group for developing the concept paper, I turned to my OSKTL friends, including Laura Abrantes ‘Nehek’, Estanislau Salsinha ‘Bico’ and Raul Bernardino ‘Dino’. Within two days, we produced a policy paper. José Chang, Francisco Soares and José António endorsed the proposal, which set out “Four Phases of Transition to Independence”: These called for the unconditional withdrawal of the Indonesian military from East Timor and urged the building of popular awareness about the political change in Indonesia and the small window of opportunity

it gave Timorese to act and secure an act of self-determination through a fair referendum. This was to be implemented through public meetings, demonstration and dialogues at the grass root level. The document invited the presence of UN agencies such as UN High Commissions on Human Rights, UNDP and other relevant UN bodies, demanded the release of all political prisoners and called for the formation of a Timorese Transitional Government by November 1998 and a Referendum under United Nation's supervision.

Within days, UNTIM became a university for resistance and for popular education. Jenny Grant from the South China Morning Post interviewed me for an article published 19 June 1998:

Student leader Antero Benedito da Silva said East Timorese had to capitalise on the change. "The Suharto regime has collapsed so we have to do something in this new atmosphere. The people are not scared to say they want independence through a referendum," he said. The elated but exhausted student leader has led rallies for the past two days and says he will keep up the pace until there is change. "We have stopped our studies. Maybe now we will find a new way to learn on the streets," said Mr da Silva (Grant 1998).

While the students were taking action, Domingos Sousa, former UDT leader and brother-in-law of Xanana Gusmão, with the support of some young intellectuals including some members and supporters of student solidarity at the UNTIM, mainly Benjamin Corte-Real, António Cardoso and Vicente Faria founded the *Forum Sarjana Pro-Referendum dan Pembangunan Timor-Lorasa'e* (FORSAREPETIL) (Sousa 2010, p.131). There was a conservative view that academics should be neutral when the students were on the street, and the students had gone beyond the limit of neutrality. FORSA-REPETIL was therefore helpful in mobilizing the Timorese graduates, making an end to the so-called political neutrality of intellectuals. Both ETSSC and FORSA-REPETIL were invited to meet the European Unions Ambassadorial 'Troika', consisting of the British, Austrian and the Dutch Ambassadors in Mahkota Hotel on June 30, 1998 (see also Sousa, 2010, p. 135). By July 1998, the ETSSC had grown into a broader Council of Youth, encompassing the High school and University Students of Timor-Lorosae (DSMPPTL), and the dialogues and public rallies had spread out to all the districts.

In July 19, 1998, in Baucau, under the sponsorship of Mgr. Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, we presented our document, *Four Phases of Transition towards Independence*, to the Pakistani Diplomat Jamsheed Marker, who was the UN Secretary General's Special Representative (Da Silva 2000, p.6).¹⁹⁶ Geoffrey Gunn, who visited Timor-Leste in August 1998, wrote that the Student Solidarity Movement rejected autonomy within Indonesia, which Jamsheed Marker had informally sanctioned and which was proposed by the Indonesian military (Gunn 1999, p.296). On August 01, 1998, Laura Abrantes, a founding member of OKSTL, and I were fired from our jobs in the Catholic organisation, Caritas in Dili, because we were seen as linked to South East Asian communism, and endangering the work of the Church in Timor-Leste.

In October 1998, Tereza de Carvalho and the women members of ETSSC, established the Young Women's Group of Timor (*Grupo Feto Foinsae Timor Lorosae* - GFFTL) and organized the first Rural Women's Mini-Conference in Aileu. This was followed up in November 1998 with a women's conference on the situation of Timorese women, the first conference of its kind during the twenty-three years of occupation with some international participation. Among the speakers were two older and vocal sisters - Micato and Olandina (Aditjondro 2000; Watson 2001, p.2). The Youth and Student Solidarity Council had now become a popular movement involving women in rural areas. It was an all out campaign throughout the country.

As the campaign intensified, the occupying forces launched their counter-attack, forming militia gangs which attacked the students' centres across the country. When a military clash occurred between Indonesian forces and FALINTIL, causing civilian death and dislocations in Same district, the authorities blamed the students. I was attending the first All-Inclusive Intra-East Timorese Dialogue (AIETD) opening ceremony in Krumbach Castle, Austria on November 3, 1998, when Abílio Osório Soares, the Indonesian Governor in Timor-Leste, received a phone call from Timor-Leste informing him about the military clash in Same. Governor Soares turned to me and said, "Antero, your students have killed some Indonesian forces." I politely replied to him: "The students have no weapons. Those who have weapons are General Wiranto and Commander Xanana Gusmão. They are responsible for the violence in Same." The military

196 The original documents of the ETSSC *Four Phase Transition Proposal* were burned in 1999, and I have been unable to obtain a copy

formed militias groups and the attacks intensified from November 1998 onwards (Da Silva, 1999).

On the way back from Norway, I went to see Xanana Gusmão in Cipiung prison on December 22, 1998, and he told me, “Antero, tell your brother, Mau Hodu, that the military is mine, the civilian is yours.” In the middle of this crisis, the International Students Festival in Thronheim Norway announced the first Student Peace Prize Award had been made to the ETSSC Students Solidarity Council for its outstanding commitment to active non-violence (ISFIT 1999). This was a vital symbol of international student support for our self-determination struggle. The Student Peace Prize Committee of Norway wrote that the work of East Timorese Student Solidarity Council (ETSSC) centered on three principles: humanity, ecology and solidarity (Da Silva, 1999). This was indeed important recognition of the values we stood for over the years. In accordance with these principles, the movement set out to oppose anything that damaged humanity or nature, and build solidarity among East Timorese and on an international level. The existence of these long-term guiding values helped the movement to remain strong, even after reaching the goal of national liberation from Indonesia in 1999.

The May 5th Agreement: the People’s University and Popular Education Centres

With financial support from NGOs Cafod, Trocaire and Amnesty International, about sixty youth and student solidarity leaders held a retreat in Bali in late April 1999, to develop a new campaign strategy. On May 5th, the news arrived that the United Nations Security Council meeting in New York had resolved that the UN would supervise a popular consultation on self-determination. On May 11, 1999 I was travelling on the same plane from Bali to Dili with the UN Secretary General’s initial delegation, consisting of David Wimberst, Mark Guateman, and Colin Steward, and I learned from them that the UN mission needed local translators. ETSSC then mobilized three hundred translators in readiness to assist the United Nations Mission for East Timor (UNAMET), thereby securing our access to the rural areas.

Towards the end of May, the first group of ETSSC leaders was ready to return to Dili from Bali for political actions. They returned as the Student Solidarity Mini Council representing each

district. They began by organising meetings at UNTL to discuss the re-building the state of East Timor, including the issues of holistic development and democracy. The nature of the intervention had now changed, from active political demonstrations on the streets. Now it was time to reflect on the state building. We were attempting to send a message to the country side, including to the pro-Indonesian groups, that we should start thinking again of being a nation. Forming our own state was more dignified than becoming the twenty-seventh province of Indonesia, subordinate to the Jakarta regime. The pro-Independence supporters from each district participated in these study circle discussions, and UNTIM was like a people's university. To enable these issues to be discussed with the people at the grass roots, the ETSSC built centres for popular education and dialogue throughout the country, hoping that the United Nations Police Force could provide security for them. An ETSSC press release dated 29 July 1999 indicated that the new Student Solidarity Information Centres were established in Maliana, Dili, Baucau, Viqueque, Lospalos, Manatuto, Same, Ainaro, Aileu, Ermera, Atauro Island and Ambeno (ETSSC 29/07/199). Here the students organized voter education and discussions including with UNMET. The students also worked with international solidarity groups who came as observers, such as the International Federation for East Timor, Solidamor of Indonesia, and from West Timor, the Forum Solidaritas Mahasiswa for Independent Timor-Leste. However, these Centres came under attack from the Indonesian militias. In most districts, the student leaders operated through underground networks and continued door-to-door voter education campaigns.

The vote finally took place on 30 August 1999 with 98% of registered voters placing a vote. Four long days later UNAMET announced on September 4 that 78.5% per cent of the votes were for independence. The Indonesian military and their militias then set the whole country on fire (Cristalis 2009; Martin 2001).

CONCLUSION

The Indonesian military operation had destroyed the RDTL as a state structure and only a few of its leading figures survived. The formation of PML-F/CRRN, then CNRM and finally CNRT (National Council of Timorese Resistance) in 1998 meant that the Resistance operated more as a broad-based political and social movement because of the impossibility of operating as a state. The purpose of the CNRT was to address the internal disunity and to harmonize ideological disputes among the Timorese including to consolidate the support of the Catholic Church. Unlike Mgr. Joaquim Ribeiro, a conservative anti-liberation theology Bishop who was against FRETILIN, the two indigenous Timorese Bishops Mgr. Martinho da Costa Lopes and Mgr. Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, were both true citizens of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. This development was captured by Xanana when he wrote in 1985, “FRETILIN is a movement of liberation in which a militancy of Christians, as well as non-Christians, co-exists” (Gusmão 2000, p. 126).

This study confirms that indeed the Bases de Apoio and the establishment of the new Government were like political schools of FRETILIN. In the Bases de Apoio, the popular education method of *conscientização* was used by FRETILIN and its mass organizations OPMT and OJTL. In the occupied territories the nature of learning was through small and multiple clandestine networks and was action-oriented. People who came from the Bases de Apoio became the organizers of the Resistance in the occupied territories including in the university and schools.

Throughout the 1980s, a new wave of resistance emerged among the younger generation of FRETILIN supporters. Since the mass education approached used in the Bases de Apoio was not possible inside the occupied territories, these clandestine networks and their structures were in themselves a form of political education for the young people. The FRETILIN leaders also used letters to exchange information and ideas with the clandestine networks in the cities. The popular actions took many forms such as seeking political asylum with foreign embassies in Indonesia; demonstrations to coincide with visits to Dili by foreign delegations; and letter writing to the United Nations.

After the November 12 1991 massacre at Santa Cruz, the solidarity movement with the people of Timor re-emerged in the international and regional level as discussed in the previous Chapter. The clandestine movement transformed the Universitas Timor-Timur into a Resistance Base. This resulted in the formation of DSMTT/DSMPPTL, which led to the transition to Independence from 1998. DSMPPTL along with FRETILIN cadres and the ex-FALINTIL forces mobilized the people across the country at the grass roots to make sure they hit the nail in the right place on the ballot paper on August 30, 1999. The result was that an extremely high percentage of the voting population, 78.5%, rejected autonomy within Indonesia and chose independence. This vote was the ultimate victory of the popular mass education work that had begun in 1975, was continued in the Bases de Apoio and when they fell in 1978, as this chapter shows, was revived in the clandestine movement in the occupied territories.

CHAPTER 13

IN SEARCH OF A PEDAGOGY OF THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION STRUGGLE

INTRODUCTION

As this thesis has demonstrated, from the beginning, the objectives of the liberation struggle in Timor-Leste were twofold, to free the homeland and to free the people - *Libertação do Pátria e Libertação do Povo*. The purpose of this chapter is to analyse some examples of the renewal of popular education in Timor-Leste in the period since the end of the Indonesian occupation in 1999, and their relevance to the development within FRETILIN of a new pedagogy for the liberation of the people. The chapter begins by revisiting the original objectives of FRETILIN, followed by a broad overview of the achievements and challenges of the party in the period of rebuilding since 1999. The second and longer section examines the role of popular education in the new social movements which emerged from the Resistance. The analysis is limited to two examples, from campaigns with which I have had a close involvement over the last decade. These are the literacy campaign of the women’s wing of the Students Solidarity Council *Grupo Feto Foinsae Timor-Lorosae* - GFFTL from March 2000 onwards; and the work of the *Kdadalak Sulimutuk Institute* (KSI) with the coffee farmers in Ermera. The conclusion reflects on the contradictions and convergences between the party and the social movements.

THE PEDAGOGY OF THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION STRUGGLE

To understand the pedagogy of the people’s liberation struggle in the current period, it is first necessary to recall FRETILIN’s original concepts of liberation and the people’s liberation struggle. As was shown in Chapter 5, FRETILIN in 1974-1975 defined ‘people’s liberation’ in a sense much broader than economic freedom. The FRETILIN Political Manifesto, the RDTL I Constitution and the National Anthem, *Pátria, Pátria* use the term ‘liberation’ to refer to freedom from political, economic and cultural oppression, and from all forms of domination and exploitation of men by men (FRETILIN 1974, p. 27). Freedom means an end to colonialism and imperialism, the country and the people are free (Jolliffe 1976, p.47; RDTL 1976, p. 33). For FRETILIN’s founders, therefore, decolonization did not simply mean political independence,

but major social transformation. On October 25 1975, on the eve of the full-scale invasion, *Jornal de Povo Maubere* published a message from Vice President Nicolau dos Reis Lobato in which he said that the aim of the Maubere War was “to construct a new society which is free from exploitation of men by men and in solidarity with all peoples who fight for progress” (Lobato 1975, p.3).

Rebuilding FRETILIN

It could be said that FRETILIN won a pyrrhic victory in the liberation struggle, as almost all its leading figures from 1974-75 whose work has been described in this thesis were killed during the twenty-four year resistance struggle.¹⁹⁷ But even though the liberation struggle was seriously weakened ideologically, nevertheless, popular support for FRETILIN remains high. In 2000, Francisco Guterres ‘Lu Olo’, a cadre who returned from fighting as a guerilla in the mountains, emerged as a political figure, taking on the Presidency of FRETILIN, while Mari Alkatiri, a founding member from 1974, and a member of the External Delegation during the occupation, returned from exile to become the Secretary-General.

Under this new leadership, FRETILIN set about giving new momentum to the people’s liberation struggle, organising the election of delegates from every district to attend the Party’s first above-ground cadres’ Conference since the invasion in Dili in May 2000. Then, in August 2001, under the auspices of the United Nations Transitional Authority (UNTAET), the internationally recognized sovereign governing body at that time, a multi-party Constituent Assembly election was held for the first time in Timor-Leste. FRETILIN won 57% of the vote, which translated into 55 of the 88 seats in the Constituent Assembly, thereby re-establishing itself as the largest political force in the country (Niner 2009, p.220-21). This came as a complete surprise to many foreigners, who had assumed that FRETILIN had died.¹⁹⁸ Nevertheless, under the new Constitution adopted by the Assembly, FRETILIN became the majority party in the

197 José Manuel da Costa ‘Ma’Huno’, the last and most consistent among the surviving founding members of FRETILIN who remained inside, suffered an incapacitating stroke in 1999, and, while still alive today, he remains now only as a symbol. José da Costa ‘Mau Hudo’, a leading cadre trained during the UNETIM days (see Chapter 7) who was a powerful symbol of the Resistance in the 1990s, especially among younger people, disappeared in mysterious circumstances in late 1999.

198 This misapprehension, which was encouraged by some leaders who had left FRETILIN, was reinforced by FRETILIN’s strategic decision to work through the CNRT in the period leading up to the August 1999 popular consultation.

first National Parliament, and took office as the First Constitutional Government in May 2002, with Mari Alkatiri as Prime Minister, and 'Lu'Olo' as President of the Parliament. FRETILIN indirectly supported Xanana Gusmão by having no alternative candidate, and he was elected as the country's President.

The victory, however, revived some of the historic anti-FRETILIN sentiment, both internally, and within the international community. There was increasingly sectarian criticism both against a Muslim Prime Minister, and against FRETILIN, in its early months of government, from June 2002 onwards. In December 2002, a group of protesters from the opposition parties burned the Prime Minister's residence to the ground, and over the next two years, there were sporadic outbreaks of anti-government violence. In 2005, the Catholic Church, a major power-broker in Timorese society, staged mass demonstrations against government policy in protest against the decision of the Ministry of Education to end the Indonesian practice, whereby religion was a compulsory examinable subject in public schools (Niner 2009, p.227). The following year, January 2006, some fifty young military officers protesting over alleged ethnic discrimination in the armed forces, deserted the F-FDTL headquarters and launched a military rebellion, and the opposition parties stepped in, campaigning for regime change. Dili was again set on fire, and armed conflict occurred between loyalist and rebel security forces, leading to the return of an international peacekeeping force in a second international military intervention (Anderson 2006).

The FRETILIN Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri was forced to resign in June 2006, but the FRETILIN Government continued until new elections, both Presidential and Parliamentary, were held between April and June 2007. FRETILIN again won the most seats, 21 (29%), with a new party, CNRT, led by outgoing President and former FRETILIN leader, Xanana Gusmão, winning 18 seats (24%). The ASDT-PSD coalition won 11 seats (15.8%); and PD won 8 seats (11.3%). However, the newly-elected President, José Ramos Horta, refused to invite FRETILIN to form government, and the Party was forced to become the opposition, against the Parliamentary Majority Alliance (AMP), a coalition put together after the election led by Xanana Gusmão and CNRT (Leach 2009).

While the complex political dynamics underlying these events¹⁹⁹ is not a subject for this thesis, its significance here is that these events contributed to a renewal within FRETILIN of interest in the popular education practices of the past. Most importantly, during the final months of the FRETILIN Government, a mass literacy campaign had begun, with the support of a group of specialist literacy advisers provided by the Cuban Government (Boughton 2008; 2010b).²⁰⁰ Then, in the month after the formation of the AMP Government, FRETILIN conducted its first popular assembly in Same district where it launched a non-violent campaign of mass opposition against the ruling coalition, under the slogan ‘March of Peace.’ In 2009 and 2010, FRETILIN had two national cadres’ meetings, one in Dili and one in Maubisse, to develop its analysis and a new strategy called ‘March to Victory’ to regain power in the 2012 elections. There have also been new political education initiatives in the villages and within the FRETILIN structures.

Some of these initiatives were developed and inspired through the process of this research, which I described in Chapter 1 as ‘re-conscientisation.’ For example, in 2010, OPMT launched an oral history research project on women’s role in the national liberation struggle, and the research is capturing momentum contributing to the FRETILIN’s ‘March of Peace and March to Victory’ (see also FRETILIN 2011). This study has also helped to inspire the restoration of the youth front, OPJT. In June 2011, a group of former members of OPJT and young FRETILIN cadres began a series of intense political discussions, with the aim of producing a new Manifesto for the organization and to form a new line of youth leaders to initiate political education and leadership development for young cadres at community level in coming years. Consistent with the Law of the Council of National Resistance Combatants, the restoration of OPJT also contributes to the preservation of the values of the Resistance (RDTL 2011, p.1). These initiatives from OPMT and OPJT are expected to contribute to the strengthening of

199 In the weeks preceding the submission of this thesis in September 2011, revelations of the involvement of US and Australian government representatives in this period which had been published on Wikileaks were compiled by the Timorese NGO, Lao Hamutuk. See <http://www.laohamutuk.org/reports/Wikileaks/WikileaksDiliIndex.html>

200 In the months preceding the launch of this campaign, I was a member of the Campaign Secretariat, helping to organise over 70 UNTL students to take part. FRETILIN opened the first classes in June 2006 and the AMP Government continued this campaign, which uses the Cuban Method ‘Yes, I can’. According to the Cuban Ambassador 125, 000 (53 percent of the total illiterate adult population in 2006) have now achieved basic literacy (Ramon Vasques, Pers.Comm., 9/07/2011).

popular education theory and practice within FRETILIN, by recovering more of its history, and by re-affirming the original FRETILIN values and aims.²⁰¹

THE EMERGENCE OF NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

The formation of multiple groups within the clandestine movement in 1980s, described in Chapter 12, marked the beginning of political pluralism in the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. Nevertheless, all groups shared the same fundamental aims developed by the original FRETILIN leadership: liberation of the homeland and of the people. As the leader of the East Timor Student Solidarity Council (ETSSC), I expressed this in my speech to the ISFIT²⁰² Student Peace Prize Ceremony in Norway March 12, 1999. The Republic was soon to be restored, I said, but “students still have to work hard promoting reconciliation and democratic practices through *alternative education* to ensure that the rebuilding of the nation would also mean getting every last woman and man in the village to be part of the process” (Da Silva 1999; emphasis added). Nearly a year later, after the UN-supervised August 1999 ballot on independence, the students remained firm in their decision. The Students’ Solidarity Council stated that the objective of the students’ movement was “to raise the cries of the oppressed in Timor-Lorosae – the people who still cry and lament because of hunger, in front of the offices of the UN Transitional Administration, of CNRT²⁰³ and of non-government organizations” (DSMTT 2000, p.1).

Events moved quickly from there on. Some members of ETSSC, myself included, established a farmer’s education institute, called Kdadalak Sulimutuk Institute (KSI) to promote land reform and farmer’s education in the coffee-growing area of the Ermera District. In April 2000, GFFTL launched its first adult literacy campaign, while the General Assembly of ETSSC resolved to move ahead with promoting education at all levels, and a teachers union had been re-established, which was later known as the East Timor Teachers Union (ETTU). ETSSC members also organized a demonstration and re-occupied the University of Timor-Timur

201 Further evidence of this renewal was a paper given at the 2011 Timor Studies Conference in Dili in July, by Manuel Vicente ‘Talik’ da Cruz dos Reis, from FRETILIN Department of Organization and Development (DEPIM), entitled: The place of past experience in the process of the future leadership formation. ‘Talik’ is the son of the legendary FRETILIN leader, Vicente Reis ‘Sahe’.

202 International Students Festival in Thronheim

203 *Conselho Nacional da Resistência Timorense* was the umbrella organisation of the pro-independence movement in 1998-99; not to be confused (though it often was) with the political party established in 2007 by Xanana Gusmão, with the same initials: *Conselho Nacional da Reconstrução de Timor*.

building, which had been taken over by the UN Peace Keeping Forces, and urged CNRT and the United Nations to re-establish the University, which until then had not been on UNTAET's list of priorities. A Students Solidarity Conference was organized in May 2000, with FRETILIN Secretary-General Mari Alkatiri as a keynote speaker. This marked the beginning of a new era of popular education, largely taking place outside of FRETILIN (Da Silva 2000; KSI 2002).

GFFTL Women's Literacy Campaign

According to its founding principles, GFFTL aimed "to learn, and to act, on the bases of popular solidarity and hard work" expressed through its three main programs for women: literacy; income generation; and social training on topics such as democracy, human rights, CEDAW, domestic violence, and public speaking (Joanita de Oliveira, Saturnina Tavares and Narciso José Manuel, Interview 22/06/2011). As discussed in Chapter 12, GFFTL organized the first ever women's international conference in Dili in November 1998 with a focus on violence against women.

Following the 1999 popular consultation, one of GFFTL's immediate priorities was to support women who wanted to learn, regardless of their age. Subsequently, in March 2000, a group of GFFTL members and myself held a study circle about how to start literacy classes for women. We decided to begin by learning people's own names and the words for things around them, such as 'house', 'water', 'river', 'banana' and so forth. The literacy campaign began in Dili, with two classes in Comoro and one in Becora, reaching up to seventy students. Later, GFFTL expanded the literacy campaign to Liquiçá, Ermera, Lospalos and Viqueque. The facilitators met regularly for discussions and evaluations in order to discover new ideas and to gradually develop their pedagogy (Marquita Soares, Interview 28/03/2011; Maria de Jesus, Pers.com. 27/07/2011; Durnan 2005, p.124). In her study of popular education and peace-building in Timor-Leste, Durnan mentioned that GFFTL along with other members of the popular education movement learned the 'Action-Reflection' method in a program funded by Oxfam GB in 2004 (Durnan 2005, p. 274). However, in the early days, GFFTL's Action-Reflection method was not based on Paulo Freire, though it might have had a similar meaning. As a facilitator of literacy training for GFFTL members in 2000, I did not know of Paulo Freire until I attended a lecture

in Dili in 2001, given by the Indonesian academic and popular educator, George Aditjondro. The early Action-Reflection method of GFFTL was, in fact, derived from Marx's thesis on Feuerbach, in which he said:

Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it (Karl Marx 1845/2002).

In 1994, working under the guidance of Professor Agawili from the University of the Philippines, I had written an essay on *The Essence of Christianity* for my Philosophy class, analyzing the writing of Ludwig Feuerbach. This was how I first came across the concept of praxis, meaning the unity of action and reflection. This idea, that revolutionary theory could not be separated from revolutionary practice, then became very important to our methods of work in the student solidarity movement from 1995-1999.

Though GFFTL has continued since 2000 with its literacy campaign work, it has rarely been acknowledged for its pioneering role in popular education. Danielle Boon (2011), for example, claimed it was a group of Brazilians who started literacy work in post occupation Timor-Leste, with their program *Alfabetização Solidária*; and that this was followed, between 2001 and 2005, by the work of OXFAM GB, who ran literacy programs in the districts based on Action-Aid's Reflect Methodology. In fact, it was Ina Seac, a founding member of GFFTL, who worked for Oxfam GB, who pushed for support for the national literacy campaign within the Dai Popular network with funding support from Oxfam GB.

Likewise, in 2004, it was GFFTL who worked behind the scenes to mobilize the support of UNTL for the first National Adult Literacy Conference in September 2004. This included organizing closed-door meetings between UNTL leaders, including Miguel Maia and Apolinário Magno, and the members of *Knua Buka Hatene*, a joint resource centre of GFFTL, the Sahe Institute for Liberation²⁰⁴ and *Laifet* (Labour Advocacy Organization).²⁰⁵ That same year 2004, the National Census found that the majority of the illiterate were women with 64% of women illiterate,

204 The Sahe Institute for Liberation (SIL) is a popular education organization, established in June 2001. Its work is described in Durnan (2005).

205 Knua Buka Hatene (KBH) was built in 2002, with the support of APHEDA, the international solidarity and development arm of the Australian trade union movement.

compared with 49% of men (DRTL.NDS, 2006). According to the International Women's Development Agency (IWDA), GFFTL was "the only committed women's group persistently fighting against women's illiteracy in Timor-Leste" (IWDA, n.d.). They reported that GFFTL's eight staff offered two-hour literacy classes twice a week in villages, some of which were at times only accessible on foot. Their programs used the language, stories and real life experiences of the local women. Interviewed by IDWA, Rosa Xavier, a founder of GFFTL, said:

It is not enough that women learn basic literacy. They must also know how to use it, to make sure they are properly represented in the newly independent East Timor (quoted IWDA, n.d.)

Since the GFFTL started its literacy work in 2000, 1,621 women in thirteen districts have benefited directly from their work (IWDA n.d.). This figure might have been higher, if the key international funding agencies working with the Ministry of Education at that time, UNICEF, UNDP and USAID, had understood that Timor-Leste's liberation history had produced the pedagogy of the people's liberation struggle which this young women's organization had adopted. Instead of supporting these local initiatives, they brought in international advisers to revise a literacy program introduced into Timor-Leste during Indonesian times.

Today, GFFTL persists with its efforts to raise the literacy levels of Timorese women by combining literacy classes with income generation projects in food producing and native chicken farming. There are about 135 learners spread across communities in Baucau, Viqueque, Liquica and Lospalos. GFFTL have produced their own literacy manual and resources in the learners' mother tongue. One woman from Buanurak who started as a learner has recently become a facilitator for the new class in her own village (Joanita de Oliveira, Saturnina Tavares and Narciso Jose Manuel, Interview 22/06/2011).

Beyond their own programs, GFFTL's advocacy work successfully mobilised widespread support for a second national literacy campaign inspired by the UNETIM 1975 campaign. A bilateral aid agreement between the FRETILIN and Cuban Governments was negotiated and a mass literacy campaign began in 2006 (Boughton 2008; 2010b). In November 2008, after the

AMP Government had dismantled the campaign commission structure set up by the FRETILIN Government in partnership with Cuban advisors, GFFTL initiated moves within the NGO Forum to establish a new partnership between literacy NGOs and the Ministry of Education. GFFTL proposed that the Ministry should support local NGOs like itself to follow up the basic 13 week classes developed by the Cubans, with a range of post-literacy activities to consolidate the learners' newly acquired literacy. They argued that such a new empowerment model was urgently required, based on their knowledge of the first FRETILIN literacy campaign and their own experiences since 2000 (Da Silva 2011). GFFTL's leaders are also participating in the OPMT history project. Through both activities, the women of GFFTL are contributing to the development of a new pedagogy for the liberation of the people which is informed by the history of OPMT and UNETIM, adapted to the new conditions of an independent Timor-Leste.

The Farmers Movement for Land Reform in Ermera

While there has been some critical academic analysis of the United Nations Transitional Administration in Timor-Leste (UNTAET), (e.g. Gunn & Huang 2008), few Timorese voices have been heard on the topic. As pointed out by Hill (2009), many UN officials saw Timor-Leste as a 'blank slate', and initially UNTAET ran Timor-Leste almost as if it were a 'protectorate', to be directly managed from New York. Alongside the United Nations, there were also many humanitarian aid and development organizations and the international financial institutions (IFIs), like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. At the time, many Resistance activists experienced this as a new invasion, a view echoed by George Aditjondro, who wrote that Timor-Leste had moved from an Indonesian occupation to an occupation by global capitalism (Aditjondro 1999, p.1).

In March 2000, responding to these circumstances, I initiated the formation of the Kdadalak Sulimutuk Institute (KSI), as an alternative movement aiming at mobilizing farmers for land reform, through the nationalization of what had once been colonial properties. *Kdadalak Sulimutuk*, meaning 'Streams meet to become one river', is the title of a song written by Francisco Borja da Costa, the revolutionary FRETILIN poet introduced in Chapter 3. Established in February 2000, KSI has been involved in grass roots campaigns for adequate housing, land

reform, people's democracy and livelihood and fair trade. Its core principles are humanism, ecology, solidarity and peoples democracy CAFOD (2010). KSI has extensive international links including with MST in Brazil, La Via Campesina, Global Partnership for Armed Conflict Prevention (GPPAC), the Green Cooperatives and the Asian People's Fund based in Japan.

In November 2000, a team of Student Solidarity Council members, accompanied by a Japanese journalist, conducted a preliminary visit to a small village called Lequisi, in the district of Ermera. There we discovered that the farmers had already begun a form of popular land reform, by distributing among themselves the land of the coffee plantations which had formerly belonged to the *Sociedade Agrícola, Pátria e Trabalho* (SAPT). Though the Cooperativo Café Timor/Cooperativo Café Orgânica (CCT/CCO) of the National Cooperative Business of America (NCBA) had operated in Ermera since the time of the Indonesian occupation, no farmers' organizations had been developed. In May 2001, some 2000 coffee farmers were on the street protesting against NCBA because of the collapse of the coffee price in the international market. Mateus Tilman, KSI's Farmers' Advocacy Officer was there, observing the protest. According to a KSI leader, Amaro Silvério dos Santos, farmers from each of the communities involved in the protest initiated community self-help organizations. João Trindade was behind the formation of ERPOLEKS (Ermera/Potete/Lequisi)²⁰⁶ and built a farmers cooperative called *Kooperativa Haburas Komunidade*, Co-operative to Enhance Community - KOHA); Amaro Silvério dos Santos and Cerilo Babo initiated the Union of Youth to Fertilize the Land (*Klibur Juventude Haburas Rai* - KJHR); while Domingos Noronha and his friends established another farmers' group, *Buka Tuir Liman Fatin* (BTLF), and a cooperative called *Hel-Hel* (Be Slow). *Buka Tuir Liman Fatin* is a Tetum phrase, meaning 'searching for handprints', a reference to the forced labor imposed on the people of Ermera during the Portuguese colonial period, in the late nineteenth century. On the basis of this history, as descendants of those peasants, the farmers wanted to recapture their native title and rights to the SAPT coffee plantations, particularly in the Fatubesi area of Ermera (Amaro Silvério dos Santos and Jenito Santana, Interview 28/03/2011; Lian To'os-Na'in,²⁰⁷ 2010, p.3).

In 2001, in a village called Sakoko, under the leadership of Amaro Silverio dos Santos, the

206 The acronym ERPOLEKS is derived from the names of these three places.

207 Lian To'os Na'in (Voice of the Farmers) is a magazine published by KSI.

farmers initiated a housing cooperative, giving initial priority to those most in need as identified by community leaders. Since then, they have reconstructed 36 out of the 57 houses originally identified and this work still continues (Jenito Santana,²⁰⁸ Pers.com., 13/07/2011). Through this action, they were also rejecting the ownership claims of the former Portuguese landlords from that area. However, according to dos Santos, their struggles were so localized that they had little power. Subsequently, through these various leaders from those identified communities, an agrarian reform movement known as MRA (*Movimento de Reforma Agrária*) was established with the aim of distributing the SAPT land and defending their native titles.²⁰⁹

According to dos Santos, the 1975 Political Manifesto of FRETILIN was a very important tool for the farmers in this struggle for their rights (Amaro Silvério dos Santos, Interview 28/03/2011). That program had said that, in order to develop a people's economy based on cooperatives, it was important to re-distribute the former communal lands to the local owners, and those lands abandoned by the Portuguese should be distributed to farmers or given to state enterprises to cultivate (FRETILIN 1975.p.37-38). The Popular Socialist Research Institute (PSRI)²¹⁰ of which I was founding member facilitated the distribution of FRETILIN's Political Manual and Program to the farmers in Ermera in December 2006.

KSI and MRA have developed a strategy of multi-level education and political interventions. Firstly, at the grassroots level, utilising action-research methods, KSI identified and held discussions with key community leaders and built relationships with the farmers particularly in areas known to have had SAPT coffee plantations. Secondly, in cooperation with other NGOs, KSI and MRA organized two Conferences, one was on World Trade Organization (WTO) policies and their impacts on farmers, and the other was an International Conference of *La Via Campesina* at which farmers' representatives from ten countries participated, in the latter part of 2004 (Amaro Silvério dos Santos, Interview 28/03/2011). Thirdly, they promoted

208 Jenito Santana is the advocacy officer of Kdadalak Sulimutuk Institute.

209 The founding members of MRA were Alberto Guterres (Maudiu), João Alves Trindade (Lequisi), Luís do Ceu (Maudiu), Amaro Silvério (Sakoko) Henrique da Silva (Aitmua), Domingos Noronha (Mau-ubu), and Tomás das Naves (Ponilala) (Interview Amaro Silvério 28/03/2011).

210 The Popular Socialist Research Institute was developed in April 2004 in Dili (PSRI April 2004). The basic principles of *Socialista Popular* were to be humanity, ecology and solidarity (IISP April 2004), which had been developed as part of the struggle of the students against Indonesian occupation in late 1980s and in 1990s.

international exchanges to broaden the understanding of farmer leaders. For example, in 2003, working with the L'ao Hamutuk Institute,²¹¹ KSI sent a farmers' leader, Tomés da Neves on an exchange program to the Landless Movement (*Movimento Sem Terra* - MST) of Brazil. It has also sent Amaro Silvério dos Santos and João Alves Trindade to the Philippines to learn about land reform and the farmers movement. As dos Santos recalled:

We learned the history of the farmers' movement, strategies on how to fight against the feudal government and private companies and landlords, and about community mobilization and experiences in running cooperatives. We visited places like Negros Occidental (Southwest); Tarlac-Panpanga-Jampales (in the Luzon Island); and in Mindanao, Cotabatu and Bukidnon in the southern Philippines (Amaro Silvério dos Santos, Interview 28/03/2011).

Fourthly, in 2004, KSI began to work with Alter Trade of Japan (ATJ)²¹² and since then there have been exchange programs between the Green Co-ops' farmers in Japan and the coffee farmers in Ermera. This program aimed to directly link the farmers and consumers in Japan and eliminate the middleman. Recently, an Alternative Trade of Timor (ATT) has been established, with the aim of empowering the farmers to improve the quality of the coffee, and to have greater control over the means of production. As a key leader for this program, I participated in a Green Co-ops Conference in Nagoya, Japan.

Fifthly, KSI and the farmers not only campaign at the grass roots, they also mobilize parliamentarians and public opinion by directly bringing farmers to dialogue with the National Parliament, and inviting the parliamentarians for discussions in the communities. On December 22, 2005, for example, the farmers initiated a critical dialogue to which they invited the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Justice to speak directly with the farmers. However, the result was distressing, because the Ministries ignored the call of the farmers for land reform, precipitating a serious clash between the FRETILIN Government and the *Movimento Reforma Agrária*. In an attempt to support the farmers and, equally, help the Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri

211 La'o Hamutuk is a policy advocacy NGO based in Dili, also known as the Timor-Leste Institute for Development Monitoring and Analysis. See <http://www.laohamutuk.org/>

212 "ATJ was established by consumers' cooperatives groups for direct trade between producers and consumers, citizens' organizations, aiming to create a system and relationships different from the current one, an alternative society through trading that connects communities of production and of consumption" Alter Trade Japan. (n.d.).

to make a more correct intervention, I worked with KSI and another NGO, HASATIL (*Haburas Agrikultura Sustentavel Timor-Leste*) to develop an alternative policy, which was presented to the Prime Minister in February 2006 (HASATIL 2006). The Prime Minister intervened and suspended the program which had allowed Timor Global, a private company, to manage the SAPT coffee plantations; but it was too late to stop the hostility against FRETILIN arising in the district in that time of political crisis. In Maudiu village in Gleno, the farmers had more success. Using traditional evidence in the courts against a Portuguese landlord, including their ancestral house, graves and water springs, they were able to reclaim their original community ownership over 20 hectares of fertile land (Daniel Pereira, Pers. Com. 27/02/2010).

Sixthly, to be able to facilitate and maintain close links with the key leaders, KSI recruited Júlio Martins, a local volunteer, who was a former member of the Students Solidarity Council to successfully maintain links with communities. He was less effective in radicalizing the farmers (KSI 2002 and in May 2008, KSI developed a new strategy, recruiting a full-time advocacy officer, Jenito Santana, who was a community development student and a volunteer in the UNTL Peace and Conflict Studies Centre, “to consolidate the farmers” (Jenito Santana, Interview 28/03/2011).

In July 2009, the UNTL Peace and Conflict Studies Centre, in cooperation with KSI, organized a visit to Talo in Fatubesi for participants in the Timor-Leste Studies Association Adult and Popular Education Stream, including my two supervisors for this thesis, Dr. Bob Boughton and Dr. Rebecca Spence, Australian Aboriginal adult education leader Jack Beetson, Dr. Daniel Schugurensky of the University of Toronto Transformative Learning Centre and two young Australian trade union educators.



Timor Studies Association Conference delegates with farmers in Ermera July 2009

Finally, a year later in February 24-26, 2010, MRA and KSI organized the first farmers' congress which established a farmers' union, the Ermera Agricultural Union (UNAER). Seven hundred and fifty delegates of the coffee farmers participated, and elected Amaro Silvério dos Santos as their first President (Lian To'os Nain, 2010, p.4). UNAER is the first and still the only farmers union in the country today, defending the rights of over 13,000 people in more than 3,400 households. These families have occupied over 12,000 hectare of land, mainly in 23 areas of coffee plantations in Ermera (Amaro Silvério dos Santos, Interview 28/03/2011).

The farmers movement is producing its own "organic intellectuals," as the Italian communist Antonio Gramsci might have called them (Morrow and Torres 2001). During the congress, I noticed a middle-aged man in sunglasses, whose words were always powerful. Whenever there was disagreement in the discussion, he would have a solution to offer. He was a farmer's leader, called Adelino. In the break, I asked him how he had come to acquire such excellent ideas. Adelino responded:

Brother, since we started to talk about land reform in 2001, sometimes I could not sleep at night. I always think about how to win the battle for land reform. I discuss with my friends and have attended many meetings. That is how I learned.

Adelino then spoke slowly, with a voice almost whispering: “I used to work as a builder with a man called Paulino Lemorai” (Adelino, Pers. Com.27/02/2010). What a story! Paulino Lemorai, whom I know, was the Vice-Commander of a FALINTIL company in Baguia in Sector Ponta-Leste in the Resistance Bases, and was a political educator in CEFORPOL up until 1978. He became a key clandestine movement leader in Dili. Today, he is a senior officer of the National Police of Timor-Leste (PNTL). Adelino is one of many examples of farmer leaders in Ermera who have learned the FRETILIN lesson: To Resist is To Win.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter I have argued that the end of the Indonesian occupation marked the beginning of a search for a new pedagogical approach in the struggle for the people’s liberation. In the first period from 2001-2006, FRETILIN relied almost totally on the construction of the state as the means for achieving the people’s liberation. This was done through the writing and promulgation of the RDTL II Constitution and the formation of new state institutions. However, as a political party, FRETILIN remained vulnerable to the old anti-communist sentiments, which existed both outside and inside FRETILIN, while conservative elements within the Catholic Church attempted to play a role as a major power broker. This anti-FRETILIN sentiment climaxed in the 2006 crisis, which forced Prime Minister Alkatiri to resign, and then put FRETILIN into opposition in 2007, where it remains today. These anti-FRETILIN moves, however, had some unexpected results, in particular the resurgence of the popular education movement, both within and outside FRETILIN. Examples include the revival of the mass literacy campaign, the OPMT oral history project and the restoration of OPJT. In my view, these developments are helping FRETILIN to again become a mass-based political party,²¹³ rather than becoming, as it was tending to after it took Government in 2002, a more elite-driven, election-oriented political force.

This chapter has also highlighted the popular education work of the social movements, by examining the literacy campaign of GFFTL from March 2000 onwards and the work of KSI with

213 This view is given weight by the rapidly-growing membership resulting from a re-building process from the village level up since 2007. At the 2011 Congress, the party membership stood at 165,000.

the Agrarian Reform Movement in Ermera. Both were developed by committed members of the Party out of the concrete situation of popular social movements, utilizing a bottom-up approach, rather than a party-driven top-down education campaign. These brief case studies reveal that the issues for popular education remain similar to those when FRETILIN began, including land reform and production cooperatives for farmers; women's emancipation and literacy; and popular democracy. However, the model adopted by the social movement organisations has proved less effective than it might have been if there had been a common political platform and critical cooperation with a radical or revolutionary party in government. For example, after ten years of campaigning for literacy, GFFTL has been able to educate only 1,621 women in thirteen districts, and while the overall rate of illiteracy is declining due to the Cuban-supported national literacy campaign, the current AMP government has proved unwilling to develop a more cooperative relationship with the social movements who could be mobilised to work with this campaign.

The case of the land reform movement in Ermera also reveals a 'paradigm clash' between the 'bottom-up' approach of popular education and the 'top down' approach of the Government. In 2005, the Ermera farmers demanded a revolutionary land redistribution and management of the old estates, while the FRETILIN Government on the other hand, wanted to hand over the land management to private companies. For the farmers, this was obviously contrary to the teaching of FRETILIN in the Resistance Bases, and the ideas enshrined in the FRETILIN's Political Manifesto in 1975. The struggle of coffee farmers has resulted in the formation of the Ermera Coffee Farmers Union (UNAER) which has introduced a new dynamic in the people's liberation struggle, namely the role of autonomous organizations of local communities, which are crucial because small-holding farmers are the majority in the country, and without them being mobilized, 'on the March' as FRETILIN calls it, there cannot be a people's liberation struggle.

This chapter demonstrates the ongoing relationship between my research and my activism, a relationship between theory and practice. My initial efforts within the Student Solidarity Council after 1999 to form social movements which carried out popular education were informed by

my own experience and political education as a member of the Resistance, going back to my experiences as a child in the Resistance Bases, as recounted in Chapter 2. As my research allowed me to deepen my understanding of the history of the Resistance, I was able to bring the insights gained into that political work, such as in my work within FRETILIN to support the revival of historical memory by OPMT, and my support for GFFTL's literacy work and land reform by KSI. My research has also made it possible for me to put together the documentary evidence and a more complete account of FRETILIN's earlier work, and use the analysis of that period to understand better the tasks in the present. This analysis is now being taken forward collectively, as evidenced from the adult and popular education streams at the Timor-Leste Studies Conferences in 2009 and 2011 (Schugurensky 2009), and the 'mini' popular education Conference held in 2010 at UNTL.

The conclusion from this chapter is that to fulfill its historical objective, the liberation of the Maubere people, FRETILIN needs to support and be supported by an ongoing popular political movement beyond the next elections in 2012. The liberation of the people requires FRETILIN to maintain and develop the central role of popular education as an engine of the social revolution on one hand, and to ensure that the state plays its role, at the structural level, on the other. The industrial proletariat is a small minority in Timor-Leste, but students, landless people, small farmers and Timorese women continue, as they did in 1975-78, to provide a potential popular base for revolutionary social transformation, if they can be mobilized by FRETILIN to support and complement a FRETILIN-led popular state that will implement programs and create institutions to create real and lasting peace and freedom for the Maubere people.

CHAPTER 14

THE PEDAGOGY OF THE *MAUBERE* REVOLUTION

INTRODUCTION

I begin my conclusion by acknowledging the significance of three historic books about education and politics to my analysis of the role of popular education in the Resistance. The first is the *Communist Manifesto*, published in 1848. After becoming involved in the workers movement in Europe, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels wrote this small book, which has provided a theoretical foundation for the communist movement throughout the world, and influenced, among many others, Amílcar Cabral, Paulo Freire and Mao-Tse-tung, whose popular education theories and practice were discussed in Chapter Four. More than one hundred years later, Paulo Freire started working with millions of peasants in Brazil, using an alternative education system known as *culture circles* to liberate people from obscurantism, mass illiteracy and the culture of silence. On the basis of this experience, Freire formulated a new pedagogical approach in his most famous book, published in 1970, *The Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. Marx and Freire lived difficult lives, often in exile, after these books were published, because their ideas and works were seen as viruses, haunting the Establishments of Europe and Latin America. Amílcar Cabral, unlike Marx and Freire, died young, killed on February 20, 1973, at the age of 49, and did not manage to formulate his ideas and works in a parallel pedagogical book. In Cabral's case, the book was written by his friend, Ronald Chilcote, demonstrating that Cabral was developing a "pedagogy of the national liberation struggle" for Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde (Chilcote 1999, p.75).

The basic hypothesis of my research was that popular education was a driving force behind the perseverance and determination of the Timorese Resistance and the bravery of its supporters, enabling people to understand they were fighting for a fundamentally just cause, their liberation from the tyranny of colonialism, imperialism and traditional cultural practices. The research set out to discover answers to the following questions:

- 1) Who were the early popular education groups? Who were the leaders and other activists who were part of the groups?

- 2) What ideas and theories influenced them?
- 3) What popular education work did FRETILIN undertake prior to the Indonesian invasion, in the Resistance Bases after the invasion, and in its international work?
- 4) What is the relevance of the theory and practice of popular education of that period to the current political reality?

In pursuing these questions, I analyzed secondary sources and original writings of the AIDG and the Casa dos Timores, and participated in seminars delivered by three original members of the AIDG, namely Mari Alkatiri, José Ramos Horta and Francisco Xavier do Amaral. I also interviewed several surviving members of the Casa dos Timores. I have demonstrated that in these two founding groups, there was indeed a strong focus on developing a culture of education and learning. I also interviewed and had many informal conversations with over seventy militants of FRETILIN, many of whom lived in the Resistance Bases between 1976 and 1978, and I studied interviews conducted by others, and reflected on my personal experiences. Through this research, I discovered clear evidence of the influence of the radical education ideas of Cabral, Freire and Mao. I also discovered and documented radical popular education practices in the Resistance Bases and beyond, including mass literacy campaigns, political education classes, clandestine learning through small networks, cultural and literary activities, and beyond that, the actual establishment of an alternative popular socialist state, both as a form of political resistance and as a means to educate the Timorese people about the new culture of nationalism and independence.

The study has shown, further, that the FRETILIN leaders and educators who originated from the AIDG and the *Casa dos Timores* were not only influenced by and seeking to implement the ideas and programs of other radical educators and thinkers. Rather, as thinkers who lived in the time and space constraints of their local material world and culture, they developed a particular pedagogy based on the local Timorese context. I have called this the 'Pedagogy of the Maubere Revolution.' This concluding chapter begins by reflecting on this concept of the Pedagogy of the Maubere Revolution, under its two sub-themes, the Pedagogy of the *Libertação da Pátria* (Liberation of the Land) and the Pedagogy of the *Libertação do Povo* (Liberation of the people), which is still 'in progress.'

As I was conducting this study, one recurring theme raised by young people and intellectuals was the importance of ideology in the people's liberation struggle, while another was the growing social gap in post-independence Timor-Leste between the rich and the poor. This leads back to the discourse of *Maubere*, initiated by the AIDG and the Casa dos Timorese, and discussed in Chapter Five. Today, there is a new interest within Timor-Leste in *Maubere*, not simply as a term to describe the people who are marginalized, but as the source of a Timorese political and educational philosophy, an ideology, a consciousness - *Mauberism*. Based on my research findings, and my personal understanding of Timorese society and its characteristics, I conclude the thesis by systematizing, in a tentative and introductory way, the main features of a contemporary ideology of *Mauberism*.

PEDAGOGY OF THE *LIBERTAÇÃO DA PÁTRIA*

Successful popular revolutions are often the results of scientific revolutions, revolutions in thinking, in which a small number of people who experience and witness the suffering of the majority spend the time to develop a critical analysis, thinking through to the fundamental aspects of society and then set out to change things, eventually becoming the key educators and leaders of the revolutions. The term 'popular educators' should refer to such people, whose intellectual analyses develop out of their organic relationships with the popular masses. They become popular educators, propagandists, agitators and leaders, knowing they cannot resist and change the existing social order alone, as it is too powerful to change. However, they also understand that they cannot treat the people as their political commodities, as objects whose role is to achieve the leaders' aims. The only way to transform society is to build a cultural force, as Mao Tse-tung put it. This means the leaders must work to educate the people around them, so they develop a similar understanding of the situation which faces them, and join the march for revolution by their own choice.

Chapter 3 demonstrated that the initial intellectual leadership of this process came from two groups, the Anti-Colonial Informal Discussion Group (AIDG) and the Casa dos Timores students based in Lisbon, Portugal. These were the first political/educational groups to resist the dominance of Portuguese colonialism, organizing outside of the colonial education system to

reflect critically on the existing social order. They were dealing with both political and economic powers, as they began to challenge the social and political order of the old colonial society. Their aim was to build an alternative society, as they conceived of it in their own imagination. Both groups learned from anti-colonial and anti-imperialist movements around the world, engaging with the ideas and practices of other radical thinkers, leaders and educators. They used these ideas not only to analyze their own social and political reality, but as a way to develop and lead a range of revolutionary practices, which became the subject matter of this thesis.

The research further identified some individual leaders and educators associated with three other social groups, with links to the AIDG and Casa dos Timores. The first was a private school in Santa Cruz, started in the early 1960s by Francisco Xavier do Amaral, offering private courses to disadvantaged native Timorese who could not access Portuguese public schools. I have identified several graduates of this school who held key positions in the lower ranks of FRETILIN, including Antonino Santana, Caetano Guterres, Lino da Silva and José Sarmento, and this school deserves further detailed investigation for its contribution to the early struggle against obscurantism. Second, there was a group of poets, including Ruy Cinnati, Julieta Fatal, Inácio Moura, Francisco Borja da Costa and José Alexandre Gusmão, who wrote anti-colonial poetry prior to and following the 1974 Carnation Revolution. The third source of early popular education leadership were the Catholic Schools which most members of the AIDG and Casa dos Timores attended in their early years. Despite the conservatism of the Catholic Church, individuals such as Mgr. Martinho da Costa Lopes and Mgr. Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo developed close relationships with some of the Casa dos Timores and AIDG members, and they too played a significant role in the later years of the Resistance, after most leading members of those groups had been killed by the occupation forces. Together, the members of all these groups, the AIDG, the Casa dos Timores, the graduates of Xavier's school, the radical poets and the allies in the Catholic Church formed a line of strong and intelligent leaders and educators who fought alongside the people for independence.

Imperative of a Pedagogical Intervention

The research identified Nicolau dos Reis Lobato and the AIDG as the first group in Portuguese Timor to attempt to build an anti-colonial political movement, through group discussions, personal contacts with African National Liberation movements, and their regular contributions to *Seara* and *A Voz de Timor* which aimed to influence the Timorese public. At the same time, Timorese students studying in Portuguese universities who had begun to interact with anti-colonial and anti-fascist movements, including PAIGC, FRELIMO and MPLA in Africa, and the MRRP of Portugal, undertook a rigorous scientific analysis of the social and political context of Timor, and developed a set of ideas to guide them towards revolution, transforming the situation in Timor to the path of independence.

Further, this study has shown that these early leaders were aware that, without a correct pedagogical intervention, there would be no popular resistance against colonialism and imperialism, and the imminent invasion from Indonesia. Long before, numerous attempted rebellions against Portuguese colonialism had been crushed, forcing the native Timorese, the Maubere People, to the margins of colonial society. The early leaders realized that Portuguese colonialism had systematically attacked the culture of the people, and had denied the fundamental rights of the majority to education, as a way to maintain their colonial rule. They learned from revolutionary thinkers such as Marx, Lenin, Cabral, Mao Tse-tung and Freire that a popular revolutionary movement was needed, based on a conscientized people. On September 11, 1974, the founding members of the Association of Social Democrats of Timor (ASDT) transformed their organization into a political front, FRETILIN. The Casa dos Timores in particular, knew that FRETILIN could only be strong if there were genuinely revolutionary movements at the base level, movements which would produce revolutionaries, people with a new mentality - anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist and with a great desire for freedom from all forms of oppression. They turned to mass popular education as the method to obtain their objective.

These early leaders and educators knew that, as products of the colonial system for the elite, including the Church education system, they would not easily be accepted in the villages and rural areas as popular leaders. Drawing again on the ideas and experiences of Freire, Cabral and Mao

Tse-tung, they committed ‘class suicide’. Abandoning their privileged positions as intellectuals and members of the petty bourgeoisie, they committed themselves totally to a liberation struggle which was also a cultural revolution, the Maubere Revolution, working alongside the villagers, speaking the language of equality, and denouncing colonialism, imperialism and all forms of exploitation. In their hands, the revolutionary theories and practice of mass popular education became a powerful instrument of the struggle for Timorese independence.

Building FRETILIN as a Popular Movement

In Portugal in June 1974, the Casa dos Timores students adopted a ‘*Declaration of Principles*’ which included the formation of revolutionary bases, an idea inspired by the ‘Return to the Village’ experience of Mao Tse-tung and his followers in Yen-an Province, discussed in Chapter 4. Returning to Timor, they obtained support from the founding FRETILIN leaders, then dramatically multiplied the number of the popular educators through establishing the national student union, UNETIM, with 200 active members from Dili’s four high schools. They began their own grass-roots form of scientific revolution, with the students in the frontline of the struggle working in the villages on one hand, while they built a structural link with the Portuguese authorities Decolonization Committee and its Group for the Transformation of Teaching in Timor (GRET) on the other. The mass literacy campaign of *consciencialização* began on January 1, 1975. FRETILIN was now developing an alternative pedagogy, on the basis of Timor’s culture, political reality, people and ecology. This was demonstrated in Chapter 6, through an analysis of the Literacy Manual *Rai Timor, Rai Ita Nian*, whose fifty generative themes complete with images illustrating the experiences of the common Timorese and their oppression made the literacy campaign an effective method for popular mobilization and awareness building.

At the level of political ideas, the Casa dos Timores did not attempt to impose communism as an ideology. Rather, having joined FRETILIN, they adopted the term *Maubere* to refer to the illiterate majority being organized to fight for their freedom. FRETILIN militants were called Maubere to refer to men and Buibere to refer to women, and the *Revolução de Maubere* was launched on May 20, 1975. As Nicol (2002) noted, the idea of Mauberism arose from the

actions taken to intensify the base work and literacy campaign. As Lenin had written, “without revolutionary theory, there can be no revolutionary movement” (cited Freire, 1970, p.106). Freire further explained that “revolution is achieved neither through verbalism nor activism, rather with praxis, that is, with reflection and action, directed at the structure to be transformed,” and this was only possible through the participation of the people (Freire 1970, p.106).

In Chapters 6 and 7, it was shown that UNETIM was transformed in the second half of 1975, and its members became the core leadership for two new mass organizations of women and youth, OPMT and OPJT. In this way, FRETILIN expanded beyond the student movement, as the number of revolutionaries multiplied again, to include the youth and women in the rural areas in the country. Through OPMT, as shown in Chapter 7, women became a distinct cultural force, not only in the resistance against the Indonesian occupation, but also in bringing about a cultural revolution against paternalism and the domestication of women. Over time, more women became involved in both politics and the military struggle, laying a solid foundation for a continuing women’s liberation struggle today. As this mass mobilization proceeded, the people involved became what I have called an *army of the pens*, formed to fight for the liberation of the Maubere People. I call it an *army of the pens* because we produced no weapons, no bombs, not even a single bullet; nor did we receive any external military support to fight the Indonesian forces. The Timorese social revolution began from the education system, with students and teachers at the frontline of the cultural struggle. This was how FRETILIN grew, in 1974-75, to become a militant mass movement for liberation.

However, in August 1975, UDT, with the support of Indonesia, imposed violence on the Maubere Revolution, leading to the formation of the National Liberation Army (FALINTIL), and although UDT was defeated within two weeks, the UDT coup d’état helped pave the way for Indonesia finally to invade Timor-Leste. This initiated a new phase of the struggle, combining armed struggle with social revolution. During this period, FRETILIN began to see the importance of developing its own media, establishing a newspaper *Timor-Leste. Jornal do Povo Maubere* and initiating a radio broadcasting operation, Radio Maubere. As discussed in

Chapter 11, the radio became the only link of FRETILIN/RDTL with the outside world after Timor was isolated by the foreign powers and the people were being bombed in the mountains.

The ‘Popular Socialist’ State in Experiment

One of the political objectives in the Casa dos Timores Declaration of June 30, 1974 was to destroy and replace the colonial state structure. In fact, FRETILIN did not have to destroy the Portuguese colonial structure, because it was already in the process of self-destruction. The Portuguese fascist regime, which dominated Portuguese politics for nearly fifty years, collapsed after April 1974. Then the new Portuguese authorities lost control over the decolonization process, when it was aborted by the UDT coup d’état in August 1975. FRETILIN tried but failed to get the Portuguese Colonial Administration to re-assume responsibility over the process, leading inevitably to the brutal Indonesian invasion and annexation of Timor-Leste.

While FRETILIN formed FALINTIL to defend itself against this new colonial power, its leaders knew they could not defeat Indonesia militarily. Their resistance would need to be political, and to resist politically they needed to be an independent country. This would provide them a political advantage in terms of raising the national consciousness as well as defending Timor-Leste as a state internationally, particularly in the United Nations. So FRETILIN unilaterally proclaimed independence on November 28, 1975; adopted the RDTL I Constitution on November 29, declared the formation of a Cabinet and sent a diplomatic mission abroad. From then on, Timor-Leste was no longer a Portuguese colony but rather an independent country. But how could the new Republic operate as a state under circumstances of war? This was one of the grave challenges for the leadership. The first Popular Assembly met for one whole month May- June 1976 to debate this, finally deciding to establish the Resistance Bases. Timor-Leste was to be divided into six Sectors, which would operate both as Centres for Administration of the population and as Bases for a Popular Resistance War, as described in Chapters 8 - 10. This decision created a division among the leadership, with Nicolau Lobato, the Prime Minister in support, while the President of the Republic, Francisco Xavier do Amaral, opposed the formation of the Bases, arguing instead that the population should surrender and the Resistance move

immediately to a strategy of guerilla warfare. Months later, Xavier do Amaral was detained for treason, and his followers were all either imprisoned or executed.

From 1976-1978, the Resistance Bases strategy proved to be successful, both as a way to resist the Indonesian occupation and to experiment with a real popular socialist state model, the first independent state in Timorese history. The popular socialist state had mechanisms for collective decision making at all levels: the Popular Assembly; the Council of Ministers; Commissariats in the six Sectors; the Zone Committees; and the Revolutionary Democratic Council at the village level. The military character of the state persisted because of the military occupation, but the military was subject to civilian control at all levels. The Revolutionary Democratic Council at the village level played a key role in promoting self-reliance in production and social services from the grass roots level. The Republic built over 400 schools and at least three identified Medical Schools operated in different sectors across the country. In the schooling system, there was no dichotomy between the formal and non-formal education system. Instead these schools were instruments for the revolution. Beyond reading and writing, the schools taught participants basic political literacy, including radical independence slogans such as 'to resist is to win' and 'dead or alive, independence'. Politics was also learned through social gatherings (*convívios*) with Timorese dancing (*tebe-tebe*) and revolutionary songs and poems. School students also became involved in food production, contributing to the economic resistance against the occupation forces. FRETILIN/RDTL also developed a justice system known as National Rehabilitation (RENAL), in all sectors.

For the first time in their history since the arrival of the Portuguese, the Timorese people adopted a development strategy during this period which was based on their own local knowledge, and they were running their own Government, with no international advisors. FRETILIN/RDTL also established solidarity links with anti-colonial and workers movements internationally, as described in Chapter 11, forming an international dimension of the FRETILIN Popular Education campaign. There was consistent solidarity support in African Liberation Movements, but there was less support obtained in Australia and in Portugal due to political conservatism in

these respective countries. In Portugal, by the 1980s, FRETILIN/RDTL had gained new support but in Australia solidarity campaigns were still marginal though they continued until 1999.

At the end of 1978, Indonesian occupying forces launched three successful military operations against RDTL I Resistance Bases, with weapons provided by the United States. With the exception of the External Delegation, almost all the members of Casa dos Timores students and AIDG were killed in battle or executed upon surrendering. However, while they had lost the conventional 'war of position', they had not lost the guerilla or cultural war. Moreover, they had prepared a new line of leaders and educated the population of the whole country during three years of the Resistance Bases, and a popular war of a different nature was about to begin. Both politically and militarily, people were prepared to resist for a longer period of time. Some of the middle ranking leaders who had spent time with the original leaders, studying and involved in the organization of the Resistance Bases, were now ready to take over the leadership.

Return to Political Movement

Chapters 12 showed that the end of Matebian and the destruction of the RDTL I Resistance Bases led FRETILIN to a new analysis and a new form of resistance, as Xanana Gusmão and Ma'Huno, the two surviving members of the CCF and the RDTL I Government, re-organized the Republic as a political movement. In 1981, FRETILIN formally became Marxist-Leninist Party - FRETILIN (PML-F), and the Revolutionary Council of the National Resistance was formed, to build a new national front. The citizens of the RDTL who came from the Resistance Bases became the new political educators and mobilizers in the occupied territories, creating new small clandestine networks to support the idea of independence. Citizens of Indonesia according to their citizenship cards, they were true RDTL citizens in their hearts and minds. The new form of resistance was characterized by a high degree of involvement of youth and students in the clandestine fronts both in Indonesia and in Timor-Leste. The penetration of UNTIM, and the formation of clandestine groups in high schools and inside Church youth organizations were strategic interventions, bringing about a new awareness of nationalism among a new generation of students, and generating new forms of cultural resistance and revolution. The November 12 Massacre of 1991 was one of the most significant events in this period, and opened a new era

of international solidarity. The campaign culminated in the formation of the Students and Youth Solidarity Council which took a leading role in the grass roots dialogue, leading to the United Nations supervised referendum on August 30, 1999, where people voted overwhelmingly in favor of Independence and forced the withdrawal of the Indonesian occupation forces.

PEDAGOGY OF THE *LIBERTAÇÃO DO POVO* IN PROGRESS

The United Nations directly ran Timor-Leste during the so-called transition, until May 20, 2002 which marked the restoration of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, which I have called RDTL II, the Second Republic. A Constituent Assembly, in which FRETILIN was the majority party, had developed a new RDTL II Constitution, which created a different form of state, a multiparty social democracy. During this period, and in the years immediately following the restoration, FRETILIN did not organize a popular education campaign among its members and supporters. Instead, it was forced to concentrate on the tasks of state building.

RDTL II: Re-reconstructing political philosophy

Six years following the United Nations intervention and after four years of FRETILIN Governance, Timor-Leste was again in political turmoil, which began as a protest within the new national army, F-FDTL, before spreading out to become a social and political crisis engulfing the country in 2006. The crisis demonstrated the failure of the competing ‘elite party’ model of the new multi-party parliamentary system to mobilize the people of Timor-Leste to undertake a peaceful transformation towards the formation of a new human community, based on justice and ecological sustainability. Consequently, these events provoked renewed political debate about what kind of state model is truly democratic and liberating. The 2006 military, political and social crisis marked a beginning of the return of the political party FRETILIN to its leading role, not only in the traditional processes of cadre formation through popular education and the party structures, but also through involvement in development activities at the base level.

Chapter 13 showed that popular education continued in the period up to and since the crisis, but largely outside of FRETILIN party structures. New organisations which originated within FRETILIN adopted popular education methods and practices, and they have proved successful

in developing grass root programs and popular movements. The examples of GFFTL and the Kdadalak Sulimutuk Institute were shown to provide relevant models, case-studies which FRETILIN might consider as it seeks to develop a renewed political movement. This chapter highlighted the persistent focus of GFFTL on campaigning to raise women's literacy, using the classical praxis method of action and reflection. Likewise, Kdadalak Sulimutuk Institute's persistent campaign for land reform in the coffee growing communities in Ermera took ten long years before the communities finally established the Ermera Agricultural Union (UNAER) with 750 members participating in its first Congress in February 2010. This is an historical development, first, because there has not previously been any strong farmers union in Timor-Leste, and second, because it shows it is possible to move from 'project-based' work to a peoples, farmers-centered, social and political movement.

FRETILIN, both at the grass-roots level of party militants, and within the party structures, is now aware of the importance of reviving the popular education movement, and this study contributed to this awareness through what I have called '*re-conscientisation*'. Beyond FRETILIN, popular education has also again become a concern among educators and students. The Popular Education Mini Conference at the National University of Timor-Lorosae (UNTL) in November 2010 demonstrated strong interest in reconstructing a Timorese pedagogy and campaigning for education for all. It is noteworthy that, on the same day, the so-called 'donor countries' organized another conference under the theme '*Education as an opportunity*', with the Minister of Education as a key note speaker. If educational opportunity means what it does in the United States, where those who have money are able to continue their studies as far as they like, while the 'have nots' must borrow in order to study, and are indebted to the banks for much of their lives, then this new form of colonial thinking will inevitably lead to new resistance in the education system.

Developing a Timorese Popular Socialism: Mauberism

The study has shown that FRETILIN's leaders used Marxist class analysis to analyse Timorese society in 1975, but because Timor-Leste was an agrarian society and the proletariat was not

a significant force, the concept of the *Maubere* was used to refer to the lowest segments of the Timorese society, the illiterate, the peasants, small farmers and the minority of urban workers:

‘Maubere’ was the people who resisted colonialism culturally; they were the real vanguard of the popular culture, because of that they suffered... (Araújo, cited Barros Duarte 1988, p.18).

A similar idea was expressed in a speech by Amílcar Cabral in 1970, in which he argued that popular culture, the culture of the people, was necessarily a culture of resistance, because colonialism could not help but be an attack on that culture and way of living (Cabral 1973).

Already, in 1975-76, some FRETILIN leaders had developed the concept of *Mauberism*, which Dennis Freney described as “an egalitarian philosophy” (Denis Freney: CIET.MS.9535/3/9). Initially I understood Mauberism to mean a Timorese form of *primitive* communism.²¹⁴ However, by the early 1900s, the primitive communism of Timorese society had undergone a transformation due to the presence of colonialism and the introduction of a new mode of production. The formation of monoculture and agro-business had produced forced labor, *quasi-slavery* and feudalism in Timor-Leste. In 2006, therefore, in my work with the Grupo Estudu Maubere, I began to develop the idea of Mauberism as a form of Timorese *popular socialism* (Da Silva 2006). This theoretical development was based on the fact that FRETILIN has consistently used the concept ‘popular’ since 1975, and had attempted a form of popular democracy in the Resistance Bases, which combined democratic centralism with direct revolutionary democracy at the grass root level. Maubersim, then, is a specifically-Timorese form of socialism, which arises on the basis of three fundamental concepts: *democratic centralism, popular democracy, and social solidarity*. Its roots lie both in Timorese culture, and in the rich experiences and experiments that occurred over twenty-four years of political and cultural opposition to the Indonesian occupation.

This represents a theoretical development within Timorese popular education, as it has been described and analysed, but also actualised, through this thesis. It is my attempt, which is only

214 For a discussion of this term, see Lafargue (1890/2008).

a beginning, at a new systematisation²¹⁵. I now define the Maubere Philosophy, Mauberism, to consist of five main features. The first element is social solidarity, an idea which is found everywhere in Timorese culture, expressed under different names in different dialects, for example: fulidaidai (Makaleru), Kawak/hakawak (Bunak and Tetum Terik of Suai), Arosan (Manatuto), Ulu-Ini (Naueti) and Slulu (Mombae). They all mean ‘working together’ or ‘to be together in building houses and farming’. *Fetsa-umane*, which is particularly practiced in the patrilineal societies, is also a form of social solidarity, keeping the community together on the basis of blood lineage relationships and marriage. In Portuguese times, this was also a form of social resistance against outsiders.

The second element is the intrinsic relationship between the Timorese people and their ecological world. The songs of Francisco Borja da Costa, including *Foho Ramelau* and *Kdadalak Sulimutuk* are classical expressions of these relationships. Both Portuguese colonialism and the Indonesian occupation have exploited and destroyed massively the Timorese ecology, and yet, at the same time, the ecology was our ally - the mountains, the landscape and its fertility, the caves and water springs all provided great protection for our guerrilla fighters throughout the 24 years of armed Resistance. Still today, the vast majority of Timorese people generate their living out of their natural resources and the ecology at large. It is a source of life and abundance.

The third element is the particular relationship the Timorese people have with their ancestors. This is expressed through the existence of the *Uma Fukun* (elder-house) as a form of governance and care for the community. People from generation to generation remain in contact through the elder-house. The people regularly gather to celebrate life and to perform rituals in respect of their ancestors.

The fourth element is the understanding which the history of Timorese struggle has taught us about the relationship between the more privileged and the less privileged in relation to

215 “In Spanish, the use of the word “sistematización” had been limited to the process of ordering and organizing information within a research project; in the context (of popular education) when there appears the new meaning of systematization, which is developed in this article, the word was intended to express the idea of “organizing the practice within a system”, “to order experience as a system of stable elements and relations”. From there on, there is the acceptance and diffusion of the word which today seems too short to express the richness of meaning which presently characterizes the systematization of experiences” (Carillo Torres 2010, p.210).

education and wealth. Colonials against the colonized, occupiers against the occupied - these material-historical realities created social stratification and class struggle, which today remain as a source of social conflict and energy for transformation and revolution. Why do we fight? We fight for the liberation of the homeland and all things in it from the exploitation of the colonial powers. We also fight to liberate our people from oppression, in all dimensions, cultural, political, economic and ecological. The Maubere Revolution is also internationalist in nature; it is one among many similar struggles in the world.

The fifth feature is the valuing of popular democracy. FRETILIN initially was a nationalist-communist front which set out to build a *real* socialist state, i.e. one which was possible in the circumstances of the time. On the basis of my research, I have described the first Timorese Republic, RDTL I, as a *popular real socialist state model*. It combined democratic centralism, meaning all decisions were subject to a dialectical process, finding unity through opposition, but once a decision was made, it had to be implemented without opposition; and, at the base level, the people themselves actively taking the initiative in development. This was demonstrated in the formation of the Revolutionary Democratic Councils at the village level, and in the high value placed on collective decision-making at all levels, even in the military operation.

The restoration of the Republic, RDTL, on May 20, 2002 has meant also the return of ideological discourse and debate, both at the state and Party level, an ideology discourse that was forbidden by the Indonesian occupying force. RDTL has maintained the original symbols of the original State, including the flag and the national anthem. However, it now has a new RDTL II Constitution. What model of state do we call today's RDTL? In the text of the proclamation and the national anthem, RDTL II remains an anti-colonial and anti-imperialist state, a popular socialist state according to its stated principles; but now it has a multi-party parliamentary system, a social democracy.

CONCLUSION

Beginning with the students of UNETIM, FRETILIN introduced Paulo Freire's popular education, which sees, beyond reading and writing, that literacy is a process of *consciencialização*, in which people become able to read the world, both the colonial world and their own society. The objective of this study has likewise been to introduce a new process of conscientisation, which I term 're-conscientisation', a process of reflection both at the collective and also the individual level. This process is particularly relevant in a post-colonial post-conflict society like Timor-Leste, where so much focus has been placed on physical reconstruction and development, undermining and downgrading the social, cultural and historical aspects of the transformation, which FRETILIN defines as '*Libertação do Povo*', the people's liberation'. There are new research processes that are taking place as I am completing this study. Last year, OPMT initiated its own oral history research and writing process, through which it is reproducing a new generation of young popular educators, both women and men, who are participating in the process as researchers. Another example is the popular education streams at the Timor-Leste Studies Association Conference in 2009 and this year 2011. The 2011 stream indicated that there is a new popular education movement growing in Timor-Leste. An unexpected outcome from this research is discovering that the fundamental principle of popular education is to recognize that the history of thirty-five years of revolution and resistance in Timor-Leste are histories of a people, the Maubere People. This ushers in a new dimension to materialist history writing and research in Timor-Leste. Many local histories of ordinary people who laid down their lives in the struggle for national liberation struggle are still yet to be written and recognized, as new histories are also to be made in the coming decades of the Maubere Revolution, for the liberation of the people: *LIBERTAÇÃO DO POVO*'

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Appendix 1. Informants and interviewees

No	Names	Nome da Guerra	Position	Method	Date
01	Abel Ximenes	Larisina		Pers.com	
02	Abilio Araujo		Ex-member of CCF	Interview	09/09/2009
03	Abilio Sereno		Political Assistant	Interview	13/06/2008
04	Adelino de Jesus Eladio Faculto		Former Political Assistant/ OJETIL	Interview	26/03/2011
05	Afondo Pinto		Member CEFORPOL	Interview	
06	Afonso Soares	Uairela	Member MIPLIN	Interview	15/03/2010
07	Aires de A lmeida		Member of Casa dos Timores	Interview	08/07/2008
08	Alarico Fernandes		Ex-Minister of Internal Security and Information	Interview	28/10/2008
09	Alfredo Borges Ferreira		Farmer Rep. of FRETILIN in Australia	Interview	12/09/2011
10	Ali Alkatiri		Member of Central Committe	Interview	30/03/2011
11	Ana dos Reis Fernandes		OPMT	Interview	20/04/2009
12	Andrew McNaughton		Australian Journalist	Interview	28/10/ 1998
13	Antonio de Jesus Pinto		Secretary in Aldeia-Uato- Lari	Interview	26/03/2011
14	Antonio Correia	Amesa	Militant	Interview	19/10/2009
15	Amaro Silverio & Jenito Santana		UNAER	Interview	28/03/2011
16	Aurelio Freitas Ribeiro		Member of DSMPTL	Pers.com	15/03/2011
17	Aurelio Cristovao Guterres		Current Rector of UNTL	Pers.com	20/07/2008
18	Bernardo Guterres		Member of Health Brigade	Interview	07/05/2010
19	Barbedo Magalhaes ¹⁰		Former Portuguese Army Officer	Interview	09/06/2008
20	Braz Rangel	Warik	Director of Education in Regiao Viqueque	Interview	18/03/2009
21	Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, Mgr.		Nobel Peace Laureate	Interview	9/06/2008
22	Brian Manning		Operator of Radio Maubere-Darwin	Pers.com.	26/05/201
23	Celestino M. da Costa	Malik	Popular educator	Interview	19/09/2009
24	Correia Vilanova, Manuel Beremau, Rosita Quintao		OPJT members	Interview	19/10/2009
25	Daniel Guterres		Member of CEFORPOL	Interview	08/07/2009

No	Names	Nome da Guerra	Position	Method	Date
26	Domingos Caetano	Beremau	UNETIM member	Interview	03/03/2011
27	Eduardo dos Anjos		FRETILIN member	Interview	17/06/2011
28	Elda Guterres da Silva		Membru DSMPPPTL	Interview	27/07/2011
29	Elias Vilanova	Mau Metama	FALINTIL Company collaborator	Interview	19/10/ 2009
30	Estanislao da Silva Filomena de Almedia	Mau-Bais Filou	Members of Casa dos Timores	Interview	08/07 2008
31	Esetvao Cabral		Ex-member of UNETIM	Pers.com.	10/2009 11/2010
	Francisco Xavier do Amaral		Former President of FRETILIN/RDTL	Public Sem.	12/06/2009
29	Francisco Calsona Domingos Beremau		Member of Directive Committee of UNETIM/ Leader of Pilot Project Oecusse	Interview	20/10/2009
30	Felizberto de Carvalho		Ex-Member of FALINTIL	Interview	21/07/2009
32	Francisco Soares	Borulaco	Political Delegate (DK)	Pers.com.	27/08/2009 15/09/2009
33	Gregorio Lobo Pinto	Bersalis/Hamaluk	Platoon Commander of FALINTIL-Hedemumu	Interview	04/03/2011
34	Inacio da Costa		Member Health Brigade	Interview	18/08/2009
35	Jafar Alkatiri			Interview	07/12/2010
36	Jenito Santana		UNAER/KSI	Pers.com.	28/03/2011
37	Joanita Oliveira et al		GFFTL	Group Inter	22/06/2011
38	Joanita Oliveira		GFFTL	Interview	22/06/2011
39	Jose Kamarada			Interview	11/03/2009
40	Jose Monteiro & Raul da Costa Araujo da Silva		Ex-FALINTIL/Guard for RENAL Remexio/ Commander of Zone A Remexio	G-Inter	19/09/2009
41	Jose Ramos Horta		Founding Member of FRETILIN	Lecture	19/ 07/2009
42	Jose Sarmento		Member Policia Revolucionaria	Interview	10/10/2009
43	Juliana Mendonca		Ex-member of OPMT	Interview	19/09/2009
44	Julio de Fatima	Rihi	Ex-FALINTIL Commander	Interview	08/04/2010
45	Julio dos Santos		Member of OJETIL-HPP-MAI	Interview	11/03/2011
46	Julmira Sirana	Sirana	Ex-Member of UNETIM	Interview	20/10/2009
47	Justino Iap		Ex-member of Casa dos Timores	Interview	12/06/2008

No	Names	Nome da Guerra	Position	Method	Date
48	Lamartinho de Oliveira		Assistant SECAE in Metebain	Interview	20/04/2010
49	Liborio de Jesus Freitas		Former member of FALINTIL	Interview	15/05/2008
50	Lino da Silva	Kai-Mau	Chefe Aldeia	Interview	18/03/2010
51	Lorenzo Guterres & Lorenca da Silva Guterres	Bissae	Adult Educator & member of CEFORPOL	Interview	18/03/2010
52	Luis Araujo	Luis Gonzaga	Militant in Aisirimu	Interview	20/09/2009
53	Luisa Teotonio Pereira		Founding Member of CIDAC-Lisbon	Pers.com	3/03/2009
54	Madalena da Silva Fernandes		Member of CEFORPOL Ravina	Interview	05/2/2009
55	Manuel Coelho	AA	Director of Education in Centre North Sector	Interview	12/06/2008
56	Marelino Pereira		Member of FALINTIL	Interview	18/3/2010
57	Maria Angelina Sarmiento Lopes	Kiukai	Member of GFFTL	Pers.com	15/04/2010
58	Maria Maia Reis	Lalu	Member of UNETIM	Pers Com	08/30/2011
59	Mari Alkatiri		Head of External Delegation	Lecture	30/12/2010 05/06/2011
60	Maria de Jesus		Member of GFFTL	Pers.com	27/07/2011
61	Marquita Soares		Member of CCF/GFFTL	Interview	28/03/2011
62	Matias da Silva	Mau-calma	Member of Health Brigade	Interview	16/03/2010
63	Merita Alves		Member of OPMT	Interview	08/09/2008
65	Nicolau Monis		Adult Educator/Secretario da Zona-Maliana	Pers.com	24/3/2010
66	Padre Leonito do Rego		Priest	Interview	1980
67	Paulino Viegas Tilman		Militant of FRETILIN	Pers.com	20/04/2009
68	Ramaldo da Costa et al		FRETILIN militants	Group Inter.	20/04/2009
69	Renato de Oliveira		FRETILIN Political Assistant	Pers.com	09/2001
70	Rogério Tiago Lobato		First Commander of FALINTIL	Pers.com	19/12/2009
71	Tereza da Costa	Bui-Iku	OPMT	Interview	17/10/2009
72	Tobias Mendonca		Ex-Chefe da Zona/ FRETILIN Prisoner/Cook to Sahe	Interview	19/09/2009
73	Vicente de Paulo		Popular Educator	Interview	10/2009
74	Zelia Fernandes		GFFTL	Pers.com	14/05/2011