Talks by Harry Alanen
This talk explores the connections between Aristotle's abstract account of self-motion in Physics... more This talk explores the connections between Aristotle's abstract account of self-motion in Physics VIII and his more detailed accounts developed in De Anima III.10 and De Motu Animalium. In particular, I explore how the different motions and activities Aristotle identifies in discussing locomotion are related to one another: how is the activity of the object of desire, desiring, the alterations of the pneuma and other bodily instruments connected or related.
Aristotle’s key thoughts on teleology are found in Physics II.8-9. My aim here will be limited: t... more Aristotle’s key thoughts on teleology are found in Physics II.8-9. My aim here will be limited: to understand the way in which a final cause, something good, acts as a cause. Hypothetical necessity provides the logical structure of how goals are present in changes and understanding this should help us understand how Aristotle saw goals functioning as causes. Final causes are not merely the limit at which some efficient cause ends, they are either prior to efficient causes, or they function as distinctive kinds of efficient causes.
Habit (ethos) and habituation play important roles in Aristotle’s ethics. Good habituation counts... more Habit (ethos) and habituation play important roles in Aristotle’s ethics. Good habituation counts for good character, and thus it is vital for virtuous agents. Without good habituation one cannot come to possess virtues of character such as temperance or bravery. How Aristotle conceived of habituation to come about is a matter of controversy, since Aristotle never properly explains how he thinks we become habituated such that we retain responsibility. Indeed, Aristotle claims that what is natural in us, is not up to us, in a way that acting virtuously (or not) is. It is therefore unclear how Aristotle thinks we can be responsible for our habitual doings, if some of those doings result from natural activities (like perception and desire) which we are subject to, qua biological creatures. However, while there has been some discussion on how habituation might come about, less attention has been paid on what Aristotle thinks counts as habitual actions. This question will be the focus of my talk. The question about habitual action in Aristotle is made more difficult given contemporary disagreements on what habits are, and how they should be thought of in relation to non-habitual actions. The talk has the following structure: I begin with an overview of Aristotle’s views on habit and habituation, and raise a number of questions we might want answers to, if we are to fully appreciate Aristotle’s views. I then discuss generally some contemporary views regarding habits and actions, in hopes that this will help set the stage for what is distinctive in Aristotle’s thought. I then discuss the range of cases Aristotle counts as habitually done, and suggest some criterion that makes all of these habits.
Aristotle's discussion in De Anima III.7 contains an important, but often overlooked, account of ... more Aristotle's discussion in De Anima III.7 contains an important, but often overlooked, account of desire (orexis). It is important because it develops some of Aristotle's earlier remarks regarding the connection between perception, pleasure, pain, and desire. On the reading offered here, desire is either a perceiving of something as good or pleasant, or thinking that something is good, where good is to be understood as something to be gone for, or something to be enjoyed. On this interpretation desire covers a broad range of phenomena from aesthetic pleasures to desires that requires one to move one's body in pursuit of what one sees or thinks pleasant or good. So understood, pleasantly perceiving something, feeling pleasure, and desiring, are not distinct activities, one following the other, but rather different ways of describing the same activity. This interpretation differs from a classical one, according to which phantasia must be brought in to convert ordinary, value-neutral perception, into evaluative perception that can function as the content of a desire.
Aristotle clearly thinks that desire is the cause of action, and of the animal moving its body wi... more Aristotle clearly thinks that desire is the cause of action, and of the animal moving its body with respect to place. For contemporary philosophers working on action, these claims may seem familiar. For example, Donald Davidson claims that “Aristotle pretty much invented the subject as we now think of it.” This is a substantial claim.
When philosophers make these kinds of generalisations, those working on the history of philosophy become anxious. It is far from clear that the terms and concepts used by past philosophers pick out the same phenomena as their apparent contemporary versions. Nor is it clear that historical figures are even trying to answer the same questions their contemporary colleagues are. These kinds of worries set the agenda for my research.
This talk examines some aspects of Aristotle's views on action and agency, and contrast some features of his approach with a prevalent, contemporary view, often referred to as the “standard story of action”. Despite certain similarities, Aristotle is not a proponent of this so-called “standard story”; or, so I hope to show. Given my time constraints, I can’t really hope go in depth on the details of Aristotle’s views on these difficult questions – my task is therefor more modest: to raise some reasons to doubt that “Davidson’s claim” – as I shall call the quote just given – is correct. I’ll end with a consideration as to why we should care about Davidson’s claim.
Aristotle agrees with his predecessors (in Physics III.2) that it is difficult to say what change... more Aristotle agrees with his predecessors (in Physics III.2) that it is difficult to say what change (kinêsis) is. Nevertheless, he thinks his account in Physics III.1 is considerably better than his predecessors’ attempts. This talk examines some features that sets Aristotle’s approach apart from theirs. The key difference is that Aristotle is not trying to give a reductive account of change; or so I hope to show. By contrast, they tried to account for change in terms of “inequality”, “difference” and “non-being”. The problem with these attempt, according to Aristotle, is that none of them really explain why change occurs.
As I hope to show, Aristotle thought his predecessors erred by granting too much to an Eleatic puzzle which seems to deny the possibility of change. Not being able to adequately resolve this dilemma is what led them astray in trying to account for change. Aristotle’s own position builds on his predecessors’ views (In Physics I), but in a way that avoids the Eleatic dilemma. In this way we can see how Aristotle took his own account to be an improvement.
Aristotle holds that desire is the cause of the animal moving its body with respect to place, and... more Aristotle holds that desire is the cause of the animal moving its body with respect to place, and that desire is the cause of action. For certain contemporary philosophers working on action, these claims will seem familiar. This talk examines some aspects of Aristotle's views on desire (orexis) as developed in De Anima III.7, his claims in De Anima III.10 that desire is the cause of the animal moving its body with respect to place, and contrast some features of his approach with contemporary approaches to the explanation of action. Despite certain similarities, Aristotle is not a proponent of the so-called “standard story of action”.
I discuss Aristotle's arguments regarding the perception of pleasure and pain in De Anima III.7 4... more I discuss Aristotle's arguments regarding the perception of pleasure and pain in De Anima III.7 431a8-14. This passage is important, since it provides us with Aristotle's view on how perception and desire are related. However, Aristotle's arguments are compressed and need to be spelled out. On the view I defend, sensual desire, for Aristotle, is a pleasure involving perception, and not a case of an ordinary perception followed by a separate judgement that the object perceived is pleasant (or painful, in the case of aversion). So understood, the perception of pleasure involves the perceptive mean being affected by an object of perception in a pleasant way. My main focus will be on developing an interpretation of the passage. I discuss some objections, but a full defence lies outside this paper.
Many consider Aristotle to be the father of philosophy of action. However, philosophy of action w... more Many consider Aristotle to be the father of philosophy of action. However, philosophy of action wasn't established as a distinct field until the 20th century. While true that he discussed similar questions contemporary philosophers engage with, he did not do so in a systematic fashion, nor did he dedicate any single work on the topic. This makes it difficult to work out what exactly he has contributed to the field. Nor is it clear that he approached the explanation from action in the same way as contemporary philosophers do. In this paper I argue that philosophy of action as typically conceived of today is influenced by two major developments in the history of philosophy: a post-Cartesian view of mind-body dualism, and a post-Humean conception of causation. I aim to show how these developments influence the way in which questions about mind and action are now standardly raised, and then argue that Aristotle shares neither the post-Cartesian or post-Humean assumptions. This sets his approach to the explanation of action apart from certain contemporary approaches.
Conference Presentations by Harry Alanen
Habit and habituation play important roles in Aristotle’s ethics. How Aristotle conceived of habi... more Habit and habituation play important roles in Aristotle’s ethics. How Aristotle conceived of habituation to come about is a matter of controversy, since Aristotle never properly explains how he thinks we become habituated such that we retain responsibility. It is therefore unclear how Aristotle thinks we can be responsible for our habitual doings, if some of those doings result from natural processes we are subject to qua biological creatures. However, while there has been some discussion on how habituation might come about, less attention has been paid on what Aristotle thinks counts as habitual actions. This question will be the focus of my talk. The question about habitual action in Aristotle is made even more difficult given contemporary disagreements on what habits are, and how they should be thought of in relation to non-habitual actions. I begin with some general remarks on Aristotle and make some distinctions regarding habits and their place in theory of action which we might make today, in hope that by setting the stage for how we might think about habits, we will be in a better position to see to what extent Aristotle’s approach is similar to, or different from certain contemporary one’s. I then survey the broad range of cases Aristotle calls “habitual” or “customary” (ethos); things we usually (ethein) or repeatedly (pollakis) do. I end by suggesting what common features Aristotle’s habitual actions have. One important difference between Aristotle’s approach and certain contemporary approaches is that Aristotle suggests, in Rhetoric I.11 1370a6-15, that habitual actions are “pleasant” by which he means they are unforced.
Papers by Harry Alanen
Ancient philosophy today, Apr 1, 2019
My aim is to investigate Aristotle's arguments regarding what roles desire and other parts, c... more My aim is to investigate Aristotle's arguments regarding what roles desire and other parts, capacities, or powers of the soul – such as perception and reason – have in causing animal locomotion, as presented in De Anima. This will require an investigation into parts and powers of soul, for Aristotle sometimes talks of the parts of the soul while setting forth his own views, while at times he seems highly critical of theories of the soul that assume the soul to be partitioned. My claim is that in De Anima III.9-10 Aristotle is attempting to account for locomotion in a way that allows for cases of mental conflict, without appealing to distinct or independent parts of the soul. I hope to show that Aristotle's arguments are best understood as a rejection of a Platonic account of mental conflict, which does appeal to distinct parts (pulling in different directions). However, in order for Aristotle's rejection of Plato's account to be successful we must consider in what wa...
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Talks by Harry Alanen
When philosophers make these kinds of generalisations, those working on the history of philosophy become anxious. It is far from clear that the terms and concepts used by past philosophers pick out the same phenomena as their apparent contemporary versions. Nor is it clear that historical figures are even trying to answer the same questions their contemporary colleagues are. These kinds of worries set the agenda for my research.
This talk examines some aspects of Aristotle's views on action and agency, and contrast some features of his approach with a prevalent, contemporary view, often referred to as the “standard story of action”. Despite certain similarities, Aristotle is not a proponent of this so-called “standard story”; or, so I hope to show. Given my time constraints, I can’t really hope go in depth on the details of Aristotle’s views on these difficult questions – my task is therefor more modest: to raise some reasons to doubt that “Davidson’s claim” – as I shall call the quote just given – is correct. I’ll end with a consideration as to why we should care about Davidson’s claim.
As I hope to show, Aristotle thought his predecessors erred by granting too much to an Eleatic puzzle which seems to deny the possibility of change. Not being able to adequately resolve this dilemma is what led them astray in trying to account for change. Aristotle’s own position builds on his predecessors’ views (In Physics I), but in a way that avoids the Eleatic dilemma. In this way we can see how Aristotle took his own account to be an improvement.
Conference Presentations by Harry Alanen
Papers by Harry Alanen
When philosophers make these kinds of generalisations, those working on the history of philosophy become anxious. It is far from clear that the terms and concepts used by past philosophers pick out the same phenomena as their apparent contemporary versions. Nor is it clear that historical figures are even trying to answer the same questions their contemporary colleagues are. These kinds of worries set the agenda for my research.
This talk examines some aspects of Aristotle's views on action and agency, and contrast some features of his approach with a prevalent, contemporary view, often referred to as the “standard story of action”. Despite certain similarities, Aristotle is not a proponent of this so-called “standard story”; or, so I hope to show. Given my time constraints, I can’t really hope go in depth on the details of Aristotle’s views on these difficult questions – my task is therefor more modest: to raise some reasons to doubt that “Davidson’s claim” – as I shall call the quote just given – is correct. I’ll end with a consideration as to why we should care about Davidson’s claim.
As I hope to show, Aristotle thought his predecessors erred by granting too much to an Eleatic puzzle which seems to deny the possibility of change. Not being able to adequately resolve this dilemma is what led them astray in trying to account for change. Aristotle’s own position builds on his predecessors’ views (In Physics I), but in a way that avoids the Eleatic dilemma. In this way we can see how Aristotle took his own account to be an improvement.