Dariusz Stola
Dariusz Stola is a historian, professor at the Institute for Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences. He has authored six and co-edited four books, and published more than a hundred scholarly articles on the political and social history of Poland in the 20th century, the Holocaust, international migrations and the communist regime. In 2014-2019 he was the director of the Polin Museum of the History of Polish Jews.
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For English summary see pages 472-477.
It developed in two acts. In the summer of 1967, the Cold War and subordination to Moscow caused the communist leaders of Poland take the Arab side in the distant conflict in the Near East. The inhabitants of Poland were supposed to follow in the steps of their rulers, thus an anti-Israeli propaganda campaign was unleashed, mobilizing the masses to express the expected opinions and feelings against Israel and its Western allies. The political police monitored non-conformist attitudes and informed the leaders that Polish Jews sympathized with Israel. Władysław Gomulka, the communist party leader, stigmatized them for this crime, and the first punishments began to fall. Those who had previously sought to deal with the Jews, a number of them concentrated in particular in the Security Service of the Ministry of Interior (MSW), felt that their moment approached.
The events of the spring of 1968, known in Poland as the March events, had a much more extensive scope and greater drama than the first act. In reaction to student protests and the ferment among intellectuals, who had been increasingly frustrated by restrictions on freedoms, censorship and withdrawal from the reforms Gomułka had promised when taking power in 1956, the authorities unleashed a large-scale hate campaign. Among the alleged internal enemies the campaign attacked, Zionists appeared in first place. In just a few days the anti-Zionist propaganda reached its apogee, masses were mobilized against the enemies, hate sessions organized throughout the country, and a purge begun. Simultaneously, an unclear intra-party struggle was going on behind the scenes. The campaign was officially terminated in July 1968, although its deceleration had begun earlier. Its most significant aftereffect, a wave of mass Jewish emigration, lasted for many months afterwards, taking away some 15,000 people, i.e. half of the Jeewish community in Poland.
Schwarzbart hoped that the common struggle against Nazi Germany and political cooperation aimed at restoring an independent and democratic Poland would radically improve Polish-Jewish relations and eventually lead to a better position of Jews in Poland after the war. He believed that his historical mission was to encourage such a cooperation and revision of Polish policy towards the Jews. He acted under extraordinary circumstances, in a complex sets of relationships between the political parties composing the government-in-exile, Polish leaders in exile and in the underground in occupied Poland, and Jewish organizations – those of Polish Jews as well as British and American. His strategy of building mutual trust encountered serious obstacles. Polish and Jewish leaders often disagreed in their evaluation of pre-war relations and Polish policy towards the Jews. Mutual suspicion led them to watch each other with detailed scrutiny, to voice strong demands or adopt a defensive attitude. Reports from Poland carried news of antisemitic attitudes among the Poles and pro-Soviet attitudes among the Jews. In exile, Jewish refugees complained of unequal treatment by the Polish relief apparatus while Jewish soldiers complained of antisemitic attitudes in the Polish Armed Forces. These problems took on dramatic dimensions with the establishment of the Polish Army in the USSR and its eventual evacuation to Iran.
Yet the greatest challenge strategy was to come with the news of the systematic extermination of Jews in occupied Poland. Reports about mass killing were reaching London since fall 194. The Polish underground and the government played a crucial role in transmitting the news to the West and Schwarzbart was the first Jewish leader to know. But only gradually did he understand that Polish Jews faced total annihilation. Schwarzbart and other exiled leaders were slow to react to the increasingly terrifying reports, which they had initially found unreliable and exaggerated. When he had realized the dramatic situation, his undertook efforts to save Polish Jews, but they did not bring satisfactory results. The government was eager to join the demands, coming from Jewish underground in Poland, for retaliatory action aimed at stopping German crimes but Allies rejected them. His second demand, that the government appeals to the Polish population to help the Jews in hiding met with resistance and brought results only after several months of lobbying. He assisted the government and Jewish organizations in sending, through the Polish underground channels, 1.3 million dollars for the Jews in Poland, but the fate of a substantial part of that money is unclear. There was some success in helping Polish-Jewish refugees in various countries, but his efforts to rescue Jews in German-occupied Poland proved late and mostly futile.
As of 1943, reports from Poland read that a great majority of Jews had already perished. The feeling of helplessness and abandonment contributed to Schwarzbart's bitter resentment against the Polish leaders and the Poles at large. His hopes for better Polish-Jewish relations failed, and the government-in-exile, to which he remained loyal to, was losing ground to the new, communist government imposed by the Soviets. As a result of the split in the Polish leadership in exile, the National Council was dissolved. At the end of the war Schwarzbart was a representative of a people, who no longer existed, to the government that the Great Powers no longer recognized.
Papers
museologist—talk about museums as institutions to practice history;
they discuss what academic historians can learn working at museums,
and they dwell on the challenges resulting from the success of museums
as vehicles of public history.
This is penultimate version of the paper published in East European Politics & Societies vol. 29 n. 1, 2015, ss. 96-119
Holocaust victims and of the land where most of the ghettoisation and killing took
place. This study argues that the exile government’s policies towards the Jews
resulted from a combination of factors: a general weakness and dependence on the
host country; urgent calls from Poland for effective action to stop German crimes;
the need to respond to demands voiced by the exiled Polish-Jewish leaders; the need
to take into account reports on anti-Jewish sentiments among the Polish
underground and in society more generally; the antisemitic position of one of its
constituent parties; and the evolving knowledge of what was happening to the Jews
in occupied Poland.
For English summary see pages 472-477.
It developed in two acts. In the summer of 1967, the Cold War and subordination to Moscow caused the communist leaders of Poland take the Arab side in the distant conflict in the Near East. The inhabitants of Poland were supposed to follow in the steps of their rulers, thus an anti-Israeli propaganda campaign was unleashed, mobilizing the masses to express the expected opinions and feelings against Israel and its Western allies. The political police monitored non-conformist attitudes and informed the leaders that Polish Jews sympathized with Israel. Władysław Gomulka, the communist party leader, stigmatized them for this crime, and the first punishments began to fall. Those who had previously sought to deal with the Jews, a number of them concentrated in particular in the Security Service of the Ministry of Interior (MSW), felt that their moment approached.
The events of the spring of 1968, known in Poland as the March events, had a much more extensive scope and greater drama than the first act. In reaction to student protests and the ferment among intellectuals, who had been increasingly frustrated by restrictions on freedoms, censorship and withdrawal from the reforms Gomułka had promised when taking power in 1956, the authorities unleashed a large-scale hate campaign. Among the alleged internal enemies the campaign attacked, Zionists appeared in first place. In just a few days the anti-Zionist propaganda reached its apogee, masses were mobilized against the enemies, hate sessions organized throughout the country, and a purge begun. Simultaneously, an unclear intra-party struggle was going on behind the scenes. The campaign was officially terminated in July 1968, although its deceleration had begun earlier. Its most significant aftereffect, a wave of mass Jewish emigration, lasted for many months afterwards, taking away some 15,000 people, i.e. half of the Jeewish community in Poland.
Schwarzbart hoped that the common struggle against Nazi Germany and political cooperation aimed at restoring an independent and democratic Poland would radically improve Polish-Jewish relations and eventually lead to a better position of Jews in Poland after the war. He believed that his historical mission was to encourage such a cooperation and revision of Polish policy towards the Jews. He acted under extraordinary circumstances, in a complex sets of relationships between the political parties composing the government-in-exile, Polish leaders in exile and in the underground in occupied Poland, and Jewish organizations – those of Polish Jews as well as British and American. His strategy of building mutual trust encountered serious obstacles. Polish and Jewish leaders often disagreed in their evaluation of pre-war relations and Polish policy towards the Jews. Mutual suspicion led them to watch each other with detailed scrutiny, to voice strong demands or adopt a defensive attitude. Reports from Poland carried news of antisemitic attitudes among the Poles and pro-Soviet attitudes among the Jews. In exile, Jewish refugees complained of unequal treatment by the Polish relief apparatus while Jewish soldiers complained of antisemitic attitudes in the Polish Armed Forces. These problems took on dramatic dimensions with the establishment of the Polish Army in the USSR and its eventual evacuation to Iran.
Yet the greatest challenge strategy was to come with the news of the systematic extermination of Jews in occupied Poland. Reports about mass killing were reaching London since fall 194. The Polish underground and the government played a crucial role in transmitting the news to the West and Schwarzbart was the first Jewish leader to know. But only gradually did he understand that Polish Jews faced total annihilation. Schwarzbart and other exiled leaders were slow to react to the increasingly terrifying reports, which they had initially found unreliable and exaggerated. When he had realized the dramatic situation, his undertook efforts to save Polish Jews, but they did not bring satisfactory results. The government was eager to join the demands, coming from Jewish underground in Poland, for retaliatory action aimed at stopping German crimes but Allies rejected them. His second demand, that the government appeals to the Polish population to help the Jews in hiding met with resistance and brought results only after several months of lobbying. He assisted the government and Jewish organizations in sending, through the Polish underground channels, 1.3 million dollars for the Jews in Poland, but the fate of a substantial part of that money is unclear. There was some success in helping Polish-Jewish refugees in various countries, but his efforts to rescue Jews in German-occupied Poland proved late and mostly futile.
As of 1943, reports from Poland read that a great majority of Jews had already perished. The feeling of helplessness and abandonment contributed to Schwarzbart's bitter resentment against the Polish leaders and the Poles at large. His hopes for better Polish-Jewish relations failed, and the government-in-exile, to which he remained loyal to, was losing ground to the new, communist government imposed by the Soviets. As a result of the split in the Polish leadership in exile, the National Council was dissolved. At the end of the war Schwarzbart was a representative of a people, who no longer existed, to the government that the Great Powers no longer recognized.
museologist—talk about museums as institutions to practice history;
they discuss what academic historians can learn working at museums,
and they dwell on the challenges resulting from the success of museums
as vehicles of public history.
This is penultimate version of the paper published in East European Politics & Societies vol. 29 n. 1, 2015, ss. 96-119
Holocaust victims and of the land where most of the ghettoisation and killing took
place. This study argues that the exile government’s policies towards the Jews
resulted from a combination of factors: a general weakness and dependence on the
host country; urgent calls from Poland for effective action to stop German crimes;
the need to respond to demands voiced by the exiled Polish-Jewish leaders; the need
to take into account reports on anti-Jewish sentiments among the Polish
underground and in society more generally; the antisemitic position of one of its
constituent parties; and the evolving knowledge of what was happening to the Jews
in occupied Poland.
If you wished to have a copy, please write me.
For the volume it makes part of: "Poland under German Occupation, 1939-1945: New Perspectives", ed. by J. Huener and A. Löw, New York (Berghahn) 2024,
see https://www.berghahnbooks.com/title/HuenerPoland
For the volume see
https://www.wallstein-verlag.de/9783835354968-migration-und-migrationspolitik-in-europa-1945-2020.html
See the book at https://books.google.pl/books?id=tZNyDwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&hl=pl#v=onepage&q&f=false
It developed in two acts. In the summer of 1967, the Cold War and subordination to Moscow had caused the Communist leaders of Poland take the Arab side in the distant conflict in the Near East. The inhabitants of Poland were supposed to follow in the steps of their rulers. Thus an anti-Israeli propaganda campaign was unleashed, mobilizing the masses to express dictated opinions and feelings. The political police monitored non-conformist attitudes and informed the leaders that Polish Jews sympathized with Israel. Władysław Gomulka, the communist party leader, stigmatized them for this crime, and the first punishments began to fall. Those who had previously sought to deal with the Jews, a number of them concentrated in particular in the Ministry of Interior (MSW) with its secret services, felt that their moment had at last approached.
The events of the spring of 1968, called the March events, had a much more extensive scope and greater drama than the first act. In reaction to student protests and the ferment among intellectuals, who had been increasingly frustrated by restrictions on freedoms, censorship and withdrawal from the reforms Gomułka had promised when taking power in 1956, the authorities unleashed a large-scale hate campaign. Among the alleged internal enemies the campaign attacked, Zionists appeared in first place. In just a few days the anti-Zionist propaganda reached its apogee, masses were mobilized against the enemies, hate sessions organized throughout the country, and a purge begun. Simultaneously, an unclear intra-party struggle was going on behind the scenes. The campaign was officially terminated in July 1968, although its deceleration had begun earlier. Its most significant aftereffect, a wave of mass Jewish emigration, lasted for many months afterwards.
While stressing the great impact those events had not only on the past but also on the present and future, this Geschichtspolitik raises many questions: How do the tension of academic writing, national perceptions, and public discourse rewrite history? Could battles of victimhood shape the past? What impact do charged encounter of various national discourses have? And what is the role of intellectuals in this debate?
Speakers
Prof. Havi Dreifuss, Head of the The Institute for the History of Polish Jewry and Israel-Poland Relations at Tel Aviv University and Head of the Center for Research on the Holocaust in Poland, the Yad Vashem International Institute of Holocaust Research.
Dr. Evgeni Klauber, Historian, lecturer at Tel Aviv University, expert in Russia and the post-Soviet world.
Dr. Robert Rozett, Senior Historian in the International Institute for Holocaust Research, Yad Vashem, former Director of the Libraries at Yad Vashem.
Prof. Dariusz Stola, Historian, Professor at the Institute for Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences, former Head of the POLIN Museum of the History of Polish Jews in Warsaw, Poland.
Prof. Amos Morris-Reich, Historian, Director of The Stephen Roth Institute for the Study of Contemporary Antisemitism and Racism at Tel Aviv University, Researcher at the The Cohn Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Ideas
Dr. Anna C. Zielinska, Philosopher, lecturer at the University of Lorraine in Nancy, France and at the Sciences Po Paris; executive director of the European Association of POLIN Museum of the History of Polish Jews.
Organisators
The Institute for the History of Polish Jewry and Israel-Poland Relations at the Tel Aviv University
University of Lorraine (Nancy, France)
prof. ucz. Joanna Wawrzyniak (Wydział Socjologii UW)
Dyskutujący:
prof. ucz. Maciej Michalski (Wydział Historii UAM)
prof. ucz. Roma Sendyka (Wydział Polonistyki UJ)
Sebastian Słowiński (Studencki Komitet Antyfaszystowski)
prof. dr hab. Dariusz Stola (Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN)
dr Karolina Szymaniak (Katedra Judaistyki UWr, Żydowski Instytut Historyczny)
Jesienią 1937 roku zarządzenie ministra wyznań religijnych i oświecenia publicznego pozwoliło rektorom polskich uczelni na wyznaczenie studentom żydowskim specjalnych miejsc w salach wykładowych. Część elit akademickich uległa w ten sposób żądaniom nacjonalistycznych organizacji młodzieżowych - zdecydowały się na instytucjonalizację antysemityzmu, dążąc - jak twierdzono - do uspokojenia sytuacji na uczelniach. Skutek był odwrotny, przemoc i hasła rasistowskie,jak żądania „dni bez Żydów", stały się zjawiskami powszechnymi, a na mocy postanowień i legalnymi. Getta ławkowe to wyraźny symbol, ale nie jedyny przejaw uprzedzeń i konformizmu profesury oraz sankcjonowanego przez polskie państwo rasizmu w akademii w latach trzydziestych. Towarzyszyły mu numerus clausus, brak zgody na obecność Żydów w wielu stowarzyszeniach, oraz postulowany przez kręgi studenckie, a wprowadzony w nielicznych uczelniach numerus nullus, czyli nieprzyjmowanie żydowskich studentów i studentek w mury akademii. Wiedza o tych zjawiskach jest dzisiaj powierzchowna nawet wśrodowiskach akademickich. Podczas debaty będziemy rozmawiać o tym, co wiemy na temat ówczesnej segregacji studentów, a przede wszystkim o tym, czy, dlaczego i jak powinniśmy przypominać o międzywojennym antysemityzmie na polskich uczelniach we współczesnej przestrzeni publicznej.
Wolność badań jest immanentną cechą nauki i podstawą jej rozwoju. Czy we współczesnej Polsce dostrzegalne są jakieś zagrożenia dla wolności? A może nie ma żadnych powodów do obaw, ponieważ nikt nie stara się jej ograniczać, a środowisko historyczne jest na tyle silne, że nie pozwoliłoby sobie odebrać tego prawa? Czy wobec tego istnieją problemy, na które szczególnie należałoby zwrócić uwagę?
Na ten temat dyskutowali:
Prof. Barbara Engelking (Centrum Badań nad Zagładą Żydów, Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii PAN)
Dr hab. Piotr Witek (Instytut Historii UMCS)
Prof. Dariusz Stola (Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN)
Rozmowę poprowadził Prof. Mariusz Mazur (Instytut Historii UMCS)
Debata odbyła się w poniedziałek 15 lutego o godzinie 17.00
Wideo i podcast są dostępne na portalu ohistorie.eu oraz na naszych kanałach w mediach społecznościowych – Youtube i Fb i twitterze.
Zachęcamy Państwa do odwiedzania naszego portalu www.ohistorie.eu i lektury zamieszczonych na nim artykułów, wywiadów, opinii i recenzji oraz oglądania i słuchania relacji wideo i podcastów z organizowanych przez nas debat i dyskusji.
Zapraszamy także Państwa do subskrybowania naszego kanału na platformie youtube oraz polubienia naszego profilu na facebooku.
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Realizacja wideo o podcastu:
Dr hab. Piotr WITEK