Helena Cobban is a writer and researcher on international affairs who lives in Washington DC. In 1984, Cambridge U.P. published her seminal study The Palestinian Liberation Organisation. Three of her six other sole-authored books dealt with political and strategic developments in the Arab-Israeli theater, the rest with more global matters. For 17 years she contributed a regular column on global issues to The Christian Science Monitor and Al-Hayat (London).In 2010 she founded Just World Books, which has published ground-breaking titles by Palestinian, Zionism-questioning Jewish, and other authors; and in 2016 she was a co-founder of Just World Educational, which she now serves as president. Her current main writing platform is Globalities.org.

Rami G. KhouriRami G. Khouri is a Palestinian-American academic and journalist whose family resides in Beirut, Amman, and Nazareth. During his 50-year career in journalism he was Managing Editor of the Jordan Times and the Daily Star (Beirut) newspapers, and contributed reporting and opinion pieces from the Middle East to the Financial Times, NPR, BBC radio, and other outlets. He founded and managed the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs (IFI), at the American University of Beirut. He has been a Harvard Nieman Journalism Fellow and a senior fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, and a Fellow of the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs in Arab East Jerusalem. He is currently a distinguished fellow at IFI, a senior fellow at the Arab Center Washington, DC, a regular contributor to Aljazeera online, and a member of the Just World Ed board. His texts and interviews are available on X @ramikhouri.

Dr. Paola Caridi teaches at the University of Palermo and is a former journalist who reported from Jerusalem from 2003-12. She is the author of Hamas: From Resistance to Government.

Dr. Jeroen Gunning, a Professor of Middle Eastern Politics and Conflict Studies at King's College London, is the author of a 2010 book on Hamas and a founder of the field of critical terrorism studies.

Dr. Khaled Hroub, a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre of Islamic Studies at the University of Cambridge, is professor of Middle Eastern studies at Northwestern University in Qatar and author of Hamas: A Beginner’s Guide.

Mouin Rabbani, co-editor of Jadaliyya, is managing editor of the Journal of Peacebuilding and Development and a former senior analyst on Israel-Palestine for the International Crisis Group.

Dr. Azzam Tamimi, a British-Palestinian-Jordanian political thinker, was previously head of the Institute of Islamic Political Thought and is the author of several books including Hamas: A History from Within.

Rami G. Khouri:

What is the most important way to understand what Hamas is and why it matters?

Dr. Paola Caridi:

This is a very, very hard question, Rami. Hamas is a political movement with a sometimes very rigid structure that has used different tools, political, armed struggle, and even terrorism. We don't have to fear words. Suicide attacks against civilians were terrorism. But, on the same level, we can't avoid the political dimension of the movement that started in some years before 1987, when there was the meeting in Gaza that paved the way to the movement. And it's important to underline why there were years of thought regarding the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, that is Hamas.

It started in 1982 because of Beirut, because of the Israeli Operation Peace for Galilee and the PLO's expulsion from Beirut. The idea that the PLO failed was one of the things that paved the way to an Islamist political movement born from the Muslim Brotherhood. After that there were different chapters in the life of Hamas. There was an initial chapter that started with the First Intifada. There was a second one after the Ibrahimi Mosque massacre done by Baruch Goldstein, an Israeli settler in al-Khalil, Hebron, which was when the movement decided to use—and it was the political movement that decided to use—the armed struggle and terror tools like suicide attacks.

And then in 2005, there was the most important chapter from the political point of view and that was a suspension of the suicide attacks and the idea of participating in the Palestinian Authority elections for the parliament of the Palestinian Authority. That was a big change because, in a way, it recognized the PA through the parliamentary elections, and nobody in the international community stopped this idea. Israel, the United States, the international community, the European Union, and the Arab states, also Egypt, paved the way to the elections where Hamas had a list, and paved the way to the success of Hamas on the political level. Then there was 2007, the coup. But the most important thing is that, from the beginning until now, the structure of Hamas is extremely relevant: four constituencies, a spread-out activism, with members in the West Bank, in Gaza, abroad (in the refugee camps), and a very strong organizational structure.

Rami G. Khouri:

Thank you. So, from what you've told us, Hamas has evolved and changed over time. I have two questions related to that. What causes Hamas to change? Is it political pragmatism? Is it desperation? Is it opportunism? How are those decisions made among these different constituencies you mentioned? And the second question related to that is, people who are interested in following Palestinian events, and Hamas in particular, how should they find credible insights or facts about Hamas? Should they read their press statements? Should they read their newspaper? Should they listen to interviews with their leaders? Where are the critical sources that you recommend to people to follow in order to be accurately up to date with Hamas's thinking?

Dr. Paola Caridi:

In a way, I will say that the movement has a lot of pragmatism, within a very rigid organizational structure, and a very rigid decisional process. If I have to suggest sources, I would suggest interviews with their leaders and press statements, written statements. If they say that they will do something, they do it. And this is also the rigidity of Hamas. Why? Because the constituencies vote for having part in the decision process. What does that mean? When they decided to stop the suicide attacks in 2005, there was a sort of poll among the constituencies. I will underline the constituencies because they are very important: the West Bank, Gaza, abroad, that is both the leadership and the activists in the refugee camps—and prisons. Prisons, especially the Israeli prisons, where the activists, Hamas activists, continue to be involved in the decisional process and continue to be politically involved. What does it mean? It means that, for example, in 2005 and 2007, the prison constituency was extremely important. First, the participation in the PA elections, and second, in the search for unity among the factions. I was very lucky to have had the permit to go inside an Israeli jail and meet some of the activists from Fatah, from the Popular Front, from the Islamic Jihad, and from Hamas. They showed me the draft of the Prisoner's Document, and I didn't know at that moment that that draft would be so relevant in the history of Palestinian politics. So, I mean, this is the way the movement is acting in the structure, that shows both the rigidity and the pragmatism of the movement—when it deals with the outside, with Israel, with Palestinian politics, with alliances, and with different actors in the region.

Rami G. Khouri:

So, based on the Prisoner's Document, and the way the Hamas prisoners have acted in jail, interacting with other factions of the Palestinian national movement, what does this tell us about the capacity or willingness of Hamas to actually give and take, to negotiate politically within the Palestinian leadership world, and then possibly beyond that in the Arab world, with Israel, and with the West? Should the prison experience of Hamas give us insights into its capacity to negotiate? And then the question, which I'll follow up after that, is to negotiate for what? What do you see, what do you understand, is their ultimate aim today?

Dr. Paola Caridi:

The prisoners' experience tells us also about Hamas's political behavior outside of the prison. It means that they are negotiating—they are capable, and they are able to negotiate. They negotiated both inside the prison, among the factions in prison, and outside. If we think about Hamas along the years of its life as a political movement, we see that it negotiated with Israel, for example. It negotiated with Israel, starting from 1988, a few months after it had been founded as a movement. There are some documents that tell us a lot about this. They were invited to Tel Aviv to speak with the Israeli leadership and they said no to many of the requests—to all the requests of the Israeli leadership. So, they started since the beginning with a negotiation and they continued along the years. Of course, they negotiated also with Arafat, but that didn't go any further. They negotiated with Israel, for example in the [2011] exchange between Gilad Shalit and the 1,027 [Palestinian] political prisoners, not only Hamas prisoners. We also have to underline this. And they also negotiate inside the Palestinian political arena, to cross the borders of Gaza. They did a lot along the years.

Helena Cobban is a writer and researcher on international affairs who lives in Washington DC. In 1984, Cambridge U.P. published her seminal study The Palestinian Liberation Organisation. Three of her six other sole-authored books dealt with political and strategic developments in the Arab-Israeli theater, the rest with more global matters. For 17 years she contributed a regular column on global issues to The Christian Science Monitor and Al-Hayat (London).In 2010 she founded Just World Books, which has published ground-breaking titles by Palestinian, Zionism-questioning Jewish, and other authors; and in 2016 she was a co-founder of Just World Educational, which she now serves as president. Her current main writing platform is Globalities.org.

Rami G. KhouriRami G. Khouri is a Palestinian-American academic and journalist whose family resides in Beirut, Amman, and Nazareth. During his 50-year career in journalism he was Managing Editor of the Jordan Times and the Daily Star (Beirut) newspapers, and contributed reporting and opinion pieces from the Middle East to the Financial Times, NPR, BBC radio, and other outlets. He founded and managed the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs (IFI), at the American University of Beirut. He has been a Harvard Nieman Journalism Fellow and a senior fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, and a Fellow of the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs in Arab East Jerusalem. He is currently a distinguished fellow at IFI, a senior fellow at the Arab Center Washington, DC, a regular contributor to Aljazeera online, and a member of the Just World Ed board. His texts and interviews are available on X @ramikhouri.

Dr. Paola Caridi teaches at the University of Palermo and is a former journalist who reported from Jerusalem from 2003-12. She is the author of Hamas: From Resistance to Government.

Dr. Jeroen Gunning, a Professor of Middle Eastern Politics and Conflict Studies at King's College London, is the author of a 2010 book on Hamas and a founder of the field of critical terrorism studies.

Dr. Khaled Hroub, a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre of Islamic Studies at the University of Cambridge, is professor of Middle Eastern studies at Northwestern University in Qatar and author of Hamas: A Beginner’s Guide.

Mouin Rabbani, co-editor of Jadaliyya, is managing editor of the Journal of Peacebuilding and Development and a former senior analyst on Israel-Palestine for the International Crisis Group.

Dr. Azzam Tamimi, a British-Palestinian-Jordanian political thinker, was previously head of the Institute of Islamic Political Thought and is the author of several books including Hamas: A History from Within.

Rami G. Khouri:

What is the most important way to understand what Hamas is and why it matters?

Dr. Paola Caridi:

This is a very, very hard question, Rami. Hamas is a political movement with a sometimes very rigid structure that has used different tools, political, armed struggle, and even terrorism. We don't have to fear words. Suicide attacks against civilians were terrorism. But, on the same level, we can't avoid the political dimension of the movement that started in some years before 1987, when there was the meeting in Gaza that paved the way to the movement. And it's important to underline why there were years of thought regarding the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, that is Hamas.

It started in 1982 because of Beirut, because of the Israeli Operation Peace for Galilee and the PLO's expulsion from Beirut. The idea that the PLO failed was one of the things that paved the way to an Islamist political movement born from the Muslim Brotherhood. After that there were different chapters in the life of Hamas. There was an initial chapter that started with the First Intifada. There was a second one after the Ibrahimi Mosque massacre done by Baruch Goldstein, an Israeli settler in al-Khalil, Hebron, which was when the movement decided to use—and it was the political movement that decided to use—the armed struggle and terror tools like suicide attacks.

And then in 2005, there was the most important chapter from the political point of view and that was a suspension of the suicide attacks and the idea of participating in the Palestinian Authority elections for the parliament of the Palestinian Authority. That was a big change because, in a way, it recognized the PA through the parliamentary elections, and nobody in the international community stopped this idea. Israel, the United States, the international community, the European Union, and the Arab states, also Egypt, paved the way to the elections where Hamas had a list, and paved the way to the success of Hamas on the political level. Then there was 2007, the coup. But the most important thing is that, from the beginning until now, the structure of Hamas is extremely relevant: four constituencies, a spread-out activism, with members in the West Bank, in Gaza, abroad (in the refugee camps), and a very strong organizational structure.

Rami G. Khouri:

Thank you. So, from what you've told us, Hamas has evolved and changed over time. I have two questions related to that. What causes Hamas to change? Is it political pragmatism? Is it desperation? Is it opportunism? How are those decisions made among these different constituencies you mentioned? And the second question related to that is, people who are interested in following Palestinian events, and Hamas in particular, how should they find credible insights or facts about Hamas? Should they read their press statements? Should they read their newspaper? Should they listen to interviews with their leaders? Where are the critical sources that you recommend to people to follow in order to be accurately up to date with Hamas's thinking?

Dr. Paola Caridi:

In a way, I will say that the movement has a lot of pragmatism, within a very rigid organizational structure, and a very rigid decisional process. If I have to suggest sources, I would suggest interviews with their leaders and press statements, written statements. If they say that they will do something, they do it. And this is also the rigidity of Hamas. Why? Because the constituencies vote for having part in the decision process. What does that mean? When they decided to stop the suicide attacks in 2005, there was a sort of poll among the constituencies. I will underline the constituencies because they are very important: the West Bank, Gaza, abroad, that is both the leadership and the activists in the refugee camps—and prisons. Prisons, especially the Israeli prisons, where the activists, Hamas activists, continue to be involved in the decisional process and continue to be politically involved. What does it mean? It means that, for example, in 2005 and 2007, the prison constituency was extremely important. First, the participation in the PA elections, and second, in the search for unity among the factions. I was very lucky to have had the permit to go inside an Israeli jail and meet some of the activists from Fatah, from the Popular Front, from the Islamic Jihad, and from Hamas. They showed me the draft of the Prisoner's Document, and I didn't know at that moment that that draft would be so relevant in the history of Palestinian politics. So, I mean, this is the way the movement is acting in the structure, that shows both the rigidity and the pragmatism of the movement—when it deals with the outside, with Israel, with Palestinian politics, with alliances, and with different actors in the region.

Rami G. Khouri:

So, based on the Prisoner's Document, and the way the Hamas prisoners have acted in jail, interacting with other factions of the Palestinian national movement, what does this tell us about the capacity or willingness of Hamas to actually give and take, to negotiate politically within the Palestinian leadership world, and then possibly beyond that in the Arab world, with Israel, and with the West? Should the prison experience of Hamas give us insights into its capacity to negotiate? And then the question, which I'll follow up after that, is to negotiate for what? What do you see, what do you understand, is their ultimate aim today?

Dr. Paola Caridi:

The prisoners' experience tells us also about Hamas's political behavior outside of the prison. It means that they are negotiating—they are capable, and they are able to negotiate. They negotiated both inside the prison, among the factions in prison, and outside. If we think about Hamas along the years of its life as a political movement, we see that it negotiated with Israel, for example. It negotiated with Israel, starting from 1988, a few months after it had been founded as a movement. There are some documents that tell us a lot about this. They were invited to Tel Aviv to speak with the Israeli leadership and they said no to many of the requests—to all the requests of the Israeli leadership. So, they started since the beginning with a negotiation and they continued along the years. Of course, they negotiated also with Arafat, but that didn't go any further. They negotiated with Israel, for example in the [2011] exchange between Gilad Shalit and the 1,027 [Palestinian] political prisoners, not only Hamas prisoners. We also have to underline this. And they also negotiate inside the Palestinian political arena, to cross the borders of Gaza. They did a lot along the years.