
Part X

Subsidiary organs of the Security Council: peacekeeping operations and special political missions

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Introductory note

Article 29

The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

Rule 28

The Security Council may appoint a commission or committee or a rapporteur for a specified question.

The powers of the Security Council to establish subsidiary organs are set out in Article 29 of the Charter of the United Nations and reflected in rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure. Part X of the present Supplement covers decisions of the Council relating to field-based subsidiary organs that the Council established for the performance of its functions under the Charter and that were active during 2018. These field-based subsidiary organs, referred to herein as peace operations, can be divided into two categories: peacekeeping operations (covered in section I); and special political missions (covered in section II).

Other subsidiary organs, such as committees, working groups, investigative bodies, tribunals, ad hoc commissions, special advisers, envoys, representatives and coordinators, and the Peacebuilding Commission, are covered in part IX. Peace operations led by regional organizations are covered in part VIII, which deals with the Council's cooperation with regional organizations.

Peace operations covered in part X are presented by region and in the order in which they were established. Successor operations are listed immediately after their predecessors. The introduction to each main section includes overview tables identifying the mandates assigned to each operation (tables 1, 2, 4 and 5) and provides an analysis of the key trends and developments during the reporting period. The mandates of the operations are presented in those tables according to 21 categories of mandated tasks, which are based exclusively on the language of the decisions of the Council and do not necessarily reflect the specific structure or activities of the mission. The categories are provided only as a convenience for readers and do not reflect any practice or position of the Council.

Subsections provide a summary of major developments concerning the mandate and composition of each operation, reflecting the decisions of the Council adopted during the period under review. For information on the mandate and composition of missions in the past, see previous Supplements to the *Repertoire*.

I. Peacekeeping operations

Note

Section I focuses on the decisions adopted by the Security Council during the period under review concerning the establishment and termination of peacekeeping operations, as well as changes to their mandates and composition.

Overview of peacekeeping operations during 2018

During the period under review, the Council oversaw 15 peacekeeping operations.¹ Eight of the operations were in Africa, one in the Americas, one in Asia, two in Europe and three in the Middle East. The Council did not establish any new peacekeeping operations in 2018 and one completed its mandate.

Terminations and extensions of mandates

As was provided for in resolution [2333 \(2016\)](#), on 30 March 2018, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) completed its mandate 14 years after its deployment. The Council also extended the mandates of the following peacekeeping operations: United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH), United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), and United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

The mandates of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) remained open-ended and no decision was required to extend them.

¹ For Council decisions and deliberations relating to the item entitled “United Nations peacekeeping operations”, see part I, sect. 26. For Council discussions concerning individual peacekeeping operations, see the respective country-specific studies in part I.

Mandates of peacekeeping operations, including the authorization of the use of force

In 2018, the Council continued to highlight the need to tailor peacekeeping mandates to conditions on the ground and acknowledged and/or endorsed the recommendations of seven reviews of operations conducted by the Secretariat in 2017 and 2018 concerning the mandates of MINURSO, UNAMID, MONUSCO, UNMISS, MINUSMA, MINUSCA and UNFICYP.² The Council also expressed its intention to continue revising as appropriate the configuration and mandate of UNISFA in the light of the recommendations of the Secretary-General further to the independent review of that mission.³ Six of the strategic reviews were independent in nature, with the participation of external non-United Nations experts.⁴ The Council requested the Secretary-General to conduct a new strategic review of UNAMID and a strategic assessment of MINUJUSTH in the context of the planned drawdown and exit of both operations and acknowledged the benchmarks developed for that purpose.⁵

The Council reauthorized the use of force by MONUSCO, UNMISS, MINUSMA and MINUSCA.⁶

² In connection with MINURSO, resolution [2440 \(2018\)](#), final preambular paragraph; in connection with UNAMID, resolution [2429 \(2018\)](#), para. 2; in connection with MONUSCO, resolution [2409 \(2018\)](#), para. 57; in connection with UNMISS, resolution [2406 \(2018\)](#), para. 3; in connection with MINUSMA, resolution [2423 \(2018\)](#), thirty-seventh preambular paragraph; in connection with MINUSCA, resolution [2448 \(2018\)](#), thirty-fourth preambular paragraph; and, in connection with UNFICYP, resolution [2398 \(2018\)](#), para. 10.

³ Resolution [2445 \(2018\)](#), para. 6.

⁴ In connection with MINURSO, [S/2018/889](#), paras. 72–75; in connection with UNISFA, [S/2018/778](#); in connection with UNMISS, [S/2018/143](#); in connection with MINUSMA, resolution [2423 \(2018\)](#), thirty-seventh preambular paragraph; in connection with MINUSCA, resolution [2448 \(2018\)](#), thirty-fourth preambular paragraph; and, in connection with UNFICYP, [S/2017/1008](#).

⁵ In connection with UNAMID, [S/PRST/2018/4](#), tenth paragraph; resolution [2429 \(2018\)](#), para. 7; and [S/PRST/2018/19](#), sixth paragraph. In connection with MINUJUSTH, resolution [2410 \(2018\)](#), fifteenth preambular paragraph and para. 9.

⁶ In connection with MONUSCO, resolution [2409 \(2018\)](#), para. 35; in connection with UNMISS, resolution [2406 \(2018\)](#), paras. 7 and 9; in connection with MINUSMA, resolution [2423 \(2018\)](#), para. 32; and, in connection with MINUSCA, resolution [2448 \(2018\)](#), para. 32.

UNAMID, UNISFA, MINUJUSTH and UNIFIL were reauthorized to take all necessary action in fulfilling only certain elements of their mandates such as protecting civilians and United Nations personnel and equipment, ensuring their freedom of movement and that of humanitarian workers, protecting mission areas of responsibility, and supporting and developing national police forces.⁷

For peacekeeping operations, the most common tasks mandated by the Council were those related to the provision of good offices and support to peace processes and the implementation of peace agreements, as well as the protection of civilians, human rights monitoring and reporting, and the protection of United Nations personnel and property and humanitarian workers. The mandates of more long-standing missions such as MINURSO, UNMOGIP, UNTSO and UNDOF remained relatively narrowly focused on the monitoring of ceasefires.

In modifying mandates, the Council placed particular emphasis on strengthening the good offices and political support role of peacekeeping operations and requesting the implementation of a more comprehensive and integrated approach to the protection of civilians; defined new language regarding the provision of operational and logistical support to national military and police forces; and requested the inclusion of gender and children and armed conflict considerations throughout mission activities.

Specifically, the Council strengthened the good offices role of MONUSCO, UNMISS and MINUSCA in support of ongoing peace processes in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan and the Central African Republic in coordination with other international, regional and local actors.⁸ The Council further requested MONUSCO, MINUSMA and MINUSCA to adopt a more comprehensive approach to the protection of civilians, including by focusing on the physical protection of certain vulnerable groups, strengthened local community engagement and empowerment, early warning, public information,

intra-mission coordination mechanisms and cooperation with United Nations country teams.⁹

MINUSMA and MINUSCA were also specifically tasked with mitigating the risk to civilians in the context of military and police operations, including those in support of national security forces.¹⁰ Moreover, as part of their efforts to support the extension of State authority in Mali and the Central African Republic, the two missions were requested to provide operational and logistical support for the progressive redeployment of national military and police forces.¹¹

In terms of cross-cutting issues, UNAMID and UNIFIL were tasked with ensuring that gender considerations were fully taken into account at all stages of mandate implementation and helping to enhance the capacity of women to participate in political processes.¹² MONUSCO and MINUSMA were requested to pay particular attention to the needs of women and children in the implementation of their respective tasks related to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and security sector reform.¹³ As part of their protection of civilians tasks, UNMISS was mandated to coordinate with and raise awareness among security and government institutions on issues of sexual and gender-based violence, and children and armed conflict,¹⁴ while the UNAMID police component was requested to focus on, *inter alia*, conducting community-oriented policing, including on sexual and gender-based violence and child protection.¹⁵ More broadly, in relation to the situation in the Abyei Area, the Council reiterated its request to the Secretary-General to ensure that effective human rights monitoring was carried out, including of any sexual and gender-based violence and violations and

⁷ In connection with UNAMID, resolutions 2425 (2018), para. 2, and 2429 (2018), para. 15; in connection with UNISFA, resolutions 2416 (2018), para. 10, and 2445 (2018), para. 11; in connection with MINUJUSTH, resolution 2410 (2018), para. 14; and, in connection with UNIFIL, resolution 2433 (2018), para. 19.

⁸ In connection with MONUSCO, resolution 2409 (2018), para. 36 (ii) (a); in connection with UNMISS, resolution 2406 (2018), para. 7 (d) (i); and, in connection with MINUSCA, resolution 2448 (2018), para. 39 (b) (i).

⁹ In connection with MONUSCO, resolution 2409 (2018), paras. 36 (i) (c), 44, 47 and 50; in connection with MINUSMA, resolution 2423 (2018), para. 38 (d) (i) and (ii); and, in connection with MINUSCA, resolution 2448 (2018), para. 39 (a) (ii) and (iv).

¹⁰ In connection with MINUSMA, resolution 2423 (2018), para. 38 (d) (ii); and, in connection with MINUSCA, resolution 2448 (2018), para. 39 (a) (i).

¹¹ In connection with MINUSMA, resolution 2423 (2018), para. 38 (a) (ii) and (b); and, in connection with MINUSCA, resolution 2448 (2018), para. 40 (a) (v).

¹² In connection with UNAMID, resolution 2429 (2018), para. 27; and, in connection with UNIFIL, resolution 2433 (2018), para. 24.

¹³ In connection with MONUSCO, resolution 2409 (2018), para. 37 (i) (d) and (ii) (b); and, in connection with MINUSMA, resolution 2423 (2018), para. 38 (a) (ii).

¹⁴ Resolution 2406 (2018), para. 7 (a) (vii).

¹⁵ Resolution 2429 (2018), para 19.

abuses of human rights committed against women and children.¹⁶

Beyond gender and children and armed conflict, the Council tasked MINUSMA, in coordination with relevant partners, to enhance its awareness of the financial sources of conflicts in Mali, including the trafficking of persons, arms, drugs and natural resources and the smuggling of migrants.¹⁷ Furthermore, in connection with UNAMID, the Council requested the United Nations and the Government of the Sudan to consider the adverse implications of climate change in their programmes in Darfur, including by undertaking risk assessments and risk management strategies, and further requested the Secretary-General to provide information of such assessments in mandated reporting.¹⁸

In the context of ongoing efforts by the Secretariat and relevant stakeholders to enhance the performance of peacekeeping operations, the Council paid significant attention to measuring effectiveness, the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse, and the safety and security of personnel in peacekeeping operations.¹⁹ In that regard, the Council welcomed the initiatives of the Secretary-General to standardize a “culture of performance” in missions and expressed support for the development of a comprehensive and integrated policy framework that would facilitate the effective and full implementation of mandates.²⁰

¹⁶ Resolution 2416 (2018), para. 26.

¹⁷ Resolution 2423 (2018), para. 31.

¹⁸ Resolution 2429 (2018), para. 47.

¹⁹ For more information on discussions in the Council and decisions regarding enhancing the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations, see part I, sect. 26, “United Nations peacekeeping operations.”

²⁰ Resolutions 2406 (2018), para. 16; 2409 (2018), para. 52; 2414 (2018), para. 15; 2416 (2018), para. 29; 2423 (2018), para. 58; 2426 (2018), para. 10; 2429 (2018), para. 26; 2430 (2018), para. 17; 2433 (2018), para. 23; and 2445 (2018), para. 30.

Moreover, the Secretary-General was requested to implement such frameworks with respect to MINURSO, UNAMID, UNISFA, MINUSMA, UNFICYP and UNIFIL.²¹ The Council also specifically requested UNAMID, in line with the zero tolerance policy of the Secretary-General, to conduct investigations into sexual exploitation and abuse as expeditiously as possible.²² In addition, the Council, taking note of the report entitled “Improving security of United Nations peacekeepers”, welcomed the action plan developed by MINUSMA in that regard and encouraged its swift and continued implementation.²³

Tables 1 and 2 provide an overview of the mandates of peacekeeping operations in 2018, showing the wide range of tasks mandated by the Council. The mandates reflected in the tables include: (a) tasks mandated by the Council in decisions adopted during the reporting period; and (b) tasks mandated in previous periods and reiterated by the Council during the period under review. The tables also include the tasks of peacekeeping operations with open-ended mandates adopted in decisions of previous periods. The tables are provided for information purposes only and do not reflect any position or view of the Council with regard to the status of the mandates of the operations concerned.

²¹ In connection with MINURSO, resolution 2414 (2018), para. 15; in connection with UNAMID, resolution 2429 (2018), para. 26; in connection with UNISFA, resolutions 2416 (2018), para. 29, and 2445 (2018), para. 30; in connection with MINUSMA, resolution 2423 (2018), para. 58; in connection with UNFICYP, resolution 2430 (2018), para. 17; in connection with UNDOF, resolution 2426 (2018), para. 10; and, in connection with UNIFIL, resolution 2433 (2018), para. 23.

²² Resolution 2429 (2018), para. 36.

²³ Resolution 2423 (2018), para. 59.

Table 1
Mandates of peacekeeping operations, 2018: Africa

Mandate	MINURSO	UNMIL ^a	UNAMID	MONUSCO	UNISFA	UNMISS	MINUSMA	MINUSCA
Chapter VII		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Authorization of the use of force			X	X	X	X	X	X
Ceasefire monitoring	X					X	X	
Civil-military coordination			X	X		X	X	X
Demilitarization and arms management	X		X	X	X	X	X	X

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<i>Mandate</i>	<i>MINURSO</i>	<i>UNMIL^a</i>	<i>UNAMID</i>	<i>MONUSCO</i>	<i>UNISFA</i>	<i>UNMISS</i>	<i>MINUSMA</i>	<i>MINUSCA</i>
Electoral assistance	X	X		X			X	X
Human rights; women and peace and security; children and armed conflict		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Humanitarian support	X		X	X		X	X	X
International cooperation and coordination	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Mission impact assessment				X			X	X
Political process	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Protection of civilians	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Protection of humanitarian/United Nations personnel and facilities; ensuring free movement of personnel and equipment		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Public information		X		X			X	X
Rule of law/judicial matters		X	X	X	X		X	X
Security monitoring; patrolling; deterrence		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Security sector reform		X		X			X	X
Support to military				X			X	X
Support to police	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Support to sanctions regimes			X	X		X	X	X
Support to State institutions		X	X	X		X	X	X

^a By resolution 2333 (2016), the Council extended the mandate of UNMIL for a final period until 30 March 2018, as set out in the table.

Abbreviations: MINURSO, United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara; UNMIL, United Nations Mission in Liberia; UNAMID, African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur; MONUSCO, United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; UNISFA, United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei; UNMISS, United Nations Mission in South Sudan; MINUSMA, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali; MINUSCA, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic.

Table 2
Mandates of peacekeeping operations, 2018: Americas, Asia, Europe and Middle East

<i>Mandate</i>	<i>MINUJUSTH</i>	<i>UNMOGIP</i>	<i>UNFICYP</i>	<i>UNMIK</i>	<i>UNTSO</i>	<i>UNDOF</i>	<i>UNIFIL</i>
Chapter VII	X			X			
Authorization of the use of force	X						X
Civil-military coordination				X			
Ceasefire monitoring		X	X		X	X	X

**Part X. Subsidiary organs of the Security Council:
peacekeeping operations and special political missions**

<i>Mandate</i>	<i>MINUJUSTH</i>	<i>UNMOGIP</i>	<i>UNFICYP</i>	<i>UNMIK</i>	<i>UNTSO</i>	<i>UNDOF</i>	<i>UNIFIL</i>
Demilitarization and arms management							X
Electoral assistance							
Human rights; women and peace and security; children and armed conflict	X			X			X
Humanitarian support			X	X			X
International cooperation and coordination			X	X			X
Political process	X		X	X			
Protection of civilians	X						X
Protection of humanitarian/United Nations personnel and facilities; ensuring free movement of personnel and equipment							X
Public information							
Rule of law/judicial matters	X						
Security monitoring; patrolling; deterrence							X
Security sector reform							
Support to military							X
Support to police	X		X	X			
Support to sanctions regimes							
Support to State institutions				X			X

Abbreviations: MINUJUSTH, United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti; UNMOGIP, United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan; UNFICYP, United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus; UNMIK, United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo; UNTSO, United Nations Truce Supervision Organization; UNDOF, United Nations Disengagement Observer Force; UNIFIL, United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.

Authorized strength of peacekeeping operations

As illustrated in table 3, during the review period, the Council modified the composition of four peacekeeping operations. The Council decreased the military components of UNAMID and UNISFA. The Council also decreased the police component of MINUJUSTH and increased the police component of UNISFA.

**Table 3
Changes in composition of peacekeeping operations, 2018**

<i>Mission</i>	<i>Changes in composition</i>	<i>Decision</i>
UNAMID	The military component was reduced from 8,735 to up to 4,050 personnel until 30 June 2019	2429 (2018)
UNISFA	The military component was reduced from 4,791 to 4,500 personnel until 15 November 2018	2416 (2018)

<i>Mission</i>	<i>Changes in composition</i>	<i>Decision</i>
	The military component was further reduced from 4,500 to 4,140 personnel until 15 May 2019 and by an additional 295 troops to 3,845 following the commencement of the deployment of increased police personnel	2445 (2018)
	The police component was increased from 50 to 345 personnel, including 185 individual police officers and one formed police unit	
MINUJUSTH	The police component was decreased from seven formed police units (or 980 personnel) and 295 individual police officers to five formed police units and 295 individual police officers from 15 October 2018 to 15 April 2019	2410 (2018)

Abbreviations: UNAMID, African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur; UNISFA, United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei; UNMISS, United Nations Mission in South Sudan; MINUJUSTH, United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti.

Africa

United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara

The United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) was established by the Council on 29 April 1991, by resolution 690 (1991), in accordance with the settlement proposals accepted by Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO), with the mandate to monitor the ceasefire, provide security for the repatriation of refugees, and support the organization of a free and fair referendum.²⁴

In 2018, by resolutions 2414 (2018) of 27 April 2018 and 2440 (2018) of 31 October 2018, the Council extended the mandate of MINURSO twice for periods of six months, departing from the previous practice of one year, the second time until 30 April 2019.²⁵ Both resolutions were adopted with 12 votes in favour and three abstentions.²⁶

²⁴ For more information on the history of the mandate of MINURSO, see previous Supplements.

²⁵ Resolutions 2414 (2018), para. 1, and 2440 (2018), para. 1.

²⁶ China, Ethiopia and the Russian Federation abstained in the vote on resolution 2414 (2018), expressing concern regarding the conduct of the negotiations process and the non-inclusion of suggested language regarding the political process. See S/PV.8246, p. 3 (Ethiopia), pp. 3–4 (Russian Federation) and p. 6 (China). The Plurinational State of Bolivia, Ethiopia and the Russian Federation abstained in the vote on resolution 2440 (2018), expressing similar concerns. See S/PV.8387, p. 5 (Russian Federation), pp. 5–6 (Ethiopia) and pp. 8–9 (Bolivia (Plurinational State of)). See also part I, sect. 1, “The situation concerning Western Sahara”.

The Council did not modify the mandate of MINURSO during the period under review. By resolution 2414 (2018), the Council emphasized the need to make progress towards a realistic, practicable and enduring political solution to the question of Western Sahara, based on compromise and the importance of aligning the strategic focus of MINURSO and orienting the resources of the United Nations to that end.²⁷ The Council urged MINURSO to consider how new technologies could be used to reduce risk, improve force protection and better implement its mandate.²⁸

By resolution 2440 (2018), the Council considered the report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara (S/2018/889), in which he presented the findings and recommendations of the independent review of MINURSO conducted in 2018, which determined that the Mission performed conflict prevention functions and that there was significant scope for technical improvement in its ability to carry out monitoring and conflict mitigation activities.²⁹

Regarding reporting by the Secretary-General, by resolution 2414 (2018), the Council modified the prior practice of requesting briefings on the status of the negotiations and MINURSO at least twice a year and requested the Secretary-General to do so on a regular basis and at any time he deemed appropriate.³⁰ By resolution 2440 (2018), the Council specified that that

²⁷ Resolution 2414 (2018), para. 2.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 16.

²⁹ Resolution 2440 (2018), final preambular paragraph. See S/2018/889, paras. 72–75.

³⁰ Resolution 2414 (2018), para. 14. See resolutions 2285 (2016), para. 11, and 2351 (2017), para. 10.

should include a briefing within three months of the renewal of the Mission's mandate and again prior to its expiration.³¹

The Council did not modify the composition of MINURSO during the period under review. By resolution 2414 (2018), the Secretary-General was requested to seek to increase the number of women in MINURSO, as well as to ensure their meaningful participation in all aspects of operations.³²

United Nations Mission in Liberia

The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was established by the Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, by resolution 1509 (2003) of 19 September 2003 to, inter alia, support the implementation of the Liberian ceasefire agreement and the peace process, protect civilians and United Nations personnel and equipment, contribute to the protection and promotion of human rights, facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, and assist in the security sector reform efforts of the Liberian Government. On 30 March 2018, in accordance with the drawdown process defined in resolution 2333 (2016), UNMIL completed its mandate.³³ In his final progress report on UNMIL of 13 April 2018, the Secretary-General reported on the completion of the drawdown.³⁴

On 19 April 2018, following the completion of the Liberian legislative and presidential elections in 2017, the Council issued a presidential statement commending the assistance provided by UNMIL to the election process and expressing its appreciation for the Mission's important contribution to promoting peace, stability and development throughout its 14 years of operation.³⁵ The Council requested the Secretary-General to undertake a study of the role of UNMIL in the resolution of conflicts and challenges in Liberia through the contribution of good offices, political mediation and the sanctions regime, as well as other relevant factors, which had allowed for the successful completion of the Mission's mandate and its transition to the United Nations country team.³⁶

³¹ Resolution 2440 (2018), para. 11.

³² Resolution 2414 (2018), para. 15.

³³ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNMIL, see previous Supplements (2003–2015) and for information on the final drawdown of the Mission, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2016–2017*.

³⁴ S/2018/344.

³⁵ S/PRST/2018/8, second and third paragraphs. See also part I, sect. 2, "The situation in Liberia".

³⁶ S/PRST/2018/8, fourth paragraph.

African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

The Council established the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) by resolution 1769 (2007) of 31 July 2007 and, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, authorized UNAMID to take the necessary action to support the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, protect civilians and United Nations personnel and equipment and ensure the security and freedom of its own personnel and humanitarian workers.³⁷

During 2018, the Council adopted resolutions 2425 (2018) of 29 June 2018 and 2429 (2018) of 13 July 2018 and issued two presidential statements concerning UNAMID.³⁸ The Council provided for a two-week technical rollover of the Mission's mandate and subsequently extended it for 11.5 months until 30 June 2019.³⁹

The Council welcomed the improvements in the security situation in Darfur and reiterated its concerns regarding the outstanding challenges, in particular those related to the necessary conditions for the return of displaced persons. The Council oversaw the completion of the second phase of the reconfiguration of UNAMID, which had commenced in 2017, and authorized a further one in 2018.⁴⁰

In the presidential statement of 31 January 2018, the Council commended UNAMID for the successful conclusion of phase one of the reconfiguration authorized by resolution 2363 (2017).⁴¹ The Council requested UNAMID and the United Nations country team to monitor closely the impact of the reconfiguration on the situation on the ground and to report any adverse effects to the Council in a timely manner.⁴² The Council also expressed support for the recommendation made by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General, further to their joint assessment, to conduct a further

³⁷ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNAMID, see previous Supplements (2007–2017).

³⁸ S/PRST/2018/4 and S/PRST/2018/19.

³⁹ Resolutions 2425 (2018), para. 1 (providing for a technical rollover of the Mission's mandate for 14 days until 13 July 2018), and 2429 (2018), para. 1 (extending the mandate for 11.5 months until 30 June 2019).

⁴⁰ See part I, sect. 10, "Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan".

⁴¹ S/PRST/2018/4, fifth paragraph.

⁴² *Ibid.*

review of UNAMID to consider a new mission concept with adjusted priorities.⁴³

On 13 July 2018, by resolution 2429 (2018), the Council took note of the special report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the recommendations contained therein regarding a new mission concept for UNAMID and a transition concept in collaboration with the United Nations country team over a two-year timeframe with a view towards the exit of UNAMID on 30 June 2020, provided that there was no significant change in the security situation and that key indicators were fulfilled.⁴⁴ The Council also requested the Mission to consolidate the “whole-of-system” approach to Darfur focused on peacekeeping and providing sustainable solutions to the drivers of conflict with the Mission’s current “two-pronged” approach, in order to prevent relapse and enable the Government of the Sudan, the United Nations country team, civil society and international actors to prepare for the Mission’s eventual exit.⁴⁵

Further to the recommendations of the strategic review, the Council redefined the strategic priorities of UNAMID to include the protection of civilians, monitoring and reporting on human rights, sexual and gender-based violence and grave violations against children, the facilitation of humanitarian assistance and the safety and security of humanitarian personnel; mediation between the Government of the Sudan and non-signatory armed movements on the basis of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur; and support for the mediation of intercommunal or other local conflict that could undermine the security situation, including through measures to address its root causes, in conjunction with the Government, the United Nations country team and civil society.⁴⁶

In pursuit of those priorities, the Council decided that UNAMID would retain its existing mandated tasks as outlined in resolution 2363 (2017) and, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, reauthorized it to take the necessary action to implement the tasks enumerated in paragraph 15 (a) of resolution 1769 (2007), including, *inter alia*, protecting civilians and mission personnel and equipment and ensuring the security and freedom of movement of mission personnel and humanitarian workers. The Council urged UNAMID to deter any

threats against itself and its mandate.⁴⁷ The Council also refocused the Mission’s mandate related to the work of its police component and added additional tasks.

Specifically, resolution 2429 (2018) provided that the police component would focus on supporting the physical protection of civilians and facilitating humanitarian assistance; creating a protective environment by coordinating the development and training of government police; and conducting community-oriented policing initiatives, in conjunction with the United Nations country team, including on sexual and gender-based violence and child protection, pursued through engagement in the state liaison offices and at the central level.⁴⁸

In terms of additional tasks, UNAMID was requested to ensure that the necessary gender analysis and expertise was included throughout all stages of mission planning, mandate development, implementation, review and drawdown.⁴⁹ The Mission was further requested to take the necessary steps to conduct investigations into sexual exploitation and abuse as expeditiously as possible and to closely support and monitor the commitment of the parties to combating sexual violence, in accordance with resolution 2106 (2013), including through women protection advisers.⁵⁰ In connection with the Mission’s exit from Darfur, the Council called upon UNAMID to work closely with the United Nations country team to identify ways to address gaps in capabilities and to coordinate in the transfer of their responsibilities.⁵¹ As part of the transition, and specifically in the context of mine clearance, UNAMID was also requested to cooperate with the Government, the United Nations Children’s Fund, the United Nations Development Programme and the International Committee of the Red Cross.⁵²

In accordance with the recommendations of the strategic review, by resolution 2429 (2018), the Council decreased the authorized troop ceiling of UNAMID from 8,735 to up to 4,050 personnel over the course of the current mandate, unless the Council decided to adjust the scope and pace of the reduction.⁵³ The Council also decided to maintain police levels not

⁴³ *Ibid.*, tenth paragraph.

⁴⁴ Resolution 2429 (2018), para. 2. See S/2018/530.

⁴⁵ Resolution 2429 (2018), para. 3.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 11.

⁴⁷ Resolution 2429 (2018), paras. 15–16. See resolutions 1769 (2007), para. 15 (a) (i) and (ii), and 2363 (2017), para. 15.

⁴⁸ Resolution 2429 (2018), para. 19.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 27.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, paras. 35–36.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, para. 55.

⁵² *Ibid.*, para. 49.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, para. 5.

exceeding 2,500 personnel, including individual police officers and members of formed police units.⁵⁴

Lastly, the Council requested the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, in consultation with UNAMID, to provide through a strategic review by 1 May 2019 an assessment on, *inter alia*, the progress made in implementing the reconfiguration and its impact.⁵⁵ The Secretary-General was also requested to provide a clearly benchmarked exit strategy for UNAMID.⁵⁶ In the presidential statement of 11 December 2018, the Council took note of the report of the Secretary-General of 12 October 2018,⁵⁷ including the proposed benchmarks and indicators of achievement, and acknowledged that progress towards their achievement would contribute towards the successful transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding in Darfur.⁵⁸ In that regard, the Council requested UNAMID and the United Nations country team to ensure robust monitoring of progress against the benchmarks and encouraged them to ensure that their integrated transition activities supported efforts to make progress towards the achievement of the benchmarks and the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and the development plans of the Government of the Sudan.⁵⁹

United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) was established by the Council on 28 May 2010 by resolution 1925 (2010), under Chapter VII of the Charter, to succeed the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.⁶⁰ MONUSCO was authorized to use all necessary means to carry out its protection mandate as set out in the resolution and tasked with, *inter alia*, ensuring the effective protection of civilians and supporting Government stabilization and peace consolidation efforts.

During 2018, by resolution 2409 (2018) of 27 March 2018, the Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, extended the mandate of MONUSCO,

consistent with previous practice, for a period of one year until 31 March 2019.⁶¹

By the same resolution, against the backdrop of the presidential, parliamentary and provincial elections scheduled for December 2018, the Council took note of the strategic review presented by the Secretary-General (S/2017/826) and endorsed its recommendations relating to proposed adjustments to MONUSCO in the pre-election phase.⁶² In accordance with the recommendations, the Council reiterated the Mission's strategic priorities as defined by resolution 2348 (2017), namely, protecting civilians and supporting the implementation of the Comprehensive and Inclusive Political Agreement of 31 December 2016 and the electoral process.⁶³ The Council stressed that the mandate of MONUSCO should be implemented based on a prioritization of tasks.⁶⁴ Within the framework of the strategic priorities, the Council reiterated the Mission's existing priority tasks relating to the protection of civilians, the implementation of the Agreement and the protection of United Nations personnel and equipment, and further elaborated some elements in that regard.⁶⁵

In connection with the protection of civilians, the Council requested MONUSCO to take a comprehensive approach to physical protection, adding the protection of peaceful demonstrators to the Mission's existing tasks, and to focus on violence between ethnic or religious rival groups or communities in identified territories.⁶⁶ The Council requested MONUSCO to continue to strengthen local community engagement and empowerment, as well as to bolster its protection mandate through early warning and response, including prevention, and by ensuring the mobility of the Mission.⁶⁷ The Council also requested the Mission to continue to ensure the effectiveness of the monitoring and reporting mechanism on children and armed conflict.⁶⁸

The Council broadened the authorization given to the Intervention Brigade to neutralize armed groups in the east of the country to include the whole of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, under the direct command of the MONUSCO Force Commander.⁶⁹ The

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 6.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 7 (i)–(vi).

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 53.

⁵⁷ S/2018/912.

⁵⁸ S/PRST/2018/19, sixth paragraph.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, seventh and eleventh paragraphs.

⁶⁰ For more information on the history of the mandate of MONUSCO, see previous Supplements (2010–2017).

⁶¹ Resolution 2409 (2018), para. 29.

⁶² *Ibid.*, para. 57. See also part I, sect. 6, "The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo".

⁶³ Resolution 2409 (2018), para. 31 (a) and (b).

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 32.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 36 (i)–(iii).

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 36 (i) (a).

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 36 (i) (c).

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 36 (i) (b).

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 36 (i) (d).

Council further called on MONUSCO to streamline overall command and control in order to increase efficiencies and improve coordination with the police component.⁷⁰ MONUSCO was also requested to leverage United Nations police investigation capacities and expertise in order to arrest and bring to justice all those allegedly responsible for genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and violations or abuses of human rights.⁷¹

With respect to the second strategic priority, the Council strengthened the Mission's role in supporting the implementation of the Comprehensive and Inclusive Political Agreement and the electoral process by tasking MONUSCO to provide good offices and engage with interlocutors across the political spectrum and to use an integrated approach throughout the United Nations, making full use of the existing capacities of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region, the United Nations Office to the African Union and the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa.⁷² In addition, MONUSCO was tasked with providing expertise and advice in relation to elections security to the Congolese National Police in order to coordinate planning and security support.⁷³

Beyond the strategic priority tasks, the Council reauthorized MONUSCO to pursue its existing tasks relating to supporting the sanctions regime and the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo⁷⁴ and added new language on tasks relating to stabilization, demilitarization, demobilization and reintegration,⁷⁵ encouraging inclusive security sector reform, with a focus on women, children and vulnerable persons,⁷⁶ support for joint army operations in compliance with the human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces,⁷⁷ and the provision of gender and women protection advisers as part of support for stabilization efforts.⁷⁸

MONUSCO was further requested to strengthen its collaboration with humanitarian actors and

streamline coordination mechanisms with humanitarian agencies to ensure information-sharing on protection risks to the population.⁷⁹ Lastly, the Council requested that mechanisms for intra-mission coordination be strengthened to enable "whole-of-mission" efforts, in particular on priority issues such as the protection of civilians, and encouraged MONUSCO and the United Nations system in-country to strengthen integration through, inter alia, shared information and joint operational activities, based on coordinated knowledge management.⁸⁰

The Council did not modify the composition of MONUSCO during the reporting period. Further to resolution 2409 (2018),⁸¹ by a letter dated 18 July 2018, the Secretary-General provided the Council with options for the temporary reinforcement of MONUSCO in the event of a deterioration of the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo during the run-up to and in the aftermath of the elections.⁸²

United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei

The Council established the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) by resolution 1990 (2011) of 27 June 2011, taking into account the Agreement between the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement on Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area, of 20 June 2011. The Council mandated UNISFA to, inter alia, monitor and verify the redeployment of any Sudanese Armed Forces and the Sudan People's Liberation Army or its successor from the Abyei Area, participate in relevant bodies as stipulated in the Agreement, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and strengthen the capacity of the Abyei Police Service. By the same resolution, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council authorized UNISFA to take the actions necessary, inter alia, to protect United Nations and humanitarian personnel and property, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, and ensure security in the Area. By resolution 2024 (2011) of 14 December 2011, the Council expanded the mandate of UNISFA to include assisting the Sudan and South Sudan in ensuring the observance of their agreement on border security and supporting the operational

⁷⁰ Ibid., para. 50.

⁷¹ Ibid., para. 36 (i) (f).

⁷² Ibid., para. 36 (ii) (a).

⁷³ Ibid., para. 36 (ii) (c).

⁷⁴ Ibid., para. 37 (iii). For information on the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, see part IX, sect. I. For information on sanctions measures, see part VII, sect. III.

⁷⁵ Resolution 2409 (2018), para. 37 (i) (c) and (d).

⁷⁶ Ibid., para. 37 (ii) (b).

⁷⁷ Ibid., para. 37 (ii) (c).

⁷⁸ Ibid., para. 39.

⁷⁹ Ibid., para. 44.

⁸⁰ Ibid., para. 47.

⁸¹ Ibid., para. 55.

⁸² S/2018/727, fifteenth and sixteenth paragraphs.

activities of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism.⁸³

During 2018, the Council adopted resolutions 2411 (2018) of 13 April 2018, 2412 (2018) of 23 April 2018, 2416 (2018) of 15 May 2018, 2429 (2018) of 13 July 2018, 2438 (2018) of 11 October 2018 and 2445 (2018) of 15 November 2018 concerning UNISFA. The Council extended the mandates of UNISFA in support of the border security agreement and in the Abyei Area twice for periods of six months each, the second time until 15 April 2019 and 15 May 2019, respectively.⁸⁴ The Council also authorized a technical rollover of the border security agreement mandate for a period of 10 days.⁸⁵

While largely maintaining the mandate of UNISFA during the period under review, the Council drew attention to specific aspects of it. In connection with the UNISFA mandate to support the border security agreement, by resolution 2412 (2018), the Council decided that the mission's support to the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism would remain conditioned on the ability of the Sudan and South Sudan to demonstrate measurable progress on several conditions, including maintaining standing clearance for UNISFA air and ground patrols, operationalizing four Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism team sites, convening meetings of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism, withdrawing from the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone, opening additional border crossings and discussing border demarcation.⁸⁶ By resolution 2438 (2018), the Council updated that set of conditions.⁸⁷

In relation to the Abyei Area and in the context of the efforts of UNISFA to strengthen the community protection committees, by resolution 2416 (2018), the Council highlighted the need for the mission to ensure the humane and dignified treatment of suspects and other detainees.⁸⁸ Furthermore, in reiterating its request to the Secretary-General to ensure that human rights monitoring was carried out in Abyei, the Council added that such monitoring should include any sexual and gender-based violence and violations of human rights

committed against women and children.⁸⁹ The Council further requested the Secretary-General to report no later than 15 August 2018 on detailed recommendations on the reconfiguration of the UNISFA mandate in order to create the space for a viable political process that would also serve as an exit strategy.⁹⁰ In relation to the mission's cooperation with other United Nations entities, by resolution 2429 (2018), the Council reiterated its request for close coordination among UNISFA, UNAMID, UNMISS, MINUSCA and the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL).⁹¹ By resolution 2445 (2018), the Council emphasized the change in threat in the Abyei Area as characterized by the letter dated 20 August 2018 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Council (S/2018/778).⁹² The Council once again underscored that "all necessary means" included the use of force when required, in order to protect civilians under threat of physical violence.⁹³ In the context of the engagement of UNISFA with local communities, the Council invited the mission to coordinate with the Juba-appointed administration in Abyei and the Misseriya administration in Muglad, using appropriate civilian expertise, to maintain stability, foster intercommunal reconciliation and facilitate the return of displaced persons and the delivery of services.⁹⁴

During 2018, the Council twice reduced the authorized troop ceiling of UNISFA. By resolution 2416 (2018), the Council decreased troops from 4,791 to 4,500 until 15 November 2018.⁹⁵ By resolution 2445 (2018), the Council reduced the authorized troop ceiling further to 4,140 until 15 May 2019 and decided to reduce it by another 295 troops following the commencement of the deployment of increased police personnel.⁹⁶ The Council increased the authorized police ceiling from 50 to 345 personnel, including 185 individual police officers and one formed police unit, and expressed its intention to reduce the police ceiling as the Abyei Police Service was gradually established and effectively providing rule of law throughout the Abyei Area.⁹⁷

⁸³ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNISFA, see previous Supplements.

⁸⁴ Resolutions 2412 (2018), para. 1, and 2438 (2018), para. 1 (extending the mandate in support of the border security agreement); and resolutions 2416 (2018), para. 1, and 2445 (2018), para. 1 (extending the mandate in the Abyei Area).

⁸⁵ Resolution 2411 (2018), para. 1.

⁸⁶ Resolution 2412 (2018), para. 3.

⁸⁷ Resolution 2438 (2018), para. 3.

⁸⁸ Resolution 2416 (2018), para. 18.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 26.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 33.

⁹¹ Resolution 2429 (2018), para. 28.

⁹² Resolution 2445 (2018), eighth preambular paragraph. For further information, see part I, sect. 10, "Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan".

⁹³ Resolution 2445 (2018), para. 11.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 16.

⁹⁵ Resolution 2416 (2018), para. 3.

⁹⁶ Resolution 2445 (2018), para. 3.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 4.

Furthermore, depending on the parties' ability to fulfil the conditions set by the Council in relation to the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism and the border, by resolutions 2412 (2018) and 2438 (2018), the Council reiterated its intention to further reduce the authorized ceiling by another 541 troops unless the mandate of UNISFA to support the Mechanism was extended beyond 15 October 2018 and 15 April 2019, respectively.⁹⁸

United Nations Mission in South Sudan

By resolution 1996 (2011) of 8 July 2011, the Council established the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) under Chapter VII of the Charter, with a mandate to support peace consolidation and foster longer-term State-building and economic development; support the Government of South Sudan in exercising its responsibilities for conflict prevention, mitigation and resolution and to protect civilians; and support the Government, in cooperation with the United Nations country team and other international partners, in developing its capacity to provide security, to establish the rule of law and to strengthen the security and justice sectors. UNMISS was authorized to use all necessary means to carry out its protection of civilians mandate.⁹⁹

During the period under review, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council adopted resolutions 2406 (2018) of 15 March 2018 and 2428 (2018) and 2429 (2018) of 13 July 2018 concerning UNMISS. The Council extended the mandate of the Mission for a period of one year until 15 March 2019.¹⁰⁰

By resolution 2406 (2018), in the context of continued fighting across the country and the lack of progress in the implementation of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan of 2015, the Council took note of the recommendations of the Secretary-General, based on the independent review of UNMISS, on how to adapt the Mission to the situation on the ground and to increase its efficiency, as requested by the Council in resolutions 2304 (2016) and 2327 (2016).¹⁰¹ The

Council reiterated the Mission's mandate to protect civilians, create the conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, monitor and investigate human rights, and support the implementation of the 2015 Agreement.¹⁰² The Council further reauthorized UNMISS to use all necessary means to implement its mandate.¹⁰³

In accordance with the strategic review recommendations and within the framework of the priorities, the Council made several modifications to the mandate tasks of UNMISS to protect civilians and support the political process. The Mission's cooperation with South Sudanese police services, security and government institutions and civil society actors in relevant protection-focused activities would specifically focus on raising awareness of sexual and gender-based violence and children and armed conflict and providing technical assistance or advice on international humanitarian law and the investigation and prosecution of sexual and gender-based violence, conflict-related sexual violence and other serious human rights violations.¹⁰⁴

On the political process, the Council requested UNMISS to use its good offices to support the peace process, in particular the Intergovernmental Authority on Development high-level revitalization forum for the 2015 Agreement, and further elaborated that the Mission's support to the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism should include the monitoring and reporting of violations and overall effectiveness in identifying those responsible for violations.¹⁰⁵ In addition, the Council removed the previous tasks of UNMISS related to the planning and establishment of transitional security arrangements, support for the constitution-making process, the development of a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration strategy and security sector reform activities, advising and assisting the National Elections Commission, and supporting the establishment and operationalization of the Joint Integrated Police.¹⁰⁶

The Council decided that UNMISS would continue to include a regional protection force, reiterated the force's existing tasks, expanded the force's responsibility to provide a secure environment in and around Juba and in other parts of South Sudan as necessary, and authorized the force to use all

⁹⁸ Resolutions 2412 (2018), para. 2, and 2438 (2018), para. 2.

⁹⁹ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNMISS, see previous Supplements (2010–2017).

¹⁰⁰ Resolution 2406 (2018), para. 5. See part I, sect. 10, "Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan".

¹⁰¹ Resolution 2406 (2018), thirty-first preambular paragraph. See S/2018/143.

¹⁰² Resolution 2406 (2018), para. 7 (a)–(d).

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, paras. 7 and 12.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 7 (a) (vii).

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 7 (d) (i) and (ii).

¹⁰⁶ See resolution 2327 (2016), para. 7 (d) (i)–(iv), (vii) and (viii).

necessary means to accomplish its mandate.¹⁰⁷ The Council also reiterated the Mission's other existing tasks related to international coordination on the peace process,¹⁰⁸ gender mainstreaming,¹⁰⁹ the protection of civilians and security monitoring,¹¹⁰ support to security forces,¹¹¹ and ensuring the security of its own air operations.¹¹²

While maintaining the Mission's existing troop and police levels, the Council took note of the Secretary-General's intention to conduct a military and police capability study, noting in particular the relevance of reviewing the current model for providing security to the protection of civilians sites, and expressed its readiness to consider making the necessary adjustments on that basis to UNMISS, including the regional protection force.¹¹³

Lastly, by resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#), the Council reiterated the mandate of UNMISS to assist the Committee and the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#) concerning South Sudan¹¹⁴ and encouraged the timely exchange of information among them.¹¹⁵ By resolution [2429 \(2018\)](#), the Council reiterated its request for close coordination among UNMISS, UNAMID, UNISFA, MINUSCA and UNSMIL.¹¹⁶

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

The Council established the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) by resolution [2100 \(2013\)](#) of 25 April 2013, under Chapter VII of the Charter. MINUSMA was authorized to use all necessary means to stabilize population centres and support the re-establishment of State authority, support the implementation of a transitional road map, protect

civilians and United Nations personnel and property, assist the Malian authorities in promoting and protecting human rights, and support humanitarian assistance, national and international justice, and cultural preservation.¹¹⁷

During 2018, the Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, adopted resolutions [2423 \(2018\)](#) of 28 June 2018 and [2432 \(2018\)](#) of 30 August 2018 concerning MINUSMA. As per previous practice, the Council extended the mandate of MINUSMA for one year until 30 June 2019.¹¹⁸

In the context of delays in the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali of 2015, deteriorating security and humanitarian situations, in particular in the centre of the country, and preparations for the presidential elections scheduled for July and August 2018, the Council revisited the mandate of MINUSMA further to the outcome of the independent strategic review conducted in the first half of 2018.¹¹⁹ By resolution [2423 \(2018\)](#), the Council decided that the strategic priority of MINUSMA remained supporting the implementation of the 2015 Agreement, with a new focus on the definition of institutional architecture, the reform of the security sector and national reconciliation measures.¹²⁰ The Council requested MINUSMA to reprioritize its resources and efforts to focus on political tasks and reiterated that the Mission's mandate should be implemented based on a prioritization of tasks.¹²¹ The Council reauthorized MINUSMA to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate¹²² and reiterated its request for the Mission to continue to carry out its mandate with a proactive and robust posture,¹²³ to anticipate, deter and respond to threats against civilians,¹²⁴ and to protect United Nations personnel, installations and equipment.¹²⁵

The Council reiterated existing priority tasks of MINUSMA and further elaborated on some of their elements.¹²⁶ In addition, the Council defined, as a new

¹⁰⁷ Resolution [2406 \(2018\)](#), para. 9.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 13.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 14.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 15.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, para. 18.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, para. 22.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, paras. 6 and 12. For more information about the composition of UNMISS prior to the reporting period, see previous Supplements (2010–2017).

¹¹⁴ Resolution [2406 \(2018\)](#), para. 19.

¹¹⁵ Resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#), para. 24. For information on the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#) concerning South Sudan, see part IX, sects. I and III.

¹¹⁶ Resolution [2429 \(2018\)](#), para. 28.

¹¹⁷ For more information on the history of the mandate of MINUSMA, see previous Supplements (2012–2017).

¹¹⁸ Resolution [2423 \(2018\)](#), para. 24.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, thirty-seventh preambular paragraph. See the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali of 6 June 2018 ([S/2018/541](#)), which builds on the findings and recommendations of the independent strategic review. See also part I, sect. 14, "The situation in Mali".

¹²⁰ Resolution [2423 \(2018\)](#), para. 26.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, paras. 26–27.

¹²² *Ibid.*, para. 32.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, para. 33.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 34.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 35.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 38 (a) and (c)–(f).

priority task, the Mission's support for the restoration of State authority in the centre of the country through logistical and operational support for the Malian Defence and Security Forces.¹²⁷

Regarding the 2015 Agreement, the Council specified that the Mission's support, monitoring and supervision of the ceasefire would include the continued implementation of control measures on the movement and armament of signatory armed groups.¹²⁸ The Council refocused the operational and logistical support of MINUSMA to the redeployment of the Malian Defence and Security Forces under that priority to the north of Mali.¹²⁹ The resolution specified that the Mission's disarmament, demobilization and reintegration work with armed groups would include a community violence reduction programme.¹³⁰ The Mission's tasks in support of the implementation of the reconciliation and justice measures in the Agreement were modified to include supporting the operations of the International Commission of Inquiry on Mali, the work of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission and the effectiveness of justice and corrections officials in the north and centre of the country and associated interim authorities, as well as providing support to Malian judicial institutions.¹³¹ Stressing the need for the upcoming elections in 2018 to be inclusive, free, fair, transparent, credible and peaceful, the Council requested the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mali to use his good offices to support their preparation, conduct and conclusion.¹³²

The Council elaborated on the mandate of MINUSMA to protect civilians under threat of physical violence, noting that such tasks would include public information, community outreach, dialogue and direct engagement.¹³³ The Council specified that, while MINUSMA should continue to take "robust and active steps" to protect civilians, the Mission's activities aimed at stabilizing key population centres and other areas where civilians were at risk, notably in the centre and north of Mali, should also focus on mitigating the risk to civilians before, during and after military

operations, as well as on enhancing early warning and documentation of the impact of conflict and violence on civilians, and strengthening community engagement and protection mechanisms.¹³⁴

The Council also reiterated as "other tasks" the existing work of MINUSMA on supporting stabilization projects, weapons and ammunition management, and cooperation with the Committee and the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#) on Mali,¹³⁵ and excluded the task to support cultural preservation.¹³⁶ The Council reiterated its request to MINUSMA to improve operational, planning and intelligence coordination among its civilian, military and police components, including through the establishment of intra-mission dedicated coordination mechanisms.¹³⁷ MINUSMA was also mandated, in coordination with relevant partners, including the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, to enhance its awareness of the financial sources of conflicts in Mali and the implications for regional security.¹³⁸

The Council reiterated its request to the Secretary-General to ensure adequate cooperation and coordination and, when applicable, support, among MINUSMA, the Malian Defence and Security Forces, the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel, the French forces and the European Union missions in Mali, and further requested the Mission to strengthen communication with all Malian stakeholders and local populations, with the objective of enhancing awareness and understanding of the nature, impact and specificities of the Mission's mandate and activities.¹³⁹ With respect to the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel, the Mission was requested to ensure that its support was provided in strict compliance with the human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces.¹⁴⁰ The Council also urged the Mission and the Government to redouble their efforts towards ensuring the implementation of the memorandum of understanding on support for the redeployment of the Malian Defence and Security Forces.¹⁴¹ Lastly, while taking note of the

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 38 (b).

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 38 (a) (ii).

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, para. 38 (a) (iii). See letter dated 19 January 2018 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Council ([S/2018/57](#)). For more information on the International Commission of Inquiry on Mali, see part VI, sect. II, "Investigation of disputes and fact-finding."

¹³² Resolution [2423 \(2018\)](#), paras. 19 and 22.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, para. 38 (d) (i).

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 38 (d) (ii).

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 39 (a)–(c). For information on the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#) on Mali, see part IX, sect. I, and part VII, sect. III.

¹³⁶ Resolution [2364 \(2017\)](#), para. 22 (c).

¹³⁷ Resolution [2423 \(2018\)](#), para. 28.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 31.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 41.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 52.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, para. 46.

report entitled “Improving security of United Nations peacekeepers”, the Council welcomed the action plan developed by MINUSMA to improve the security of its personnel and encouraged its swift and continued implementation.¹⁴²

By resolution 2432 (2018), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council reiterated the task of MINUSMA to assist the Committee and the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) on Mali.¹⁴³

The Council did not make any changes to the configuration of MINUSMA during the reporting period.¹⁴⁴

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic

The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) was established by the Council on 10 April 2014 by resolution 2149 (2014), under Chapter VII of the Charter. MINUSCA was authorized to take all necessary means to, inter alia, protect civilians and United Nations personnel and property; support the implementation of the transition process; facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance; promote and protect human rights; support justice and the rule of law; and support the implementation of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation strategies.¹⁴⁵

During 2018, the Council adopted resolutions 2429 (2018) of 13 July 2018, 2446 (2018) of 15 November 2018 and 2448 (2018) of 13 December 2018 concerning MINUSCA. By resolution 2429 (2018), the Council reiterated its request for close coordination among missions in the region, namely MINUSCA, UNAMID, UNISFA, UNMISS and UNSMIL.¹⁴⁶ In addition, the Council authorized a one-month technical rollover of the Mission’s mandate by resolution 2446 (2018)¹⁴⁷ and subsequently extended it

for a period of 11 months until 15 November 2019 by resolution 2448 (2018).¹⁴⁸

By resolution 2448 (2018), the Council took note of the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Central African Republic (S/2018/922), which built on the findings and recommendations of the independent strategic review of MINUSCA conducted between June and September 2018,¹⁴⁹ and, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, reiterated the Mission’s existing strategic objective to support the creation of the political, security and institutional conditions conducive to the sustainable reduction of armed groups through a comprehensive approach and proactive and robust posture.¹⁵⁰ The Council further recalled that the mandate of MINUSCA should be implemented based on a prioritization of tasks and in a phased manner,¹⁵¹ and reauthorized the Mission to take all necessary means to carry out its mandate.¹⁵²

The Council reiterated the Mission’s existing “priority tasks”, namely protecting civilians, providing good offices and support for the peace process, facilitating the creation of a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and protecting United Nations personnel and property, and made several modifications within that framework.¹⁵³ As part of its task to anticipate, deter and effectively respond to threats to civilians through a comprehensive approach, the Mission was requested to enhance its interaction with civilians, strengthen its early warning mechanism, increase its efforts to monitor and document human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law, and strengthen local community engagement and empowerment.¹⁵⁴ MINUSCA was further requested to mitigate the risk to civilians in military or police operations and to work with the authorities of the Central African Republic to identify and report threats and attacks against civilians, implement existing prevention and response plans and

¹⁴² Ibid., para. 59.

¹⁴³ Resolution 2432 (2018), para. 3.

¹⁴⁴ For more information about the composition of MINUSMA prior to the reporting period, see previous Supplements (2012–2017).

¹⁴⁵ For more information on the history of the mandate of MINUSCA, see previous Supplements (2014–2017).

¹⁴⁶ Resolution 2429 (2018), para. 28.

¹⁴⁷ Resolution 2446 (2018), para. 1.

¹⁴⁸ Resolution 2448 (2018), para. 34. China and the Russian Federation abstained in the vote on the resolution. In their statements after the vote, the Russian Federation expressed concern about the conduct of the negotiations processes on the draft resolution, while China underlined the need to recognize the efforts of the relevant parties in the international community to achieve peace in the Central African Republic (S/PV.8422, pp. 4–6 (Russian Federation) and p. 6 (China)). See also part I, sect. 7, “The situation in the Central African Republic”.

¹⁴⁹ Resolution 2448 (2018), thirty-fourth preambular paragraph.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., para. 36.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., para. 37.

¹⁵² Ibid., para. 38.

¹⁵³ Ibid., para. 39.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., para. 39 (a) (ii).

strengthen civilian-military cooperation, including joint planning.¹⁵⁵ Reiterating that the Mission should fully implement its new protection of civilians strategy adopted in April 2018, the Council also tasked MINUSCA to develop a comprehensive protection of civilians strategy involving national authorities and the United Nations country team “in coherence with its political strategy”.¹⁵⁶

MINUSCA was mandated to reinforce its role in the peace process through its participation in the African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation and the participation of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Central African Republic in the Panel of Facilitators of the African Initiative, and a stronger convening and coordinating role of international support to the African Initiative.¹⁵⁷ Furthermore, MINUSCA was requested to collaborate with the African Initiative to ensure that the Mission’s political and security strategies promoted a more coherent peace process that connected local and national peace efforts with ongoing efforts to advance disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, security sector reform, the fight against impunity and the restoration of State authority, and that the efforts of the African Initiative were informed by political, security, human rights, humanitarian and protection developments.¹⁵⁸ Taking note of the upcoming presidential, legislative and local elections in 2020 and 2021,¹⁵⁹ the Council also mandated MINUSCA to provide good offices and technical expertise in support of an inclusive and transparent electoral process as a full part of the political process.¹⁶⁰ The Mission’s assistance to the authorities to ensure an inclusive peace process was broadened to include young people and internally displaced persons and refugees.¹⁶¹ The Council also specified that the technical expertise provided by MINUSCA to the Government in its regional engagement should include the assessment of opportunities to resolve issues of common and bilateral interest, in order to improve the anticipation and prevention of possible risks to regional stability.¹⁶²

The Council also reiterated the Mission’s remaining tasks related to support for the extension of State authority; security sector reform; disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation; the

promotion and protection of human rights; and support for national and international justice, the fight against impunity and the rule of law, and made modifications to some of them.¹⁶³ Specifically, the Council elaborated on the task of MINUSCA to support the deployment of security forces, including by providing enhanced planning and technical assistance to the national military and police forces¹⁶⁴ and limited logistical support for their redeployment, in accordance with the human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces, without exacerbating the risks to the stabilization of the country, civilians, the political process, United Nations peacekeepers or the impartiality of the Mission.¹⁶⁵ With regard to the Mission’s task to provide strategic and technical advice to the authorities of the Central African Republic on the implementation of the national strategy on security sector reform, MINUSCA was requested to coordinate closely with the European Union Military Training Mission in the Central African Republic and other international partners, including France, the Russian Federation and the United States of America.¹⁶⁶

Reiterating the additional role of MINUSCA in support of the Committee and the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution [2127 \(2013\)](#) concerning the Central African Republic, the Council added that the Mission should support the Panel in collecting information about acts of incitement to violence, in particular on an ethnic or religious basis, that undermined the peace, stability or security of the country.¹⁶⁷ Lastly, the Council also reiterated the remaining existing tasks of MINUSCA relating to the environmental impact of its operations, child protection, gender mainstreaming, and weapons and ammunition management.¹⁶⁸

The Council also decided to maintain the existing military and police configuration of MINUSCA.¹⁶⁹

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., para. 39 (a) (iv).

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., para. 39 (b) (i).

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., para. 39 (b) (ii).

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., fourteenth preambular paragraph.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., para. 39 (b) (iv).

¹⁶¹ Ibid., para. 39 (b) (iii).

¹⁶² Ibid., para. 39 (b) (vi).

¹⁶³ Ibid., para. 40 (a)–(e).

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., para. 40 (a) (iv).

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., para. 40 (a) (v).

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., para. 40 (b) (i). For information on the mandate of the European Union Military Training Mission in the Central African Republic, see part VIII, sect. III.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., para. 41 (d). For information on the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2127 \(2013\)](#) concerning the Central African Republic, see part IX, sect. I.

¹⁶⁸ Resolution [2448 \(2018\)](#), paras. 54 and 56–61.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., para. 35. For more information about the composition of MINUSCA prior to the reporting period, see previous Supplements (2014–2017).

Americas

United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti

The Council established the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, by resolution 2350 (2017) of 13 April 2017, subsequent to the closure of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti. MINUJUSTH was mandated to assist the Government of Haiti in strengthening rule of law institutions, supporting and developing the Haitian National Police, and engaging in human rights monitoring, reporting and analysis. The Mission was authorized to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate in support of the Haitian National Police and in protecting civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.¹⁷⁰

During 2018, by resolution 2410 (2018) of 10 April 2018, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council extended the mandate of MINUJUSTH for a period of one year until 15 April 2019.¹⁷¹ The resolution was adopted with 13 votes in favour and 2 abstentions.¹⁷²

The Council reiterated the existing mandate of MINUJUSTH.¹⁷³ The authorization to MINUJUSTH to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate to support and develop the Haitian National Police was also renewed.¹⁷⁴ The Council further authorized MINUJUSTH to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, as needed.¹⁷⁵

The Council further elaborated on the Mission's human rights and rule of law mandates. Underscoring respect for human rights by the Haitian National Police and the judiciary as essential elements of stability in Haiti, the Council called on MINUJUSTH to provide monitoring and support in that regard.¹⁷⁶ The Council further specified that the good offices role of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Haiti should include close coordination with the Government for the development of a political strategy aimed at addressing political challenges to progress towards the rule of law and creating momentum for systematic progress.¹⁷⁷

In terms of the Mission's configuration, the Council decided to maintain seven formed police units and 295 individual police officers until 15 October 2018 and to decrease the police component to five formed police units between that date and 15 April 2019.¹⁷⁸

The Council welcomed the benchmarked exit strategy submitted by the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 2350 (2017)¹⁷⁹ and requested him to develop specific dates and indicators for achieving the benchmarks, with the goal of transitioning tasks to the Government, in coordination with the United Nations country team, and to report to the Council in that regard.¹⁸⁰ The Council also requested the Secretary-General to conduct a strategic assessment mission to Haiti by 1 February 2019 and, on that basis, to present to the Council recommendations on the future United Nations role in Haiti, including any recommendations for drawdown and exit.¹⁸¹ The Council affirmed its intention to consider the withdrawal of MINUJUSTH and transition to a non-peacekeeping United Nations presence in Haiti beginning no sooner than 15 October 2019, taking into account the security conditions on the ground and the overall capacity of Haiti to ensure stability.¹⁸²

¹⁷⁰ For more information on the history of the mandate of MINUJUSTH, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2016–2017*.

¹⁷¹ Resolution 2410 (2018), para. 1.

¹⁷² China and the Russian Federation abstained in the vote on the draft resolution. In their statements after the vote, China stated that MINUJUSTH should focus on helping Haiti to address peace and security challenges, rather than human rights, while the Russian Federation questioned the adoption of the draft resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter (see *S/PV.8226*, pp. 2–3 (Russian Federation) and p. 4 (China)). See also part I, sect. 15, "The question concerning Haiti".

¹⁷³ Resolution 2410 (2018), para. 1.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 14. See also resolution 2350 (2017), paras. 12–13.

¹⁷⁵ Resolution 2410 (2018), para. 15.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 11.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 12.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 3.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, fifteenth preambular paragraph.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, paras. 5–6.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, para. 9.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, para. 10.

Asia

United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan

The Council established the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) by resolution [47 \(1948\)](#) of 21 April 1948. The first team of military observers, who eventually formed the nucleus of UNMOGIP, was deployed in January 1949 to the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan established by resolution [39 \(1948\)](#). Following the termination of the Commission, the Council, by resolution [91 \(1951\)](#), decided that

UNMOGIP would continue to supervise the ceasefire in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Since the renewed hostilities in 1971, the task of UNMOGIP has been to monitor developments pertaining to the strict observance of the ceasefire of 17 December 1971. During 2018, the Council did not discuss UNMOGIP or make changes to its composition or mandate, which remained open-ended.¹⁸³

¹⁸³ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNMOGIP, see Repertoire, Supplement 1946–1951, and subsequent Supplements (1952–2017).

Europe

United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

The Council established the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) by resolution [186 \(1964\)](#) of 4 March 1964. UNFICYP was mandated to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions.¹⁸⁴

During 2018, the Council adopted resolutions [2398 \(2018\)](#) of 30 January 2018 and [2430 \(2018\)](#) of 26 July 2018 concerning UNFICYP. In accordance with previous practice, the Council extended the mandate of the mission twice, for a period of six months each time, the second time until 31 January 2019.¹⁸⁵

The Council did not modify the mandate of UNFICYP during the period under review. By resolution [2398 \(2018\)](#), the Council welcomed the report of the Secretary-General on the strategic review of UNFICYP ([S/2017/1008](#)) and endorsed its recommendations.¹⁸⁶ Accordingly, the Council expressed support for the need to improve the mission's capacity for liaison and engagement with the sides across all components, including people-to-people contacts, to keep stability and calm, and thereby contribute effectively to conditions conducive to progress in a settlement process.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁴ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNFICYP, see previous Supplements (1964–2017).

¹⁸⁵ Resolutions [2398 \(2018\)](#), para. 9, and [2430 \(2018\)](#), para. 11. See also part I, sect. 19, "The situation in Cyprus".

¹⁸⁶ Resolution [2398 \(2018\)](#), para. 10. See also [S/2017/1008](#), para. 57.

¹⁸⁷ Resolution [2398 \(2018\)](#), para. 11.

The Council also endorsed the recommendation of the Secretary-General to reduce the mission's actual strength from 888 to 802 military personnel, while maintaining an authorized strength of 860.¹⁸⁸ By resolution [2430 \(2018\)](#), the Council requested the Secretary-General to increase the number of women in UNFICYP and to ensure their meaningful participation in all aspects of operations.¹⁸⁹

United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was established by the Council on 10 June 1999, by resolution [1244 \(1999\)](#), under Chapter VII of the Charter. The Council mandated UNMIK to carry out a range of tasks, including promoting the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, performing basic civilian administrative functions, and organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government.¹⁹⁰ During 2018, the Council did not adopt any decision relating to UNMIK and made no change to its composition or to its mandate, which remained open-ended.¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 10. See also [S/2017/1008](#), para. 51.

¹⁸⁹ Resolution [2430 \(2018\)](#), para. 12.

¹⁹⁰ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNMIK, see previous Supplements (1996–2017).

¹⁹¹ See part I, sect. 20 B, "Security Council resolutions [1160 \(1998\)](#), [1199 \(1998\)](#), [1203 \(1998\)](#), [1239 \(1999\)](#) and [1244 \(1999\)](#)".

Middle East

United Nations Truce Supervision Organization

The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was established by the Council on 29 May 1948, by resolution [50 \(1948\)](#), to assist the United Nations Mediator and the Truce Commission in supervising the observance of the truce in Palestine, following the end of the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict. UNTSO military observers have since remained in the Middle East and have continued to assist and cooperate with the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon in monitoring ceasefires and supervising armistice agreements.¹⁹² During 2018, the Council did not adopt any decisions concerning UNTSO or make changes to its composition or to its mandate, which remained open-ended.

United Nations Disengagement Observer Force

The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) was established by the Council on 31 May 1974, by resolution [350 \(1974\)](#), following the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces, in the Golan Heights. Since then, UNDOF has remained in the area to maintain the ceasefire between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic, and to supervise the implementation of the Agreement and the areas of separation and limitation.¹⁹³

During 2018, the Council adopted resolutions [2426 \(2018\)](#) of 29 June 2018 and [2450 \(2018\)](#) of 21 December 2018 concerning UNDOF. Consistent with prior practice, the Council extended the mandate of the mission twice, for a period of six months each time, the second time until 30 June 2019.¹⁹⁴ The Council made no changes to the mandate or the composition of UNDOF during the reporting period.

¹⁹² For more information on the history of the mandate of UNTSO, see *Repertoire, Supplement 1946–1951*, and subsequent Supplements (1952–2017).

¹⁹³ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNDOF, see previous Supplements (1972–2017).

¹⁹⁴ Resolutions [2426 \(2018\)](#), para. 12, and [2450 \(2018\)](#), para. 13.

United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was established by the Council on 19 March 1978, by resolutions [425 \(1978\)](#) and [426 \(1978\)](#), to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, restore international peace and security, and assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area.¹⁹⁵

By resolution [2433 \(2018\)](#) of 30 August 2018, the Council extended the mandate of UNIFIL for a period of one year, until 31 August 2019.¹⁹⁶ The resolution was adopted further to the letter dated 30 July 2018 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Council ([S/2018/750](#)) on the renewal of the mandate of the mission.¹⁹⁷

The Council stressed the need to improve the management of the mission's civilian resources, including through fostering enhanced cooperation with the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, with the goal of improving the effectiveness and efficiency of both missions. In that regard, the Council requested the Secretary-General to provide recommendations on the matter by 31 December 2018.¹⁹⁸

While reiterating language used in prior resolutions with regard to some core aspects of the mission's mandate, such as security monitoring and patrolling and supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces,¹⁹⁹ the resolution also included new language requesting UNIFIL to take fully into account gender considerations as a cross-cutting issue throughout its mandate, and to assist the Lebanese authorities in ensuring the full and effective participation, involvement and representation of women at all levels of decision-making. The Council further requested enhanced reporting by UNIFIL on that issue.²⁰⁰

The Council also called for the Government of Lebanon to develop a plan to increase its naval capabilities, with the goal of ultimately decreasing the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force and transitioning its responsibilities to the Lebanese Armed Forces. In that

¹⁹⁵ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNIFIL, see previous Supplements (1975–2017).

¹⁹⁶ Resolution [2433 \(2018\)](#), para. 1.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, third preambular paragraph.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 12. See also [S/2018/1182](#).

¹⁹⁹ Resolution [2433 \(2018\)](#), paras. 2, 5, 13 and 21.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 24.

regard, the Council requested that the Secretary-General present to the Council an assessment with recommendations within six months.²⁰¹

The Council encouraged the intention of the Government of Lebanon to deploy a model regiment and an offshore patrol vessel in the mission's area of

²⁰¹ Ibid., para. 7.

operations to advance the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) and the authority of the State, and called upon the Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL to strengthen their coordinated actions.²⁰²

The composition of UNIFIL was not modified during the period under review.

²⁰² Ibid., para. 8.

II. Special political missions

Note

Section II focuses on the decisions adopted by the Security Council during the period under review concerning the establishment and termination of special political missions,²⁰³ as well as the changes to their mandates.²⁰⁴

Overview of special political missions during 2018

During the period under review, the Council oversaw ten special political missions. Five were based in Africa, one in the Americas, two in Asia and two in the Middle East. Their size varied from relatively small missions such as the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia to larger assistance missions deployed in highly complex and volatile security environments such as the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI).

²⁰³ Special political missions described in the present part include regional offices and offices in support of political processes. Other types of special political missions, such as special and personal envoys, advisers or representatives of the Secretary-General, sanctions monitoring teams, groups and panels and other entities and mechanisms, are covered in other parts of the present Supplement.

²⁰⁴ For information on the envoys, advisers and representatives of the Secretary-General whose mandates relate to the Council's responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, other than those appointed as heads of peacekeeping or special political missions, see part IX, sect. VI.

Newly established special political missions and terminations and extensions of mandates

The Council did not establish any new special political missions or terminate the mandates of any existing special political missions during the period under review. The Council extended the mandates of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS), the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), UNSMIL, UNSOM, UNAMA and UNAMI. The United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) had initially been established in 2016 for a three-year period until 31 December 2019, while the mandates of the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia and the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon remained open-ended.

Mandates of special political missions

During 2018, the Council welcomed the findings and recommendations of two strategic reviews conducted in 2017 concerning UNAMA and UNAMI, with the latter having been conducted by independent non-United Nations experts.²⁰⁵ The Council also requested the Secretary-General to conduct an assessment of UNIOGBIS, including options for a possible reconfiguration of the United Nations presence in Guinea-Bissau, and a strategic review of UNOCA to provide recommendations on possible areas of improvement, including the coherence of United Nations activities in the subregion.²⁰⁶

For most special political missions, the Council prioritized mandate tasks related to the provision of

²⁰⁵ In connection with UNAMA, resolution 2405 (2018), para. 3; and, in connection with UNAMI, resolution 2421 (2018), para. 5.

²⁰⁶ In connection with UNIOGBIS, resolution 2404 (2018), para. 28; and, in connection with UNOCA, S/PRST/2018/17, fifth paragraph.

good offices and mediation support for the implementation of peace agreements, inclusive political dialogue and national reconciliation, promoting and providing capacity-building support for good governance and the strengthening of national institutions, supporting political transitions consisting of elections and constitutional review processes, and the resolution of related political and institutional crises, as well as monitoring and reporting on human rights violations and abuses and providing related capacity-building support. Regional offices, such as UNOCA and UNOWAS, continued to support the strengthening of subregional capacities in conflict prevention, early warning and women, peace and security issues, as well as addressing cross-border and transnational security threats such as terrorism and maritime security. Larger political missions, such as UNSOM, UNAMI and UNAMA, continued to coordinate international humanitarian and capacity-building efforts in the countries of their deployment.

During the period under review, the Council made modifications to the mandates of 7 out of the 10 special political missions, namely UNIOGBIS, UNOCA, UNSMIL, UNSOM, UNOWAS, UNAMA and UNAMI. In modifying their mandates, the Council placed particular emphasis on ensuring that missions fully took into account gender considerations throughout their activities. For example, in redefining the mandate of UNOCA, the Council requested the Office to give due attention to human rights and gender perspectives in the implementation of its good offices role, while UNAMI was tasked with approaching gender mainstreaming as a cross-cutting issue.²⁰⁷ UNAMA and UNAMI were requested to assist the Governments of Afghanistan and Iraq in ensuring the inclusion and political participation of women at all levels.²⁰⁸ Similarly, the Council requested UNSMIL to assist the Government of Libya in protecting women and girls from sexual and gender-based violence, and welcomed the efforts of UNOWAS to work towards the systematic involvement of women in initiatives to counter terrorism and prevent violent extremism.²⁰⁹

In the context of delays in the implementation of political agreements and planned elections in Guinea-

Bissau and Libya, the Council strengthened the political mandates of UNIOGBIS and UNSMIL. Specifically, the Council requested UNIOGBIS to use the good offices and political support of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Guinea-Bissau to support the full implementation of the 2016 Conakry Agreement on the Implementation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Road Map for the Resolution of the Political Crisis in Guinea-Bissau and the electoral and constitutional review processes, while UNSMIL was requested to exercise good offices to support an inclusive political process and security and economic dialogue within the framework of the Libyan Political Agreement and the United Nations Action Plan for Libya.²¹⁰

Building on their existing mandates to monitor, analyse and support the addressing of a wide range of cross-border and transnational issues, the Council further tasked UNOCA and UNOWAS to support efforts to address the impact of emerging security threats, such as the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, issues related to transhumance and conflict between farmers and pastoralists, as well as the regional dimension of security crises.²¹¹ Furthermore, recognizing the adverse effects of climate and ecological change and natural disasters, among other factors, on the stability of Central Africa, West Africa and the Sahel, the Council requested UNOCA and UNOWAS to take such information into consideration in their activities.²¹²

Tables 4 and 5 provide an overview of the mandates of special political missions in 2018, showing the range of tasks mandated by the Council. The mandates reflected in the tables include (a) tasks mandated by the Council in decisions adopted during the reporting period; (b) tasks mandated in previous periods and specifically reiterated by the Council during the period under review; and (c) tasks of missions with open-ended or multi-year mandates adopted in previous periods. The tables are provided for information purposes only and do not reflect any position or view of the Council with regard to the status of the mandates of the field missions concerned.

²⁰⁷ In connection with UNOCA, [S/2018/789](#), annex, objectives 1 and 2; and, in connection with UNAMI, resolution [2421 \(2018\)](#), para. 2 (e).

²⁰⁸ In connection with UNAMA, resolution [2405 \(2018\)](#), para. 39; and, in connection with UNAMI, resolution [2421 \(2018\)](#), para. 2 (e).

²⁰⁹ In connection with UNSMIL, resolution [2434 \(2018\)](#), para. 4; and, in connection with UNOWAS, [S/PRST/2018/16](#), twelfth paragraph.

²¹⁰ In connection with UNIOGBIS, resolution [2404 \(2018\)](#), para. 3 (a)–(c); and, in connection with UNSMIL, resolution [2434 \(2018\)](#), para. 1 (i) and (ii).

²¹¹ In connection with UNOCA, [S/2018/789](#), annex, objective 2 (a); and, in connection with UNOWAS, [S/PRST/2018/16](#), thirteenth paragraph.

²¹² In connection with UNOCA, [S/PRST/2018/17](#), ninth paragraph; and, in connection with UNOWAS, [S/PRST/2018/16](#), nineteenth paragraph.

Table 4
Mandates of special political missions, 2018: Africa

<i>Mandate</i>	<i>UNIOGBIS</i>	<i>UNOCA</i>	<i>UNSMIL</i>	<i>UNSOM</i>	<i>UNOWAS</i>
Chapter VII					
Civil-military coordination					
Demilitarization and arms management		X	X	X	
Electoral assistance	X	X	X	X	X
Human rights; women and peace and security; children and armed conflict	X	X	X	X	X
Humanitarian support			X		X
International cooperation and coordination	X	X	X	X	X
Maritime security		X		X	X
Political process	X	X	X	X	X
Public information					X
Rule of law/judicial matters	X			X	X
Security sector reform		X		X	X
Support to police				X	
Support to sanctions regimes			X		
Support to State institutions	X		X	X	X

Abbreviations: UNIOGBIS, United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau; UNOCA, United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa; UNSMIL, United Nations Support Mission in Libya; UNSOM, United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia; UNOWAS, United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel.

Table 5
Mandates of special political missions, 2018: Americas, Asia and Middle East

<i>Mandate</i>	<i>United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia</i>	<i>UNAMA</i>	<i>UNRCCA</i>	<i>UNAMI</i>	<i>UNSCOL</i>
Chapter VII					
Ceasefire monitoring	X				
Civilian-military coordination		X			
Demilitarization and arms management	X			X	
Electoral assistance		X		X	
Human rights; women and peace and security; children and armed conflict		X		X	
Humanitarian support		X		X	
International cooperation and coordination	X	X	X	X	X
Political process	X	X	X	X	X
Protection of civilians		X			

Mandate	<i>United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia</i>	UNAMA	UNRCCA	UNAMI	UNSCOL
Public information					
Rule of law/judicial matters		X		X	
Security sector reform				X	
Support to sanctions regimes					
Support to State institutions		X		X	

Abbreviations: UNAMA, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan; UNRCCA, United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia; UNAMI, United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq; UNSCOL, Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon.

Africa

United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau

The United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) was established by the Council by resolution 1876 (2009) of 26 June 2009 to succeed the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau. UNIOGBIS was mandated to, inter alia, assist the work of the Peacebuilding Commission in Guinea-Bissau, strengthen the capacities of national institutions to maintain constitutional order, public security and the full respect for the rule of law, support an inclusive political dialogue and national reconciliation process, provide strategic and technical support in security sector reform, undertake human rights promotion, protection and monitoring, and enhance cooperation with regional and subregional organizations.²¹³

During 2018, by resolution 2404 (2018) of 28 February 2018 and in accordance with previous practice, the Council extended the mandate of UNIOGBIS for 12 months, until 28 February 2019.²¹⁴ The Council redefined the priorities of UNIOGBIS in the context of the protracted political and institutional crisis in Guinea-Bissau, delays in the implementation of the 2016 Conakry Agreement on the Implementation of the ECOWAS Road Map for the Resolution of the Political Crisis in Guinea-Bissau, the holding of legislative and presidential elections in 2018 and 2019, and the constitutional review process.²¹⁵ In addition to retaining the priorities provided for in resolution 2343

(2017),²¹⁶ the Office was requested to support the electoral process and the full implementation of the Conakry Agreement, through the use of good offices, to ensure inclusive, free and credible legislative elections in 2018.²¹⁷

Beyond the priority areas and with a view to upcoming elections, the Council requested UNIOGBIS and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Guinea-Bissau to support the Government, in close cooperation with the Peacebuilding Commission, in the mobilization, harmonization and coordination of international assistance from the African Union, ECOWAS, the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries and the European Union.²¹⁸ The Council reiterated the Office's other tasks related to the strengthening of democratic institutions and the capacity of State organs, assisting the national authorities in the promotion and protection of human rights, providing advice and support to combat drug trafficking and organized crime, incorporating a gender perspective into peacebuilding and supporting the timely conduct of elections and the strengthening of democracy and good governance.²¹⁹

The resolution did not reiterate, however, language relating to the Office's strategic and technical advice and support to national authorities in connection with the national security sector reform, rule of law strategies and the development of civilian and military justice systems.²²⁰

²¹³ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNIOGBIS, see previous Supplements (2008–2017).

²¹⁴ Resolution 2404 (2018), para. 1.

²¹⁵ See part I, sect. 8, "The situation in Guinea-Bissau".

²¹⁶ Resolution 2343 (2017), para. 2.

²¹⁷ Resolution 2404 (2018), para. 3 (a) and (b).

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 4 (e).

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, paras. 4 (a)–(d) and 8.

²²⁰ See resolution 2343 (2017), para. 2 (c).

Lastly, the Council requested the Secretary-General to provide an assessment of UNIOGBIS within nine months, including options for a possible reconfiguration of the United Nations presence in the country and a reprioritization of tasks.²²¹

United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa

The United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) was established by an exchange of letters dated 11 December 2009 and 30 August 2010 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council.²²² The functions of UNOCA included cooperating with the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and other regional partners in the promotion of peace and stability in the broader subregion, to carry out good offices roles in the areas of conflict prevention and peacebuilding, to strengthen the capacity of the Department of Political Affairs to advise the Secretary-General on matters relating to peace and security in the region, to promote an integrated subregional approach and facilitate coordination and information exchange among United Nations organizations and partners in the subregion, and to report to Headquarters on developments of subregional significance.²²³

During 2018, the Council issued two presidential statements concerning UNOCA, on 30 January and 10 August 2018.²²⁴ The Council also extended the mandate of UNOCA for three years, until 31 August 2021, by an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council dated 24 and 28 August 2018, respectively.²²⁵

The Council modified the mandate of UNOCA during the period under review. In the presidential statement of 10 August 2018, the Council, while welcoming the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Central Africa and the activities of UNOCA (S/2018/521), which included recommendations on the mandate renewal of

UNOCA,²²⁶ noted that the priorities of the Office would include performing good offices on behalf of the Secretary-General; assisting the countries of the subregion in consolidating peace and resolving electoral tensions from the 2015–2018 period and assisting countries facing related institutional crises related to electoral processes; working with ECCAS to lay the groundwork for the structural prevention of election-related violence; enhancing the capacities of the ECCAS secretariat in conflict prevention, early warning, women, peace and security, mediation and other areas; and working with UNOWAS to address transregional issues, such as maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, conflict between farmers and herders and combating Boko Haram.²²⁷ The Council encouraged UNOCA to fully take into account gender considerations as a cross-cutting issue in its activities and to continue to support ECCAS in its adoption and implementation of the regional action plan for the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000).²²⁸ Recognizing the adverse effects of climate and ecological change and natural disasters, among other factors, on the stability of the Central African region, the Council stressed the need for long-term strategies by Governments and the United Nations, based on risk assessments, to support stabilization and build resilience, and requested that such information be taken into consideration by UNOCA in its activities.²²⁹

By the exchange of letters dated 24 and 28 August 2018, the Council reiterated the existing four objectives of UNOCA, as defined in 2015,²³⁰ and made some further modifications with respect to its mandate, tasking UNOCA with monitoring political developments in Central Africa, carrying out good offices and enhancing subregional capacities for conflict prevention and mediation; supporting United Nations efforts in the subregion as well as regional and subregional initiatives on peace and security; enhancing the coherence and coordination of the work of the United Nations in the subregion on peace and security; and advising the Secretary-General and United Nations entities in the region on significant developments in Central Africa.²³¹

Within that framework, the Council requested UNOCA to give due attention to human rights and gender perspectives in the implementation of its good

²²¹ Resolution 2404 (2018), para. 28. See the special report of the Secretary-General on the strategic assessment of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau, dated 6 December 2018 (S/2018/1086).

²²² S/2009/697 and S/2010/457.

²²³ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNOCA, see previous Supplements (2008–2017).

²²⁴ S/PRST/2018/3 and S/PRST/2018/17. See part I, sect. 9, “Central African region”.

²²⁵ S/2018/789 and S/2018/790.

²²⁶ S/PRST/2018/17, fifth paragraph. See S/2018/521, paras. 77–79 and 91.

²²⁷ S/PRST/2018/17, sixth paragraph.

²²⁸ Ibid., eighth paragraph.

²²⁹ Ibid., ninth paragraph.

²³⁰ See S/2015/554, annex.

²³¹ S/2018/789, annex, objectives 1–4.

offices role and in supporting United Nations and regional and subregional initiatives.²³² Furthermore, as part of the latter objective, the Council specified that UNOCA would promote and support efforts to address the impact of emerging security threats, including Boko Haram, maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and other cross-border threats, such as issues related to transhumance, as well as the regional dimension of security crises in some States of the subregion.²³³ The Office was also tasked with supporting the African Union-led African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation.²³⁴

During the period under review, the Council highlighted the importance of cooperation between UNOCA and United Nations peacekeeping operations and special political missions in the region. In that regard, the Council encouraged further cooperation, mutual prioritization and the clear division of tasks between UNOCA and UNOWAS, MINUSCA, MONUSCO, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region and the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Burundi.²³⁵ The Council welcomed the support provided by UNOCA and UNOWAS for the development of a joint strategy to address the root causes of the crisis in the Lake Chad Basin region.²³⁶

Lastly, by the presidential statement of 10 August 2018, the Council requested the Secretary-General to conduct a strategic review of the scope of the mandate and activities of UNOCA and to present recommendations to the Council by 1 August 2019 for areas of improvement, including the coherence of United Nations activities in countries under the Office's mandate, or new or refocused priorities.²³⁷

United Nations Support Mission in Libya

By resolution 2009 (2011) of 16 September 2011, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council established the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), with a mandate to support Libyan national efforts to restore public security and order and promote the rule of law, undertake inclusive political dialogue and promote national reconciliation, extend

State authority, promote and protect human rights and support transitional justice, initiate economic recovery, and coordinate international support.²³⁸

During 2018, the Council adopted resolutions 2429 (2018) of 13 July 2018, 2434 (2018) of 13 September 2018 and 2441 (2018) of 5 November 2018 concerning UNSMIL. In 2018, the Council extended the mandate of UNSMIL once, for one year, until 15 September 2019.²³⁹

By resolution 2434 (2018), the Council reiterated its strong support for the ongoing efforts of UNSMIL and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya and reaffirmed its endorsement of the United Nations Action Plan for Libya and the Libyan Political Agreement.²⁴⁰ In that context, the Council broadened and elaborated on the existing mandate of UNSMIL, as defined in resolution 2376 (2017).²⁴¹ Specifically, the Council decided that UNSMIL would exercise mediation and good offices to support an inclusive political process and security and economic dialogue within the framework of the Libyan Political Agreement and the United Nations Action Plan for Libya; continued implementation of the Agreement; consolidation of the governance, security and economic arrangements of the Government of National Accord, including support for economic reform in collaboration with international financial institutions; and subsequent phases of the Libyan transition process, including the constitutional process and the organization of elections.²⁴²

Beyond those tasks, the Council reiterated, within operational and security constraints, the Mission's tasks to support key Libyan institutions; support, upon request, the provision of essential services and the delivery of humanitarian assistance; monitor and report on human rights; support the securing of uncontrolled arms and related materiel and counter their proliferation; and coordinate international assistance and provide advice and assistance to the efforts led by the Government of National Accord to stabilize post-conflict zones, including those liberated from Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da'esh).²⁴³

²³² Ibid., objectives 1 and 2.

²³³ Ibid., objective 2 (a).

²³⁴ Ibid., objective 2 (b).

²³⁵ S/PRST/2018/17, seventh paragraph. See also S/PRST/2018/3, twenty-third paragraph.

²³⁶ S/PRST/2018/17, thirteenth paragraph.

²³⁷ Ibid., fifth paragraph.

²³⁸ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNSMIL, see previous Supplements (2010–2017).

²³⁹ Resolution 2434 (2018), para. 1.

²⁴⁰ Ibid., fourth and seventh preambular paragraphs. See part I, sect. 13, "The situation in Libya".

²⁴¹ See resolution 2376 (2017), paras. 1–3.

²⁴² Resolution 2434 (2018), para. 1.

²⁴³ Ibid., para. 2.

Furthermore, while reiterating its request to the Mission to fully take into account a gender perspective throughout its mandate and to assist the Government in ensuring the full and effective participation of women in political processes, the Council also tasked the Mission with assisting the Government in the protection of women and girls from sexual and gender-based violence, in line with resolution 1325 (2000).²⁴⁴ The Council welcomed the progress made by UNSMIL in re-establishing a presence in Tripoli and its plans to re-establish a presence in Benghazi and other parts of Libya through a phased return, as security conditions allowed.²⁴⁵ The Council requested the Secretary-General to reassess a series of detailed objectives for the implementation of the Mission's mandated tasks, to include a particular focus on the steps required to set the constitutional basis for elections and to advance the political process from its current trajectory, and to report on progress towards those objectives in his regular reporting.²⁴⁶

By resolution 2441 (2018), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council reiterated the mandate of UNSMIL to cooperate fully with the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya and its Panel of Experts.²⁴⁷ By resolution 2429 (2018), the Council reiterated the need for close coordination among UNSMIL, UNAMID, UNISFA, UNMISS and MINUSCA.²⁴⁸

United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) was established by the Council by resolution 2102 (2013) of 2 May 2013. Its mandate was, *inter alia*, to provide good offices functions to support the Federal Government of Somalia in the peace and reconciliation process and to provide strategic policy advice on peacebuilding and State-building; to assist in the coordination of international donor support, in particular on security sector assistance and maritime security; to help to build the capacity of the Federal Government to promote respect for human rights, women's empowerment, child protection and the prevention of conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence; and to monitor, help to

investigate and report on abuses or violations of human rights.²⁴⁹

During 2018, the Council adopted resolutions 2408 (2018) of 27 March 2018 and 2431 (2018) of 30 July 2018 concerning UNSOM. The Council extended the mandate of UNSOM for a period of one year, until 31 March 2019.²⁵⁰

The Council renewed the existing mandate of UNSOM as defined in resolution 2358 (2017), adding new language to some of the Mission's tasks.²⁵¹ Specifically, while reiterating the request to UNSOM to implement its mandate at the national and regional level, the Council specified that that should include further strengthening and maintaining its presence in all federal member states, including in Galmudug and its administrative capital Dhuusamarreeb.²⁵² In addition, reiterating the Mission's task to provide strategic policy advice on the Government-led inclusive political process, reconciliation, peacebuilding and State-building, the Council specified that that should also include the review of the Provisional Federal Constitution, preparations for the 2020/2021 elections, security sector reform and the implementation of the transition plan.²⁵³

Underscoring the importance of the Mission's support to the Government-led inclusive political process, including the provision of good offices functions, the Council added that that should focus on strengthening the rule of law and the implementation of the new policing model in line with the comprehensive approach to security.²⁵⁴ Furthermore, with respect to the elections, the Council further underscored the importance of the Mission's support, with a focus on the National Independent Electoral Commission at national and subnational level to fulfil its constitutional mandate, in line with the Somali-led Operational Strategic Plan for 2017–2021, the goal of nationwide voter registration by 2019, and coordination of international electoral support to Somalia.²⁵⁵

With regard to security sector reform, the Council requested UNSOM to provide strategic advice to accelerate the implementation of the comprehensive approach to security, including facilitating more

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 4.

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 5.

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 3.

²⁴⁷ Resolution 2441 (2018), para. 16.

²⁴⁸ Resolution 2429 (2018), para. 28.

²⁴⁹ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNSOM, see previous Supplements (2012–2017).

²⁵⁰ Resolution 2408 (2018), para. 1.

²⁵¹ Resolution 2408 (2018), paras. 1–2. See also resolution 2158 (2014), para. 1.

²⁵² Resolution 2408 (2018), para. 2.

²⁵³ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 3.

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 4.

effective coordination of international partners' efforts to support the Security Pact, the priorities of the transition plan, the implementation of the national security architecture and the New Partnership for Somalia.²⁵⁶ The Council requested the Mission to continue to assist the Federal Government in coordinating international donor support to the security sector in compliance with the human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces, including through coordination and advice to the comprehensive approach to security structure.²⁵⁷ In addition, the Council requested UNSOM to continue to support the Government's efforts to implement the national strategy and action plan for preventing and countering violent extremism, in order to strengthen the country's capacity to prevent and counter terrorism, consistent with its international obligations, Council resolutions and the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.²⁵⁸ The Council underlined the importance of strengthening the relationship between UNSOM, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) and the United Nations country team, including through the Senior Leadership Coordination Forum.²⁵⁹ The Council also requested UNSOM to continue to work with partners to provide support and strategic policy advice in order for the Federal Government to fulfil its commitments to sound, transparent and accountable financial management, with a view to, inter alia, laying the foundations for inclusive and transparent elections.²⁶⁰

By resolution [2431 \(2018\)](#), while extending its authorization for the deployment of AMISOM under Chapter VII of the Charter,²⁶¹ the Council encouraged continued close collaboration between UNSOM, UNSOS and AMISOM in order to strengthen joint senior leadership decision-making, ensure the alignment of operational efforts with a common set of strategic priorities, and enhance coordination efforts on the ground within the comprehensive approach to security mechanism.²⁶² The Council further reiterated the Mission's task to support the federal policing model and to work with AMISOM to ensure that women and girls were protected from sexual and gender-based violence, including sexual exploitation and abuse.²⁶³

United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel

The United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) was established by an exchange of letters dated 14 and 28 January 2016 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council, merging the Office of the Special Envoy for the Sahel with the United Nations Office for West Africa. The Council mandated UNOWAS to, inter alia, monitor political developments in West Africa and the Sahel and carry out good offices on behalf of the Secretary-General to assist in peacebuilding, sustaining peace efforts and enhancing subregional capacities for conflict prevention and mediation; enhance subregional capacities to address cross-border and cross-cutting threats to peace and security; support the implementation of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel and the coordination of international and regional engagements; and promote good governance, respect for the rule of law and human rights, and the mainstreaming of gender into conflict prevention and management initiatives.²⁶⁴

In 2018, the Council adopted three presidential statements in connection with UNOWAS, on 30 January, 19 April and 10 August 2018.²⁶⁵ The Council did not renew the mandate of the Office during the period under review.²⁶⁶

The Council modified the mandate of UNOWAS in relation to several areas. By the presidential statement of 30 January 2018, the Council reiterated its full support for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa and the Sahel, looked forward to ongoing activities undertaken by UNOWAS in the areas of conflict prevention, mediation and good offices, subregional and regional cooperation to address root causes and strengthening institutional capacity, and underlined the need for sustained support and adequate resources.²⁶⁷ The Council encouraged further cooperation, mutual prioritization and the clear division of tasks between UNOWAS and UNOCA with a view to strengthening the capacity of regional and subregional organizations to address cross-border threats, commended the engagement and assistance of UNOWAS to regional and subregional organizations to promote peace and

²⁵⁶ Ibid., para. 6.

²⁵⁷ Ibid., para. 20.

²⁵⁸ Ibid., para. 7.

²⁵⁹ Ibid., para. 9.

²⁶⁰ Ibid., para. 21.

²⁶¹ Resolution [2431 \(2018\)](#), para. 5.

²⁶² Ibid., para. 25.

²⁶³ Ibid., paras. 42 and 44.

²⁶⁴ For more information on the initial mandate of UNOWAS, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2016–2017*.

²⁶⁵ [S/PRST/2018/3](#), [S/PRST/2018/8](#) and [S/PRST/2018/16](#).

²⁶⁶ The mandate of UNOWAS was renewed for a three-year period, from 1 January 2017 to 31 December 2019, by an exchange of letters dated 27 and 29 December 2016 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council ([S/2016/1128](#) and [S/2016/1129](#)).

²⁶⁷ [S/PRST/2018/3](#), third paragraph.

stability in the region, and recognized the role of the Office in contributing to strategic and integrated analysis of the opportunities, risks and challenges in support of efforts by national and local actors to sustain peace.²⁶⁸ The Council also recognized the important role of UNOWAS in providing technical assistance to the permanent secretariat of the Group of Five for the Sahel and encouraged enhanced cooperation and information-sharing.²⁶⁹

By the presidential statement issued on 19 April 2018, and further to the completion of the mandate of UNMIL on 30 March 2018, the Council broadened the mandate of UNOWAS and requested the Office to make available its good offices, as necessary, to the Government of Liberia and the United Nations Resident Coordinator.²⁷⁰

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, twenty-third and twenty-fourth paragraphs.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, fourteenth paragraph.

²⁷⁰ [S/PRST/2018/8](#), seventh paragraph.

By the presidential statement issued on 10 August 2018, the Council recognized the adverse effects of climate and ecological change and natural disasters, among other factors, on the stability of West Africa and the Sahel, stressed the need for long-term strategies by Governments and the United Nations, based on risk assessments, to support stabilization and build resilience, and requested that such information be taken into consideration by UNOWAS in its activities.²⁷¹ The Council also welcomed the efforts by UNOWAS and ECOWAS to work towards the systematic involvement of women in initiatives to counter terrorism and prevent violent extremism and requested that those issues continue to be integrated into regular reporting by UNOWAS.²⁷²

²⁷¹ [S/PRST/2018/16](#), nineteenth paragraph.

²⁷² *Ibid.*, twelfth paragraph.

Americas

United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia

The Council established the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia by resolution [2366 \(2017\)](#) of 10 July 2017 after the completion of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Colombia. The Verification Mission was mandated to, inter alia, verify the implementation of the process of political, economic and social reincorporation of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army (FARC-EP) and of the personal and collective security guarantees provided under the Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace between the Government of Colombia and FARC-EP, signed on 24 November 2016.²⁷³

²⁷³ For more information on the mandate of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2016–2017*.

By resolution [2435 \(2018\)](#) of 13 September 2018, the Council extended the existing mandate of the Verification Mission for a period of one year, until 25 September 2019.²⁷⁴ The Council further expressed its willingness to work with the Government of Colombia to further extend the mandate of the Verification Mission on the basis of agreement between the parties.²⁷⁵

²⁷⁴ Resolution [2435 \(2018\)](#), para. 1.

²⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 2. For further information, see part I, sect. 16, "Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2016/53](#))".

Asia

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) was established by the Council by resolution [1401 \(2002\)](#) of 28 March 2002 and was mandated to fulfil the tasks and responsibilities

entrusted to the United Nations under the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, signed in Bonn on 5 December 2001.²⁷⁶

²⁷⁶ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNAMA, see previous Supplements (2000–2017).

During 2018, by resolution [2405 \(2018\)](#) of 8 March 2018, the Council extended the mandate of UNAMA, in accordance with previous practice, for one year until 17 March 2019.²⁷⁷

By the resolution, the Council welcomed the findings of the strategic review of UNAMA, which had been conducted in 2017 further to resolution [2344 \(2017\)](#).²⁷⁸ The Council called for the implementation of the recommendations of the review, including with a view to aligning the Mission's substantive functions in support of peace efforts with the Secretary-General's emphasis on integrating conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding into the three pillars of work of the United Nations in Afghanistan, including in support of an intra-Afghan dialogue.²⁷⁹

The Council reiterated the priorities of UNAMA, as defined in previous resolutions, namely to provide outreach and good offices support to the Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process; to promote more coherent support by the international community of development and governance priorities; to support regional cooperation; to monitor the situation of civilians, promote accountability and assist in ensuring respect for human rights; and to closely cooperate and coordinate with the non-combat Resolute Support Mission led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as the NATO Senior Civilian Representative.²⁸⁰ While also reiterating the Mission's electoral assistance mandate, the Council specified that that would include the organization of future elections, including the parliamentary and district council elections in 2018 and the presidential elections in 2019.²⁸¹

UNAMA was also requested to implement its remaining "priority tasks", as defined previously, namely supporting the implementation of the Kabul Process for Peace and Security Cooperation, the efforts of the Government of Afghanistan to improve governance and the rule of law, the facilitation and delivery of humanitarian assistance, and efforts to strengthen the protection of children.²⁸² Lastly, the Council encouraged the Government to identify further opportunities to support the participation of women in the peace process and requested the support of UNAMA in that regard.²⁸³

United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia

The United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia was authorized by the Council through an exchange of letters dated 7 and 15 May 2007 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council,²⁸⁴ at the initiative of the Governments of the region. With a view to strengthening the United Nations capacity for conflict prevention in Central Asia, the Centre was assigned a number of tasks, including liaising with the Governments of the region on issues relevant to preventive diplomacy; monitoring and analysing the situation on the ground; and maintaining contact with regional organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The Centre was established with an open-ended mandate. During the period under review, the Council made no changes to its mandate.

²⁷⁷ Resolution [2405 \(2018\)](#), para. 4. See part I, sect. 17, "The situation in Afghanistan".

²⁷⁸ Resolution [2405 \(2018\)](#), para. 3. See [S/2017/696](#) and resolution [2344 \(2017\)](#), para. 7.

²⁷⁹ Resolution [2405 \(2018\)](#), para. 3.

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 6 (a) and (c)–(f).

²⁸¹ *Ibid.*, paras. 6 (b) and 14.

²⁸² *Ibid.*, paras. 7 (a)–(c) and 33.

²⁸³ *Ibid.*, para. 39.

²⁸⁴ [S/2007/279](#) and [S/2007/280](#). For more information on the history of the mandate of the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia, see previous Supplements (2007–2017).

Middle East

United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq

The Council established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) on 14 August 2003 by resolution [1500 \(2003\)](#) to support the Secretary-General in the fulfilment of his mandate under resolution [1483 \(2003\)](#), in accordance with the structure and responsibilities set out in his report of

17 July 2003.²⁸⁵ Those responsibilities included coordinating activities of the United Nations in post-conflict processes in Iraq and humanitarian and reconstruction assistance; promoting the return of refugees and displaced persons, economic reconstruction and the conditions for sustainable

²⁸⁵ [S/2003/715](#).

development; and supporting efforts to restore and establish national and local institutions.²⁸⁶

During 2018, by resolution [2421 \(2018\)](#) of 14 June 2018, the Council, departing from the previous practice of 12 months, extended the mandate of UNAMI for 10 months, until 31 May 2019.²⁸⁷

By the same resolution, the Council welcomed the results of the independent external assessment of UNAMI, which had been conducted in 2017 further to resolution [2367 \(2017\)](#),²⁸⁸ and revisited the Mission's priorities for the first time since 2007.²⁸⁹ Taking into account the views of the Government of Iraq,²⁹⁰ the Council decided that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq and Head of UNAMI would prioritize the provision of advice, support and assistance to the Government and people of Iraq on advancing inclusive, political dialogue and national and community-level reconciliation.²⁹¹ In addition, the Council further decided that the Special Representative and UNAMI would advise, support and assist the Iraqi authorities in a variety of areas, including the development of processes for holding elections and referendums; constitutional review and implementation; facilitating regional dialogue and cooperation; and security sector reform efforts and planning, funding and implementing reintegration programmes for former members of armed groups.²⁹² Lastly, the Council also decided that the Special Representative and UNAMI would promote, support and facilitate, in coordination with the Government,

the delivery of humanitarian assistance; the implementation of programmes to improve services for the people of Iraq; efforts with respect to economic reform, capacity-building and setting conditions for sustainable development; the contributions of United Nations agencies, funds and programmes; and accountability and the protection of human rights, judicial and legal reform, and the work of the investigative team established by resolution [2379 \(2017\)](#).²⁹³ Moreover, the Council decided that the Special Representative and UNAMI would approach gender mainstreaming as a cross-cutting issue throughout the Mission's mandate and advise and assist the Government in ensuring women's participation, involvement and representation at all levels, and would also support the efforts of the Government and the United Nations country team to strengthen child protection, including the rehabilitation and reintegration of children.²⁹⁴

Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon

The establishment of the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon was authorized by the Council by means of an exchange of letters dated 8 and 13 February 2007 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council.²⁹⁵ The Office was established with an open-ended mandate. The position of Special Coordinator was created to replace the position of Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for Southern Lebanon, which had been created in 2000.²⁹⁶ During the period under review, the Council made no changes to the mandate of the Office.²⁹⁷

²⁸⁶ Resolution [1483 \(2003\)](#), para. 8 (a)–(i). For more information on the history of the mandate of UNAMI, see previous Supplements (2000–2017).

²⁸⁷ Resolution [2421 \(2018\)](#), para 1. In its statement after the vote on the resolution, the United States, as penholder, explained that the ten-month extension was done on a one-time basis so as to better align mandate renewals with the budget cycle, in keeping with the findings of the independent external assessment of UNAMI ([S/PV.8285](#), p. 2). See part I, sect. 25, "The situation concerning Iraq".

²⁸⁸ Resolution [2421 \(2018\)](#), para 5.

²⁸⁹ For further information on the mandate priorities in 2007, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2004–2007*, chap. V, part I. F.

²⁹⁰ See [S/2018/430](#).

²⁹¹ Resolution [2421 \(2018\)](#), para. 2 (a).

²⁹² *Ibid.*, para. 2 (b).

²⁹³ *Ibid.*, para. 2 (c) and (d). For information on the mandate of the investigative team established by resolution [2379 \(2017\)](#), see part VI, sect. II, and part IX, sect. III.

²⁹⁴ Resolution [2421 \(2018\)](#), para. 2 (e) and (f).

²⁹⁵ [S/2007/85](#) and [S/2007/86](#).

²⁹⁶ [S/2000/718](#).

²⁹⁷ For more information on the history of the mandate of the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, see previous Supplements (2004–2017). See also part I, sect. 23, "The situation in the Middle East", and sect. 24, "The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question".