

7. The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Overview

During the period under review, the Security Council held 13 meetings and adopted four resolutions and two statements by the President on the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo. No debates were held on the item, and invitations under rule 37 were limited to the representatives of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda. The meetings consisted mainly of briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Head of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), one briefing by the Secretary-General and one by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region. After initially considering the elections held in November 2011, the Council turned its attention to the violence in the eastern part of the country, which led to the appointment of the Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region, and to the installation of an Intervention Brigade in MONUSCO. Security sector reform and the transfer of tasks to the United Nations country team were discussed in close connection with the events in the eastern part of the country.

In 2012 and 2013, the Council renewed and modified the mandate of MONUSCO twice, by resolutions [2053 \(2012\)](#) and [2098 \(2013\)](#).¹²² The sanctions regime and the mandate of the Group of Experts established pursuant to resolution [1533 \(2004\)](#) were renewed by resolution [2078 \(2012\)](#) until February 2014.¹²³

¹²² For more information on MONUSCO, see part X, sect. I, "Peacekeeping operations".

¹²³ For more information on the sanctions measures concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, see part VII, sect. III, "Measures not involving the use of armed force in accordance with Article 41 of the Charter". For more information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1533 \(2004\)](#) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the mandate of the Group of Experts, see part IX, sect. I.B.

Developments between two elections

On 7 February 2012, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Head of MONUSCO briefed the Council on the national presidential and legislative elections of 28 November 2011. He reported that the campaign period had been increasingly marked by political and inter-community tensions in some areas of the country, including Kinshasa. On 26 November, those tensions culminated in violent incidents resulting in the deaths of several Congolese. The Special Representative announced a thorough investigation of all reports of electoral violence as well as the issuance of a detailed report in the near future. He also enumerated various logistical problems that had arisen during and in the immediate aftermath of the elections and stressed the need to address the electoral process in a thorough and open review. He added that MONUSCO had provided all support possible to the electoral process consistent with its mandate.¹²⁴

The representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo expressed regret for the negative consequences of election-related violence for the security of individuals and their property, but said that the country was resolutely determined to follow a process of returning to normality and peace. She quoted the Head of State, Joseph Kabila Kabange, in saying that, for the first time in the history of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a presidential term of office had ended without an institutional crisis, with 95 per cent of electoral costs funded by the Republic's own resources.¹²⁵

In his briefing to the Council on 12 June 2012, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General expressed concern about the challenges ahead for ensuring the successful conduct of future provincial and local elections. He anticipated that a review and recommendations by the Independent National Electoral Commission, together with recommendations by the National Assembly, would be critical to an assessment by donors, the Council and other partners in terms of engagement with, and support for, the future provincial and local elections. He stressed that the Government would need to do everything possible

¹²⁴ [S/PV.6712](#), pp. 2-3.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

to ensure free conditions for all to participate.¹²⁶ The representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo said that the Independent National Electoral Commission had adopted a series of measures to restore its credibility and had published on 6 June the timetable for provincial, senatorial and gubernatorial elections: 25 February 2013 for provincial elections, 5 June 2013 for senatorial elections, and 22 June 2013 for elections for governors and vice-governors of provinces.¹²⁷

On 21 November 2012, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General informed the Council about a special commission established to seek to identify appropriate compromises between majority and opposition members to allow for the necessary election commission reform legislation to go forward with broad support.¹²⁸ On 22 February 2013, he reported on decisions taken by the National Assembly to facilitate reform of the Independent National Electoral Commission.¹²⁹ Finally, on 21 October 2013, he said that the electoral process seemed to be revived, and that consultations with donor partners and national stakeholders had brought forward a consensus on a road map and subsequent sequencing of the different elections.¹³⁰ At the same meeting, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region of Africa told the Council that she would engage the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on electoral reform and the calendar for local elections.¹³¹

Deteriorating security situation in the east and the appearance of M23

On 7 February 2012, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General expressed his concern about renewed activity by the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) movement, including a massacre of an estimated 54 civilians in South Kivu Province. The increased activity of existing armed groups and the emergence of new ones in the east of the country represented a significant threat to civilians and to general security.¹³² The representative of the

Democratic Republic of the Congo said peacebuilding and the fight against armed groups were the top priorities for her country.¹³³

In his briefing on 12 June 2012, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General informed the Council of considerable progress made on the issue of the security challenges posed by FDLR, but at the same time reported on a mutiny in the ranks of the regular Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as the emergence of the Mouvement du 23 mars (M23 movement), started by one of the soldiers involved in that mutiny. The fight against this new threat had produced major displacements of civilians. In the context of the general increase in instability, FDLR and numerous Congolese groups had stepped up their own activity.¹³⁴ The representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo also reported on the mutiny, and added that elements recruited and trained in and deployed from Rwanda had fought within the ranks of the M23 movement.¹³⁵

Extension of the mandate of MONUSCO

By resolution [2053 \(2012\)](#), adopted on 27 June 2012, the Council extended the mandate of MONUSCO until 30 June 2013, reaffirmed that the protection of civilians remained the priority of the Mission, and underlined the importance of security sector reform. It also welcomed the steps taken by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to investigate the violence in the context of the elections of 28 November 2011 and decided that MONUSCO should support the organization and conduct of provincial and local elections. In the same resolution, the Council condemned the mutiny and all outside support to all armed groups and urged the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with support from MONUSCO, to sustain its action against armed groups, restore order and bring the perpetrators to justice.

Further destabilization and designation of a Special Envoy

In its presidential statement of 19 October 2012, the Council expressed deep concern regarding the deteriorating security and humanitarian crisis in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and

¹²⁶ [S/PV.6785](#), p. 5.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

¹²⁸ [S/PV.6868](#), p. 5.

¹²⁹ [S/PV.6925](#), p. 5.

¹³⁰ [S/PV.7046](#), p. 5.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

¹³² [S/PV.6712](#), pp. 3-4.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 8.

¹³⁴ [S/PV.6785](#), pp. 2-3.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

condemned M23 for all its attacks on the civilian population, United Nations peacekeepers and humanitarian actors, as well as its abuses of human rights, including summary executions, sexual and gender-based violence and large-scale recruitment and use of child soldiers. The Council also condemned the attempts by M23 to establish a parallel administration and external support to M23 by neighbouring countries. The Council called on the Secretary-General to explore further high-level diplomatic mechanisms to facilitate enhanced dialogue between relevant parties. It welcomed the establishment of the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism on 14 September as an important starting point for rebuilding confidence between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda and took note of ongoing coordination efforts between the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, the African Union and the United Nations to clarify the objectives, modalities and means of a proposed “Neutral International Force” in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo in relation to MONUSCO.¹³⁶

On 20 November 2012, the Council adopted resolution [2076 \(2012\)](#), in which it expressed its deep concern regarding the entry of M23 into the city of Goma on that same day. The Council also reiterated its demand that any outside support to M23 cease immediately. With regard to the role of MONUSCO in countering the threat posed by M23, the Council requested the Secretary-General to report on options for the possible redeployments of MONUSCO contingents and additional force multipliers, which could improve the ability of MONUSCO to protect civilians and report on flows of arms across the borders of the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as on options for high-level dialogue between relevant parties, including the option of the possible designation of a special envoy.

Speaking after the vote, the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo accused Rwanda of supporting the military operations of M23 against Goma and hence of a serious and persistent violation of the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, and suggested that the Council ascertain all the consequences of the behaviour of Rwanda and take whatever steps were necessary to restore peace and security.¹³⁷ The representative of Rwanda refuted the

accusation and said that several times since the fighting had resumed Rwanda had suffered rocket and mortar attacks originating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.¹³⁸

On 21 November 2012, in his briefing to the Council, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General reported on a seriously deteriorated security situation, in addition to the large-scale humanitarian crisis. He informed the Council that, since the occupation of Goma by M23, violent and spontaneous demonstrations had targeted both the Congolese symbols of power and United Nations personnel and installations. Furthermore, M23 had effectively occupied a significant portion of North Kivu Province, and it had been establishing a formal administrative or governing structure. Numerous reports of human rights abuses had been received. In response to the situation, MONUSCO supported the regional efforts of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region to develop a neutral international force to confront M23 and other armed groups, and the establishment of an enlarged Joint Verification Mechanism.¹³⁹

In resolution [2078 \(2012\)](#), adopted on 28 November 2012, the Council demanded that M23 and other armed groups ceased immediately all forms of violence, and reiterated its concern at reports indicating external support to M23.¹⁴⁰ Speaking after the adoption of the resolution, the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo said that the final report of the Group of Experts¹⁴¹ established that the Government of Rwanda had continued to violate the arms embargo by providing direct military assistance to M23.¹⁴² The representative of Rwanda stated that these accusations were false and that his country had placed its trust in the Joint Verification Mechanism set up by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, which had concluded that at that stage there

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹³⁹ [S/PV.6868](#), pp. 2-3.

¹⁴⁰ By resolution [2078 \(2012\)](#), the Council also renewed the sanctions measures, namely the arms embargo, the measures on transport, and the financial and travel measures. For more information on the sanctions measures concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, see part VII, sect. III, “Measures not involving the use of armed force in accordance with Article 41 of the Charter”.

¹⁴¹ [S/2012/843](#).

¹⁴² [S/PV.6873](#), p. 2.

¹³⁶ [S/PRST/2012/22](#).

¹³⁷ [S/PV.6866](#), pp. 2-3.

was no proof that Rwanda had provided any military or logistical support to M23.¹⁴³

On 22 February 2013, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General briefed the Council on the continuously deteriorating security situation in the eastern part of the country. While M23 had in the meantime retreated from the provincial capital of Goma, it had maintained significant military positions just outside of the city and continued to consolidate its own administrative structures in the portion of North Kivu it was occupying. There were reports of widespread violence and continuing recruitment of new combatants, including through the use of force and widespread recruitment of minors. He also reported on a general increase in Congolese militia activity throughout the province. MONUSCO had sought to respond to those threats using all available resources. To further improve the capabilities of MONUSCO, unmanned aerial vehicles would be deployed at the earliest possible time. Regarding the proposal for an additional military force or brigade within MONUSCO equipped with a peace enforcement authority going beyond a traditional United Nations peacekeeping mandate, he was convinced that a peace enforcement capability on the ground was a necessary component to permit a durable peace.¹⁴⁴ The representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo concurred and said that the deployment of an intervention force was intended to respond to a real and urgent security need in the eastern part of his country. He therefore urged the Council to consider adopting a resolution to change the mandate of MONUSCO as soon as possible.¹⁴⁵

On 5 March 2013, the Secretary-General reported to the Council on the signing, in Addis Ababa on 24 February, by 11 countries of the region and four co-guarantors of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region, which was intended to address the root causes of violence in the region. He announced that he would appoint a special envoy to support the implementation of the Framework. To further support the political objectives of the Framework, he also proposed the establishment, within MONUSCO, of an intervention brigade with the ability to conduct offensive operations against all armed groups that

threatened the peace, neutralizing those groups and disarming them.¹⁴⁶

New mandate for MONUSCO, including creation of an intervention brigade

By resolution [2098 \(2013\)](#), condemning the continued presence of M23 in the immediate vicinity of Goma and its attempts to establish an illegitimate parallel administration, the Council decided to extend the mandate of MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of the Congo until 31 March 2014, and to include in MONUSCO, on an exceptional basis and without creating a precedent, an Intervention Brigade with headquarters in Goma, with the responsibility of neutralizing armed groups and with the objective of contributing to reducing the threat posed by armed groups to State authority and civilian security in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. The mandate of the Intervention Brigade set out in the resolution was to protect civilians, neutralize armed groups, monitor the implementation of the arms embargo, and support national and international judicial processes. The Council also called on the newly designated Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region to lead, coordinate and assess the implementation of national and regional commitments under the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework.

Speaking after the adoption of the resolution, several delegations underlined that the protection of civilians remained at the heart of the mandate of MONUSCO.¹⁴⁷ The exceptional and non-precedential nature of the creation of the Intervention Brigade was also emphasized.¹⁴⁸ Some speakers cautioned that the neutrality and impartiality of the United Nations must not be compromised by the nature of the brigade.¹⁴⁹

Implementation of Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework and end of M23 rebellion

On 6 May 2013, the newly appointed Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region briefed the Council on her recent visit to

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

¹⁴⁴ [S/PV.6925](#), pp. 2-4.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

¹⁴⁶ [S/PV.6928](#), pp. 2-3.

¹⁴⁷ [S/PV.6943](#), p. 5 (United Kingdom); p. 6 (Argentina, Luxembourg); p. 8 (United States); and p. 9 (France).

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 5 (Argentina); p. 7 (Pakistan); p. 8 (China); and p. 11 (Democratic Republic of the Congo).

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 3 (Rwanda); p. 4 (Guatemala); p. 6 (Argentina); p. 7 (Pakistan); and p. 8 (China).

various countries of the region, where she had discussed with the leaders the commitments of each country under the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region. She reported that President Kabila had informed her that his Government was working on a plan of action for the implementation of the commitments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo under the Framework, and that she had stressed the importance of the inclusiveness of such a national mechanism, which should involve civil society representatives and have the necessary expertise to play an effective supervisory role. She also said that while the overwhelming majority of the Congolese she had spoken to were enthusiastic about the deployment of the Brigade, she had stressed that the Intervention Brigade, while an important tool, should be seen as one element of a much larger political process aimed at finding a comprehensive solution to the crisis in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.¹⁵⁰

In his briefing to the Council on 21 October 2013, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Democratic Republic of the Congo reported via videoconference from Kampala on the ongoing peace talks there, which were convened with the objective of concluding a comprehensive agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and M23 to end the rebellion, disband M23 and allow its transformation into a political movement within the limits of the Constitution and the laws of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Regardless of the progress in Kampala, he expressed concern with the situation on the ground, where a considerable military build-up on both sides of the front line had been observed in recent days. At the same time, M23 had fired twice at unarmed United Nations helicopters, and had strengthened its offensive positions threatening United Nations peacekeepers. He added that M23 was not the only concern, but that also FDLR, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and many Mayi Mayi groups were terrorizing the population and continued to represent a threat to civilians and to the State authority.¹⁵¹ The Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region, speaking at the same meeting, reported on the difficulties encountered in the negotiations to agree on certain contentious and

difficult issues, namely, amnesty, disarmament and integration of M23 fighters. She also gave an overview of the implementation of the Framework both at national and at regional levels.¹⁵²

On 14 November 2013, the Council adopted a presidential statement by which it welcomed the announcement by M23 to put an end to its rebellion, the acceptance by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo of this announcement and the cessation of hostilities between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and M23. The Council called for the swift conclusion and implementation of a final, comprehensive and agreed outcome that provided for the disarmament and demobilization of M23 and accountability for human rights abusers. The Council also stressed the importance of neutralizing FDLR and all armed groups, including ADF, the Lord's Resistance Army and various Mayi Mayi groups.¹⁵³

Security sector reform

In his briefing to the Council on 7 February 2012, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General said that reform and strengthening of the military were a key element to the achievement of durable security conditions in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.¹⁵⁴ The representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo added that the reforms launched the previous year in the security sector would be continued, in order to train a police force and an army that were fully capable of ensuring security throughout the national territory and to enhance conditions for a return to economic and social development.¹⁵⁵

In its resolution [2053 \(2012\)](#), adopted on 27 June 2012, the Council stressed the importance of security sector reform for the achievement of the objectives of MONUSCO, and therefore urged the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to operationalize and implement, with the support of MONUSCO, a national and comprehensive vision and strategy for the security and justice sectors. In resolution [2076 \(2012\)](#), adopted on 20 November 2012, and in resolution [2078 \(2012\)](#), adopted on 28 November 2012, the Council urged the Government

¹⁵⁰ [S/PV.6960](#), pp. 3-4.

¹⁵¹ [S/PV.7046](#), pp. 3-4.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 8-11.

¹⁵³ [S/PRST/2013/17](#).

¹⁵⁴ [S/PV.6712](#), p. 4.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to increase efforts to reform the security sectors.

On 21 November 2012, during his briefing to the Council, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General expressed confidence that there was broad recognition among Congolese authorities of the need for a full, comprehensive and strong military reform programme addressing multiple areas and needs.¹⁵⁶

In his briefing to the Council on 22 February 2013, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General said that it was of vital importance to define a comprehensive strategy on security sector reform that provided the needed resources, engagements and expertise of all parties under the overall direction of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.¹⁵⁷ At the same meeting, the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo said that legislation concerning the reorganization of the armed forces, the organization and functioning of the national police, and the military code for the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo had already been adopted.¹⁵⁸ On 5 March 2013, he said that in the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework, his country had renewed its commitment to continuing and deepening the reform of the security sector, particularly with regard to the army and the police.¹⁵⁹

In resolution [2098 \(2013\)](#), the Council decided that the duration of the presence of the Intervention Brigade would depend on the implementation of a security sector reform road map for the creation of a Congolese “rapid reaction force” able to take over responsibility for achieving the objective of the Intervention Brigade. By the same resolution, the Council requested the Secretary-General to report to the Council every three months on the implementation of the commitments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo under the Framework, which included

continuing and deepening security sector reform, particularly with respect to the army and police. Speaking after the vote, speakers underlined the importance of security sector reform.¹⁶⁰

On 21 October 2013, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General reported on a meeting on 11 October, at which international partners had agreed to coordinate their security sector reform initiatives via an expanded security sector reform coordination working group, to be chaired by the Congolese Minister of Defence and supported by MONUSCO.¹⁶¹

Transfer of tasks to the United Nations country team

In its resolution [2053 \(2012\)](#), adopted on 27 June 2012, the Council requested MONUSCO to continue transferring tasks to the United Nations country team in provinces not affected by the conflict. In resolution [2098 \(2013\)](#) it requested the Secretary-General to produce a report on the current division of labour between MONUSCO and the United Nations country team on tasks shared by the Mission, the United Nations country team and the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with a road map to transfer tasks to the United Nations country team or to the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in provinces not affected by the conflict. The representative of the United Kingdom welcomed this decision and thought it would play an important role in guiding the way forward for the United Nations system to work together to build peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.¹⁶²

In his briefing to the Council on 21 October 2013 the Special Representative of the Secretary-General said that MONUSCO would reduce its presence in the areas not affected by armed conflict and suggested that the weight of the country team should be increased.¹⁶³

¹⁵⁶ [S/PV.6868](#), p. 5.

¹⁵⁷ [S/PV.6925](#), p. 6.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

¹⁵⁹ [S/PV.6928](#), p. 4.

¹⁶⁰ [S/PV.6943](#), p. 6 (Luxembourg); p. 9 (United States); and p. 10 (Russian Federation).

¹⁶¹ [S/PV.7046](#), p. 5.

¹⁶² [S/PV.6943](#), p. 5.

¹⁶³ [S/PV.7046](#), p. 6.

Meetings: the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.6712 7 February 2012	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) (S/2012/65)		Democratic Republic of the Congo	Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Head of MONUSCO	All invitees	
S/PV.6785 12 June 2012	Report of the Secretary-General on MONUSCO (S/2012/355)		Democratic Republic of the Congo	Special Representative of the Secretary-General	All invitees	
S/PV.6792 27 June 2012	Report of the Secretary-General on MONUSCO (S/2012/355)	Draft resolution submitted by France (S/2012/485)				Resolution 2053 (2012) 15-0-0
S/PV.6850 19 October 2012						S/PRST/2012/22
S/PV.6866 20 November 2012		Draft resolution submitted by Colombia, France, Germany, Morocco, Portugal, South Africa, Togo, United Kingdom, United States (S/2012/858)	Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda		All invitees	Resolution 2076 (2012) 15-0-0
S/PV.6868 21 November 2012	Report of the Secretary-General on MONUSCO (S/2012/838)			Special Representative of the Secretary-General	Special Representative of the Secretary-General	

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.6873 28 November 2012	Letter dated 12 November 2012 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2012/843)	Draft resolution submitted by France (S/2012/884)	Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda		All invitees	Resolution 2078 (2012) 15-0-0
S/PV.6925 22 February 2013	Report of the Secretary-General on MONUSCO (S/2013/96)		Democratic Republic of the Congo	Special Representative of the Secretary-General	All invitees	
S/PV.6928 5 March 2013	Special report of the Secretary-General on the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes region (S/2013/119)		Democratic Republic of the Congo		Secretary-General, Democratic Republic of the Congo	
S/PV.6943 28 March 2013	Special report of the Secretary-General on the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes region (S/2013/119)	Draft resolution submitted by France, Togo, United States (S/2013/195)	Democratic Republic of the Congo (Minister for Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and la Francophonie)		11 Council members, ^a Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution 2098 (2013) 15-0-0
S/PV.6960 6 May 2013				Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region	

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.7046 21 October 2013	Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region (S/2013/569) Report of the Secretary-General on MONUSCO (S/2013/581)			Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region	Democratic Republic of the Congo, all invitees under rule 39	
S/PV.7058 14 November 2013						S/PRST/2013/17

^a Argentina, China, France, Guatemala, Luxembourg, Morocco, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Rwanda, United Kingdom, United States.

8. The situation in the Central African Republic

Overview

During the period under review, the Security Council held eight meetings and adopted three resolutions in connection with the situation in the Central African Republic. It received several briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Central African Republic and Head of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA) as well as other officials of the United Nations and regional organizations, including the African Union and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS).

The Council gave sustained consideration to this item, particularly in 2013, after armed conflict resumed in the Central African Republic. The Libreville Agreements, signed on 11 January 2013, included a ceasefire agreement and defined modalities of a political transition. The Council extended the mandate of BINUCA once for a period of 12 months and subsequently reinforced it to allow the mission to support the implementation of the transition process. The Council authorized the deployment of the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic, imposed an arms embargo and expressed its intention to consider additional targeted measures against individuals who acted to undermine security and peace.

Briefing on the progress of the political dialogue and the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration process

On 6 June 2012, the Council heard a briefing by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Central African Republic and Head of BINUCA, who introduced the seventh report of the Secretary-General¹⁶⁴ and informed the Council on political, security, socioeconomic, humanitarian and human rights developments in the Central African Republic. Despite continued instability at the political and security levels, she highlighted the commitment of the Government in regard to political dialogue, disarmament, the demobilization and reintegration process, and stabilization efforts in the north-eastern region through the deployment of a force under a

tripartite agreement with Chad and the Sudan. She provided information on the role of BINUCA in supporting security sector reform, local mediation initiatives, and the Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army; and stressed the need to continue building on the momentum created by the Government on the political and security fronts.¹⁶⁵ The representative of the Central African Republic said that the elections held in 2011 had triggered a new political and institutional order. Although security remained the fundamental concern of the Government, the State was progressively regaining control over a large part of the national territory, allowing for a gradual return of internally displaced persons and refugees. He stressed the importance of the reform of the security sector and reaffirmed the commitment of the Government to establishing a State that genuinely protected human rights.¹⁶⁶

Briefings on the rebel offensive and the Libreville Agreements, and extension of the mandate of BINUCA

On 11 January 2013, the Council heard briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of BINUCA (by videoconference from Libreville) and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict. The former informed the Council of a rebel offensive against the Government of the Central African Republic, launched on 10 December 2012 in the northern regions by the newly formed Séléka coalition, which had occupied several towns. The resumption of conflict undermined the positive achievements detailed in the latest report of the Secretary-General.¹⁶⁷ She noted that the failure of the army to repel the attacks was "indicative of the depth of decay within the national armed forces" and highlighted the prompt response by regional actors to the crisis, including the deployment by Chad of an interposition force, a decision by the Heads of State of ECCAS to facilitate peace talks in Libreville, and the reinforcement of the ECCAS Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the

¹⁶⁴ S/2012/374.

¹⁶⁵ S/PV.6780, pp. 2-5.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., pp. 5-7.

¹⁶⁷ S/2012/956.