

1. **Reaffirms** the right of Nicaragua and of all the other countries of the area to live in peace and security, free from outside interference;
2. **Commends** the efforts of the Contadora Group and urges the pursuit of those efforts;
3. **Appeals urgently** to the interested States to cooperate fully with the Contadora Group, through a frank and constructive dialogue, so as to resolve their differences;
4. **Urges** the Contadora Group to spare no effort to find solutions to the problems of the region and to keep the Security Council informed of the results of these efforts;
5. **Requests** the Secretary-General to keep the Council informed of the development of the situation and of the implementation of the present resolution.

After the vote, the representative of Nicaragua stated that the very fact that the United States had not opposed the resolution was seen by Nicaragua as a **manifestation** of its will to put an end to armed aggression against Nicaragua and to respect the right of its people to live in peace and security free from any foreign interference. He said that if it proved otherwise, it would be Nicaragua's duty once again to come back to the Council.*

The representative of the United States said that Nicaragua had maligned and misrepresented the policies of the United States and of Honduras and that once Nicaragua was **willing to fulfil** its obligations and promises to its neighbours and its own people, there would be no further problems between the United States and Nicaragua.*

NOTES

S/15746. *OR, 38th yr., Suppl. for April-June 1983.*

¹ For similar charges and counter charges, see S/15742 and S/15745, *ibid.*

² For details, see chap. III of the present *Supplement*.

³ 2431st mtg. Similar views were expressed by Ethiopia (2432nd mtg.), Syrian Arab Republic and Cuba (2433rd mtg.).

⁴ 2431st mtg.

⁵ 2432nd mtg. Similar views were expressed by Panama (2434th mtg.) and Venezuela and Colombia (2435th mtg.).

⁶ 2432nd mtg. Similar views were expressed at the same meeting by Seychelles and Algeria and at the 2433rd meeting by Mauritius. See also the letter dated 13 May 1983 (S/15762, *OR, 38th yr., Suppl. for April-June 1983*) from the representative of Panama transmitting the information bulletin issued at the conclusion of the meeting held on 11 and 12 May 1983 at Panama City by the Ministers of External Relations of Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela (known as the Contadora Group).

⁷ 2433rd mtg.

⁸ *Ibid.* Similar views were expressed by Guatemala (*ibid.*), Costa Rica (2435th mtg.) and El Salvador (*ibid.*).

⁹ 2436th mtg.

¹⁰ S/15770, subsequently adopted as resolution 530 (1983).

¹¹ 2437th mtg.

¹² *Ibid.* For the vote, see also chap. IV of the present *Supplement*

19. LETTER DATED 2 AUGUST 1983 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CHAD TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

INITIAL PROCEEDINGS

By letter dated 2 August 1983, the Permanent Representative of Chad to the United Nations requested an urgent **meeting** of the Council to consider the grave situation in Chad resulting from open Libyan aggression against that country.

At its 2462nd meeting, on 3 August 1983, the Council included this question in its **agenda**. Following the adoption of the agenda, the **Council** invited the following, at their request, to participate without vote in the discussion: the representatives of Chad and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya; and at the 2463rd meeting, the representatives of Egypt, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Ivory Coast, Liberia and the Sudan; at the 2465th **meeting**, the representatives of Benin, Guinea, Kenya, the **Niger**, Senegal and the United Republic of Cameroon; at the 2467th **meeting**, the representative of Somalia; and at the 2469th **meeting**, the representative of the Congo.² The **Council** considered the question at its 2462nd to 2465th, 2467th and 2469th meetings, from 3 August to 31 August 1983.

Opening the discussion at the 2462nd meeting, the representative of Chad accused the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya of stepping up its **aggression** against his country. He charged that since 31 July 1983, when the **Chadian** National Armed Forces had retaken the town of Faya-Largean in the north of Chad, the Libyan Air Force had been massively bombing the town, causing many casualties among the civilian population. Chad had come before the Council today to allow it to assume its responsibilities with regard to that situation, which undoubtedly threatened international peace and security.

The speaker recalled the previous discussions in the Council relating to the border dispute between the two countries. He charged that **within** two days of the Council's adoption, on 6 April, of a **statement**³ calling for a peaceful settlement of the conflict and urging the parties to refrain from any action that **might** exacerbate the situation, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya had flouted that statement. In a **message**⁴ dated 24 June 1983, the President of the Republic of Chad had informed the Council of a subsequent escalation of Libyan aggression. However, thanks to the energetic reaction of the government forces, backed by logistical support from countries responding to a **Chadian** appeal, the Libyan forces had been routed and the central authorities had again taken control of the entire eastern part of the country.

Successive Governments of Chad had held talks with the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in an effort to arrive at a peaceful settlement of the dispute, and Chad remained willing to **negotiate**.⁵ However, the Libyan intention **continued** to be to destabilize the government regime in order to set up another **régime** that would be of its own persuasion. Thus, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya would be able to perpetuate its occupation of the Aouzou Strip, to annex the entire country and to use it as a base for aggression against neighbouring countries, and finally to carry out its dream of creating the "United States of the Sahel".

The representative of Chad accused the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya of violating the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. He urged the Council to condemn the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya for its bombing of **Chadian** townships, to order an end to such bombings and to order the withdrawal of Libyan occupation forces from **Chad**.⁶

The representative of the Libyan Arab **Jamahiriya** denied the allegations contained in the letters dated 1 and 2 August 1983 from **Chad**.⁷ He said that the

position of his country had been clarified in previous statements in the Council and in its communications dated 27 June 1983,⁸ 5 July 1983⁹ and 2 August 1983.¹⁰ He stressed that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya had not intervened in the affairs of Chad and sent neither planes nor troops to that country. Moreover, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya had declared its neutrality *vis-à-vis* the current conflict in Chad and had proposed that OAU send a fact-finding mission to Chad to verify it.

He underlined that his Government did not recognize the current Government of Chad and regarded as extremely grave the direct intervention of the United States, France and Zaire in Chad, which entailed risks for peace and security in the region and in the world. Speaking of the efforts of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to bring about national conciliation in Chad, he elaborated on the Libyan view of the post-independence events in Chad that had led to the installation of Mr. Hisssein Habré in his present position. The speaker reiterated the readiness of his country to work with other African States to help to achieve peace and security in Chad.⁶

The representative of Zaire said that the forces of Zaire were in Chad at the request of the Government of Hisssein Habré and would remain there as long as that Government wished.⁶

At the 2463rd meeting, on 11 August 1983, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of Chad stated that the Libyan aggression had increased considerably in the last few days and had taken "the form of virtual genocide of the people of Chad with indiscriminate bombing of sites in the north and east of the country by the Libyan Air Force". He also described attempts by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to obstruct a solution of the Chadian problem and produced documents and photographs to prove the Libyan interference in Chad. The Libyan army, he charged, included agents of all nationalities, recruited primarily from Sub-Saharan countries and sent to training camps in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya through Benin. He reiterated the request of his Government and the people of Chad that the Council strongly condemn the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya for its armed aggression against Chad and demand its withdrawal from Chadian territory.⁷

The representative of the Sudan characterized the statement by the Libyan representative as a desperate attempt to deny the intervention of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in Chad. No dispute over the legitimacy of Governments could serve as a pretext for occupation, aggression, expansion or appropriation of the territory by force. The Sudan strongly condemned the Libyan aggression against the people of Chad and called upon the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to put an immediate end to material and logistic assistance to the insurgents against the Government of Chad. The speaker insisted that the two countries enter into negotiations to end the dispute. He appealed to the international community and to African countries to give whatever assistance they could to the Government and people of Chad to bring about the necessary economic and social development.⁸

The representative of Togo appealed to both countries concerned to apply without delay the statement of the Council of 6 April 1983.³ He said that the international community could not accept the occupation and bombardment of Chad as a fait accompli since that would jeopardize the confidence

that militarily weak, small countries placed in the United Nations to ensure their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.⁹

The representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, speaking in exercise of his right to reply, reiterated that the conflict in Chad was strictly an internal matter and that imperialist forces were trying to internationalize the dispute by supporting one of the parties with weapons, troops and aircraft. He claimed that the current Government in Chad was not legitimate and did not enjoy the support of the Chadian people, and that its army was composed of no more than a few mercenaries of various nationalities; he cited newspaper articles in support of his contentions. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, he maintained, was prepared to co-operate and enter into dialogue with any legitimate Government in Chad.¹⁰

In response to the statement made by the Libyan representative about the legitimacy of the Government of Chad, the President of the Council (France) recalled the Council's statement of 6 April,³ which contained references to the statement made by the Foreign Minister of Chad and to the dispute between Chad and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.¹¹

At the 2465th meeting, the representative of the Soviet Union condemned the escalation of imperialist meddling in the internal affairs of Chad as a threat to international peace and security. He expressed his Government's full support for the efforts of OAU, which was seeking to bring about a peaceful settlement to the situation in that country.¹²

The representative of Benin flatly rejected as false the accusations of Chad against his country as being a transit point for mercenaries said to be recruited into service by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and added that Benin favoured a national conference of reconciliation under the auspices of OAU.¹²

The representative of Kenya said that the Council should examine the facts involved in the conflict and make recommendations that would lead to the peaceful settlement of the problem. For that purpose he suggested that the following steps be taken: (a) the incursion of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya into Chadian territory should be condemned and the Government of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya should be asked, in the spirit of compromise, to withdraw its forces from Chadian territory, immediately and without any conditions; (b) the Council should make every effort to devise ways to bring about a Government of national unity of Chad, arranging negotiations that could be undertaken; (c) the Council should condemn the acts of aggression against Chad; (d) the Council should employ all means available to halt any further hostilities in Chad and endeavour to restore order and to ensure the safety of civilians; (e) the Council should respond to Chad's appeal for assistance in recovering its territorial integrity in order that it might resume its development programmes for the people of Chad; and (f) the Libyan military forces in the Aouzou Strip and Faya-Largean should be entirely withdrawn.*

The representative of the United Kingdom deplored that the issues regarding Chad which had been before the Council six months earlier and had been the subject of a statement of the President on behalf of the Council,³ had now returned as if nothing had been achieved earlier on. The only difference was that the situation seemed to have gotten worse. In that connection he recalled the comments of the

Secretary-General in his annual report to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session on the work of the Organization¹³ for 1982 about the collective **responsibilities** of the Council and about the way in which its members should all take those responsibilities very seriously.

The President of the Council, **speaking** as the representative of France, said that Chad had become the victim of outright aggression by a foreign Power, evidence of which had been clearly submitted. In the face of the extreme seriousness of the situation, the Government of Chad, headed by Mr. Hissain **Habré**, had appealed to the French Government for **implementation** of the provisions of the co-operation agreement signed by the two countries in 1976. France had responded by adapting and apportioning its assistance in a manner consistent with the fighting. The French Government was pursuing no other goal but that of allowing Chad to exercise fully its right to self-defence, in full conformity with **international law**, as **enshrined** in Article 51 of the Charter. France hoped that the problems of Chad might be resolved peacefully among Chadians. Any foreign intervention directed against the Government of Chad should come to an end and, consequently, the armed intervention from outside should cease. In that way it would be possible for OAU once again to play its rightful role in the issue in accordance with the resolution adopted at the nineteenth ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU.¹²

The representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya indicated that the tragedy of Chad was a direct consequence of French colonialism, as well as a result of the continuation of France's **policy** of intervention and that the **sending** of French troops could not be viewed within the framework of the treaty of co-operation between France and Chad and was nothing other than stark military intervention in the civil war. He then challenged the comments of the President at the 2463rd meeting regarding the legitimacy of the **Habré** Government and stated that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya doubted that those comments reflected the views of the Council and considered them as representing the point of view of France only. He stressed that the Council did not compel any State to recognize the Government of another State, because that was the sovereign right of **States**.¹²

The President remarked that he could not accept the statement by the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya calling into question the acts of the Council. He pointed out that a statement of that kind made in a debate on a complaint by the Government of Chad questioning the legitimacy of that Government had led to an absolute internal contradiction.*

At the 2447th **meeting** on 16 August 1983, the representative of Zimbabwe said that the external involvement in Chad not only undermined any possibility of national reconciliation there, but was also bound to frustrate efforts by OAU to **bring** about a peaceful solution. Therefore, the best course of action open to the Council in the circumstances was to throw its weight behind the initiatives of OAU.¹⁴

The representative of the Netherlands spoke of the necessity to maintain the distinction between the provision, at the request of the legitimate Government, of military assistance to a country acting in self-defence, on the one hand, and an Instance of armed intervention in the affairs of a neighbouring

State in clear violation of the Charter on the other hand. The dispute between Chad and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya should be solved by negotiations and not by **force**.¹⁴

The representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya mentioned that some speakers had overlooked the fact that French forces and United States military advisers were present in Chad along with troops from Zaire and the **Sudan**.¹⁴

The representative of the Sudan denied the presence of Sudanese troops in Chad and invited the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to cooperate with the Council and the international **community**.¹⁴

At the 2469th **meeting**, on 31 August 1983, the representative of the **United Kingdom** expressed regret that the prolonged efforts by the members of the Council to secure agreement on some Council action had not succeeded. In his delegation's view the Council should not drop the matter. He said that the appeal for a peaceful settlement and the call upon both sides to refrain from any actions which could aggravate the current situation had been defied by one of the parties. The Council could not honestly consider that it had discharged its responsibilities while the conflict continued and while the members of the Council had initiated no specific steps to bring about a solution. He emphasized Article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4, and Article 33 of the Charter and mentioned in particular the principles of territorial integrity and inviolability of national boundaries, as well as non-interference in the internal affairs of States. He said that to equate the right of Chad to seek the help of friendly States in defending its security with external intervention was a grotesque distortion of the facts. His Government regretted that the Council had not demanded the withdrawal of the armed forces intervening against Chad, and an end to attempts to destabilize that country by military means and had not condemned the use of force and the occupation of part of its territory by a neighbouring country."

The representative of the Netherlands expressed the opinion that it was high time that the debate resulted in appropriate **action** by the Council. He then proposed certain elements to which all parties concerned should be able to subscribe. First, he mentioned the deep concern expressed by all speakers at the serious aggravation of the military situation in Chad; nobody had disputed that the conflict between Chad and the **Libyan Arab Jamahiriya** should be resolved through negotiations and not by force. Secondly, he stated that negotiations could be renewed within the context of OAU in conformity with the resolution adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU during its nineteenth ordinary session at **Addis Ababa**, inviting Chad and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to seek a negotiated solution to their differences within the context of an ad hoc mediation committee established by OAU. Thirdly, the least the Council could do was to request the Secretary-General to take appropriate measures in order to follow actively the situation in Chad and to keep the Council informed about the developments in that country. He said that his Government would be prepared to support a **draft** resolution of the Council containing the above-mentioned elements. He invited those that had shown themselves to be reluctant to support such a minimal,

non-partisan and moderate stance of the Council to change their **minds**.¹⁵

The representative of Guyana said that a helpful response by the Council could have been the establishment and prompt dispatch of a fact-finding mission to assess the situation on the grounds and the extent to which the relevant principles were being violated and the goals and aspirations of the people of Chad were being obstructed, if at all, and by whom. The mission would thereafter report to the Council. The speaker also asked for the application of Articles 34, 35 and 52 of the Charter in that **case**.¹⁵

The representative of the United States deplored that the Council had not responded to the appeal of Chad unequivocally and immediately. On 4 August the **Council** should have been prepared to vote on a draft resolution that condemned Libyan aggression and that demanded the cessation of **fighting** and the immediate withdrawal of Libyan forces from the territory of Chad. In the absence of such a draft resolution there was little reason to be proud on the part of the Council and the world **Organization**.¹⁵

The representative of Pakistan said that the external interference in Chad's affairs, in utter disregard for its political independence and territorial integrity, was the central issue constituting the international dimension of the **Chadian** crisis. He regretted that the Council, despite its strenuous efforts, had not come up with a decision that could fully respond to the conditions of intervention and conflict in Chad. A proper response from the Council should include the following elements: (a) an **affirmation** of respect for the political independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of Chad and observance of the principles of non-use of force, non-interference and non-intervention in the internal affairs of States; (b) the termination of all foreign intervention, the withdrawal of foreign forces and a call upon the parties involved in the conflict to disengage so as to allow the process of peace to gather momentum; and (c) encouragement and support for efforts by OAU to achieve a peaceful solution of the **problem** afflicting Chad. As for a dispatch of a fact-finding mission to Chad, that moment had passed and the Council should confine its role to **encouraging** OAU. Should the efforts of OAU fail to bear **fruit**, the Council should resume its consideration of the situation and take appropriate measures in the discharge of its Charter **responsibilities**.¹⁵

The representative of the Soviet Union pointed out that from the Council's consideration two **separate** policies had clearly emerged: one was "Africa for the Africans" - letting OAU settle the difficult problem itself. The Soviet Union supported that **policy** and would continue to support it. The other **policy** was "Africa as a sphere-of-influence" - a **policy** upheld by those who would like to continue to resolve Africa's affairs by themselves, those who would like to return Africa to the sad time of the Berlin Congress. But such a policy was the echo of a remote past: it had also been **rejected** by most of the members of the Council. Therefore, the policy that had been pursued by one narrow group of States in the Council had been obviously doomed to failure and, accordingly, had **failed**.¹⁵

The representative of the Congo brought to the attention of the members of the Council the Declaration of Brazzaville on the situation in Chad, adopted on 16 August 1983 by the Heads of State of Central

Africa.¹⁶ According to the document, the current Chairman of OAU was requested to establish contact with all the parties concerned with a view to achieving, (a) a cease-fire; (b) the withdrawal of all foreign troops in Chad; and (c) a prohibition of all countries from interfering in the internal affairs of Chad.

The representative of Libya stressed once **again** that the situation in Chad was the result of an internal civil war which had ideological, religious, tribal and ethnic roots and was being encouraged by the imperialist countries. The Libyan Arab **Jamahiriya** stood ready to contribute to any initiative aimed at putting an end to the civil war and to bringing about national reconciliation and believed that the best solution was to leave the whole matter to **OAU**.¹⁵

The representative of Chad stated that the text that had been proposed by the President for adoption was purely procedural and constituted the very least that could have been expected from the Council. He expressed regret that in spite of enormous concessions on the part of his delegation the non-aligned group in the Council was unable to arrive at a compromise text based on the **Chadian** draft resolution. He called it a serious evasion of responsibility by the non-aligned members of the Council. He objected to the recommendations to refer the question to OAU, as the functioning of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Chad-Libyan **dispute** was blocked by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. He concluded that Chad reserved its right to return to the Council at any **time**.¹⁵

The President, speaking as the representative of France, recalled the position of his country with regard to the important roles of OAU and the **United Nations**. He said that bearing in mind the initiative being prepared by OAU, his country **agreed** that the Council, without evading its responsibilities in the matter, should not take a position on that day.

NOTES

¹ S/15902, OR, 38th yr., Suppl. for July-Sept. 1983.

² For details see chap. III of the present Supplement.

³ S/15688, OR, 38th yr., Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council, 1983. For further details, see in sect. 16 of the present chapter.

⁴ S/15843, OR, 38th yr., Suppl. for April-June 1983.

⁵ For relevant communications regarding those efforts, see S/15889 and S/15897, *ibid.*, Suppl. for July-Sept. 1983.

⁶ 2462nd mtg.

⁷ S/15897, S/15898 and S/15902, OR, 38th yr., Suppl. for July-Sept. 1983.

⁸ S/15844, *ibid.*, Suppl. for April-June 1983.

⁹ S/15856, *ibid.*, Suppl. for July-Sept. 1983.

¹⁰ S/15903, *ibid.*

¹¹ 2463rd mtg.

¹² 2465th mtg.

¹³ ORGA, 37th sess., Suppl. No. 1 (A/37/1).

¹⁴ 2467th mtg.

¹⁵ 2469th mtg.

¹⁶ S/15936, OR, 38th yr., Suppl. for July-Sept. 1983.