

United Nations efforts in the subregion, as well as regional and subregional initiatives on peace and security, including from human rights and gender perspectives; and (d) enhancing coherence and coordination in the work of the United Nations in the subregion on peace and security.²¹⁴

Meetings: Central African region, 2022

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for- against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.9058 8 June	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) (S/2022/436)			Assistant Secretary-General for Africa, President of the Commission of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Vice-President of the Coalition des organisations de la société civile d’Afrique centrale pour la préservation de la paix, la prévention des conflits, la résolution et la transformation des crises	13 Council members, ^a all invitees	
S/PV.9213 8 December	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Central Africa and the activities of UNOCA (S/2022/896)			Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Central Africa and Head of UNOCA, President of ECCAS	13 Council members, ^a all invitees ^b	

^a Brazil, China, France, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

^c The President of the ECCAS Commission participated in the meeting by videoconference.

7. Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan

During the period under review, the Council held 22 meetings and adopted six resolutions under the item entitled “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan”. Sixteen of the meetings took the form of briefings, and six were convened for the adoption of a resolution.²¹⁵ More information on the meetings, including on participants and outcomes, is provided in the tables below. In addition to the meetings, Council members also held informal consultations of the whole in connection with the item.²¹⁶ Furthermore, the Council held two private (closed) meetings with countries contributing

²¹⁴ S/2021/719, annex, objectives 1–4. For more information on the mandate of UNOCA, see part X, sect. II.

²¹⁵ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

²¹⁶ See A/77/2, part II, chap. 26.

troops and police to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) pursuant to resolution [1353 \(2001\)](#).²¹⁷

Consistent with prior practice, the Council considered several topics under the item, namely: (a) the situation in the Sudan and the mandate of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS); (b) relations between the Sudan and South Sudan, the situation in the Abyei Area and the mandate of UNISFA; and (c) the situation in South Sudan and the mandate of UNMISS.²¹⁸ The Council also discussed the work of the Committees and Panels of Experts concerning the Sudan and South Sudan and the implementation of resolution [1593 \(2005\)](#), by which the Council referred the situation in Darfur to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.

In relation to the Sudan, the Council heard four briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and Head of UNITAMS further to the periodic reports of the Secretary-General on the situation in the country and the activities of the Mission.²¹⁹ The Council also heard one briefing by a civil society representative.²²⁰ The Special Representative focused his statements on the impact of the military takeover of the Government on 25 October 2021 on the political, economic, humanitarian and security situation in the Sudan. He also updated the Council on the work of the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the United Nations in support of the Sudanese-owned and Sudanese-led political dialogue to restore the political transition.

At the meeting held on 28 March,²²¹ the Special Representative noted that the Sudan remained without a functioning Government since the coup d'état. Furthermore, protests against the coup d'état and the violent repression of them continued, and the economic, humanitarian and security situations in the country were deteriorating. In terms of economic developments, the Special Representative reported on the 45 per cent fall of the Sudanese pound against the United States dollar, the dramatic price increase for basic goods and services, the absence of foreign investment and the dwindling of exports. He added that the combined effects of the conflict, economic crisis and poor harvests would likely double the number of people facing acute hunger to approximately 18 million by the end of 2022. The Special Representative stated that, in the absence of a political solution to the crisis, the security situation had worsened across the country. In Darfur, crime and lawlessness were on the rise and intercommunal conflict had intensified. He welcomed steps taken by the Government of the Sudan and the signatories to the Juba Agreement for Peace in the Sudan to begin the training for and standing up of the joint security-keeping force. He expressed support for the Government's request for international support to implement disarmament, demobilization and reintegration measures. The Special Representative noted that, meanwhile, frequent protests against military rule continued in Khartoum and elsewhere, with protestors continuing to be killed, injured, arrested and subject to criminal charges. He added that it was of particular concern that women were targeted and subjected to violence and intimidation by members of the security forces, mentioning that, as at 22 March, 16 women had reportedly been raped during protests in Khartoum.

The Special Representative announced that the United Nations, the African Union and IGAD had agreed to join efforts in supporting the Sudan through the next phase of the political process by facilitating an inclusive Sudanese-owned and Sudanese-led political process with the full and meaningful participation of women. According to the Special Representative, in order to have a chance of succeeding, the political talks required favourable conditions that entailed an end to the violence and the establishment of the right to hold peaceful demonstrations, the release of political detainees and a firm commitment to phase out the emergency status in the country.

²¹⁷ The private meetings were held on 3 March and 7 November in connection with the item entitled "Meeting of the Security Council with the troop- and police-contributing countries pursuant to resolution [1353 \(2001\)](#), annex II, sections A and B"; for UNMISS, see [S/PV.8985](#), and for UNISFA, see [S/PV.9186](#). See also [A/77/2](#), part II, chap. 21.

²¹⁸ For more information on the mandates of UNISFA, UNMISS and UNITAMS, see part X.

²¹⁹ See [S/PV.9006](#), [S/PV.9041](#), [S/PV.9129](#) and [S/PV.9211](#).

²²⁰ See [S/PV.9129](#).

²²¹ See [S/PV.9006](#).

At a meeting held on 13 September,²²² the Special Representative noted the announcement on 4 July by the Chair of the Sovereign Council, Lieutenant General Abdel-Fattah Al-Burhan, of the military's intention to withdraw from politics, which generated momentum among civilian forces, resulting in several major initiatives aimed at reaching a common civilian vision. One such initiative was a draft constitutional framework presented by the Sudanese Bar Association, which gathered a broad spectrum of civilian stakeholders. The Special Representative emphasized that, while important differences about the institutional division of powers, in particular the role of the military, remained, there was nevertheless a wide-ranging consensus on, among other things, the need for a civilian Head of State, an independent Prime Minister and Cabinet composed of experts and technocrats, and that transitional justice should be high on the list of priorities. With regard to the security situation, he noted the particularly worrying surge of violence in Darfur and Blue Nile, with UNITAMS documenting 40 incidents of intercommunal violence resulting in the death of more than 300 civilians from 24 May to 28 August. He urged all communities to refrain from hate speech and the authorities to urgently address protection gaps. As a positive step in the implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement, the Special Representative referred to the graduation of the first batch of 2,000 fighters for the joint security-keeping force in Darfur, while also urging the authorities to begin their deployment. He informed Council members that humanitarian needs were at record levels owing to a combination of ongoing political instability, economic crises, a rise in intercommunal violence, poor harvests and floods. Some 11.7 million people were facing acute hunger and the 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan was only 32 per cent funded.

At the meeting held on 7 December,²²³ the Special Representative informed the Council that, on 5 December, the military leadership and a broad range of civilian actors signed a political framework agreement to lay the ground for a final political accord and the formation of a new civilian Government, leading the country towards recovery and democratic elections over a two-year transitional phase. The agreement followed negotiations, facilitated by the trilateral mechanism, based on the draft constitutional document prepared under the auspices of the Sudanese Bar Association. While the signing of the framework agreement was an important breakthrough, critical contentious issues such as security sector reform and the merger of forces, transitional justice, the implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement, the status of the dismantling committee and the situation in the east of the Sudan still needed to be addressed. He underlined the importance of a sufficiently inclusive process in the lead-up to a final political agreement in order to safeguard against the influence of those who did not see their interests advanced by a political settlement. He also cautioned that as the Sudan got closer to reaching a final political agreement, those who did not see their interests advanced by a political settlement could escalate attempts to undermine the process.

Reflecting on the challenges during the 13 months since the coup d'état, the Special Representative recalled that over 900 people had reportedly been killed and many more injured in violent conflict and that the resurgence of large-scale violence demonstrated the increasing fragility at the State level, exacerbated by the continued government vacuum. In that regard, he noted that the situation in Blue Nile remained precarious despite the imposition of a state of emergency, while intercommunal violence in the Lagawa locality, West Kordofan, in mid-October had resulted in the killing of at least 19 and displacement of 65,000 people. Furthermore, there was intense fighting in Central Darfur between the Sudan Liberation Army led by Abdul Wahid Al-Nur and the Rapid Support Forces. Across the Sudan, 260,000 people had been displaced since the beginning of 2022 as a result of the conflict. Humanitarian partners estimated that about 15.8 million people, one third of the population, would need humanitarian assistance in 2023, which was an increase of 1.5 million compared with 2022. He concluded by noting that the framework agreement offered a path for realizing the aspirations of Sudanese young people, women and men and that working together with the United Nations, Council members and the larger international community in support of those efforts could help them to move forward on their chosen path.

In his statement to the Council on 13 September,²²⁴ the President of the Sudan Social Development Organization discussed the efforts of civil society under the Sudanese Bar Association initiative to reach

²²² See S/PV.9129.

²²³ See S/PV.9211.

²²⁴ See S/PV.9129.

an agreement on a civilian Government. He underscored that a civilian Government could not be established without a unified army and State authority and that such a Government was necessary to stabilize the economic situation, reform the civil service, begin constitutional reform, resolve the issue of transitional justice and address insecurity in Darfur. He highlighted the lack of progress on ensuring the meaningful representation of women during the transition period and noted that, at the initiative of the Sudanese Bar Association, civilian stakeholders agreed that 50 per cent of the Cabinet and the Sovereign Council and more than 40 per cent of the Transitional Legislative Council must be represented by women.

In their discussions in 2022, most Council members expressed concern and disappointment with the negative impact of the military takeover of 25 October 2021 on the political transition, as well as socioeconomic, humanitarian and security conditions in the Sudan. Council members welcomed and expressed support for the African Union-IGAD-United Nations trilateral mechanism and urged all stakeholders to negotiate in good faith with a view to restoring the political transition. Multiple Council members stressed that the transition process must be inclusive and consider the concerns of all stakeholders, in particular women, youth and other marginalized groups.²²⁵ At a meeting held on 11 December, Council members welcomed the signing of the political framework agreement on 5 December, describing it as a good step towards ending the political crisis in the country, with a number of speakers calling upon the parties to work towards a final agreement and the restoration of a civilian Government.²²⁶ Some speakers²²⁷ called on other political stakeholders that had not done so to sign the framework agreement.

Council members condemned the violence and human rights violations against protesters against the military takeover, including acts of sexual violence, and called on the military authorities to create the conditions necessary for political dialogue by lifting the state of emergency, allowing peaceful protests and freedom of expression and releasing all political detainees.²²⁸ With respect to insecurity and violence in Darfur, Blue Nile and Western Kordofan, some speakers urged the Government to ensure the full implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement and the national plan for the protection of civilians.²²⁹ Several delegations stressed the need for the international community to ensure continued support to the Government to ensure the full implementation of the peace agreement and the national plan.²³⁰

With respect to the economic and humanitarian situation, several delegations expressed concern with the decision of international financial institutions and donors to suspend aid to the Sudan following the military takeover, noting in particular the impact of such measures on the civilian population, and objected to linking such support to progress in the political process.²³¹ In that regard, the representative of the Russian Federation noted that the politicization of the provision of economic and financial assistance had already led to divisions in society, as well as a loss of civic trust in the transitional authorities, which in turn had led to general instability and new separatist trends in the country.²³² The representatives of Gabon and Kenya, speaking on behalf of the three African members of the Council, echoed the appeal of the Secretary-General for the creation of exceptional modalities to ensure continued

²²⁵ See [S/PV.9006](#) (India, Ireland, Albania, Norway and Mexico); [S/PV.9041](#) (Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), United Arab Emirates, Albania, Brazil, Russian Federation, Norway, Mexico, Ireland and United States); [S/PV.9129](#) (Ireland, Norway, Brazil, India, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya) and Albania); and [S/PV.9211](#) (United Kingdom, Norway, Ireland, United Arab Emirates, Mexico and France).

²²⁶ See [S/PV.9211](#) (United Kingdom, Norway, United States, Albania, United Arab Emirates, Russian Federation, France and India).

²²⁷ Russian Federation, China and Mexico.

²²⁸ See [S/PV.9006](#) (United Kingdom, France, United States, Ireland, Albania and Mexico); [S/PV.9041](#) (United Kingdom, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Albania, Norway, France, Mexico, Ireland and United States); [S/PV.9129](#) (United Kingdom); and [S/PV.9211](#) (United Kingdom, Norway, Ireland, Ghana (speaking also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), United States and France).

²²⁹ See [S/PV.9006](#) (United States, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), Ireland, Albania, Norway and Mexico); [S/PV.9041](#) (Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Norway, France, Mexico and Ireland); [S/PV.9129](#) (Ireland and France); and [S/PV.9211](#) (United Kingdom, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), United States, Albania, Brazil and Mexico).

²³⁰ See [S/PV.9041](#) (Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana)); [S/PV.9129](#) (United Arab Emirates and China); and [S/PV.9211](#) (United Arab Emirates).

²³¹ See [S/PV.9006](#) (India, China and United Arab Emirates); [S/PV.9129](#) (United Arab Emirates, India and China); and [S/PV.9211](#) (India).

²³² See [S/PV.9006](#).

international assistance for the Sudan and called on the international community to reconsider the temporary suspension of aid.²³³ Other Council members opined that an inclusive political settlement and the establishment of a civilian Government was the best way to improve socioeconomic and humanitarian conditions in the country.²³⁴ In his remarks at Council meetings, the representative of the Sudan appealed to the international community for financial support for the implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement, in particular the provisions of security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and the resumption of development assistance to mitigate the impact of necessary economic reforms.²³⁵

By its resolution 2636 (2022) of 3 June, the Council unanimously extended the existing mandate of UNITAMS as contained in resolution 2579 (2021) for a period of one year, until 3 June 2023.²³⁶ After the adoption, the representative of the United Kingdom stated that, as penholder, his delegation's preference would have been for the Council to adopt a substantive resolution that voiced support for the vital efforts of UNITAMS in facilitating a Sudanese-led process to restore a civilian-led transition towards democracy.²³⁷ He added that a substantive resolution would also have enabled the priorities of the Mission to be updated to reflect the request of the Sudan for additional support on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, transitional justice and civilian protection. A preference for a substantive resolution reflecting the realities on the ground was also expressed by the representatives of Albania, Ireland, Mexico and Norway. The representative of the Russian Federation urged all external players, including UNITAMS, to play a constructive role and recalled that the Mission was deployed at the invitation of the Government to support national efforts in strengthening peace, fulfilling the terms of the Juba Peace Agreement, dealing with issues relating to internally displaced persons and mobilizing assistance for economic development. The representative of China stated that the international community should maintain the patience necessary to create space for the resolution of differences among parties and avoid choosing sides, aggravating tensions and exerting excessive pressure. He recalled that UNITAMS was a political mission established at the request of the Sudan under Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations, that it had to abide by the mandate of the Council and respect the sovereignty of the Sudan, and called upon it to strengthen its mandate on mobilizing international development assistance.

Council members also heard four briefings by the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) on the work of the Committee and its Panel of Experts.²³⁸ The Chair informed Council members that the Panel had submitted its final report to the Committee in December 2021, after which the Committee had reiterated some of the Panel's recommendations to the Permanent Representatives of the Sudan, the Central African Republic, Chad, Egypt and Libya on 1 March 2022.²³⁹ By its resolution 2620 (2022) of 15 February, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council unanimously extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts for a period of 13 months, until 12 March 2023.²⁴⁰ The Council took note of the report of the Secretary-General of 31 July 2021 (S/2021/696), as requested in resolution 2562 (2021), which provided a review of the situation in Darfur and recommending benchmarks to assess the sanctions measures. The Council also expressed its intention to consider by 31 August 2022 adjusting the measures to respond to the situation in Darfur establishing clear, well-identified and realistic key benchmarks.²⁴¹ In Council discussions during the reporting period, several Council members, as well as the representative of the Sudan, consistently stressed that the sanctions measures no longer corresponded to the situation in Darfur and impeded the implementation of Juba Peace Agreement and the Government's ability to maintain security and protect civilians.²⁴² The

²³³ See S/PV.9006 (Ghana); S/PV.9041 (Kenya); and S/PV.9211 (Ghana).

²³⁴ See S/PV.9041 (Albania, Norway and United States); and S/PV.9129 (United Kingdom).

²³⁵ See S/PV.9006, S/PV.9041, S/PV.9129 and S/PV.9211.

²³⁶ Resolution 2636 (2022), para. 1.

²³⁷ See S/PV.9054.

²³⁸ See S/PV.9005, S/PV.9070, S/PV.9128 and S/PV.9210.

²³⁹ See S/PV.9005. See also S/2022/48.

²⁴⁰ Resolution 2620 (2022), para. 2.

²⁴¹ Resolution 2620 (2022), para. 5. The Council did not establish benchmarks to assess the measures in 2022.

²⁴² See S/PV.8964 (China and Russian Federation); S/PV.9005 (Sudan); S/PV.9006 (Russian Federation and China); S/PV.9041 (China); S/PV.9070 (Russian Federation, China and Gabon); S/PV.9129 (China and Russian Federation); and S/PV.9211 (Russian Federation, China and Sudan).

representative of China expressed regret that the Council was not able to define benchmarks by 31 August and noted that such benchmarks had to be clear, well defined and realistic.²⁴³

In addition to the above, pursuant to resolution 1593 (2005), the Prosecutor of the International Court briefed the Council twice in 2022 in relation to Darfur.²⁴⁴ At a meeting held on 17 January,²⁴⁵ he expressed concern with the suspension of investigative activities in the Sudan by his office following the military takeover and stressed the need for safe and secure access to the country and the archives. At a meeting held on 23 August,²⁴⁶ he gave a briefing to the Council by videoconference from Khartoum and reported on his first visit to Darfur and the interaction with Sudanese authorities and internally displaced persons. In terms of procedural developments, he reported that the case against Abd-Al-Rahman (“Ali Kushayb”), the senior Janjaweed militia leader and sole suspect in the Court’s custody in relation to the situation in Darfur, had started in April on 31 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Furthermore, he stated that the Government’s cooperation with his office had taken a step backwards in recent months and underlined the need for the issuance of multiple entry visa to help with the establishment of an office in Khartoum, the collection of evidence and the building of relationships with the Sudanese authorities and victims.

With respect to the Abyei Area and the situation between the Sudan and South Sudan, Council members heard two briefings by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa and one each by the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations and the Assistant Secretary-General for Africa in the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations.²⁴⁷ At the meeting held on 21 April,²⁴⁸ the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations stated that, while the overall security situation in Abyei remained calm, the trust deficit between the Misseriya and Ngok Dinka communities was still of great concern. He noted several incidents of intercommunal violence since October 2021 in Noong/Annam, Kolom, Leul/Al Luo and the Amiet common market/Faydelzaraf areas that resulted in the killing of 29 people, including two women, and the injury of 30 persons from both communities. He underlined that it was first and foremost for the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan to renew their engagement on the final status of Abyei and called upon them to use the next meeting of the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee to move forward on the issue. He mentioned that significant progress was made in the development of the Abyei joint programme, through consultations between a team of representatives from the Department of Peace Operations, the Development Coordination Office and the United Nations country teams in the Sudan and South Sudan with women, youth, elders and other community members. The Under-Secretary-General informed the Council that the humanitarian situation had deteriorated, owing largely to the intercommunal violence between the Twic Dinka and Ngok Dinka communities near Agok in February and March. With respect to the other mandated area of UNISFA, he reported an absence of progress on reoperationalizing Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism team sites 11 and 12 and the headquarters of Sector 1 in Gok Machar after UNISFA was forced to relocate in 2021. Given the three direct attacks against UNISFA patrols in the past two months, the Under-Secretary-General concluded his remarks by strongly emphasizing the need to ensure the safety and security of UNISFA peacekeepers and called on the relevant authorities to investigate those incidents as a matter of priority.

In her statement at the same meeting, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa stated that, with the removal of the civilian Government in Khartoum, the momentum towards the resolution of outstanding issues between the Sudan and South Sudan had suddenly stopped. Specifically, the meeting of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism, which had been scheduled to take place in January, had not been held and no action had been taken on the decisions reached at the previous meeting, including the withdrawal of Sudanese and South Sudanese forces from the safe demilitarized border zone and the commitment of South Sudan to mediate between communities in Aweil towards the reactivation of the three locations of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism. The Special Envoy

²⁴³ See S/PV.9129. For further detail on the discussion, see part II, sect. VIII.

²⁴⁴ See S/PV.8948 and S/PV.9113.

²⁴⁵ See S/PV.8948.

²⁴⁶ See S/PV.9113.

²⁴⁷ See S/PV.9020 and S/PV.9170.

²⁴⁸ See S/PV.9020.

nevertheless highlighted multiple engagements between the two countries in support of each other's peace processes. For example, in March, Lieutenant General Abdel-Fattah Al-Burhan visited Juba to address tensions between the President of South Sudan, Salva Kiir Mayardit, and the First Vice-President, Riek Machar, over the sharing of senior leadership positions in the future national army. South Sudanese officials, meanwhile, continued to shuttle between Juba and Khartoum to facilitate a solution between the military and civilian components of the transitional Government of the Sudan, as well as to exert efforts to convince Abdul Wahid Al-Nur and his faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army to join the peace process and to secure the resumption of negotiations between the Government and the Al-Hilu faction of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North. Lieutenant General Al-Burhan and Mr. Kiir also agreed to focus on cooperation along their common border, starting with the development of unitized oil fields, including in the Abyei Area.

At the meeting held on 27 October,²⁴⁹ the Assistant Secretary-General for Africa highlighted the renewed engagement of the Sudan and South Sudan to address the final status of Abyei and border issues. She welcomed their agreement to enhance cooperation on issues related to Abyei and its final status, as well as their willingness to resume the meetings of the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee, which had not met since 2017. Regarding the security situation, she noted a shift in the conflict dynamics over previous years, with a decrease in intercommunal violence between the Misseriya and Ngok Dinka communities in 2022. However, since February, a new conflict had emerged between the Ngok Dinka and Twic Dinka communities in southern Abyei with the loss of lives and displacement on both sides. In coordination with UNMISS, UNISFA maintained close contact with the Government of South Sudan to support mediation efforts and, in particular, plans for a government-facilitated peace conference in South Sudan. The Assistant Secretary-General expressed concern that, amid the tensions between the two communities, seven attacks on peacekeepers had been recorded, including on 16 October when local community members threatened UNISFA personnel and demanded the removal of Twic Dinka employees and some international staff members from the Mission's headquarters. Finally, the Assistant Secretary-General reported that the reconfiguration of UNISFA into a multinational peacekeeping force was near completion, with 2,567 military personnel out of the authorized 3,250 personnel in place. She expressed the view that, with the Ngok Dinka-Twic Dinka conflict creating new protection needs in the south, the new force must be better equipped to cover a wider area.

In her remarks, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa noted that, at the meeting of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism on 24 May, the two countries agreed to re-establish the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee, activate river transport, immediately open border crossings and recommit to withdrawing forces from the safe demilitarized border zone. Since May, working with the Chairperson of the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel, the Special Envoy had held separate consultations with the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya communities to find a way out of the stalemate on the final status of Abyei. She added that, on 24 October, the Sudan and South Sudan agreed to jointly expedite the provision of services to the citizens of Abyei and to activate joint mechanisms to provide humanitarian services. She concluded by stating that, notwithstanding the improved bilateral relations, a renewed commitment regarding the implementation of transitional arrangements, as well as the dispute resolution over the final status of Abyei, could not be set apart from the fragile internal situations in both countries.

In their discussions on Abyei and the border during the reporting period, Council members welcomed the improvement in relations between the Sudan and South Sudan and stressed the importance of using that as an impetus to make progress on the final status of the territory. Council members reiterated their calls for the implementation of the agreement of 20 June 2011, in particular through the establishment of the joint institutions provided thereunder, and the regular holding of meetings of the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee and the Joint Political and Security Mechanism. Most Council members expressed serious concern regarding persistent intercommunal violence in Abyei, including the conflict between the Ngok Dinka and Twic Dinka communities. In that regard, a number of speakers highlighted the importance of the role of UNISFA in supporting intercommunal peace initiatives and dialogue.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁹ See [S/PV.9170](#).

²⁵⁰ See [S/PV.9020](#) (United States, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), United Arab Emirates, Russian Federation, China, Mexico and Norway); and [S/PV.9170](#) (United States, United Arab Emirates, Russian Federation and Ireland).

Regarding the operations of UNISFA, many delegations called on the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan to ensure the Mission's freedom of movement, including the ability of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism to fully implement its mandate and return to its sector headquarters in Gok Machar.²⁵¹ Lastly, several Council members reiterated their calls on the Government of the Sudan to expedite the issuance of visas for Mission staff, including police personnel.²⁵²

By resolutions 2630 (2022) of 12 May and 2660 (2022) of 14 November, both adopted unanimously, the Council twice extended the mandate of UNISFA to support the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism and, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Mission's mandate in the Abyei Area.²⁵³ While resolution 2630 (2022) extended the mandate for six months, until 14 November, resolution 2660 (2022) did so for one year, until 15 November 2023. By virtue of both resolutions, the Council urged the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan to provide full support for UNISFA in the implementation of its mandate and deployment of its personnel.²⁵⁴ In resolution 2630 (2022), the Council further reiterated that the Abyei Area should be demilitarized from any forces, as well as armed elements of the local communities, and urged the two Governments and the local communities to take all necessary steps in that regard.²⁵⁵

In connection with the situation in South Sudan, the Council heard four briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for South Sudan and Head of UNMISS further to the periodic reports of the Secretary-General on the situation in the country.²⁵⁶ The Council also heard briefings by the interim Chairperson of the reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission,²⁵⁷ a representative of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs²⁵⁸ and three civil society representatives.²⁵⁹ In his briefings to the Council, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General focused on the status of the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic in South Sudan as the two-year transitional period drew to a close. He also updated Council members on increasing levels of intercommunal violence and humanitarian needs in the country and the role of UNMISS in the protection of civilians and supporting the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement.

In his first briefing of the year on 7 March,²⁶⁰ the Special Representative stated that the ceasefire in South Sudan continued to largely hold, with civilian casualties significantly reduced over the previous year. On the progress in the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement, he noted the conclusion of executive appointments at the national and state levels and the reconstitution of the Transitional National Legislative Assembly and Council of State and state parliaments. He was concerned, however, that as the remaining 12 months of the transitional period commenced, an accumulation of unfulfilled commitments remained, with limited time to address them. Key pending benchmarks related to the necessary conducive political and civic space, as well as technical and logistical prerequisites and an agreed timetable for free and fair elections. He also recalled that the constitution-making bill was still pending and that the graduation of unified forces was yet to commence, with no agreement on the command structure.

The Special Representative stressed that the slow implementation of the Revitalized Agreement came at a cost and that peace dividends for the South Sudanese remained elusive. Nowhere was that more clearly reflected than in the frustration of marginalized youth, many of whom had joined tribal militias or channelled their anger at humanitarians and peacekeepers. He noted that subnational violence, which

²⁵¹ See S/PV.9020 (United States, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), India, United Arab Emirates, France, Ireland, China, Mexico, Albania and United Kingdom); and S/PV.9170 (Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), Albania, France, United Kingdom, Brazil, India, Mexico and Ireland).

²⁵² See S/PV.9020 (United States, India, Ireland, Albania and Norway); and S/PV.9170 (United States, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), Albania, Norway, India, Mexico and Ireland).

²⁵³ Resolutions 2630 (2022) and 2660 (2022), paras. 1 and 2.

²⁵⁴ Resolutions 2630 (2022) and 2660 (2022), para. 4.

²⁵⁵ Resolution 2630 (2022), para. 6.

²⁵⁶ See S/PV.8987, S/PV.9067, S/PV.9134 and S/PV.9219. See also S/2022/156, S/2022/468, S/2022/689 and S/2022/918.

²⁵⁷ See S/PV.8987 and S/PV.9219.

²⁵⁸ See S/PV.9067.

²⁵⁹ See S/PV.8987, S/PV.9067 and S/PV.9134.

²⁶⁰ See S/PV.8987.

was fuelled by national and local political competition, continued to spread. The conflicts involved the non-signatory armed groups, clashes between factions of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-Army in Opposition and community disputes over land and resources, including those induced by climate change. He added that humanitarian needs were projected to continue growing, with the third consecutive year of floods, exacerbated by insecurity and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, while the appetite of donors to furnish additional resources was trending in reverse. With regard to the efforts of UNMISS, the Special Representative stated that the Mission had established 125 temporary operating bases to prevent and respond to conflict hotspots and had enhanced its capabilities by moving away from static security tasks and maximizing the mobility of the force, which contributed to a 42 per cent decline in the number of civilian casualties over the previous year. He also stated that UNMISS stood ready to provide technical advice on constitutional and electoral matters that were ultimately sovereign choices for the South Sudanese to make.

In his remarks on 20 June,²⁶¹ the Special Representative noted that, after the opposition's withdrawal from the transitional security mechanisms amid a tense security situation at the end of March, the parties reached a breakthrough agreement on 3 April on a single joint command structure for the necessary unified forces. It was now expected, according to the Special Representative, for the parties to agree on a road map, recommitting themselves to the Revitalized Agreement, as jointly called for by the African Union, IGAD, the reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission and the United Nations. He stated that more than 80 per cent of civilian casualties in 2022 had been attributed to intercommunal violence and community-based militias and noted in particular the spread of conflict in Eastern and Central Equatoria, Unity, Warrap and Jonglei States, as well as in the Abyei Area.

At the meeting held on 16 September,²⁶² the Special Representative informed Council members that on 4 August the signatory parties had agreed on the road map for the remaining tasks, which included revised benchmarks and timelines providing for an extension of the transitional period for 24 months and the holding of elections in December 2024. He added that, while the road map was a welcome development, the extension of the transitional period had met with mixed reactions by many South Sudanese, who had raised concerns about the inclusivity of the process and had called for greater clarity around the Government's commitment to implement the agreement on time.

On 13 December,²⁶³ the Special Representative stated that notable progress had been made in the previous months in the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement, with the adoption of essential bills by the national legislature, including the constitution-making bill, as well as the ratification of the road map of 4 August. He noted that the graduation of the first phase of the necessary unified forces was largely complete and that the second phase required urgent financial, logistical and political support from the Government. While citing some progress in the preparation of the National Elections Act, he expressed concern that the deadlines relating to the Political Parties Act, the Political Parties Council, the reconstituted National Constitution Review Commission and the establishment of the Constitution Drafting Commission had been missed, causing a "domino effect" on subsequent key benchmarks in the road map. He reiterated the position of UNMISS that the first of the two phases recommended by the 2021 electoral needs assessment mission,²⁶⁴ namely fulfilling the legal requirements and preparing the grounds and environment for the conduct of elections, had to be completed before material assistance for their actual conduct would be contemplated.

With regard to the security situation, he reported that the year-long fracturing of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-Army in Opposition and the Kit-Gwang splinter group had taken on an ethnic dimension in the Nile River corridor of Upper Nile State, and condemned the resulting human rights violations and abuses, including conflict-related sexual violence. He stated that UNMISS was coordinating with humanitarian partners to accommodate fleeing civilians and engaging politically at the state and national levels to bring needed attention to the conflict and encourage a resolution. Moreover, as tensions continued to simmer and intensify as the electoral date drew closer, the Special Representative

²⁶¹ See S/PV.9067.

²⁶² See S/PV.9134.

²⁶³ See S/PV.9219.

²⁶⁴ See S/2021/661.

underscored that UNMISS was prioritizing the protection of civilians in all aspects of its mandated tasks. He deemed that those efforts would go a long way to support an expansion of civic and political space and a culture of non-violent debate and dispute resolution. With 9.4 million people projected to need humanitarian and protection assistance in 2023, he urged partners to continue to respond generously to the Humanitarian Response Plan. Finally, the Special Representative concluded his remarks by stating that the new road map was a “second mortgage” on the Revitalized Agreement and that, as moral guarantors and partners of the agreement, the international community had a collective task of ensuring that the parties had the best possible international support to fulfil their commitments to the people of South Sudan.

In his statements to the Council, the interim Chairperson of the reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission focused on the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement, including the development and progress of the road map of 4 August. On 7 March, he observed that the most critical tasks for the conduct of free, fair and credible elections and the fulfilment of the Revitalized Agreement were the unification of forces and their deployment, the enactment of a permanent constitution, the review of the political parties and electoral-related laws and the constitution of the Political Parties Council and the National Election Commission.²⁶⁵ Concerning the recurring challenges, he cited the lack of sufficient resources, the insufficient political will and commitment of some actors, trust deficits among the parties and capacity gaps, subnational violence and activities of hold-out groups, military defections from one signatory party to another, seasonal flooding and the COVID-19 pandemic. Given the challenges and the timelines provided under the Revitalized Agreement, he noted that the reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission had tasked the Government of South Sudan with developing a clear road map and strategy on how to implement the outstanding critical tasks. On 13 December, the interim Chairperson provided an update on the implementation of the road map, in particular with respect to governance, permanent ceasefire and transitional security arrangements, humanitarian assistance and reconstruction, resource, economic and financial management, and the making of the permanent constitution.²⁶⁶ In that context, he recommended to the Council to increase its engagement with the Government to adhere to the road map timelines and prioritize their implementation through the provision of predictable, timely and adequate funding for all tasks. He also recommended that the Council encourage the Government to ensure that civic and political space were guaranteed and protected and to urgently address the root causes of intercommunal violence and insecurity, in particular in Upper Nile and Jonglei States, and that the Council remain seized of the peace process and consider undertaking regular visits to South Sudan as a show of solidarity.

In her remarks on 20 June,²⁶⁷ the Acting Director in the Operations and Advocacy Division of Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs informed Council members that, against a backdrop of profound macroeconomic challenges in South Sudan, the drivers of conflict and climate shocks had resulted in a dire humanitarian situation. She noted that 8.3 million people were likely to experience severe food insecurity during the lean season, of whom 2.9 million would likely face emergency levels of hunger and 87,000 would probably face catastrophic and famine-like levels of food insecurity. South Sudan was facing a fourth year of above-average rainfall, which had disrupted the agricultural season and constrained food production. The Acting Director noted that more than 2 million people remained internally displaced and more than 2.3 million were refugees. While underlining the commitment of humanitarian partners to stay and deliver in South Sudan, she reported that four humanitarian workers had been killed so far in 2022. She concluded her briefing with three messages to the Council. First, she stressed that the international response needed humanitarian, development and peacebuilding efforts working together to address the root causes of the crisis. Second, the Government and all parties to the conflict needed to ensure the safety of aid workers and assets. Lastly, with only 26 per cent of the 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan funded, unearmarked and early funding at scale were urgently required to address the growing humanitarian needs, including to prevent a dangerous deterioration in the food security situation.

²⁶⁵ See S/PV.8987.

²⁶⁶ See S/PV.9219.

²⁶⁷ See S/PV.9067.

In their briefings on South Sudan, civil society representatives discussed the impact of the delays in the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement, particularly increased levels of intercommunal and local conflicts and sexual and gender-based violence. In her remarks on 7 March, Riya Williams Yuyada, a women's human rights and peace activist working with Crown The Woman, a feminist non-governmental organization in South Sudan, addressed the limited progress made in the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement and the increased violence at the local level driven by the exclusionary nature of political and peace efforts.²⁶⁸ She noted that the denial of protection and justice to survivors of gender-based violence resulting from near total impunity continued to be raised to her organization. In that regard, she urged the Council to follow up on its previous call on the Government to improve the judicial system and establish the Hybrid Court for South Sudan, as well as to swiftly implement the joint action plan for the armed forces on addressing conflict-related sexual violence. On 20 June, Lorna Merekaje, a South Sudanese human rights defender, civil rights activist and peace advocate, expressed similar views to Ms. Yuyada regarding the implementation of the peace agreement, violence and human rights violations against civilians.²⁶⁹ She stated that the people of South Sudan wanted to be given an opportunity to choose their leaders and participate in the design of a progressive agenda for the country, but that required strengthening the capacity of the institutions and personnel required to conduct a credible election, creating an environment conducive to the operation of free media and civic engagement without intimidation and reprisals and strengthening the necessary legal framework. Furthermore, in order to enhance the contribution of civil society in South Sudan, she recommended that periodic forums be established in which civil society could engage with UNMISS in order to facilitate better in-country interaction and analysis and that the Council authorize the Mission to facilitate or host periodic engagement with the Government and civil society. In her statement on 16 September, the President of the South Sudan Women's Empowerment Network called on the region and the international community to support a broad-based process to ensure inclusivity in the country's transition to peace, democracy and development, and in that regard expressed support for the initiative of Fordham University to convene an inclusive political dialogue to help the South Sudanese to reach a broad consensus on a road map for a new transitional programme.²⁷⁰

During their discussions on South Sudan, Council members expressed concern with the delays in the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement. They called upon the parties to fully implement the road map of 4 August in accordance with the timelines established therein and commended the facilitation efforts of IGAD and the African Union in that context. The representative of the United States expressed disappointment with the decision of the parties to extend the transitional period for another two years, despite failing to fully deliver on commitments made in the Revitalized Agreement in 2018.²⁷¹ Many speakers underscored the importance of an inclusive transition process with the engagement of civil society, women, youth, persons with disabilities and other marginalized groups, and called on the Government to address the continued shrinking of the civic space and create the conditions necessary for the holding of future elections. Council members condemned the subnational and intercommunal violence over the past year, including acts of sexual and gender-based violence, many of them recalling the primary responsibility of the Government of South Sudan to protect civilians and undertake intercommunal dialogue and reconciliation.²⁷² Many speakers also called on the Government to investigate and ensure accountability for such crimes. Council members welcomed the graduation of the necessary unified forces, stressing the importance of their urgent deployment to stabilize the security situation.²⁷³ Multiple delegations called for the review and lifting of the arms embargo imposed on South Sudan and noted that

²⁶⁸ See [S/PV.8987](#).

²⁶⁹ See [S/PV.9067](#).

²⁷⁰ See [S/PV.9134](#).

²⁷¹ See [S/PV.9134](#) and [S/PV.9219](#).

²⁷² See [S/PV.8987](#) (United States, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Brazil, Albania); [S/PV.9067](#) (United States, Mexico, Russian Federation, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya) and France); [S/PV.9134](#) (Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), Norway, Ireland, Albania, Mexico, United Kingdom); and [S/PV.9219](#) (United States, United Kingdom, Mexico, Albania and Norway).

²⁷³ See [S/PV.8987](#) (United States, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Albania, United Kingdom and Norway); [S/PV.9067](#) (United States, Ireland, Norway and France); [S/PV.9134](#) (United States, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), Norway, Ireland, Albania, Mexico, United Kingdom and France); and [S/PV.9219](#) (Mexico, Albania, Norway and Ireland).

the embargo was hampering the deployment of the necessary unified forces, disarmament, demobilization and demilitarization and security sector reform efforts.²⁷⁴

Council members expressed serious concern with the humanitarian conditions in South Sudan, many of them calling on the Government to ensure access for and the safety and security of humanitarian workers. Several speakers called on the international community to strengthen humanitarian support for South Sudan.²⁷⁵ Furthermore, some Council members made specific reference to the impact of climate change and floods on the situation in the country and underscored the need to define sustainable and long-term solutions to address the consequences of the phenomenon.²⁷⁶ In his remarks, the representative of South Sudan noted that the new road map and extension of the transitional period were inevitable given that much remained to be implemented in the Revitalized Agreement, but stressed that it was crucial that the parties were able to agree on the way forward on their own and peacefully.²⁷⁷ He also touched on the need for continued international financial support and the lifting of the arms embargo for the implementation of the agreement, as well as for the international community to fulfil its humanitarian pledges, noting in particular the severe impact of floods.²⁷⁸

By its resolution [2625 \(2022\)](#) of 15 March, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council extended the mandate of UNMISS for one year, until 15 March 2023, with some modifications, concerning in particular the Mission's support for constitution-drafting, the electoral process, combating and reporting on sexual and gender-based violence and providing risk assessments on the adverse effects of climate change.²⁷⁹ With respect to the political process, the Council expressed its deep concern about the delays in implementing the Revitalized Agreement and called upon the Government and all relevant actors to take action to fulfil several priority measures, including providing security to redesignated protection of civilians sites, initiating a permanent constitution-making process, making progress on key milestones in the preparations for free and fair elections and completing the graduation of the necessary unified forces.²⁸⁰

Resolution [2625 \(2022\)](#) was adopted with 13 votes in favour and two abstentions (by China and the Russian Federation).²⁸¹ In her statement after the vote, the representative of the Russian Federation asserted that the Council and UNMISS did not have the appropriate resources to fulfil the functions of human rights capacity-building, combating sexual violence, defending the rights of women and fighting corruption, which were internal matters for the country. She added that, while the Mission could, at the request of the host country, provide technical and logistical assistance for the conduct of elections, its core function was to stabilize the security situation and assist the South Sudanese authorities in implementing the Revitalized Agreement. The representative of China expressed an objection to the inclusion of human rights-related text in the draft resolution and the assignment of climate change-related mandates to peacekeeping operations without an in-depth analysis of its impacts and a clear understanding of climate change as a driver of security risks. Furthermore, the representatives of China and Ghana expressed criticism of the use of the term "human rights defenders" in the draft text, which was not agreed language and not clearly defined. Although he had voted in favour of the resolution, the representative of India expressed reservations regarding what he described as attempts to "securitize" climate change and added that the place for such discussions was within the framework of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. As penholder of the draft resolution, the representative of the United States thanked Council members for their efforts to strengthen the mandate

²⁷⁴ See [S/PV.8987](#) (Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana)); [S/PV.9067](#) (Russian Federation and China); [S/PV.9134](#) (China and Russian Federation); and [S/PV.9219](#) (Russian Federation, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya) and China).

²⁷⁵ See [S/PV.8987](#) (Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), China, India and United Arab Emirates); [S/PV.9067](#) (India, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya) and China); [S/PV.9134](#) (Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), United Arab Emirates, Brazil); and [S/PV.9219](#) (China and India).

²⁷⁶ See [S/PV.8987](#) (Ireland, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Albania, Norway and United Arab Emirates); [S/PV.9067](#) (Mexico, United Arab Emirates, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya) and Albania); [S/PV.9134](#) (Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), Norway and Ireland); and [S/PV.9219](#) (Mexico, Albania, United Arab Emirates and Ireland).

²⁷⁷ See [S/PV.9134](#).

²⁷⁸ *Ibid.* and [S/PV.9219](#).

²⁷⁹ Resolution [2625 \(2022\)](#), paras. 1 and 3. For more information on the mandate of UNMISS, see part X, sect. I.

²⁸⁰ Resolution [2625 \(2022\)](#), paras. 6 and 9.

²⁸¹ See [S/PV.8994](#).

of UNMISS and noted that the renewed mandate reinforced the Mission's core tasks, strengthened its sexual and gender-based violence prevention activities and authorized it to provide electoral assistance.

In addition to the regular briefings relating to South Sudan and UNMISS, Council members heard a briefing on 13 December by the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#), providing a summary of the work of the Committee in 2022, including its discussions on the final report of the Panel of Experts and the granting of five exemptions with respect to the arms embargo, travel ban and asset freeze.²⁸² By its resolution [2633 \(2022\)](#) of 26 May, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council extended the arms embargo, travel ban and asset freeze for South Sudan until 31 May 2023, as well as the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 1 July 2023.²⁸³ The Council requested the Secretary-General, in close consultation with UNMISS and the Panel of Experts, to conduct, no later than 15 April 2023, an assessment of progress achieved on the benchmarks established in resolution [2577 \(2021\)](#).²⁸⁴

Resolution [2633 \(2022\)](#) was adopted with 10 votes in favour and five abstentions.²⁸⁵ In explaining their decision to abstain in the vote, the representatives of China, Gabon, India, Kenya and the Russian Federation expressed regret that the resolution did not take into account the improved situation in South Sudan and the views of the Government, IGAD and the African Union on the need to lift the arms embargo and targeted sanctions, noting that the measures were not effective in supporting the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement and hindered the strengthening of the armed forces. The representative of Kenya added that the resolution also fell short of the Council's own commitment to progressively lift the measures. The representative of China recalled that his delegation put forward constructive amendments to the draft text, including on exempting training and non-lethal equipment, changing the application of exemption requests to reporting, and adjusting the targeted sanctions that, had they been adopted, would have helped the country to respond positively to the concerns of the African Union, enhance the security capacity of South Sudan and encourage the Government to take more substantive steps towards implementing the benchmarks.

For the purposes of facilitating coverage of this item, information on meetings is set out below in three tables under three headings, namely, Sudan (table 1); Sudan and South Sudan and Abyei (table 2); and South Sudan (table 3).

Table 1
Meetings: reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan – the Sudan, 2022

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8948 17 January			Sudan	Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court	All Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.8964 15 February	Letter dated 24 January 2022 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) addressed to the President of the Council (S/2022/48)	Draft resolution submitted by United States (S/2022/111)			Three Council members (China, Russian Federation, United States)	Resolution 2620 (2022) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)

²⁸² See [S/PV.9219](#). For further information on the sanctions measures relating to South Sudan, see part VII, sect. III.

²⁸³ Resolution [2633 \(2022\)](#), paras. 1, 12 and 18. For further information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#) and the Panel of Experts, see part IX, sect. I.B.

²⁸⁴ Resolution [2633 \(2022\)](#), para. 5.

²⁸⁵ See [S/PV.9045](#).

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<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.9005 28 March			Sudan		One Council member (Ghana), ^a invitee	
S/PV.9006 28 March	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS) (S/2022/172)		Sudan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and Head of UNITAMS	13 Council members, ^b all invitees	
S/PV.9041 24 May	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Sudan and the activities of UNITAMS (S/2022/400)		Sudan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General	13 Council members, ^c all invitees	
S/PV.9054 3 June		Draft resolution submitted by United Kingdom (S/2022/443)			Nine Council members ^d	Resolution 2636 (2022) 15-0-0
S/PV.9070 21 June			Sudan		Five Council members (China, Gabon, Ghana, Russian Federation, United States), ^a invitee	
S/PV.9113 23 August			Sudan	Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court	All Council members, all invitees ^e	
S/PV.9128 13 September			Sudan		One Council member (Ghana), ^a invitee	

**Part I. Consideration of questions under the responsibility of
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international peace and security**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.9129 13 September	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Sudan and the activities of UNITAMS (S/2022/667)		Sudan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General, President of Sudan Social Development Organization	13 Council members, ^f all invitees ^g	
S/PV.9210 7 December			Sudan		One Council member (Ghana), ^a invitee	
S/PV.9211 7 December	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Sudan and the activities of UNITAMS (S/2022/898)		Sudan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General	13 Council members, ^b all invitees ^h	

^a The representative of Ghana spoke in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1591 \(2005\)](#) concerning the Sudan.

^b Albania, Brazil, China, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

^c Albania, Brazil, China, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

^d Albania, China, France, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States.

^e The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court participated in the meeting by videoconference.

^f Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

^g The President of Sudan Social Development Organization participated in the meeting by videoconference.

^h The Special Representative participated in the meeting by videoconference.

Table 2
Meetings: reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan – the Sudan, South Sudan and Abyei, 2022

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.9020 21 April	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abyei (S/2022/316)		Sudan, South Sudan	Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa	13 Council members, ^a all invitees ^b	
S/PV.9031 12 May		Draft resolution submitted by United States (S/2022/387)			One Council member (Russian Federation)	Resolution 2630 (2022) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)

Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 2022

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.9170 27 October	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abyei (S/2022/760)		Sudan, South Sudan	Assistant Secretary-General for Africa, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General	13 Council members, ^c all invitees ^d	
S/PV.9191 14 November		Draft resolution submitted by United States (S/2022/839)				Resolution 2660 (2022) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)

^a Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon (also on behalf of Gabon, Ghana and Kenya), India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

^b The Under-Secretary-General and the Special Envoy participated in the meeting by videoconference.

^c Albania, Brazil, China, France, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

^d The Special Envoy participated in the meeting by videoconference.

Table 3

Meetings: reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan – South Sudan, 2022

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8987 7 March	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in South Sudan (S/2022/156)			Special Representative of the Secretary-General for South Sudan and Head of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, interim Chairperson of the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, women's human rights and peace activist	13 Council members, ^a all invitees ^b	
S/PV.8894 15 March	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in South Sudan (S/2022/156)	Draft resolution submitted by United States (S/2022/219)	South Sudan		Five Council members (China, Ghana, India, Russian Federation, United States), invitee	Resolution 2625 (2022) 13-0-2 ^c (adopted under Chapter VII)

**Part I. Consideration of questions under the responsibility of
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international peace and security**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.9045 26 May		Draft resolution submitted by United States (S/2022/417)	South Sudan		Six Council members, ^d invitee	Resolution 2633 (2022) 10-0-5 ^e (adopted under Chapter VII)
S/PV.9067 20 June	Report of the Secretary- General on the situation in South Sudan (S/2022/468)		South Sudan	Special Representative of the Secretary- General, Acting Director in the Operations and Advocacy Division of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, South Sudanese human rights defender, civil rights activist and peace advocate	13 Council members, ^f all invitees ^g	
S/PV.9134 16 September	Report of the Secretary- General on the situation in South Sudan (S/2022/689)		South Sudan	Special Representative of the Secretary- General, President of the South Sudan Women's Empowerment Network	13 Council members, ^f all invitees	
S/PV.9219 13 December	Report of the Secretary- General on the situation in South Sudan (S/2022/918)		South Sudan	Special Representative of the Secretary- General, interim Chairperson of the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission	13 Council members, ^{f,h} all invitees ⁱ	

^a Albania, Brazil, China, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

^b The interim Chairperson of the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission and the civil society representative participated in the meeting by videoconference.

^c *For:* Albania, Brazil, France, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States; *against:* none; *abstaining:* China, Russian Federation.

^d China, Gabon, Ghana, India, Kenya and Russian Federation

^e *For:* Albania, Brazil, France, Ghana, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States; *against:* none; *abstaining:* China, India, Kenya, Russian Federation.

^f Albania, Brazil, China, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

^g The South Sudanese human rights defender and activist participated in the meeting by videoconference.

^h The representative of Gabon spoke in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) concerning South Sudan.

ⁱ The interim Chairperson of the Commission participated in the meeting by videoconference.