

2. The situation in Somalia

In 2022, the Council held 12 meetings and adopted six decisions on the situation in Somalia, four of which were under Chapter VII of the Charter. Six meetings took the form of briefings, while the remaining six were convened to adopt decisions.¹⁴ More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is provided in the table below. Council members also held informal consultations of the whole to discuss the situation in Somalia.¹⁵

During the period under review, the Council endorsed the decision of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union to reconfigure the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) into the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS),¹⁶ and modified the name of the Committee previously known as the “Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia” to the “Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Al-Shabaab”.¹⁷ For the first time since their introduction in 2008,¹⁸ the Council did not renew the authorizations set out in resolution 2608 (2021) in connection with the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, which had expired in March 2022.¹⁹ More information on these and other developments is provided below.

In addition to its consideration of the reports of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia,²⁰ the Council heard regular briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia and Head of ATMIS, as well as the latter’s Deputy.²¹ The Chair of the Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Al-Shabaab also provided briefings to the Council.²² In addition, the Council heard briefings by the Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations and the Special Representative of the European Union for the Horn of Africa.

In his briefings in 2022, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General provided updates to the Council concerning the political developments in Somalia, including the conclusion of the electoral process in May 2022, the worsening humanitarian conditions and the volatile security situation with a focus on the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and the reconfiguration of AMISOM into ATMIS.

Regarding the political developments, in February, the Special Representative stated that national elections in Somalia were more than one year behind the constitutionally prescribed schedule.²³ In his briefing in May, the Special Representative welcomed the conclusion of the electoral process in Somalia as a major milestone for the country.²⁴ On 15 May, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud had been elected President in a joint session of Parliament that had been peaceful, orderly and respectful of the rules of procedure. The Special Representative noted, nevertheless, that, contrary to the provisional Constitution of Somalia, the Somali people had not had the opportunity to vote in a one-person, one-vote election and that women had been elected to just 21 per cent of parliamentary seats. Many irregularities in the selection of Members of Parliament had been noted throughout the process, which had been repeatedly marred by violence. In September, the Special Representative reported that the political climate in Somalia was more conducive to addressing key national priorities following the conclusion of its contentious electoral process.²⁵ In June, the Parliament had unanimously endorsed the nominee for Prime Minister, Hamza Abdi Barre, and in August, confirmed his Cabinet. The Special Representative noted that only 13 per cent

¹⁴ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

¹⁵ See *A/77/2*, part II, chap. 6.

¹⁶ Resolution 2628 (2022), para. 22. For more information on ATMIS, see part VIII, sect. III.

¹⁷ Resolution 2662 (2022), para. 24. For more information on the Committee, see part IX, sect. I.B.

¹⁸ See resolution 1816 (2008). For more information, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2008–2009*, part I.

¹⁹ For more information on the authorizations in connection with the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, see part VII of previous supplements covering the period from 2008 to 2021.

²⁰ *S/2022/101*, *S/2022/392* and *S/2022/665*.

²¹ Prior to the adoption of resolution 2628 (2022) on 31 March, the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission provided a briefing to the Council in his capacity as the Head of AMISOM.

²² For more information, see part VII, sect. III.A, and part IX, sect. I.B.

²³ See *S/PV.8965*.

²⁴ See *S/PV.9040*.

²⁵ See *S/PV.9125*.

of Cabinet members were women and called again upon Somali leaders to take further measures to ensure the meaningful participation of women across institutions of government, as well as the inclusion of youth and historically marginalized groups. The Special Representative commended the President on his efforts to improve relations between the central Government and the federal member states in order to advance national priorities, as well as on his outreach to neighbouring countries.

The humanitarian situation remained extremely dire, with 7.7 million Somalis requiring assistance in 2022.²⁶ In May, the Special Representative reported that the conditions were worsening following the failure of a fourth consecutive rainy season and noted that the number of people affected by the drought had risen to 6.1 million, with the country facing a heightened risk of localized famine in six communities.²⁷ Later in the year, he noted that nearly half of the country's estimated population had been impacted by the worst drought in at least four decades, exacerbated by climate factors.²⁸ The Special Representative underscored that the ongoing humanitarian crisis had especially contributed to the vulnerability of displaced women and children.

According to the Special Representative, the security conditions remained volatile in 2022, with Al-Shabaab continuing to pose a major security threat by exploiting local political and security tensions and extensively using improvised explosive devices,²⁹ with its attacks focused on Mogadishu, South-West State and Hirshabelle.³⁰ In that context, the Special Representative commended the Somali security forces and ATMIS, who had safeguarded the electoral process and borne the brunt of Al-Shabaab's attacks.³¹ On the reconfiguration of the African Union-led Mission, on 15 February, the Special Representative reported on the progress made with regard to the development of the joint African Union-Federal Government of Somalia concept of operations; the joint African Union-United Nations proposal on a reconfigured Mission; and the United Nations logistical options in support of a reconfigured Mission and the Somali security forces going forward, as requested under resolution 2568 (2021).³² The Special Representative underscored that progress in the implementation of the Somalia Transition Plan was key for both the reconfiguration of AMISOM and to determine the pace of the transfer of responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces. In his final briefing of the year, the Special Representative reported that the implementation of the transition tasks mandated by resolution 2628 (2022) was advancing, including the request for the Federal Government of Somalia, the African Union, the European Union and the United Nations to identify relevant, clear and realistic benchmarks for progress.³³

In their briefings, the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia and his Deputy informed the Council about the electoral assistance and the security support that the Mission had provided to the Somali authorities, including through joint operations targeting Al-Shabaab.³⁴ The Special Representative noted that, following the reconfiguration of AMISOM into ATMIS earlier in the year, force generation and adequate and predictable funding and equipment attuned to force activity and mobility were key to degrading Al-Shabaab and ensuring the success of the transition. It was vital to scale up air strategic support with transport and attack helicopters, as well as adequate offensive weapons in all sectors, for both ATMIS and the Somali security forces.³⁵ Addressing the Council later in the year, the Deputy Special Representative and Acting Head of ATMIS noted that the upcoming drawdown of 2,000 troops by December 2022 would ultimately depend on the ability of the Federal Government to generate forces to fill the gaps left by the reduction of the ATMIS force.³⁶ A key requirement in that regard was the availability of sustainable, predictable and adequate levels of funding. Given the reluctance to consider a special United Nations meeting on financing for ATMIS and the Somali security forces, she appealed to the Council and all partners to ensure sustainable, predictable and adequate funding for the Mission for the duration of its mandate.

²⁶ See [S/PV.8965](#).

²⁷ See [S/PV.9040](#).

²⁸ See [S/PV.9125](#).

²⁹ See [S/PV.8965](#).

³⁰ See [S/PV.9040](#).

³¹ See [S/PV.9040](#) and [S/PV.9125](#).

³² See [S/PV.8965](#).

³³ See [S/PV.9125](#).

³⁴ See [S/PV.8965](#), [S/PV.9040](#) and [S/PV.9125](#).

³⁵ See [S/PV.9040](#).

³⁶ See [S/PV.9125](#).

In connection with the above, in her briefing to the Council in September, the Special Representative of the European Union for the Horn of Africa asserted that Al-Shabaab had grown to become the richest and strongest global franchise of Al-Qaida, threatening peace and security, as well as humanitarian efforts, in Somalia and the Horn of Africa.³⁷ She recalled that the European Union was committed to supporting ATMIS, but that there was no support for more of the same. She urged the Government to provide clarity on the Somalia Transition Plan and the national security architecture and noted that the only exit strategy for ATMIS was to support the Somali security sector.

Regarding the fight against piracy off the coast of Somalia, in his briefing in February, the Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations expressed the hope that the Council would be able to agree on a revised resolution that better reflected Somali priorities, while also renewing the legal provisions necessary for the continuation of Operation Atalanta of the European Union Naval Force for at least the remainder of the year.³⁸ If the authorizations set out in the resolution were not extended beyond 3 March, Operation Atalanta would not have the authorization to fight piracy and to protect the deliveries of the World Food Programme and other vulnerable vessels in the Somali territorial waters. At the same meeting, some Council members³⁹ expressed support for finding a solution for the renewal of the authorizations set out in the resolution on maritime security off the coast of Somalia. The representative of Somalia, however, reiterated that the Federal Government of Somalia would no longer request any renewal or modification of the authorizations set out in the resolution, since it had successfully achieved its intended objectives after nearly 15 years.⁴⁰

During the period under review, Council members' discussions were centred on political developments, including the conduct of elections, the deteriorating humanitarian conditions, the continued threat posed by Al-Shabaab and the reconfiguration of AMISOM into ATMIS.

On the political developments in 2022, Council members welcomed the conclusion of the electoral process and the election of the President, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud,⁴¹ and took note of the formation of a new government led by the Prime Minister, Hamza Abdi Barre.⁴² Concerning the representation of women, while several Council members noted that it fell short of the 30 per cent quota, they congratulated Sadia Yasin Haji Samatar on being the first Somali woman elected Deputy Speaker.⁴³ Throughout the year, several Council members also called for the meaningful participation of women in political processes, including in decision-making.⁴⁴ In that regard, the representatives of India and Brazil took note of the increase in the participation of women following the appointment of the Cabinet, while the representative of Ireland indicated that the number of women appointed to the new Cabinet fell short of the country's own commitments.⁴⁵ Council members also discussed the constitutional reform process⁴⁶ and national reconciliation efforts being made by the Federal Government and the federal member states of Somalia.⁴⁷

Concerning the humanitarian situation, Council members discussed the deteriorating conditions resulting in acute food insecurity and displacement, exacerbated by an unprecedented drought. In that

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ See [S/PV.8965](#).

³⁹ United Kingdom, United States, France and Ireland.

⁴⁰ See also the letter dated 26 February from the representative of Somalia to the President of the Security Council ([S/2022/162](#)) and the report of the Secretary-General on the situation with respect to piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, in which he stated that the international naval operations within the territorial sea of Somalia had ceased following the expiration on 3 March of the relevant authorizations set out in resolution [2608 \(2021\)](#) ([S/2022/819](#)).

⁴¹ See [S/PV.9040](#).

⁴² See [S/PV.9125](#) (Ireland, India, United Arab Emirates, Albania, Mexico and Brazil).

⁴³ See [S/PV.9040](#) (United Kingdom, Norway, France, Albania, Ireland, Mexico and United States).

⁴⁴ See [S/PV.9040](#) (Albania, Ireland and Mexico); [S/PV.9071](#) (Gabon); and [S/PV.9125](#) (Ireland, Norway and Albania).

⁴⁵ See [S/PV.9125](#).

⁴⁶ See [S/PV.8965](#) (United Kingdom); [S/PV.9040](#) (United Kingdom, Norway, France, Ireland, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya) and India); and [S/PV.9125](#) (Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), Norway, Albania and United States).

⁴⁷ See [S/PV.8965](#) (Norway); [S/PV.9040](#) (United Kingdom, Norway, Ireland, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya) and United States); and [S/PV.9125](#) (United Kingdom, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), Norway, China, United States and Brazil).

context, several Council members noted the growing need for humanitarian assistance,⁴⁸ with some also referring to the impact of climate change as a contributing factor.⁴⁹ Later in the year, Council members warned about the risk of famine in Somalia and called for the scaling-up of efforts to avert such a scenario.⁵⁰

On the security front, the discussions in the Council were focused on the persistent threat posed by Al-Shabaab, with members condemning the group's terrorist attacks, which continued in 2022. In connection with the reconfiguration of the African Union-led Mission, Council members paid tribute to the efforts of troop- and police-contributing countries that had served in AMISOM and welcomed the establishment of the successor Mission.⁵¹ Noting that it was rare that the Council got the opportunity to help to shape the transition of a mission, the representative of the United States stated that the mandate of ATMIS provided the opportunity to adapt and reinvigorate the African-led international effort against Al-Shabaab. Several Council members underscored the importance of ensuring sustainable and predictable financing for ATMIS to be effective in fulfilling its mandate.⁵² The representative of France expressed the view that no new funding for ATMIS, regardless of the amount, would suffice without Somali efforts to generate armed forces, together with the federal states, or without strong support from ATMIS to help Somali forces and conduct offensive operations with them.⁵³ The representative of the United Kingdom, noting that her country provided funding to ATMIS, encouraged other Member States to join in that endeavour so that Somali forces could develop the capacity and capabilities they needed to end the threat posed by Al-Shabaab.⁵⁴

In 2022, the decisions of the Council were also focused on the issues outlined above, and specifically on the reconfiguration of AMISOM and the review of the mandate of UNSOM.

Concerning the reconfiguration of AMISOM, on 31 March, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2628 (2022). By that resolution, the Council endorsed the decision of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union to reconfigure AMISOM into ATMIS and authorized, for an initial period of 12 months, the member States of the African Union to take all necessary measures to carry out its mandate to reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab, support the capacity-building of the integrated Somali security and police forces, conduct a phased handover of security responsibilities to Somalia and support peace and reconciliation efforts in support of the development of a stable, federal, sovereign and united Somalia.⁵⁵ The Council further decided that the strategic objectives of ATMIS would include conducting jointly planned and targeted operations with Somali security forces to degrade Al-Shabaab and affiliates linked to Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da'esh); supporting Somali security forces by, inter alia, jointly holding priority population centres and providing protection for the local communities, United Nations personnel and installations; assisting the Federal Government in the implementation of stabilization efforts for all recovered areas; and supporting the capacity development of the Somali security forces.⁵⁶ By the same resolution, the Council maintained the number of authorized uniformed personnel at the same level as for AMISOM, at 19,626, inclusive of a minimum of 1,040 police personnel including five formed police units, until 31 December 2022, and endorsed the decision of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union to draw down 2,000 personnel by that date.⁵⁷ The Council also authorized the member States of the African Union,

⁴⁸ See [S/PV.8965](#) (United Kingdom, India, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), United States, Norway, Ireland, Mexico, United Arab Emirates, China and Albania); [S/PV.9040](#) (France and United Arab Emirates); and [S/PV.9125](#) (India, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), Albania and France).

⁴⁹ See [S/PV.8965](#) (United Kingdom, France, Norway, Ireland, Mexico, United Arab Emirates and Albania); [S/PV.9040](#) (Norway, Albania, Ireland, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya) and Mexico); [S/PV.9071](#) (Ghana); and [S/PV.9125](#) (Ireland, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), United Arab Emirates, Mexico and France).

⁵⁰ See [S/PV.9040](#) (United Kingdom, Norway, China, Albania, Ireland, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), Mexico, United Arab Emirates, India and United States); and [S/PV.9125](#) (United Kingdom, Ireland, Norway, United Arab Emirates, Mexico, China, United States and Brazil).

⁵¹ See [S/PV.9009](#).

⁵² See [S/PV.9040](#) (China, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), Russian Federation and India); and [S/PV.9125](#) (Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya) and China).

⁵³ See [S/PV.9040](#).

⁵⁴ See [S/PV.9125](#).

⁵⁵ Resolution 2628 (2022), para. 22.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 23.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 26.

between 1 January and 31 March 2023, to deploy up to 17,626 uniformed personnel, inclusive of a minimum of 1,040 police personnel including five formed police units.⁵⁸

On 21 December, acting under Chapter VII, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2670 \(2022\)](#), in which it noted the African Union request to extend phase 1 of ATMIS for the drawdown of 2,000 ATMIS personnel until 30 June 2023 and exceptionally extended its authorizations and affirmed that paragraph 27 of resolution [2628 \(2022\)](#) was annulled.⁵⁹

With regard to UNSOM, on 26 May, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2632 \(2022\)](#), by which it extended the mandate of the Mission for a period of five months, until 31 October 2022.⁶⁰ In the same resolution, the Council welcomed the conclusion of the electoral process, resulting in the election of the President, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, allowing for the peaceful transition of power, and underscored that the swift formation of an inclusive federal government, with the full, equal and meaningful participation of women, would help to progress critical national priorities, promote national reconciliation and security, and support transition from international security support.⁶¹ The Council also underscored that the mandate of UNSOM was complementary to the mandates of ATMIS, the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) and the United Nations country team, and the support provided by the African Union and international partners.⁶² Furthermore, the Council requested the Secretary-General to undertake a strategic review of UNSOM to include recommendations for clearly defined, measurable and realistic benchmarks to track the timely execution and achievement of its mandate and to report to the Council by 30 September 2022.⁶³

On 31 October, the Council adopted resolution [2657 \(2022\)](#),⁶⁴ with one abstention, by which it endorsed the proposed benchmarks and recommendations set out in the strategic review and extended the mandate and tasks of UNSOM, for one additional year, until 31 October 2023.⁶⁵ It requested UNSOM to maintain and strengthen its presence across Somalia and to continue to strengthen its cooperation with Somalia and ATMIS.⁶⁶ Recognizing the renewed operations against Al-Shabaab, the Council encouraged UNSOM to support Somalia (a) to ensure that plans were in place to protect civilians and communities in areas which were the focus of military operations, prior to, during and after engagements; (b) to accelerate implementation of the national stabilization strategy and state-level stabilization plans; (c) to support Somali civilian leadership, ownership and oversight in the planning and coordination of stabilization efforts; (d) to promote expansion of a governance and service delivery to areas and districts where fragility persisted; and (e) to ensure timely, balanced support to areas newly or recently recovered from Al-Shabaab.⁶⁷ In explaining the vote, the representative of the United States stated that his country was encouraged by the fact that resolution [2657 \(2022\)](#) had incorporated recommendations from the strategic review of UNSOM, including further coordination between ATMIS, UNSOS, the United Nations country team and other multilateral and bilateral partners.⁶⁸ The representative of China noted that his country had abstained in the voting as it considered that there was still need for improvement in resolution [2657 \(2022\)](#) on issues such as the protection of civilians, humanitarian access, climate change and the protection of children, and that the future direction of relevant efforts must be clarified.⁶⁹ The representative of the Russian Federation said that her delegation had voted in favour, but that it shared the view of China concerning the imbalanced nature of some of the wording of the resolution, including with respect to humanitarian issues, the protection of children in armed conflict and human rights. She also expressed regret that the resolution did not sufficiently reflect the recommendations of the strategic review of UNSOM and its mandate conducted by the Secretariat's independent team.

⁵⁸ Ibid., para. 27.

⁵⁹ Resolution [2670 \(2022\)](#), second preambular paragraph and para. 1 (a).

⁶⁰ Resolution [2632 \(2022\)](#), para. 1. For more information on the mandate of UNSOM, see part X, sect. II.

⁶¹ Resolution [2632 \(2022\)](#), third preambular paragraph.

⁶² Ibid., fourth preambular paragraph.

⁶³ Ibid., para. 3. For more information on the report on the independent strategic review of UNSOM, see [S/2022/716](#).

⁶⁴ See [S/PV.9177](#).

⁶⁵ Resolution [2657 \(2022\)](#), paras. 2 and 4.

⁶⁶ Ibid., para. 6.

⁶⁷ Ibid., para. 7.

⁶⁸ See [S/PV.9177](#). See also resolution [2657 \(2022\)](#), para. 3.

⁶⁹ See [S/PV.9177](#).

In 2022, the Council also heard three briefings by the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) and received updates about the Committee's activities in the reporting period. On 24 February, the Chair reported that Committee members welcomed the continued improvement in the relationship between the Panel of Experts and the Federal Government of Somalia, particularly with regard to cooperation on the implementation of the charcoal ban.⁷⁰ On 21 June, the Chair noted, *inter alia*, that the members of the Committee had expressed the view that the successful conclusion of the presidential elections presented a renewed opportunity to cooperate and collaborate with the Federal Government on moving forward with important issues that fell under the Committee's remit.⁷¹ At the same meeting, the representative of Ghana underscored the need for cooperation and unified action within the Council, which was critical to ensuring strict compliance with all the sanctions measures and sustained pressure on all parties to end and prevent all grave violations against children. The representative of Gabon stated that his country supported, *inter alia*, the recommendation that encouraged the Federal Government of Somalia and its partners to make various efforts in order to dry up the finances of Al-Shabaab, including through restrictions and assets seizure, targeting in particular the money that Al-Shabaab considered essential for carrying out its operations. In his last briefing of the year, held on 19 October, the Chair informed the Council about the Committee's activities in the reporting period, including about the thematic reports received from the Panel of Experts.⁷²

The Council adopted two resolutions concerning the sanctions regime relating to Somalia. On 15 November, the Council adopted resolution 2661 (2022), by which it extended resolution 2607 (2021) for two days, until 17 November 2022.⁷³ On 17 November, acting under Chapter VII, the Council adopted resolution 2662 (2022), with four abstentions.⁷⁴ By that resolution, the Council renewed the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 15 December 2023, and expanded the tasks referred to in paragraph 11 of resolution 2444 (2018) to include those contained in paragraphs 32 and 35 of the resolution.⁷⁵ By the resolution, the Council also renewed the maritime interdiction of charcoal, weapons or military equipment and improvised explosive devices components until 15 November 2023,⁷⁶ and reaffirmed the ban on components of improvised explosive devices.⁷⁷ In addition, the Council reaffirmed the partial arms embargo and the exemptions on deliveries on weapons and military equipment or the provision of technical advice, financial and other assistance, and training related to military activities whose beneficiaries were the Somali security and police institutions or those listed in paragraph 21.⁷⁸ It further confirmed its commitment to working with Somalia to ensure that the notification procedures were lifted progressively, in the light of the progress made against the benchmarks set out in the technical assessment (S/2022/698).⁷⁹ The Council also recalled previous decisions concerning the asset freeze, travel ban and charcoal ban measures, and renewed the humanitarian exemption to the assets freeze without specifying an expiry date.⁸⁰ By the same resolution, the Council decided that the name of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia was to be known as the "Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Al-Shabaab".⁸¹

In the resolution, the Council emphasized that its objective was to establish a consolidated framework to strengthen state- and peace-building in Somalia, defeat Al-Shabaab and complement the mandates of UNSOM and ATMIS, including in particular through: (a) supporting weapons and ammunition management and security sector reform in Somalia (pillar 1); and (b) degrading the threat posed by Al-Shabaab (pillar 2).⁸² By the same resolution, the Council requested the Somali Government

⁷⁰ See S/PV.8976.

⁷¹ See S/PV.9071.

⁷² See S/PV.9157.

⁷³ Resolution 2661 (2022), para. 1.

⁷⁴ See S/PV.9196.

⁷⁵ Resolution 2662 (2022), para. 44. For more information on the mandate of the Panel of Experts, see part IX, sect. I.B.

⁷⁶ Resolution 2662 (2022), para. 41.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 37.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, paras. 10, 11, 14, 15, 18 and 21.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 13.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, paras. 26, 28 and 34.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, para. 24. For more information on the mandate of the Committee, see part IX, sect. I.B.

⁸² Resolution 2662 (2022), para. 2.

authorities to consider developing and submitting a proposal for consideration by the Committee, for the one-off, complete disposal of charcoal stockpiles to prevent Al-Shabaab from profiting from the sale.⁸³

In explanation of their votes, several Council members presented their views on the sanctions regime relating to Somalia.⁸⁴ In addition, the representative of the Russian Federation expressed disagreement with several aspects of resolution 2662 (2022), including references to questions relating to bilateral relations between Djibouti and Eritrea and the approach to Al-Shabaab. He said that his delegation continued to be troubled by the ambivalent approach to Al-Shabaab, which blurred the focus of global counter-terrorism efforts. Despite the dangerous nature of that entity and its affiliation with ISIL/Da'esh and Al-Qaida, he added that it continued to be “kept at a distance from the Committees established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015), respectively”. In that regard, he expressed the view that, with the resolution, another erroneous step had been taken by enshrining on paper the notion that Al-Shabaab would be dealt with by the Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992), which was in charge of the Somalia sanctions regime. The representative of Kenya explained that his country had voted in favour to demonstrate its backing for the resolution’s tougher measures against the Al-Qaida affiliate in Somalia. He added that Kenya and the other African members of the Council were instrumental in ensuring that resolution 2662 (2022) was framed in a way that clarified that the enemy was a terrorist group, Al-Shabaab. He also stated that they had increased pressure on the group by making it easier for the Federal Government to acquire more lethal weapons. The representative of the United Arab Emirates stressed that a critical aspect, which must be part of any discussion on countering terrorism, was the importance of not linking terrorism to religion and welcomed the inclusion of a paragraph jointly put forward by the United Arab Emirates and the three African members of the Council that condemned terrorist groups’ attempts to craft distorted narratives based on the misinterpretation and misrepresentation of religion.

Meetings: the situation in Somalia, 2022

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8965 15 February	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia (S/2022/101)		Somalia	Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia and Head of the African Union Mission in Somalia, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations	13 Council members, ^a all invitees	
S/PV.8976 24 February					One Council member (Ireland) ^b	

⁸³ Ibid., para. 36 (b).

⁸⁴ See S/PV.9196 (United Kingdom, United States, United Arab Emirates, Gabon, Russian Federation, Kenya, China and Ghana). For more information on discussions relating to Article 41, see part VII, sect. III.

**Part I. Consideration of questions under the responsibility of
the Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace and security**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.9009 31 March		Draft resolution submitted by United Kingdom (S/2022/277)	Somalia		Six Council members, ^c invitee	Resolution 2628 (2022) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)
S/PV.9040 23 May	Report of the Secretary- General on the situation in Somalia (S/2022/392)		Somalia	Special Representative of the Secretary- General, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia and Head of the African Union Transition Mission for Somalia (ATMIS)	13 Council members, ^d all invitees	
S/PV.9044 26 May	Report of the Secretary- General on the situation in Somalia (S/2022/392)	Draft resolution submitted by United Kingdom (S/2022/412)	Somalia		Invitee	Resolution 2632 (2022) 15-0-0
S/PV.9071 21 June					Three Council members (Gabon, Ghana and Ireland) ^e	
S/PV.9125 7 September	Report of the Secretary- General on the situation in Somalia (S/2022/665)		Somalia	Special Representative of the Secretary- General, Deputy Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia and Acting Head of ATMIS, Special Representative of the European Union for the Horn of Africa	13 Council members, ^a all invitees	
S/PV.9157 19 October	Letters dated 10 and 15 October 2022 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee				One Council member (Ireland) ^f	

Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 2022

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
	pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2022/754 and S/2022/766)					
S/PV.9177 31 October	Letter dated 26 September 2022 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2022/716)	Draft resolution submitted by United Kingdom (S/2022/812)	Somalia		Six Council members, ^g invitee	Resolution 2657 (2022) 14-0-1 ^h
	Letter dated 15 October 2022 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2022/766)					
S/PV.9193 15 November	Letter dated 15 September 2022 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2022/698)	Draft resolution submitted by United Kingdom (S/2022/855)				Resolution 2661 (2022) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)
S/PV.9196 17 November		Draft resolution submitted by United Kingdom (S/2022/865)	Somalia		Eight Council members, ⁱ invitee	Resolution 2662 (2022) 11-0-4 ^j (adopted under Chapter VII)

**Part I. Consideration of questions under the responsibility of
the Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace and security**

Meeting record and date	Sub-item	Other documents	Rule 37 invitations	Rule 39 and other invitations	Speakers	Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)
S/PV.9232 21 December		Draft resolution submitted by United Kingdom (S/2022/983)			Six Council members ^k	Resolution 2670 (2022) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)

^a Albania, Brazil, China, France, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

^b The representative of Ireland spoke on behalf of the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia.

^c Albania, China, India, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

^d Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

^e The representative of Ireland spoke in her capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia.

^f The representative of Ireland spoke in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia.

^g China, Kenya, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

^h For: Albania, Brazil, France, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States; *against*: none; *abstaining*: China.

ⁱ China, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

^j For: Albania, Brazil, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States; *against*: none; *abstaining*: China, Gabon, Ghana, Russian Federation.

^k China, France, Ireland, Norway, United Kingdom and United States.

3. The situation in the Great Lakes region

During the period under review, the Council held two meetings on the situation in the Great Lakes region, both in the form of briefings.⁸⁵ The Council did not adopt any decisions under this item in 2022. More information on the meetings, including on participants and speakers, is provided in the table below. Council members also held informal consultations of the whole in connection with the item.⁸⁶

In 2022, the Council heard briefings by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region, the Executive Secretary of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and a civil society representative. In addition, the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission submitted written advice, under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure, in connection with the two briefings.⁸⁷ Further to the two reports of the Secretary-General,⁸⁸ during his briefings to the Council, the Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region focused on the activities of his Office in supporting the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region and the progress achieved on the political and security fronts, as well as the related challenges.

At the meeting held on 27 April, the Special Envoy noted that, since his previous briefing to the Council, the situation in the Great Lakes region had shown an encouraging trend in terms of dialogue, cooperation and integration and, in general, the continued will to tackle the root causes of the instability.⁸⁹ However, that positive trend had been disrupted by the security and humanitarian crisis in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, compounded by the resumption of military activities by the Mouvement du 23 mars in the last quarter of 2021, with attacks on several positions of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.⁹⁰ The Special Envoy expressed regret that the Allied Democratic Forces and other local armed groups continued to commit atrocities against civilians. Despite that

⁸⁵ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

⁸⁶ See A/77/2, part II, chap. 11. See also S/2022/868.

⁸⁷ See S/2022/353 and S/2022/789. For more information on written advice submitted in accordance with rule 39, see part II, sect. VII, and part IX, sect. VII.

⁸⁸ S/2022/276 and S/2022/735.

⁸⁹ See S/PV.9023.

⁹⁰ For more information on the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, see sect. 4 below.