

**Part I. Consideration of questions under the responsibility of
the Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace and security**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.9086 7 July	Report of the Secretary- General on the activities of UNOWAS (S/2022/521)			Special Representative of the Secretary- General, Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission, Coordinator of the Association Alliance for Peace and Security	13 Council members, ^a all invitees	

^a Albania, Brazil, China, France, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

^b The Special Representative, the Executive Director of UNODC and the lawyer and public policy analyst with Médecins du Monde participated in the meeting by videoconference.

9. Peace and security in Africa

During the period under review, the Council held eight meetings in connection with the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa”. Three of the meetings took the form of briefings, two took the form of debates, and two were convened for the adoption of decisions.³⁰⁷ The Council held one private (closed) meeting to discuss the situation in the north of Ethiopia, in relation to which it issued a communiqué.³⁰⁸ The Council adopted one resolution and a presidential statement. More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is provided in the table below. In addition to the meetings, Council members held informal consultations of the whole in connection with the item.³⁰⁹

In 2022, the meetings of the Council under the item were focused on the activities and role of the Group of Five for the Sahel, the situation of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea, capacity-building for sustaining peace in Africa and the fight against the financing of armed groups and terrorists through the illicit trafficking of natural resources.

The Council held two meetings on the operations of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel on 18 May³¹⁰ and 16 November³¹¹ further to the reports of the Secretary-General on the Joint Force.³¹² The Council heard briefings by the Assistant Secretary-General for Africa, the Executive Secretary of the Group of Five for the Sahel and two civil society representatives.³¹³ The briefings were focused primarily on the political and security situation in the subregion and the role of the Group of Five for the Sahel.

At the meeting on 18 May, the Assistant Secretary-General for Africa and the Executive Secretary of the Group of Five for the Sahel both said that the decision of the Malian authorities to withdraw from the Group of Five for the Sahel and its Joint Force was regrettable.³¹⁴ The Assistant Secretary-General noted that the security situation in the region had deteriorated and informed the Council that, in the light of the growing complexity of the crisis facing the Sahel, the African Union Commission and the United Nations Secretariat were conducting a joint strategic assessment with a view to strengthening support for the Group of Five for the Sahel and other security and governance initiatives in the region, and exploring innovative ways to mobilize sustainable resourcing for such initiatives. The Executive Secretary said that the Group of Five for the Sahel would participate in that assessment and expressed the hope that its main

³⁰⁷ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

³⁰⁸ See S/PV.9160.

³⁰⁹ See A/77/2, part II, chap. 35.

³¹⁰ See S/PV.9035.

³¹¹ See S/PV.9194.

³¹² S/2022/382 and S/2022/838.

³¹³ See S/PV.9035 and S/PV.9194.

³¹⁴ See S/PV.9035.

components would enable it to define a better security, governance and cooperation architecture in order to ensure the optimal use of resources. Given the way the Joint Force operated and the new context with the ongoing deterioration in the security situation, a review of the concept of its operations had been considered. On the political level, the unconstitutional changes that had taken place in three of the countries of the Group of Five for the Sahel (Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali), as well as the sanctions imposed on some of them, had not contributed to harmony in the subregion. The Coordinator and President of the Rights and Resources Initiative/Group focused her briefing on the links between climate change and the conflict in the Sahel countries, including the ways in which climate change exacerbated conflict, and the impact of climate change and conflict on women and young people. She made several recommendations, including strengthening cooperation with the Group of Five for the Sahel on climate change.

At the meeting on 16 November,³¹⁵ the Assistant Secretary-General for Africa said that it was regrettable that, in addition to its financial difficulties, the Joint Force had been weakened by the withdrawal of Mali and the second coup d'état in Burkina Faso, further undermining regional cohesion. The Executive Secretary of the Group of Five for the Sahel underlined the consequences of the withdrawal of Mali. Reaffirming the firm commitment of the Group to continue its mission and of the Heads of State to continue working together, he said that a number of decisions had been taken on the new format of the Joint Force and a road map had been drawn up. He called for the Council to understand the seriousness of the situation in the region, noting the possibility of an even greater threat to international peace and security without a rapid and urgent response. An independent expert on the Joint Force provided an analysis of the threats facing the region, focusing on the threat of terrorism. He said that the results achieved by the Joint Force seemed to be mixed or inadequate, and outlined its limitations and its political, financial, logistical and institutional weaknesses, including the lack of a robust mandate from the Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

Following the briefings at both meetings, Council members discussed the political, security, socioeconomic, humanitarian and human rights situation in the Sahel countries. Council members called on members of the Group of Five for the Sahel, namely Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali, to restore constitutional order.

Council members addressed security challenges in the Sahel, including the expansion and spread of terrorism to the coastal region of the Gulf of Guinea.³¹⁶ Some members discussed the activities of the Wagner Group as another potential source of insecurity in the region.³¹⁷ Council members discussed the impact of the conclusion of Operation Barkhane in November 2022 on the security situation in the region.³¹⁸ They deliberated ways to combat insecurity in the Sahel, including by improving governance and addressing socioeconomic challenges such as underdevelopment, poverty, inequality and corruption, as well as climate change.³¹⁹

Council members often addressed the role of regional and subregional organizations, most notably the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), in the peace and political processes of the countries of the Sahel.³²⁰ Some took note of or welcomed the joint strategic assessment on security and development in the Sahel.³²¹ The representatives of Norway and Ghana, speaking also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya, underscored that the Independent High-level Panel on Security and Development in the Sahel should build on existing initiatives, including the efforts of the

³¹⁵ See [S/PV.9194](#).

³¹⁶ See [S/PV.9035](#) (France, China, India and Russian Federation); [S/PV.9194](#) (France, Ireland, China, Brazil, Albania and India).

³¹⁷ See [S/PV.9194](#) (France, United States, Ireland, United Kingdom, Albania and Norway).

³¹⁸ See [S/PV.9194](#) (France, Mexico, Brazil and Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya)).

³¹⁹ See [S/PV.9035](#) (Albania, India, United Kingdom, Ireland, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), United Arab Emirates and United States); and [S/PV.9194](#) (United States, Ireland, Mexico, China, United Arab Emirates, Norway and Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya)).

³²⁰ See [S/PV.9035](#) (Albania, India, Mexico, United Kingdom, Ireland, Norway, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya) and United States); and [S/PV.9194](#) (Ireland, Russian Federation, Mexico, United Kingdom and United Arab Emirates).

³²¹ See [S/PV.9035](#) (Albania, Brazil, China, Mexico, Ireland, Norway, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya) and United Arab Emirates); and [S/PV.9194](#) (France, United States, Ireland, Mexico, United Kingdom, China, Brazil, Albania and Norway).

Group of Five for the Sahel, the Accra Initiative, the Multinational Joint Task Force and the Nouakchott Process.³²²

The activities of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel in the context of the regional security architecture were frequently addressed by all Council members in 2022. Council members discussed the consequences of the decision by Mali to withdraw from the Group of Five for the Sahel and its Joint Force.³²³ Some emphasized the need for the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to provide support to the Joint Force,³²⁴ and some suggested that the Force would benefit from predictable support through United Nations assessed contributions.³²⁵

Concerning the issue of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea, at a meeting held on 31 May,³²⁶ the Council adopted resolution 2634 (2022), in which it stressed the primary responsibility of the States of the Gulf of Guinea to counter piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea and address the underlying causes³²⁷ and called upon Member States in the region to criminalize piracy and armed robbery at sea under their domestic laws.³²⁸ The Council also requested the Secretary-General to report, within five months and on an exceptional basis in advance of the 10-year anniversary of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct, on the situation of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea and its underlying causes, including any possible and potential linkages with terrorism in West and Central Africa and the Sahel, on United Nations support and contributions, and on any recommendations for further supporting and enhancing national efforts and regional and international cooperation towards combating piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea.³²⁹

On 22 November, the Council held a meeting³³⁰ at which the Assistant Secretary-General for Africa presented the report of the Secretary-General on the situation of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea and its underlying causes,³³¹ pursuant to the request contained in resolution 2634 (2022). She reported on the steady decline in instances of piracy and armed robbery at sea.³³² She elaborated on the changing dynamics of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea; the underlying causes of piracy, including youth unemployment and inadequate access to public services; and regional and international initiatives aimed at addressing maritime challenges. She emphasized the need to fully operationalize the maritime security architecture set out in the Yaoundé Code of Conduct. While there was no firm evidence to suggest any potential or possible linkages between terrorists and pirate groups, addressing the underlying social, economic and environmental challenges faced by communities in the region would serve to contain both threats. Following the briefing of the Assistant Secretary-General, the Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) made several recommendations for improving maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, including helping Member States in the region to develop their capacities and legal frameworks for combating piracy, responding to shifting trends and emerging threats related to piracy in the region by being agile and adaptable, and addressing the root causes of piracy. The Executive Secretary of the Gulf of Guinea Commission then gave a briefing on the achievements in terms of combating piracy in the region, including in the context of the Yaoundé architecture, as well as in terms of bilateral cooperation. She said that other crimes were ongoing in the region that were affecting the well-being of coastal populations and the economic well-being of Governments, including illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, oil theft and pollution. Lastly, the Maritime Planning Officer of the

³²² See S/PV.9194. For discussions on the role of regional and subregional organizations, including the African Union and ECOWAS, in the pacific settlement of disputes, see part VIII, sect. II.B.

³²³ See S/PV.9035 (France, Albania, Brazil, India, Mexico, Russian Federation, Ireland and United States); and S/PV.9194 (France, United States, Mexico, Brazil, Albania, India, Norway and Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya)).

³²⁴ See S/PV.9035 (France, Albania, Brazil, China and Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya)); and S/PV.9194 (Ireland, United Arab Emirates and Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya)).

³²⁵ See S/PV.9035 (France, Ireland, India and Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya)); and S/PV.9194 (France, India and Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya)). For more information on peacekeeping operations led by regional and subregional organizations, see part VIII, sect. III.

³²⁶ See S/PV.9050.

³²⁷ Resolution 2634 (2022), para. 2.

³²⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 3.

³²⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 16.

³³⁰ See S/PV.9198.

³³¹ S/2022/818.

³³² See S/PV.9198.

African Union Commission gave a briefing on the nature of maritime crime in the region and regional and international efforts aimed at improving maritime security in the areas of information-sharing, joint training and exercises.

Following the briefings, Council members discussed the different threats to peace and security posed by piracy and other crimes at sea in the Gulf of Guinea. Speakers³³³ also addressed the humanitarian, socioeconomic and environmental impacts of those crimes and some³³⁴ highlighted their underlying causes, including poverty, unemployment, corruption, climate change and food insecurity. Participants³³⁵ addressed the role played by regional organizations, including the Economic Community of Central African States, ECOWAS and the Gulf of Guinea Commission, in the resolution and prevention of piracy and other maritime crimes. Some³³⁶ said their delegations had taken note of the recommendations provided by the Peacebuilding Commission. The representative of the Russian Federation called for the establishment of a specialized entity under the auspices of the United Nations responsible for addressing the entire spectrum of issues related to combating maritime crime.

On 8 and 9 August, at the initiative of China, which held the presidency for the month,³³⁷ the Council held an open debate on the issue of capacity-building for sustaining peace in Africa.³³⁸ In his briefing, the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security of the African Union elaborated on the security threats facing the region, including violent extremism, terrorism, climate change and the illicit exploitation of natural resources, and solutions for addressing those threats.³³⁹ He emphasized the need for demonstrable joint transformative leadership between the Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council and the need to strengthen democracies. The Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Africa gave a briefing on the internal and external factors that undermined the capacities of African countries to prevent and address violence. She recommended investing in institutional infrastructure to build the capacities needed to tackle the internal causes of violence and strengthening cooperation between peacekeeping missions and national and local authorities, which could, from the perspective of institution-building and security, create opportunities for increasing the presence of the State and enhancing the delivery of services, thereby preventing gaps that could be leveraged by terrorist groups and non-State actors. The Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission focused his briefing on changing conflict dynamics and elaborated on the capacity-building work of the Peacebuilding Commission in Africa.

In the ensuing discussion, speakers addressed the capacity-building challenges facing Africa and identified ways to improve capacity-building to sustain peace. Speakers discussed the roles of regional and subregional organizations, including the African Union,³⁴⁰ as well as the United Nations, including the Security Council³⁴¹ and the Peacebuilding Commission,³⁴² in efforts to sustain peace in Africa. Many

³³³ Norway, Gabon, India, Albania, Brazil, United Arab Emirates and European Union.

³³⁴ Gabon, United Kingdom, United States, Brazil, United Arab Emirates, Ireland, China, Mexico and Ghana.

³³⁵ Norway, Gabon, India, United States, France, Albania, Brazil, China and European Union.

³³⁶ Norway, United Kingdom, Kenya, Mexico, Ghana and Germany.

³³⁷ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 1 August ([S/2022/592](#)).

³³⁸ See [S/PV.9106](#) and [S/PV.9106 \(Resumption 1\)](#). For more information on the discussion, see part VIII, sect. II.

³³⁹ For more information on discussions regarding threats to regional and international peace and security, see part VII, sect. I.B.

³⁴⁰ See [S/PV.9106](#) (Ireland, India, Mexico, Norway, United States, Russian Federation, Ghana, Albania, Senegal, South Africa and Algeria); and [S/PV.9106 \(Resumption 1\)](#) (Republic of Korea, Germany, European Union (also on behalf of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine), Malta, Portugal, Canada, Denmark, Thailand, Italy, Slovenia, Ethiopia, Australia, Tunisia, Equatorial Guinea, Argentina and Bangladesh).

³⁴¹ See [S/PV.9106](#) (Switzerland); and [S/PV.9106 \(Resumption 1\)](#) (Ethiopia).

³⁴² See [S/PV.9106](#) (Kenya, Ireland, United Kingdom, Brazil, Norway, France, Senegal, Egypt, Japan and Algeria); and [S/PV.9106 \(Resumption 1\)](#) (Republic of Korea, Poland, Portugal, Ecuador, Canada, Denmark, Thailand, Italy, Morocco, Rwanda, Australia, Equatorial Guinea and Bangladesh).

members underlined the need to strengthen cooperation between the African Union and the United Nations, including the Council, in the context of capacity-building.³⁴³

Participants also discussed the nexus between climate change and security,³⁴⁴ and between sustainable development and peace and security.³⁴⁵ Among the proposals put forward to strengthen capacity-building for sustaining peace, speakers made reference to increasing funding for peacebuilding;³⁴⁶ strengthening institution-building and the rule of law;³⁴⁷ and involving women, young people and civil society in peacebuilding efforts, including in decision-making, public policy implementation and security sector reform.³⁴⁸ Some speakers commented on the impact of Council-imposed sanctions in relation to maintaining and sustaining peace in Africa.³⁴⁹

On 31 August, the Council adopted a presidential statement in relation to capacity-building for sustaining peace, in which it recognized the need to step up capacity-building support to African countries and emphasized the importance of providing capacity support, at the request of and in close consultation with the country in question, to improve the rule of law, strengthen national institutions, extend legitimate State authority, build governance, promote and protect human rights, and enhance social cohesion and inclusiveness.³⁵⁰ The Council also highlighted the importance of sharing best practices and providing financial support to promote inclusive and effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes; supporting socioeconomic development for sustaining peace in Africa; and providing capacity support and institutional training to address through a holistic approach the underlying conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism and violent extremism.³⁵¹ The Council encouraged continued development and application of mechanisms for peaceful settlement of disputes through regional and subregional arrangements, and welcomed the continuing important efforts and enhanced role of the African Union, subregional organizations and regional mechanisms in peace operations in accordance with Council resolutions.³⁵²

On 6 October, at the initiative of Gabon, which held the presidency for the month,³⁵³ the Council held a high-level debate on strengthening the fight against the financing of armed groups and terrorists through the illicit trafficking of natural resources.³⁵⁴ In her briefing, the Executive Director of UNODC highlighted the importance of understanding the links between organized crime and terrorism in Africa through data collection. The illegal exploitation of minerals provided armed groups and terrorists with significant sources of revenue. She described the Office's programmes to prevent and respond to crimes against the environment, illegal mining and trafficking, including its youth-driven peacebuilding projects.

³⁴³ See [S/PV.9106](#) (Gabon, Brazil, Norway, Ghana, Egypt, South Africa and Algeria); and [S/PV.9106 \(Resumption 1\)](#) (Portugal, Denmark (on behalf of the Nordic countries), Italy, Netherlands, Slovenia and Equatorial Guinea). For more information on discussions regarding the relationship between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations, see part VIII, sect. II.

³⁴⁴ See [S/PV.9106](#) (Kenya, Ireland, Mexico, Ghana, Albania, France and Switzerland); and [S/PV.9106 \(Resumption 1\)](#) (Poland and Canada).

³⁴⁵ See [S/PV.9106](#) (China, Gabon, Mexico, Brazil, United Arab Emirates and Switzerland); and [S/PV.9106 \(Resumption 1\)](#) (Malta, Thailand, Italy, Morocco, Slovenia, Ethiopia, Tunisia, Equatorial Guinea and Argentina).

³⁴⁶ See [S/PV.9106](#) (Kenya, Switzerland, Egypt and South Africa); and [S/PV.9106 \(Resumption 1\)](#) (Germany, European Union (also on behalf of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine), Portugal, Ecuador, Mozambique, Netherlands, Morocco, Slovenia, Rwanda, Australia and Tunisia).

³⁴⁷ See [S/PV.9106](#).

³⁴⁸ See [S/PV.9106](#) (Ireland, Gabon, Mexico, United Kingdom, Brazil, Ghana, Albania, France, Switzerland, South Africa and Algeria); and [S/PV.9106 \(Resumption 1\)](#) (Republic of Korea, European Union (also on behalf of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine), Malta, Portugal, Canada, Denmark (on behalf of the Nordic Countries), Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Morocco, Slovenia, Slovakia, Tunisia and Bangladesh).

³⁴⁹ See [S/PV.9106](#) (China, Kenya, United States, Russian Federation and France); and [S/PV.9106 \(Resumption 1\)](#) (Equatorial Guinea). For more information on discussions regarding the role of sanctions and their unintended consequences, see part VII, sect. III and IX, respectively.

³⁵⁰ See [S/PRST/2022/6](#), third and fourth paragraphs.

³⁵¹ *Ibid.*, sixth, thirteenth and sixteenth paragraphs.

³⁵² *Ibid.*, nineteenth and twentieth paragraphs. For more information, see part VIII, sect. II.

³⁵³ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 30 September ([S/2022/728](#)).

³⁵⁴ See [S/PV.9147](#).

The Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security of the African Union then reported on various African Union initiatives, including the establishment of national counter-terrorism fusion centres and national financial intelligence units and strengthened law enforcement at the national level. He underlined the need for enhanced cooperation in terms of capacity-building and the transfer of knowledge in favour of countries in post-conflict situations, and the need to strengthen sanctions regimes against terrorist individuals, groups and organizations through close collaboration with the Council. The Regional Director for East Africa and representative of the Institute for Security Studies to the African Union elaborated on the complex nature of illicit trafficking by non-State and terrorist armed groups and the tools for combating the problem. To strengthen the fight against the income-generating activities of non-State armed groups, including trafficking in natural resources, he suggested modernizing sanctions regimes, breaking up criminal networks within administrations and armed forces, and improving due diligence processes.

Following the briefings, Council members discussed the nature of the threat posed by illicit trafficking in natural resources to finance terrorist activities. Speakers addressed the linkages between the exploitation of natural resources and conflict³⁵⁵ and the utilization of natural resources to finance terrorism, including through the acquisition of arms, ammunition and mining concessions.³⁵⁶ Some participants focused on the threats posed by the activities of specific groups, including Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da'esh) and Al-Qaida,³⁵⁷ Al-Shabaab³⁵⁸ and the Wagner Group.³⁵⁹ Regarding how to mitigate the problem, speakers focused on international and regional cooperation and support for African countries and on how the United Nations, including the Council,³⁶⁰ and regional organizations, such as the African Union³⁶¹ and the Central African Economic and Monetary Community,³⁶² could support the fight against the exploitation of natural resources. The role and effectiveness of Council-imposed sanctions as a means of curbing trafficking in natural resources was also addressed by several speakers.³⁶³ Some speakers³⁶⁴ suggested that there was a need to address shortcomings in governance, institutional frameworks and the rule of law.

Meetings: peace and security in Africa, 2022

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.9035 18 May	Report of the Secretary-General on the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel (S/2022/382)			Assistant Secretary-General for Africa, Executive Secretary of the Group of Five for the Sahel, Coordinator and President of the Rights and Resources Initiative/ Group	13 Council members, ^a all invitees	

³⁵⁵ Gabon, United States, India, United Arab Emirates, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, Ireland, Norway, Brazil and Central African Republic.

³⁵⁶ Gabon, Ghana, Russian Federation, Mexico, Norway, Kenya, Brazil and Central African Republic.

³⁵⁷ United States, India, Norway and Kenya.

³⁵⁸ United Arab Emirates, China, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, Mexico, Ireland, Kenya and Brazil.

³⁵⁹ United States, United Kingdom and France.

³⁶⁰ Gabon, United Kingdom, Kenya and Brazil.

³⁶¹ Gabon, India, United Arab Emirates, China and United Kingdom.

³⁶² India.

³⁶³ United States, United Arab Emirates, Russian Federation, Ireland, Norway, Brazil and Central African Republic.

³⁶⁴ India, China, United Kingdom, Mexico, Ireland, France, Norway, Kenya, Brazil and Central African Republic.

**Part I. Consideration of questions under the responsibility of
the Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace and security**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.9050 31 May		Draft resolution submitted by 37 Member States ^b (S/2022/62)	28 Member States ^c		Seven Council members ^d	Resolution 2634 (2022) 15-0-0
S/PV.9106 and S/PV.9106 (Resumption 1) 8 and 9 August	Capacity- building for sustaining peace Letter dated 1 August 2022 from the Permanent Representativ e of China to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary- General (S/2022/592)		30 Member States ^e	Special Adviser to the Secretary- General on Africa, Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security of the African Union, Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations	All Council members, all invitees ^f	
S/PV.9122 31 August					One Council member (China)	S/PRST/2022/6
S/PV.9147 6 October	Strengthening the fight against the financing of armed groups and terrorists through the illicit trafficking of natural resources Letter dated 30 September 2022 from the Permanent Representativ e of Gabon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary- General (S/2022/728)		Central African Republic, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Morocco, Senegal	Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security of the African Union, Head of the Delegation of the European Union, Regional Director for East Africa and representative of the Institute for Security Studies to the African Union	All Council members, ^g four invitees under rule 37 (Central African Republic, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Morocco), all other invitees ^h	

Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 2022

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.9160 (closed) 21 October			Ethiopia	Director of the Operations and Advocacy Division of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, African Union High Representative for the Horn of Africa Region	13 Council members, ⁱ all invitees	
S/PV.9194 16 November	Report of the Secretary-General on the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel (S/2022/838)			Assistant Secretary-General for Africa, Executive Secretary of the Group of Five for the Sahel, independent expert on the Joint Force	13 Council members, ^a all invitees	
S/PV.9198 22 November	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea and its underlying causes (S/2022/818)		Germany, Nigeria	Assistant Secretary-General for Africa, Executive Director of UNODC, Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Delegation of the European Union, Executive Secretary of the Gulf of Guinea Commission, Maritime Planning Officer of the African Union Commission	All Council members, all invitees ^f	

^a Albania, Brazil, China, France, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

^b Albania, Angola, Benin, Brazil, Chad, Denmark, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Japan, Kenya, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mauritius, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Tunisia and United States.

^c Angola, Benin, Chad, Denmark, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Finland, Gambia, Guinea, Japan, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mauritius, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Seychelles, Slovakia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo and Tunisia.

^d Brazil, China, Ghana, India, Norway, United Kingdom and United States.

^e Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Germany, Italy, Japan, Malta, Morocco, Mozambique, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Rwanda, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Switzerland, Tunisia, Thailand and Ukraine.

^f The Commissioner and the Special Adviser participated in the meeting by videoconference. The representative of the European Union spoke also on behalf of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, the Republic of Moldova, Serbia and Ukraine.

^g Gabon (President of the Council) was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs; Ghana was represented by its Minister of National Security; India was represented by its Minister of State for External Affairs; the United Arab Emirates was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation; and the United States was represented by its Permanent Representative to the United Nations and member of the President's Cabinet.

^h The Executive Director of UNODC, the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security of the African Union and the representative of the Institute for Security Studies to the African Union participated in the meeting by videoconference.

ⁱ Albania, Brazil, China, France, India, Ireland, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

^j The representative of Germany spoke on behalf of the Group of Seven Group of Friends of the Gulf of Guinea.

10. The situation in Libya

During the period under review, the Council held 17 meetings concerning the situation in Libya and adopted six resolutions, including two under Chapter VII of the Charter. All the meetings that were not devoted to the adoption of decisions of the Council took the form of briefings.³⁶⁵ More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below. In addition to the meetings, Council members held informal consultations of the whole and one informal interactive dialogue to discuss the item.³⁶⁶ In 2022, the Secretary-General appointed a new Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL).³⁶⁷

In 2022, the Council heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the Assistant Secretary-General for Africa and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya. The briefings focused on the ongoing political, security, humanitarian and socioeconomic challenges facing Libya, including the constitutional review process in preparation for the postponed presidential and parliamentary elections. The briefings also covered the work of UNSMIL towards the implementation of the Libyan-led ceasefire monitoring mechanism, as well as efforts to support the economic reform process and improve the security and humanitarian situation across the country. Other briefers included the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya, who gave a briefing on the activities of and developments relating to the work of the Committee and its Panel of Experts; the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, who provided updates on the Court's ongoing investigations regarding the situation in Libya; and three civil society representatives. Invitations under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure were limited to Libya.

On 24 January, the Council heard a briefing by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, who reported that growing polarization among political actors in disputes over key aspects of the electoral process had resulted in the postponement of the elections scheduled for 24 December 2021.³⁶⁸ She noted that, on 5 December 2021, the Secretary-General had appointed a Special Adviser on Libya, who was working closely with UNSMIL and who had undertaken wide-ranging consultations in Tripoli, Benghazi, Misratah and Sirte since her arrival in Libya on 12 December. Concerning the political situation in the country, the Under-Secretary-General underlined that the Special Adviser had reiterated to Libyan interlocutors that the focus of the political process should remain the holding of parliamentary and presidential elections in the shortest possible time frame. On the security track, the Under-Secretary-General reported that there had been meetings among various armed groups. On the economic track, she noted that further steps had been taken towards the reunification of the Central Bank of Libya. The Under-Secretary-General welcomed the renewed efforts to advance national reconciliation based on the principles of transitional justice. While the ceasefire had continued to hold,

³⁶⁵ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

³⁶⁶ See A/77/2, part II, chap. 37.

³⁶⁷ See S/2022/669 and S/2022/670.

³⁶⁸ See S/PV.8952.