

5. The situation in the Central African Republic

During the period under review, the Council held five meetings and adopted two resolutions, all under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, in connection with the situation in the Central African Republic. Three of the meetings took the form of briefings, and the remaining two were held to adopt a decision of the Council.¹⁶¹ More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below. The Council held one private (closed) meeting with countries contributing troops and police to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA).¹⁶² In addition to meetings, Council members held informal consultations of the whole in connection with the situation in the Central African Republic.¹⁶³

During 2022, Council members heard three briefings on the reports of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic by his Special Representative for the Central African Republic, consistent with the four-month reporting schedule established by the Council in resolution 2387 (2017).¹⁶⁴ Council members also heard briefings by the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union for the Central African Republic and Head of the African Union Office in the Central African Republic, the Executive Secretary of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and a civil society representative.

The briefings were focused on the political, security, economic, human rights and humanitarian situation in the country. In that regard, they served to continue to update the Council on efforts aimed at revitalizing the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic signed by the authorities and 14 armed groups in Bangui on 6 February 2019 and implementing the joint road map adopted under the auspices of the President of Angola on 16 September 2021 by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and the republican dialogue launched in March 2022 by the Government with the political parties and key forces. The briefings also served to apprise the Council of preparations for the local elections, the status of the ceasefire of 15 October 2021, the activities of armed groups, including Coalition des patriotes pour le changement, and their impact on security, elections and the provision of humanitarian assistance, efforts to fight impunity for human rights violations and the role of MINUSCA.

At the meeting held on 22 February,¹⁶⁵ the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, congratulating the new Prime Minister of the Central African Republic, said that the Government would have to overcome the challenges of the implementation of the Political Agreement, the organization of the republican dialogue and the restoration of State authority. He gave a briefing to the Council on two visits by representatives of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region to the Central African Republic, in January and February, to advance the effective implementation of the road map and enable the establishment and development of the terms of reference of a follow-up working group to monitor the road map. He described the ways in which MINUSCA was contributing to advancing the political process through its good offices, through its support for preparations for the local elections and through the establishment of a climate of trust between the Government and the opposition, leading to the return of the opposition to the organizing committee of the republican dialogue, which had resumed its work. He recalled that the security situation remained concerning and was marked by military offensives and continued reports of human rights violations. He commended the efforts of the Government to make operational the Commission on Truth, Justice, Reparation and Reconciliation and welcomed the first public hearing of the Special Criminal Court as signs of progress in fighting impunity.

The African Union Special Representative, taking note of the political tensions surrounding the preparations for the republican dialogue, outlined some issues that remained to be addressed by its organizing committee, including the choice of topics, the presidium and the list of participants. He welcomed the initiatives and efforts of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region in the

¹⁶¹ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

¹⁶² The private meeting was held on 7 November in connection with the item entitled “Meeting of the Security Council with the troop- and police-contributing countries pursuant to resolution 1353 (2001), annex II, sections A and B”; see S/PV.9185. See also A/77/2, part II, chap. 21.

¹⁶³ See A/77/2, part II, chap. 13.

¹⁶⁴ See S/PV.8971, S/PV.9074 and S/PV.9156. See also S/2022/119, S/2022/491 and S/2022/762.

¹⁶⁵ See S/PV.8971.

context of the road map to mobilize the subregion in promoting dialogue in the country, including contacts with the leaders of the Coalition des patriotes pour le changement and the regrouping of its combatants. He stated that an offensive by the Armed Forces of the Central African Republic, supported by bilateral forces, to decrease potential trouble-making by armed groups was under way.

The Executive Secretary of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region focused on the major political, security and humanitarian developments in the Central African Republic. He commended the Government for establishing the organizing committee of the republican dialogue. He stressed that the implementation of the Political Agreement faced challenges, owing to many interlinked factors, and that the Government's institutional capacity to expeditiously implement the Agreement was hampered by both financial and non-financial challenges. He described the obstacles to the holding of the local elections, including those related to voter registration and education. He expressed concerns regarding the humanitarian and security situation, highlighting continued displacement, poverty and unemployment, as well as abuses against civilians and attacks on defence and security forces.

At the meeting held on 22 June,¹⁶⁶ the Special Representative of the Secretary-General updated the Council on efforts to revitalize the political process and reposition MINUSCA. She provided a briefing on her efforts to remobilize the region since she had taken office, culminating, under the leadership of the Government of the Central African Republic and the auspices of Angola and Rwanda, in a strategic review meeting on the political process in Bangui on 4 June. She reported that the authorities had decided to establish a permanent platform for the strategic review, to be convened on a quarterly basis, and called for the Council's unanimous support in carrying out the plan for its monitoring. She suggested that the political commitments previously undertaken separately under the auspices of the Political Agreement guarantors and within the framework of the road map should be part of a single platform and bring together the representatives of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, Angola and Rwanda, the African Union, the Economic Community of Central African States and MINUSCA. She urged the Government to expedite the implementation of the recommendations of the republican dialogue, which was one of the components of the road map. Expressing concern about the persistent violations of the ceasefire by all parties, she stated that MINUSCA had readjusted its concept of operations in order to prioritize a preventive approach centred on the civilian populations.

The President of the Network for Women's Leadership in the Central African Republic expressed major concerns regarding the sociopolitical, security, humanitarian and human rights situation in her country, highlighting, *inter alia*, the killings targeting the populations of the hinterlands and atrocities committed by the Coalition des patriotes pour le changement as well as members of the national army, its allies and the regime militias. She expressed regret that, despite the participation of civil society in the republican dialogue, the nature of the dialogue was non-inclusive. She urged the Council to consider the Central African Republic as a country in an emergency situation for which emergency measures must be taken.

At the meeting held on 19 October,¹⁶⁷ the Special Representative expressed concern regarding the security situation and highlighted the need to critically assess the progress in the implementation of the MINUSCA mandate in four areas: political and security dynamics, safeguarding the Mission's achievements, decentralization of the political and peace process and the extension of State authority. She welcomed the implementation of the shared timetable of the Political Agreement and the joint road map and highlighted the developments that had already emerged in that regard, such as the opening of the President's dialogue with leaders of 11 armed groups. Concerning human rights violations, she informed the Council about the establishment of a framework for constructive dialogue and accountability with regard to the follow-up of documented violations and the implementation of the recommendations made in the public reports of MINUSCA and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.

Throughout 2022, discussions in the Council were focused mainly on the topics outlined above. With regard to the political process, Council members took note of the holding of the Executive Monitoring

¹⁶⁶ S/PV.9074.

¹⁶⁷ See S/PV.9156.

Committee meeting on the Political Agreement on 14 February¹⁶⁸ and the subsequent strategic review meeting held on 4 June by the Government of the Central African Republic, with the participation of regional actors, to monitor the implementation of the road map.¹⁶⁹ Council members stressed the need for the implementation of the road map and highlighted its critical importance in restoring peace and security in the country and returning to the commitments under the Political Agreement.¹⁷⁰ The representative of China expressed the hope that the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region would enhance communication with the Government of the Central African Republic in the implementation of the road map and strive to form synergies based on the reality on the ground and its needs.¹⁷¹ The representative of the Russian Federation underlined the importance for the authorities to commit to the principle of inclusivity when implementing the road map on actualizing the Political Agreement. Other Council members echoed similar sentiments, urging that the process of implementing the road map include women and other social groups.¹⁷²

Concerning the republican dialogue initiated in March, Council members stressed the need for inclusivity, including ensuring the participation of women in the dialogue.¹⁷³ The representative of Mexico welcomed the regional mobilization to facilitate the republican dialogue and revitalize the Political Agreement, in particular through the road map, and expressed belief that the region could play an important role in opening channels of communication with the groups linked to the Coalition des patriotes pour le changement in order to bring them back to the negotiating table.¹⁷⁴ The representative of France noted that some of the country's active forces had not been able to participate, emphasizing that only inclusive consultations and consensus surrounding the rules of the democratic process would enable the country to advance towards peace and reconciliation, while the representatives of Gabon (speaking also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya) and Norway emphasized the need for the implementation of the recommendations resulting from the republican dialogue.¹⁷⁵ Council members also welcomed the establishment of the follow-up committee.¹⁷⁶

Throughout the year, Council members repeatedly expressed concerns regarding the persistent human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law,¹⁷⁷ including those committed by the national security forces and the Wagner Group.¹⁷⁸ The representative of the United States recalled that the national defence forces and Wagner Group contractors, referred to as "other security personnel" in the report of the Secretary-General,¹⁷⁹ had perpetrated over 40 per cent of all violations documented during the reporting period, which was why the United States found it hard to consider lifting the arms embargo.¹⁸⁰ In a similar vein, concerned by the alarming reports regarding the conduct of the Central African forces and the brutal methods applied by the Wagner Group and instilled upon the Central African partners, the representative of France stressed that any changes to the embargo must be considered against that backdrop.¹⁸¹ Council members condemned the massacres allegedly committed by the Wagner Group against

¹⁶⁸ See [S/PV.8971](#).

¹⁶⁹ See [S/PV.9074](#) (China, United Arab Emirates, India and Norway).

¹⁷⁰ See [S/PV.8971](#) (France, United Arab Emirates and Brazil); [S/PV.9074](#) (France, Norway, Ireland and Albania); and [S/PV.9156](#) (France, Albania, China, Mexico, Brazil, United Arab Emirates, India, Russian Federation and Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya)).

¹⁷¹ See [S/PV.8971](#).

¹⁷² See [S/PV.9156](#) (France, Albania, Mexico and United Arab Emirates).

¹⁷³ See [S/PV.8971](#) (United Arab Emirates, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya) and Norway); [S/PV.9074](#) (France, Brazil, United Arab Emirates and India); and [S/PV.9156](#) (Brazil, United States, United Arab Emirates, Norway, United Kingdom and Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya)).

¹⁷⁴ See [S/PV.9074](#).

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁶ See [S/PV.9156](#) (Brazil, India and Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya)).

¹⁷⁷ See [S/PV.8971](#) (Albania, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), United Kingdom and Ireland); [S/PV.9074](#) (Brazil); and [S/PV.9156](#) (France, Albania, Norway, Ireland and United Kingdom).

¹⁷⁸ See [S/PV.8971](#) (Albania, Norway and Ireland); [S/PV.9074](#) (France, Norway, United States, Ireland, United Kingdom and Albania); and [S/PV.9156](#) (France, Albania, Ireland, United States, Norway and United Kingdom).

¹⁷⁹ [S/2022/119](#).

¹⁸⁰ See [S/PV.8971](#).

¹⁸¹ See [S/PV.9074](#).

civilians in January in Aigbando.¹⁸² The representative of Ireland pointed out that State agents were also responsible for 45 per cent of violations and abuses documented between June and October, which was unacceptable.¹⁸³ The representatives of Albania and Norway expressed regret that the unilateral ceasefire had not produced the expected results in terms of ending hostilities, and the representative of the United States called upon the authorities to immediately stand up and enforce a ceasefire monitoring mechanism.¹⁸⁴ Council members urged the authorities of the Central African Republic to investigate the allegations of human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law and bring those responsible for those acts to account, including through prosecution.¹⁸⁵ The representative of Gabon stressed the need for the implementation of a national special investigation commission to shed light on serious crimes and violations of human rights and humanitarian law.¹⁸⁶ The representative of the United States noted the initial steps taken by the special commission of inquiry, led by the Minister of Justice of the Central African Republic, and the need to follow through on the investigations. Council members welcomed the start of public hearings of the Special Criminal Court.¹⁸⁷

During the period under review, the Council adopted two resolutions under this item, one in relation to the mandate of MINUSCA and one concerning the sanctions measures for the Central African Republic. Neither of the resolutions was adopted unanimously. With regard to the sanctions measures, by its resolution 2648 (2022) adopted on 29 July, the Council renewed until 31 July 2023 the arms embargo, asset freeze and travel ban,¹⁸⁸ and expanded the list of exemptions to the arms embargo.¹⁸⁹ The Council also removed the requirement of advance notification to the Committee of the intention to acquire arms and related material exempted from the arms embargo by the resolution.¹⁹⁰ Furthermore, the Council extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 31 August 2023, requesting it to provide to the Council a final report no later than 30 May 2023.¹⁹¹ In the resolution, the Council also welcomed the strategic review meeting held in Bangui on 4 June on the operationalization of the road map adopted by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region on 16 September 2021 to revitalize the implementation of the Political Agreement.¹⁹²

Resolution 2648 (2022) was adopted with 10 votes in favour and five abstentions.¹⁹³ Following the adoption, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Francophonie and Central Africans Abroad of the Central African Republic expressed satisfaction with the first significant step to be made with regard to the embargo on armed groups, but stressed that it remained to be seen how it could be applied to armed groups. She thanked States that had voiced their support for lifting the embargo completely, China and the Russian Federation for their call to take into account the realities on the ground, as well as the three African members of the Council, and expressed regret that the resolution did not respond to her country's legitimate request for a total lifting of the embargo.

Explaining their delegations' abstentions, the representatives of China, Gabon, Kenya and the Russian Federation recalled the requests by the Central African Republic authorities and regional organizations to lift the embargo, which the resolution failed to do. The representative of China said that the resolution still contained a number of restrictive measures that could pose unnecessary obstacles to the defence capacity-building of the Government and that the embargo measures had become increasingly incompatible with developments in the country. The representative of Kenya, recalling provisions of

¹⁸² See [S/PV.8971](#) (France, Albania and United States).

¹⁸³ See [S/PV.9156](#).

¹⁸⁴ See [S/PV.8971](#).

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.* (Albania, Norway, United States, United Kingdom and Ireland); and [S/PV.9074](#) (Norway, Ireland and United Kingdom).

¹⁸⁶ See [S/PV.8971](#).

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.* (France, Mexico and Albania); [S/PV.9074](#) (Brazil, India, United States, Ireland, Mexico and Albania); and [S/PV.9156](#) (France, Ireland, Mexico, Brazil and Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya)).

¹⁸⁸ Resolution 2648 (2022), paras. 1, 3 and 4. For more information on the sanctions measures concerning the Central African Republic, see part VII, sect. III.

¹⁸⁹ Resolution 2648 (2022), paras. 1 (g) and (h).

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.* paras. 1 (a)–(h).

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.* paras. 6 and 7. For information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) and the Panel of Experts, see part IX, sect. I.B.

¹⁹² Resolution 2648 (2022), third preambular paragraph.

¹⁹³ See [S/PV.9105](#).

Chapter VIII of the Charter, expressed the hope that the Council would listen to the voices of people from the Central African Republic and the relevant regional organizations and take the remaining step of removing the notification requirement as soon as possible. The representative of the Russian Federation said that the resolution did not respond fully to the task of stabilizing the situation in the Central African Republic. Noting that the resolution represented the best possible outcome given the prevailing circumstances, the representative of Ghana expressed gratitude for the efforts of France as penholder in trying to accommodate the input of delegations for a responsible release of the levers on the embargo in a way that did not have an adverse impact on the stability of the Central African Republic and its neighbours.

Among the Council members who voted in favour, the representative of France said that the resolution made it even easier for the armed forces of the Central African Republic to acquire all types of weapons and ammunition, sending a strong message to the authorities, whose greater involvement was key to combating the proliferation of weapons in the country. The representative of Albania underscored that the resolution was the closest to a balanced approach. Recognizing the progress made by the authorities in meeting the benchmarks, he noted that the final formula of the resolution kept the focus on the need to improve the ability of the country to safeguard its internal security and improve its compliance with the benchmarks. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that the embargo remained an important tool for supporting the maintenance of peace and stability in the country. The representative of the United States noted that the region was awash with guns, and that it was time to halt that unfettered flow. With effective implementation, which meant a notification requirement, the arms embargo could help to silence the guns. The representative of Brazil said that the resolution kept in place important mechanisms, such as the system of benchmarks and the work of the Panel of Experts, to help to guide the country towards stabilization and durable peace and addressed, although only partially, the assessments and claims of the authorities and regional organizations.

On 15 November, the Council adopted resolution [2659 \(2022\)](#), by which it extended the mandate of MINUSCA for a period of one year, until 15 November 2023.¹⁹⁴ The Council reiterated that the Mission's mandate should be implemented on the basis of a prioritization of tasks.¹⁹⁵ In that regard, the Council reiterated, with certain modifications, the four priority tasks for MINUSCA, namely, the protection of civilians; the provision of good offices and support for the peace process, including the implementation of the Political Agreement and the ceasefire; facilitation of the creation of a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance; and the protection of United Nations personnel, installations, equipment and goods.¹⁹⁶ In the resolution, the Council also took note of the republican dialogue held in March, and called for further steps from all actors to implement the recommendations contained therein to resolve any arising issues and conclude the electoral process through the organization of local elections.¹⁹⁷ The Council welcomed the strategic review meeting on 4 June, noting the Government's ongoing efforts and the Prime Minister's leadership to coordinate the implementation of the Political Agreement through the road map.¹⁹⁸

During the meeting at which the Council adopted resolution [2659 \(2022\)](#), with three abstentions, several Council members took the floor to explain their votes.¹⁹⁹ Explaining her country's abstention, the representative of Gabon emphasized that the text of the resolution did not meet the aspirations of the Central African Republic. She said that it was deplorable that, during the negotiations, the proposals put forward by the three African members of the Council in support of a strong commitment to restoring State authority, which would undoubtedly help to build peace, had been rejected. She expressed regret for the lack of differentiated treatment of the armed groups and the Central African authorities and for the deletion of the well-defined deadline for the strategic review of MINUSCA. She emphasized that the resolution did not take into account the efforts made by the Central African Republic armed forces in defending and securing their territory in difficult conditions. The representative of China emphasized that peacekeeping operations should define their priorities on the basis of the host country's needs. He expressed regret that

¹⁹⁴ Resolution [2659 \(2022\)](#), para. 29.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 33.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 35 (a)–(d). For more information on the mandate of MINUSCA, see part X, sect. I.

¹⁹⁷ Resolution [2659 \(2022\)](#), seventeenth preambular paragraph.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, twelfth preambular paragraph.

¹⁹⁹ See [S/PV.9190](#).

the resolution did not reflect the fact that the Government of the Central African Republic continued to recover lost territory and did not take on board the views of China on the security threat posed by armed groups, as well as the Mission's independent strategic review, which left China no other choice but to abstain in the voting. He expressed the hope that the Mission's assistance in extending State authority would be prioritized. The representative of the Russian Federation underscored that her delegation could not accept a text that equated all parties and armed groups to one another, when it was well documented that the latter were responsible for the majority of the violations. She stressed that many points raised by the Russian Federation had not been included in the text, including the proposed wording on the need to effectively investigate the supply chain used to deliver explosive devices and their components deployed to the country.

Among the Council members who voted in favour of the resolution, some²⁰⁰ expressed support for the inclusion of new language concerning the Mission's freedom of movement and the authorization of night flights. The representative of France said that the abstentions were deplorable and stressed the need for the Council's unanimous support for MINUSCA. The representative of the United States expressed regret that the issue of the "Kremlin-backed Wagner Group" had been left out of the resolution and emphasized that the forces sent by the Russian Federation to the Central African Republic had consistently obstructed the Mission's ability to fulfil its mandate. The representative of the United Kingdom expressed disappointment over the loss of agreed language on the responsibility to protect, stressing that the Government of the Central African Republic remained primarily responsible for the protection of civilians. The representatives of Kenya and Ghana expressed regret that some of the proposals presented by the three African members of the Council, including promoting the extension of State authority, the deployment of security forces and the preservation of territorial integrity from "other tasks" to "priority tasks", had been left out. The representative of Kenya also expressed the hope for stronger language condemning the activities of armed groups and regretted that manifest geopolitical considerations had dictated the positions of certain delegations during the negotiation process.

Meetings: the situation in the Central African Republic, 2022

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8971 22 February	Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic (S/2022/119)		Central African Republic	Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Central African Republic and Head of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union for the Central African Republic and Head of the African Union Office in the	13 Council members, ^a all invitees ^b	

²⁰⁰ France, United States and United Kingdom.

**Part I. Consideration of questions under the responsibility of
the Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace and security**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
				Central African Republic, Executive Secretary of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region		
S/PV.9074 22 June	Letter dated 1 June 2022 from the Secretary- General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2022/449)		Central African Republic	Special Representative of the Secretary General, President of the Network for Women's Leadership in the Central African Republic	13 Council members, ^a all invitees	
	Report of the Secretary- General on the Central African Republic (S/2022/491)					
S/PV.9105 29 July	Letter dated 14 June 2022 from the Secretary- General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2022/489)	Draft resolution submitted by France (S/2022/579)	Central African Republic		13 Council members, ^c invitee ^d	Resolution 2648 (2022) 10-0-5 ^e (adopted under Chapter VII)
	Letter dated 29 June 2022 from the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to resolution 2588 (2021) addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2022/527)					

Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 2022

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.9156 19 October	Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic (S/2022/762)		Central African Republic, Rwanda	Special Representative of the Secretary-General	13 Council members, ^a all invitees ^d	
S/PV.9190 14 November		Draft resolution submitted by France (S/2022/845)	Central African Republic		11 Council members, ^f invitee ^d	Resolution 2659 (2022) 12-0-3 ^g (adopted under Chapter VII)

^a Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

^b The Central African Republic was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs, Francophonie and Central Africans Abroad. The Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union for the Central African Republic and the Executive Secretary of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region participated in the meeting by videoconference.

^c Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon, Ghana, Ireland, Kenya, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

^d The Central African Republic was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs, Francophonie and Central Africans Abroad.

^e *For:* Albania, Brazil, France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States; *against:* none; *abstaining:* China, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Russian Federation.

^f Albania, China, France, Gabon, Ghana, Ireland, Kenya, Norway, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States.

^g *For:* Albania, Brazil, France, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States of America; *against:* none; *abstaining:* China, Gabon, Russian Federation.

6. Central African region

In 2022, the Council held two meetings under the item entitled “Central African region”. Both meetings took the form of briefings.²⁰¹ Under this item, the Council considered developments in Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon and the Gulf of Guinea. More information on the meetings is given in the table below.²⁰² In 2022, the Secretary-General appointed a new Special Representative for Central Africa and Head of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA).²⁰³

During the period under review, consistent with the six-month reporting period requested by the Council in its presidential statement of 10 August 2018,²⁰⁴ the Council heard a briefing by the Assistant Secretary-General for Africa in the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Central Africa and Head of UNOCA further to the reports of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Central African Region.²⁰⁵ The Assistant Secretary-General and the Special Representative apprised the Council of the activities of UNOCA, its continued cooperation with the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), and its activities as the secretariat for the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa. They updated the Council on the political, human rights and security situation in the region, including on the preparation and conduct of electoral processes in several Central African countries and the subsequent

²⁰¹ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

²⁰² See also [A/77/2](#), part II, chap. 24.

²⁰³ See [S/2022/582](#).

²⁰⁴ [S/PRST/2018/17](#), twentieth paragraph.

²⁰⁵ [S/2022/436](#) and [S/2022/896](#).