

<sup>e</sup> Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Germany, Italy, Japan, Malta, Morocco, Mozambique, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Rwanda, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Switzerland, Tunisia, Thailand and Ukraine.

<sup>f</sup> The Commissioner and the Special Adviser participated in the meeting by videoconference. The representative of the European Union spoke also on behalf of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, the Republic of Moldova, Serbia and Ukraine.

<sup>g</sup> Gabon (President of the Council) was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs; Ghana was represented by its Minister of National Security; India was represented by its Minister of State for External Affairs; the United Arab Emirates was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation; and the United States was represented by its Permanent Representative to the United Nations and member of the President's Cabinet.

<sup>h</sup> The Executive Director of UNODC, the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security of the African Union and the representative of the Institute for Security Studies to the African Union participated in the meeting by videoconference.

<sup>i</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, France, India, Ireland, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>j</sup> The representative of Germany spoke on behalf of the Group of Seven Group of Friends of the Gulf of Guinea.

## **10. The situation in Libya**

During the period under review, the Council held 17 meetings concerning the situation in Libya and adopted six resolutions, including two under Chapter VII of the Charter. All the meetings that were not devoted to the adoption of decisions of the Council took the form of briefings.<sup>365</sup> More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below. In addition to the meetings, Council members held informal consultations of the whole and one informal interactive dialogue to discuss the item.<sup>366</sup> In 2022, the Secretary-General appointed a new Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL).<sup>367</sup>

In 2022, the Council heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the Assistant Secretary-General for Africa and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya. The briefings focused on the ongoing political, security, humanitarian and socioeconomic challenges facing Libya, including the constitutional review process in preparation for the postponed presidential and parliamentary elections. The briefings also covered the work of UNSMIL towards the implementation of the Libyan-led ceasefire monitoring mechanism, as well as efforts to support the economic reform process and improve the security and humanitarian situation across the country. Other briefers included the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya, who gave a briefing on the activities of and developments relating to the work of the Committee and its Panel of Experts; the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, who provided updates on the Court's ongoing investigations regarding the situation in Libya; and three civil society representatives. Invitations under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure were limited to Libya.

On 24 January, the Council heard a briefing by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, who reported that growing polarization among political actors in disputes over key aspects of the electoral process had resulted in the postponement of the elections scheduled for 24 December 2021.<sup>368</sup> She noted that, on 5 December 2021, the Secretary-General had appointed a Special Adviser on Libya, who was working closely with UNSMIL and who had undertaken wide-ranging consultations in Tripoli, Benghazi, Misratah and Sirte since her arrival in Libya on 12 December. Concerning the political situation in the country, the Under-Secretary-General underlined that the Special Adviser had reiterated to Libyan interlocutors that the focus of the political process should remain the holding of parliamentary and presidential elections in the shortest possible time frame. On the security track, the Under-Secretary-General reported that there had been meetings among various armed groups. On the economic track, she noted that further steps had been taken towards the reunification of the Central Bank of Libya. The Under-Secretary-General welcomed the renewed efforts to advance national reconciliation based on the principles of transitional justice. While the ceasefire had continued to hold,

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<sup>365</sup> For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

<sup>366</sup> See A/77/2, part II, chap. 37.

<sup>367</sup> See S/2022/669 and S/2022/670.

<sup>368</sup> See S/PV.8952.

political uncertainty in the run-up to the elections had had a negative impact on the security situation. The second group of international monitors from the UNSMIL ceasefire monitoring component had deployed to Tripoli in December 2021. Regarding the human rights situation, the Under-Secretary-General said that UNSMIL had documented incidents of election-related violence, attacks against journalists, activists and individuals expressing political views, and hate speech and violence against women and men working to protect and promote the rights of women. She also noted the continued occurrence of arbitrary detention and the inhumane treatment of migrants and refugees in Libya. Nonetheless, the overall humanitarian situation had improved in 2021.

At the same meeting, the Council heard a briefing by the co-founder and Director of Lawyers for Justice in Libya, who warned that focusing on the dates for the elections, instead of a clear process to facilitate them, risked compromising due process for the sake of perceived political expediency. She reported that the systematic crackdown on civil society by all parties in Libya was particularly targeting women human rights defenders and women exercising their right to participate in political or public life. She called upon the Council and Member States to support an electoral process rooted in a legitimate legislative and constitutional framework; to demand accountability of all parties to the conflict, including third States; to apply sanctions fairly, transparently and consistently; to protect women and civil society; and to adopt and implement the recommendations of the independent strategic review of UNSMIL.

On 31 January, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2619 (2022), by which it extended the mandate of UNSMIL for three months, until 30 April.<sup>369</sup> By the same resolution, the Council recalled that UNSMIL should be led by a Special Envoy and recognized the responsibility of the Secretary-General to appoint such an envoy, as set out in resolution 2542 (2020).<sup>370</sup> Despite the unanimous adoption, most Council members expressed disappointment at the Council's inability to reach an agreement on a substantive renewal of the mandate of UNSMIL.<sup>371</sup> Two Council members<sup>372</sup> supported the three-month extension to allow the Council to respond to developments in the situation in Libya and to agree on the appointment of a Special Envoy.

In her briefing to Council members on 16 March, the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, reporting on the political situation in Libya, noted that the Libyan executive was facing a crisis that could lead to instability and parallel Governments in the country.<sup>373</sup> She reported increasingly threatening rhetoric, growing political tensions and divided loyalties among armed groups in western Libya following the 1 March vote of confidence on the new Government. Although the Secretary-General had expressed concern that the vote had fallen short of standards of transparency and procedure, the new Prime Minister had been sworn in by the House of Representatives on 3 March. The Special Adviser on Libya had continued her consultations with a broad cross-section of Libyan political and security actors and civil society. The United Nations was focusing its efforts on building consensus among Libyan institutions regarding the constitutional basis for holding elections as soon as possible. The Under-Secretary-General urged the members of the Council to call for responsible leadership by the Libyan institutions and to remain united in support of United Nations efforts to assist Libya.

At the same meeting, the Council heard a briefing by a member of civil society who was a legal academic, activist and candidate for the parliamentary elections, who conveyed the concerns of the Libyan people regarding the ongoing impasse in the political process, the absence of a permanent constitution, the lack of executive and legislative legitimacy of the State authorities, and the situation of human rights in the country, in particular the rights of women. She called on the Council to support the Libyan electoral process through the international monitoring of elections and to urge the Libyan leadership to honour the commitments of Libya to respect women and ensure a gender perspective in all policies, legislation and national strategies.

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<sup>369</sup> Resolution 2619 (2022), para. 1.

<sup>370</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 2.

<sup>371</sup> See S/PV.8961.

<sup>372</sup> Russian Federation and China.

<sup>373</sup> See S/PV.8996.

On 29 April, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2629 \(2022\)](#), by which it extended the mandate of UNSMIL for three additional months, until 31 July.<sup>374</sup> By the same resolution, the Council requested the Mission to implement the recommendations of the independent strategic review of UNSMIL and decided that the Mission should be led by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General, in Tripoli, supported by two Deputy Special Representatives, and called upon the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative promptly.<sup>375</sup> The Council further requested the Secretary-General to report on the implementation of the resolution every 30 days.<sup>376</sup> Many Council members expressed regret that the Council had not been able to secure consensus on a substantive one-year mandate renewal.<sup>377</sup> At the same time, most expressed the hope that the Council would soon be able to agree on a substantive resolution on UNSMIL and called upon the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative without delay. Several Council members<sup>378</sup> welcomed the endorsement by the Council of the recommendations of the strategic review, with some<sup>379</sup> citing in particular the reform of the Mission's leadership structure.

On 26 May, the Council heard a briefing by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, who said that the deadlock on the political, security and economic fronts in Libya had persisted, despite the best efforts of the United Nations to facilitate agreement among Libyan actors.<sup>380</sup> The human rights situation had also deteriorated, and she expressed concern about the negative impact of the protracted political impasse on the security situation. While the 2020 ceasefire continued to hold and the activities of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission had resumed, the situation remained fragile, with clashes among armed groups in Tripoli. On the economic front, the reluctance of the Government of National Unity to pay the Libyan National Army's salaries for the first quarter of 2022 had led elements affiliated with the Army to close several oilfields, cutting the country's daily oil output in half.

On 27 June, the Council heard a briefing by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, who said that during the final round of consultations of the House of Representatives and the High State Council regarding the constitutional basis for elections, broad consensus had been reached on most of the contentious issues.<sup>381</sup> She was encouraged that the leaders of both chambers had accepted the invitation of the Special Adviser to meet in Geneva in June to discuss and reach agreement on measures governing the transitional period leading to elections. Nevertheless, she noted that continued political divisions were contributing to a tense security environment in and around Tripoli. The human rights situation remained alarming, with civic space consistently being eroded, arbitrary restrictions imposed on civil society organizations, human rights activists being targeted, and reports of torture in detention facilities and prisons. On the economic front, the suspension of oil revenue transfers could have a negative impact on the ability of the Government of National Unity to pay salaries and meet other spending needs.

Following the briefing by the Under-Secretary-General, the operations manager of Fezzan Libya Organization, a civil society organization, speaking by videoconference from Sabha, Libya, said that there were significant challenges to the political participation of women, who continued to face systemic violence from the Government. While recent Governments had taken positive steps by appointing more women to higher positions, she underlined that achieving the meaningful participation of women also required adopting pro-women legislation.

On 25 July, the Council heard a briefing by the Assistant Secretary-General for Africa, who said that the overall situation in Libya remained highly volatile and that the constitutional and political stalemate persisted, prolonging the tense security environment, with an increased number of clashes in and around Tripoli.<sup>382</sup> Progress had been made on the constitutional track with the agreement between

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<sup>374</sup> Resolution [2629 \(2022\)](#), para. 1.

<sup>375</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 2.

<sup>376</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 6.

<sup>377</sup> See [S/PV.9025](#) (Ireland, Albania, Brazil, Mexico, Norway, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, France, United States and United Kingdom).

<sup>378</sup> United Arab Emirates, Ireland, Albania, Mexico, Norway, France and United Kingdom.

<sup>379</sup> Ireland, Brazil, Mexico and France.

<sup>380</sup> See [S/PV.9047](#).

<sup>381</sup> See [S/PV.9078](#).

<sup>382</sup> See [S/PV.9098](#).

the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the High State Council on some of the transitional measures that would lead to the holding of national elections and on a road map. She reported on the demonstrations held across Libya on 1 July, during which protestors had expressed their frustration with the continuing political divisions and the deterioration of living conditions. Libyan monitors, together with the international monitors of UNSMIL, had conducted two joint workshops to operationalize the Libyan-led and Libyan-owned ceasefire monitoring mechanism. Regarding the economic situation, she expressed concern about the politicization of the National Oil Corporation, emphasizing that the dire economic situation had had a negative impact on people's fundamental right to basic services and access to food, water, sanitation, health care and education.

On 28 July, the Council adopted resolution 2647 (2022), with three abstentions,<sup>383</sup> by which it extended the mandate of UNSMIL for an additional three months, until 31 October 2022, reiterated that the Mission should be led by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General, in Tripoli, supported by two Deputy Special Representatives, and called upon the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative promptly.<sup>384</sup> Expressing regret that a number of the deliverables of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum road map had yet to be achieved, the Council underlined that the objectives and governing principles set out therein were still relevant to the political process and urged the Libyan political institutions and key stakeholders to agree on a pathway to deliver elections as soon as possible through dialogue, compromise and constructive engagement, in a transparent and inclusive manner.<sup>385</sup> In the preambular paragraphs of the resolution, the Council expressed support for the ongoing facilitation of intra-Libyan consultations to create the conditions and circumstances for elections on a constitutional and legal basis, while also encouraging further international support and regional cooperation between Libya, neighbouring countries and relevant United Nations bodies in support of peacebuilding and sustaining peace in the country and the region.<sup>386</sup> The Council recalled that the oil resources of Libya were for the benefit of all Libyans and needed to remain under the exclusive control of the National Oil Corporation and expressed grave concern about the humanitarian situation in the country.<sup>387</sup>

After the vote, the representative of the United Kingdom, the penholder of the resolution, said that resolution 2647 (2022) contained a number of important messages, including on the political and security processes, the integrity of the National Oil Corporation, and human rights.<sup>388</sup> Of particular importance was the message to the Libyan parties on the need to agree on a pathway to deliver presidential and parliamentary elections as soon as possible. However, she shared the frustration of the three African delegations that had abstained due to the short three-month mandate and said that the approach by the Russian Federation of insisting on three-month rollovers in the absence of a Special Representative was short-sighted and undermined the ability of UNSMIL to support Libyan leaders to achieve the political and security objectives required to bring stability to the country. The representative of the Russian Federation said that the adopted resolution was the only possible compromise for all at the current stage and that the tenure of the Special Adviser without an appropriate security mandate had been unjustifiably prolonged. The Secretary-General should promptly submit a worthy and authoritative candidate for the position of Special Representative for Libya and Head of UNSMIL, who would suit the main Libyan actors and regional stakeholders, for subsequent approval by the members of the Council. The insistence of the Russian Federation on appointing a Special Representative was dictated solely by concern for maintaining the effectiveness of United Nations efforts to promote a settlement in Libya. The representative of Gabon explained that her delegation had abstained in the voting on the renewal of UNSMIL as a call for the interests and concerns of Libyans to be put above all other considerations. The Council remained insensitive, despite the gradual deterioration of the security situation on the ground. Short mandates undermined the credibility of the Council. She reiterated her delegation's support for the appointment of an African to the position of Special Representative. Similarly, the representative of Ghana said that the Council had failed to show commitment to the Libyan people by not extending the mandate of UNSMIL for a one-year period in order to consolidate the gains of the peace efforts and foster serious engagement between the Council and the Libyan people through UNSMIL. The failure of the

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<sup>383</sup> See S/PV.9103.

<sup>384</sup> Resolution 2647 (2022), paras. 1 and 2.

<sup>385</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 3.

<sup>386</sup> *Ibid.*, second and third preambular paragraphs.

<sup>387</sup> *Ibid.*, sixth and ninth preambular paragraphs.

<sup>388</sup> See S/PV.9103.

Council to find consensus on the Secretary-General's proposed nominee for the vacant position further complicated the Libyan peace process, with the departure of the Special Adviser on Libya. The representative of Kenya said that the resolution and the three-month mandate extension constituted yet another disappointment for the people of Libya and expressed the belief that it was no longer tenable for UNSMIL to operate with such a brief and uncertain mandate. The representative of China expressed support for the appointment of an African candidate and noted that appointing a Special Representative as soon as possible would help to restore the full performance of UNSMIL, strengthen the United Nations capacity for good offices and help to create conditions for UNSMIL to obtain a longer mandate extension in the future. The representative of the United States welcomed the fact that the resolution provided a more substantive mandate, including language in support of the political process and assurances that the oil revenue of Libya was managed transparently for the benefit of the entire Libyan people. She noted the abstentions of the three African members of the Council in protest at the insistence of the Russian Federation on a three-month mandate and said that she shared their frustration. She further rejected the "specious contention" of the Russian Federation that a three-month mandate would assist the Secretariat in securing the Council's full support for a nominee and said that, on the contrary, a short mandate duration only complicated the Secretariat's efforts to recruit the best candidate for the role and made it much harder for UNSMIL to implement long-term plans and develop sustainable solutions to challenges in Libya. The representative of Brazil expressed the view that a candidate from the African continent would be well-suited to the position. He said that the compromise reached within the Council on the duration of the mandate of UNSMIL offered the Secretary-General and Council members a new opportunity to engage in the appointment of the Mission's leadership, with the expectation that a suitable candidate would be appointed as soon as possible, and expressed the hope that subsequent renewals of the mandate would benefit from more predictable time frames.

On 30 August, the Council heard a briefing by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, who reported that the United Nations had continued to engage with Libyan actors at every level to facilitate a resolution to the political impasse.<sup>389</sup> She noted that the ongoing stalemate and continued delays in implementing the electoral process posed a growing threat to security in and around Tripoli, and potentially to all Libyans. Fighting had broken out in Tripoli and its outskirts on 27 August between armed groups supporting Abdul Hamid Dbeibah and Fathi Bashagha respectively. She expressed concern about the limited political progress made during the reporting period and the lack of progress on forging a consensus on a constitutional framework for the elections.

On 24 October, the Council heard a briefing by the newly appointed Special Representative for Libya and Head of UNSMIL, who reported that prior to his arrival in Libya, he had spoken to a range of representatives of Member States and regional organizations and had stressed the importance of ensuring that the international community would support Libyan efforts in a coordinated manner, rally behind the United Nations and refrain from taking any action that could further deepen divisions.<sup>390</sup> Addressing the political situation in the country, he indicated that the deadlock persisted, further delaying the prospects for the holding of inclusive, free and fair elections. He had decided to prioritize consultations with Libyan institutional, political, security and civil society actors from across the country. While significant differences remained among Libyans on how to resolve the crisis, there was near unanimous condemnation across the spectrum of the presence of mercenaries, foreign fighters and foreign forces in Libya and of the incessant foreign interference in the country's affairs. Although the ceasefire continued to hold, the security track needed to be reinvigorated, as it had been adversely affected by the political impasse. He expressed concern regarding the human rights situation, reporting that violations against migrants and asylum-seekers continued with impunity and that arbitrary detention was a common practice. Recalling that the situation in Libya called for a "consensus State re-legitimation process", he stressed the paramount importance of the conduct of legislative and presidential elections and said that he would intensify consultations in that regard.

On 28 October, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2656 \(2022\)](#),<sup>391</sup> by which it extended the mandate of UNSMIL until 31 October 2023 and welcomed the appointment of Abdoulaye Bathily as

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<sup>389</sup> See [S/PV.9120](#).

<sup>390</sup> See [S/PV.9162](#).

<sup>391</sup> See [S/PV.9173](#).

Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya and Head of UNSMIL.<sup>392</sup> By the same resolution, the Council reiterated its request for the Mission to implement the recommendations of the independent strategic review of UNSMIL.<sup>393</sup> Recalling the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum road map, the Council urged the Libyan political institutions and key stakeholders to agree on a road map to deliver elections as soon as possible across the country.<sup>394</sup> The Council welcomed the support provided by the United Nations to the Libyan High National Elections Commission.<sup>395</sup> The Council emphasized that there could be no military solution in Libya and called upon all parties to refrain from violence or other actions that could escalate tensions, exacerbate conflicts and undermine the political process or the 23 October 2020 ceasefire.<sup>396</sup> The Council requested the Secretary-General to report on the implementation of the resolution every 60 days.<sup>397</sup>

After the vote, the representatives of Kenya, Brazil, Ghana and Gabon welcomed the substantive renewal of the mandate of UNSMIL for a 12-month period.<sup>398</sup> The representative of Gabon said that, as an African State and one of the three African members of the Council, his delegation felt a sense of having contributed to an important milestone in the stabilization of a major African State. The representative of Kenya said that the Libyan peace process was complex at the national level and made more so by the involvement of competing external interests, and urged all international support to be channelled through the United Nations-led process.

On 15 November, the Council heard a briefing by the Special Representative for Libya, who reported on the various meetings he had held with Libyan stakeholders and representatives of the international community in an effort to bring the country back to peace and stability through a Libyan-Libyan solution to the crisis.<sup>399</sup> He said that UNSMIL continued to provide technical assistance to the High National Elections Commission to maintain readiness for elections. There appeared to be broad agreement that restoring the legitimacy of Libyan institutions across the board was of paramount importance, as was the need to coordinate bilateral and multilateral diplomatic initiatives and to coalesce behind the efforts of the United Nations. He warned that further postponing the elections would make Libya even more vulnerable to political, economic and security instability and could put the country at risk of partition, and urged the Council to send an unequivocal message to obstructionists that their actions would not remain without consequences. On the security track, he reported some progress, including the holding of a meeting of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission, at which the Commission had agreed to establish a subcommittee for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed groups. The ceasefire continued to hold, despite ongoing escalatory rhetoric and a build-up of forces on both sides. He expressed alarm about the human rights situation and reported that online violence against women was on the rise. On the economic front, he noted that the lack of accountability, transparency and equity in the allocation of resources remained a key cause of tensions.

On 16 December, the Special Representative for Libya gave a briefing on his engagement with Libyan stakeholders and international partners to advance the political process and revive the electoral track, including his visits to Türkiye,<sup>400</sup> Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Tunisia.<sup>401</sup> He called upon the Council, its members and all those with convening power to support the efforts of UNSMIL to bring Libyan political leaders back to the negotiating table and prevent a further deterioration of the situation. On the security and military track, while the ceasefire had continued to hold, the proliferation of weapons under the control of State and non-State actors and the presence of foreign fighters, foreign forces and mercenaries continued to pose security challenges and undermine efforts to unify the country's security institutions. Furthermore, UNSMIL continued to observe a systematic campaign by Libyan security actors attempting to undermine and silence civil society, humanitarian actors, human rights

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<sup>392</sup> Resolution 2656 (2022), paras. 1 and 2.

<sup>393</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 3.

<sup>394</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 4.

<sup>395</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 5.

<sup>396</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 7.

<sup>397</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 11.

<sup>398</sup> See S/PV.9173.

<sup>399</sup> See S/PV.9192.

<sup>400</sup> Since 2022, "Türkiye" has replaced "Turkey" as the short name used at the United Nations.

<sup>401</sup> See S/PV.9223.

defenders and political activists, including women and young people. He expressed concern about new bureaucratic obstacles and movement restrictions impeding humanitarian access.

During the period under review, the Council also heard regular briefings by the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya.<sup>402</sup> During the briefings, the Chair reported on the implementation and violations of the sanctions regime, including the arms embargo, asset freeze, travel ban and the timebound authorizations and measures aimed at preventing the illicit export of petroleum from Libya.<sup>403</sup> The Chair reported on the implementation of the assets freeze, including discussions regarding the preservation of Libyan frozen assets for the benefit of the Libyan people, exemption requests and notifications with respect to the illicit export of petroleum, the travel ban, the assets freeze and the arms embargo, and the consideration of delisting requests by the Committee.

On 13 July, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2644 (2022) under Chapter VII of the Charter, by which it extended until 30 October 2023 the authorizations and measures contained in resolutions 2146 (2014), 2441 (2018) and 2509 (2020).<sup>404</sup> The Council also extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts established by resolution 1973 (2011) until 15 November 2023 and requested that the Panel closely follow and report to the Committee any information relating to the illicit export from or illicit import to Libya of petroleum, including crude oil and refined petroleum products.<sup>405</sup> The Council also demanded full compliance by all Member States with the arms embargo and called on all Member States not to intervene in the conflict or take measures that exacerbated the conflict.<sup>406</sup>

In 2022, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court continued to provide briefings to the Council. He reported twice on the progress and challenges relating to the Court's ongoing investigations regarding the situation in Libya. On 28 April, he gave a briefing on the twenty-third report of the Prosecutor to the Council, pointing out that it was the first time that the Office of the Prosecutor had indicated benchmarks in terms of timelines for certain action, so that the Office could be held to account.<sup>407</sup> At a meeting held on 9 November,<sup>408</sup> the Prosecutor gave a briefing from Libya for the first time. Describing the work performed by forensic experts in various locations, he underlined the need for the international community and the Court to do more to deliver justice for the people of Libya.

In their deliberations in 2022, Council members focused on the political, security and humanitarian situation in Libya and addressed the economic factors that were further destabilizing the country. Many expressed disappointment and concern regarding the postponement of the presidential and parliamentary elections, as well as the deteriorating situation in the country.<sup>409</sup> Council members expressed support for the Libyan-led and owned political process<sup>410</sup> and called on Libyan stakeholders to commit to holding

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<sup>402</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#), [S/PV.8996](#), [S/PV.9047](#), [S/PV.9120](#) and [S/PV.9223](#). For more information on the work of the Committee and the Panel of Experts, see part IX, sect. I.B.

<sup>403</sup> For more information on the sanctions measures, see part VII, sect. III.

<sup>404</sup> Resolution 2644 (2022), para. 2.

<sup>405</sup> *Ibid.*, paras. 3 and 12.

<sup>406</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 5.

<sup>407</sup> See [S/PV.9024](#).

<sup>408</sup> See [S/PV.9187](#).

<sup>409</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#) (United Kingdom, Brazil, Albania, India, Mexico and Norway); [S/PV.8996](#) (United Kingdom, Ireland, Russian Federation, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), Mexico, France, China, Norway and United States); [S/PV.9162](#) (United Kingdom, Norway, Mexico, Albania, France, United States, Brazil, China, India, Ireland and United Arab Emirates); [S/PV.9192](#) (Russian Federation, United Kingdom, Norway, Ireland, United States, Brazil, France, Albania, India, China, Mexico and Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya)); and [S/PV.9223](#) (United Kingdom, Ireland, Albania and India).

<sup>410</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#) (United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates, Ireland, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), India, Russian Federation, China, United States and Norway); [S/PV.9047](#) (Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), India and Norway); [S/PV.9078](#) (Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), India, China and Albania); [S/PV.9098](#) (United Kingdom, India, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Ireland, Albania and Brazil); [S/PV.9120](#) (Brazil, Russian Federation, India, Albania and China); [S/PV.9192](#) (United Kingdom, Ireland, Brazil, Albania, India, United Arab Emirates, China and Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya)); and [S/PV.9223](#) (United Kingdom, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), China, Brazil, Ireland, United Arab Emirates and India).

free, fair and inclusive elections as soon as possible.<sup>411</sup> Several Council members expressed support for the efforts of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on Libya and then the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya to convene consultations between the House of Representatives and the High State Council to establish a constitutional basis for elections.<sup>412</sup> The representative of Gabon, speaking also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya, recommended that the Secretary-General make use of the vast body of African expertise available in the context of the high-level United Nations leadership to achieve progress in the dialogue between the parties and strengthen coordination with States of the region.<sup>413</sup> Council members called for the full implementation of the ceasefire agreement, including the withdrawal of mercenaries and foreign forces from Libya,<sup>414</sup> compliance with the arms embargo,<sup>415</sup> the unification of institutions in Libya,<sup>416</sup> national reconciliation,<sup>417</sup> full and meaningful political participation of women in

<sup>411</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#) (Ireland, Brazil, India, Mexico, France, United States and Norway); [S/PV.8996](#) (Brazil, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), Mexico, France, China, India, Norway, United States, Albania and United Arab Emirates); [S/PV.9047](#) (United Kingdom, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Ireland, Albania, United Arab Emirates, France, India, Norway and United States); [S/PV.9078](#) (Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), India, Norway, France, Ireland, United Arab Emirates and Albania); [S/PV.9098](#) (United Kingdom, India, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Mexico, France, Ireland, Norway, China, United Arab Emirates, Albania and Brazil); [S/PV.9120](#) (Norway, Russian Federation, India, United States, Albania, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), United Arab Emirates, France, Mexico, Ireland and China); and [S/PV.9223](#) (United Kingdom, China, Mexico, France, Ireland, Russian Federation, Norway, Albania, United Arab Emirates, United States and India).

<sup>412</sup> See [S/PV.8996](#) (United Kingdom, Ireland, Brazil, Mexico, India, Norway, United States and Albania); [S/PV.9047](#) (United Kingdom, Albania, China, United Arab Emirates, France, Norway and United States); [S/PV.9078](#) (United Kingdom, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), Norway, United States, Brazil, France, Mexico, China, Ireland, United Arab Emirates, Russian Federation and Albania); [S/PV.9098](#) (India, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), United States, Norway and China); [S/PV.9192](#) (China); and [S/PV.9223](#) (China, Mexico, Brazil, Russian Federation, Norway, United Arab Emirates and United States).

<sup>413</sup> See [S/PV.8996](#). See also [S/PV.9223](#) (Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana)).

<sup>414</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#) (United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates, Ireland, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Brazil, Albania, India, Mexico, France, United States and Norway); [S/PV.8996](#) (France, China, India, Norway, United States, Albania and United Arab Emirates); [S/PV.9047](#) (United Kingdom, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Ireland, Russian Federation, India, Norway and United States); [S/PV.9078](#) (United Kingdom, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), India, Norway, Brazil, France, Mexico, Ireland, United Arab Emirates, Russian Federation and Albania); [S/PV.9098](#) (India, Mexico, France, China, United Arab Emirates, Russian Federation and Albania); [S/PV.9120](#) (Norway, Russian Federation, India, Albania, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), United Arab Emirates, France, Mexico, Ireland and China); [S/PV.9162](#) (United Kingdom, Norway, Kenya, Mexico, Albania, France, United States, Brazil, China, India, Ireland and United Arab Emirates); [S/PV.9192](#) (United Kingdom, United States, France, Albania, India, United Arab Emirates, China and Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya)); and [S/PV.9223](#) (United Kingdom, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), China, Brazil, France, Russian Federation, Norway, Albania, United Arab Emirates, United States and India).

<sup>415</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#) (Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), India and Mexico); [S/PV.8996](#) (France and United States); [S/PV.9047](#) (United States); [S/PV.9078](#) (Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya) and France); [S/PV.9098](#) (United Kingdom, India, Mexico, France, Ireland, Norway and Albania); [S/PV.9120](#) (Brazil, India, United States, France and Mexico); [S/PV.9162](#) (Mexico, France, Brazil and India); [S/PV.9192](#) (Brazil, France, India and Mexico); [S/PV.9192](#) (Brazil, France, India and Mexico); and [S/PV.9223](#) (Brazil, France and India).

<sup>416</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#) (France, Russian Federation, China and United States); [S/PV.8996](#) (United Kingdom, Russian Federation, United States and United Arab Emirates); [S/PV.9047](#) (United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates and France); [S/PV.9078](#) (France); [S/PV.9098](#) (Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Mexico, France, Norway, Russian Federation and Albania); [S/PV.9120](#) (Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), United Arab Emirates and Mexico); [S/PV.9162](#) (United Kingdom, Mexico, France, Brazil and United Arab Emirates); [S/PV.9192](#) (Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya)); and [S/PV.9223](#) (China, Brazil, France, Ireland, Russian Federation and United Arab Emirates).

<sup>417</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#) (Kenya (also on behalf also of Gabon and Ghana) and China); [S/PV.8996](#) (Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya) and United Arab Emirates); [S/PV.9047](#) (Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), United Arab Emirates and India); [S/PV.9078](#) (Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), India, Brazil, China, Ireland, United Arab Emirates and Albania); [S/PV.9098](#) (Mexico, United Arab Emirates and Russian Federation); [S/PV.9120](#) (Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates and China); [S/PV.9162](#) (Russian Federation, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Brazil, China and United Arab Emirates); [S/PV.9192](#) (Brazil, United Arab Emirates and Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya)); and [S/PV.9223](#) (Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), China, Brazil, Russian Federation and United Arab Emirates).



the political process,<sup>418</sup> and for addressing the concerns of Libya regarding the management of its frozen assets.<sup>419</sup> Some Council members addressed the attempts to disrupt oil production at the National Oil Corporation and said that the Corporation should not be politicized and must be allowed to fulfil its duties without interference.<sup>420</sup> Council members expressed concern about the humanitarian and human rights situation in the country, in particular the condition and arbitrary detention of migrants and refugees<sup>421</sup> and incidents of violence against journalists and civil society activists, including women's groups.<sup>422</sup> Some Council members further underscored the importance of ensuring that efforts undertaken for the withdrawal of mercenaries and foreign forces included disarmament, demobilization and reintegration measures in order to prevent instability in neighbouring countries and the Sahel region.<sup>423</sup> Several Council members expressed support for the action plan of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission for the withdrawal of foreign forces and mercenaries.<sup>424</sup> The appointment of a Special Representative for Libya and Head of UNSMIL was discussed extensively by Council members from January to August, both in regular briefings and in meetings for the adoption of decisions.

During his participation in Council meetings on Libya, the representative of Libya said that holding transparent and fair elections based on consensus laws and on a strong constitutional basis was the only genuine guarantee that could return legitimacy to the people, end the conflict and resolve the

<sup>418</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#) (United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates, Ireland, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Brazil and Norway); [S/PV.8996](#) (France and United Arab Emirates); [S/PV.9047](#) (Ireland, Albania and United Arab Emirates); [S/PV.9078](#) (Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), Mexico and Ireland); [S/PV.9098](#) (Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana)); [S/PV.9162](#) (United Kingdom, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Mexico, Albania, Brazil, Ireland and United Arab Emirates); [S/PV.9192](#) (United Kingdom, Ireland, Mexico and Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya)); and [S/PV.9223](#) (Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Ireland and United Arab Emirates).

<sup>419</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana) and China; [S/PV.8996](#) (Brazil, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya) and China); [S/PV.9047](#) (Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana)); [S/PV.9078](#) (Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya) and China); [S/PV.9098](#) (Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), China and Brazil); [S/PV.9120](#) (Brazil, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), United Arab Emirates and China); [S/PV.9162](#) (Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana) and Brazil); [S/PV.9192](#) (Brazil); and [S/PV.9223](#) (Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Brazil and Russian Federation).

<sup>420</sup> See [S/PV.8996](#) (United Kingdom, France, China, United States and Albania); [S/PV.9047](#) (United Kingdom, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Albania, China, France and Norway); [S/PV.9078](#) (France, Mexico, China and Albania); [S/PV.9098](#) (United Kingdom, United States, China and Albania); [S/PV.9162](#) (Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana) and Brazil); [S/PV.9192](#) (Russian Federation and Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya)); and [S/PV.9223](#) (United States).

<sup>421</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#) (Ireland, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Brazil, Albania, Mexico, France, United States and Norway); [S/PV.8996](#) (Ireland, Brazil, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), Mexico and Norway); [S/PV.9047](#) (United Kingdom, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Ireland, Brazil, France and Norway); [S/PV.9078](#) (Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), Mexico and Albania); [S/PV.9098](#) (Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Ireland and Albania); [S/PV.9120](#) (Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), France, Mexico and Ireland); [S/PV.9162](#) (Norway, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Mexico, Albania, France and Ireland); [S/PV.9192](#) (Norway, Mexico and Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya)); and [S/PV.9223](#) (Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Mexico, France, Ireland and United States).

<sup>422</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#) (Brazil); [S/PV.8996](#) (Ireland, Mexico, Norway, United States and Albania); [S/PV.9047](#) (Brazil, Albania, Norway and United States); [S/PV.9078](#) (Norway and Ireland); [S/PV.9098](#) (United Kingdom, Mexico, Ireland and Brazil); [S/PV.9162](#) (United Kingdom, Norway and Ireland); [S/PV.9192](#) (Ireland, Albania and Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya)); and [S/PV.9223](#) (United Kingdom, Mexico, France, Ireland, Norway and Albania).

<sup>423</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#) (Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), India, Mexico, France, China and Norway); [S/PV.8996](#) (Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya)); [S/PV.9047](#) (Ireland, France, India and Mexico); [S/PV.9078](#) (Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), India, France and Mexico); [S/PV.9098](#) (Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), United States and France); [S/PV.9120](#) (Norway, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana) and France); [S/PV.9162](#) (Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), France, Brazil and China); [S/PV.9192](#) (Brazil and Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya)); and [S/PV.9223](#) (Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), China, Mexico, France and India).

<sup>424</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#) (United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates, Kenya (also on behalf also of Gabon and Ghana), Brazil, Albania, India, France, Russian Federation, China and United States); [S/PV.9047](#) (Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Ireland, France and Mexico); [S/PV.9162](#) (Norway, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), France and Brazil); and [S/PV.9223](#) (Brazil, Norway and Albania).

situation in the country.<sup>425</sup> He reiterated his request to the United Nations to support, seriously and more effectively, the electoral process and to send its assessment teams, and emphasized the importance of Libyan ownership and leadership of any political process that would lead the country towards stability and impose the State's authority, while excluding all external dictates and intervention.<sup>426</sup> He recalled the need to support the 5+5 Joint Military Commission to ensure the full implementation of the ceasefire agreement and to put an end to any foreign presence on Libyan territories.<sup>427</sup> He said that the people of Libya had become hostage to the disagreements of Council members and some regional Powers, some of which went as far as to intervene directly in Libyan affairs, and recalled the lack of consensus on the mandate of UNSMIL or the appointment of a new Special Envoy of the Secretary-General.<sup>428</sup> He called upon the Council to play a positive and more effective role in supporting Libyan consensus, working to end all interventions in Libya, correcting past mistakes, and supporting all efforts to launch a national reconciliation and transitional justice project.<sup>429</sup> He also called upon the Council to support the strategic vision for national reconciliation<sup>430</sup> and to take additional constructive steps to support stability in Libya and end international division on the issue.<sup>431</sup>

In addition to the decisions outlined above, on 3 June, the Council adopted resolution [2635 \(2022\)](#) under Chapter VII of the Charter, with one abstention, by which it extended the authorizations concerning the implementation of the arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya, as set out in resolution [2578 \(2021\)](#), for a further 12 months.<sup>432</sup> After the vote, the representative of the Russian Federation noted that the special inspection regime designed to implement the arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya had failed to decrease the illicit trade in weapons and bring about a political settlement of the protracted conflict in Libya.<sup>433</sup> He said that the European Union military operation in the Mediterranean (Operation IRINI) had in recent years demonstrated low effectiveness in assisting the implementation of the arms embargo and that the work of the European Union Naval Force lacked transparency. The Russian Federation would continue to closely monitor the work of Operation IRINI to ensure full compliance with the arms embargo and would provide a legal assessment of the actions of the European Union Naval Force.

Developments in Libya were also considered under the item entitled "Maintenance of international peace and security".<sup>434</sup>

#### Meetings: the situation in Libya, 2022

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.8952</a> 24 January	Letter dated 15 December 2021 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution <a href="#">1970 (2011)</a> concerning Libya addressed to		Libya	Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, co-founder and Director of Lawyers for Justice in Libya	13 Council members, <sup>a</sup> all invitees	

<sup>425</sup> See [S/PV.8996](#).

<sup>426</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#).

<sup>427</sup> See [S/PV.8996](#) and [S/PV.9192](#).

<sup>428</sup> See [S/PV.9078](#).

<sup>429</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#), [S/PV.9192](#) and [S/PV.9223](#).

<sup>430</sup> See [S/PV.9078](#) and [S/PV.9162](#).

<sup>431</sup> See [S/PV.9162](#).

<sup>432</sup> Resolution [2635 \(2022\)](#), para. 1.

<sup>433</sup> See [S/PV.9053](#).

<sup>434</sup> For more details, see sect. 35 below.

**Part I. Consideration of questions under the responsibility of  
the Security Council for the maintenance of  
international peace and security**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
	the President of the Security Council (S/2021/1058)					
	Report of the Secretary- General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) (S/2022/31)					
S/PV.8961 31 January	Report of the Secretary- General on UNSMIL (S/2022/31)	Draft resolution submitted by United Kingdom (S/2022/69)			13 Council members <sup>b</sup>	Resolution 2619 (2022) 15-0-0
S/PV.8996 16 March			Libya	Under-Secretary- General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, activist and candidate for the parliamentary elections	13 Council members, <sup>c</sup> all invitees	
S/PV.9024 28 April			Libya	Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court	All Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.9025 29 April		Draft resolution submitted by United Kingdom (S/2022/356)			14 Council members <sup>d</sup>	Resolution 2629 (2022) 15-0-0
S/PV.9047 26 May	Report of the Secretary- General on UNSMIL (S/2022/409)		Libya	Under-Secretary- General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs	13 Council members, <sup>a</sup> all invitees	
S/PV.9053 3 June		Draft resolution submitted by France (S/2022/450)			Russian Federation	Resolution 2635 (2022) 14-0-1 <sup>e</sup> (adopted under Chapter VII)

Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 2022

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.9078</a> 27 June			Libya	Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, operations manager of Fezzan Libya Organization	13 Council members, <sup>f</sup> all invitees <sup>g</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9092</a> 13 July	Letter dated 24 May 2022 from the Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to resolution <a href="#">1973 (2011)</a> addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2022/427</a> )	Draft resolution submitted by United Kingdom ( <a href="#">S/2022/548</a> )				Resolution <a href="#">2644 (2022)</a> 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)
<a href="#">S/PV.9098</a> 25 July			Libya	Assistant Secretary-General for Africa	13 Council members, <sup>h</sup> all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.9103</a> 28 July		Draft resolution submitted by United Kingdom ( <a href="#">S/2022/580</a> )			10 Council members <sup>i</sup>	Resolution <a href="#">2647 (2022)</a> 12-0-3 <sup>j</sup>
<a href="#">S/PV.9120</a> 30 August	Report of the Secretary-General on UNSMIL ( <a href="#">S/2022/632</a> )		Libya	Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs	13 Council members, <sup>k</sup> all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.9162</a> 24 October			Libya	Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya and Head of UNSMIL	13 Council members, <sup>h</sup> all invitees <sup>l</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9173</a> 28 October		Draft resolution submitted by United Kingdom ( <a href="#">S/2022/803</a> )			Four Council members (Brazil, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya)	Resolution <a href="#">2656 (2022)</a> 15-0-0
<a href="#">S/PV.9187</a> 9 November			Libya	Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court	All Council members, all invitees <sup>m</sup>	

**Part I. Consideration of questions under the responsibility of  
the Security Council for the maintenance of  
international peace and security**

Meeting record and date	Sub-item	Other documents	Rule 37 invitations	Rule 39 and other invitations	Speakers	Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)
S/PV.9192 15 November			Libya	Special Representative of the Secretary- General	13 Council members, <sup>f</sup> all invitees <sup>l</sup>	
S/PV.9223 16 December	Report of the Secretary- General on UNSMIL (S/2022/932)		Libya	Special Representative of the Secretary- General	13 Council members, <sup>k</sup> all invitees <sup>l</sup>	

<sup>a</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, France, India, Ireland, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Mexico, Russian Federation, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States. The representative of India also gave a briefing in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya.

<sup>b</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>c</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), India, Ireland, Mexico, Russian Federation, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States. The representative of India also gave a briefing in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya.

<sup>d</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon, Ghana, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>e</sup> For: Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States; against: none; abstaining: Russian Federation.

<sup>f</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, France, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), India, Ireland, Mexico, Russian Federation, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>g</sup> The operations manager of Fezzan Libya Organization participated in the meeting by videoconference.

<sup>h</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, France, India, Ireland, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Mexico, Russian Federation, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>i</sup> Brazil, China, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Mexico, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>j</sup> For: Albania, Brazil, China, France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States; against: none; abstaining: Gabon, Ghana and Kenya.

<sup>k</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, France, India, Ireland, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Mexico, Russian Federation, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States. The representative of India also gave a briefing in her capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya.

<sup>l</sup> The Special Representative participated in the meeting by videoconference.

<sup>m</sup> The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court participated in the meeting by videoconference.

## 11. The situation in Mali

During the period under review, the Council held seven meetings and adopted two resolutions under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations in relation to the situation in Mali. Five of the meetings took the form of briefings, and two meetings were convened for the adoption of a resolution.<sup>435</sup> More information on the meetings, including on participants and outcomes, is provided in the table below. The Council also held one private (closed) meeting with countries contributing troops and police to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) pursuant to resolution 1353 (2001).<sup>436</sup> In addition, Council members held informal consultations of the whole in connection with the item.<sup>437</sup>

In 2022, the Council heard four briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mali and Head of MINUSMA in connection with the periodic reports of the Secretary-General on the

<sup>435</sup> For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

<sup>436</sup> The private meeting was held on 7 June in connection with the item entitled "Meeting of the Security Council with the troop- and police-contributing countries pursuant to resolution 1353 (2001), annex II, sections A and B"; see S/PV.9057. See also A/77/2, part II, chap. 21.

<sup>437</sup> See A/77/2, part II, chap. 38.