Kyle Lascurettes
I am an associate professor of international affairs at Lewis & Clark College. My book on great powers and international order was published by Oxford University Press in 2020, and won the Jervis-Schroeder prize in 2021.
My research interests include the intersection of global governance and international security, the history and evolution of the international system, and American foreign policy. I teach courses in international relations, IR theory, international organizations and global order.
I received my Ph.D. in foreign affairs from the University of Virginia in 2012. Previously I have been a postdoctoral fellow at the Mortara Center for International Studies at Georgetown University and a visiting professor of political science at the George Washington University.
Supervisors: Jeffrey Legro, John Owen, Dale Copeland, and Melvyn Leffler
Phone: 503-768-7746
Address: Lewis & Clark College
0615 SW Palatine Hill Rd.
MSC #36
Portland, OR 97219
My research interests include the intersection of global governance and international security, the history and evolution of the international system, and American foreign policy. I teach courses in international relations, IR theory, international organizations and global order.
I received my Ph.D. in foreign affairs from the University of Virginia in 2012. Previously I have been a postdoctoral fellow at the Mortara Center for International Studies at Georgetown University and a visiting professor of political science at the George Washington University.
Supervisors: Jeffrey Legro, John Owen, Dale Copeland, and Melvyn Leffler
Phone: 503-768-7746
Address: Lewis & Clark College
0615 SW Palatine Hill Rd.
MSC #36
Portland, OR 97219
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the particular set of rules that set parameters for states’ behavior on the
world stage—when and as they do? This essay examines American motives in founding the so-called liberal international order after the Second World War and then expanding it after the Cold War. Contrary to more conventional thinking about international order, the article argues that hegemonic orderers have often been motivated by competition and
exclusion, advocating for order changes out of a desire to combat and weaken other actors rather than cooperatively engaging with them. And contrary to the narrative supported by the liberal order’s fiercest advocates, this essay posits that the United States fits comfortably within this historical record rather than transcending it. Viewing the life and times of the liberal international order through a broader historical lens, this essay contends, can help illuminate why this order served American interests so well for decades but is under increasing strain today. In particular, the essay concludes by examining how the United States and China view the liberal order today, what history suggests they may seek to do with it tomorrow, and what these dynamics portend for calls to elevate fora like the G20 to address contemporary international problems.
When it comes to how orders emerge, the majority of existing explanations can be categorized according to two criteria and corresponding set of questions. First, are orders produced by a single actor or a select subset of actors that are privileged and powerful, or are they created by many actors that are roughly equal and undifferentiated in capabilities and status? Second, do orders come about from the purposive behavior of particular actors, or are they the aggregated result of many behaviors and interactions that produce an outcome that no single actor anticipated? The resulting typology yields four ideal types of order explanations: hegemonic (order is intentional, and power is concentrated), centralized (order is spontaneous, but power is concentrated), negotiated (order is intentional, but power is dispersed), and decentralized (order is spontaneous, and power is dispersed).
Finally, it is useful to think about the process by which order can transform or break down as a phenomenon that is at least sometimes distinct from how orders emerge in the first place. The main criterion in this respect is the rapidity with which orders transform or break down. More specifically, they can change or fall apart quickly through revolutionary processes or more gradually through evolutionary ones.
the particular set of rules that set parameters for states’ behavior on the
world stage—when and as they do? This essay examines American motives in founding the so-called liberal international order after the Second World War and then expanding it after the Cold War. Contrary to more conventional thinking about international order, the article argues that hegemonic orderers have often been motivated by competition and
exclusion, advocating for order changes out of a desire to combat and weaken other actors rather than cooperatively engaging with them. And contrary to the narrative supported by the liberal order’s fiercest advocates, this essay posits that the United States fits comfortably within this historical record rather than transcending it. Viewing the life and times of the liberal international order through a broader historical lens, this essay contends, can help illuminate why this order served American interests so well for decades but is under increasing strain today. In particular, the essay concludes by examining how the United States and China view the liberal order today, what history suggests they may seek to do with it tomorrow, and what these dynamics portend for calls to elevate fora like the G20 to address contemporary international problems.
When it comes to how orders emerge, the majority of existing explanations can be categorized according to two criteria and corresponding set of questions. First, are orders produced by a single actor or a select subset of actors that are privileged and powerful, or are they created by many actors that are roughly equal and undifferentiated in capabilities and status? Second, do orders come about from the purposive behavior of particular actors, or are they the aggregated result of many behaviors and interactions that produce an outcome that no single actor anticipated? The resulting typology yields four ideal types of order explanations: hegemonic (order is intentional, and power is concentrated), centralized (order is spontaneous, but power is concentrated), negotiated (order is intentional, but power is dispersed), and decentralized (order is spontaneous, and power is dispersed).
Finally, it is useful to think about the process by which order can transform or break down as a phenomenon that is at least sometimes distinct from how orders emerge in the first place. The main criterion in this respect is the rapidity with which orders transform or break down. More specifically, they can change or fall apart quickly through revolutionary processes or more gradually through evolutionary ones.
In moving the debate forward, I take a middle ground between these opposing perspectives. We can identify a distinct and intentional set of principles that constitutes a "liberal order," and thus its advocates have a point. In addition, this order has paid tangible dividends to the United States and its Western allies, thus affecting important international outcomes.
On the other hand, the skeptics tell a more convincing story about American motives surrounding the liberal order's origins. Furthermore, this story more closely aligns with broader patterns of great power order building throughout history. Contrary to the conventional thinking, this historical record reveals that order building has often in fact been a strategic and deeply exclusionary practice. And contrary to the narrative supported by the liberal order’s advocates, the United States fits comfortably within this historical record rather than transcending it. Viewing the life and times of the liberal international order through a broader historical lens, I argue, can help us understand why this order was so successful for decades but is under increasing strain today.
Introduction by David Edelstein, Georgetown University
Review by Kyle M. Lascurettes, Lewis & Clark College
Review by Paul K. MacDonald, Wellesley College
Review by Evan Braden Montgomery, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.
Response by Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, Boston University
Contents
Introduction by Susan Hyde, University of California, Berkeley
Review by David M. Edelstein, Georgetown University
Review by Kyle M. Lascurettes, Lewis & Clark College
Author’s Response by Seva Gunitsky, University of Toronto
Introduction by James McAllister, Williams College
Review by Seth G. Jones, RAND Corporation and Johns Hopkins University
Review by Kyle M. Lascurettes, Lewis & Clark College
Review by Kimberly Marten, Barnard College, Columbia University
Author’s Response by Paul D. Miller