

# Is output-oriented regulation an adequate solution to reach a reliable and efficient network? Martin Crouch

IEA/CEER workshop on Network Investment and Regulation



# **Overview**

"To date, increasingly effective regulatory arrangements have allowed for more efficient use of network capacity."

- 1. GB experience with national transmission regulation
- 2. Extension offshore and interconnection



# **GB** experience

#### 1990s

- Basic RPI-X framework
- Main incentive: cost efficiency reveals cost information over time

#### 2000s

- Improve monitoring/regulator's understanding, more benchmarking
- Add output incentives and add-ons for new investments
- Start to encourage innovation and social and environmental responsibility

#### 2010-

- RIIO framework onshore
- Competitive tendering for new separable assets (offshore wind links so far)
- Value based regulation for interconnectors



### Significant benefits from 'RPI-X'


| We used RPI-X as a basis for regulating energy networks for about 20 years |                 |           |            |            |
|--|-----------------|-----------|------------|------------|
| Reductions in  | Improvements in | More      | Improved   | Increased  |
| network  | operating       | efficient | quality of | Investment |
| charges  | efficiency      | financing | service    | Investment |

But some challenges with the initial formulation...

- 4-5 year control reset weakens incentives, especially for innovation
- No flexibility mechanisms, everything agreed upfront risk of overpaying for things not needed or non-delivery of needed investment that was not foreseen
- No outputs companies able to outperform settlement by not delivering capex as per plans => customers not getting what they had paid for
- Strong incentives to reduce costs, but consumers' interests are wider than this quality of service etc
- Unequal efficiency incentives on opex and capex (not constant for capex) leading to capex bias
- Network companies increasing focus on managing the regulator



# **RIIO framework**




Fast-track process harnesses competitive rivalry between network company management



# **Outputs and incentives**

# Safe and reliable networks



#### **Connections**



# Reducing harmful environmental impacts



# **Customer satisfaction**



# Network availability and wider works





# Some examples

#### **Safety**

- Compliance with legal health & safety requirements
- No financial incentive
- Secondary deliverables on asset risk

#### **Connections**

- Timing of pre-connection period in electricity
- Timing of build in gas and electricity
  - Are guaranteed standards sufficient?

#### **Reliability: Electricity**

- Energy not supplied/SAIDI/SAIFI
- Suite of asset health secondary deliverables

#### **Customer satisfaction**

 Broad measure of customer satisfaction (survey evidence, stakeholder engagement and complaints handling)

#### **Reliability: Gas**

- Compliance with obligations to transport volumes of gas at system entry and exit
  - Suite of asset health secondary deliverables
- Secondary deliverable on indicators to identify future network development needs

#### **Environment**

- Direct emissions targets
- Visual Amenity funding for undergrounding
- ■Environmental Discretionary

  Reward to driver wider

  culture change




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#### **GB model: offshore transmission**





# Key benefits of OFTO regime

#### For Generators

- Delivers cheaper and more timely offshore grid connections
- Focused on generator's requirements; fit for purpose assets
- Flexibility for future offshore generation needs
- Reduces generators' overall capital need per MW

#### For OFTOs

- Enable new entrants to compete in this market and bring innovation
- Long term regulatory certainty and light-handed regulation
- Low risk OFTO protected against generator failure and credit risk (and construction for transitional projects)

#### For Consumers

Value for money in electricity bills - £200m+ savings on Tender Round 1



### Vision for interconnection

More interconnection

Develop efficient levels of interconnection to maximise social welfare, integrate renewables and contribute to security of supply

**Efficient Regulation** 

Developed "cap and floor" framework so business case driven by use of interconnector

- Regime is contestable to non-TSOs
- Commercially viable projects
- Risk is shared between consumers and developers
- Strong incentives for efficiency
- Facilitates regulatory cooperation

Currently working on 7 live interconnector projects: from 4GW towards 12GW



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