Papers by Manuel Francisco Herrera Almela
IAI Commentary, 2023
The 49th G7 Summit in Hiroshima
produced notable outcomes pertaining
to the Group’s aspirations... more The 49th G7 Summit in Hiroshima
produced notable outcomes pertaining
to the Group’s aspirations for the future
of the international liberal order. The
Summit addressed pressing challenges
across various domains, including
new and emerging technologies,
international trade and development
cooperation. Overall, however, the
focus on matters of international
security was dominant. This emphasis
is likely to persist at the G20 summit
in September, where security issues
related to regional hotspots (especially
in Eastern Europe and North-East Asia),
economic security, non-proliferation
and disarmament are expected to feature
prominently. Notably, in Hiroshima,
the Group aimed to transcend
the conventional, vague rhetoric
surrounding nuclear disarmament that
often accompanies such gatherings,
striving instead to formulate a
coherent vision and approach to the
broader non-proliferation regime.
The aim is to enhance the political
security dimension of the G7 non
proliferation efforts, as a result of the
current international environment.
This, however, begets the problem of
striking a balance between pragmatism
and idealism.
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IAI Documenti, 2023
The seminar to which this report refers aimed to identify the conditions and instruments necessar... more The seminar to which this report refers aimed to identify the conditions and instruments necessary to re-establish a security system on the European continent capable of preventing new conflicts and deterring potential aggressors, including through agreements on the control of conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons, taking into account the negotiation processes that may be developed to provide a political solution to the conflict in Ukraine or to manage its consequences. As a consequence, the main focus of the event was on the EU's non-proliferation and disarmament policies in the European context, and more specifically on the role of the EU in the context of the diplomatic efforts to establish a more stable security system in Europe and to provide security guarantees to Ukraine; concrete initiatives that the EU can take to revive arms control in Europe, in particular in the field of conventional arms and Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs), in order to restore a stable strategic balance; and the prospects-if conditions are met-for a resumption of the security dialogue with Russia in the framework of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or other forums.
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PRIF Report, 2022
The establishment of a Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East remains ... more The establishment of a Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East remains an urgent item on the international agenda. But which approach has the best prospects of success? The author presents the positions of the most relevant states in the Middle East in terms of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and then analyses the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which has been the only successful attempt to contain WMD in the region to date. He concludes that while the JCPOA is not a blueprint for the establishment of a WMDFZ, it provides many ideas and steps for confidence-building measures that can pave the way for future negotiations.
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IAI Commentary, 2022
Nuclear power has never lived up to expectations due to its enormous
development, construction a... more Nuclear power has never lived up to expectations due to its enormous
development, construction and maintenance costs, as well as safety
concerns. However, governments committed to ambitious climate change
targets have taken a second look at it. In Europe, for instance, in January this year, the European Commission added nuclear power to the list of projects eligible for green financing and, in July, included it in its taxonomy. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, meanwhile, has sent fossil fuel prices soaring and put energy security at the top of the political
agenda in Europe. The nuclear industry believes it has the
answer both for guaranteeing energy security in Europe and reducing greenhouse gas emissions: a new generation of small modular reactors
(SMRs), designed to be cheaper, faster to build and less financially risky. The main differences between SMRs and classical nuclear power plants are the former’s smaller power output (typically less than 300 Mwe per unit) and modularity, which allows working in a more controllable environment and the standardisation of design, as well as shorter construction time.Against this backdrop, last June, the International Energy Agency (IEA) published a report recognising the unique opportunity for nuclear power in the context of the current energy crisis and ambitious decarbonisation goals. The report notes that both the
net-zero challenge and the impacts of the Russian invasion of Ukraine are
rekindling global interest in nuclear power and, in particular, advanced
nuclear technology, including SMRs. However, as with any new technology,
the pros and cons of SMRs must be carefully examined, to assess their
viability as an alternative energy source in Europe.
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Indian Strategic Studies Forum, 2022
There is a clear communication problem, which in turn generates constant tensions and frustration... more There is a clear communication problem, which in turn generates constant tensions and frustrations, in the way Indians and Europeans relate to each other. For instance, Europeans always point out the complexity, fragmentation and changing rules of the Indian import-export regime. But while European companies complain about the difficulty of doing business in the diverse Indian subcontinent, few realise that Indians feel the same way about Europe.
The main problem lies in the fact that Indians tend to approach Europe through bilateral relations with each member state, rather than treating it as a whole. As well, the North-South divide pits Europe as a giver of lessons against an India that often does not accept them. Add to this India's defensive, anti-interventionist character and Europe's increasingly centrifugal tendency, and it becomes clear why there has been little mutual understanding between the two of them.
Nevertheless, India and the EU have much in common. Both are societies caught in a perpetual debate, defined by the difficulty of reaching and implementing sound common strategies. Both pride themselves on their democracies, and both are under pressure from authoritarian and harsh neighbours. Both have a patchwork of language and religious communities and maintain a delicate balance between central and state powers (the word federal is avoided in both cases). There is as well tension in foreign policy between soft power and hard power; and both have a problematic neighbourhood policy, as the shadow of a resurgent great power looms over their borders.
However, two weaknesses do not make a strength. For instance, on the European side, the assertion that "India and the EU, as the world's largest democracies, share common values and beliefs"[1] has given way to Indian criticism as many of the European Parliament's actions on India relate to the field of human rights. More broadly, the EU is affected by the lack of a shared view on India, for instance, there are member states who compete fiercely for the Indian market and those that refrain from doing so because of criticism on religious or human rights grounds. In terms of trade and investment, the large-scale projects of the Indian central government and India's flourishing state government initiatives challenge the conventional way of doing business for European member states, which would find it easier to deal with a more unified partner.
Nevertheless, both India and the EU are realising that in today's fragmented world, the power of any aspiring global actor depends on the number and quality of its bilateral and multilateral relations. In this context, both of them see each other as a useful partner on which to rely, as the two of them need a strong partnership to fulfil their leadership objectives of becoming global actors and counter-balance the increasing dominance of the US-China bipolar system.
In this sense, and given that we are currently celebrating not only the 75th anniversary of India's independence, but also the 60th anniversary of the formalisation of relations between India and the then European Economic Community (EEC), it is worth taking a comprehensive look at the events and developments that have brought these two giants to the present day, and assess, based on the strategic opportunities and needs, the possibilities and sectors in which both could and should deepen their cooperation in the immediate future to avoid becoming politically irrelevant.
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IAI Commentary, 2022
North Korea has been conducting regular missile tests as part of its
weapons development progra... more North Korea has been conducting regular missile tests as part of its
weapons development programme over the past year. Put bluntly, this
reflects the complete stalemate in denuclearisation talks following Biden’s
election in the US and a stark reminder of the meagre results of the conciliatory strategy carried out by the former South Korean President Moon Jae-in.
Hypersonic as well as short-range, intermediate-range and long-range
ballistic missiles have all been part of this latest series of tests. On 24
March, North Korea claimed to have successfully launched a new modern
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), denominated Hwasong-17.
While the entity of the vector has yet to be confirmed, if this allegation is
proven true it would mark the first time an ICBM has been fired since 2017, breaking Pyongyang’s self-imposed moratorium on such tests. The volley of tests has fuelled speculations that North Korea is gearing up for the launch of a larger weapon theoretically capable of reaching the US mainland.
These events serve as a reminder that the security conundrum on the Korean Peninsula must not be ignored even as the world’s attention is focused on the Ukraine crisis. Indeed, recent developments – particularly the hesitant approach adopted by the Biden administration and the election of a new hard-line president in South Korea – seem poised to produce even further escalations and a potential new arms race in the absence of concerted action by interested parties on the Peninsula, in China, the US and Europe.
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IAI Commentary, 2022
In an international context characterised by increasing concern over the risk of nuclear war trig... more In an international context characterised by increasing concern over the risk of nuclear war triggered by the conflict in Ukraine, it is worth noting that incidents in other regions could also lead to nuclear escalation,
either by design or miscalculation. A recent incident involving India and
Pakistan is a case in point, albeit the event did not receive ample coverage, overshadowed by the news of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
On 9 March, what authorities described as a “technical malfunction”1
led India to accidentally fire a supersonic missile that fell in Pakistani territory. The missile struck near Mian Channu in Punjab, Khanewal District, Pakistan; fortunately, it did not cause civilian casualties, although it did cause damage to civilian property.
The risk of accidents between nuclear-armed neighbours has been raised in the past. The incident alarmed Pakistan over the possibility that India has missiles in position ready for launch without the necessary safeguards of a command-and-control system. This raises serious concern about the control of nuclear missiles and an increased risk of mistakes or accidents that could lead to a nuclear strike.India and Pakistan are of particular concern due to a long history of military confrontation, lack of progress in resolving territorial disputes and the
ongoing expansion of their respective nuclear arsenals. While nuclear conflict remains remote, the incident should encourage careful and calm reflection on the need to expand and strengthen weapon safeguards to prevent these accidents for reoccurring in the future.
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Spanish Institute of Strategic Studies, 2021
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was drafted 25 years ago. Since
then, like the... more The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was drafted 25 years ago. Since
then, like the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it has received quasi-majority
support from the entire international community. However, unlike the NPT, the CTBT has
not yet entered into force due to the lack of ratification by the States listed in Annex II of
the treaty. This article aims to explore the main reasons why four of the eight non-ratifying states (the U.S., China, India and Pakistan) have not yet ratified the treaty, as well as suggest possible areas of convergences between emerging nuclear weapon powers like India, China and Pakistan and the nuclear superpower that is, the U.S. that can eventually bring about the treaty’s entry into force
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The News Lighthouse, 2020
Last July’s meeting between the leaders of the European Union and India is an indication of the p... more Last July’s meeting between the leaders of the European Union and India is an indication of the possible deepening of bilateral relations between these two world powers. It demonstrates the realistic possibility of greater cooperation in several areas in the near future.
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Global Affairs, 2021
This article analyses the contestation of the European Union’s (EU)
nuclear non-proliferation pol... more This article analyses the contestation of the European Union’s (EU)
nuclear non-proliferation policy. Contestation is as a social practice
by which third actors express in discursive or practical terms their
disapproval of certain norms and the actions that match them. In
this way, norms are challenged, reinterpreted and transformed;
and as a consequence, the validity of the norms is weakened or
reinforced. There are reasons to believe that, as it is happening in
other areas of EU foreign policy, the Union’s role in the global
nuclear non-proliferation regime is becoming increasingly
controversial. The article argues that the contestation to the EU’s
nuclear non-proliferation policy is the result of its actions and
positions in both in multilateral (i.e. The Non-Proliferation Treaty
Review Conference), and bilateral (i.e. EU-India relations) settings.
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Esglobal, 2020
Este año debía celebrarse la vigésima conferencia de revisión del Tratado de No Proliferación de ... more Este año debía celebrarse la vigésima conferencia de revisión del Tratado de No Proliferación de Armas Nucleares (TNP). No obstante, debido a la pandemia provocada por la covid19 su celebración se ha pospuesto al año que viene. Esto es una buena noticia ya que otorga a los Estados partes del tratado más tiempo para discutir y negociar entre ellos los temas clave del actual ciclo de revisión en vistas de publicar una declaración conjunta al final de la conferencia.
Esto desde luego no resultará sencillo. El tratado, y el régimen de no proliferación nuclear en su conjunto, se enfrentan a serios peligros derivados del comportamiento de los Estados que lo integran. Estos van desde la polarización de las posiciones con respecto al desarme nuclear hasta las discrepancias sobre cómo aproximar el Tratado de Prohibición de Armas Nucleares de 2017, pasando por el progresivo desmantelamiento de los instrumentos de control de armamentos y la modernización de los arsenales nucleares.
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Fondation por la recherche stratégique , 2020
L'Espagne a maintenu une attitude réticente à l'égard de la signature du Traité sur la non-prolif... more L'Espagne a maintenu une attitude réticente à l'égard de la signature du Traité sur la non-prolifération des armes nucléaires (TNP) pendant près de vingt ans. Une politique ambiguë, perpétuée au-delà de la fin du régime franquiste, donna lieu à des spéculations sur ce qu’étaient les véritables objectifs nucléaires du gouvernement espagnol. Les médias gouvernementaux rapportaient que l'Espagne avait la capacité technique de produire des bombes atomiques. Il y avait des raisons « inavouables » à la non-signature du TNP : la crainte que la signature ne ralentisse le programme nucléaire espagnol ou ne porte préjudice à la signature de nouveaux accords commerciaux avec des États tiers.
Toutefois, comme nous l’évoquerons plus tard, la ratification du traité en 1986 a entraîné un changement d'attitude de l'Espagne à l'égard du régime international de non-prolifération nucléaire, qui a permis au pays de devenir l'un de ses plus grands défenseurs et promoteurs. À cette fin, l'Espagne a adopté au fil des ans une approche préventive de la prolifération des armes de destruction massive en général, axée principalement sur les acteurs non étatiques, et rendue opérationnelle par le biais de mécanismes et d'institutions multilatéraux.
Afin d’étayer cet aspect de la politique étrangère espagnole, nous analyserons un cas dans lequel l'Espagne a joué un rôle pertinent et/ou de premier plan dans la prévention de la prolifération nucléaire : ses actions et ses positions pendant la présidence espagnole du Conseil 1540 en 2015 et 2016.
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AsiaNortheast, 2020
India reportó su primer caso de coronavirus (COVID-19) el 30 de enero de 2020. Desde entonces, se... more India reportó su primer caso de coronavirus (COVID-19) el 30 de enero de 2020. Desde entonces, se ha registrado un crecimiento exponencial del número de infectados en el país. Hoy la población india se encuentra completamente confinada en sus casas, una fuerte restricción en una nación de 1.300 millones de personas que el primer ministro del país, Narendra Modi, y su gobierno han insistido en que ayudará a derrotar el virus.
Los casos se distribuyen de forma desigual por el país, siendo los estados de Maharashtra y Kerala los que registraron las cifras más altas. No obstante, la India, que alberga al 17,5 por ciento de la población mundial, tiene menos del 1 por ciento de los casos de COVID-19 del mundo. Y donde actualmente el balance más reciente son casi 18.000 los casos de coronavirus y cerca de 600 muertes.
El éxito del país a la hora de controlar el brote del virus se debe a sus medidas de control fronterizo. El cierre temprano de las fronteras para los pasajeros aéreos de los países afectados y la prohibición de los visitantes de determinados países contribuyó a controlar la propagación de la pandemia. La iniciativa del gobierno y los medios de comunicación de difundir la concienciación sobre el virus, incluidas las prácticas de higiene, también ha facilitado a estas bajas cifras. En definitiva, las medidas preventivas han resultado ser la clave a la hora de evitar la propagación de la epidemia.
Ahora bien, la mayoría de las pruebas a posible infectados se han hecho en aeropuertos y sólo se realizan en centros gubernamentales para los casos sintomáticos y los que tienen un historial de viajes al extranjero. Dada la gran migración interna, la alta densidad de población y en el hecho de que una gran proporción de la atención sanitaria es proporcionada por el sector privado, las cifras oficiales mostradas hasta la fecha son bastante cuestionables.
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Polikracia , 2020
Tanto los ingenieros como los estrategas nucleares han utilizado periódicamente lenguaje e imágen... more Tanto los ingenieros como los estrategas nucleares han utilizado periódicamente lenguaje e imágenes religiosas para equiparar las armas nucleares con la divinidad (Gusterson, 1999:126).
Ahora bien, la bomba atómica no cayó del cielo, sino que es el resultado de un largo proceso por el cual la raza humana buscaba deliberadamente desarrollar una “super-arma”. Este proceso fue simplemente el resultado de la ambición política, y la persistente tendencia a resolver las disputas internacionales mediante la amenaza al uso de la fuerza. En la actualidad, varios países poseen armas de un poder sin precedentes. La humanidad ha adquirido la capacidad de cometer un acto de autodestrucción. Lo peor, sin embargo, no ha sucedido. ¿Por qué es así? Los activistas pro-nucleares podrían tener una respuesta inequívoca: porque los países que participan en el enfrentamiento militar se disuaden mutuamente mediante la intimidación (la llamada mutually assured destruction (MAD)). El miedo a la represalia final es lo que impide que ambas partes recurran a la agresión nuclear. La principal deficiencia moral de las armas nucleares, su fuerza destructiva excesiva e indiscriminada, infunde un terror que aturde hasta al más gallardo de los estrategas. Resulta que la deficiencia moral de las armas nucleares no es en absoluto un vicio, sino más bien una virtud, en la medida en que impide que estalle la guerra.
Es por ello que a continuación analizaremos, mediante un estudio comparado, las distintas aproximaciones religiosas (principalmente la católica y la protestante) a la cuestión nuclear, y defenderé que, al igual que otras políticas de Estado, la religión también puede aportar algo distinto, crítico y útil en esta materia en términos normativos y dialécticos, lo cual en última instancia representa su capacidad de influir en la toma de decisiones nucleares.
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Esglobal, 2019
Los asuntos militares y de defensa han estado tradicionalmente vinculados a los avances tecnológi... more Los asuntos militares y de defensa han estado tradicionalmente vinculados a los avances tecnológicos, de modo que los Estados pudiesen obtener una ventaja estratégica sobre sus adversarios mediante la incorporación de nuevas tecnologías a sus aparatos militares. Así ocurrió en el caso de la bomba atómica, que en 1945 dio a Estados Unidos una ventaja cualitativa sin precedentes sobre el resto de países.
Hoy en día estamos presenciando una revolución en los asuntos militares similar a la de 1945 gracias al desarrollo de la inteligencia artificial (IA). Aunque, hoy día, este tipo de tecnología se utiliza principalmente con fines civiles y empresariales, ya hay algunos países (sobre todo Estados Unidos, China y Rusia) que están realizando importantes inversiones en este ámbito para lograr una ventaja estratégica sobre sus adversarios. Por el momento, la inclusión de la IA en los asuntos militares se ha utilizado con buenos resultados en el pilotaje de vehículos aéreos no tripulados y en el análisis de macrodatos. Sin embargo, parece poco probable que su uso se limite a estas áreas.
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AsiaNortheast, 2019
La India decidió no adherirse al acuerdo comercial de la Asociación Económica Integral Regional (... more La India decidió no adherirse al acuerdo comercial de la Asociación Económica Integral Regional (abreviado RCEP por sus siglas en inglés), el cual engloba a los países de la ASEAN más los seis Estados Asía-Pacífico (Japón, Australia, Nueva Zelanda, India, Corea del Sur y China), en la cumbre reciente celebrada en Bangkok, al considerar Nueva Delhi dañados sus propios intereses y abriría las puertas a que Pekín pueda inundar de productos al país.
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AsiaNortheast, 2019
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Polikracia, 2019
La visión predominante en EEUU es que el equilibrio de poder ha de ser la principal garantía de s... more La visión predominante en EEUU es que el equilibrio de poder ha de ser la principal garantía de seguridad y estabilidad en el Golfo Pérsico. Quienes proponen esta opción como mecanismo para garantizar la estabilidad regional sostienen que la comunidad internacional debería establecer un nuevo tipo de equilibrio de poder para frenar la expansión de la influencia iraní. No obstante, es probable que cualquier progreso hacia esa vía sea efímero, ya que EEUU ha buscado forjar una alianza anti-iraní en lugar de acoger con beneplácito la normalización de las relaciones entre Irán y los países del Golfo. Esta política ha fracasado en el pasado y lo más probable es que fracase en el futuro, ya que los países del Golfo no confían más en la capacidad de EEUU para ofrecerles protección, por lo que están menos dispuestos a desafiar a Irán.
En lugar de resistirse a esta tendencia, sería sugerible que EEUU la aceptara. La normalización de las relaciones entre Irán y los países del Golfo sería un primer paso útil para traer a Irán de vuelta al redil, haciéndolo participe y responsable de la seguridad regional, y así poder desarrollar un nuevo orden de seguridad en el Golfo. No obstante, la reacción por parte de EEUU ha sido totalmente opuesta: en vez de buscar mejorar las relaciones con Teherán ha favorecido la confrontación apoyando y armando a sus aliados regionales. Ahora bien, los países del Golfo tienen recursos suficientes para comprar armas, pero no tienen ni remotamente las capacidades necesarias para participar con éxito en una confrontación militar con Irán. En consecuencia, la política de EEUU dirigida a contener a Irán debe tener en cuenta la falta de capacidades y voluntad de sus aliados regionales para adoptar una actitud de confrontación hacia su vecino.
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Global Risk Insights , 2019
During the past two decades, several initiatives by ISRO concerning the Indian space programme ha... more During the past two decades, several initiatives by ISRO concerning the Indian space programme have been conducted. These reflect both an international environment of competition for space dominance and India’s growing wealth and technological capability.
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Global Risk Insights, 2019
Since 2014, assumptions about the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons on the Crimean Peninsula ... more Since 2014, assumptions about the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons on the Crimean Peninsula have riddled the Western press. However, it has not been materially confirmed whether or not this is the case, and the implications of such a move remain limited in scope – for the time being.
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Papers by Manuel Francisco Herrera Almela
produced notable outcomes pertaining
to the Group’s aspirations for the future
of the international liberal order. The
Summit addressed pressing challenges
across various domains, including
new and emerging technologies,
international trade and development
cooperation. Overall, however, the
focus on matters of international
security was dominant. This emphasis
is likely to persist at the G20 summit
in September, where security issues
related to regional hotspots (especially
in Eastern Europe and North-East Asia),
economic security, non-proliferation
and disarmament are expected to feature
prominently. Notably, in Hiroshima,
the Group aimed to transcend
the conventional, vague rhetoric
surrounding nuclear disarmament that
often accompanies such gatherings,
striving instead to formulate a
coherent vision and approach to the
broader non-proliferation regime.
The aim is to enhance the political
security dimension of the G7 non
proliferation efforts, as a result of the
current international environment.
This, however, begets the problem of
striking a balance between pragmatism
and idealism.
development, construction and maintenance costs, as well as safety
concerns. However, governments committed to ambitious climate change
targets have taken a second look at it. In Europe, for instance, in January this year, the European Commission added nuclear power to the list of projects eligible for green financing and, in July, included it in its taxonomy. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, meanwhile, has sent fossil fuel prices soaring and put energy security at the top of the political
agenda in Europe. The nuclear industry believes it has the
answer both for guaranteeing energy security in Europe and reducing greenhouse gas emissions: a new generation of small modular reactors
(SMRs), designed to be cheaper, faster to build and less financially risky. The main differences between SMRs and classical nuclear power plants are the former’s smaller power output (typically less than 300 Mwe per unit) and modularity, which allows working in a more controllable environment and the standardisation of design, as well as shorter construction time.Against this backdrop, last June, the International Energy Agency (IEA) published a report recognising the unique opportunity for nuclear power in the context of the current energy crisis and ambitious decarbonisation goals. The report notes that both the
net-zero challenge and the impacts of the Russian invasion of Ukraine are
rekindling global interest in nuclear power and, in particular, advanced
nuclear technology, including SMRs. However, as with any new technology,
the pros and cons of SMRs must be carefully examined, to assess their
viability as an alternative energy source in Europe.
The main problem lies in the fact that Indians tend to approach Europe through bilateral relations with each member state, rather than treating it as a whole. As well, the North-South divide pits Europe as a giver of lessons against an India that often does not accept them. Add to this India's defensive, anti-interventionist character and Europe's increasingly centrifugal tendency, and it becomes clear why there has been little mutual understanding between the two of them.
Nevertheless, India and the EU have much in common. Both are societies caught in a perpetual debate, defined by the difficulty of reaching and implementing sound common strategies. Both pride themselves on their democracies, and both are under pressure from authoritarian and harsh neighbours. Both have a patchwork of language and religious communities and maintain a delicate balance between central and state powers (the word federal is avoided in both cases). There is as well tension in foreign policy between soft power and hard power; and both have a problematic neighbourhood policy, as the shadow of a resurgent great power looms over their borders.
However, two weaknesses do not make a strength. For instance, on the European side, the assertion that "India and the EU, as the world's largest democracies, share common values and beliefs"[1] has given way to Indian criticism as many of the European Parliament's actions on India relate to the field of human rights. More broadly, the EU is affected by the lack of a shared view on India, for instance, there are member states who compete fiercely for the Indian market and those that refrain from doing so because of criticism on religious or human rights grounds. In terms of trade and investment, the large-scale projects of the Indian central government and India's flourishing state government initiatives challenge the conventional way of doing business for European member states, which would find it easier to deal with a more unified partner.
Nevertheless, both India and the EU are realising that in today's fragmented world, the power of any aspiring global actor depends on the number and quality of its bilateral and multilateral relations. In this context, both of them see each other as a useful partner on which to rely, as the two of them need a strong partnership to fulfil their leadership objectives of becoming global actors and counter-balance the increasing dominance of the US-China bipolar system.
In this sense, and given that we are currently celebrating not only the 75th anniversary of India's independence, but also the 60th anniversary of the formalisation of relations between India and the then European Economic Community (EEC), it is worth taking a comprehensive look at the events and developments that have brought these two giants to the present day, and assess, based on the strategic opportunities and needs, the possibilities and sectors in which both could and should deepen their cooperation in the immediate future to avoid becoming politically irrelevant.
weapons development programme over the past year. Put bluntly, this
reflects the complete stalemate in denuclearisation talks following Biden’s
election in the US and a stark reminder of the meagre results of the conciliatory strategy carried out by the former South Korean President Moon Jae-in.
Hypersonic as well as short-range, intermediate-range and long-range
ballistic missiles have all been part of this latest series of tests. On 24
March, North Korea claimed to have successfully launched a new modern
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), denominated Hwasong-17.
While the entity of the vector has yet to be confirmed, if this allegation is
proven true it would mark the first time an ICBM has been fired since 2017, breaking Pyongyang’s self-imposed moratorium on such tests. The volley of tests has fuelled speculations that North Korea is gearing up for the launch of a larger weapon theoretically capable of reaching the US mainland.
These events serve as a reminder that the security conundrum on the Korean Peninsula must not be ignored even as the world’s attention is focused on the Ukraine crisis. Indeed, recent developments – particularly the hesitant approach adopted by the Biden administration and the election of a new hard-line president in South Korea – seem poised to produce even further escalations and a potential new arms race in the absence of concerted action by interested parties on the Peninsula, in China, the US and Europe.
either by design or miscalculation. A recent incident involving India and
Pakistan is a case in point, albeit the event did not receive ample coverage, overshadowed by the news of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
On 9 March, what authorities described as a “technical malfunction”1
led India to accidentally fire a supersonic missile that fell in Pakistani territory. The missile struck near Mian Channu in Punjab, Khanewal District, Pakistan; fortunately, it did not cause civilian casualties, although it did cause damage to civilian property.
The risk of accidents between nuclear-armed neighbours has been raised in the past. The incident alarmed Pakistan over the possibility that India has missiles in position ready for launch without the necessary safeguards of a command-and-control system. This raises serious concern about the control of nuclear missiles and an increased risk of mistakes or accidents that could lead to a nuclear strike.India and Pakistan are of particular concern due to a long history of military confrontation, lack of progress in resolving territorial disputes and the
ongoing expansion of their respective nuclear arsenals. While nuclear conflict remains remote, the incident should encourage careful and calm reflection on the need to expand and strengthen weapon safeguards to prevent these accidents for reoccurring in the future.
then, like the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it has received quasi-majority
support from the entire international community. However, unlike the NPT, the CTBT has
not yet entered into force due to the lack of ratification by the States listed in Annex II of
the treaty. This article aims to explore the main reasons why four of the eight non-ratifying states (the U.S., China, India and Pakistan) have not yet ratified the treaty, as well as suggest possible areas of convergences between emerging nuclear weapon powers like India, China and Pakistan and the nuclear superpower that is, the U.S. that can eventually bring about the treaty’s entry into force
nuclear non-proliferation policy. Contestation is as a social practice
by which third actors express in discursive or practical terms their
disapproval of certain norms and the actions that match them. In
this way, norms are challenged, reinterpreted and transformed;
and as a consequence, the validity of the norms is weakened or
reinforced. There are reasons to believe that, as it is happening in
other areas of EU foreign policy, the Union’s role in the global
nuclear non-proliferation regime is becoming increasingly
controversial. The article argues that the contestation to the EU’s
nuclear non-proliferation policy is the result of its actions and
positions in both in multilateral (i.e. The Non-Proliferation Treaty
Review Conference), and bilateral (i.e. EU-India relations) settings.
Esto desde luego no resultará sencillo. El tratado, y el régimen de no proliferación nuclear en su conjunto, se enfrentan a serios peligros derivados del comportamiento de los Estados que lo integran. Estos van desde la polarización de las posiciones con respecto al desarme nuclear hasta las discrepancias sobre cómo aproximar el Tratado de Prohibición de Armas Nucleares de 2017, pasando por el progresivo desmantelamiento de los instrumentos de control de armamentos y la modernización de los arsenales nucleares.
Toutefois, comme nous l’évoquerons plus tard, la ratification du traité en 1986 a entraîné un changement d'attitude de l'Espagne à l'égard du régime international de non-prolifération nucléaire, qui a permis au pays de devenir l'un de ses plus grands défenseurs et promoteurs. À cette fin, l'Espagne a adopté au fil des ans une approche préventive de la prolifération des armes de destruction massive en général, axée principalement sur les acteurs non étatiques, et rendue opérationnelle par le biais de mécanismes et d'institutions multilatéraux.
Afin d’étayer cet aspect de la politique étrangère espagnole, nous analyserons un cas dans lequel l'Espagne a joué un rôle pertinent et/ou de premier plan dans la prévention de la prolifération nucléaire : ses actions et ses positions pendant la présidence espagnole du Conseil 1540 en 2015 et 2016.
Los casos se distribuyen de forma desigual por el país, siendo los estados de Maharashtra y Kerala los que registraron las cifras más altas. No obstante, la India, que alberga al 17,5 por ciento de la población mundial, tiene menos del 1 por ciento de los casos de COVID-19 del mundo. Y donde actualmente el balance más reciente son casi 18.000 los casos de coronavirus y cerca de 600 muertes.
El éxito del país a la hora de controlar el brote del virus se debe a sus medidas de control fronterizo. El cierre temprano de las fronteras para los pasajeros aéreos de los países afectados y la prohibición de los visitantes de determinados países contribuyó a controlar la propagación de la pandemia. La iniciativa del gobierno y los medios de comunicación de difundir la concienciación sobre el virus, incluidas las prácticas de higiene, también ha facilitado a estas bajas cifras. En definitiva, las medidas preventivas han resultado ser la clave a la hora de evitar la propagación de la epidemia.
Ahora bien, la mayoría de las pruebas a posible infectados se han hecho en aeropuertos y sólo se realizan en centros gubernamentales para los casos sintomáticos y los que tienen un historial de viajes al extranjero. Dada la gran migración interna, la alta densidad de población y en el hecho de que una gran proporción de la atención sanitaria es proporcionada por el sector privado, las cifras oficiales mostradas hasta la fecha son bastante cuestionables.
Ahora bien, la bomba atómica no cayó del cielo, sino que es el resultado de un largo proceso por el cual la raza humana buscaba deliberadamente desarrollar una “super-arma”. Este proceso fue simplemente el resultado de la ambición política, y la persistente tendencia a resolver las disputas internacionales mediante la amenaza al uso de la fuerza. En la actualidad, varios países poseen armas de un poder sin precedentes. La humanidad ha adquirido la capacidad de cometer un acto de autodestrucción. Lo peor, sin embargo, no ha sucedido. ¿Por qué es así? Los activistas pro-nucleares podrían tener una respuesta inequívoca: porque los países que participan en el enfrentamiento militar se disuaden mutuamente mediante la intimidación (la llamada mutually assured destruction (MAD)). El miedo a la represalia final es lo que impide que ambas partes recurran a la agresión nuclear. La principal deficiencia moral de las armas nucleares, su fuerza destructiva excesiva e indiscriminada, infunde un terror que aturde hasta al más gallardo de los estrategas. Resulta que la deficiencia moral de las armas nucleares no es en absoluto un vicio, sino más bien una virtud, en la medida en que impide que estalle la guerra.
Es por ello que a continuación analizaremos, mediante un estudio comparado, las distintas aproximaciones religiosas (principalmente la católica y la protestante) a la cuestión nuclear, y defenderé que, al igual que otras políticas de Estado, la religión también puede aportar algo distinto, crítico y útil en esta materia en términos normativos y dialécticos, lo cual en última instancia representa su capacidad de influir en la toma de decisiones nucleares.
Hoy en día estamos presenciando una revolución en los asuntos militares similar a la de 1945 gracias al desarrollo de la inteligencia artificial (IA). Aunque, hoy día, este tipo de tecnología se utiliza principalmente con fines civiles y empresariales, ya hay algunos países (sobre todo Estados Unidos, China y Rusia) que están realizando importantes inversiones en este ámbito para lograr una ventaja estratégica sobre sus adversarios. Por el momento, la inclusión de la IA en los asuntos militares se ha utilizado con buenos resultados en el pilotaje de vehículos aéreos no tripulados y en el análisis de macrodatos. Sin embargo, parece poco probable que su uso se limite a estas áreas.
En lugar de resistirse a esta tendencia, sería sugerible que EEUU la aceptara. La normalización de las relaciones entre Irán y los países del Golfo sería un primer paso útil para traer a Irán de vuelta al redil, haciéndolo participe y responsable de la seguridad regional, y así poder desarrollar un nuevo orden de seguridad en el Golfo. No obstante, la reacción por parte de EEUU ha sido totalmente opuesta: en vez de buscar mejorar las relaciones con Teherán ha favorecido la confrontación apoyando y armando a sus aliados regionales. Ahora bien, los países del Golfo tienen recursos suficientes para comprar armas, pero no tienen ni remotamente las capacidades necesarias para participar con éxito en una confrontación militar con Irán. En consecuencia, la política de EEUU dirigida a contener a Irán debe tener en cuenta la falta de capacidades y voluntad de sus aliados regionales para adoptar una actitud de confrontación hacia su vecino.
produced notable outcomes pertaining
to the Group’s aspirations for the future
of the international liberal order. The
Summit addressed pressing challenges
across various domains, including
new and emerging technologies,
international trade and development
cooperation. Overall, however, the
focus on matters of international
security was dominant. This emphasis
is likely to persist at the G20 summit
in September, where security issues
related to regional hotspots (especially
in Eastern Europe and North-East Asia),
economic security, non-proliferation
and disarmament are expected to feature
prominently. Notably, in Hiroshima,
the Group aimed to transcend
the conventional, vague rhetoric
surrounding nuclear disarmament that
often accompanies such gatherings,
striving instead to formulate a
coherent vision and approach to the
broader non-proliferation regime.
The aim is to enhance the political
security dimension of the G7 non
proliferation efforts, as a result of the
current international environment.
This, however, begets the problem of
striking a balance between pragmatism
and idealism.
development, construction and maintenance costs, as well as safety
concerns. However, governments committed to ambitious climate change
targets have taken a second look at it. In Europe, for instance, in January this year, the European Commission added nuclear power to the list of projects eligible for green financing and, in July, included it in its taxonomy. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, meanwhile, has sent fossil fuel prices soaring and put energy security at the top of the political
agenda in Europe. The nuclear industry believes it has the
answer both for guaranteeing energy security in Europe and reducing greenhouse gas emissions: a new generation of small modular reactors
(SMRs), designed to be cheaper, faster to build and less financially risky. The main differences between SMRs and classical nuclear power plants are the former’s smaller power output (typically less than 300 Mwe per unit) and modularity, which allows working in a more controllable environment and the standardisation of design, as well as shorter construction time.Against this backdrop, last June, the International Energy Agency (IEA) published a report recognising the unique opportunity for nuclear power in the context of the current energy crisis and ambitious decarbonisation goals. The report notes that both the
net-zero challenge and the impacts of the Russian invasion of Ukraine are
rekindling global interest in nuclear power and, in particular, advanced
nuclear technology, including SMRs. However, as with any new technology,
the pros and cons of SMRs must be carefully examined, to assess their
viability as an alternative energy source in Europe.
The main problem lies in the fact that Indians tend to approach Europe through bilateral relations with each member state, rather than treating it as a whole. As well, the North-South divide pits Europe as a giver of lessons against an India that often does not accept them. Add to this India's defensive, anti-interventionist character and Europe's increasingly centrifugal tendency, and it becomes clear why there has been little mutual understanding between the two of them.
Nevertheless, India and the EU have much in common. Both are societies caught in a perpetual debate, defined by the difficulty of reaching and implementing sound common strategies. Both pride themselves on their democracies, and both are under pressure from authoritarian and harsh neighbours. Both have a patchwork of language and religious communities and maintain a delicate balance between central and state powers (the word federal is avoided in both cases). There is as well tension in foreign policy between soft power and hard power; and both have a problematic neighbourhood policy, as the shadow of a resurgent great power looms over their borders.
However, two weaknesses do not make a strength. For instance, on the European side, the assertion that "India and the EU, as the world's largest democracies, share common values and beliefs"[1] has given way to Indian criticism as many of the European Parliament's actions on India relate to the field of human rights. More broadly, the EU is affected by the lack of a shared view on India, for instance, there are member states who compete fiercely for the Indian market and those that refrain from doing so because of criticism on religious or human rights grounds. In terms of trade and investment, the large-scale projects of the Indian central government and India's flourishing state government initiatives challenge the conventional way of doing business for European member states, which would find it easier to deal with a more unified partner.
Nevertheless, both India and the EU are realising that in today's fragmented world, the power of any aspiring global actor depends on the number and quality of its bilateral and multilateral relations. In this context, both of them see each other as a useful partner on which to rely, as the two of them need a strong partnership to fulfil their leadership objectives of becoming global actors and counter-balance the increasing dominance of the US-China bipolar system.
In this sense, and given that we are currently celebrating not only the 75th anniversary of India's independence, but also the 60th anniversary of the formalisation of relations between India and the then European Economic Community (EEC), it is worth taking a comprehensive look at the events and developments that have brought these two giants to the present day, and assess, based on the strategic opportunities and needs, the possibilities and sectors in which both could and should deepen their cooperation in the immediate future to avoid becoming politically irrelevant.
weapons development programme over the past year. Put bluntly, this
reflects the complete stalemate in denuclearisation talks following Biden’s
election in the US and a stark reminder of the meagre results of the conciliatory strategy carried out by the former South Korean President Moon Jae-in.
Hypersonic as well as short-range, intermediate-range and long-range
ballistic missiles have all been part of this latest series of tests. On 24
March, North Korea claimed to have successfully launched a new modern
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), denominated Hwasong-17.
While the entity of the vector has yet to be confirmed, if this allegation is
proven true it would mark the first time an ICBM has been fired since 2017, breaking Pyongyang’s self-imposed moratorium on such tests. The volley of tests has fuelled speculations that North Korea is gearing up for the launch of a larger weapon theoretically capable of reaching the US mainland.
These events serve as a reminder that the security conundrum on the Korean Peninsula must not be ignored even as the world’s attention is focused on the Ukraine crisis. Indeed, recent developments – particularly the hesitant approach adopted by the Biden administration and the election of a new hard-line president in South Korea – seem poised to produce even further escalations and a potential new arms race in the absence of concerted action by interested parties on the Peninsula, in China, the US and Europe.
either by design or miscalculation. A recent incident involving India and
Pakistan is a case in point, albeit the event did not receive ample coverage, overshadowed by the news of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
On 9 March, what authorities described as a “technical malfunction”1
led India to accidentally fire a supersonic missile that fell in Pakistani territory. The missile struck near Mian Channu in Punjab, Khanewal District, Pakistan; fortunately, it did not cause civilian casualties, although it did cause damage to civilian property.
The risk of accidents between nuclear-armed neighbours has been raised in the past. The incident alarmed Pakistan over the possibility that India has missiles in position ready for launch without the necessary safeguards of a command-and-control system. This raises serious concern about the control of nuclear missiles and an increased risk of mistakes or accidents that could lead to a nuclear strike.India and Pakistan are of particular concern due to a long history of military confrontation, lack of progress in resolving territorial disputes and the
ongoing expansion of their respective nuclear arsenals. While nuclear conflict remains remote, the incident should encourage careful and calm reflection on the need to expand and strengthen weapon safeguards to prevent these accidents for reoccurring in the future.
then, like the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it has received quasi-majority
support from the entire international community. However, unlike the NPT, the CTBT has
not yet entered into force due to the lack of ratification by the States listed in Annex II of
the treaty. This article aims to explore the main reasons why four of the eight non-ratifying states (the U.S., China, India and Pakistan) have not yet ratified the treaty, as well as suggest possible areas of convergences between emerging nuclear weapon powers like India, China and Pakistan and the nuclear superpower that is, the U.S. that can eventually bring about the treaty’s entry into force
nuclear non-proliferation policy. Contestation is as a social practice
by which third actors express in discursive or practical terms their
disapproval of certain norms and the actions that match them. In
this way, norms are challenged, reinterpreted and transformed;
and as a consequence, the validity of the norms is weakened or
reinforced. There are reasons to believe that, as it is happening in
other areas of EU foreign policy, the Union’s role in the global
nuclear non-proliferation regime is becoming increasingly
controversial. The article argues that the contestation to the EU’s
nuclear non-proliferation policy is the result of its actions and
positions in both in multilateral (i.e. The Non-Proliferation Treaty
Review Conference), and bilateral (i.e. EU-India relations) settings.
Esto desde luego no resultará sencillo. El tratado, y el régimen de no proliferación nuclear en su conjunto, se enfrentan a serios peligros derivados del comportamiento de los Estados que lo integran. Estos van desde la polarización de las posiciones con respecto al desarme nuclear hasta las discrepancias sobre cómo aproximar el Tratado de Prohibición de Armas Nucleares de 2017, pasando por el progresivo desmantelamiento de los instrumentos de control de armamentos y la modernización de los arsenales nucleares.
Toutefois, comme nous l’évoquerons plus tard, la ratification du traité en 1986 a entraîné un changement d'attitude de l'Espagne à l'égard du régime international de non-prolifération nucléaire, qui a permis au pays de devenir l'un de ses plus grands défenseurs et promoteurs. À cette fin, l'Espagne a adopté au fil des ans une approche préventive de la prolifération des armes de destruction massive en général, axée principalement sur les acteurs non étatiques, et rendue opérationnelle par le biais de mécanismes et d'institutions multilatéraux.
Afin d’étayer cet aspect de la politique étrangère espagnole, nous analyserons un cas dans lequel l'Espagne a joué un rôle pertinent et/ou de premier plan dans la prévention de la prolifération nucléaire : ses actions et ses positions pendant la présidence espagnole du Conseil 1540 en 2015 et 2016.
Los casos se distribuyen de forma desigual por el país, siendo los estados de Maharashtra y Kerala los que registraron las cifras más altas. No obstante, la India, que alberga al 17,5 por ciento de la población mundial, tiene menos del 1 por ciento de los casos de COVID-19 del mundo. Y donde actualmente el balance más reciente son casi 18.000 los casos de coronavirus y cerca de 600 muertes.
El éxito del país a la hora de controlar el brote del virus se debe a sus medidas de control fronterizo. El cierre temprano de las fronteras para los pasajeros aéreos de los países afectados y la prohibición de los visitantes de determinados países contribuyó a controlar la propagación de la pandemia. La iniciativa del gobierno y los medios de comunicación de difundir la concienciación sobre el virus, incluidas las prácticas de higiene, también ha facilitado a estas bajas cifras. En definitiva, las medidas preventivas han resultado ser la clave a la hora de evitar la propagación de la epidemia.
Ahora bien, la mayoría de las pruebas a posible infectados se han hecho en aeropuertos y sólo se realizan en centros gubernamentales para los casos sintomáticos y los que tienen un historial de viajes al extranjero. Dada la gran migración interna, la alta densidad de población y en el hecho de que una gran proporción de la atención sanitaria es proporcionada por el sector privado, las cifras oficiales mostradas hasta la fecha son bastante cuestionables.
Ahora bien, la bomba atómica no cayó del cielo, sino que es el resultado de un largo proceso por el cual la raza humana buscaba deliberadamente desarrollar una “super-arma”. Este proceso fue simplemente el resultado de la ambición política, y la persistente tendencia a resolver las disputas internacionales mediante la amenaza al uso de la fuerza. En la actualidad, varios países poseen armas de un poder sin precedentes. La humanidad ha adquirido la capacidad de cometer un acto de autodestrucción. Lo peor, sin embargo, no ha sucedido. ¿Por qué es así? Los activistas pro-nucleares podrían tener una respuesta inequívoca: porque los países que participan en el enfrentamiento militar se disuaden mutuamente mediante la intimidación (la llamada mutually assured destruction (MAD)). El miedo a la represalia final es lo que impide que ambas partes recurran a la agresión nuclear. La principal deficiencia moral de las armas nucleares, su fuerza destructiva excesiva e indiscriminada, infunde un terror que aturde hasta al más gallardo de los estrategas. Resulta que la deficiencia moral de las armas nucleares no es en absoluto un vicio, sino más bien una virtud, en la medida en que impide que estalle la guerra.
Es por ello que a continuación analizaremos, mediante un estudio comparado, las distintas aproximaciones religiosas (principalmente la católica y la protestante) a la cuestión nuclear, y defenderé que, al igual que otras políticas de Estado, la religión también puede aportar algo distinto, crítico y útil en esta materia en términos normativos y dialécticos, lo cual en última instancia representa su capacidad de influir en la toma de decisiones nucleares.
Hoy en día estamos presenciando una revolución en los asuntos militares similar a la de 1945 gracias al desarrollo de la inteligencia artificial (IA). Aunque, hoy día, este tipo de tecnología se utiliza principalmente con fines civiles y empresariales, ya hay algunos países (sobre todo Estados Unidos, China y Rusia) que están realizando importantes inversiones en este ámbito para lograr una ventaja estratégica sobre sus adversarios. Por el momento, la inclusión de la IA en los asuntos militares se ha utilizado con buenos resultados en el pilotaje de vehículos aéreos no tripulados y en el análisis de macrodatos. Sin embargo, parece poco probable que su uso se limite a estas áreas.
En lugar de resistirse a esta tendencia, sería sugerible que EEUU la aceptara. La normalización de las relaciones entre Irán y los países del Golfo sería un primer paso útil para traer a Irán de vuelta al redil, haciéndolo participe y responsable de la seguridad regional, y así poder desarrollar un nuevo orden de seguridad en el Golfo. No obstante, la reacción por parte de EEUU ha sido totalmente opuesta: en vez de buscar mejorar las relaciones con Teherán ha favorecido la confrontación apoyando y armando a sus aliados regionales. Ahora bien, los países del Golfo tienen recursos suficientes para comprar armas, pero no tienen ni remotamente las capacidades necesarias para participar con éxito en una confrontación militar con Irán. En consecuencia, la política de EEUU dirigida a contener a Irán debe tener en cuenta la falta de capacidades y voluntad de sus aliados regionales para adoptar una actitud de confrontación hacia su vecino.
Despite the fact that this has led to think about the EU as an emerging defender of the fundamental sense of non-proliferation and disarmament, EU member States have diverging views altogether on these matters, particularly on the second one. Reality is that the field of non-proliferation is not one where the EU has acted to its full potential.
The question therefore that arises is if third parties consider the European Union as a fully-fledged actor in non-proliferation and if it can do more and be more effective in this field. In this sense, we formulate the following hypothesis: The acceptance of the norms that the EU intends to expand in this policy field by third party actors entails a
positive performance in terms of its non-proliferation policy, and therefore its acceptance as a valid actor in this regime. To verify this hypothesis, we will proceed to carry out two case studies that provide practical evidence of the EU's normative power in action, these being the negotiation of a non-proliferation clause with India, and the implementation of sanctions against Iran as a result of its nuclear programme.
Ultimately, this will allow us to have a clear idea of the real capacity of the EU for disseminating its non-proliferation norms, whether the EU non-proliferation norms have been adopted (accepted) or not, to know to what extent the EU is conceived by other States as a valid actor in this policy area, and whether conditionality instruments are really fulfilling their function or whether the principle of EU political conditionality needs
to be revised.
Much of the stability of this traffic in the near future will depend on whether the Iranian nuclear deal survives to the sanctions imposed by the Trump administration. In fact, the future of the deal and the potential consequences of its collapse for regional politics are difficult to predict. The survival of the agreement on the long-term depends on whether Iran, faced with US policies and ties in the region, will continue to adhere to the deal irrespective of whether or not the US comes back to its framework. This will depend on whether the other stakeholders are able to grant the necessary economic incentives to Iran in order to stay inside it, and currently not many incentives are present for Iran to continue binding by the agreement and even less for its renegotiation. Particularly without the support of the United States, the other stakeholders cannot offer much to encourage Iran to engage on its ballistic missile program and other regional affairs. In the short-term, regional tensions and the role of the US in the Middle East will continue to make the deal unstable. And without addressing regional tensions and conflicts, the renegotiation of the agreement will be impossible. Finally, if Iran withdraws from the JCPOA and resumes uranium enrichment, this could encourage other regional powers to develop nuclear programs for military purposes, and as a consequence, the possibility of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, with all its potential consequences for the shipping industry, can’t be discarded.
As one of the main negotiators for the resolution of the Iranian nuclear crisis, the EU has sustained a consistent and unified position against Washington’s decision to withdraw from the Iranian nuclear deal and the resumption of unilateral sanctions. EU measures to protect the deal, such as reviving the blocking statute and create the Instrument for Support Trade Exchanges (INSTEX), are critical to forestalling the accord’s collapse. Such efforts would be more effective alongside more robust political signaling and a public diplomacy campaign underscoring the extent of the EU’s work to preserve the agreement, both to the European private sector and Iran itself.
The EU will certainly continue discussions with the US regarding member state exemptions on secondary sanctions, and even impose sanctions on Iran based on other issues not necessarily related with its nuclear program (e.g. human rights) that may have a negative effect on Iran’s economy, in order to satisfy Washington. Visits by high-level EU officials to Iran, outreach to Farsi media platforms explaining EU decisions and policy, and the production of readilyaccessible information in Farsi of relevant EU statements and announcements will serve to increase the visibility and explain the importance of EU decisions on Iran. Brussels will also intensify its consultations with the Islamic Republic to allow the establishment of an EU delegation in Tehran, and will also maintain its dialogues with Iran on Yemen and Syria while exploring wider avenues of engagement on both regional and domestic issues.
However, the gap between risks and opportunities for any company that wants to do business with Iran through INSTEX remains very large due to its current limited scope, which does not eliminate sanctions-related risks for European buyers of other products that are not related with food or medicines, and this will certainly have effects on shipping companies willing to transport goods from Iran to Europe and vice versa. With important elements of INSTEX still a work in progress, it remains doubtful whether the instrument will provide enough security for trading with Iran; and European companies with links with the US will likely remain hesitant to trade with the Persian country over concerns that they could be hit with US secondary sanctions.
However, if INSTEX becomes fully operational, widens its scope, and guarantees isolation from US secondary sanctions then it could offer real access to the Iranian market, creating potential opportunities through the re-establishment of international trade with the Middle East’s second largest economy. But, despite the fact that the current crisis may be solved through an amplified INSTEX and secondary payment channels, it is highly advisable to be patient and cautious when re-entering into business with Iran. That’s so because the future of the nuclear deal is still uncertain, and INSTEX existence is conditioned to Iran’s commitment to the agreement.
Finally, the way the current crisis in the Persian Gulf is affecting shipping industry in that region and its surroundings it’s quite evident: Last June, two oil tankers were attacked with explosive weapons. These events had an immediate impact on the shipping industry with two tanker companies suspending new bookings to oil-producing States in the Persian Gulf. These types of events could make oil shipping through the Persian Gulf become riskier, making the prices of insurances being provided to ships and tankers who operate there to go up so much that it will have a dramatic impact on the prices of transport services. In order to calm down the situation, the Pentagon has reported that despite the incidents in the Persian Gulf, no increase in Iranian troops has been detected in the region. However, if Iran perpetrated the attacks it could be the beginning of a deterrence strategy to curb maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz in order to put pressure on the West. Iran's threats could go beyond simple attacks on ships and lead to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, attacks on oil facilities in Saudi Arabia or even a nuclear exchange with Israel. However, the probability of any of these three scenarios is very small but not disposable. To this must be added the risks derived from the sanctions imposed by the US on the Iranian oil and gas industry, the fall in exports to Asia, and the nuclear safety problems suffered by Iranian plants.