Istituto Affari Internazionali
Security & Defence
Many scholars tried to show that the enlargement process undermined EU capacity and political willingness to build its own “strategic culture”. New member States were too keen to recognize USA and NATO as the main guarantors of security... more
Many scholars tried to show that the enlargement process undermined EU capacity and political willingness to build its own “strategic culture”. New member States were too keen to recognize USA and NATO as the main guarantors of security in the Continent, while they constantly frustrated Old members attempts to build a stronger EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. The aim of this paper is to show that there have always been different types of “strategic cultures” in Europe and that new Members’ alleged “Atlanticism” was not just an “anti-European” stance. On the contrary, it was a complementary step towards the creation of a more independent EU security capacity. Moreover, the enlargement process showed that the main rift between Old and New Member States had to be found on the Eastern border, rather than on the Western one. Central and Eastern European Countries’ dynamism towards EU eastern neighbours showed the attempt by new Members to shape the European “strategic culture”, by protecting their strategic interests in the Eastern Neighbourhood. Although the European Neighbourhood Policy as well as the Eastern Partnership Initiative, became sources of misunderstandings within EU Institutions, they showed how willing new comers were to contribute to enhancing EU security. Both Transatlantic Trends and Eurobarometers highlight that even the most traditionally enduring “Atlanticists” are becoming “Europeanized”, by advocating an increased “communitarian” approach to strengthen EU CFSP/CSDP effectiveness. In this sense, looking at both Polish and Lithuanian cases will allow us to realize that, despite persistent scepticism, Central and Eastern European Countries cannot be considered anymore as “US Trojan Horses” in Europe. Therefore, only by including their projects and dynamic ideas in a reinvigorated debate over “European strategic culture”, this strategy will become common also in practice.
This article provides an overview on the way the war in Ukraine, the Minsk Agreements and the murder of Boris Nemtsov are described by Russian Media.
When reading the Russian press one can deduct that patriotism has become a fundamental key for understanding the Russian Federation’s foreign policy. It is interesting to study the different analyses of this phenomenon, from the most... more
When reading the Russian press one can deduct that patriotism has become a fundamental key for understanding the Russian Federation’s foreign policy. It is interesting to study the different analyses of this phenomenon, from the most conservative to those most critical of the regime. What does Russian patriotism consist of?
Russia’s “pivot to Asia” has come to the fore in the wake of the crisis over Ukraine. Growing tensions with the West over the common neighbourhood, coupled with economic sanctions, have accelerated this trend, with China gaining in... more
Russia’s “pivot to Asia” has come to the fore in the wake of the crisis over Ukraine. Growing tensions with the West over the common neighbourhood, coupled with economic sanctions, have accelerated this trend, with China gaining in strength as both an economic and military partner to Moscow. The Kremlin’s propaganda has sought to convince the broader public that Russia’s strategies in Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Arctic region are a complement to China’s new Silk Road Economic Belt. Nonetheless, behind the headlines huge potential problems jeopardise the emergence of a durable Sino-Russian consensus in Eurasia. Against this backdrop, the EU should opt for “strategic patience.” This would be a far more effective policy choice than finger pointing, which only deepens the mutual ideological clash between the EU and Russia.
The security landscape in and around Europe since 2014 has experienced significant changes. As a result, in the 31 European countries considered by this study defence spending will grow by an estimated average of 8.3 per cent in 2016,... more
The security landscape in and around Europe since 2014 has experienced significant changes. As a result, in the 31 European countries considered by this study defence spending will grow by an estimated average of 8.3 per cent in 2016, compared to 2015. This represents a break with the structural trends experienced in previous years. Yet, increased defence budgets are no guarantee that the countries will spend their money better or with more intra-European cooperation than before 2015. The whole landscape of defence cooperation in Europe is particularly diversified and fragmented. The study analyses six trends which mark current cooperative patterns, for example in relation to bilateralism, regionalism, as well as the role of Germany and the United States. Finally, it discusses five driving factors, including Russia’s aggressive posture and non-conventional threats, which are likely to shape the European defence cooperation landscape in the short-medium term. - See more at: http://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/defence-budgets-and-cooperation-europe#sthash.u5m0FHTO.dpuf
Contributo per il rapporto IAI sulla Politica Estera Italiana
- by Giovanna De Maio and +1
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- Russia, Sanctions, Italian foreign policy, Ukraine Crisis
Over the last decades, food security has come to the fore as a relevant issue both for scholars and for policy-makers. The so-called " Arab Spring " revealed the strong linkage between food security, political instability and migration.... more
Over the last decades, food security has come to the fore as a relevant issue both for scholars and for policy-makers. The so-called " Arab Spring " revealed the strong linkage between food security, political instability and migration. The European Union's food security policy has set up solid building blocks to deal with the challenge both in terms of development and of humanitarian policies. However, such an approach has proved to be too sectoral, lacking a clear strategic framework where food is embedded into broader security dynamics. An EU food diplomacy under the aegis of the European External Action Service could help to integrate the two souls – development and humanitarian assistance – of the EU's food security policy, in line with the EU Global Strategy and the international commitments made on climate change and sustainable development.
The extremely unequal distribution of food worldwide has generated a paradox: while almost a billion citizens do not have access to healthy food, a part of the global population can afford to buy food in excess and – more importantly –... more
The extremely unequal distribution of food worldwide has generated a paradox: while almost a billion citizens do not have access to healthy food, a part of the global population can afford to buy food in excess and – more importantly – generate enormous food losses and waste (FLW), with high economic, environmental and social costs. The EU has been working to find a comprehensive solution to this problem, with the aim of changing the current paradigm that tolerates good food being allowed to rot away. This paper explores the opportunities deriving from the latest EU efforts against FLW and, in particular, the Circular Economy Package, which includes waste legislation that is in line with UN goals on sustainable development. Several gaps have yet to be filled, but the mix of ambitious European and domestic laws, virtuous practices on the part of private companies, and a radical change in consumers' habits are key to giving back to food the value it deserves.
Since 2014 Russia’s war in Crimea, NATO’s renewed priority to collective defence implies higher requirements for its members, and allies are rebalancing the force mix in favour of the heavy component including Main Battle Tanks (MBT). The... more
Since 2014 Russia’s war in Crimea, NATO’s renewed priority to collective defence implies higher requirements for its members, and allies are rebalancing the force mix in favour of the heavy component including Main Battle Tanks (MBT). The new MBT’s characteristics require a greater technological effort than in the past, ranging from active protection systems to gun, turret, vetronics and optronics, and particularly to automation. Yet MBTs in European inventories are often outdated and their readiness level is low. Against this backdrop, in 2017, France and Germany have launched a joint project to develop and produce a next generation Main Ground Combat System (MGCS). Italy and Poland have repeatedly asked to join the MGCS cooperation, yet Paris and Berlin want to keep it exclusively bilateral until a prototype will be developed. Therefore, Italy has to rapidly choose among a limited number of options in order to satisfy urgent army’s MBT needs, as well as maintain a reasonable level of technological sovereignty in this sector.
Dalla guerra russa in Crimea del 2014, la rinnovata priorità Nato sulla difesa collettiva comporta requisiti più elevanti per gli stati membri, e gli alleati stanno ri-bilanciando il mix di forze in favore della componente terrestre,... more
Dalla guerra russa in Crimea del 2014, la rinnovata priorità Nato sulla difesa collettiva comporta requisiti più elevanti per gli stati membri, e gli alleati stanno ri-bilanciando il mix di forze in favore della componente terrestre, inclusi i carri armati (Main Battle Tanks-Mbt). Le caratteristiche del carro di nuova generazione richiedono un sforzo tecnologico maggiore che in passato, in particolare riguardo ai sistemi di protezione attiva, il cannone, la torretta, vetronica e optronica, e soprattutto l'automazione. Gli Mbt attualmente in dotazione alle forze armate europee sono spesso però obsoleti, e il loro livello di prontezza è basso. In questo scenario, Francia e Germania hanno lanciato nel 2017 un progetto congiunto per sviluppare e produrre un carro di nuova generazione. Italia e Polonia hanno ripetutamente chiesto di poter aderire al progetto franco-tedesco, ma Parigi e Berlino intendono mantenerlo esclusivamente bilaterale finché non sarà sviluppato un prototipo. L'Italia deve quindi rapidamente scegliere tra le poche opzioni disponibili quanto a Mbt per soddisfare le necessità urgenti dell'esercito e mantenere allo stesso tempo un ragionevole livello di sovranità tecnologica in questo settore.
Dopo anni in cui la componente pesante degli eserciti sembrava aver perso la sua importanza, il ritorno a partire dal 2014 del rischio di scontri ad alta intensità in Europa, accompagnato da una componente ibrida e asimmetrica crescente,... more
Dopo anni in cui la componente pesante degli eserciti sembrava aver perso la sua importanza, il ritorno a partire dal 2014 del rischio di scontri ad alta intensità in Europa, accompagnato da una componente ibrida e asimmetrica crescente, rende necessario per i Paesi Nato investire di nuovo sui carri armati. Quest'esigenza diventa ancora più pressante per quei Paesi i cui mezzi sono al termine della propria vita operativa e risentono di anni di mancato investimento e aggiornamento. Questa è la situazione dell'Italia-ma anche di buona parte degli eserciti in Europa-che si trova a dover pensare, con tempistiche molto strette, quale carro armato sostituirà l'Ariete attualmente in servizio, con chi produrlo e in che modo.
The land component of European armies suffered from neglect over the past decades, as emerging asymmetric and hybrid threats pushed states to focus on new types of equipment and capabilities. While such threats are far from over, more... more
The land component of European armies suffered from neglect over the past decades, as emerging asymmetric and hybrid threats pushed states to focus on new types of equipment and capabilities. While such threats are far from over, more conventional forms of military deterrence within NATO should not be overlooked, as they remain essential for an effective and integrated force posture in Europe. Upgrading heavy land platforms is one important dimension of this effort, particularly with regards to the development of a new generation Main Battle Tank (MBT), an endeavour which may also provide increased momentum to foster defence integration across the EU.
Gli accordi Government-to-Government (G2G) applicati al mercato della difesa costituiscono uno strumento diffuso per la vendita di armamenti, complementare a quello di mercato. Questi accordi presentano vantaggi sia per lo stato... more
Gli accordi Government-to-Government (G2G) applicati al mercato della difesa costituiscono uno strumento diffuso per la vendita di armamenti, complementare a quello di mercato. Questi accordi presentano vantaggi sia per lo stato acquirente che per il venditore e spesso sono determinanti per la costruzione e il consolidamento di una rete di alleanze e partenariati con gli stati esteri. Grazie al sistema G2G il Paese acquirente riceve garanzie governative sulla conduzione del contratto-che può essere più vantaggioso rispetto ad un accordo di vendita stipulato direttamente con l'azienda venditrice. Da contro, lo stato venditore riesce a supportare meglio l'export delle imprese nazionali del settore. Ad eccezione della Germania, i maggiori esportatori al mondo di armamenti sono dotati di sistemi G2G che riflettono le peculiarità e soddisfano le esigenze settoriali nazionali. In Italia la recente modifica dell'articolo 537-ter del Codice dell'ordinamento militare introduce la possibilità per lo stato di svolgere attività contrattuale, ma lascia irrisolti alcuni problemi normativi e operativi che precludono al Paese la possibilità di avere un sistema G2G funzionante e completo. Il superamento di queste criticità-attraverso un nuovo regolamento e possibilmente una riformulazione della norma-permetterebbe all'Italia di sfruttare a pieno le potenzialità del settore e di porsi sulla scena internazionale come attore di primo piano.
Government-to-Government agreements (G2G) represent a widely used instrument for the sale of arms within the defence market, complementary to those occurring on the market. Such instruments bring advantages to both the purchaser and the... more
Government-to-Government agreements (G2G) represent a widely used instrument for the sale of arms within the defence market, complementary to those occurring on the market. Such instruments bring advantages to both the purchaser and the seller and contribute towards building and strengthening a network of alliances and partnerships with foreign states. Thanks to the G2G, the acquiring state receives government guarantees on the performance of the contract which might be more advantageous than sales contract concluded directly with the selling company. At the same time, the seller state manages to better support the export of its national defence industries. With the exception of Germany, the leading arms exporters in the world have equipped themselves with G2G systems which reflect the peculiarities and meet the national sectoral demands.
- by Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and +1
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- France, Spain, United Kingdom, Sweden
The 2016 EU Global Strategy delineated the level of ambition of the Union, but four years later the EU still struggles to reach this level in the defence domain. The paper investigates how the current EU initiatives such as Permanent... more
The 2016 EU Global Strategy delineated the level of ambition of the Union, but four years later the EU still struggles to reach this level in the defence domain. The paper investigates how the current EU initiatives such as Permanent Structured Cooperation and European Defence Fund could help defining and reaching such a concept, to eventually realise an appropriate level strategic autonomy. In light of the principle of the "single set of forces", as well as due to synergies and commonalities between EU and NATO, the paper also inquires whether the old vertical "division of labour" discussed in the early 2000s is still a valid approach, or if the EU quest for a wider and stronger strategic autonomy could ultimately bring to a geographical division of responsibilities. However, such an occurrence implies a strong political willingness and commitment towards EU defence, that is now further shaken by the impact of COVID-19 particularly on military budget and capability development. In such a context, Italy needs to clearly position itself in a post-Brexit EU at 27, where the different stances on the level of strategic autonomy and on transatlantic relations need to be balanced in renewed ways-also in light of the new role played by the European Commission. In the end, a new and more solid "centre of gravity" for EU defence in Europe could be established, should Rome manage to fully enter the Franco-German driver for strategic autonomy.
La Strategia globale dell'Ue del 2016 ha delineato il livello di ambizione dell'Unione, ma dopo quattro anni si fatica ancora a raggiungerlo nel settore della difesa. Questo studio analizza il modo in cui le attuali iniziative europee,... more
La Strategia globale dell'Ue del 2016 ha delineato il livello di ambizione dell'Unione, ma dopo quattro anni si fatica ancora a raggiungerlo nel settore della difesa. Questo studio analizza il modo in cui le attuali iniziative europee, quali la Cooperazione strutturata permanente e il Fondo europeo per la Difesa, possono favorire la definizione e il raggiungimento di questo concetto, al fine di arrivare a un appropriato livello di autonomia strategica. Alla luce del principio di un "unico serbatoio di capacità militari" nonché delle sinergie e delle caratteristiche comuni tra Ue e Nato, lo studio si chiede inoltre se la vecchia "suddivisione del lavoro" verticale discussa nei primi anni del 2000 sia ancora un approccio valido o se la ricerca da parte dell'Unione europea di una più ampia e forte autonomia strategica possa portare alla fine a una suddivisione geografica delle responsabilità. Tale eventualità implica però una forte volontà politica e un altrettanto forte impegno nella difesa europea, che al momento è inoltre condizionato negativamente dall'impatto del Covid-19, in particolare per ciò che riguarda i bilanci della difesa e lo sviluppo di equipaggiamenti militari. In questo contesto l'Italia deve prendere una posizione chiara in una Ue a 27 post-Brexit in cui-anche alla luce del nuovo ruolo svolto dalla Commissione europea-le diverse prese di posizione sul livello di autonomia strategica e sulle relazioni transatlantiche devono essere bilanciate in nuove modalità. Detto ciò, un nuovo e più solido "centro di gravità" della difesa europea potrebbe istituirsi, a patto che Roma riesca a inserirsi pienamente nel motore franco-tedesco per l'autonomia strategica.
The year 2020 has been a challenging year not only under a health, social and economic perspective, but also in relation to EU defence. The level of strategic autonomy necessary to satisfy the EU level of ambition has not been reached... more
The year 2020 has been a challenging year not only under a health, social and economic perspective, but also in relation to EU defence. The level of strategic autonomy necessary to satisfy the EU level of ambition has not been reached yet, with consequences on the EU effectiveness to deliver results. Difficulties towards this end have been exacerbated by the effects of COVID-19 and EU member states will need to take into account several factors-from the Brexit impact on defence, towards the lack of military capabilities, to the nuclear landscape in Europe-to let the Strategic Compass be successful in achieving the expected outcomes. This publication is a follow-on of a reflection inaugurated with the online roundtable "Europe of Defence in a New World (Dis)order: Choices for Italy", held on 11 November 2020. The virtual event has been jointly organised by IAI, Centro Studi sul Federalismo (CSF) and Scuola di Applicazione dell'Esercito. It received the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and took place within the framework of the strategic partnership with the Fondazione Compagnia di San Paolo.
Nel più ampio perimetro della sicurezza cibernetica, il presente studio si concentra esclusivamente sulla cyber defence, analizzando l’approccio della Nato nel suo complesso ed in particolare degli stati di riferimento quanto a strategia,... more
Nel più ampio perimetro della sicurezza cibernetica, il presente studio si concentra esclusivamente sulla cyber defence, analizzando l’approccio della Nato nel suo complesso ed in particolare degli stati di riferimento quanto a strategia, capacità militari e investimenti – in primis gli Stati Uniti ovviamente, ma anche Regno Unito, Francia, Germania e Spagna per fornire un solido quadro europeo.
- by Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and +1
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- NATO, France, Spain, United Kingdom
In 2016 NATO recognised cyber as a domain comparable to the air, land and sea ones, in consideration of the growing number of cyberattacks and of their negative impact on the cyberspace, as well as on the "real world". Both NATO and its... more
In 2016 NATO recognised cyber as a domain comparable to the air, land and sea ones, in consideration of the growing number of cyberattacks and of their negative impact on the cyberspace, as well as on the "real world". Both NATO and its member states have launched initiatives to better tackle the cyber challenge both operationally and in terms of capability development. Nevertheless, among major NATO's members a common approach to cyber defence is still missing, thus generating a division among countries that pursue a more active defence-US, UK and France-and those that prefer a more defensive approach-Germany and Spain.
- by Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and +1
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- NATO, France, Spain, United Kingdom
Il primo Focus Euro-Atlantico del 2021 si apre come di consueto con un’analisi ragionata dello stato delle relazioni transatlantiche (corredata da una serie di grafici). In Europa c’è una generale aspettativa che il cambio di... more
Il primo Focus Euro-Atlantico del 2021 si apre come di consueto con un’analisi ragionata dello stato delle relazioni transatlantiche (corredata da una serie di grafici). In Europa c’è una generale aspettativa che il cambio di amministrazione a Washington riporti stabilità nelle relazioni transatlantiche dopo le turbolenze della presidenza Trump. Il nuovo inquilino della Casa Bianca, Joe Biden, è un atlantista convinto che ha messo il rilancio delle alleanze al centro della sua politica estera. Nel primo approfondimento Ester Sabatino illustra il potenziale contributo dell’Amministrazione Biden al rilancio dell’agenda strategica della Nato. Il secondo approfondimento è dedicato alla possibile direzione delle relazioni degli Stati Uniti con la Russia sotto l’Amministrazione Biden. Giovanna De Maio sostiene che il neo-presidente Usa porterà maggiore coerenza nella politica verso Mosca. Il terzo approfondimento, di Karolina Muti, è dedicato alla politica spaziale dell’Amministrazione Biden.