EU-Med

The events of 3 July 2013 have cast a troubling shadow
over Egypt’s future and have opened a new phase in the
country’s transition. While opinions in Egypt are deeply
divided over whether the new situation is the result of a
military-dictated “soft coup” or the outburst of a
reinvigorated, grassroots revolutionary momentum, or both,
the challenges to a veritable democratic and pluralistic
transition process are manifold. Stopping the bloodshed
and easing the tensions and polarization are only the first
steps. A process of national reconciliation accompanied by
an inclusive revision of the constitution need to be pursued
by the new interim government. The new leadership should
also find ways to engage the excluded Muslim Brotherhood
facilitating its inclusion in Egypt’s political institutions. Only
at the end of this long journey we will know whether Egypt
has embarked on an Algerian-style civil war-type path, or a
Turkish-like experience marked, at least until recently, by
successful government with the Islamists at the forefront.

"Two major trends can be identified that characterize the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries in the wake of the Arab uprisings. The first is their increased fragmentation and the appearance of seemingly centrifugal trajectories across the region with countries at different stages of the transition process. The second hallmark of the region today has to do with the pivotal position occupied by new political actors, namely the various Islamist parties that have emerged by and large as the most victorious political forces in the region after the first free and fair elections ever to be held in many countries in the region. This report attempts to illustrate and study the new regional dynamics (or lack thereof) in the Mediterranean through four papers written by European and Southern Mediterranean experts. They tackle regional dynamics in the Mediterranean in the areas of trade and investment patterns; movement of people; energy cooperation; and civil society, culture, and means of communications. The goal of the report is to go beyond describing the current trends that underscore the existence of regional dynamics (or lack thereof) to assess the impact of domestic, regional, and global changes on them and to put forward policy recommendations for the transatlantic partners.
"

The Syrian conflict remains one of the most troubling foreign policy issues facing the international community since the beginning of the Arab uprisings in 2011. While the number of civilian casualties and displaced persons escalates, a renewed diplomatic effort seems to be losing steam, thus projecting a grim outlook onto the future of the country. This paper addresses some of the open questions in the Syrian crisis, namely the weaknesses of the opposition groups, the funding and arming of the opposition, the differences between the so-called moderate and extremist forces within it and the humanitarian aid provided to the Syrian refugees, focusing on the active engagement of the Arab Gulf countries, mainly Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Conflicts between the strategies pursued by these two players could further weaken the Syrian opposition. Against this backdrop, a more or less covert arms race is already taking place, which now risks spreading out both in geographical scope and intensity over the Summer.

The turmoil sweeping across the Arab world and the ensuing transition processes have been a crucial test for Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Oman. Confronted with external as well as internal outbursts of disaffection, they have responded in a mixed way by combining patronage, outright repression, and outreach to the protesters. It is important to focus on the external role of the Gulf countries in North Africa by answering two questions: to what extent does the economic cooperation between the Gulf and North Africa represent an instrument of political penetration and influence and what are its effects on the transitions? Does it help or impinge on the chances of genuine reform in the countries undergoing these transitions aimed at solving the problems that triggered the Arab uprisings two years ago, e.g., lack of accountable, transparent, and inclusive institutions as well as unsustainable socio-economic policies? The four authors of this paper — coming from different geographical backgrounds and disciplines — attempted to address the aforementioned questions and to offer policy recommendations. The result is a comprehensive and multi-faceted assessment of the growing engagement of the GCC countries with the North African region and its potential impact. While offering different perspectives, the four papers contribute to highlighting a number of common points from which some policy-oriented proposals can be drawn.

"In 2011 the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries have
been confronted with increasing challenges stemming from
the Arab uprisings. Internally they have had to face popular
mobilization and discontent, triggering a mixed reaction made
up of economic handouts, patronage, limited political and
economic reforms as well as military intervention and
repression. Externally they have actively intervened in support
of the protest movements in Syria and Libya and
enthusiastically facilitated president Saleh’s departure from
Yemen. At first sight these responses may seem
schizophrenic. At closer inspection, though, managing
instability by shoring up friendly regimes on the inside and
expanding the GCC’s influence outside represent two sides of
the same coin. This paper aims at unpacking the GCC’s
responses to the “Arab Spring” by making use of the concept
of “double standard”. It is argued that three main dichotomies
- inside vs. outside, monarchies vs. republics and Sunnis vs.
Shiites - explain the GCC’s reaction and its implications for
the future of the MENA region. "

The question of state sustainability is highly relevant in the case of Morocco. The recent upheavals in the Maghreb and the Middle East, alongside the growing problems of poor education and high unemployment are likely to bring to the surface the unsustainable elements of Morocco’s status quo. The central issues concern the quality of institutions, reforms aimed at promoting the rule of law, curbing corruption and overhauling the judiciary. This paper will argue that while institutional quality is a pre-requisite for successful and sustainable socio-economic performance, this cannot be achieved unless major reforms in the political system are carried out. There is a window of opportunity to accelerate reforms and to address the acute centralisation of Moroccan politics and decision-making, the lack of accountability of the monarchic institutions, as well as the fragility of representative bodies, such as parties and trade unions. Seizing this opportunity could spare Morocco a period of instability, while also assuring continuity in the transition that began in 1999, when the new king came to power.

Any analysis of the prospects for stability and sustainability in the states of Syria and Lebanon reveals the strong ties that exist between these two countries and the impact of external influences on their overall development. Their trajectories, while starkly divergent in terms of the challenges confronting them at present, converge on a path of long-term unsustainability. Lebanon is in the midst of yet another transition phase, triggered by the collapse of Hariri’s government in January 2011. The current situation might be described as one of deteriorating status quo; the state is performing poorly in terms of its delivery of fundamental public services and its institutional legitimacy is tenuous in the face of emerging para-state structures and latent (occasionally active) violence. In Syria, challenges to the sustainability of the state have evolved dramatically since the beginning of 2011, and are now nearing a tipping point. In view of the mounting unrest and violence in the country, the future prospects for its economic and political development are dim. More ominously, the risk of widespread conflict, with sectarian overtones, cannot be discounted.