Jon Beale
I'm a Research Affiliate with the Human Flourishing Program in the Institute for Quantitative Social Science at Harvard University, where I co-lead the Program's Flourishing Network. I'm also a Coach for the Flow Research Collective and the Center for Human Potential, and a consultant specialising in well-being and education research. I co-host a podcast called Flourish FM, sponsored by the Human Flourishing Program at Harvard and the University of Oxford's Department of Education.
I've previously held positions at the University of Oxford (2021-22), Eton College (2019-21) and Harvard (2011-13). I'm also a Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts.
My research focuses on the philosophy of human flourishing and how to most effectively promote flourishing in workplaces and education. More widely, I work on the philosophy of education, character education, and the science of learning.
My publications include four co-edited books, including The Future of Education, forthcoming from Oxford University Press. I've published philosophy and education articles in academic journals and media outlets including the New York Times.
I've given invited talks at universities including Harvard, Yale, Oxford and Cambridge, for organisations including the Royal Society of Arts, and businesses including Bain Capital and Waystar. I've been interviewed by publications including the Psychologist and podcasts including Flow Research Collective Radio.
For research, consultancy or coaching enquiries, contact me via here or [email protected].
___
Supervisors: Prof. Maximilian de Gaynesford and Prof. Severin Schroeder
I've previously held positions at the University of Oxford (2021-22), Eton College (2019-21) and Harvard (2011-13). I'm also a Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts.
My research focuses on the philosophy of human flourishing and how to most effectively promote flourishing in workplaces and education. More widely, I work on the philosophy of education, character education, and the science of learning.
My publications include four co-edited books, including The Future of Education, forthcoming from Oxford University Press. I've published philosophy and education articles in academic journals and media outlets including the New York Times.
I've given invited talks at universities including Harvard, Yale, Oxford and Cambridge, for organisations including the Royal Society of Arts, and businesses including Bain Capital and Waystar. I've been interviewed by publications including the Psychologist and podcasts including Flow Research Collective Radio.
For research, consultancy or coaching enquiries, contact me via here or [email protected].
___
Supervisors: Prof. Maximilian de Gaynesford and Prof. Severin Schroeder
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Edited Books by Jon Beale
We held a conference on the book at St Antony's College, Oxford on 16-17 Sept 2022: https://forms.gle/VN2KEHx8P7fuVkHL7
The book explores the philosophical basis of Wittgenstein’s anti-scientism; how this anti-scientism helps us understand Wittgenstein’s philosophical aims; and how this underlies his later conception of philosophy and the kind of philosophy he attacked.
An outstanding team of international contributors articulate and critically assess Wittgenstein’s views on scientism and anti-scientism, making Wittgenstein and Scientism essential reading for students and scholars of Wittgenstein’s work, on topics as varied as the philosophy of mind and psychology, philosophical practice, the nature of religious belief, and the place of science in modern culture.
Book webpage: https://www.routledge.com/The-BrainCanDo-Handbook-of-Teaching-and-Learning-Practical-Strategies/Harrington-Beale-Fancourt-Lutz/p/book/9780367187057
The Foreword to the book is readable here: http://193.61.4.246/dnl/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Thomas_BrainCanDo_foreword_finaldraft.pdf
Articles & book chapters by Jon Beale
education is epistemic: to advance students’ acquisition of epistemic goods such as
knowledge, understanding and wisdom, and develop the cognitive skills and
epistemic virtues that support the acquisition of epistemic goods, such as critical
thinking skills. It is also widely held that education’s ultimate aim is to support
human flourishing. What is the relation between these proposed aims? This chapter
aims to conceptualise this relation and thereby identify what the role of flourishing
should be among education’s aims. The chapter argues that education’s epistemic
aims and promoting flourishing are mutually supportive, in the sense that the
fulfilment of either type of aim is supported by fulfilment of the other. Empirical
and conceptual reasons are put forward in support.
An earlier draft of this chapter was presented at Harvard: https://youtu.be/8s3M1jTK8ZQ?si=WfM167bcqwewIq9w
An account is offered of what AR is and how it relates to and differs from the psychological concept of resilience (§1). An overview is provided of the character skills that are associated with AR, as predictors of or skills correlated with it (§2). Cultural and systemic factors that may impact AR are discussed (§3). A key distinction between AR and ‘academic buoyancy’ is explained (§4). How AR is measured is explained, including one of the measures used in the intervention (§5). Strategies for developing AR, including those used in the intervention, are outlined (§6). An argument is put forward for why AR is important for students (§7). An overview is provided of the intervention (§8), covering the structure of the course (§8.1); data collection (§8.2); findings (§8.3); what the intervention identified about developing AR (§8.4); the impact of Covid-19 on the students (§8.5); and why learning about resilience is important (§8.6).
Link to the book:
https://www.routledge.com/Transcending-Crisis-by-Attending-to-Care-Emotion-and-Flourishing/Cottingham-Erickson-Lee/p/book/9781032196862
This article provides an overview of an intervention conducted at Sevenoaks School in collaboration with the Human Flourishing Program at Harvard University and Research Schools International on promoting the flourishing of students.
There is a growing global movement to promote flourishing in education. The Human Flourishing Program at Harvard University defines flourishing as a state of complete well-being, characterised by happiness and life satisfaction, a sense of meaning and purpose, good character and virtue, physical and mental health, and close social relationships (VanderWeele, 2017).
In this study, researchers from Research Schools International (RSI) and Harvard collaborated with Sevenoaks School to conduct research on student flourishing. We collected survey data from 866 students and analysed this data using a mixed methods approach. Results revealed that male students and students in lower school years reported greater flourishing than others. Furthermore, findings illustrate how Sevenoaks supports student flourishing through exercise, humour, volunteering, kindness, supporting healthy eating and sleeping, and inspiring a sense of wonder. Results also identified ways that Sevenoaks can further support flourishing, such as engaging students in more gratitude or mindfulness practices.
Whether we hold that education has a principal aim or set of aims, it's uncontroversial that its goals include epistemic aims above and supporting flourishing. This paper discusses the areas of UNESCO’s research brief that are concerned with the relationship between flourishing and education’s epistemic aims.
In answer to the first, the paper argues against the interpretation that the later Wittgenstein was a 'liberal naturalist'. It is argued that there are, however, two grounds for ascribing a form of naturalism to Wittgenstein: his opposition to metaphysics and the role that observations concerning natural facts play in his later method of providing surveyable representations of grammar to dissolve philosophical problems. The kind of 'naturalism' we can ascribe to Wittgenstein is therefore entirely methodological and negative, supporting his aim of exposing the conceptual confusions underlying philosophical problems. I call this 'grammatical naturalism', given its relation to his philosophical method of grammatical investigation.
The account of grammatical naturalism is used to address the second question. It is argued that grammatical naturalism is a deflationary approach towards normativity, in two senses. First, Wittgenstein does not offer a conception what counts as 'natural' to account for normativity within a naturalistic framework. Second, Wittgenstein does not search for something beyond our normative practices to explain the relationship between normativity and the natural order. For Wittgenstein, we can elucidate the place of normativity within the natural order by offering surveyable representations of normative notions within our practices.
That approach towards normativity reflects Wittgenstein's grammatical naturalism. Wittgenstein's naturalism does not possess a 'positive' feature, such as an account of what counts as natural or the place of normativity within the natural order. This distances Wittgenstein further from liberal naturalism.
How can neuroscience and psychology be applied to education without risking scientism? Scientism is an elusive concept, so this chapter offers an account of what scientism is (§§1-3). It is argued that education should be included among the areas that are the most difficult to reduce to explanations in scientific terms (§3). The account of scientism is used to outline three examples of ways in which neuroscience and psychology could be applied in education that would be open to accusations of scientism (§4). Three indicators of scientism when scientific theories or evidence are applied in education are described. Alongside each indicator, suggestions are offered on what we should watch out for to avoid being scientistic when applying theories or evidence from neuroscience and psychology in education (§5) – or, to avoid what we might call ‘educational neuroscientism’.
Book webpage: https://www.routledge.com/The-BrainCanDo-Handbook-of-Teaching-and-Learning-Practical-Strategies/Harrington-Beale-Fancourt-Lutz/p/book/9780367187057
Three examples of scientism in education are outlined, related to views concerning applications of the science of learning. First, assuming that neuroscientific methods and findings can be immediately or straightforwardly applied in educational contexts. Second, holding that it is not possible to provide a good education without recourse to the science of learning. Third, holding that one cannot be a proficient teacher without understanding the science of learning.
Journal issue available open access: https://www.etoncollege.com/userfiles/files/TLC_brochure_2020_spreads_FAW.pdf
This article argues that even if we accept the points above, a cognitive pedagogical approach plays an important role in values education. An important component of values education is providing students with the best tools and methods for reaching independent critical judgements about their beliefs. Logic and critical thinking offer the best skillset for independently critically assessing which beliefs are rationally defensible. This skillset can be used effectively in values education by teaching critical thinking and applying it to fields where the values and beliefs that influence the ways we live are often acquired.
One such field is religion. The article outlines a course and teaching methodology the author has designed which integrates a study of critical thinking with living religions, using the latter as the subject matter to which the concepts and methods of the former are applied. Among the benefits of this approach is that it equips students with the skills to reach independent critical judgements about their beliefs.
Article online at https://impact.chartered.college/article/the-value-cognitive-approach-values-education/
It is argued that Wittgenstein’s later philosophy can nonetheless be described as ‘naturalistic’ for two reasons. First, observations concerning natural facts play an important role in his method of providing surveyable representations of grammar. Second, his opposition to metaphysics and the absence of recourse to metaphysical phenomena in his philosophical investigations. While ascribing naturalism to the later Wittgenstein is misleading because of the four caveats raised, the chapter suggests that if we are to describe the later Wittgenstein as a naturalist, his position can be described as such insofar as there are the two naturalistic strands in his later philosophy, both of which are important to his method of grammatical investigation. This position is dubbed ‘grammatical naturalism’.
Article online at https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-27569-3_6
This article outlines and offers reflections on the programme, which it is hoped could be useful for teachers interested in offering an international social action programme.
The course document for the programme is available on request; please contact me if you would like a copy. In light of the Covid-19 pandemic, I am currently not sure whether I will be able to run this programme during the academic year 2020-21.
Given how broad, multifaceted, complex and elusive the concept of character is, it is suggested that a hybrid framework involving multiple means of assessment would be the most reliable, accurate and fair means of assessing character development. Some suggestions are made for particularly worthwhile research in this area and replies are offered to some foreseeable objections against formatively assessing character.
Journal issue available open access: https://www.etoncollege.com/userfiles/files/CharacterEducationJournalNov2019.pdf
Full text available online at https://impact.chartered.college/article/beale-developing-effective-learning-emotional-engagement-teaching-ethics/
It is argued that the later Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy is marked out against two scientistic claims in particular. First, the view that the scientific method is superior to all other means of learning or gaining knowledge. Second, the view that scientific knowledge is superior to all other kinds of knowledge and understanding. Wittgenstein’s opposition to these claims is brought out through examining a fundamental aim of his later philosophy, producing the ‘kind of understanding which consists in “seeing connections”’ (PI §122), and his attempts to expose certain philosophical confusions. It is argued that these reflect his anti-scientistic worldview.
Through discussion of Oswald Spengler’s influence on Wittgenstein, the paper outlines how Wittgenstein’s opposition to scientism underwrites his negative cultural outlook and how this is connected with the anti-scientistic elements of his later philosophy discussed. The work of Ray Monk and Hans-Johann Glock is instrumental in what follows.
Book webpage: https://www.routledge.com/Wittgenstein-and-Scientism/Beale-Kidd/p/book/9781138829398
We held a conference on the book at St Antony's College, Oxford on 16-17 Sept 2022: https://forms.gle/VN2KEHx8P7fuVkHL7
The book explores the philosophical basis of Wittgenstein’s anti-scientism; how this anti-scientism helps us understand Wittgenstein’s philosophical aims; and how this underlies his later conception of philosophy and the kind of philosophy he attacked.
An outstanding team of international contributors articulate and critically assess Wittgenstein’s views on scientism and anti-scientism, making Wittgenstein and Scientism essential reading for students and scholars of Wittgenstein’s work, on topics as varied as the philosophy of mind and psychology, philosophical practice, the nature of religious belief, and the place of science in modern culture.
Book webpage: https://www.routledge.com/The-BrainCanDo-Handbook-of-Teaching-and-Learning-Practical-Strategies/Harrington-Beale-Fancourt-Lutz/p/book/9780367187057
The Foreword to the book is readable here: http://193.61.4.246/dnl/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Thomas_BrainCanDo_foreword_finaldraft.pdf
education is epistemic: to advance students’ acquisition of epistemic goods such as
knowledge, understanding and wisdom, and develop the cognitive skills and
epistemic virtues that support the acquisition of epistemic goods, such as critical
thinking skills. It is also widely held that education’s ultimate aim is to support
human flourishing. What is the relation between these proposed aims? This chapter
aims to conceptualise this relation and thereby identify what the role of flourishing
should be among education’s aims. The chapter argues that education’s epistemic
aims and promoting flourishing are mutually supportive, in the sense that the
fulfilment of either type of aim is supported by fulfilment of the other. Empirical
and conceptual reasons are put forward in support.
An earlier draft of this chapter was presented at Harvard: https://youtu.be/8s3M1jTK8ZQ?si=WfM167bcqwewIq9w
An account is offered of what AR is and how it relates to and differs from the psychological concept of resilience (§1). An overview is provided of the character skills that are associated with AR, as predictors of or skills correlated with it (§2). Cultural and systemic factors that may impact AR are discussed (§3). A key distinction between AR and ‘academic buoyancy’ is explained (§4). How AR is measured is explained, including one of the measures used in the intervention (§5). Strategies for developing AR, including those used in the intervention, are outlined (§6). An argument is put forward for why AR is important for students (§7). An overview is provided of the intervention (§8), covering the structure of the course (§8.1); data collection (§8.2); findings (§8.3); what the intervention identified about developing AR (§8.4); the impact of Covid-19 on the students (§8.5); and why learning about resilience is important (§8.6).
Link to the book:
https://www.routledge.com/Transcending-Crisis-by-Attending-to-Care-Emotion-and-Flourishing/Cottingham-Erickson-Lee/p/book/9781032196862
This article provides an overview of an intervention conducted at Sevenoaks School in collaboration with the Human Flourishing Program at Harvard University and Research Schools International on promoting the flourishing of students.
There is a growing global movement to promote flourishing in education. The Human Flourishing Program at Harvard University defines flourishing as a state of complete well-being, characterised by happiness and life satisfaction, a sense of meaning and purpose, good character and virtue, physical and mental health, and close social relationships (VanderWeele, 2017).
In this study, researchers from Research Schools International (RSI) and Harvard collaborated with Sevenoaks School to conduct research on student flourishing. We collected survey data from 866 students and analysed this data using a mixed methods approach. Results revealed that male students and students in lower school years reported greater flourishing than others. Furthermore, findings illustrate how Sevenoaks supports student flourishing through exercise, humour, volunteering, kindness, supporting healthy eating and sleeping, and inspiring a sense of wonder. Results also identified ways that Sevenoaks can further support flourishing, such as engaging students in more gratitude or mindfulness practices.
Whether we hold that education has a principal aim or set of aims, it's uncontroversial that its goals include epistemic aims above and supporting flourishing. This paper discusses the areas of UNESCO’s research brief that are concerned with the relationship between flourishing and education’s epistemic aims.
In answer to the first, the paper argues against the interpretation that the later Wittgenstein was a 'liberal naturalist'. It is argued that there are, however, two grounds for ascribing a form of naturalism to Wittgenstein: his opposition to metaphysics and the role that observations concerning natural facts play in his later method of providing surveyable representations of grammar to dissolve philosophical problems. The kind of 'naturalism' we can ascribe to Wittgenstein is therefore entirely methodological and negative, supporting his aim of exposing the conceptual confusions underlying philosophical problems. I call this 'grammatical naturalism', given its relation to his philosophical method of grammatical investigation.
The account of grammatical naturalism is used to address the second question. It is argued that grammatical naturalism is a deflationary approach towards normativity, in two senses. First, Wittgenstein does not offer a conception what counts as 'natural' to account for normativity within a naturalistic framework. Second, Wittgenstein does not search for something beyond our normative practices to explain the relationship between normativity and the natural order. For Wittgenstein, we can elucidate the place of normativity within the natural order by offering surveyable representations of normative notions within our practices.
That approach towards normativity reflects Wittgenstein's grammatical naturalism. Wittgenstein's naturalism does not possess a 'positive' feature, such as an account of what counts as natural or the place of normativity within the natural order. This distances Wittgenstein further from liberal naturalism.
How can neuroscience and psychology be applied to education without risking scientism? Scientism is an elusive concept, so this chapter offers an account of what scientism is (§§1-3). It is argued that education should be included among the areas that are the most difficult to reduce to explanations in scientific terms (§3). The account of scientism is used to outline three examples of ways in which neuroscience and psychology could be applied in education that would be open to accusations of scientism (§4). Three indicators of scientism when scientific theories or evidence are applied in education are described. Alongside each indicator, suggestions are offered on what we should watch out for to avoid being scientistic when applying theories or evidence from neuroscience and psychology in education (§5) – or, to avoid what we might call ‘educational neuroscientism’.
Book webpage: https://www.routledge.com/The-BrainCanDo-Handbook-of-Teaching-and-Learning-Practical-Strategies/Harrington-Beale-Fancourt-Lutz/p/book/9780367187057
Three examples of scientism in education are outlined, related to views concerning applications of the science of learning. First, assuming that neuroscientific methods and findings can be immediately or straightforwardly applied in educational contexts. Second, holding that it is not possible to provide a good education without recourse to the science of learning. Third, holding that one cannot be a proficient teacher without understanding the science of learning.
Journal issue available open access: https://www.etoncollege.com/userfiles/files/TLC_brochure_2020_spreads_FAW.pdf
This article argues that even if we accept the points above, a cognitive pedagogical approach plays an important role in values education. An important component of values education is providing students with the best tools and methods for reaching independent critical judgements about their beliefs. Logic and critical thinking offer the best skillset for independently critically assessing which beliefs are rationally defensible. This skillset can be used effectively in values education by teaching critical thinking and applying it to fields where the values and beliefs that influence the ways we live are often acquired.
One such field is religion. The article outlines a course and teaching methodology the author has designed which integrates a study of critical thinking with living religions, using the latter as the subject matter to which the concepts and methods of the former are applied. Among the benefits of this approach is that it equips students with the skills to reach independent critical judgements about their beliefs.
Article online at https://impact.chartered.college/article/the-value-cognitive-approach-values-education/
It is argued that Wittgenstein’s later philosophy can nonetheless be described as ‘naturalistic’ for two reasons. First, observations concerning natural facts play an important role in his method of providing surveyable representations of grammar. Second, his opposition to metaphysics and the absence of recourse to metaphysical phenomena in his philosophical investigations. While ascribing naturalism to the later Wittgenstein is misleading because of the four caveats raised, the chapter suggests that if we are to describe the later Wittgenstein as a naturalist, his position can be described as such insofar as there are the two naturalistic strands in his later philosophy, both of which are important to his method of grammatical investigation. This position is dubbed ‘grammatical naturalism’.
Article online at https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-27569-3_6
This article outlines and offers reflections on the programme, which it is hoped could be useful for teachers interested in offering an international social action programme.
The course document for the programme is available on request; please contact me if you would like a copy. In light of the Covid-19 pandemic, I am currently not sure whether I will be able to run this programme during the academic year 2020-21.
Given how broad, multifaceted, complex and elusive the concept of character is, it is suggested that a hybrid framework involving multiple means of assessment would be the most reliable, accurate and fair means of assessing character development. Some suggestions are made for particularly worthwhile research in this area and replies are offered to some foreseeable objections against formatively assessing character.
Journal issue available open access: https://www.etoncollege.com/userfiles/files/CharacterEducationJournalNov2019.pdf
Full text available online at https://impact.chartered.college/article/beale-developing-effective-learning-emotional-engagement-teaching-ethics/
It is argued that the later Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy is marked out against two scientistic claims in particular. First, the view that the scientific method is superior to all other means of learning or gaining knowledge. Second, the view that scientific knowledge is superior to all other kinds of knowledge and understanding. Wittgenstein’s opposition to these claims is brought out through examining a fundamental aim of his later philosophy, producing the ‘kind of understanding which consists in “seeing connections”’ (PI §122), and his attempts to expose certain philosophical confusions. It is argued that these reflect his anti-scientistic worldview.
Through discussion of Oswald Spengler’s influence on Wittgenstein, the paper outlines how Wittgenstein’s opposition to scientism underwrites his negative cultural outlook and how this is connected with the anti-scientistic elements of his later philosophy discussed. The work of Ray Monk and Hans-Johann Glock is instrumental in what follows.
Book webpage: https://www.routledge.com/Wittgenstein-and-Scientism/Beale-Kidd/p/book/9781138829398
Full text available online: https://publicseminar.org/2020/05/misinformation-in-a-moment-of-crisis-is-incredibly-dangerous/
Article online at https://thinknowmag.org/2020/04/23/is-death-an-evil/
Full text available online: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/18/opinion/wittgensteins-confession-philosophy.html
Article written for the Human Flourishing Program at Harvard University's Medium page, readable here: https://hfharvard.medium.com/we-talk-so-much-about-resilience-but-not-enough-about-buoyancy-3bf33f602f35
Schools cannot meet these challenges alone. Support is needed from governmental and non-governmental organisations. Effective community support is also vital. Fruitful co-operation between communities and their members requires effective collaboration. What kind of collaboration is needed to foster the community support required to address the challenges education faces after Covid-19? This blogpost addresses this question.
An abridged version of this article was posted as a blogpost for Big Education’s ‘Learning from Lockdown’ blog, on 17 August 2020: https://bigeducation.org/lfl-content/the-importance-of-community-and-collaboration-in-education-after-covid-19/
Article online at https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2019.1565316
Article online at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2010.00486.x/abstract
Full text available online at https://rdcu.be/bfe92
Journal issue available open access: https://cirl.etoncollege.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2021/07/Issue-5.pdf
I present a video overview of this editorial here: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1awkBZlFqlXaANfw6tC4kOs3O0Sk93dor/view
Overview:
In January 2021, England’s Office for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills (‘Ofsted’) published ‘What’s working well in remote education?’, a guide for schools and teachers. This was released as England’s third national lockdown commenced and schools and universities returned to remote teaching and learning. The guide makes some claims about learning and remote education which require scrutiny. Perhaps the most significant is a claim concerning the science of learning and remote education: ‘Our brains don’t learn differently using remote education’.
The 2021 guide is the latest in a growing body of publications from Ofsted’s Research and Evaluation team on issues such as curriculum (2018), lesson observations and safeguarding (2019). Ofsted’s platform ensures that its publications receive considerable attention and exert a powerful influence.
This workshop aims to facilitate discussion about the important issues Ofsted’s guide raises and addresses about learning, remote education and the relation between these. The central question around which the workshop orientates is, ‘What has remote education taught us about how learning works?’. We will consider Ofsted’s 2021 guide through the lens of this question.
For the seminar series, see http://www.educationalneuroscience.org.uk/events/seminars/
For the full paper, see https://www.academia.edu/41220351/Educational_Neuroscience_and_Educational_Neuroscientism
This paper argues three claims. First, that the sense in which the later Wittgenstein was a naturalist is methodological, with naturalistic phenomena occupying a role within his method of providing surveyable representations of grammar. Second, drawing upon McGinn’s and Hutto and Satne’s arguments against McDowell, and Warren Goldfarb’s writings on Wittgenstein’s anti-scientism in the philosophy of mind, that McDowellian liberal naturalism is problematic in its approach towards normativity for the same fundamental reason as some forms of scientific naturalism. Third, that Wittgenstein’s naturalistic account of concepts with a normative character, such as understanding and meaning, is better understood when read in terms of his anti-scientism, as is his naturalism in general.
By distinguishing between, on the one hand, misleading pictures that take a linguistic form and philosophical confusions arising from misleading features of language (§§2-5) and, on the other, conceptual pictures (§6), it is argued that some philosophical confusions do not arise through misunderstandings concerning the workings of language. What all misleading pictures share is what Wittgenstein regards as the fundamental cause of all philosophical confusion: they risk generating or exacerbating misunderstandings concerning conceptual connections. It is argued that misleading pictures are, therefore, always concerned with conceptual representation, but not always with linguistic representation. In this way, misleading pictures offer a good way of understanding the central aim of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy: providing ‘the understanding which consists in “seeing connections”’ (PI §122).
A video of my most recent presentation of this paper is available here (from 1:04:41-1:34:41): https://youtu.be/hRvSJo9R9tE