When the crowdworkers are strategic about their costs, we design truthful mechanisms for both the scenarios. In particular, for the heterogeneous case, we ...
May 4, 2015 · In this mechanism, a planner (or task requester) needs to crowdsource labels for a set of tasks in a cost effective manner and make a high ...
When the crowdworkers are strategic about their costs, we design truthful mechanisms for both the scenarios. In particular, for the heterogeneous case, we ...
Truthful Interval Cover Mechanisms for Crowdsourcing Applications · Pankaj Dayama, Balakrishnan Narayanaswamy, +1 author. Y. Narahari · Published in Adaptive ...
The varying nature of qualities and costs of the crowdworkers makes task allocation a non-trivial problem in almost all crowdsourcing applications.
We introduce the Truthful Interval Covering (TIC) problem, a novel problem in the field of mechanism design without money [Procaccia and Tennenholtz, 2013]. In ...
An instance of TIC consists of a set of agents each associated with an individual interval on a line, and the objective is to decide where to place a covering ...
Nov 16, 2024 · We initiate the study of a novel problem in mechanism design without money, which we term Truthful Interval Covering (TIC).
Jan 18, 2024 · We show that a simple mechanism, which places the covering interval at the starting position of the agent with the maximum-length interval is ...
Using randomized techniques, Koutsopoulos [15] presented a mechanism which determines the user participation level and allocates payments. For the case where ...
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