Mar 15, 2007 · This paper characterizes strategy-proof social choice functions (SCFs), the outcome of which are multiple public goods.
We characterize the set of strategy-proof social choice functions (SCFs), the outcome of which are multiple public goods. The set of feasible alternatives is a ...
(2005) characterize all strategy-proof social choice functions (SCFs) for constrained multiple public good voting for both ad- ditive and weakly separable ...
We characterize the set of strategy-proof social choice functions (SCFs), the outcome of which are multiple public goods. The set of feasible alternatives ...
This paper characterizes strategy-proof social choice functions (SCFs), the outcome of which are multiple public goods. Feasible alternatives belong to ...
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This paper characterizes strategy-proof social choice functions (SCFs), the outcome of which are multiple public goods, and finds that the range of the SCF ...
Mar 15, 2007 · Abstract This paper characterizes strategy-proof social choice functions. (SCFs), the outcome of which are multiple public goods.
If the indivisible goods are inter- preted as public goods instead of private goods as in the present paper, the allocation mechanism is a ``voting procedure'' ...
Strategy-proof allocation of multiple public goods. Lars-Gunnar Svensson and Pär Torstensson ([email protected]).
Oct 3, 2012 · In a voting model where the set of feasible alternatives is a subset of a product set A = A1×⋯×Am of m finite categories, we characterize ...