Sep 17, 2020 · Abstract. We characterize when a stable and strategy-proof mechanism is guaranteed to exist in the setting of many-to-one matching with ...
In this paper, we introduce three novel conditions---observable substitutability, observable size monotonicity, and non-manipulability via contractual terms--- ...
We introduce three novel conditions—observable substitutability, observable size monotonicity, and non-manipulatability—and show that when these conditions are ...
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In the final part of the paper, we characterize the class of choice functions for which the cumulative offer mechanism is guaranteed to yield a stable outcome.
Abstract. We characterize when a stable and strategy-proof mechanism is guaranteed to exist in the setting of many-to-one matching with contracts.
Kominers and Sönmez [9] identified a novel class of preferences, called slot-specific priorities, and showed that if each firm's preferences are in this class, ...
Jul 30, 2015 · We introduce three novel conditions—observable substitutability, observable size monotonicity, and non-manipulatability—and show that when these ...
Feb 12, 2018 · Abstract. We characterize when stable and strategy-proof matching is possible in the setting of many-to-one matching with contracts.
Aug 17, 2017 · Paper presentation at the 18th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'17), Cambridge, MA, June 30, 2017: Title: Stability, ...
In this paper, we introduce three novel conditions---observable substitutability, observable size monotonicity, and non-manipulability via contractual terms--- ...