Models of rationality typically rely on underlying logics that allow simulated agents to entertain beliefs about one another to any depth of nesting.

Mar 2, 1995 · We show that nested beliefs are only required for nested reasoning, so cooperative dialogues only need beliefs at the object level and at two ...

We show that nested beliefs are only required for nested reasoning, so cooperative dialogues in these circumstances only need beliefs at the object level and at ...

Models of rationality typically rely on underlying logics that allow simulated agents to entertain beliefs about one another to any depth of nesting.

Dec 13, 2021 · Abstract. We investigate how belief change in cooperative dialogues can be handled within a modal logic of action, belief, and intention.

We give an axiomatics and a possible worlds semantics, and we show how the belief state of an agent can be reconstructed after a speech act. 1 Introduction.

In this paper, we propose a dynamic theory of belief- sharing which dens with certain processes of forming and revising shared beliefs during cooperative ...

The framework is based on certain beliefs of the participants and on pragmatic rules concerning the communicative acts that can be performed during the dialogue ...

In 'Belief reconstruction in cooperative dialogues' [9] , Herzig et al. deal with the question of determining agents' beliefs through a sequence of speech acts.

Models of rationality typically rely on underlying logics that allow simulated agents to entertain beliefs about one another to any depth of nesting.