[PDF] Parameterized Supply Function Bidding: Equilibrium and Efficiency
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Apr 17, 2012 · We consider a model where a finite number of producers compete to meet an infinitely divisible but inelastic demand for a product.
Oct 1, 2011 · We consider a model where a finite number of producers compete to meet an infinitely divisible but inelastic demand for a product.
Oct 22, 2024 · We consider a model where a finite number of producers compete to meet an infinitely divisible but inelastic demand for a product.
Parameterized Supply Function Bidding: Equilibrium and Efficiency. The MIT Faculty has made this article openly available. Please share how this access ...
We are interested in evaluating the impact of price-anticipating behavior both on the allocative efficiency of the market and on the prices seen at equilibrium.
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The. SFE model is closer to the real bidding formats in electricity markets. However, most existing works using the SFE model do not study the impact of the ...
In this paper, a supply function model is used to simulate the bidding strategy of suppliers in a power pool. Firstly, a supply function model with forward ...
Johari and J. N. Tsitsiklis, “Parameterized supply function bidding: Equilibrium and efficiency,” Operations Research, vol. 59, no. 5, pp. 1079–1089, 2011 ...
We propose a scalar-parameterized function bidding mechanism for the prosumers, in which we establish the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium.
We study the efficiency loss caused by strategic bidding behavior from power generators in electricity markets. In the considered market, the demand of ...