profiles under approval voting for worst, best, and stochastic dominance comparison. The special cases of strict preferences follow as corollaries. Strategy- ...

Oct 22, 2024 · PDF | We characterize all preference profiles at which the approval (voting) rule is manipulable, under three extensions of preferences to ...

Dec 13, 2011 · We characterize all preference profiles at which the approval (voting) rule is manipulable, under three extensions of preferences to sets of ...

We characterize the (non-)manipulable preference profiles and give some analytical and numerical (simulation) results. Related early works: Kelly (1988, 1989, ...

Downloadable! We characterize all preference profiles at which the approval (voting) rule is manipulable, under three extensions of preferences to sets of ...

In this paper, we axiomatically investigate approval voting when the set of voters is fixed and each voter has a dichotomous preference over the ...

On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules. Citation for published version (APA):. Peters, H. J. M., Roy, S., & Storcken, A. J. A. ...

We characterize all preference profiles at which the approval (voting) rule is manipulable, under three extensions of preferences to sets of alternatives: ...

We characterize all preference profiles at which the approval (voting) rule is manipulable, under three extensions of preferences to sets of candidates: by ...

On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules. AUTHORS: Hans Peters, Ton Storcken, Souvik Roy. JOURNALNAME: Social Choice and Welfare.